The National Interest

Peter Suciu

B-1B Lancer,

In recent years, the Air Force has continued to upgrade and update the aging warbird – and the plan is for the B-1 fleet to remain in service well into the 2030s when the Northrop Grumman B-21 Raider enters service.

The United States Air Force has tested ways that the Cold War-era Boeing B-1B Lancer could be used to carry hypersonic weapons externally. External pylons were originally designed for use on the B-1s but were later scrapped to comply with the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). Recently the Air Force has taken the opinion that the return to the use of external hardpoints would not violate the New START agreement.

While the B-1 was originally designed for nuclear capabilities, the aircraft were switched exclusively to a conventional combat role in the mid-1990s under the Conventional Mission Upgrade Program. This was brought on by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War – and President George H.W. Bush ordered the $3 billion refit, which included the removal of nuclear arming and fuzing hardware – while provision under the New START treaty additional modifications were further made to prevent nuclear weapon pylons from being attached to the aircraft. The conversion process was completed by 2011, and Russian officials have been allowed to inspect the aircraft yearly to verify compliance.

The conventional upgrade program included a series of upgrades: Block C, which was completed in 1997 gave the aircraft the capability to drop cluster bombs; Block D, completed in June 2001 included the deployment of the JDAM defensive system, new navigation and communications systems; while the Block E, which was completed in September 2006, added capability to deploy joint stand-off weapons (JSOW) and joint air-to-surface stand-off missiles (JASSM). An additional Block F, which included the defensive system upgrade program (DSUP), was terminated.

In recent years, the Air Force has continued to upgrade and update the aging warbird – and the plan is for the B-1 fleet to remain in service well into the 2030s when the Northrop Grumman B-21 Raider enters service.

Flying High Work Horse

Since the conversion to a conventional bomber, the Air Force has employed the B-1B Lancer fleet in countless sorties. While six of the B-1s flew just two percent of the strike missions during Operation Allied Force in 1996, those aircraft dropped 20 percent of the Ordnance; and during Operation Enduring Freedom, B-1s flew two percent of sorties and dropped more than 40 percent of precision weapons.

The aging aircraft have put in a lot of miles, and B-1s have been nearly continuously deployed in combat operations over Afghanistan and Iraq since 2001.

Today the B-1B is not armed with nuclear weapons, but it is still capable of carrying the AGM-86B air launch cruise missile (ALCM) and the AGM-69 short-range attack missile. The B-1s feature three internal weapon bays, as well as six external hardpoints over the fuselage – and the aircraft have a maximum internal weapons payload of 75,000 pounds and a maximum external weapons payload of 59,000 pounds.

The Air Force maintains a fleet of just 62 B-1s, and today the Lancers remain part of the service's spearhead – and continue to effectively address the threats in an ever-changing world.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He regularly writes about military small arms, and is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com.

Peter Suciu

Russia Battleships,

The Soviet Union failed to build much of a navy before World War II, but Josef Stalin had dreams not all that different from Hitler's of building a fleet of powerful battleships.

A reoccurring theme among dictators, despots and totalitarian regimes is to build a massive fleet of powerful warships. China's People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is currently engaged in an effort to build aircraft carriers as part of its world-class navy, while the Islamic Republic of Iran has been rumored to harbor plans to develop its own aircraft carriers.

However, before the Second World War, it was the battleship that was the envy of the world. It was Germany's Kaiser Wilhelm II's building of the "High Seas Fleet" that pushed the UK closer to France and Russia, while Nazi Germany attempted to "rebuild" a "High Seas Fleet" that was to be made up of massive battleships. Imperial Japan also sought to build such large battle wagons, before refocusing on aircraft carriers.

The Soviet Union failed to build much of a navy before World War II, but Josef Stalin had dreams not all that different from Hitler's of building a fleet of powerful battleships.

Stalin's Battleship Dreams

In 1938, the final five-year plan to be started before the outbreak of the war, Stalin called for a fleet of 19 ships of the line. Among those was to be the Sovetsky Soyuz class that would have been the largest warships produced by the Soviet Union up to that time. The plan was for a Pacific Fleet that could defeat the Japanese if war came, while the Baltic and Northern Fleets were supposed to be capable of defeating the German, as well as the navies of Poland, Sweden, Finland, and the Baltic States. The Black Sea Fleet was to be able to defeat the Italian, Romanian, Bulgarian and Turkish Navies.

However, while a total of 15 of the massive warships were planned and four were laid down at the Baltic Shipyard in Leningrad before the program was scaled back to just three in 1940, while all were cancelled in 1941.

The ships, which soon earned the nickname "Stalin's Republics," at 65,000 tons would have been 13,000 tons larger than Germany's Bismarck, and more on the scale of the Imperial Japanese Navy's Yamato class and the U.S. Navy's planned but canceled Montana-class, yet it has been noted that the Soviet ships may have been less heavily armed with just nine 406mm (16-inch) main guns. That was compared to the nine 460mm (18.1-inch) guns of the Japanese warships and the dozen 16-inch guns on the proposed U.S. vessels.

Why It Never Occurred

The Soviets would likely have had to cut corners to build the warships, which would have cost 1.180 billion rubles, a not-so-small fortune even in the late 1930s. From the onset, steel was plagued by quality problems and short supplies. Only 1,800 metric tons were even delivered for the project in 1939 – ten times less than what was actually required. To address the issue, thinner plates were made harder, but then proved to be too brittle and failed to pass acceptance tests. The purges of the military further seriously hampered efforts to keep the project on schedule, while Soviet industry simply wasn't up to the task of building the massive warships.

After canceling one of the four vessels under construction, with the resources redirected to the Red Army, production on the remaining three slowly advanced until the German invasion in June 1941. Work was initially halted on all three battleships, but then throughout the summer work resumed at a near snail's pace on the lead warship Sovetsky Soyuz, until work on it and its two sister ships was canceled on September 10, 1941. The ships were stricken from the navy list.

The unfinished lead vessel was lightly damaged by German air attacks during the Siege of Leningrad, but it survived the war. While consideration was given to completing the ship, experience gained during the war highlighted the fact that the ship was largely obsolete and the era of the battleship all but over. Sovetsky Soyuz, Sovetskaya Rossiya and Sovetskaya Ukraina were all scrapped in the late 1940s.

As a side note, material for the fourth vessel Sovetskaya Belorussiya, which had been canceled after it was found that some 70,000 rivets in her hull plating were of inferior quality, was used to construct a floating battery that was used during the defense of Leningrad.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He regularly writes about military small arms, and is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com.

Peter Suciu

Gun Laws,

Such a move couldn't happen in the United States, right?

Our neighbor to the north doesn't have a "Second Amendment," so there is little that gun owners can do if Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau passes his sweeping gun reform legislation. Not only would it ban the ownership of so-called "assault-style" firearms such as AR-15s, but it could allow municipalities to even ban handguns – all handguns regardless of age.

In a press conference earlier this month, the Liberal Party PM said he would move forward with a buyback program in the coming months, but also said that the legislation would empower municipalities to restrict storage and transportation of handguns within their boundaries. Breaching of the law would carry a maximum penalty of two years in prison.

Such a move couldn't happen in the United States, right?

Actually, it almost did – and already some communities have sought to ban guns. While court cases such as District of Columbia v. Heller (554 U.S. 570) from 2008 and McDonald v. City of Chicago (561 U.S. 742) two years later essentially ensure that municipalities can't infringe on an individual's Second Amendment rights with an outright ban, many people today forget that the U.S. lawmakers actually considered a nationwide regulation of handguns back in the 1930s.

The NFA Almost Included Handguns

The National Firearms Act of 1934 (NFA), which was passed into law to address gangland violence including the St. Valentine's Day Massacre of 1929, as well as the attempted assassination of then-President-elect Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1933, didn't actually ban machine guns and short-barreled rifles/shotguns, but rather it highly regulated them.

The 1934 Act required those (and other) items to be registered and taxed. Buyers of those firearms had to undergo a thorough, almost methodical, background check and "transfer" those items via a $200 tax. That was roughly the price of a Thompson submachine gun at the time – and while it is not entirely clear on how Congress settled on that amount, it has been suggested that it essentially doubled the cost of buying the firearm. It is also worth noting that the $200 tax was likely considered quite prohibitive at the time, it has fortunately for buyers not increased in the nearly 90 years since its enactment.

According to Gregg Lee Carter's 2002 book Guns in American Society: An Encyclopedia of History, Politics, and the Law, "the legislation would use the tax power as a means to impose near-prohibitory controls on machine guns and handguns."

As that noted, handguns – pistols and revolvers – would have been regulated as strictly as machine guns, due largely to the fact that such firearms could be so readily concealed. It should be noted that Presidents Lincoln, Garfield, and McKinley were in fact all assassinated by handguns; whilst Giuseppe Zangara, FDR's would-be assassin, also carried a handgun.

Today, many opponents of the Second Amendment like to maintain that the National Rifle Association (NRA) wasn't always a political lobbyist group and that it really was only focused on promoting shooting sports. As Carter noted, this wasn't the case, as even in the 1930s the NRA maintained enough clout that it dropped its opposition of the proposal only when a compromise was made in which handguns were removed from the bill.

Had the NRA not stepped up, handguns might have been as difficult to own as machine guns – but it questionable, even doubtful, as to whether America would be any safer.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He regularly writes about military small arms, and is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com.

Peter Suciu

MiG-31,

The Mikoyan MiG-31 was developed during the Cold War era as a home-defense interceptor. Codenamed "Foxhound" by NATO, the long-range, two-seat supersonic aircraft has maintained a certain mystique in the west, in part because there remains much speculation over all of its capabilities. It took its maiden flight in September 1975 and was designed to work efficiently in all weather conditions.

In early February, the Russian Central Military District conducted an exercise against a notional intruder and while such exercises aren't that unexpected, this drew attention as it involved a Mig-31BM, a supersonic high-altitude interceptor-fighter. The pilots reportedly performed around 30 sorties in the drills, which were conducted near the Ural Mountains and involved practicing measures on their own to detect, track, forced to land, and notionally eliminate airspace intruders.

"The pilots visually detected an aircraft and locked it on," the Central Military District's press office told Tass. "The crews of MiG-31BM interceptor-fighters acted in pairs, forcing the intruder to climb to ultimate altitudes."

MiG-31 Foxhound: The History 

The Mikoyan MiG-31 was developed during the Cold War era as a home-defense interceptor. Codenamed "Foxhound" by NATO, the long-range, two-seat supersonic aircraft has maintained a certain mystique in the west, in part because there remains much speculation over all of its capabilities. It took its maiden flight in September 1975 and was designed to work efficiently in all weather conditions.

Derived from the MiG-25 Foxbat interceptor and equipped with state-of-the-art digital avionics, the aircraft was never exported by the Soviet Union, and of the more than 500 produced, most remained in service with the Russian Air Force, while some thirty are in service with the Kazakhstan Air Force.

While Syria had reportedly ordered eight of the MiG-31E aircraft in 2007 the order was suspended due to Israeli pressure along with a lack of Syrian funds. Turkish news media has reported that six of the aircraft may have been delivered for use by the Syrian Arab Air Force, but Russia has denied that it actually sold the aircraft to Syria.

During the late Cold War, a MiG-31 Foxhound may have been used to chase after the U.S. military's SR-71 Blackbird spy plane and reportedly locked on with its missiles, but as the American reconnaissance aircraft was never employed to actually overfly Soviet airspace, whether the incidence occurred has remained a matter of conjecture at best.

More recently it has been reported that the Russian military had upgraded the MiG-31 Foxhound and has explored the option of arming the home-defense interceptor with hypersonic missiles, which would make the airframe a very serious threat. Despite the fact that the aircraft dates back to the 1970s, Russia has an established trend of preserving original aircraft designs by integrating modern weapons and avionics and this has resulted in the MiG-31BM upgrade from a decade ago. The upgrades provided network-centric combat control, as well as phased array radar.

The upgraded MiG-31BM can also employ R-33 long-range air-to-air missiles and R-73 short-range air-launched weapons. It is powered by two D-30F6 engines, which provide a take-off thrust of 15,500 kgf each, and the fighter-interceptor has a maximum speed of 3,000 km/h and a ceiling of 20,600 meters. It is also outfitted with a mid-air refueling system.

It is unknown how many of the original MiG-31s have been upgraded to the 31BM standard but it has been reported that it is less than 100 of the original 500 aircraft produced during the Soviet era.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He regularly writes about military small arms, and is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com.

Ted Galen Carpenter

Security,

Iran has been preparing for years.

Here's What You Need to Remember: Beyond utilizing its direct military capabilities, Tehran might well call upon its network of Shia political and military allies in the Middle East to create havoc for the United States. Iran maintains very close ties with Hezbollah in Lebanon and several Shia militias in Iraq.

Kenneth Adelman, a former assistant to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and a prominent figure in the U.S. foreign policy community, famously predicted in 2002 that a war to oust Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein would be a “cakewalk.” President Donald Trump apparently learned nothing from Adelman’s hubris and rosy optimism. Although he aborted a planned airstrike on Iran at the last minute, Trump later warned Iranian leaders that the military option was still very much on the table. He added that if the United States used force against Iran, Washington would not put boots on the ground but would wage the conflict entirely with America’s vast air and naval power. There was no doubt in his mind about the outcome. He asserted that such a war “wouldn’t last very long,” and that it would mean the “obliteration” of Iran.

(Note: This first appeared several years ago and is being reposted due to reader interest.) 

But history is littered with examples of wars that political leaders and the general public erroneously believed would be quick and easy. When Abraham Lincoln opted to confront the secession of the Southern states with force, his initial troop request was merely for 90-day enlistments. People in Washington, DC, were so confident that the Union army would crush the upstart rebels at the impending battle of Manassas that hundreds drove out in carriages to view the likely battlefield. They treated it like a spectator event, in some cases complete with picnic baskets. Four years later, more than 500,000 American soldiers were dead.

Leaders and populations in the major European capitals in 1914 exuded optimism that the new war would be over in a matter of months—with their side winning a glorious victory, of course. Once again, the situation did not turn out as planned. The projected quick and relatively bloodless conflict became a prolonged, horrific slaughter consuming millions of young lives, toppling established political systems in Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia, and ushering in the plagues of fascism and communism. 

A common thread in the various blunders was the assumption that the initial phase of a conflict would be utterly decisive. That was Adelman’s error. Washington’s military encounter with Saddam’s forces was fairly close to being a cakewalk. The decrepit Iraqi army was no match for the U.S.-led invaders. When Saddam fell from power, President George W. Bush flew to a U.S. aircraft carrier that displayed a huge (later infamous) “Mission Accomplished” banner. 

However, the initial military victory proved to be just the beginning of a giant headache for the United States. Within months, an insurgency arose against the U.S. occupation force, and political instability bordering on civil war plagued Iraq, paving the way for the rise of ISIS. At last count, more than 4,400 American troops have perished pursuing the Iraq mission, and the United States has spent well over a trillion dollars. Not exactly a cakewalk.

That is what makes President Trump’s cavalier attitude about a war with Iran so worrisome. He implicitly assumes that the United States has control over the twin processes of retaliation and escalation. U.S. officials made that same faulty assumption in Iraq—and decades earlier in Vietnam. But even adversaries that are inferior in terms of conventional military capabilities may have numerous options to wage asymmetric warfare. And that strategy can become a war of attrition that inflicts serious damage on the militarily superior United States.

Iran may be especially effective if it adopts that course. Indeed, just in the narrow military sense, Iranian capabilities are far from trivial. Retired Admiral James Stavridis notes that Iran has “exceptionally strong asymmetric warfare capability” in several areas. “Cyber [attacks], swarm small-boat tactics, diesel submarines, special forces and surface-to-surface cruise missiles are all high-level assets,” Stavridis stated. “They are also very experienced at employing them in the demanding environment of the Middle East.”

Beyond utilizing its direct military capabilities, Tehran might well call upon its network of Shia political and military allies in the Middle East to create havoc for the United States. Iran maintains very close ties with Hezbollah in Lebanon and several Shia militias in Iraq. The residual U.S. force deployed in the latter country could be especially vulnerable to harassment and lethal attacks. And one should not ignore or discount the potential role of the angry, oppressed Shia majority in Bahrain. If their seething discontent at the Sunni-controlled regime that Washington backs explodes into outright conflict, the Trump administration could find it increasingly difficult to continue basing the U.S. Fifth Fleet in Bahrain.

Going to war against Iran would be no minor matter, and President Trump is irresponsible to act in such a flippant manner. Attacking Iran could trigger a prolonged, costly nightmare in both treasure and blood. Rep. Tulsi Gabbard (D-HI), a Democratic presidential candidate, likely is prophetic that a war against Iran would make the Iraq War look like a cakewalk. Tehran certainly has a multitude of ways to retaliate for U.S. aggression and to escalate the bilateral confrontation. U.S. leaders would be wise not to venture farther down that perilous path

Ted Galen Carpenter, a senior fellow in security studies at the Cato Institute and a contributing editor at the National Interest, is the author of twelve books and more than eight hundred articles on international affairs. His latest book is Gullible Superpower: U.S. Support for Bogus Foreign Democratic Movements (2019). This article first appeared in 2019.

Image: Reuters.

Peter Suciu

Armata Tank,

Good things come to those who wait, and in the case of military hardware, some of the best things take time to finally enter service – at least in significant numbers. This is most certainly the case with the Russian military's T-14  Armata tank, which has truly been a slow time coming.

Good things come to those who wait, and in the case of military hardware, some of the best things take time to finally enter service – at least in significant numbers. This is most certainly the case with the Russian military's T-14  Armata tank, which has truly been a slow time coming.

However, on Thursday Defense Minister Army General Sergei Shoigu said during a ministry conference call that a "pilot batch" of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and repair and evacuation equipment based on the Armata combat platform will be delivered to the Russian troops sometime next year.

In 2022, there are plans to deliver a pilot batch of T-14 tanks, T-15 infantry fighting vehicles and T-16 armored repair and evacuation hardware to the troops," Shoigu said, as reported by Tass.

In December, the Russian Ministry of Defense had announced that the serial production of Russia's "prospective military hardware," including the latest T-14 'Armata' main battle tank (MBT) as well as the T-15 infantry fighting vehicle, would begin before the completion of all trials. The goal was to speed up the delivery to the Russian armed forces.

Russia's Armata heavy tracked universal platform was developed to carry various hardware including the T-14 tanks, T-15 infantry fight vehicles and T-16 overhaul and evacuation armored vehicles. The T-14 had already undergone preliminary trials in 2019.

The new MBT, which differs fundamentally from its predecessors. The T-14, which was developed by Uralvagonzavod, was first demonstrated at the May 9, 2015, Victory Day parade in Moscow. It is a revolutionary design that features fully digitized equipment, along with an unmanned turret and an isolated armored capsule for the crew, which was designed to reduce the risk of personnel loss in combat.

Armata Tank: Amazing Capabilities, High Costs

Russia had originally announced plans to acquire upwards of 2,300 T-14s by 2025, but given the high cost of each tank, Moscow has scaled back considerably. Likewise, the arrival to troops has also been slow going and has become akin to "Waiting for Godot." One issue has been that the T-14 Armata is so revolutionary that it has its share of "teething problems," many of which are based on the design.

The crew compartment doesn't rotate with the turret and requires greater emphasis on optical equipment and electronics, which some analysts have warned could fail in battle – a potentially catastrophic situation if there ever was one. As a result of the costs and problems, Russia has opted to upgrade much of its existing tank fleet.

However, it has continued to press forward with the T-14 Armata and in the summer of 2020, it was announced that Russian designers were considering ways that the tank could be employed without a crew at all.

"The appearance of heavy unmanned combat vehicles is a matter of the near future," the T-14's manufacturer UralVagonZavod announced during the Army-2020 forum.

UralVagonZavod's Deputy General Director Vyacheslav Khalitov has previously stated that the company had carried out theoretical and experimental work to create a robotic tank on the Armata-heavy military tracked vehicle platform. It is also the first tank in the world to incorporate so-called “network-centric warfare” technologies. In normal speak this means that the T-14 can be conduct reconnaissance missions, operate as a target designation and fire adjustment vehicle for self-propelled guns, surface-to-air missile systems, and even T-90 tanks.

To offset the high costs of the tank, Russia has been seeking to find foreign customers for the T-14, and it was unveiled abroad at the IDEX 2021 arms show in Abu Dhabi last month.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He regularly writes about military small arms, and is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com.

Michael Peck

Security, Asia

The 1971 India-Pakistan War was the third major conflict between the two nations in twenty-five years.

Here's What You Need to Remember: In the end, India had demonstrated its military superiority. Pakistan lost half its territory and population. Perhaps more important, Pakistani illusions that an Islamic army could rout the “weak” Hindus had been disproved.

This is what happens when you chop a nation in half.

Before December 3, 1971, Pakistan was a country suffering from a split personality disorder. When British India became independent in 1947, the country was divided into Hindu India and Muslim Pakistan. The problem was that East Pakistan and West Pakistan were almost a thousand miles apart, and wedged in between them was archenemy India. Imagine if the United States only consisted of the East Coast and West Coast, and Russia controlled all of North America in between.

Thirteen days later, Pakistan had been amputated. Indian troops had conquered East Pakistan, which became the new nation of Bangladesh. More than ninety thousand Pakistani soldiers were taken prisoner, half the Pakistani Navy had been sunk and the Indian Air Force came out on top. It was total humiliation, and not just for Pakistan. The United States and Britain sent aircraft carriers in a futile attempt to intimidate India, and ended up facing off against Soviet warships. Pakistan’s defeat also spurred its rulers to begin the development of nuclear weapons.

The 1971 India-Pakistan War, the third major conflict between the two nations in twenty-five years, was sparked by unrest in East Pakistan. The Bengalis of East Pakistan, who constituted 54 percent of Pakistan’s population at the time, chafed under the rule of West Pakistan. The two Pakistans belonged to different ethnic groups and spoke different languages.

Bengali demands for autonomy were rebuffed. By mid-1971, an East Pakistan guerrilla movement had emerged, supported by India. Pakistan’s military-controlled government cracked down hard, killing up to three million Bengalis in what has been described as a genocide. By November, both India and Pakistan were preparing for war.

On December 3, Pakistan launched a preemptive air strike against Indian airfields, ironically trying to emulate how the Israeli Air Force had destroyed Egyptian airpower in 1967. The difference was that the Israelis committed two hundred aircraft and wiped out nearly five hundred Egyptian aircraft in a few hours; Pakistan committed fifty aircraft and inflicted little damage. The air war featured the full panoply of Cold War jets, pitting Pakistani F-104 Starfighters, F-86 Sabres, MiG-19s and B-57 Canberras against Indian MiG-21s, Sukhoi-7s, Hawker Hunters and Folland Gnats, as well as Hawker Sea Hawks flying from the Indian carrier Vikrant.

Both sides claimed victory in the air war. Chuck Yeager, who was in Pakistan advising their air force, claimed the Pakistanis “whipped their asses.” The Indians claim Yeager was crazy. However, it does appear that India had the upper hand in the air, controlling the skies over East Pakistan and losing about forty-five aircraft to Pakistan’s seventy-five. The maneuverable little Indian Gnat, a British-made lightweight fighter (its predecessor was called the Midge), proved so successful against Pakistani F-86s that the Indians dubbed it the “Sabre Slayer.”

At sea, there is no question that India won. The Indian Navy dispatched missile boats, armed with Soviet-made Styx missiles, to strike the western port of Karachi, sinking or badly damaging two Pakistani destroyers and three merchant ships, as well as fuel tanks. Indian ships blockaded East Pakistan from reinforcements and supplies. Notable was India’s use of the carrier Vikrant to conduct air strikes on coastal targets, as well as conducting an amphibious landing on Pakistani territory.

Pakistan retaliated by dispatching the submarine Ghazi to mine Indian ports. While stalked by an Indian destroyer, the Ghazi mysteriously blew up. However, the submarine Hangor did sink the Indian frigate Khukri.

As for the ground war, the best that can be said is that if Napoleon himself had faced Pakistan’s strategic dilemma, he would have sulked off to St. Helena. Isolated by land and blockaded by sea, no army could have defended East Pakistan against even a moderately competent foe, let alone the nine Indian divisions that quickly captured the East Pakistan capital of Dhaka. East Pakistani forces surrendered on December 16.

To add insult to the defeat of Pakistan and its proudly Muslim rulers, the Indian campaign was planned by Maj. Gen. J. F. R. Jacob—an Indian Jew descended from a family that fled Baghdad in the eighteenth century.

One issue that hampered Pakistan’s war effort would soon become familiar in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan and other ethnically divided nations. In 1971, Bengalis comprised a significant part of the Pakistani military, especially in technical jobs.

Meanwhile, the superpowers were flexing their muscles. Despite its cruelty toward the Bengalis, and the opposition of U.S. diplomats, President Richard Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger backed Pakistan against pro-Soviet India (see the Nixon-Kissinger transcripts here). Task Force 74, centered on the aircraft carrier Enterprise, steamed into the Bay of Bengal, as did the British carrier Eagle. Why India would have been intimidated into a cease-fire, even as its tanks were rolling into Dhaka, is a mystery. America’s attempt to deter India from defeating Pakistan became a case study of the limitations of relying on the threat of force to compel other nations to change their behavior.

In fact, what the U.S. Navy accomplished was to chill U.S.-Indian relations for years. Even more disturbing were the Soviet cruisers, destroyers and submarines shadowing Task Force 74. A war between two Southwest Asian nations could have triggered a superpower showdown at sea, and perhaps World War III.

In the end, India had demonstrated its military superiority. Pakistan lost half its territory and population. Perhaps more important, Pakistani illusions that an Islamic army could rout the “weak” Hindus had been disproved. Following the 1947 and 1965 wars, the 1971 war was the third major conflict between India and Pakistan. It was also the last. Despite some hostilities in Kargil and other spots on the border, India and Pakistan have not fought a major war in forty-five years.

Unfortunately, Pakistan’s humiliation in 1971 spurred it into developing an atomic bomb. With India also armed with atomic weapons, South Asia now lives under the shadow of nuclear war. The next major India-Pakistan clash could be the last.

Michael Peck is a frequent contributor to the National Interest and is a regular writer for many outlets like WarIsBoring. He can be found on Twitter and Facebook. This article first appeared several years ago.

Image: Reuters.

Akhilesh Pillalamarri

Politics, Asia

The Qing could have done better at focusing on threats from the sea—first the West, and then Japan.

Here’s What You Need to Remember: Chinese civilization is one of the world’s oldest continuous civilizations. Indeed, unlike Western, Islamic, and Indian civilizations, China has managed to remain politically unified for much of its history.

Contrary to the common perception of China being historically isolated and weak, many Chinese dynasties were very powerful and have had a profound impact on global history. Yes, it is true that during the Ming Dynasty, China ships conducted multiple voyages of exploration (1405-1433) before abruptly stopping. But this hardly dented the enormous economic and political influence China wielded for most of its history in East, Southeast, and Central Asia. Although the people of these regions pursued their own interests as best as they could, China was always the major power to be dealt with.

Nonetheless, not all Chinese dynasties were created, and these three stood above the rest.

The Han Dynasty

The Han Dynasty ruled China for a solid four centuries, from 206 B.C.E. to 220 C.E. Although the preceding Qin Dynasty unified China, it was the Han Dynasty that kept it together and developed the institutions that characterized most of Chinese history since.

The Han Dynasty was able to maintain its bureaucracy and military through a more efficient and thorough system of taxation than many contemporary empires. Additionally, to gain increased revenue, the Han created monopolies on iron and salt. The salt monopoly has been a traditional source of revenue for Chinese states since, one that apparently lasted until 2014.

The Han’s large coffers allowed it to expand China’s boundaries outwards from its traditional heartland in the Yellow River valley toward what is today southern China. Southern China would prove to be very important to China in the future since it can support a large population through the rice crop. Thanks in part to southern China’s wealth, China’s sociopolitical development was usually greater than its neighbors, allowing China to easily incorporate or defeat them.

One exception to this, however, was China’s perennial problem— namely, nomads to its north. During the Han, these were the Xiongnu. Constant harassment and raids by these nomads necessitated the first construction of the Great Wall during the Qin Dynasty. During the Han, China attempted to outflank its enemies, which led to an expedition westward into today’s Xinjiang and Central Asia.

This process is generally thought to have informed China for the first time of other civilizations, a shocking development for a people who until then believed themselves to be the only state society. Indeed, during this time China became aware of the civilizations of India, the Bactrians, the Sogdians, the Persians, and many more, This event is thought to have stimulated the development of trade routes that would later be called the Silk Road.

To control trade routes and outflank their enemies, Chinese forces occupied much of Xinjiang for many decades, allowing them to project their influence deep to the west. Buddhism also entered China through this route at this time.

Tang

After the Han Dynasty collapsed due to civil war, China entered a period of disunity until being reunited by the Sui Dynasty, which was subsequently succeeded by the Tang Dynasty, which ruled China from 618-907 C.E. The Tang Dynasty was one of China’s most cosmopolitan and urbane dynasties, opening China up to a period of foreign influences. The Tang Dynasty was also likely China’s largest and most powerful dynasty in history and is considered the golden age of imperial China.

The population base of the Tang Dynasty was estimated to have been around 80 million people, enabling it to completely dominate its neighbors. During this time, China continued to expand northeast and south, incorporating much of Manchuria and Vietnam. It was also during this period that many other state societies developed under Chinese influence, including Korea, Japan, and Tibet. This period thus saw the establishment of the tributary state system to a greater extent than under the Han. Although they did not rule Tibet, the Tang were the first Chinese dynasty to exert influence over the previously foreboding plateau to the southeast.

The Tang military was successful because it had learned to fight like the steppe nomads in many ways. The Tang were crazy about horses, which had previously been relatively rare in China, and imported and breed many different breeds, negating the main advantage of the nomads to their north. The Tang also promoted and used talented Central Asian generals (a decision which would later come back to haunt them).

The Tang’s grip on Xinjiang was firm during this time (the region had slipped from Chinese rule after the Han) and garrisons were established in the “Western Region,” an area that was expanding rapidly to dominate all of Central Asia up to the border of the Persian Empire. Until the Arabs defeated the Chinese in the Battle of Talas (751), it looked as though Central Asia’s future was with China. Numerous states near this region such as Kabul and Kashmir became direct tributaries to China. The Chinese also intervened in the affairs of their steppe neighbors and even in the northern heartland of India.

The Tang Dynasty never recovered from the An Lushan Rebellion, when An Lushan, a Tang general of Central Asian origin, revolted and named himself emperor. Up to half of the empire’s population is said to have perished in the resulting fighting, famines, and diseases in what has been called one of history’s largest man-made disasters.

The Tang Dynasty managed to limp on due to support from Tibetan and Turkish soldiers but eventually collapsed.

Qing

The dynasties that followed the Tang’s collapse were all very weak. It wasn’t until the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644) hundreds of years later that another dynasty  rule over the Chinese heartland without major threats or issues. However, the Ming is considered to be one of the worst Chinese dynasties, as China suffered a period of intellectual, political, and economic sterility under its rule.

The Ming were followed by the Qing, China’s last and one of its greatest dynasties, ruling from 1644 to 1911. This may seem puzzling since the Qing are often blamed for allowing the Chinese system to collapse and for the country to be humiliated by the West. These things did happen during Qing but it doesn’t diminish from their achievements. Indeed, China today maintains borders far beyond its traditional heartland, losing comparatively little territory compared to other empires and their modern successor states (like Turkey and Iran) and this feat can be attributed to the policies and conquests of the Qing.

The Qing Dynasty was actually not Chinese in origin. They were Manchus who after establishing a state in Manchuria, were let into China through the Great Wall by a dissident Ming general. They then proceeded to conquer or co-opt the rest of the country. Unlike the Mongols, the Qing established a lasting Chinese-style state. The introduction of new crops from the Americas also helped China’s population grow to around 400 million.

The Qing were the first Chinese state to effectively control regions like Tibet, Xinjiang, Manchuria, and Mongolia, peripheral regions that were inhabited by people that had always harassed China. They were able to do this because of their dual nature as both a Chinese imperial bureaucratic state able to draw on agrarian revenue, and as the leaders of a large northern tribal confederacy that was able to assimilate Mongol tribes into their system. Gunpowder also aided the Qing’s cause, allowing them to negate the power of the steppe tribes.

The Qing’s masterful diplomacy was also part of its success. For example, the Qing ably played Russia and Great Britain off one another during the Great Game. Neither of those two powers wanted the other to gain more territory in Central Asia and were thus happy to led China keep most of its extensive empire as a buffer. Chinese influence also increased in Southeast Asia and Himalayan Asia to a greater degree than before during the Qing Empire, as many states like Myanmar, Nepal, Chitral Valley (in Pakistan today), and Siam became part of the Chinese system.

The Qing could have done better at focusing on threats from the sea—first the West, and then Japan. On the whole, however, the Qing managed to lay the basis of China’s continued control into the modern era of the resources of much of inner Asia, the Chinese equivalent of America’s wild west.

Image: Reuters

This article was first published in 2015.

Peter Suciu

Submarine,

"They will not make more noise than a school of shrimp," Armed Forces Minister Florence Parly was quoted as saying by DefenseNews.

While a submerged submarine may be all but impossible to see from the surface, there are still numerous ways to track and monitor the vessels, and "noise" is one of those.

A moving submarine produces noise that makes it easy in many instances to track its location, speed and in many cases even identify the type of craft. The noise of a submarine, which can be distinguished from the ocean's natural noises, can radiate from hull vibration, power plant equipment, propellers, and flow noise.

France's New Stealth Submarine Plan

Efforts have been made to reduce the noise that a submarine gives off, and France has announced it has launched a new program for its Navy's third-generation nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines.

A total of four boats of the sous-marin nucléaire lanceur d'engin (SNLE) program will be produced, and the first is expected to be delivered beginning in 2035, with the three following to arrive on a schedule of one every five years. The submarines, which haven't received a name yet, will be built by the Naval Group and are also expected to remain in service until the 2090s.

The contracting authorities were reported to be the DGA procurement agency and the Alternative Energies and Atomic Energy Commission.

According to reports, the submarines will be slightly longer and heavier than the current Le Triomphant-class, which entered service in 1995. Notably, the new class of boats will also be far more silent.

"They will not make more noise than a school of shrimp," Armed Forces Minister Florence Parly was quoted as saying by DefenseNews.

SNLE, Explained

A SNLE-3G (Third Generation) program officer for the Marine Nationale (French Navy) also told Naval News, "The submarine will be so quiet that its radiated noise may be less than the ambient noise in the ocean."

The new class of French submarines is thought to be utilizing some of the technology developed for the Suffren-class attack submarine, and that could include the X-form rudders and pumpjet propulsor.

In addition, to be quiet the SNLE submarines will be equipped with what H I Sutton of Naval News reported was the Thales' ALICIA (Analyse, Localisation, Identification, Classification Intégrées et Alertes), a holistic sensor suite, which could combine a wide range of sensors and a SYBOBS 3.0 data processing system. This could be capable of Ultra-Low Frequency (ULF) detection, which could allow the submarines to track and identify even the quietest adversaries.

Artificial intelligence (AI) could also be employed to help the crew identify contacts, reducing the pressure on the crew. Whether this system could tell a school of shrimp from another SNLE-3G boat isn't clear however.

So far a lot of effort has already gone into this new class of submarines' development. According to Armed Forces Minister Parly, who announced the launch of the program at DGA's hydrodynamic technologies center at Val-de-Reuil, work on the SNLE has been underway for more than a decade.

"Fifteen million hours have already been spent on development studies, and a further twenty million will be necessary for each submarine," she noted.

Making a submarine that is truly as quiet as the ocean doesn't come quickly.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He regularly writes about military small arms, and is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com.

Kyle Mizokami

AR-15,

The new era of precision shooting is here.

Here's What You Need to Remember: That will bother some shooters. “Part of me sees all of this and is mildly irritated at all the time spent learning how to properly range a rifle and make the right calculations,” War is Boring contributor and long-range shooter Bryan William Jones noted in 2012, after shooting a TrackingPoint rifle.

Durng the 2014 Consumer Electronics Show, firearms-manufacturer TrackingPoint announced an AR-15 version of its computer-controlled precision rifles. The company claims that the new weapon can hit moving targets “out to five football fields away.” And anyone can use it.

Described by the company as a “precision-guided firearm,” the 500-Series rifle could revolutionize how armies all over the world prepare for war. The technology promises a world where expert riflemen can be trained with very little effort—blurring the distinction between infantry and sharpshooters.

Tank technology

TrackingPoint rifles include what are known as a ballistic computers. Used for decades on tanks, a ballistic computer takes into account a number of factors—wind speed, barrel and ambient temperature, range to target and ballistic performance of the cannon round—and computes what it would take to hit a target.

The computer then compensates for those factors and makes corrections when the shot is fired. It makes tank guns extraordinarily accurate and is the reason why an M-1 Abrams has a 90-percent hit rate on a moving target 2,000 yards away.

The size and complexity of the ballistic computer, as well as the sensors it needs—weather sensors, thermometers and laser rangefinders—are why these computers have, until now, stayed on tanks. However, miniaturization has finally made both processors and sensors small enough to mount on individual rifles.

The TrackingPoint ballistic computer runs off Linux and is about the size of a pint glass. It has the same set of built-in sensors as a tank. The shooter acquires the target in the built-in heads-up display and places a red ‘X’ over it. This locks the rifle on the target. The shooter pulls the trigger, but the rifle doesn’t fire—yet.

The computer takes into account known bullet performance, sensor data and even barrel wear. It crunches this data, determines when the rifle is on target and then fires.

Breaking down the rifle

TrackingPoint’s Series-500 rifle looks very similar to a standard, direct impingement AR-15. Many of the parts—including the grip, muzzle brake and upper receiver—appear no different from those on any other AR-15 or M-4 carbine.

The barrel seems to be a standard, government-profile 18 inches long—a little longer than the average 16-inch AR-15 barrel. The two inches of extra barrel length probably impart an extra 50- to 100-feet-per-second velocity to a 5.56-millimeter bullet, which would be useful if you’re regularly shooting out to 500 yards. The rifle’s hand guard appears to be unattached to the barrel … to improve accuracy.

The ballistic computer’s batteries are in the stock, which looks broader than most AR stocks. Curiously, the Series-500 rifle retains a triangular front sight, which is only useful if a rifle has a backup rear sight—which this rifle does not. This could be a cosmetic detail to remind people of the rifle’s AR-15/M-16 lineage. In other words, it’s just for show.

An important detail that TrackingPoint has not mentioned is how much the weapon weighs. AR-15 enthusiasts usually prefer rifles weighing just six or seven pounds. This new weapon, without the computer and batteries, probably weighs in at seven pounds. How much the ballistic computer and batteries add to that is unclear.

Of course, if you’re able to reliably pick off moving targets at 500 yards, mobility is less important—and some extra weight is probably not a big deal.

What does it all mean?

The effective range of the 500-Series is 500 yards. Among AR-15 rifles, that’s decent, but not great. All U.S. Marine Corps recruits must shoot to 500 yards using the M-16A4 rifle’s built-in sights. With a lot of practice, a skilled AR-15 owner can push out to 1,000 yards.

But the Smart AR is different. For one, the system removes the need for actual marksmanship skill and makes all-but-impossible shots—such as a man-sized target moving at 10 miles an hour at 500 yards—routine.

That will bother some shooters. “Part of me sees all of this and is mildly irritated at all the time spent learning how to properly range a rifle and make the right calculations,” War is Boring contributor and long-range shooter Bryan William Jones noted in 2012, after shooting a TrackingPoint rifle.

Ballistic computers will eventually be standard issue in Western armies. The ability to easily hit a target at 500 yards, even while standing or lying beneath a car, is a rifleman’s dream come true—especially if he didn’t have to train for years in order to do it.

This first appeared in WarIsBoring here. 

Image: Creative Commons. 

Bennett Ramberg

North Korea, Asia

Normal diplomatic ties buttressed by deterrence have provided a path to nuclear peace in other bilateral relationships, including between China and the United States.

North Korea’s recent public displays of new intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles have raised fresh concerns about the risks the regime in Pyongyang poses to the US mainland. As President Joe Biden’s administration reviews US policy towards the DPRK over the past four years and draws what lessons it can from Donald Trump’s nuclear summitry with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, it should consider a new arms-control approach.

The failure of Trump’s efforts should surprise no one. After all, prior US administrations’ initiatives to stop North Korea’s nuclear-arms program—including Bill Clinton’s ‘Agreed Framework’, the six-party talks during George W. Bush’s administration, and Barack Obama’s ‘Leap Day’ agreement—came to naught. Quite the contrary: North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2003, and has failed to abide by a 1992 accord with South Korea pledging to keep the Korean Peninsula free of nuclear weapons.

All this diplomatic activity leading nowhere raises a fundamental question: Does nuclear-arms control have a future on the peninsula?

It does, but not as currently practiced. It should be clear by now that Kim will not abolish his nuclear arsenal, or permit a verifiable nuclear freeze, as some have called for. The reason is simple: as with all nuclear-armed countries today, nuclear weapons remain the regime’s ultimate security blanket. The bomb also provides Kim with leverage over South Korea. The challenge, then, is to ensure that North Korea never uses its nuclear arsenal.

Realising this aim will require a combination of classic deterrence and new diplomatic thinking—specifically, a normalisation of US–North Korea ties. America currently provides deterrence on the peninsula through its offshore air- and sea-based nuclear umbrella over South Korea, while nearly 30,000 US troops in the country supplement more than three million active and reserve South Korean troops.

But relying on deterrence alone against North Korea cannot assuredly prevent or manage missteps, because the country’s isolation from the rest of the world breeds unique perils. Seclusion promotes pathological insecurities that could fuel misunderstanding and miscalculation. To complicate matters further, Kim is prone to grandiosity, military posturing and bullying.

Normal diplomatic ties buttressed by deterrence have provided a path to nuclear peace in other bilateral relationships, including between China and the United States. As menacing as North Korea is today, Cold War-era China under Mao Zedong’s leadership posed a far greater threat to American interests. Mao intervened in the Korean War against the US, fomented the Taiwan Strait crises later in the 1950s, and encouraged wars of national liberation against Western powers. When President John F. Kennedy’s administration entered office in 1961, it regarded China as a rising nuclear bête noire and considered military action against it.

But America did not bomb away, and Richard Nixon’s subsequent opening to China and the normalisation of relations during Jimmy Carter’s presidency neutralised US concerns. Despite the absence of a bilateral nuclear-arms limitation treaty, China’s arsenal remains largely a low-level issue amid current Sino-American tensions.

Similarly, US diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union dating back to the 1930s proved their worth in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. As the US ramped up its military readiness to compel the Soviet Union to withdraw its nuclear missiles, the interaction between Washington-based Soviet diplomats and US officials proved pivotal in ending the standoff. Likewise, US diplomatic influence over Pakistan, and its ties with India, helped slow the momentum towards nuclear war during the 1999 Kargil conflict and in the aftermath of the 2001 Jaish-e-Mohammad terrorist attack on the Indian parliament.

To be sure, the centrality of North Korea’s nuclear enterprise to the survival of Kim’s regime would complicate any effort to normalise diplomatic relations. Then there are questions about how to build a diplomatic relationship. Can or should the process begin with the opening of embassies, in the hope that this will engender confidence and enable the two countries to address substantive issues? Or can negotiators get down to details immediately?

Either way, two priorities stand out. North Korea needs relief from international economic sanctions, and the US needs to eliminate North Korea’s capability to strike it with intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Sanctions, domestic mismanagement, natural disasters and Covid-19 have left North Korea’s economy—by Kim’s own admission—in desperate need of repair. For America, which currently lacks effective ballistic-missile defences, the prospect of being in North Korea’s nuclear crosshairs is unacceptable. Could this point to a possible trade-off, namely the lifting of sanctions in exchange for the elimination of missiles?

Such a deal would leave North Korea’s theatre nuclear force untouched and help mend the country’s economy while reducing the risk of a pre-emptive American strike. It would also immunise the US against a possible North Korean ICBM attack, leaving it better placed to meet South Korean and Japanese security needs. And with diplomatic representation in each other’s countries, both sides would have reliable channels to address disputes and manage relations generally.

To determine whether Kim’s regime would be open to serious negotiation, the Biden administration could initially endorse so-called Track II diplomacy—former US government and non-government interlocutors meeting informally with North Korean officials in third-party countries. If the outreach sparked interest in Pyongyang, the door to formal talks would open. America’s default option is to return to tried-and-failed efforts to persuade North Korea to disarm. The challenge will be to convince leaders on both sides that diplomatic normalisation leading to an ICBM–sanctions trade-off is the best path forward.

Bennett Ramberg was a policy analyst in the US State Department’s Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs under President George H.W. Bush and is the author of Destruction of nuclear energy facilities in war and Nuclear power plants as weapons for the enemy. This article is presented in partnership with Project Syndicate © 2021.

This article first appeared at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

Image: Reuters.

Shaun Ee

National Security, Eurasia

The Quad has been embracing an ever-wider range of priorities and needs a concrete anchor to tie it down. For that, it could turn to another metaphor—not NATO, but Geico, the insurance company.

When the top diplomats of the “Quad” security dialogue met virtually recently, it seems they had plenty to discuss. In individually released statements, Australia, India, Japan, and the United States affirmed their shared commitment to cooperating on a slew of issues—so many, in fact, that it isn’t clear how they plan to get everything done.

Maritime security—the Quad’s original purpose—is a clear priority for the four countries, promoted under the banner of a “free and open Indo-Pacific.” Yet that mantra risks dilution as the Quad adds issues like the coronavirus and climate change to its agenda. Compare it to the clarity of another transoceanic security grouping’s motto: NATO’s “collective defense.”

To tackle non-military challenges, the Quad should consider a similar rallying cry. But rather than mirroring the Atlantic, why not try something better suited for the Pacific: collective risk management?

In Search of a Metaphor 

This Quad ministerial, the third since its 2017 resurrection, shows that President Joe Biden plans to keep it as a “foundation” of U.S. policy in Asia and that his three Asian counterparts are eager to play ball. That may annoy some critics, who, aware that the Quad owes its revival to growing concern over China, have likened it to an “Indo-Pacific NATO.”

But Quad members have downplayed this comparison, and with good reason: NATO’s core ethos of “collective defense,” wherein an attack on one is considered an attack on all, is a poor fit for Asia. Regional players may share common concerns, but the prospect of NATO-style collaboration brings fears like backlash from China, entrapment in unwanted conflicts, and Cold War-style picking of sides. 

The Quad’s core principle is better characterized as a commitment to a “free and open Indo-Pacific,” a phrase coined by Japan in 2016 and since adopted by others. Yet this principle, encompassing freedom of navigation, trade, and more, has been criticized for vagueness. The administrations of Japan’s former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and former President Donald Trump, for example, could not agree on whether it was aimed at China.

With the Quad embracing an ever-wider range of priorities, it needs a concrete anchor to tie it down. For that, it could turn to another metaphor—not NATO, but Geico, the insurance company. Rather than “collective defense,” intra-Asian security cooperation could be built around collective risk management, aiming to mitigate transnational risks or spread them across like-minded partners. 

This change of metaphor would be more than mere pedantry. Collective defense presumes a common enemy that allies must rally their military resources against. Conversely, collective risk management assumes shared dependencies in economic, technological, and other realms that can’t always be fought off with tanks and guns.

This might permit closer ties with “Quad Plus” countries like South Korea and Vietnam, who are wary of overtly opposing China, but keen to tackle shared challenges. With friends, the Quad could spin off an institution—call it the Indo-Pacific Risk Management Council—to coordinate efforts on all manner of non-military security issues. The price of admission? Support for an open, rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific region. 

True, the council’s non-military nature means the Quad would have to continue deepening military cooperation on its own. Yet this framework could provide both incentive and cover for greater regional collaboration, and bolster Asia against other threats.

Coercion, Compromise, Contagion 

The council would certainly have its hands full: Asia faces several distinct risks, for which the pandemic-stricken world provides some convenient examples. It is most obviously mid-contagion—rife not just with the coronavirus, but other cascading, compounding outbreaks, like ransomware attacks on hospitals or the financial panic of last March.

Contagions, though, are not the only risk. Late last year, China barred billions of dollars of Australian exports, a ramp-up of earlier trade restrictions that PM Scott Morrison termed “coercion.” And countries like Japan and Singapore have limited Huawei’s role in their 5G infrastructure, concerned that it could be used to compromise their supply chains.

Some of these risks stem from China. Some do not. But collective risk management would do well to focus on the risks over the actors, for reasons both diplomatic and practical. After all, the most successful coronavirus responses, like Vietnam’s or Taiwan’s, have come from countries that asked “how will China shape this risk?” instead of “will this help China win?”

Risk management also suggests a fuller, longer-term picture of the challenges that Asia faces. It encourages policymakers to angle for acceptable levels of risk, rather than throw resources at an unquenchable survival anxiety. It implies trade diversification, rather than tariffs; supply chain risk management, rather than tearing out every Chinese-manufactured part.

Put another way: we eliminate threats, but we manage risks. Barring a general and catastrophic nuclear war, China will not go away anytime soon. It is up to the United States, its allies, and partners to decide how they want to cope with that.

More Than an Empty Frame 

Even if NATO’s core framework serves the Quad poorly, it still has some lessons to share. Like Europe, national capabilities and interests vary widely across Asia, which would hamper any framework’s implementation.

To solve that, the council could borrow from NATO’s Centers of Excellence, or COEs.

NATO’s COEs are the potluck lunch of the alliance, letting member states show off their signature dish while splitting the cost. Member states selectively fund chosen COEs, training personnel and developing doctrines in their distinctive specialty. The Cooperative Cyber Defense COE is in Estonia, for example, while the Cold Weather Operations COE is in—surprise—Norway.

In Asia, COEs could help countries “burden share,” letting them flexibly decide their niche and level of contribution. A Trade Risk Mitigation COE housed in Australia could identify patterns of Chinese economic coercion and hold private sector summits, for example, while a Cyber Defense COE in Singapore could build capacity through the region. This would suit the Asia-Pacific region better than a one-size-fits-all approach. 

Member states could also adopt other big-ticket items, such as an infrastructure development fund to compete with China, a “collective insurance” fund to help industries facing boycotts, or a consortium to offer secure alternatives in emerging technologies like 5G.

And at the agency-to-agency level, they could share intelligence on early-warning crisis indicators (e.g. upticks in respiratory symptoms), war-game crisis responses, or map out supply chain bottlenecks. These regular contacts could pave the way for smoother teamwork when the next crisis hits—be that a cyber espionage campaign, a trade war, or a pandemic.

An Appetite for Risk (Management) 

Quad members have already shown interest in cooperation on some of these fronts, such as in Australia, India, and Japan’s joint call to improve supply chain resilience. But cooperation is not guaranteed, and mutual distrust could make for some awkward conversations.

Would South Korea support a boycott bailout fund covering Japanese firms against South Korean citizens’ actions? Would Japan help South Korea manage supply chain risk, after having restricted key exports in 2019? Council members will have to trust that disagreement in some places does not preclude cooperation elsewhere, and hope that the overall benefits of participation can persuade countries to go along with things they would not otherwise.

Across the Pacific, DC-based policymakers might instead quip that this framework has no deterrent power against China. This is fair: against armed conflict in the maritime domain, risk management will not do. But this is also why the Risk Management Council would complement the Quad, not substitute for it. Putting these issues on a separate track would allow the Quad greater clarity of purpose.

Moreover, risk management is not purely ornamental. It insulates allied militaries from interference, ensuring they can operate unhindered by pressure elsewhere. It was Chinese economic coercion, after all, that torpedoed South Korea’s missile defense ambitions, and it is Huawei’s 5G deployments that threaten operational security.

An Indo-Pacific Risk Management Council would guard against that and would be valuable for its own sake. As the region’s GDP grows, so will its interdependencies, but by working jointly, leaders can ward off catastrophic failure, keeping Asia resilient and stable.

The success of so many Asia-Pacific governments in the face of the coronavirus demonstrates what they each can do individually. Let’s see what they can pull off together.

Shaun Ee, a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Image: Reuters

Kyle Mizokami

Firearms, World

Smith & Wesson, Glock, and Heckler and Koch all make the cut.

Key point: These U.S. arms makers are some of the best in the world. Here is how they compete and compare to each other.

America’s prolific firearms industry means that choosing the top five manufacturers is no easy task. While boutique handgun builders may produce some very fine pieces, quantity has a quality all its own, and several companies ship hundreds of thousands of handguns a year. Like the auto industry, some of the best handguns come from foreign manufacturers. Here are the five best handgun manufacturers.

This first appeared earlier and is being reposted due to reader interest.

Glock

Gaston Glock’s initial attempt to build a handgun for the Austrian military has exploded into an international empire, all the more amazing considering that it was built solely on handguns. From the original Glock 17, the company now offers twenty-six handguns on the U.S. market in calibers from .380 Auto to .45 G.A.P. The company’s simple emphasis on lightweight, slim-profile, “pointable” pistols was a recipe for success, impressing first-time shooters with their ease of use and longtime shooters with their reliability and accuracy. For all of the variety, Glock’s handguns are strikingly similar to one another, demonstrating that Glock won’t fix what isn’t broken.

Recommended: Uzi: The Israeli Machine Gun That Conquered the World

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Recommended: Why Glock Dominates the Handgun Market (And Better than Sig Sauer and Beretta)

Sturm Ruger & Co.

Known colloquially as Ruger, the Sturm Ruger & Company was founded by Alexander Sturm and Bill Ruger in 1949. Unlike Glock, Ruger manufactures both long guns and handguns. Ruger’s handguns are generally similar to Ford pickup trucks: simple, reliable and moderately priced compared to the competition. Ruger’s GP100 is one of the leading full-size revolvers, while the company’s LCR series of hammerless, double-action-only compact revolvers make excellent concealed-carry weapons. The company also produces a variety of pistols, including the .22 caliber Mark IV target pistol and the SR1911, its own in-house version of John Browning’s 1911. The new Ruger American pistol is Ruger’s entry into the high-capacity, polymer-frame pistol market.

Sig Sauer

A Swiss-German company, Sig Sauer was relatively unknown in the U.S. market until its failed entrant in the competition to replace the Colt 1911A1 handgun in U.S. military service was picked up by the U.S. Navy SEALs. Sig’s handgun line is based on the original Sig P210, originally designed for Swiss military service. A redesign and reconfiguration into new full-sized and compact models saw the Sig series of handguns widely accepted among U.S. police forces, including the San Francisco Police Department, and are acceptable carry pistols for the New York and Houston police departments. Like most gun manufacturers Sig Sauer produces its own version of the 1911. Sig Sauer recently won the contract for the U.S. Army’s new M17 handgun.

Smith and Wesson

One of the oldest names in American firearms, Smith and Wesson was founded in 1852. From the early Volcanic lever action pistol to the current M&P series of polymer, striker-fired handguns, Smith and Wesson has continually produced pistols over its 165-year history. The company’s Model 1 handgun was purchased privately by soldiers on both sides of the U.S. Civil War, while the heavier Schofield revolver was carried by postwar U.S. cavalrymen. Today the M&P pistols are standard issue in many police departments worldwide, including the Chicago, Houston and Detroit police departments, while Smith and Wesson revolvers are considered the standard in American revolvers.

Heckler and Koch

A postwar German arms maker that rose from the ashes of the legendary Mauser corporation, Heckler and Koch has made a reputation building innovative, reliable firearms. “H&K,” as it is known in the U.S. market, makes everything from grenade launchers for the United States Army to the U.S. Marine Corps’ new M27 Infantry Automatic Rifle. H&K’s nine-millimeter VP9 series of handguns are durable and reliable, while the .45 caliber HK45 fires a more powerful round. The USP, or Universal Service Pistol, was designed as an entry in U.S. Special Operations Command’s Offensive Handgun Weapon System.

Kyle Mizokami is a defense and national-security writer based in San Francisco who has appeared in the Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and the Daily Beast. In 2009 he cofounded the defense and security blog Japan Security Watch. You can follow him on Twitter: @KyleMizokami. This first appeared earlier and is being reposted due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters.

Robert Farley

Security, Americas

The Cold War saw radical shifts in the balance between fighters and bombers.

Here's What You Need to Know:

As the Cold War opened, fighters and bombers both underwent a transformation.

For instance, Jet engines and the airframes that could handle them transformed both kinds of aircraft. Just as important, the development of nuclear weapons radically increased the lethality of bombers, giving a single plane as much or more killing power than a fleet.

The Cold War saw radical, violent shifts in the balance between fighters and bombers. It also saw the emergence of unmanned missiles, which in different configurations could either kill or replace bombers. Nevertheless, both the Soviets and the Americans continued to invest in both kinds of aircraft, all the way until the fall of the Berlin Wall, and beyond.

Korea:

The first test of bombers would come in Korea. The B-29 Superfortress entered service in the last two years of World War II, but because of ineffective Japanese air defenses and a lack of aviation fuel, was never really tested against the best fighters of the day. Indeed, most Japanese successes against the Superfortress came in the form of ramming tactics, which were obviously unsustainable. For the sake of convenience, the Soviets adopted the same bomber; the Tu-4, a near exact copy of the B-29 (12,000 lbs of bombs at medium altitude, maximum speed 350 mph), meaning that the superpowers depended on the same bomber in the early years of the Cold War.

The ultimate test for the B-29 came over Korea, where it first encountered a modern jet interceptor. The MiG-15 was a hundred miles faster than the Me-262, with twice the thrust-weight ratio and three times the rate of climb. With relatively predictable approach-paths to North Korea targets, Communist MiG-15s enjoyed plentiful hunting against B-29 formations, even when the latter had fighter escort. Some two dozen B-29s were lost to air-to-air combat, at which point the USAF shifted to night-bombing tactics, just as it had during World War II.

The newly-minted United States Air Force had other bombers, including the gigantic B-36 Peacemaker. While the B-36 could carry a heavier load and travel farther than the B-29 (nearly 4,000 miles with a load of 70,000 lbs, and a maximum speed of over 400 mph), no one believed that it could survive in the face of concerted fighter opposition. Indeed, General Curtis Lemay kept the B-36 as far away from Korea as possible for specifically this reason. The USAF even developed a scheme to attach a parasite fighter to the B-36, which would (ineffectually) have tried to fight off Soviet interceptors. On the upside, the B-36 could carry a hydrogen bomb, meaning that not terribly many needed to get through in order to have a major impact on Soviet attitudes.

Jet Bombers vs. Jet Interceptors:

The Soviets and the Americans dove into a race between bombers and interceptors even before the guns of the Korean War had fallen silent. The bomber-obsessed USAF developed the B-47 Stratojet, capable of carrying 25000 lbs of bombs at a speed over 600 mph. It followed this up with the legendary B-52 Stratofortress, which could carry 70000 lbs of bombs over 4000 miles with a maximum speed of 650 mph. The Soviets developed the Tu-16 “Badger,” capable of 650 mph with a 20000 lbs bomb load, and the Tu-95 “Bear,” a massive turboprop-driven plane with a speed of 500 plus mph and a payload of some 24000 lbs.

Developments on the interceptor side followed. Vulnerable to enemy attack for the first time in a long while, the Americans adopted a range of interceptors capable of catching and killing Soviet bombers before they could unleash their payloads. The Soviets, paranoid about the security of their vast airspace, did the same. The rapid rate of technological change in the 1950s meant that many designs were obsolete before they left the drawing board, but by the mid-1960s most of the major fighter producers had settled upon a basic template. There were many interceptors, ranging from the Convair F-106 Delta Dart to the English Electric Lightning to the Saab Draken to the Soviet Su-15 to the ill-fated CF-105 Avro Arrow. All of them tended to max out with speeds around 1500 mph, generally carried substantial radar suites, and had long ranges to cover considerable ground in a hurry. They also carried air-to-air missiles designed to kill their large prey at range (sometimes armed with nuclear warheads).

The next generation of jet bombers would have equaled the interceptors in speed and high altitude performance, but fate intervened. The majestic B-70 Valkyrie had a top speed more than Mach 3 and inspired the Soviet T-4, an aircraft with similar performance. Fortunately or not, by the time the B-70 was ready for production, it had become apparent that surface-to-air missiles and fast interceptors were making high altitude penetration missions suicidal. The XB-70 was canceled, and the Mach 2-capable B-58 “Hustler” retired early. For their part, the Soviets responded to the threat of the B-70 by developing the MiG-25 “Foxbat,” an interceptor that could exceed Mach 2.8 and that carried long-range air-to-air missiles.

Rise of the Fighter-Bomber, and the Diversification of Roles:

But the day of the fighter-bomber was also arriving. Since World War I, the trade-off between heavy, long-range bombers and light, short-range fighters was reasonably well-understood. The high-performance bombers of the interwar period, and the use of a few bomber-type aircraft in night-fighter configuration notwithstanding, fighters enjoyed advantages in speed and maneuverability that made them lethal to bombers, while bombers could carry heavy loads to distant targets.

Fighters had always operated in an attack role, even in World War I. But over time, fighters carried ever-greater payloads of munitions. In the early years of the Vietnam War, the F-105 Thunderchief (nicknamed “Thud”) took on the workhorse bomber role in Rolling Thunder. It could carry 14000 lbs of bombs at Mach 2, although it lacked maneuverability. The North Vietnamese hunted Thuds with the MiG-17 and MiG-21, the latter itself capable of Mach 2 flight.

Bombers did have some advantages; even though they couldn’t run faster than fighters, they could run farther, which could be enough to escape a pursuer. Bombers were also large enough to carry sophisticated electronic warfare equipment, capable of jamming or disorienting the radars on pursuing fighters. The B-52 survived as a low altitude penetration bomber and continued to operate as a conventional bomber over Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Bombers also survived by diversifying. The Soviets developed the Tu-95 into the Tu-142, a long-range sub-hunting plane. They designed the Tu-22M “Backfire” bomber to hunt American aircraft carriers with long-range cruise missiles. The Americans responded to the cruise missile threat with the F-14 Tomcat, a long-range, fast, carrier-borne interceptor with beyond visual range missiles.

The last two generations of bombers began to come into service in the 1980s. They represented a division of effort. On the one hand, the B-1B “Lancer” and the Soviet Tu-160 combined supersonic speeds with low-level penetration capabilities. On the other, the B-2 “Spirit” took advantage of developments in stealth technology to evade radar, missiles, and interceptors. All of these bombers are also capable of traditional conventional bombing and have been pressed into those missions in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan.

Final Bombs:

A single F-15E Strike Eagle can carry a load as heavy as forty-six Gotha IV bombers, larger than any one of the raids that the terrified London in the First World War. The same aircraft can carry as much ordnance as almost five B-17s, and reach its targets considerably faster. With precision-guidance, those munitions can have a much greater impact on military and civilian targets. The F-15 can do all of that, and yet remains a formidable air-to-air fighter.

And yet the biggest air forces continue to buy big bombers. The United States recently placed an order for one hundred B-21 “Raider” stealth bombers. Russia and China have also ordered new stealth bombers, although the ability of the former to complete the project remains in question. The success of the latter depends to a great extent on how well China can integrate stolen technology, as well as develop workable engines. In short, big planes still confer big advantages for air forces interested in strike capabilities. But fighters, whether of the legacy or the stealth variety, will continue to pose a major obstacle for any bomber trying to reach its target.

Robert Farley, a frequent contributor to TNI, is the author of The Battleship Book. The views expressed here are his personal views and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Defense, the U.S. Army, the Army War College, or any other department or agency of the U.S. government.

This article first appeared in 2018.

Image: Wikimedia Commons

Ethen Kim Lieser

Public Health, Americas

However, Dr. Fauci did agree with Biden that a degree of normalcy would be possible by the end of 2021.

White House coronavirus advisor Dr. Anthony Fauci has projected that the United States will be “approaching a degree of normality” by the end of this year, but that pandemic-weary Americans may still be wearing face masks and coverings well into 2022.

“You know, I think it is possible that that’s the case (that Americans will be wearing masks in 2022) and, again, it really depends on what you mean by normality,” President Joe Biden’s chief medical advisor on the coronavirus said Sunday on CNN’s State of the Union.

Fauci added that he believes that by the end of 2021, “we’re going to have a significant degree of normality beyond the terrible burden that all of us have been through over the last year. As we get into the fall and the winter, by the end of the year, I agree with (Biden) completely that we will be approaching a degree of normality.”

The comments from the director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases come as the U.S. death toll from the yearlong coronavirus pandemic recently surpassed five hundred thousand, representing more than six average NFL stadiums worth of victims. More than a fifth of all deaths worldwide have occurred in the United States, which has less than 5 percent of the global population, according to the latest data compiled by Johns Hopkins University.

Like Fauci, health experts and top government officials have asserted that necessary coronavirus precautions must remain in place to further slow the spread of the virus.

“While the progress we’re making toward recovery is exciting, it’s critical that we don’t ease up on the precautions that we know have worked thus far,” Dr. Iahn Gonsenhauser, chief quality and patient safety officer at The Ohio State Wexner Medical Center, told the National Interest.

“Masks and physical distancing are still our best weapons for limiting spread and, now that we have a vaccine, will make those precautions even more effective and will drive new cases way down if we stay the course.”

Dr. Rochelle Walensky, the director of the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, shared similar sentiments Sunday on NBC’s Meet the Press.

“We are still at about a hundred thousand cases a day. We are still at around fifteen hundred to thirty-five hundred deaths per day. The cases are more two and a half fold times what we saw over the summer,” she said.

“It’s encouraging to see these trends coming down, but they’re coming down from an extraordinarily high place.”

Other experts have taken on a more wait-and-see approach.

“It is probably too early to speculate on 2022, but it’s certainly probable that masks will still have some type of role,” Dr. Jason Keonin, of Northwest Iowa Surgeons PC, told the National Interest.

The CDC also has recently confirmed that double-masking, or the wearing of two face masks at once, can provide extremely high levels of protection against spreading or contracting the virus.

In addition, the agency’s study discovered that a tighter fit can markedly improve the overall effectiveness of masks. One particular way to improve the fit of medical masks is to make sure they are “knotted and tucked”—which can be achieved “by bringing together the corners and ear loops on each side, knotting the ear loops together where they attach to the mask, and then tucking in and flattening the resulting extra mask material to minimize the side gaps,” the CDC noted.

Ethen Kim Lieser is a Minneapolis-based Science and Tech Editor who has held posts at Google, The Korea Herald, Lincoln Journal Star, AsianWeek, and Arirang TV. Follow or contact him on LinkedIn.

Image: Reuters.

Robert Farley

Security,

Many of the technologies and practices of advanced submarine warfare were never employed in anger. However, every country in the world that pretends to serious maritime power is building or acquiring advanced submarines.

Here's What You Need to Remember: We take for granted the most common form of today’s nuclear deterrent; a nuclear submarine, bristling with missiles, capable of destroying a dozen cities a continent away. These submarines provide the most secure leg of the deterrent triad, as no foe could reasonably expect to destroy the entire submarine fleet before the missiles fly.

There have been three great submarine campaigns in history, and one prolonged duel. The First and Second Battles of the Atlantic pitted German U-boats against the escorts and aircraft of the United Kingdom and the United States. The Germans very nearly won World War I with the first campaign, and badly drained Allied resources in the second. In the third great campaign, the submarines of the US Navy destroyed virtually the entire commercial fleet of Japan, bringing the Japanese economy to its knees. US subs also devastated the Imperial Japanese Navy, sinking several of Tokyo’s most important capital ships.

But the period most evocative of our modern sense of submarine warfare was surely the forty year duel between the submarines of the USSR and the boats of the various NATO navies. Over the course of the Cold War, the strategic nature of the submarine changed; it moved from being a cheap, effective killer of capital ships to a capital ship in its own right. This was especially the case with the boomers, submarines that carried enough nuclear weapons to kill millions in a few minutes.

As with previous “5 Greatest” lists, the answers depend on the parameters; different sets of metrics will generate different lists. Our metrics concentrate on the strategic utility of specific submarine classes, rather than solely on their technical capabilities.

· Was the submarine a cost-effective solution to a national strategic problem?

· Did the submarine compare favorably with its contemporaries?

· Was the submarine’s design innovative?

And with that, the five best submarines of all time:

U-31:

The eleven boats of the U-31 class were constructed between 1912 and 1915. They operated in both of the periods of heavy action for German U-boats, early in the war before the suspension of unrestricted warfare, and again in 1917 when Germany decided to go for broke and cut the British Empire off at the knees. Four of these eleven boats (U-35, U-39, U-38, and U-34) were the four top killers of World War I; indeed, they were four of the five top submarines of all time in terms of tonnage sunk (the Type VII boat U-48 sneaks in at number 3). U-35, the top killer, sank 224 ships amounting to over half a million tons.

The U-31 boats were evolutionary, rather than revolutionary; they represented the latest in German submarine technology for the time, but did not differ dramatically from their immediate predecessors or successors. These boats had good range, a deck gun for destroying small shipping, and faster speeds surfaced than submerged. These characteristics allowed the U-31 class and their peers to wreak havoc while avoiding faster, more powerful surface units. They did offer a secure, stealthy platform for carrying out a campaign that nearly forced Great Britain from the war. Only the entry of the United States, combined with the development of innovative convoy tactics by the Royal Navy, would stifle the submarine offensive. Three of the eleven boats survived the war, and were eventually surrendered to the Allies.

Balao:

The potential for a submarine campaign against the Japanese Empire was clear from early in the war. Japanese industry depended for survival on access to the natural resources of Southeast Asia. Separating Japan from those resources could win the war. However, the pre-war USN submarine arm was relatively small, and operated with poor doctrine and bad torpedoes. Boats built during the war, including primarily the Gato and Balao class, would eventually destroy virtually the entire Japanese merchant marine.

The Balao class represented very nearly the zenith of the pre-streamline submarine type. War in the Pacific demanded longer ranges and more habitability than the relatively snug Atlantic. Like their predecessors the Gato, the Balaos were less maneuverable than the German Type VII subs, but they made up for this in strength of hull and quality of construction. Compared with the Type VII, the Balaos had longer range, a larger gun, more torpedo tubes, and a higher speed. Of course, the Balaos operated in a much different environment, and against an opponent less skilled in anti-submarine warfare. The greatest victory of a Balao was the sinking of the 58000 ton HIJMS Shinano by Archerfish.

Eleven of 120 boats were lost, two in post-war accidents. After the war Balao class subs were transferred to several friendly navies, and continued to serve for decades. One, the former USS Tusk, remains in partial commission in Taiwan as Hai Pao.

Type XXI

In some ways akin to the Me 262, the Type XXI was a potentially war-winning weapon that arrived too late to have serious effect. The Type XXI was the first mass produced, ocean-going streamlined or “true” submarine, capable of better performance submerged than on the surface. It gave up its deck gun in return for speed and stealth, and set the terms of design for generations of submarines.

Allied anti-submarine efforts focused on identifying boats on the surface (usually in transit to their patrol areas) then vectoring killers (including ships and aircraft) to those areas. In 1944 the Allies began developing techniques for fighting “schnorkel” U-boats that did not need to surface, but remained unprepared for combat against a submarine that could move at 20 knots submerged.

In effect, the Type XXI had the stealth to avoid detection prior to an attack, and the speed to escape afterward. Germany completed 118 of these boats, but because of a variety of industrial problems could only put four into service, none of which sank an enemy ship. All of the Allies seized surviving examples of the Type XXI, using them both as models for their own designs and in order to develop more advanced anti-submarine technologies and techniques. For example, the Type XXI was the model for the Soviet “Whiskey” class, and eventually for a large flotilla of Chinese submarines.

George Washington:

We take for granted the most common form of today’s nuclear deterrent; a nuclear submarine, bristling with missiles, capable of destroying a dozen cities a continent away. These submarines provide the most secure leg of the deterrent triad, as no foe could reasonably expect to destroy the entire submarine fleet before the missiles fly.

The secure submarine deterrent began in 1960, with the USS George Washington. An enlarged version of the Skipjack class nuclear attack sub, George Washington’s design incorporated space for sixteen Polaris ballistic missiles. When the Polaris became operational, USS George Washington had the capability from striking targets up to 1000 miles distant with 600 KT warheads. The boats would eventually upgrade to the Polaris A3, with three warheads and a 2500 mile range. Slow relative to attack subs but extremely quiet, the George Washington class pioneered the “go away and hide” form of nuclear deterrence that is still practiced by five of the world’s nine nuclear powers.

And until 1967, the George Washington and her sisters were the only modern boomers. Their clunky Soviet counterparts carried only three missiles each, and usually had to surface in order to fire. This made them of limited deterrent value. But soon, virtually every nuclear power copied the George Washington class. The first “Yankee” class SSBN entered service in 1967, the first Resolution boat in 1968, and the first of the French Redoutables in 1971. China would eventually follow suit, although the PLAN’s first genuinely modern SSBNs have only entered service recently. The Indian Navy’s INS Arihant will likely enter service in the next year or so.

The five boats of the George Washington class conducted deterrent patrols until 1982, when the SALT II Treaty forced their retirement. Three of the five (including George Washington) continued in service as nuclear attack submarines for several more years.

Los Angeles:

Immortalized in the Tom Clancy novels Hunt for Red October and Red Storm Rising, the U.S. Los Angeles class is the longest production line of nuclear submarines in history, constituting sixty-two boats and first entering service in 1976. Forty-one subs remain in commission today, continuing to form the backbone of the USN’s submarine fleet.

The Los Angeles (or 688) class are outstanding examples of Cold War submarines, equally capable of conducting anti-surface or anti-submarine warfare. In wartime, they would have been used to penetrate Soviet base areas, where Russian boomers were protected by rings of subs, surface ships, and aircraft, and to protect American carrier battle groups.

In 1991, two Los Angeles class attack boats launched the first ever salvo of cruise missiles against land targets, ushering in an entirely new vision of how submarines could impact warfare. While cruise missile armed submarines had long been part of the Cold War duel between the United States and the Soviet Union, most attention focused either on nuclear delivery or anti-ship attacks. Submarine launched Tomahawks gave the United States a new means for kicking in the doors of anti-access/area denial systems. The concept has proven so successful that four Ohio class boomers were refitted as cruise missile submarines, with the USS Florida delivering the initial strikes of the Libya intervention.

The last Los Angeles class submarine is expected to leave service in at some point in the 2020s, although outside factors may delay that date. By that time, new designs will undoubtedly have exceeded the 688 in terms of striking land targets, and in capacity for conducting anti-submarine warfare. Nevertheless, the Los Angeles class will have carved out a space as the sub-surface mainstay of the world’s most powerful Navy for five decades.

Conclusion

Fortunately, the United States and the Soviet Union avoided direct conflict during the Cold War, meaning that many of the technologies and practices of advanced submarine warfare were never employed in anger. However, every country in the world that pretends to serious maritime power is building or acquiring advanced submarines. The next submarine war will look very different from the last, and it’s difficult to predict how it will play out. We can be certain, however, that the fight will be conducted in silence.

Honorable Mention: Ohio, 260O-21, Akula, Alfa, Seawolf, Swiftsure, I-201, Kilo, S class, Type VII

Robert Farley is an assistant professor at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce. His work includes military doctrine, national security, and maritime affairs. He blogs at Lawyers, Guns and Money and Information Dissemination and The Diplomat. Follow him on Twitter:@drfarls.

All Images: Wikicommons.

Editor's Note: This piece first appeared on January 18. It is being recirculated due to reader interest. 

Peter Suciu

Japan, Asia

The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force increasingly resembles the former Imperial Japanese Navy, but in a smaller size.

Here's What You Need to Remember: One type of warship the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force won't operate is a battleship, and there are no plans for a 21st-century version of the Yamato super battleship.

The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force increasingly resembles the former Imperial Japanese Navy, but in a smaller size. It has a fleet of some 154 ships and operates 346 aircraft. In 2000 it has also been the world's fourth-largest navy by tonnage, and likely will only increase in size.

In December 2018, Tokyo approved a plan to modify its two Izumo-class helicopter carriers to embark the Lockheed Martin F-35B Lightning II jet fighter. The modifications would enable Japan to operate flattops with fixed-wing aircraft for the first time since World War II. The Japanese government also announced as part of its record-setting defense budget it would purchase additional F-35 aircraft.

With an eventual plan to be equipped with 105 F-35As and 42 F-35Bs, Japan would become the largest operator of the fifth-generation stealth fighter aircraft outside of the United States. 

Not Battleships But The Next Best Thing

One type of warship the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force won't operate is a battleship, and there are no plans for a 21st-century version of the Yamato super battleship.

However, according to a recent report from TheDrive, citing Japanese media, Tokyo is now considering the feasibility of procuring two "super-destroyers." Such warships – much like the modified flattops – would seem to be in contradiction of Japan's 1947 Constitution, which renounced war, but is also seen to suggest that Japan's military forces are maintained for the purpose of self-defense.

In this case, however, the super-destroyers would serve as a replacement to the pair of planned land-based Aegis Ashore systems. Work on those was suspended due to technical issues, costs and domestic criticism. The destroyers would be focused on missile defense – primarily from North Korea – and would be equipped with a version of the Aegis combat system that is equipped with Lockheed Martin's AN/SPY-7 Long Range Discrimination Radar. That platform was originally intended for the shore-based Aegis system.

Nikkei Asia reported that the funding for the system modifications of the AN/SPY-7 will be allocated in Japan's fiscal 2021 budget.

While the Defense Ministry has been expected to approve the vessels, based on an interim report that is due later this month from a private-sector technical study, officials have also considered the option of a special-purpose warship that could be dedicated to intercepting missiles. However, despite the fact that such a vessel would cost less, it could be far more vulnerable to submarine and air attacks.

The other consideration is that even as North Korean missiles are seen as the primary threat, Japan has other priorities that include patrolling the East China Sea due to increased Chinese aggression, and new Aegis-equipped destroyers could be a practical addition to the fleet due to their maneuverability and defenses.

One issue outstanding could be that of personnel. Tokyo opted for the Aegis Ashore system to address the lack of personnel, but now the Maritime SDF may need to be further expanded with the addition of such warships.

A New Class

Yet to come into focus is whether Tokyo would opt to build a new warship or a derivative of vessels currently in the fleet. TheDrive cited a report from Tokyo's Kyodo News agency, which suggested that the government was considering a vessel with a standard displacement of around 8,000 tons – which would be larger than the current Maya-class's displacement of 8,200 tons.

The Maya-class is a modified version of the Atago-class, and the lead vessel Maya was commissioned on March 19, 2020, with a second vessel, Haguro, set to enter service in March of next year. These vessels were also designed to enhance Japan's ballistic missile defense capabilities, but now it seems that Tokyo is thinking even bigger.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com. This article first appeared last year and is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters.

Peter Suciu

Security, Asia

This was the first time since Washington and Taipei ended formal diplomatic ties in 1979 that the island nation has admitted the presence of U.S. forces.

Here's What You Need To Remember: Despite the fact that Washington has not officially acknowledged the presence of U.S. troops in Taiwan for more than forty years, it is known that military exchanges had been commonplace prior to the Covid-19 outbreak.

This week the Taiwanese government publicly acknowledged that members of the United States Marine Corps have begun training operations on the island nation. A unit of Marine Raiders was reportedly deployed to Taiwan to help boost Taipei's military readiness.

This was the first time since Washington and Taipei ended formal diplomatic ties in 1979—when the United States formally recognized the People's Republic of China—that the island nation has admitted the presence of U.S. forces.

According to Newsweek, which cited the Taipei-based United Daily News, the Taiwan Marine Corps will receive four weeks of training under the American Special Forces unit. The Raiders will reportedly provide training on amphibious assault operations and speedboat infiltration techniques at the Tsoying military base in the southwestern port city of Kaohsiung.

The Marine Raiders were believed to have arrived on the island nation as early as October 26, and subsequently observed two weeks of quarantine as part of the island's measures to contain the novel coronavirus. These are the first troops to conduct training with the Taiwanese military since the Covid-19 outbreak began earlier this year.

"In order to maintain regional peace and stability, routine security cooperation and exchanges between the militaries of Taiwan and the United States are proceeding as usual," the Taiwanese Navy said in a statement on its website.

Plausible deniability 

Despite the acknowledgement from Taipei, the United States Department of Defense (DoD) on Tuesday refused to confirm if the Marines have been deployed to the island nation. Stars & Stripes reported that Pentagon spokesperson John Supple said in a statement to the news outlet via Indo-Pacific Command that reports about the Marines on Taiwan were inaccurate.

"The United States remains committed to our One-China Policy," Supple noted, referring to a policy acknowledging that Beijing believes it has sovereignty over Taiwan. Beijing maintains that the island is a breakaway province that would be brought under its control, even if force is required.

Despite the fact that Washington maintains no formal relations with Taiwan, which has a democratically-elected government, current U.S. law—the Taiwan Relations Act—requires that it ensures that Taiwan can defend itself. It has been in place for more than forty years, and ensures Taipei's defense needs.

"The United States will continue to make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain sufficient self-defense capabilities," added Supple.

Last month, the United States Department of State approved a second weapons sale to Taiwan in just over a week. This most recent deal was for 400 anti-ship cruise missiles, worth a reported $2.37 billion. That followed the sale of three weapons systems in a separate deal worth $1.8 billion. It was the ninth weapons sale approved by Washington to Taipei since President Donald Trump was elected in 2016.

In addition to the 400 Boeing Harpoon Block II missiles, the recent deal also includes 100 Harpoon Coastal Defense Systems and exercise missiles, radar trucks, and test equipment, along with U.S. technical assistance.

Worst Kept Secret 

Despite the fact that Washington has not officially acknowledged the presence of U.S. troops in Taiwan for more than forty years, it is known that military exchanges had been commonplace prior to the Covid-19 outbreak.

U.S. Army Special Forces have been invited for annual joint sessions with Taiwan's equivalent Army Aviation and Special Forces Command in past years, while U.S. Army Green Berets had taken part in Operation Balance Temper, which took place in the mountainous regions in the center of the island nation. Additionally, U.S. Navy SEALs have trained with Taiwanese frogmen off the coast of the Penghu Islands during Operation Flash Tamper.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com. This article first appeared last year.

Image: Reuters.

Robert Farley

History, Europe

The casualties number in the tens of millions. 

Here's What You Need To Remember: The scars of the war remain, not least in the absence of the populations exterminated during the conflict. The states occupied by the Soviet Union at the end of the war (including Poland, the Baltics, and Ukraine) remain deeply suspicious of Russian intentions. For its part, memory of the war in Russia continues to condition Russian foreign policy, and Russia’s broader response to Europe.

The war between Germany and the Soviet Union officially began in late June 1941, although the threat of conflict had loomed since the early 1930s. Germany and the USSR launched a joint war against Poland in September of 1939, which the Soviets followed up with invasions of Finland, Romania, and the Baltic states across the following year.

After Germany crushed France, and determined that it could not easily drive Great Britain from the war, the Wehrmacht turned its attention back to the East. Following the conquests of Greece and Yugolavia in the spring of 1941, Berlin prepared its most ambitious campaign; the destruction of Soviet Russia. The ensuing war would result in a staggering loss of human life, and in the final destruction of the Nazi regime.

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The Fight on Land

On June 22, 1941, the German Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe struck Soviet forces across a wide front along the German-Soviet frontier. Romanian forces attacked into Soviet-occupied Bessarabia on the same day. The Finnish armed forces joined the fight later that week, with Hungarian troops and aircraft entering combat at the beginning of July. By that time, a significant contribution of Italian troops was on its way to the Eastern Front. A Spanish volunteer division would eventually join the fight, along with large formations recruited from Soviet prisoners of war and from the local civilian population of occupied Soviet territories.

The course of the war is far too complicated to detail in this article. Suffice to say that the German enjoyed overwhelming success for the first five months of the war, before weather and stiffening Red Army resistance led to a Soviet victory in the Battle of Moscow. Germany resumed the offensive in 1942, only to suffer a major defeat at Stalingrad. The Battle of Kursk, in 1943, ended the Wehrmacht’s offensive ambitions. 1943, 1944, and 1945 saw the pace of Soviet conquest gradually accelerate, with the monumental offensives of late 1944 shattering the German armed forces. The war turned the Wehrmacht and the Red Army into finely honed fighting machines, while also draining both of equipment and manpower. The Soviets enjoyed the support of Western industry, while the Germans relied on the resources of occupied Europe.

The Fight in the Air

Mercifully, the nature of the war did not offer many opportunities for strategic bombing. Russia launched a few sorties against German cities in the first days of the war, usually suffering catastrophic casualties. For their part, the German Luftwaffe concentrated on tactical support of the Wehrmacht. Germany did launch a few large air raids against Russian cities, but did not maintain anything approaching a strategic campaign.

Notwithstanding the improvement of the Soviet Air Force across the war, and the effectiveness in particular of attack aircraft, in general the Luftwaffe mauled its Soviet foe. This remained the case even as the Soviet aviation industry far outstripped the German, and as the Combined Bomber Offensive drew the attention of the Luftwaffe to the west.

The Fight at Sea

Naval combat does not normally loom large in histories of the War in the East. Nevertheless, Soviet and Axis forces fought in the Arctic, the Baltic, and the Black Sea for most of the conflict. In the north, Soviet air and naval forces supported convoys from the Western allies to Murmansk, and harassed German positions in Norway. In the Black Sea, German and Romanian ships struggled against the Soviet Black Sea Fleet, winning important victories until the tide of the land battle turned. In the Baltic, Russian submarines and small craft fought a guerilla conflict against Germany and Finland for the first three years, although the Germans successfully leveraged their surface naval superiority in support of retreats in the final year of the war.

The Fight Against Civilians

The Holocaust is perhaps the most remembered legacy of the War in the East. The invasions of Poland and the Soviet Union brought the bulk of Eastern Europe’s Jewish population under Nazi control, facilitating a German policy of extermination. For non-Jews, German occupation policies were nearly as brutal, although populations sympathetic to the anti-Soviet crusade were sometimes spared.

Towards the end of the war, the Soviets did their best to return the favor. Soviet depredations against the German civilian population of East and Central Europe do not generally received the same degree of attention as German actions, in no small part because of an enduring (if problematic) sense that the German deserved what they got. Other Eastern European populations were caught in the crossfire, suffering starvation and other depredations from both sides. Nevertheless, there is no question that the Soviets (and the peoples of Eastern Europe) suffered far more deeply from the war than the Germans.

The Costs

The raw statistics of the war are nothing short of stunning. On the Soviet side, some seven million soldiers died in action, with another 3.6 million dying in German POW camps. The Germans lost four million soldiers in action, and another 370000 to the Soviet camp system. Some 600000 soldiers from other participants (mostly Eastern European) died as well. These numbers do not include soldiers lost on either side of the German-Polish War, or the Russo-Finnish War.

The civilian population of the territory in conflict suffered terribly from the war, in part because of the horrific occupation policies of the German (and the Soviets), and in part because of a lack of food and other necessities of life. Around 15 million Soviet civilians are thought to have been killed. Some three million ethnic Poles died (some before the German invasion of the Soviet Union, but many after) along with around three million Jews of Polish and another two million of Soviet citizenship (included in the Soviet statistics). Somewhere between 500000 and 2 million German civilians died in the expulsions that followed the war.

Statistics of this magnitude are inevitably imprecise, and scholars on all sides of the war continue to debate the size of military and civilian losses. There is little question, however, that the War in the East was the most brutal conflict ever endured by humankind. There is also little question that the Red Army provided the most decisive blows against Nazi Germany, causing the vast majority of German casualties during World War II as a whole.

Postwar

The end of the War in the East left the Soviet Union in control of a vast portion of the Eurasian continent. Red Army forces occupied Germany, Poland, Czechosolvakia, parts of the Balkans, the Baltic states, and parts of Finland. The Western allies remained in control of Greece and much of western Germany, while Joseph Tito established an independent communist regime in Yugoslavia. The Soviet Union redrew the map of Eastern Europe, annexing large chunks of Poland, Germany, and the Baltics, and ceding much of Germany to Polish control. Russian domination over the region would last into the early 1990s, when the layers of the Soviet Empire began to peel away.

The scars of the war remain, not least in the absence of the populations exterminated during the conflict. The states occupied by the Soviet Union at the end of the war (including Poland, the Baltics, and Ukraine) remain deeply suspicious of Russian intentions. For its part, memory of the war in Russia continues to condition Russian foreign policy, and Russia’s broader response to Europe.

Robert Farley is a frequent contributor to TNI, is author of The Battleship Book. He serves as an Senior Lecturer at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky. His work includes military doctrine, national security, and maritime affairs. He blogs at Lawyers, Guns and Money and Information Dissemination and The Diplomat.

Image: Wikimedia Commons.

This first appeared in 2016. 

Peter Suciu

Security, Asia

South Korean missile defenses are getting an upgrade.

Here's What You Need to Remember: "JTAGS is vital to warfighters and of growing importance as we create true Joint All-Domain Command and Control systems, especially as we find new ways to integrate and leverage space-based assets.”

Defense contractor Northrop Grumman and the U.S. Army have enhanced the Joint Tactical Ground Station (JTAGS) capabilities in South Korea. The deployment of the JTAGS system will improve battle-space awareness and improve missile defense. This has marked the completion of phase one of the platform's modernization efforts.

JTAGS was first fielded in tactical shelters in 1997 to provide in-theater missile warning using data directly from satellite sensors. It receives and processes data that is directly down-linked from the Overhead Persistent Infrared constellation of satellites, which include the Defense Support Program and Space-Based Infrared System sensors, and other infrared satellite sensors. Networked sensor data is also provided from the Highly Elliptical Orbit sensor.

Additionally, 3D stereo processing of multiple sensors is performed to greatly improve tactical parameters. This technology was first developed at Northrop Grumman in 1994 and is still used today throughout the missile warning community. The system disseminates near-real-time warning, alerting and cueing information on ballistic missile launches and other tactical events of interest throughout the theater using multiple communications networks. This allows for the dissemination of data directly to combatant commanders.

Phase One 

As part of the phase one modernization efforts, Northrop Grumman and the U.S. Army installed JTAGS Block II in permanent facilities in Japan, Qatar, Italy, and most recently the Republic of Korea (South Korea). This has included updates to the hardware, software, and communication systems, as well as enhancements to cybersecurity and soldier-machine interface.

The deployments include soldier training as well as exercise support capabilities.

“This is a tremendous milestone in our decades-long mission of delivering missile warning and defense capabilities to protect our joint warfighters and allies," said Kenn Todorov, vice president and general manager, combat systems and mission readiness, Northrop Grumman. "JTAGS is vital to warfighters and of growing importance as we create true Joint All-Domain Command and Control systems, especially as we find new ways to integrate and leverage space-based assets.”

Four JTAGS are deployed worldwide as part of the U.S. Strategic Command's Theater Event System. U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command soldiers operate JTAGS, providing 24/7 support to theater operations.

Phase Two 

With the completion of phase one, the defense contractor has already begun executing phase two of the JTAGS Pre-planned Product improvement (P3I) modernization program. It includes the delivery of additional sensor processing capabilities and updating software architecture.

Under the direction of the JTAGS Product Office, Integrated Fires Mission Command (IFMC) Project Office, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, Northrop Grumman has been the JTAGS prime contractor since 1994, responsible for developing, fielding, maintaining and enhancing the system worldwide.

Joint Army-Navy crews operate the JTAGS system, which consists of a deployable towed shelter and a crew of fifteen soldiers and sailors which provides 24-hour, 365 day-a-year, all weather threat monitoring.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com. This article first appeared last year and is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters