The National Interest

Summary: The B-47 Stratojet, the U.S.'s first jet bomber, was introduced in 1951, marking a significant transition in military aviation.

-Designed for high-altitude, long-range missions to deliver nuclear weapons, it featured advanced technologies like swept wings and powerful jet engines.

-Despite early issues with stability and maintenance, the B-47 became a pivotal aircraft in the Cold War, with over 2,000 units produced.

-Its role extended beyond its initial design, including electronic intelligence missions.

-The B-47 set the stage for subsequent jet bombers and represented a critical leap in U.S. strategic bombing capabilities.

A slew of U.S. bomber aircraft have transcended the military community to become iconic weapons of war in the eyes of the general public.

The stable of World War II bombers, for example, like the B-17 Flying Fortress, B-24 Liberator, and B-29 Superfortress, which are typically associated with the liberation of Europe and Asia.

Then you’ve got the B-52 Stratofortress, a massive eight-engine brute that has been in service for seven decades without any plans for retirement.

But there were also machines that debuted in the small window between the iconic classes of U.S. bombers; after World War II but before the B-52 became a mainstay of U.S. aerial power. And generally, understandably, those bombers have been forgotten as relics of a transitional period in military technology.

But one such example is particularly important: the B-47 Stratojet, the U.S.’s first jet bomber. 

The B-47 Stratojet was introduced in 1951 as a long-range, high-altitude, jet-powered strategic bomber. The B-47 was designed to avoid enemy interceptor aircraft and deliver nuclear weapons deep within the Soviet Union’s territory. 

In 1943, the U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF) made an informal request for the design of a jet-powered reconnaissance bomber. Jet technology was sparkling new in 1943 and had not yet been applied to a bomber platform – but the merits of such an application were obvious. Several aerospace companies responded to the USAAF’s request, and began conducting research into jet bomber technology.

By 1944, the USAAF had formalized its request, asking for proposals for a jet bomber with impressive specifications: 550 mile per hour top speed; 450 mile per hour cruising speed; 3,500 mile range, and; 45,000 foot service ceiling. North American Aviation, Convair, Boeing, and the Glenn Martin Company each submitted proposals – and all four companies were awarded study contracts. NAA and Convair were asked to focus on four-engine designs – which would become the B-45 and XB-46 respectively. Boeing and Martin were asked to focus on six-engine designs – which would become the B-47 and XB-48 respectively.

In 1945, the Army Air Forces Scientific Advisory Board inspected a secret German aeronautics lab. Embedded with the inspection team was George S. Schairer, the chief of Boeing’s technical staff. During the inspection, the team found German airplane models incorporated something novel, something rumored but unconfirmed: swept wings. Extensive wind tunnel data confirmed that the swept wing design was quite effective. Urgently, Schairer wired back to Boeing.

“Stop the bomber design,” Schairer wrote. The new bomber, under development back home with Boeing, featured straight wings. But Schairer was now a convert; he wanted the new bomber to have swept wings.

Back home, Boeing redesigned its jet bomber to include wings and tail that swept back at 35 degrees. Further revisions were to follow, especially with respect to engine placement and landing gear placement. 

By April 1946, Boeing was satisfied with all of its tweaks. The USAAF ordered two prototypes, which were designated as the XB-47. The XB-47s rolled off the assembly line, ready for flight testing, just a few days before the USAAF separated from the U.S. Army to become a distinct service, the U.S. Air Force. The newly formed USAF set to work, exhaustively testing the new XB-47.

Because the new jet bomber incorporated so many cutting-edge technologies, the platform was heavily tested. Test pilot Robert Robbins, who helped debut the XB-47, was initially skeptical about the new bomber. “Oh God, please help me through the next two hours,” Robbins prayed before the XB-47’s first flight. Robbins' fears were alleviated, however; the XB-47 could fly. 

There were some problems, however. The prototype had a tendency to “Dutch roll,” or weave side to side in an uncontrolled yawing motion. A “yaw damper” control system was installed to prevent such yawing. The bomber also had a habit of pitching up at maximum speed – a dangerous flight characteristic caused stalling due to upward pitching of the outboard section of the wing. To remedy the upward pitching, Boeing installed “vortex generators” to prevent the airflow separation that led to upward pitching and stalling. And tragically, during an early test flight, pilot Scott Osler was killed when the XB-47’s canopy ripped off at high speed. The co-pilot managed to land the bomber safely – and Boeing redesigned the canopy. 

The exhaustive tweaking and testing paid off in dividends – although the finished B-47 Stratojet still had problems. 

The finished B-47 Stratojet was regarded as the fastest bomber in the world. USAF Col. Walter Boyne described the new bomber as a “sleek, beautiful outcome that was highly advanced.” The B-47 was said to fly with a light touch, more like a fighter jet than a bomber. The B-47 was so aerodynamically clean that high-speed landing gear (180 knots) was required; the landing was assisted, however, with a ribbon-like drag chute that would slow the bomber down. And because of the hazards associated with such high-speed landings, the B-47 was the first mass-produced aircraft to be equipped with an anti-skid braking system (ABS). 

Still, the B-47 was criticized for its high landing speed – which, when paired with the bomber’s sluggish takeoff performance made for a dangerous combination. The B-47 was also very particular about its landing attitude. If landed at the wrong attitude, the bomber would porpoise – and sometimes skid onto one wing before cartwheeling. Another serious problem: the wings flexed in flight, which had a tendency to affect flight control. Also, the B-47 was a “maintenance hog.” 

Despite the drawbacks, over 2,000 B-47s were produced. The standard variant served proudly until 1969, while the electronic-intelligence variant, the EB-47, served until 1977. 

Harrison Kass is a prolific defense writer with over 1,000 published articles posted online and around the world. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, he joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. He lives in Oregon and listens to Dokken. Follow him on Twitter @harrison_kass.

Image Credit: Creative Commons or Shutterstock. 

Summary: The Lockheed S-3 Viking, retired by the U.S. Navy in 2016 after over four decades of service, was a versatile, carrier-based aircraft renowned for its anti-submarine capabilities.

-Initially developed to replace the Grumman S-2 Tracker, the S-3 featured a four-person crew and advanced sensor integration.

-Although it was later repurposed for surface detection, ground attack, and in-flight refueling, its retirement has left some defense planners nostalgic for its submarine detection abilities, especially amid rising naval tensions with China.

-Despite interest in reviving the S-3, modern replacements like the V-22 Osprey have taken over its roles.

A few years ago, NASA retired the Lockheed S-3 Viking, which had been in service with the U.S. Navy until 2016 – over four decades after the jet’s introduction in 1974.

The S-3, nicknamed “War Hoover” for the vacuum cleaner-like sound it made, was originally developed as a submarine killer – and was distinct for its four-person crew.

To replace the aging, prop-driven Grumman S-2 Tracker, the Navy developed the VSX program to procure an anti-submarine successor.

The winning design, the S-3, was a carrier-based, all-weather aircraft capable of subsonic, long-range flight. The S-3 was very much a conventional-looking plane, with a slightly swept leading edge and two GE TF-34 turbofan engines mounted under the wings. Whereas most military jets required ground service equipment to assist with the engine start, the S-3 housed an auxiliary power unit (APU) and could perform unassisted starts.  

Unlike most carrier-capable jet aircraft measuring around 50 feet long, the S-3 carried a four-person crew – rather than a two-person, or one-person crew. Upfront sitting side-by-side was the pilot and the copilot/tactical coordinator (COTAC).

In the back, also side-by-side, were the tactical coordinator (TACCO) and the sensor operator (SENSO). The SENSO was enlisted, whereas the other three crew members were commissioned officers. The four-person configuration came with an odd ejection protocol: if the pilot or COTAC initiated ejection, all four crew members would be ejected, with the backseaters firing 0.5 seconds before the frontseaters to allow for separation.

If TACCO or SENSO, sitting in the back initiated ejection, the pilots up front would not be ejected – no, they had to initiate their own ejection. 

The S-3 was renowned for its sensory integration; the S-3 was the first anti-submarine aircraft to integrate all of its sensor systems into a single General Purpose Digital Computer (GPDC). The integration allowed crew members, who were each seated in front of a Multi-Purpose Display (MPD) screen, to consult and collaborate with each other by analyzing the same data at their own station simultaneously. Alternatively, each crew member could assess separate data.

The end result: the S-3 was a powerful detective, with sensory capabilities considered equivalent to the P-3 Orion, a 116-foot plane with a crew of 12. 

Despite the S-3’s adeptness at sleuthing out enemy submarines, by the 1990s, with the Soviet Union folded, there just weren’t many enemy submarines left to sleuth.

Accordingly, the S-3’s mission profile was modified, from anti-submarine operations to sea surface detection, ground-attack, and in-flight refueling operations. For the S-3’s updated, less sophisticated function, the backseat crew was removed, leaving just a pilot and COTAC to operate the S-3 for most missions. The S-3 served reliably until 2016 when it was retired.

Still, some interest in the S-3 has remained, including rumors of a “comeback.” South Korea’s Navy, for example, expressed interest in purchasing the S-3. Even the U.S. Navy has spitballed the idea of bringing a few S-3s back from storage to perform anti-submarine duties.

For a moment, it appeared as though Lockheed was going to refurbish the S-3, rename it the C-3, and use it to replace the C-2 Greyhound for carrier onboard delivery (COD). Instead, the V-22 Osprey was chosen as the C-2’s replacement.

But the lingering interest in the S-3 serves as a testament to the jet’s functionality and reliability.

And now, in light of China’s naval build-up and aggressive behavior, some war planners are longing for the S-3’s vaunted submarine detection abilities, and wondering if the Viking’s retirement was premature. 

Harrison Kass is a prolific defense writer with over 1,000 articles published. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

All images are Creative Commons. 

Does the United States need the ability to fight more than one major war at a time? 

The Senate Armed Services Committee has been asking this question of late, and it is right to do so.

Today, according to official Pentagon planning doctrine, the United States could not. One need not believe literally in a “new axis of evil” that includes Russia, North Korea, Iran, and China to worry that if America and its allies wound up in a fight against one of these four states, another one might consider opportunistic aggression. This could be particularly concerning if the potential adversary believed it could win fast, creating a fait accompli that the United States would be challenged to reverse even after concluding war in another theater. 

For many decades, seeking to ensure deterrence and prevent opportunistic aggression by a second foe if engaged already against a first, the United States aspired to some variant of a two-war capability. During the Cold War, the United States generally aimed to be able to fight a major war alongside NATO allies against the Soviet bloc in Europe and at least one other simultaneous conflict (like the Korean or Vietnam war) elsewhere. Accordingly, the U.S. military during the Cold War was generally 60 to 100 percent larger than it is today.

Once the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, the United States cut back its armed forces but kept a two-war planning goal. However, those two wars were imagined to be against much less capable foes:  the likes of Iraq, Iran, North Korea, or perhaps Syria. In fact, the United States wound up fighting two overlapping wars for many years in Iraq and Afghanistan—though they differed from the typical scenarios envisioned in these force-sizing paradigms since they were long and moderate in scale rather than short and big (like Operation Desert Storm in 1991). Because of their duration, the United States had to stagger its peak efforts in those wars, emphasizing Iraq under President George W. Bush and Afghanistan in the first term of President Obama. 

Starting around 2015, things changed again. Pentagon planners, starting with Secretary of Defense Ash Carter and Joint Chiefs Chairman General Joseph Dunford, created a “4+1” threat framework with Russia and China joining Iran, North Korea, and transnational terrorism on the Pentagon’s list of top concerns. Then, under Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis and Secretary Mark Esper during the Trump years, the Pentagon prioritized Russia and China; the Biden administration under Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin has kept a very similar National Defense Strategy.

According to official doctrine [media.defense.gov], today’s U.S. military should have the capacity to do the following all at once:

-Together with allies, fight and defeat China or Russia (but not both at the same time), presumably in conflicts centered on the western Pacific region and eastern European region, respectively,

-Defend the American homeland while also maintaining a nuclear deterrent,

-Deter North Korea and Iran (without specifying exactly how), and

-Maintain momentum against transnational violent extremist organizations as part of the so-called “war on terror.”

But this is still just a one-war framework. Is that enough military for today’s world? 

Before jumping to the conclusion that we need a big defense buildup, a few other considerations are in order. Leave aside the fact that, at nearly $900 billion, America’s national defense budget already exceeds the Cold War peak and is roughly triple China’s and six times Russia’s—at a time when the U.S. structural federal deficit of more than $1 trillion a year makes a big defense buildup challenging to imagine. More to the point, the four nemeses mentioned above, while certainly in cahoots with each other already on some issues, are not likely to fight literally for each other. For any of them, going to war deliberately against the United States would be a decision of huge consequence not likely to be reached just because America seemed temporarily preoccupied elsewhere. In addition, the Army today cannot even recruit to fill out the currently desired troop strength and most of the other services have been struggling to make personnel targets as well.

Most of all, for both the Trump and Biden administrations, the quality of the armed forces has been rightly seen as a higher priority than their size. Defense planners have wanted to focus on improving military lethality, survivability, sustainability, resilience, and adaptability in an era of rapid technological change. 

The United States does need to buttress its deterrence of simultaneous, opportunistic aggression. But the right standard for doing so is probably to ensure that the country has sufficient key capabilities for each of the four key potential foes that—with allies—it could prevent a quick, successful aggression by any of them even while concentrating most of its forces on a single big war.  As recently argued compellingly by Thomas Mahnken as well, another key benefit of a multi-war planning framework is that it would, in effect, create a strategic reserve of munitions. By producing and pre-stationing ordnance for several wars at once in key overseas theaters on a larger scale than today, the United States would, in effect, create a hedge against a single war going longer or taking more weaponry than initially expected. This policy would also buy time to start manufacturing more weapons to restore a rock-solid multi-theater capability if and when a war broke out in one place. Fortunately, these are attainable and affordable goals that the National Defense Strategy already pays lip service to. We need to ensure that we have the capabilities, not just the right words.

Some of the key additional capabilities that might be needed to support such a strategy include a couple of squadrons of dedicated “fifth generation” fighter aircraft for Korea (to attack North Korean missile launchers early in any war, limiting damage to Seoul); unmanned submarines stationed in the western Pacific with anti-ship sensors and missiles to help Taiwan resist a Chinese invasion attempt; vertical-lift aircraft on Okinawa with ordnance usable for the same purpose; dedicated missile defense systems for the Middle East of the type that helped stymie Iran’s recent missile and drone barrage against Israel; and a brigade of U.S. ground troops backed up by fighters and attack helicopters in the Baltic states as a permanent deterrent against Russian aggression there.  Again, augmentations of some sensor networks and munitions stockpiles also make sense.

The price tag for this sort of modest force expansion would hardly be trivial but would not exceed tens of billions of dollars a year. It could be partially funded by selective cuts in the defense budget elsewhere.  As we gear up for a presidential election this fall and a new defense review next year, these issues of possible simultaneous war—but simultaneous deterrence—should be front and center in the American strategic debate.

Michael E. O’Hanlon is a senior fellow and director of research in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, where he specializes in U.S. defense strategy, the use of military force, and American national security policy. He directs the Strobe Talbott Center on Security, Strategy and Technology, as well as the Defense Industrial Base working group, and is the inaugural holder of the Philip H. Knight Chair in Defense and Strategy. He co-directs the Africa Security Initiative as well. He is an adjunct professor at Columbia, Georgetown, and George Washington universities, and a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. He also serves as a member of the Defense Policy Board at the U.S. Department of Defense. O’Hanlon was a member of the external advisory board at the Central Intelligence Agency from 2011-12. O’Hanlon’s latest book, “Military History for the Modern Strategist: America’s Major Wars Since 1861” (Brookings and Rowman & Littlefield, 2023) was published in January 2023.

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock. 

Summary: The resurgence of tank warfare in Ukraine has spotlighted the importance of anti-tank weapons, including the Swedish AT4.

-This shoulder-fired, disposable anti-tank missile system, initially adopted by the Swedish Army and later by the U.S., is effective against lighter armored vehicles and buildings.

-While less versatile than its peers like the Javelin and NLAW, the AT4 has played a crucial role in Ukraine, reportedly taking out Russian T-90 tanks.

-Its ease of use and widespread availability have made it a valuable asset in the conflict, despite its limitations in urban settings due to a significant back-blast.

The revival of tank warfare in Ukraine has coincided with a resurgence of interest in anti-tank weapons.

Throughout Russia’s invasion, Western nations have provided Ukrainian forces with sophisticated anti-tank missile systems to aid the country’s defensive efforts.

While news surrounding the role the American-made FGM-148 Javelin and Swedish-made Next Generation Light Anti-tank Weapon have played in the Eastern European conflict has circulated widely over the last year, one anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) is also seeing good use in Ukraine.

The AT4 Swedish shoulder-fired weapon has proven to be a major pain to Moscow’s armored vehicles. 

The Swedish Army adopted the predecessor to its indigenous AT4 in the late 1960s.

Within a decade, the weapon’s manufacturer began researching a more advanced variant that would be singularly capable of penetrating heavily armored main battle tanks in frontal engagements. With this design priority in mind, the AT4 was created. The ATGM was conceptualized to be a weapon that could engage lighter armored Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) from any direction and heavily armored MBTs from the sides or rear. In addition to tanks, the AT4’s manufacturer wanted the weapon to be an effective tool against buildings and fortifications.  

Prior to the AT4’s introduction to the Swedish army, the AT4 was observed by the U.S. Army after Congress mandated an ATGM competition to replace the M72 LAW. Out of the competition’s six participants, the AT4 was recognized as the winner. The Swedish-made ATGM is a disposable, single-shot unguided launcher that fires an 84mm round. The AT4 is light, portable, and can be easily slung on a soldier’s shoulder. 

As outlined in a previous work, “The AT4 is a little over 3 feet (roughly 1 meter) in length and weighs around 15 pounds (6.80 kilograms). The round has a muzzle velocity of 820 feet (250 meters) per second and can penetrate 16 inches (40.64 centimeters) of armor at a maximum effective range of roughly 1,000 feet (305 meters). The projectiles can be high-explosive anti-tank, dual-purpose delayed penetration, high-penetration, and anti-structure for urban combat.”

The AT4’s manufacturer, Saab Bofors, implemented many of the same design features that the Cal Gustaf hosts. As a true supergun, the Gustaf can effectively target bunkers, thinly-armored personnel carriers, and even main battle tanks. Like the AT4, the Gustaf is man-portable and shoulder-fired.

However, unlike the Gustaf, the ATF is not reusable. Both weapons are of the same caliber and weight, but the AT4 is intended for two-person operation, unlike the Gustaf. 

Perhaps the AT4’s best quality is that it can be easily used.

The weapon’s simplicity and durability have led to its export across the globe and 20 countries today readily deploy this ATGM. The U.S. military alone has procured more than 600,000 AT4 ATGMs over the years. While the Swedish-made weapon is user-friendly, it also comes with some cons. 

One major flaw that the AT4 possesses is that it develops a large back-blast behind the weapon, which could injure the weapon’s operator and nearby friendly forces, according to Army Technology.

Therefore, the AT4 is not as versatile as other portable ATGMs, since it cannot be used in restricted areas frequently present in urban warfare settings. Due to this flaw, in addition to the AT4’s inability to take out main battle tanks easily, the Swedish-made weapon lags behind its Javelin and NLAW near-peer ATGMs. Despite this fact, the weapon has been used effectively in Ukraine.

According to Ukrainian officials, its soldiers were reportedly able to use the AT4 to take out some of Moscow’s top-of-the-line T-90 tanks.

In January of last year, Ukrainian-American journalist Viktor Kovalenko shared a clip of an alleged AT4 attack on social media.

In the footage, plumes of grey smoke can be seen billowing from a damaged T-90 tank.

While the Javelin and NLAW systems will continue to take center stage in Ukraine’s ATGM use, the AT4 should not be dismissed. 

Maya Carlin is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin.

All images are Creative Commons. 

Summary: The Nimitz-class aircraft carriers, named after Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, have been pivotal to the U.S. Navy's power projection since the mid-1970s.

-Despite plans to replace them with the Gerald R. Ford-class, delays and production issues have extended the Nimitz-class service life beyond past stated end dates, with the Navy spending $200 million on extensions.

-These carriers are vital for maintaining U.S. military presence in key regions like the Red Sea and South China Sea.

-Known for their robust capabilities, including advanced armament and large air wings, Nimitz-class carriers will continue to operate into the 2050s, supporting critical naval operations worldwide.

The Nimitz-class aircraft carriers have remained the backbone of the U.S. Navy since their introduction in the mid-1970’s. Named to honor World War II Pacific Fleet commander Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, these nuclear-powered carriers represented the largest warships to ever be built for the service until the introduction of the USS Gerald R. Ford in 2017.

From the Cold War to the War on Terror, the Nimitz class has a proven track record of power projection. More recently, the service has revealed that this carrier class will remain commissioned for longer than initially planned. The Navy’s fiscal 2023 budget called to prolong the service life of the lead ship of the class beyond 2025.

The Nimitz-class’ planned Ford successors are experiencing delays and other production issues, forcing the Navy to maintain these carriers past their service lives.

According to a 2023 report to Congress, the Navy plans to spend $200 million on extension work to preserve the Nimitz ships’ life spans.

As stated by Director of Air Warfare Division N98 Rear Adm. Michael Donnelly, “Carriers are the linchpin of everything we do in naval aviation. Our requirements are designed and aligned within our air wings to provide the capability out to the [combatant commands] for our ability to conduct the mission. Our ability to get the carriers out on time, whether it is new procurement or maintenance, is essential.”

The Navy must keep a sufficient number of carriers out at sea to project military might abroad. As tensions in the Red Sea, Persian Gulf and South China Sea continue to spike, the presence of U.S. carriers is even more vital. Until the Ford ships all enter service, their Nimitz predecessors will remain deployable.

The Navy first ordered the Nimitz-class carriers as replacement vessels for the older Kitty Hawk and Enterprise-classes. Powered by two A4W pressurized water reactors instead of the typical gas turbines or diesel-electric systems used previously on ships, the Nimitz are more sophisticated than their predecessors. Specifically, this class can carry 90% more aviation fuel and to% more ordnance than the earlier Forrestal carriers. The U.S. Navy prioritized developing a carrier class capable of withstanding more than three times the damage inflicted on the Essex ships during the Second World War. To fulfill this need, the Nimitz hangers are divided and more protected to restrict the spread of fire.

Armament-wise, the Nimitz carriers are well-equipped. Each ship in this class carries two or three RIM-7 Sea Sparrow or RIM-162 Evolved SeaSparrow Missile Mk29 missile launchers for use against aircraft and anti-ship missiles, in addition to Phalanx Close-In Weapon System (CIWS). The Phalanx is used to defend against incoming missiles, aircrafts and small boats. The weapon consists of a radar-guided Vulcan cannon. It is deployed on every class of surface combat ship except the San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock and Zumwalt-class destroyer.

While these weapons are formidable, the true strength of an aircraft carrier is its air wing. During the Cold War, the Nimitz carriers typically carry 85-90 aircraft, including E-2 Hawkeyes, S-3A Viking antisubmarine planes and A-6 Intruder attack bombers.

Today, the Nimitz carriers host the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, the EA-18G Growler electronic warfare aircraft and F-35C Lightning fighters.

The ten Nimitz-class carriers were constructed at Newport News Shipbuilding in Newport News, Virginia, between 1968 and 2006. Nimitz was commissioned in 1975, followed by Dwight D. Eisenhower, Carl Vinson, Theodore Roosevelt, Abraham Lincoln, George Washington, John C. Stennis, Harry S. Truman, Ronald Reagan, and George H.W. Bush in subsequent years.

The Nimitz first saw combat during Operation Eagle Claw over the Indian Ocean, when hostages were taken in the U.S. embassy in Tehran. During the Gulf War and Operation Southern Watch in the 1990’s, USS Theodore Roosevelt played a critical role in combat operations. Roosevelt and sister-ship Carl Vinson were among the first U.S. warships to operate in Operation Enduring Freedom following the September 11th attacks. Since then, essentially every Nimitz ship has supported air operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

While the Nimitz-class certainly retains an honorable service history, certain limitations require a next-generation carrier-class that can better adapt to technological advances. The Gerald R. Ford-class was ordered in 2008 and is expected to replace its Nimitz predecessors.

However, delays are pushing back the projected timeline of the Ford ships’ entry to service, rendering the need to maintain the Nimitz ships. Recent reports suggest that the Nimitz-class ships will sail through the 2050s and perhaps later to prevent a gap in capability from forming.

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. 

Image Credit: Creative Commons and Shutterstock. 

Summary: The U.S. Air Force has deployed F-22 Raptors to the Middle East to counter Russia's escalating provocations, including harassment of American MQ-9 Reaper drones in Syrian airspace, in years past.

-This follows a history of aggressive behavior, such as a 2012 incident where Iranian pilots attempted to shoot down a U.S. Predator drone, leading to the decision to escort drones with F-22s.

-The F-22, the world's first fifth-generation fighter, is unmatched in capability, making Russian aircraft vulnerable in its presence.

-The deployment sends a clear message to Russia to reconsider its hostile actions in the region.

The U.S. Air Force recently deployed F-22 Raptors to the Middle East as part of a broader effort to combat Russia’s increasingly provocative behavior in the region.

Over the last year, Russian fighters have engaged in malign behavior targeting American unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) quite frequently. This week, the U.S. military said that Moscow’s fighters have “harassed” American drones over Syria for the third day in a row.

Three MQ-9 Reaper drones were the target of Russia’s harassment, versatile primary offensive strike UAVs for the Air Force. According to the head of the U.S. Air Forces Central Command Lt. Gen. Alex Grynkewich, “Russian aircraft flew 18 unprofessional close passes that caused the MQ-9s to react to avoid unsafe situations.” While these types of provocations over Syrian airspace are significant, Russian fighters have also intercepted a Reaper drone over the Black Sea last year. 

By sending over Raptors in response to Russia’s hostile behavior in the region, the U.S. military is telling Moscow to watch out.

As the world’s first ever fifth-generation fighter platform, the F-22 is widely considered to be the most sophisticated of its kind to ever fly the skies. Russian pilots should consider another time in history when these formidable fighters were sent to protect American spy drones against Soviet aircraft one decade ago. 

In 2012, a pair of Iranian Air Force Su-25 pilots attempted to shoot down the U.S. drone which was operating roughly 16 miles from Iran’s coastline. The U.S. Air Force’s MQ-1 Predator UAV was designed primarily for patient reconnaissance and did not pose a threat to any airframes.

In fact, if attacked, the drone would struggle quite a bit to defend itself. For this reason, the Iranian pilots considered the Predator to be an easy target. Flying Soviet-era Su-25 “frogfoots,” the Iranian pilots reportedly closed in on the drone and opened fire using their 30mm cannons. The Su-25s failed to destroy the drone.

However, the message they were sending was received by the U.S. Going forward.

The Pentagon decided to send F-22 Raptors or F-18 Hornets to escort Predator drones involved in intelligence surveillance reconnaissance missions on the move. 

In 2013, Iranian pilots would again try to take down a Predator drone close to the Iranian shoreline. This time, however, F-22 Raptors were nearby. A pair of Iranian F-4 Phantom pilots began to close in on the Predator, likely scoping out how to best take it down.

Unbeknownst to the Iranian pilots, an F-22 piloted by Lt. Col. Kevin “Showtime” Sutterfield was eying the F-4 Phantoms the whole time.

Then-Chief of Staff Gen. Mark Welsh explained what happened next:

“He [the Raptor pilot] flew under their aircraft [the F-4s] to check out their weapons load without them knowing that he was there, and then pulled up on their left wing and then called them and said ‘you really ought to go home.’” 

While Russia does fly more modern fighters than the Su-25 these days, no airframe in its arsenal would be completely safe around an F-22 Raptor tasked with protecting an American UAV. The redeployment of Raptors to the Middle East does not bode well for Moscow’s future provocations in Syria’s airspace. 

Maya Carlin is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. Email the Author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock. 

On April 10, 2024, amid the high-pitch and polarising campaign for the upcoming national elections, Indian prime minister Narendra Modi gave a crucial interview with Newsweek. Generally, BJP election campaigns put a high premium on hyper-nationalistic rhetoric on security issues. However, this time, Modi took an unexpected stance and softened his previously tough posture on India-China ties. In his Newsweek interview, he said, “Through positive and constructive bilateral engagement at diplomatic and military levels, the two countries will be able to restore and sustain peace and tranquillity at the borders.” While emphasizing that the relationship with China is “important” and “significant,” he stated, “It is my belief that we need to urgently address the prolonged situation on our borders so that the abnormality in our bilateral interactions can be put behind us. Stable and peaceful relations between India and China are important for not just our two countries but the entire region and world.” Reacting positively to Modi’s statements, China also assured that “sound and stable” relations are in both nations’ interests.

In the diplomatic quarters, Modi’s statements have signaled a breakthrough toward achieving a thaw in the stiff and estranged bilateral ties between India and China. However, the question arises whether it is possible to achieve a lasting peace in the Himalayan borders, given the fact that twenty-one rounds of core commander-level meetings and twenty-nine meetings of the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC) on India-China border affairs have failed to achieve any breakthrough. 

After the Galwan crisis in June 2020, which resulted in causalities on both sides, the bilateral ties worsened. Following the Galwan standoff, both sides amassed 50,000 troops in a mirror deployment pattern in the Ladakh sector. After four rounds of disengagement in Galwan Valley, Pangong Tso, Gogra (PP-17 A), and Hot Springs (PP-15), and continuing tensions in Depsang and Demchok, the deployments remain in a standoff on both sides of the border. Today, bilateral relations are at a nadir not seen since the 1962 war.

Nevertheless, focused as it is on the goal of a $5 trillion economy, India cannot afford to bait China into a major conflict and has no intention of doing so. On the other hand, amid rumors of China occupying further Indian territory and India forfeiting patrolling rights in some parts of Ladakh, the Chinese threat to Indian territorial integrity cannot be ignored. Further, the specter of a united China-Pakistan front will be a strategic nightmare for New Delhi. Bearing all of this in mind, how should India address the China question?

Understanding India’s Mind and its Dilemmas 

The greatest puzzle torturing Indian security czars is how to decode China’s intentions. In my interaction with several eminent Indian geostrategic experts, both practitioner diplomats and academic scholars, I found that there is hardly any agreement on what China wants. Does Beijing want to amicably settle the boundary issues and make further progress in trade and cultural ties, or simply grab India’s territory? 

Notably, in the perceptions of the Indian strategic community, the boundary issue constitutes a bottleneck preventing the improvement of bilateral relations. As many told me, India-China ties will take an upward trajectory once there is a breakthrough on the boundary front. However, regarding China’s intent, many Indian scholars and diplomats believe India can do business with China and resolve the boundary issues through bilateral diplomatic initiatives. They argue that from 1988 to 2020, both countries signed bilateral agreements in 1993, 1996, and 2005, ratifying the 1962 ceasefire line as the Line of Actual Control (LAC) to maintain peace and tranquillity on the border and focus more on building robust trade relationships. As a result, no significant differences existed on the LAC, even if the exact demarcation remained unsettled. Further, they argue that over the last three decades before 2020, India and China had discovered a successful modus vivendi to live together peacefully as neighbors, enhance commercial ties, and de-hyphenate the long-standing boundary issues from the commercial and business arena. 

The opponents of the abovementioned line of thought ask if China wanted peace, why did it unleash the Galwan conflict without provocation, spoiling the trust-building measures of the last three decades? Even before Galwan, China’s intent was never transparent and fair. In 2009, China constructed a road from Sumdo to Patrol Point 13 in the Depsang plains. The PLA’s 2011 and 2013 incursions into the Depsang plains led to a face-off with the Indian army. In 2014, PLA made incursions in Chumar (Eastern Ladakh), followed by a long-drawn standoff between the two armies in Doklam on the India-Bhutan-China trijunction in 2017. Except for the 2011 incursion, which the military leadership resolved, the remaining ones required negotiations with the civilian leadership. 

Additionally, on various occasions, China irked India by handing stapled visas to the citizens of Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh and blocking the designation of Pakistan-sponsored and based terrorist commanders as global terrorists in the UN. Further, China’s rigid and intransigent attitude on the boundary issues after twenty-one rounds of core commander-level talks following the Galwan deadlock, coupled with its heavy investment in the dual-use infrastructure in the border regions, raises serious suspicions about China’s long-term intent.

Another line of thought argues that the boundary issue in itself is irrelevant to China. A few remote tracks of land pale in significance to Beijing’s larger bid for regional and global power. As such, Beijing seeks to use the issue to subordinate India into acceptance of its status as an inferior power vis-à-vis the mighty “middle kingdom.” The 1962 war was, in part, intended to downsize India’s prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, under whose leadership India was emerging as a leader of the non-aligned countries. In China’s grand strategy, a strong, confident India cannot exist as an equal civilizational state in its own backyard and challenge its status as a world power.

Furthermore, the border issue serves to counter India’s naval presence in the Indian Ocean, which could threaten China’s shipping routes in the Malacca Strait. Beijing aims to keep India boxed in on land either by propping up the Kashmir issue with its all-weather friend Pakistan and its array of proxy terrorist groups or by salami-slicing incursions on the India-China border. Also, China may want to keep the borders vague at this stage, create confusion and ambivalence through occasional incursions, and finally settle the border under more favorable geopolitical conditions. These scenarios could include China’s attainment of decisive military and technological superiority over India, Indian isolation in global politics, or the erosion and weakening of Western capabilities and intent to support India against China.

This uncertainty and unease hovering around China’s long-term designs in the Himalayas is helped by the scarcity of information. Chinese political and military institutions are famously opaque, unlike those of democratic countries. Additionally, Indian intelligence agencies have devoted most of their attention and resources to Pakistan and its proxy terrorist networks in the last several decades. Consequently, they do not have robust intelligence capabilities and reliable assets within Chinese decision-making institutions. In fact, India relies on U.S. satellite imagery for intelligence about China’s troops’ deployment, infrastructure build-up, and other developments in the border areas. Academic scholars mostly rely on official documents from the Chinese government that are available in the public domain and articles published in prominent Chinese newspapers and media portals.

Mapping Escalation Scenarios

In 1962, when the Indian and Chinese armies were locked in a standoff in Himalayan borders over the boundary question, Chairman Mao, drawing his lessons from the classical Chinese tradition, told his commanders that China and India had fought “one and a half wars” throughout history, furnishing Beijing with valuable lessons. He narrated two instances of Chinese military intervention in India to his generals. The first war happened 1300 years earlier during the rule of the Tang dynasty (618-907 AD), when China sent its military to support a legitimate Indian king fighting against an usurper. After the first war, India and China enjoyed a long period of peace and vibrant cultural, economic, and religious exchange. The “half-war,” according to Mao, occurred when Timur the Lame, a Mongol king, plundered and raided Delhi in 1398, killing at least 100,000 people.

In Mao’s understanding, the critical lesson from the two abovementioned historical incidents was that India and China were, in Kissinger’s words, “not doomed to perpetual enmity,” and they could enjoy sustained periods of peace and prosperity again. However, for this to take place, Beijing had to “knock” India forcefully to bring it to the diplomatic negotiations.

Weeks later, China invaded India and inflicted a devasting defeat, almost occupying the entire state of modern-day Arunachal Pradesh before retreating to the previous line of control and even returning the captured heavy weaponry. The defeat of 1962 is still a major humiliation for the Indian collective psyche.

The incident mentioned above reveals the deep historical roots in China’s strategic subconscious. Hence, if history is the best way to understand China’s underlying philosophy and forecast its future actions, then there is a strong likelihood of a 1962-style swift invasion in some sectors and major skirmishes in the other sectors. One recent report from the Royal United Services Institute predicts a Second India-China war between 2025 and 2030. In such a scenario, India cannot rule out the possibility of a quick surge of Chinese troops seven to eight kilometers inside the Indian territory. 

At the same time, Pakistan may activate the Line of Control and incite terror incidents in Kashmir and communal violence in India as a diversion tactic and facilitate the execution of Beijing’s game plan as swiftly as possible. In another scenario, China may continue embarrassing and pressuring India with its periodic salami-slicing incursions. Coupled with such military adventures, India may have to face cyber-attacks on its critical infrastructure, military and civil installations, financial institutions, and stock markets. 

An invasion may happen where India least expects it. Though most recent incursions and encroachment have taken place in the Ladakh region, New Delhi cannot assume that an attack can only occur in the western sector. Minor and periodic Chinese incursions could act as diversion tactics to hide the real game plan of a mid-sized invasion in the eastern sector of the India-China border, Arunachal Pradesh, which Beijing claims as “South Tibet.” To add more to the prevailing confusion, China may initiate incursions in the middle sector, encourage Nepal to be more aggressive on the Indian border and claim Kalapani, and create intense pressure in Bhutan either by deployment, increased patrols in disputed areas, or by infrastructure build-up. 

Reportedly, the Chinese may believe this middle path of swift and mid-sized invasion is feasible in terms of a cost-benefit analysis. First, the invasion will likely be very swift, giving minimum response time to the Indian side. Against the backdrop of existing uncertainty and ambiguity, by the time New Delhi realizes Beijing’s intent, the PLA would have secured most of its intended outcomes. Second, Indian communications and road infrastructure in the Himalayan region are developing fast; however, there is a long way to go before they catch up with China. 

I have discussed in a previous article that China has constructed a sophisticated network of axial roads in the border areas, which makes troop and equipment movement much easier and rapid vis-à-vis movement on the Indian side. In such a scenario, Americans can help only by providing intelligence, minor communications equipment, and technological support, enabling smooth logistics. They are unlikely to put their boots on the ground. Political will aside, the Himalayan terrain is harsh, and the American soldiers are not accustomed to it.

The battles in the Himalayan region are likely to be infantry and artillery-centric, in which the road infrastructure will play a critical role, and China has a clear short-term advantage on that front. Additionally, China can utilize its drones and rocket force. Lastly, in such a scenario, India’s relationship with Russia would be of little value once a conflict erupts. Due to Moscow’s increased dependence on Beijing after the Ukraine war, its capabilities are limited. By the time they can influence Chinese policymakers, Beijing will have secured its gains, after which the world powers will intervene, urging restraint and diplomacy.

The chances of such a swift, embarrassing, and destabilizing attack and the periodic accidental or deliberate skirmishes escalating into a full-fledged conventional war are minimal at this stage. If the conflict escalates beyond a point and gets longer, China will be embroiled in a long-drawn and protracted conflict in rugged Himalayan terrain. India has also come a long way from where it was in 1962. Today, India is a nuclear power and a leader in advanced space programs. In addition to its robust scientific, technological, and industrial base with the fourth largest military and fifth largest GDP, it has a much stronger and credible standing in global geopolitics. Hence, if it can neutralize the initial brunt of a Chinese attack, Indians could give a robust defense and counterattack, bringing massive embarrassment to China. 

Such a scenario will be a major setback to China’s long-term ambitions to become a world power and contend with the United States. Also, following such a scenario, India would likely abandon its neutrality and switch to the American side, get closer to Quad countries and the Western camp, and cause hurdles for China’s supply lines in the Malacca straits with its strong naval presence in the Indian Ocean. It can reject the “One China” theory in principle, take a strong anti-China stand by joining forces with Vietnam, Japan, Philippines, and Indonesia, and in theatres like the Middle East, Afghanistan, and the South Caucasus, where it has emerged with a robust strategic footprint. Also, it can be more active with the Quad countries in the South China Sea and East China Sea.

Dr. Abhinav Pandya is a founder and CEO of Usanas Foundation, an India-based geopolitical and security affairs think-tank, and the author of Radicalization in India: An Exploration and  Terror Financing in Kashmir. He has a Ph.D. from OP Jindal University and an MPA from Cornell University.

Image: Natalia Davidovich / Shutterstock.com.

Summary and Key Points: Logan Nye's article revisits the restrictive rules of engagement (ROE) imposed on U.S. combat aviators by President Lyndon B. Johnson during the Vietnam War, which severely hampered their effectiveness.

-These rules prevented preemptive strikes against enemy anti-aircraft units, contributing to significant American losses.

-Under President Nixon, more aggressive tactics, exemplified by Operation Linebacker II, significantly shifted the war's dynamics.

-The lesson learned carried into the 1991 Persian Gulf War, where President George H.W. Bush allowed military leaders to conduct operations with minimal interference, resulting in the successful and decisive Operation Desert Storm.

A  somewhat recent article comments on the absolutely ludicrous rules of engagement (ROE) imposed on American combat aviators by Lyndon B. Johnson during the Vietnam War. 

The article in question, written by Logan Nye for We Are The Mighty, doesn’t offer a new premise. But seeing how this year marks the 50th anniversary of the official end of America’s involvement in the Vietnam War, his timing is certainly apropos.

In his bestselling 1995 mea culpa autobiography In Retrospect, Robert S. McNamara — secretary of defense under both JFK and LBJ — claimed that the latter president’s “instructions were clear: ‘Win!’” But the actions of McNamara and LBJ belied the expressed desire to win. 

The on-paper technological superiority of American warplanes like the F-4 Phantom — which garnered sixteen world speed and altitude records between 1959 and 1962, and held five of those records until the advent of the F-15 Eagle in 1975 — was negated by arbitrary ROEs that gave a distinct advantage to the enemy and wasted the lives of American aircrews. How so? By allowing the North Vietnamese Communists to take the initiative during American air raids.

LBJ and McNamara dictated that our fighter and bomber crews couldn’t proactively hunt the Communists’ anti-aircraft units — their anti-aircraft artillery guns and surface-to-air missiles (SAM). Our flyboys couldn’t even attack the gun batteries and SAM sites until the enemy unit fired, or at least activated radar against them. In other words, never bleeping mind that we’re already actively engaged in a shooting war, we’re going to allow the enemy to fire the first shot every time.

Johnson even went so far as to brag that no single piece of ordnance could be placed on an American warplane in Vietnam without his personal approval.

Talk about micromanagement. And talk about murdering your own countrymen and wasting your material assets: A total of 1,737 U.S. fixed-wing aircraft were lost in combat during the war, including 40 percent of the total production of F-105 Thunderchiefs and one out of every eight F-4 Phantoms ever made. Two-thousand five-hundred eighty U.S. Air Force personnel lost their lives.

LBJ’s White House successor, Richard M. Nixon, finally allowed American aviators to take the proverbial gloves off in their prosecution of the Vietnam War effort.

The difference became most glaringly obvious at the strategic level, specifically Operation Linebacker II, the so-called “Christmas bombing” of Hanoi in December 1972 that sent the North Vietnamese back to the peace table and nearly won the war for America.

But it applied at the tactical level as well, to fighter jocks as well as B-52 “BUFF” bomber drivers. This was thanks in no small part to U.S. Air Force Maj. Gen. John D. Lavelle, then commander of the Seventh Air Force.

As Mr. Nye elaborates:

“Lavelle went to the Pentagon for permission…He says that approval came, with a caveat. Nixon was working on thawing relations with China in 1972. The Pentagon supported Lavelle coming up with his own ‘interpretation’ of the rules. ‘Secretary [of Defense Melvin] Laird told me he agreed, but the climate was just not right in Washington for any changes,’ Lavelle said. ‘He told me I should make a liberal interpretation of the rules of engagement in the field and not come to Washington and ask him, under the political climate, to come out with an interpretation; I should make them in the field, and he would back me up’…Lavelle came up with, ‘Yup, you can attack the guns under certain conditions,’ and his men destroyed 11 guns. They got a special thank you from the Thai prime minister on the same day Lavelle’s boss fired him.”

Lavelle may have been fired, but he still retired honorably from the Air Force with two stars on his shoulder boards. And soon enough, the official ROEs were changed for the better and made Operation Linebacker II possible.

Fast-forward to the 1991 Persian Gulf War, AKA Operation Desert Storm, and luckily America again had a POTUS in George H.W. Bush, who, like Richard Nixon, took to heart the need to let his generals fight the war as the latter saw fit — with minimal White House meddling. Thus, it was that Air Force Gen. Chuck Horner, commander of U.S. and coalition allies’ air assets during that war, was able to wage “Instant Thunder,” a refreshing contrast to the gradualism of LBJ’s “Rolling Thunder” — not only in semantics, but in terms of speed, intensity, ferocity, accuracy, and most importantly, freedom of decision-making, from Gen. Horner on down to the individual coalition fighter and bomber crews doing the actual fighting, killing, and dying.

The contrasting final results of “Instant Thunder” vs. “Rolling Thunder” speak for themselves.

Christian D. Orr is a former Air Force Security Forces officer, Federal law enforcement officer, and private military contractor (with assignments worked in Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Kosovo, Japan, Germany, and the Pentagon). Chris holds a B.A. in International Relations from the University of Southern California (USC) and an M.A. in Intelligence Studies (concentration in Terrorism Studies) from American Military University (AMU). He has also been published in The Daily Torch and The Journal of Intelligence and Cyber Security. Last but not least, he is a Companion of the Order of the Naval Order of the United States (NOUS). 

Summary and Key Points: Israel is set to receive 25 additional F-35I Adir aircraft, bolstering its capabilities amid escalating conflicts with Iranian-backed groups like Hamas and Hezbollah.

-These fifth-generation stealth fighters are crucial for Israel's defense and potential long-range strikes, including deep inside Iran.

-The acquisition underscores the importance of maintaining Israel's qualitative military edge (QME) in a region fraught with hostilities.

-The F-35I’s advanced technology provides Israel with significant tactical advantages, essential for countering threats and conducting precision strikes, especially as tensions with Iran and its proxies intensify.

The F-35I Adir is Israel's Ace-in-the-Hole for Striking Iran

It’s official. The Israel Air Force (IAF) is getting 25 additional F-35I warplanes that are to be delivered in batches of three-to-five per year until 2028, according to the Times of Israel. The deal, worth $3 billion, comes at a time of extreme peril—and controversy—for the tiny Jewish democracy. 

Since the October 7 attacks, Israel has been at war with the Iranian-backed terrorist group, Hamas. 

Multiple offensives into Gaza, where Hamas is based, has turned international opinion against Israel, as civilian casualties among the Palestinian Arab population of Gaza mount (Hamas hides its personnel and equipment among the civilians of Gaza). 

And the longer that Israel continues its offensives deep into Gaza, the more exposed their northern flank against the far more powerful Iranian-backed terrorist organization in neighboring Lebanon is. 

Israel undoubtedly has the most powerful indigenous military in the Mideast. Yet, its small geographical size means it has a relatively small population base. So, the very worst thing that could happen for Israel would be to find itself surrounded by multiple hostile powers that have numerical advantages. To offset these potential numerical advantages, Israel needs advanced technology. 

In this context, Israel has purchased a variant of the US military’s fifth-generation warplane, the F-35. Known as the “Adir,” which means “Mighty” in Hebrew and is derived from the Book of Psalms in the Holy Bible. The initial tranche of F-35I’s were purchased back in 2010 and delivered in 2016 to the Nevatim Air Base. 

Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu proclaimed that, “Our long arm has now become longer and mightier.” The inclusion of the F-35 in Israel’s arsenal gives them a decisive advantage, especially over enemies, such as those found in Syria, Lebanon, and much farther afield, in Iran.

Interestingly, the Israelis were most displeased with the fact that the United States authorized the sale of a tranche of F-35s to the United Arab Emirates (UAE). This is because Israeli leaders understandably feared that the sale could pose a “threat to Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge (QME).” 

Essentially, the spread of F-35s to UAE might lessen Israel’s military heft in the region (degrading Israel’s technological superiority over their neighbors). Ultimately, the Israel government accepted the sale because, at the same time, the US government was helping Israel modernize its military, too.

The Importance of the F-35I Adir

The F-35I Adir is such an important piece of Israel’s advanced arsenal that the Iranian military targeted the Nevatim Air Base in their shocking missile attack against Israel in April of this year. 

Nevatim was targeted specifically because it was home to Israel’s F-35I fleet, as my colleague, Maya Carlin, elaborated in these pages at the time of those strikes. The missiles were deflected. But the fact that Iranian forces were targeting Nevatim indicates how important of an asset the F-35I is for Israel—and how much fear these systems instill in Israel’s regional rivals, such as Iran.

For its part, the F-35I was a critical component for Israel’s air defense the night of the Iranian missile attack. Multiple units were deployed as the missile fusillade approached Israel from Iranian territory. The F-35Is that were deployed successfully intercepted the missiles. 

And, for good measure, those F-35Is bombed a few Hezbollah targets next door in Lebanon. 

The additional F-35Is going to Israel is in keeping with Israel’s defense needs. Considering that the F-35I is being targeted by Iranian missile attacks, given that Hezbollah and Hamas, both groups that possess large (and growing) missile capabilities, Israel needs to ensure that they have backups to their existing fleet of Adirs. In the event their arsenal of F-35Is is damaged, another tranche of these birds from the United States would help prevent any loss in capabilities for the Israeli Air Force.

Of course, the real question is, will the presence of these planes be enough to stop the chaos currently encircling Israel? 

Israeli forces have understandably moved hard against Hamas after the terrorist attacks on October 7. Israel’s military has penetrated deep inside Palestinian Arab territories in Gaza, pushing as far south as the Philadelphi Corridor which borders Egypt. 

The only problem for Israel is that Hamas embeds itself among civilian populations. 

Very often, for Israeli forces to capture or kill Hamas fighters, they must do their utmost to avoid innocent civilians in Gaza, and, if lives are lost, Israel loses their standing in the court of international public opinion. When Israeli forces took the Philadelphi Corridor, they were fired upon by twitchy Egyptian border guards. Israeli forces returned fire, killing the Egyptian border guard in question. But this has complicated the already tense Israeli-Arab relations (a relationship the Israeli government desperately needs to maintain as it battles Iran for regional power). 

Meanwhile, sensing weakness, Hezbollah moves hard against Israel. It’s all part of Iran’s plan. And one of the only countermeasures against the all-out regional war that Iran seeks to wage upon Israel are the F-35Is that Israel has. 

Along with advanced interception capabilities and air-to-ground abilities, the F-35I provides Israel with long-range strike capabilities. In fact, the F-35I is one of only two warplanes in the IAF’s arsenal (the other being the F-15I Ra’am) that could reliably conduct a bombing mission against targets deep inside Iran. 

And that’s another important point here. 

Because the Israelis are not just going to sit back and watch as Hezbollah and Hamas move to encircle them. They understand all too well that Iran is the real culprit behind the violence in the region. Israel’s government just might decide to take matters into their own hands and directly strike Iranian targets inside of Iran. 

The F-35I Adir will allow them to do this. That’s why Israel wants the plane. And that’s why they understandably love it so much. 

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

All images are Creative Commons. 

Summary and Key Points: Last weekend, Houthi rebels claimed to have struck the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower aircraft carrier in the Red Sea with a suicide drone or missile. This week, misleading satellite images emerged, falsely depicting the carrier undergoing urgent repairs.

-In reality, one image was of the Russian aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov, and the other was an old photo of the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower in Norfolk, Virginia, with fabricated damage.

-U.S. Central Command denied the Houthi claims, labeling them as part of a disinformation campaign. Such misinformation serves to undermine U.S. military credibility and could benefit adversaries like Russia and China.

Last weekend, Houthi rebels claimed they landed a suicide drone hit (some reports suggest a missile attack as well) on the aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower in the Red Sea.

This week, a couple of satellite pictures that surfaced on X purportedly showed the American aircraft carrier undergoing urgent repairs in Souda Bay, Greece. 

Both pictures were wrong and misleading. 

First things first. In November 2023, Houthi rebels in Yemen started to attack international shipping in and close to the Red Sea as a response to Israel’s military operations in Gaza. 

A U.S.-led coalition quickly reacted to the Houthis with precision strikes on their positions. Those operations have continued, with mixed success. The Yemeni rebels continue to pose a danger to international shipping, firing ballistic anti-ship missiles and suicide drones. 

The U.S. Navy has deployed assets in the region to combat Houthi activity along with allies and partners. At least one U.S. aircraft carrier supports the operation with airstrikes. Over the weekend, the Houthis claimed to have struck USS Dwight D. Eisenhower. 

However, the satellite pictures displayed by two X accounts do not show what they claim to show. The first picture doesn’t even depict the correct warship, but rather shows the Russian aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov undergoing repairs in the Russian port of Murmansk. The second picture is indeed of USS Dwight D. Eisenhower, but it is an old picture of the warship harbored in Norfolk, Virginia. Moreover, the alleged damage on the bow of the aircraft carrier is the crude work of a rather incompetent graphic designer.  

U.S. Central Command, which is responsible for operations in the Middle East and West Asia, categorically denied the claims that the Houthis hit the U.S. aircraft carrier. 

“There is no truth to the Houthi claim of striking the USS Eisenhower or any U.S. Navy vessel,” a U.S. Central Command spokesperson told Voice of America. “This is an ongoing disinformation campaign that the Houthis have been conducting for months.”

Both videos were viewed by millions of online users, sparking discussions on the internet about the capabilities and readiness of U.S. aircraft carriers.

Misinformation that a U.S. aircraft carrier was hit by a rebel drone or missile would certainly be useful to Russia and China. America’s two near-peer adversaries would benefit from highlighting vulnerabilities on some of the U.S. military’s most fearsome weapons systems, both to boast about their own capabilities and to try to influence neutral countries or U.S. partners that might be on the fence.

As the best propaganda always does, the Houthi claims rely on tangential truths. Yes, the Houthis have impressive capabilities for an insurgent group. Yes, they have used those capabilities to target and strike international shipping. Yes, Western warships have come under direct fire. But evidence shows that USS Dwight D. Eisenhower was never hit by a suicide drone or missile. 

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from the Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

Image Credit: X Screenshot/Fake Attack on U.S. Navy Aircraft Carrier. 

Summary and Key Points: James Cameron's The Terminator hit theaters 40 years ago, popularizing the concept of "killer robots." Today, the threat is becoming reality, with nations like the U.S. and Russia developing autonomous weapons. At the 2018 International Conference on Artificial Intelligence, scientists called for laws against lethal autonomous weapons. While such technology could save lives by taking on dangerous tasks, it also raises significant ethical concerns. Russia is notably advancing its autonomous drone capabilities, including the Scorpion-M "kamikaze robot."

-Despite UN efforts to ban killer robots, both the U.S. and Russia continue to pursue these technologies, posing a potential future threat to humanity.

For those of a certain age, it might be hard to believe, but James Cameron's breakout film The Terminator hit theaters forty years ago this fall.

Cameron wasn't the first to suggest that “killer robots” would turn on their creators—Westworld came out more than a decade earlier. It featured an adult playground for the wealthy to live out their violent fantasies, but the robots did more than just level the playing field.

Sci-fi movies, TV shows, and games have continued to play up the threat of self-aware robots, but it isn't far-fetched fiction anymore.

The danger posed by “killer robots” is being taken seriously, and at the 2018 International Conference on Artificial Intelligence in Stockholm, some of the world's top scientific minds called for “laws against lethal autonomous weapons.”

Autonomous weapons can also help save lives, as they can be employed in missions alongside human operators and take on more dangerous tasks. These platforms could serve as force multipliers, bolstering deterrence against conflict escalation.

Multiple nations, including the United States, continue to develop platforms that employ artificial intelligence and could serve as loyal wingmen for combat aircraft and support vessels at sea. There are likely many who question whether the U.S. military should be trusted with the development of AI-powered systems, but perhaps the bigger danger is how other nations could harness the technology of killer robots.

TASS reported on June 4 that efforts are underway in Russia to develop more capable autonomous drones in the next three to five years.

“We can expect greater autonomy of drones due to machine vision and artificial intelligence. It will happen regardless of the type of the drone, whether it is a fixed-wing one, multicopter or hybrid. The AI will demand increased onboard computer capacities and will initially process data onboard thus decreasing the load on ground personnel,” Commercial Director of the Future Laboratory Company Pavel Kamenev told TASS at this week's St. Petersburg International Economic Forum.

Kamenev further suggested that AI could take control of re-transmitters of control signals, onboard flight, and power electronics. This could increase the flight range and payload of drones.

“The near-Earth space will be developed and will influence the drones,” Kamenev added. “In general, in 3-5 years it will be impossible to imagine our life without drones. Progress cannot be stopped. Such guidelines, as monitoring, diagnostics of linear and infrastructure objects, cargo delivery and aerial survey will be closely linked to drones.”

Though weapons weren't mentioned, the Kremlin is known to be taking the lead in developing semi-autonomous platforms. These have included land-based and aerial armed drones that can operate remotely and with limited human input. In May, news circulated that Russian forces had deployed the Scorpion-M “kamikaze robot” in the Donetsk region. It is about the size of a small radio-controlled car, but the Scorpion-M can carry more than 55 pounds of explosives and can seek out targets that might escape aerial bombardment, Fox News reported. 

Russia—and the United States—stood in the way of formal United Nations efforts to block any ban on killer robots, and the technology seems to be advancing rapidly. While there is plenty of reason for concern over U.S. efforts with the technology, Russia has shown it is willing, ready, and able to use nearly any of its weapons platforms in combat.

That should be seen as a danger not just for those in Ukraine today, but perhaps all of humanity in the not-so-distant future. The irony would be that if and perhaps when the weapons do turn on their human masters, it will be Russians in the crosshairs.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org

Summary: When Lockheed's F-117 Nighthawk entered service in 1983, it revolutionized military aviation by using stealth over speed to evade detection.

-This breakthrough stemmed from Denys Overholser at Lockheed's Skunk Works, who discovered Soviet physicist Pyotr Ufimtsev's work on radar wave diffraction.

-This led to the creation of the Hopeless Diamond model, whose radar cross-section was so low that it became invisible during tests, necessitating the invention of a new "stealth pole."

-Despite initial skepticism, these advancements paved the way for the F-117, marking a significant milestone in stealth technology and military aviation history.

When Lockheed’s legendary F-117 Nighthawk first entered service in 1983, it brought with it a revolution in military aviation. After decades of focusing on the development of higher and faster-flying aircraft to avoid enemy air defenses, the Nighthawk proved that, through a radar-defeating design, a subsonic aircraft could actually be more survivable.

What followed was decades worth of stealth innovation, competition, and advancement… but before the Nighthawk could change the world, it was up to Ben Rich, the head of Lockheed’s famed Skunk Works at the time, to sell the Air Force on the idea.

And in order to do that, Skunk Works first had to invent a stealth pole for the Air Force.

The stealth design leveraged by Skunk Works may have been uniquely American, but it was actually built upon the collective expertise of a number of scientists and researchers — some of whom even came from the wrong side of the Iron Curtain. Famously, the concept that led to stealth was born out of the work of Soviet physicist and mathematician Pyotr Ufimtsev, which had gone largely ignored by his own nation before catching the interest of Skunk Works’ Denys Overholser.

Ufimtsev’s paper, called Method of Edge Waves in the Physical Theory of Diffraction, had just been translated by the Air Force’s Foreign Technology Division. To most, this 40-page treatise focused on developing a theory for predicting the scattering of electromagnetic waves seemed like little more than dry reading. But to Overholser, the equations buried deep in the paper represented the holy grail of low-observable aviation: a means to calculate an aircraft design’s radar cross-section without even having to build it.

Armed with this new approach to analyzing aircraft designs, Rich’s team at Skunk Works set about designing an aircraft with a radar cross-section literally thousands of times smaller than the SR-71-based D-21 supersonic reconnaissance drone, the stealthiest platform they’d built to date. This effort led to a 10-foot wooden model that the Skunk Works team dubbed the Hopeless Diamond. The design was stealthy enough for Rich to win a bet against legendary engineer Kelly Johnson, but the bigger hurdle would be convincing the Air Force that stealth was real.

To test their stealth design, the Skunk Works team brought their Hopeless Diamond model to McDonnel Douglas’ radar test range in the Mojave Desert and mounted it atop a 12-foot pole. This was a common practice for testing the radar returns of new aircraft designs. But when the radar array was powered on… something seemed to be wrong.

The radar operator, manning an array just 1,500 feet from the model, looked to Ben Rich and told him that the Hopeless Diamond must have fallen off the pole. Rich looked and confirmed it was still there, but it wasn’t until a blackbird landed on top of the model that the operator registered a radar return. Mistaken, he thought the bird must be the aircraft. As Rich later recounted, it was the first time he felt certain that stealth was the real deal.

In March of 1976, it was time for Skunk Works to prove their design was as stealthy as they claimed to the Air Force. Moving on from the 10-foot Hopeless Diamond, they arrived at the White Sands radar range with a 38-foot mock-up of the aircraft, made of wood and painted black. They were set to compete against Northrop’s stealth design for an Air Force contract, and the Air Force had brought its most powerful radar arrays to size up each firm’s entries.

With five radar antennas, each broadcasting in different frequencies zeroed in on a wooden pole in the tabletop-flat test range, Rich’s team mounted their model and stepped back, waiting to hear how their design would fare against the best radar systems and operators the world had to offer…

But all they could see on radar was the pole.

According to an account later written by Denys Overholser, the pole itself registered at minus 20 decibels on radar, which compared to most aircraft, was basically invisible. But compared to the Hopeless Diamond, it might as well have been a barn.

You’d think being stealthier than what had previously been considered a practically “invisible” pole in the desert would be a huge win for the Skunk Works team… but it wasn’t all good news.

“An Air Force colonel confronted me in a fit of pique: ‘Well,’ he snorted, ‘since you’re so damned clever, build us a new pole.'” Overholser wrote.

“I thought, ‘Oh, sure. Build a tower that’s 10 decibels lower than the model. Lots of luck.'”

With no intention of being beaten by a pole, Overholser set about designing a double-wedge pylon for the Air Force that was big enough to mount large models on, but created a radar return just “the size of a bumblebee.”

Designing and building a stealth pole for the Air Force wasn’t an anticipated expense for the Skunk Works team. In fact, they ultimately had to split the half-million dollar cost (about $2.6 million today) with Northrop to get the competition going again.

Of course, this ultimately proved to be a better investment for Lockheed than for Northrop at the time. As Overholser recalls, Northrop’s program manager saw the radar return on the new pole when testing recommenced and whispered, “Jesus, if they can do that with a frigging pole, what can they do with their damned model?”

Just one year later, Lockheed’s Have Blue would take its first flight on its way to change aviation history.

Alex Hollings is a writer, dad, and Marine veteran who specializes in foreign policy and defense technology analysis. He holds a master’s degree in Communications from Southern New Hampshire University, as well as a bachelor’s degree in Corporate and Organizational Communications from Framingham State University.

This article was first published by Sandboxx News.

Image: Creative Commons.

Summary and Key Points: Earlier this spring, the last U.S. Marine Corps aviators completed training on the McDonnell Douglas AV-8B Harrier II, a V/STOL tactical attack aircraft in service for 40 years. The final Harrier squadron, VMA-223, will transition to the F-35B Lightning II by September 2026. Meanwhile, Spain will keep its Harrier fleet operational until at least 2030, with seven currently deployed on the flagship Juan Carlos I.

-Spain is considering the F-35B as a replacement but faces potential delays due to a backlog of orders.

-The Harrier II, praised for its role in the 1991 Gulf War, remains a capable but aging warbird.

Earlier this spring, the final United States Marine Corps aviators completed training on the McDonnell Douglas AV-8B Harrier II, the vertical/short takeoff and landing (V/STOL) tactical attack aircraft that first entered service with the Marine Corps forty years ago. As previously reported, the AV-8B Harrier II Fleet Replacement Detachment (FRD), Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) 14, 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW), graduated the final two pilots to receive the 7509 Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) at Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Cherry Point, North Carolina.

Marine Attack Squadron (VMA) 223 is now the final Harrier squadron in the U.S. Marine Corps, but it will only continue operating the platform through September 2026. At that point, the squadron will transition to the Lockheed Martin F-35B Lightning II. Thus in just over two years, the Harrier II’s days in service with the U.S. military will come to an end.

However, the AV-8B will remain in operation with NATO member Spain, at least for a few years longer. Last month, the Spanish Navy announced that its fleet of Harrier jets won’t be retired until at least 2030. Madrid’s sea service operates a total of ten Harriers, seven of which are currently deployed on the flagship Juan Carlos I for Operation Dédalo 24, Aerotime first reported.

The deployment to the Spanish Navy’s amphibious assault ship began in early April and is scheduled to continue until the middle of July. The warship has operated in the diverse waters around Europe from the Baltic Sea to the Eastern Mediterranean.

Though the Harrier IIs have been in service with the Spanish Navy since the mid-1980s, the remaining aircraft now in service are in good condition, according to Spanish officials. Madrid has secured contracts to continue supporting the aircraft until 2028, but has looked to extend the service life of the remaining ten Harrier IIs until 2030.

“This figure underscores the professionalism and good work of the maintainers at all levels,” Captain Regodón Gómez, commander of the Spanish Naval Aviation, told the Spanish military news outlet Info Defensa. “We are very aware that the challenge is very important because the other two users of the model [the Italian Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps] decommission it.”

Madrid has been mulling the Lockheed Martin F-35B Lightning II as the eventual replacement for the Harrier II, and the Spanish Navy remains the only current Harrier II operator not to officially opt for the F-35B. However, if Spain doesn’t move forward to secure a deal, it would potentially be left without a capable fix-winged aircraft that can operate from its flagship.

Moreover, even if Spain agrees later to obtain the S/VTOL Lightning II variant, it may find itself on a waiting list due to the backlog of orders. An aircraft carrier isn’t much good without aircraft—and while the Harrier II is still a capable warbird, it is showing its age.

As a rugged and reliable aircraft, the AV-8B was routinely deployed onboard amphibious assault ships and simple forward operating bases since the 1980s. U.S. Army General Norman Schwarzkopf named the AV-8B Harrier II one of the most important weapons of the 1991 Gulf War—but that was more than thirty years ago.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

All images are Creative Commons. 

Summary and Key Points: The F-111 Aardvark, developed in 1962 by General Dynamics, was a groundbreaking warplane with swept wings and advanced radar systems, allowing it to fly at supersonic speeds and low altitudes.

-Initially intended as a fighter for both the USAF and the Navy, it was repurposed for deep strike missions after the Navy deemed it unsuitable.

-The F-111 saw significant action in the Vietnam War, Libya, and Operation Desert Storm, proving its worth despite early flaws.

-Its operational success led to international adoption, and its last flight was in 2010 by the Australian armed forces. The Aardvark's speed and versatility offer lessons for future aircraft design.

File this under “They Don’t Make ‘Em Like They Used To.” The F-111 Aardvark was a history-making warplane. Developed in 1962 by General Dynamics, this warbird had a unique design and an even more exciting service record. With swept wings, she could hit the wild blue yonder in as little as 2,000 feet (when her wings were fully extended, that is). When those wings were fully retracted, the great warbird could blast along at supersonic speeds. In fact, the Aardvark made history as the fastest-flying plane at a low altitude.

Thanks to its advanced (for its time) “terrain-hugging” radar system, the plane could fly at extremely low altitudes and achieve supersonic flight without much risk of hitting anything. At higher altitudes, she could break easily into Mach 2.2. Further, the F-111 could make transoceanic flights without needing to refuel.

The F-111 Aardvark was ahead of its time and packed quite a punch in combat, having seen much service in the Vietnam War.

Interestingly, the F-111 was originally intended as a fighter for both the United States Air Force and the United States Navy. It cost $75 million in 1964 (or about $750 million today). Upon completion of the craft, however, the Pentagon’s brass found that the aircraft was unacceptable for its intended use. Therefore, the Navy backed out entirely from the program (although the failure of the Aardvark led to the design of the F-14 Tomcat, probably the Navy’s greatest plane ever made).

The Air Force, however, determined that the supersonic plane could be used for something else: deep, penetrating strikes into enemy territory. This was the F-111’s experience in Vietnam, against Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, and in Operation Desert Storm.

In fact, the Air Force’s fateful decision to accept the plane but to re-task it as a bomber changed history. This is a case of the Pentagon in the early days of the Cold War being far more innovative and cost-effective in its acquisitions than it ever could be today. The Air Force turned a failure into a long-term win with the Aardvark. The Navy’s loss, then, was the Air Force’s—and America’s—gain. Rather than scrap the whole project and basically burn the U.S. tax dollars that went into making it, the Air Force recognized that this plane could be used in far more unique ways than it was intended to have been deployed.

The F-111 got its nickname, “Aardvark,” because, like the African animal of the same name, the F-111 travels close to the ground, hunting its prey. In 1966, the Aardvark set the record for the longest, low-flying flight at supersonic speeds. From that point on, the Air Force knew it had a diamond in the rough. Despite its potential, when the Aardvark was first deployed to Vietnam in 1968, it performed terribly due to a wing stabilizer flaw. The Air Force had to withdraw all its Aardvarks from the fight. Many at the time believed the F-111’s days were numbered. But the stabilizer problem was soon rectified. 

By 1972—during Operation Linebacker—the Aardvark was redeployed and led the way in dangerous night bombings in which the supersonic planes skimmed the tops of the dense jungles just below. The Aardvark had proven itself after an inauspicious start. The Aardvarks were used brilliantly to soften up North Vietnamese air defenses that would have otherwise been deployed against the Air Force’s far more valuable B-52 Stratofortress bombers. The Aardvarks had one of the best performance ratings in Vietnam once that stabilizer problem was repaired. 

Of the 4,000 missions that the F-111 flew in the unfriendly skies above Indochina, only six units were lost.

Ultimately, the F-111 went international. Britain and Australia ended up purchasing variants of this warplane. The Australians had a special variant—the F-111C—unique only to their armed forces. The final flight of the F-111 as a combat plane took place in 2010. However, it was not piloted by the Americans who had built her but rather by the Australians who had come to love the plane.

The F-111 Aardvark was quite literally able to outrun whatever air defenses it faced. And this is a key feature that plane manufacturers should consider today when designing next-generation warplanes. Stealth is, of course, a massively helpful feature that most new American warplanes and bombers are incorporating. 

But there’s something to be said about building a plane that can simply go faster than the defenses that an enemy can deploy. With advances in detection technology and the rise of sophisticated anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, the Pentagon might want to stop prioritizing stealth and start amplifying the speed of its next-generation fighters and bombers.

Brandon J. Weichert is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, as well as at American Greatness and the Asia Times. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower (Republic Book Publishers), Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Summary and Key Points: China's Chengdu J-20 "Mighty Dragon" stealth fighter, developed under the J-XX program, marked a significant milestone with its maiden flight in 2011 and official service entry in 2017.

-Despite its advanced design and new WS-15 engines, the J-20 remains untested in real combat.

-In a 2020 simulation, it reportedly outperformed India's Dassault Rafale fighters, downing 17 of them.

-However, experts caution that simulations can't fully replicate real combat conditions. While the Rafale has proven its capabilities in various conflicts, the J-20's actual combat performance remains unproven.

Beijing has continued to hype the capabilities of its domestically-built "fifth generation" Chengdu J-20 "Mighty Dragon" stealth fighter – even as China struggled to develop a capable engine for the seemingly advanced aircraft. Finally last June, a new J-20 prototype flew as the Chengdu Aircraft Corporation powered by two WS-15 turbofan engines. That event was seen as a major milestone for the engines, for the aircraft and even for China, as the J-20 could finally live up to the Mighty Dragon moniker.

The Chengdu J-20 was the result of Beijing's J-XX program of the 1990s, which set out to develop an air superiority fighter with precision strike capability. The result was the world's third operational "fifth generation" fighter aircraft – after the United States Air Force's Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor and Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II.

The aircraft took its maiden flight in 2011.

Dubbed the Mighty Dragon, the aircraft was officially adopted and entered service with the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) in 2017. It is a sleek, modern aircraft that has been noted for its canard-delta configuration, blended fuselage with low radar cross-section, and large canted twin tails. It is equipped with two large internal weapon bays for long-range and air-to-air missiles.

Yet, despite the hype, the J-20 remains untested in actual combat.

Perhaps wanting to prove something to the world, Beijing employed the J-20 Mighty Dragon in a 2020 simulation against the Indian Air Force's French-made Dassault Rafale fighter.

The twin-engine, canard delta wing, multirole fighter aircraft Rafale has been described by Dassault as an "ominrole" 4.5 generation aircraft that can perform air supremacy, interdiction, aerial reconnaissance, ground support, in-depth strike, anti-ship strike, and nuclear deterrence missions.

In the simulation, the J-20 Mighty Dragon came out the victor, reportedly downing 17 of the Rafales.

According to a report from the Eurasian Times, a Chinese pilot of the Wang Hai Air Group from the PLA Eastern Theater Command, along with his colleagues, claimed to have shot down Rafale fighters in the exercises. The Wang Hai Air Group was the first air wing to be equipped with the Mighty Dragon, and thus the most experienced with China's fifth-generation fighter.

Such military simulations can be quite realistic – replicating conditions a pilot might experience in actual combat as well as a degree of uncertainty. However, aviation experts will still be quick to respond that a simulation, no matter how accurate, can never compare to the real deal when it is truly a matter of life and death.

And while Chinese military aviation experts have praised the capabilities of the J-20 following the exercise, it would have been unexpected for Beijing to actually suggest otherwise.

Accordingly, an Indian Air Force expert also told EurAsian Times on condition of anonymity that PLAAF might have set the simulations in a way to equip its J-20 with all the critical strengths, something that is not possible in real combat.

Finally, the J-20s have been marketed as fifth-generation stealth jets, yet the platform's biggest deficiency is that the Mighty Dragon has yet to prove itself in combat, while the French-based Rafale has been in service for nearly a quarter of a century, during which time it has conducted operations in Afghanistan, Libya, Mali, and Syria – conducting ground strikes. Those may not have been air-to-air kills, but the Rafale is a warbird that has employed its claws in combat, while the same can't be said of the Mighty Dragon.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock. 

Summary and Key Points: In November 2012, two Iranian Su-25s attempted to shoot down a U.S. MQ-1 Predator drone in international airspace, but the drone escaped unscathed. In response, the U.S. began providing fighter escorts for its drones. In 2013, unaware of this policy, Iranian F-4 Phantoms engaged another MQ-1, only to be surprised by a stealthy F-22 Raptor escort. The F-22, with advanced stealth and sensor capabilities, covertly assessed the F-4s before revealing its presence and advising them to withdraw, which they did.

-This incident highlights the ongoing tensions and technological disparities between the U.S. and Iran, amidst broader geopolitical negotiations.

In November 2012, two Iranian Air Force Sukhoi Su-25s tried to down a U.S. Air Force MQ-1 Predator drone. At the time, the MQ-1 was flying in international air space, 16 miles from the Iranian border; the drone flight was legal, but understandably instigatory. Iran scrambled the two Su-25s, which quickly closed on the drone. But the Su-25 was designed for close air support, not air superiority, and it struggled impotently with its cannons to shoot down the MQ-1.

The American drone escaped the interaction unscathed, having filmed the entire sequence with on-board cameras. In response to the incident, the U.S. modified its procedures to better protect its vulnerable drone fleet. It began providing drones with a fighter escort.

One year later, in 2013, the Iranians – apparently unaware of this new U.S. drone-escort policy – engaged another MQ-1. This time, the Iranians sent a jet with some air-to-air game, the F-4 Phantom – an aircraft the U.S. exported to Iran in the 1970s, back when the two countries were allies. Unlike the Su-25, the F-4 was entirely capable of bringing down the MQ-1. But when the Iranian F-4s moved to engage the MQ-1, they discovered they were not alone.

Escorting the MQ-1, lurking silently, was a Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor – a fifth-generation stealth fighter. As the Iranian pilots learned that day, the F-22 “is equipped with stealth technology that enables it to operate virtually undetected by radar.”

Indeed, the Iranians were oblivious to its presence as the F-22 stalked them from below.

This aircraft is packed with enviable, cutting-edge technology. “The F-22 Raptor is a technological marvel,” I noted previously.

“The world’s first operational fifth-generation fighter, the F-22 was designed with a bevy of novel features – stealth technology, supercruise, supermaneuverability, and sensor fusion – all combined to create the preeminent air superiority fighter.”

The Iranians flying in Vietnam War-era F-4 Phantoms were ill-equipped to match an F-22. Granted, the F-4 was a capable airframe – the most produced American supersonic military aircraft ever – but it first flew in 1958. The F-22, on the other hand, was an up-to-date, 21st century marvel.

“The F-22’s software is advanced and impressive. Using sensor fusion, data from multiple onboard sensor systems are synthesized to create a more comprehensive tactical picture,” I explained a few years back.

Besides, the F-4 was not built for dogfighting. “The Phantom was not particularly maneuverable,” I explained in a previous article on the F-4. “Enemy MiGs could typically outturn the F-4, which wasn’t designed for dogfighting and suffered from adverse yaw in tight turns. Instead, the F-4 was intended to fire radar-guided missiles from beyond visual range, not engage in air combat maneuvering.”

Well, the F-22 was comfortably within visual range: It was directly below the Iranians.

The F-22’s pilot, operating undetected, had sidled right in. “He flew under their aircraft to check out their weapons load without them knowing that he was there,” then-Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Mark Welsh said. Having determined the F-4’s payloads, the Raptor pilot finally alerted the Iranians to his presence.

He “pulled up on their left-wing and then called them and said ‘you really ought to go home,’” Welsh said. The F-4s complied and bugged out.

The incident is indicative of the friction that has underscored the U.S.-Iranian relationship since the late 1970s. Currently, the two sides are working toward a deal on Iran’s nuclear program, which is reportedly nearing break-out capacity and has made Iran an international pariah. The world is watching closely as the negotiations unfold. In the meantime, hopefully the two rival nations can avoid any further dogfighting incidents.

Harrison Kass is a senior defense editor with over 1,000 published articles. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, he joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison has degrees from Lake Forest College, the University of Oregon School of Law, and New York University’s Graduate School of Arts & Sciences. He lives in Oregon and regularly listens to Dokken. Email the Author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

Image Credit: Shutterstock and Creative Commons. 

Summary and Key Points: The last 12 years have been historically action-packed, making 2010 feel like a different era. Since then, we've experienced a global pandemic, economic collapse, populist uprisings, and significant geopolitical events. In 2010, Obama signed "Obamacare," and U.S. forces were still in Iraq and Afghanistan. Meanwhile, China was emerging as a significant power, evidenced by its massive naval expansion. The U.S. responded by demonstrating its naval strength, notably with the surfacing of three Ohio-class submarines in 2010. Today, China has the largest navy, and the focus remains on maintaining balance in the Pacific amidst rising tensions.

The year 2010 feels like a long, long time ago. Today, when the news cycle is seemingly instantaneous – leaving citizens with the impression that more is actually happening – the 12 years that have passed since 2010 feel historically action-packed, making 2010 feel like some other epoch. 

A lot has happened. A coronavirus pandemic and the corresponding economic collapse. Populist uprisings across the globe, resulting in the elections of Trump, Orban, Bolsonaro, and the UK’s Brexit. The Chicago Cubs won the World Series. The Americans withdrew from Afghanistan. The Russians invaded Ukraine. ISIS, Crimea, Occupy Wall Street, Libya, MeToo.

Back in 2010, President Obama was still in his first term. In March, Obama signed his hallmark achievement, the technocratic Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, or “Obamacare.” U.S. forces were still engaged in Iraq – and Afghanistan. The “Pivot to Asia” would not occur for two more years. Yet, trouble was surfacing in the Pacific – as underscored by a June 2010 incident. China had become fully impossible to ignore. The world’s most populous nation was beginning to realize her awesome potential, and America, for the first time since the Soviet Union’s demise, was at risk of facing a true rival, a regional hegemon in Northeast Asia.

“China is the key to understanding the future distribution of power in Northeast Asia,” John Mearscheimer wrote in his seminal 2001 text, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. “Because of the vast size of China’s population, it has the potential to become much wealthier than Japan, and even wealthier than the United States. To illustrate China’s potential, consider the following scenarios. Japan’s per capita GNP is now more than 40 times greater than China’s. If China modernizes to the point where it has about the same per capita GNP as South Korea does today, China would have a GNP of $10.66 trillion, substantially larger than Japan’s $4.09 trillion. If China’s per capita GNP grew to be just half of Japan’s present per capita GNP, China would have a GNP of $20.04 trillion, which would make China almost five times as wealthy as Japan.”

More importantly, China has the power to meet and surpass the United States.

“Another way of illustrating how powerful China might become if its economy continues growing rapidly is to compare it with the United States. The GNP of the United States is $7.9 trillion (in 2001) ... If China’s per capita GNP equals Korea’s, China’s overall GNP would be almost $10.66 trillion, which is about 1.35 times the size of America’s GNP.” Still, despite China’s unrivaled potential, the Bush 43 administration instigated two wars in the Middle East – a resource suck that directly interfered with the more important mission of balancing against China.

Obama would pay closer attention to China than his predecessor. And rightly so. China was a potential great-power rival – the only nation with such potential. And where China’s potential – and ambition – had become most obvious, was in the maritime realm, where China had convened the largest naval force expansion in modern history. 

In 2000, China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) had roughly 100 maritime platforms available. By 2005, PLAN’s force size had doubled, to over 200 maritime platforms. “This tsunami of Chinese shipbuilding has tremendous potential implications for the PRC’s effort to coercively envelop Taiwan, resolve other sovereignty disputes in its favor, carve out the region as a zone of exceptionalism to international rules and norms, and project Beijing’s power and influence around the world,” maritime-executive.com reported. In June 2010, amidst China’s shipbuilding frenzy, the U.S. chose to send a pointed message to Beijing: “the U.S. still controls the seas.” The message’s courier: three Ohio-class submarines, which surfaced in the Philippines’s Subic Bay.

The Ohio is a nuclear-powered submarine, capable of firing ballistic missiles. The third largest submarine class in the world, the Ohio can carry 24 Trident II missiles. So, when three Ohio submarines surfaced in the Indo-Pacific carrying a combined 72 ballistic missiles, the message to China was clear, if not explicit. 

Still, in the years since the Ohio incident, China has proceeded with its shipbuilding efforts. “Sometime between 2015 and 2020, China’s Navy crossed a critical threshold: it fields more battle force ships than the U.S. Navy, making it the world’s largest navy numerically,” maritime-executive.com reported. “Today, at around 360 hulls, it exceeds its American rival by more than sixty warships.” 

Hopefully, the Biden administration can maintain focus on China and the Pacific, without getting too preoccupied with Russian-related concerns, for Russia, while aggressive, lacks the hegemonic potential of China.  

Harrison Kass is an attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, he joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison has degrees from Lake Forest College, the University of Oregon, and New York University. He lives in Oregon and listens to Dokken. Follow him on Twitter @harrison_kass. Kass has over 1,000 published defense and national security articles over the span of his career. 

Summary and Key Points: In early May, U.S. Air Force F-16s intercepted Russian Tu-95 bombers near Alaska. The Russian Ministry of Defense reported that two "Bear Bombers" were on a scheduled flight over the Bering Sea, supported by Su-30SM aircraft, lasting over 11 hours.

-The Tu-95, a Cold War-era aircraft, remains a key part of Russia's aerial fleet due to its long-range capabilities and various modifications over the years.

-The interception highlighted ongoing tensions and the strategic importance of these bombers.

The U.S. Air Force reportedly intercepted Russian Tu-95 bombers near Alaska in early May. According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, two “Bear Bombers’ were conducting a flight over the Bering Strait when American F-16 Fighting Falcons were scrambled to escort them away. 

"Two Tu-95MS strategic missile-carrying bombers of the Russian Aerospace Forces' long-range aviation carried out a scheduled flight in the airspace over the neutral waters of the Bering Sea near the western coast of Alaska. The flight lasted over 11 hours. The crews of Su-30SM aircraft of the Aerospace Forces provided fighter support," the Russian Ministry of Defense said in a statement to TASS. 

By flying the Tu-95 near Alaska, Moscow was demonstrating its commitment to long-range aviation capabilities. This Cold War-era aircraft has remained in service for more than half a century, adopting new roles over the years to retain its relevance. Despite its old age, the Bear Bomber remains a mainstay of Russia's aerial fleet.

In order to counter the strategic bombers fielded by the U.S. military during the Second World War, Soviet engineers envisioned a homegrown counterpart. The USSR first issued a request in 1950 for a four-engine bomber capable of flying 5,000 miles to strike targets across the continental U.S. Some consider the Tu-95 bear Russia's own version of the B-52 bomber - just in turboprop form. 

The Bear was fitted with four Kuznetsov turboprop engines equipped with two contra-rotating four-blade propellers. The Soviets opted for the turboprop engines because early jet engines burned a lot of fuel in flight. The Bear’s powerful engine system was designed by Ferdinand Brandner – a Nazi party member who was captured by Soviet troops after attempting to flee to Prague toward the end of the war.

The Tu-95 took its maiden flight in 1952 and officially entered service with the Soviet Air Force a few years later. In 1961, Khrushchev revealed that the USSR was planning to detonate the most powerful nuclear bomb in the world. The Tsar Bomba, also referred to by its designation, AN602, was eventually dropped by parachute aboard a Tu-95V aircraft. This modified Bear variant was equipped with redesigned engines, suspensions, and release mechanisms in order to successfully release the large nuclear weapon. 

Over the years, other Bear bomber variants were created, including the Tu-142 Russian Air Force naval aviation model. As detailed by Airforce Technology, “The Bear J radio relay aircraft are equipped with VLF communications sets with a VLF ventral antenna pod under the centre fuselage. The satellite communications radome is installed just to the aft of the flight deck canopy. The aircraft maintain communications between the submarines of the Northern and Pacific fleets and the Russian command stations.” 

Other experimental Bears were envisioned by the Soviets, including the Tu-95LAL and the Tu-95K. The variants that made it to the production phase include the Tu-95MR photo-reconnaissance aircraft and the Tu-95K, which is capable of launching Kh-22 missiles.

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. 

Image Credit: Shutterstock. 

Summary: Going to sea has always been risky, especially for military personnel, where the dangers are compounded. Countless sailors have perished due to these risks, often due to human error or poor planning. Notable incidents include the USS Enterprise striking Bishop Rock in 1985, the Vasa sinking due to design flaws in the 17th century, and a German U-boat's mishap with a high-pressure toilet during WWII. Perhaps the most embarrassing incident was the near-sinking of India's first nuclear submarine, INS Arihant, in 2017 due to a hatch left open, resulting in extensive repairs and a year-long inoperative period.

Going to sea has never been without risks.

For those in military uniform the dangers are compounded, and it has always taken a special breed of men and women willing to head out over the horizon.

Countless sailors have lost their lives due to the dangers of the sea – but in a few cases, it was due to stupid mistakes.

This has included collisions and some dozen U.S. Navy ships have been seriously damaged due to such accidents. USS Enterprise (CVN-65) suffered serious damage when she struck a portion of the 13-mile-long Bishop Rock that damaged its hull in November 1985.

Other times it is simply the case of poor planning or design and as a result some vessels barely made it out to sea on their maiden voyages. That was certainly the case with the Vasa, described as the most high-tech warship when it was built in the 17th century. The Swedish warship sank within just twenty minutes of setting sail after a gust of wind capsized the majestic vessel – likely due to the heavy cannons on her gun deck.

Some other naval accidents were the result of "human error" of the most extreme kind. At the end of the Second World War, a German Type VIIC submarine nearly sank on its maiden voyage because the boat's new deepwater high-pressure toilet was used "improperly," reportedly by the captain no less! Sea water flooded the boat's batteries, which caused them to generate chlorine gas, which forced the U-1206 to surface. The crew then scuttled the submarine after it was bombed by British patrols. Three men drowned in the heavy seas.

Perhaps the most embarrassing mishap in military maritime history is what happened to INS Arihant, India's first nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine when it began its deployment in 2017.

The then-brand new $2.9 billion submarine was left completely inoperative for nearly a year simply because a hatch was left open, which allowed seawater to rush in, almost sinking the boat in the process.

The nuclear submarine was the first of an expected five in class, designed and constructed as part of the Indian Navy's Advanced Technology Vessel project. The Arihant was designed with four launch tubes that could carry a dozen K-15 short-range missiles or K-4 intermediate-range nuclear missiles. While the sub's weapons and capabilities were advanced, the training of the crew certainly wasn't.

In addition, the Arihant faced a number of problems during her development and manufacture, and that included delays in its construction and notably major differences between the Russian-supplied design and the indigenous fabrication. Those were all minor of course compared to the damage that occurred from human error.

When the hatch was left open, not only did the propulsion compartments fill with seawater, but there was substantial damage to the pipes that ran through the submarine. Given how corrosive seawater can be to the various pipes, including those that carry pressurized water coolant to and from the ship's eighty-three-megawatt nuclear reactor, all had to be cut out and replaced. The six-thousand-ton INS Arihant remained out of service at the docks while the water was pumped out, and the pipes replaced. The entire process took ten months.

India had attempted to conceal the mishap, without much success. INS Arihant's absence was first noted in the Doklam border standoff with China in the summer of 2017. At the time, the Indian military only confirmed that the submarine had undergone repairs in early 2018. As naval mishaps go the Arihant may have been among the more embarrassing but at least it didn't result in the loss of life.

Despite a rough start, the submarine has reportedly had a largely successful service history.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu.

Image Credit: Creative Commons. 

Summary: On August 12, 2000, two explosions rocked the Barents Sea, leading to the sinking of the Russian submarine Kursk during a naval exercise.

-The initial explosion occurred due to a leak of high-test peroxide (HTP) from a practice torpedo, causing a secondary, more massive explosion that doomed the vessel.

-Rescue efforts were delayed, and international assistance was initially rejected. All 118 crew members perished, with 23 surviving temporarily in the submarine's rear compartment.

-The incident was later attributed to inadequate training, poor equipment maintenance, and mismanagement.

On August 12, 2000, the waters of the Barents Sea were shaken by two explosions. Sailors aboard the Russian submarine Karelia detected the explosions but presumed they were related to a major naval exercise of which the Karelia was a part.

Tragically, however, the detonations had occurred aboard the Oscar-class submarine Kursk, and they spelled disaster for that submarine and its crew. 

The Kursk was a cruise missile submarine launched in 1994, one of the first ships built by the Russian Federation after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The Oscar class was designed to rain cruise missiles down on a U.S. carrier strike group and was one of the largest submarines ever, behind only Soviet Typhoon-class and U.S. Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines. 

In August of 2000, the Kursk was participating in the Summer-X exercise, the first major fleet maneuver of the Russian Navy. As part of the test, the vessel was to launch a pair of training torpedoes at a Russian cruiser. In addition to these dummy warheads, the Kursk carried a full complement of live ordnance, from torpedoes to cruise missiles.

It was one of the few Russian ships authorized to do so. A few hours after requesting permission to begin the test, the first explosion measuring 1.5 on the Richter scale was detected by Russian naval assets, as well as by a Norwegian seismic monitoring station. Just over two minutes later, a second, much greater explosion was detected — 4.2 on the Richter scale. 

The Kursk was supposed to check in that afternoon following the completion of the test, but senior officers were not overly concerned at first. They suspected a failure of the communication equipment, a common problem aboard the sub.

It wasn’t until nearly five hours later, and after repeated failures to contact the sub, that a search and rescue effort was ordered. 

Two Russian mini-submersibles, the AS-32 and AS-34, headed up the rescue effort.

By the evening of Sunday, August 13, they had located the stricken Kursk on the seabed, 354 feet below the surface. The bow was completely destroyed, and the first four compartments were flooded.

The submersible made repeated attempts to gain a seal over the rear escape hatch but was ultimately unsuccessful. In the following days, the rescue effort was hampered by increasingly strong winds and heavy seas. Additional submersibles were brought in, but they too failed to successfully seal against the escape hatch. Diving bells lowered by ships on the surface encountered the same problem. 

The U.S. and other Western nations were aware of the accident the day that it happened, and a coalition including the UK, France, Germany, Norway, and Israel offered assistance to the Russian Navy.

Russia turned down this assistance as Moscow sought to downplay and obfuscate the nature of the disaster, both from the world at large and from its own citizens. Finally, five days after the accident and in the face of considerable media and public backlash, Russian President Vladimir Putin accepted British and Norwegian help. 

Initially there was a great deal of hope that some survivors had held out in the relatively undamaged rear of the submarine. As the rescue dragged on, however, hope waned. When a Norwegian dive team finally gained entry to the wreck 10 days after the accident, they only found bodies. 

Once it was determined that none of the crew had survived, Russia moved to salvage the Kursk. A Dutch company was contracted to lift the submarine from its resting place on the seabed. The bow was removed before the sub was lifted, due to concerns over unexploded ordnance and structural instability. It was eventually destroyed where it lay on the seafloor. 

Upon refloating the Kursk, the full nature of the disaster was revealed. There had indeed been survivors — 23 sailors that congregated in the rearmost, ninth compartment. The nuclear reactors powering the sub had gone into emergency shutdown. This was a blessing in that they were inert and stable, but it meant all power, light, and air recycling processes were shut down. 

The men in the ninth compartment managed to survive for a time using battery-powered lights and chemical oxygen scrubbers. Their fate had already been sealed, however, due to where they were and the type of boat they were on. Although 354 feet is deep, the men would have most likely been able to survive an emergency ascent. Being stuck in the icy cold of the Barents Sea, however, would have been a sure death sentence if they were not swiftly spotted and rescued. Furthermore, some personnel were too injured to clamber into the escape trunk and attempt the ascent. 

Once the crew decided to stay aboard, they became victims of a quirk of the Kursk, and indeed of all Oscar-class submarines — an imperfect seal where the propeller shafts exited the hull. When stationary, water leaked in around the shafts. With the sub at rest on the seabed, water continued leaking in, driving up the pressure inside the compartment and making an emergency ascent physiologically impossible. 

With the air scrubbers turned off, the survivors relied on chemical scrubbers to remove poisonous carbon dioxide. Ultimately, it appears one of these scrubbers was dropped as the crew attempted to replace a used cartridge. When it splashed into the oily water, a chemical reaction ignited a flash fire in the pressurized air that burned off all the remaining oxygen, causing the remaining survivors to asphyxiate. 

With the sub on the surface, investigators were able to determine the cause of the mishap.

The Kursk was using torpedoes propelled by high-test peroxide (HTP). This chemical compound is normally stable, but in the presence of a catalyst it becomes a highly potent oxidizer. It appears the practice torpedo in use leaked enough of this fuel when it was loaded into the tube to cause the first explosion.

The forces of the initial explosion tore through the torpedo compartment, burning at temperatures estimated at nearly 5,000 degrees Fahrenheit. Such monumental pressure and temperature caused at least seven other torpedoes to detonate, producing the second explosion. Water swiftly rushed into the ruined bow of the submarine, tearing through bulkheads until it was stopped by reinforced bulkhead number five, which protected the nuclear reactors. 

The Russian state sought to spin and cover up the botched rescue that might have saved the trapped sailors. Attempts were made to deflect blame by stating the mishap was caused by a collision with a NATO submarine that was monitoring the exercise. It was noted that the sub’s rescue beacon, designed to automatically float to the surface in the event of disaster to aid in location, had been disabled prior to a deployment to the Mediterranean the year before. 

Review of documentation aboard the Kursk revealed that the crew had not been adequately trained to handle HTP torpedoes, or indeed the specific type of torpedo loaded. A secret report found “stunning breaches of discipline, shoddy, obsolete and poorly maintained equipment" and "negligence, incompetence, and mismanagement." It went on to criticize delays in initiating the rescue operation.

Ultimately, apart from some shake-ups in Putin’s cabinet, few were held to account for the tragic loss of the Kursk and all 118 sailors aboard. 

Maya Carlin is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. 

Image Credit: Creative Commons.