Ideas on Europe Blog

Even this is not going to cut it…

Earlier this morning – a bit before 8am, in fact – a family friend turned up at our house, ‘for breakfast’. This turned out to be a misunderstanding of what we had thought was a jocular exchange of texts last night and certainly was not one the house was prepared for. Of course, being archtypes (of a type), we just put the kettle on and had a laugh about it.

I mention this as a very mundane example of a perception gap, the mis-signalling of intentions and actions. In much of our lives, we can just have a cuppa and move on, but this week is demonstrating how sometimes that process can run away from people. Today’s European Council is a case in point.

It’s as depressing an agenda as you’ve ever seen, from Greece to Calais, with a detour to the UK over dinner. It looks very hard for anyone to pull much positive news out of that little pile.

But rather than dwell on that aspect, it’s perhaps more productive to consider the perception gap between the UK and the EU.

For those critical of the EU, we might break down their views of the different problems into the following categories:

“The EU is ineffectual”

The Calais strikes and attendant migrant crisis have been treated with much restraint by the Government, who recognise that annoying the French authorities isn’t any kind of productive option right now. But sceptics have been much more free-flowing in their attacks.

To take just one example, the UKIP MEP Nathan Gill tweeted: “Absolute chaos at Eurostar as all trains cancelled due to migrants storming the tunnels. #NoThanks to EU open borders” Quite what he thinks the EU should have done to stop or remove the strikers or the migrants isn’t clear, but the failure to have (relatively) free movement is clearly a stick with which to beat those in favour of integration.

Likewise, criticism of the French government for allowing migrants to traverse France to get to Calais in the first place highlights a lack of understanding about Schengen, not to mention a questionnable attitude to the use of profiling in police checks. Would they be any happier if the gendarmerie stopped anyone who looked like an ‘illegal migrant’? A difficult stance, especially for UKIP with its professed non-racist or xenophobic position.

“The EU is other people’s problems”

As today and tomorrow will expose all too clearly, one country’s problem is actually every countries’ problem in the EU. This has always been true, but until the Union institutionalised the interdependencies that wasn’t always so evident. Thus what happens with Greece has material impacts on all other member states, regardless of whether they are eurozone members or not.

Which makes the heterogeneity of Cameron’s talking point all the more obvious. In a system of give and take, he has to sit through long discussions about Greece - without being a eurozone member – and the migrant crisis – without being a Schengen member, and having made clear the UK won’t take any quota of migrants – before asking everyone to do him a favour. Small wonder that attitudes have been cool and distracted: other member states’ governments appear more comfortable with accepting that they are part of a system that requires some leaning-in and helping out, not just injunctions to ‘sort it out’.

“The EU has no future”

The concatenation of problems now facing the EU makes this argument seem ever more compelling. One does not have to look far to see the signs of discord and tension, from Hungary questioning its Dublin Convention commitments, to Marine Le Pen talking of leaving the Union, to Renzi’s secretive ‘Plan B‘ to handle the influx of Mediterranean migrants. Everyone looks hacked off, everyone seems on edge.

In the British context, that has some impact on the referendum debate, as the ‘No’ side continue to paint a picture of a deadweight EU, dragging down the UK. Business for Britain’s ‘Change or Go‘ report – being slowly released this week – is very much in this vein of thinking.

That might all be true, but the great unknown is whether any of the alternatives facing Europe are any better. If the EU breaks up, then what happens to the liberalisation of markers that has run far ahead of the rest of the world? What happens to an Eastern Europe confronted by a Russia that is already highly adept at exploiting division? What happens to all the other institutions of cooperation, like NATO? If we can’t prosper together, why should we apart?

This is the point where someone accuses me of doom-mongering, and I guess there is an aspect of that, but it would surely be remiss not to at least consider such questions, at least to come to answers that provide some reassurance.

The EU isn’t perfect, but perfection is impossible. Perhaps if we worked to make what we have better, rather than scrap it all, we might make some progress.

The post The perception gap: Calais, Greece and Brussels in the British imagination appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Tomorrow, on 24 June 2015, the European Parliament is expected to approve the legal details of Jean-Claude Juncker’s investment plan and the related European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI). This plan has been sold as a major innovation, but our research has shown that it is actually the continuation of existing EU policies, just at a larger scale. Does it still mean we are on the way towards political budget cycles in the EU?

Next week, we – Klaus H. Goetz (with whom I work here in Munich) and myself – are going to present a paper* titled “From Politicised Budgeting to Political Budgets in the EU” at the Milan International Conference on Public Policy.

At the centre of our attention is the Juncker investment plan and whether it is a sign that we are going to see more pronounced political budget cycles in the European Union in coming years. With the promise of achieving up to € 315 billion in new investments, more than double the amount of the EU’s annual budget, Juncker’s initiative definitely looked like something was in the air into that direction when we started working on our paper.

What we find (see Section V. of the paper) is that there are quite a number of ways to interpret what the Juncker plan means for the future – from a just a gradual move in the direction of multiple paths that have started years ago to a quite a radical post-electoral politicisation of EU budgeting.

More interestingly, we found that the leveraging model that was presented as Juncker’s ‘baby’ and innovation has not just been around for ten years but that it was actually already on the political agenda of Barroso five years ago, just a little less ambitious.

To see the striking similarity between Barroso’s and Juncker’s plan, see first this quote from the Juncker’s political agenda in 2014:

I do believe that we can make much better use of the common EU budget and of Union financial instruments such as the European Investment Bank (EIB). We must make use of these public funds available at Union level to stimulate private investment in the real economy.

Now, see the the second quote from Barroso’s political agenda in 2009:

We should work more closely and imaginatively with the European Investment Bank and the private sector. Within the existing instruments, we must further improve the blending between grants from the EU budget and EIB loans, in order to increase the overall leverage effect.

If you read our paper (in particular Section IV) you will understand more in detail how the Juncker plan has evolved over time from an unknown EU policy, and how it was  made something ‘big’ and ‘new’ by increasing scope but also by using quite some political communications to make it look novel and big. How to interpret this in the wider development of EU budgeting is part of a debate worth having.

I’d be happy to hear your thoughts on our paper and our findings. If you happen to be at ICPP in Milan next week, don’t hesitate to contact me in advance for a chat!

Update: See also yesterday’s background paper by the European Parliament Research Service on the EFSI.

*The paper is part of a research project on budgeting in international organisations as part of a larger Research Unit on International Public Administrations, financed by the DFG.

The post How novel are Juncker’s investment plan and the EFSI? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

On Alternative(s) to Neoliberal Globalization

From 17 to 19 June 2015, I attended the 14th Annual Conference of the International Social Theory Consortium (ISTC) “Reconstructing Social Theory, History and Practice” at the University of Cambridge, with presentation “On Alternative(s) to Neoliberal Globalization” on the 17th of June 2015.

First, the ISTC conference addressed reconstruction, deconstruction, as the past thirty years can been named Age of Deconstruction; and possibilities of a return of history, discussing, whether there are limits to the deconstruction project? Have these limits been reached? What are the possibilities for the “reconstruction” of narratives of long-term historical change? Is it possible to incl. and integrate the insights and contributions of various critiques of knowledge, while at the same time developing new forms of knowledge? Can we submit the project of deconstruction itself to deconstruction? Etc.

Return to history acknowledges history’s “continuing importance as a social-theoretical category and frame, considering [history’s] persistent utility after […] realizations, and accepting the fact that, by most accounts, history has not reached its end.”

“● How would social science disciplines benefit from new perspectives on understanding long-term change?

● What might, could and should a new philosophy of history – subsequent to so many “turns” – look like?

● What are the possibilities for practice in addressing social justice and democracy, with the benefit or in the absence of long-term historical consciousness?”

Second – The text of my presentation:

The Structure:

Two main premises:

1)  The philosophy of history could have had different development as it has today;

2)    Could there be an alternative or alternatives to neoliberal globalization.

Subquestions:

● Socialism (revolutionary socialism, reformist constitutional socialism) vs. industrial capitalism – as a starting point

● „Traces of moral thought“ and „religious injunctions“ influencing law (Klabbers, Piiparinen)

● Defining normative order (Klabbers, Piiparinen), political ideology (Heywood) and morality (Kant)

● Justifiability of law on moral grounds or on normative grounds (religion, social norm, cultural practice, etc.)

● Examples of different levels (Christianity-Judaism; Judaism-Islam; Marxism-capitalism; Soviet socialist law-capitalist civil law; structuralists-poststructuralists; poststructuralists-Islam; Western cultural practice-Islam; etc.) /The initial idea was to compare modernism-postmodernism, socialism-postsocialism, liberalism-neoliberalism, critical theory-positivism, naturalism-positivism, and then postsocialism-postpostsocialism, postmodernism-postsocialism, poststructuralism-postmodernism, neoliberalism-psotstructuralism, etc./

● Kant’s idea of international and cosmopolitan justice – perpetual peace – in the light of the previous

● The politics of framing in global (and EU) governance / agenda setting

● The role of a lawyer – drawing extralegal concerns into law?

● Who could decide?

Problems:

● Could legal history have developed differently if human thought had in history developed differently?

● Why could there be alternative(s) to neoliberal globalization?

For the structure, I have used the texts of Kant, Klabbers/Piiparinen in order to make my argument that follows in the body:

[I] most recently have worked with EU accountability, incl. political accountability

According to Aristotle, things have both: form and substance / content.

For better understanding political accountability, I first attempted at mapping politics, by mapping political parties at European level and in Estonia, which method – combined with history research – allowed me to estimate transformation of politics in Estonia. – Such research was oriented toward form / structure, and did not say much about political (party) ideologies, except making some conclusions according to the parties’ own assertions about their position on the political right-left scale, although my research also established that more important than what a political party says about its ideology, should be its actual behaviour.

My research also established – agreeing with Chantal Mouffe – that political party ideologies are not easily distinguishable in the contemporary World, because – and Mouffe names two reasons: 1) the right-wing addresses for populist aims left-wing arguments, whereas the left-wing uses right-wing arguments, and 2) there are certain concerns that all political parties would address, such as environment, women’s rights, etc.

Mouffe concludes that although it is dangerous phenomenon, because it limits choice – and, consequently, antagonism always remains and should remain into politics – today’s political parties mostly seem to have reached consensus at the centre btw. centre-right and centre-left.

Mouffe explains such as impossibility to find an alternative to neoliberal globalization.

Now, this was the turning-point for me, because it made me think about the history of political thought from different angle.

One example of antagonism is socialism that – as utopian idea and reaction – appeared against industrial capitalism, resumed by Heywood as having an aim to end capitalist economy and replace it with common ownership. Such development can be divided into: revolutionary socialism (that developed into Communism), and reformist constitutional socialism that turned into social-democrat ideologies.

I understand Mouffe’s conclusion about impossibility of finding an alternative to neoliberal globalization as a-kind-of stop in socialist thought, although neoliberalism refers to greater community / State influence in markets (and, thus, to socialist influence).

One has to take into account that reality exists independently of human cognition, even though humans may not identify it and despite our understandings of reality, which is an old description of the relation btw. objectivity and subjectivity (the latter being constrained in time and space too much to adequately understand and communicate objectivity.)

The relevance for law of the previous:

Jan Klabbers and Touko Piiparinen in book “Normative Pluralism and International Law” (Cambridge University Press, ASIL Studies in International Legal Theory, 2013), explains law as a social phenomenon, containing: “traces of moral thought” or “religious injunctions” detaining meaning and changing over time. They establish that also religions contain normativity, and define “normative order” as “normative control system” – signifying a set of related commands: “Do’s” and “Don’ts” that stem from the same or related source(s).

That way, normative orders are understood as wholes of norms of social control.

Based on understanding “norms” as “rules of behaviour” … whiches breach is accompanied by liability. For that reason, Klabbers and Piiparinen see law as a distinct normative order.

Similarly, religion can be regarded as distinct normative order.

What concerns morals, I would understand morals as quite a distinct from normativity phenomemon, because all human thought does not contain coercive capacity like law or norms. I would derive from Kant who explains morals also as sth. Developing through experience, incl. knowledge about different thinkers.

At the same time, law is related to political morals, ideologies and philosophical thought. We all live in politics – a human being is already by the very nature Zwv noLitikwov.

Schaffer has a concern related to that – if decisions in a society are not grounded in empirics and experience (for example, here lies an advantage of American sociology that is indexial), they can be dangerous, unpredictable, and even have disastrous consequences.

Unger if of opinion that law is an expression of political ideology – thus, the same applies toward legal decisions, and applies toward international law that regulates international relations – thus also social and political processes.

There coexist several normative orders, for example, Christianity, Islam, Judaism, in addition to law. Then, there exist different political ideologies, such as social-democracy, … And there coexist different moral theories, most recently, such as poststructuralism, postmodernism, neoliberalism, critical theory, etc., the latter do not entail enforcement mechanisms.

Although these all are not equal categories, one can bring the following examples: 1) while Christianity is centred around liberation, Islam and Judaism are centred around commandments, thus, prescribing for the “free will” how to behave for the benefit of the community and the governors – thus, Islam and Judaism can actually be considered political ideologies, too, although normative; 2) while Marxism favours nationalization, capitalism favours unequal distribution of capital; 3) while speculation under Soviet Socialist laws was punishable under criminal laws, regulation of resale forms a common part of capitalist civil laws; 4) while structures / forms are important for structuralists, poststructuralists consider ideas / content more important than form; 5) while poststructuralists justify human pleasure, some forms of it are forbidden in Islam; 6) while headscarves are not common in Western cultural tradition, they are prescribed for women in Islam. 7) One could continue here, and actually, before reading Klabbers, Piiparinen, my initial idea was to that way compare modernism-postmodernism, socialism-postsocialism, liberalism-neoliberalism, critical theory-positivism, naturalism-positivism, and then postsocialism-postpostsocialism, postmodernism-postsocialism, poststructuralism-postmodernism, neoliberalism-psotstructuralism, etc.

Thus – society (and law) have to deal with collision of norms, but not solely of norms, but also of concerns of real politics or justice.

Immanuel Kant – who has defined morals – advanced the idea of international and cosmopolitan justice – perpetual peace – being possible, when mature societies reach consensus in peaceful coexistence. All moral questions, according to Kant, are thought in a particular situation – thus “applied moral questions.” Kant also talks about inability to use one’s own understanding without the guidance of another, because various selves interrelate in a community.

Francis Fukuyama’s idea was that liberal democracies do not go to war with each other – and here, to my mind, the word “democracy” refers to consensus and “common moral character.”

Thus, it is relevant to relate law with morals, and in such context analyse historical development of moral thought.

Piiparinen claims that not only one but more spheres of authority are in control of the World – and they may all derive their authority from legal or other norms and theories, for legitimacy.

Still, my presentation derives from the premises that: 1) law should be morally respectable; 2) law should be in harmony with the society it aims to regulate; 3) law can have effects on the society if regulates.

Important is what are the individual moralities who should shape law (that shapes individual moralities) similarly to different normative orders.

Klabbers and Piiparinen explain such as the politics of framing. And to illustrate that, asks, whether the intervention over Kosovo should be judged by moral standards or legal standards?

For lawyers, such position of question is connected with legitimacy, meaning – if illegal, would one be allowed to derive justification from morals (which could be a slippery slope, because morals is fragmented – a comprehensive understanding of universal morals is absent, and understanding and interpretation of morals is subjective, depending on the interpreting person’s education, life experience, intellectual and cognitive abilities, etc.)

Klabbers and Piiparinen still conclude that if morally acceptable, an illegal practice may be accepted and even become new law. The same authors see the problem in drawing the line btw. morally justifiable and morally unjustifiable – which is determined by subjective people.

The problem is that if to question people, many would feel that there was a conflict btw. law and morals at Kosovo, but if to ask people to specify what kind of morals was breached in Kosovo, even the lawyers would have problems with finding the relevant arguments.

On the other hand, maybe such is not the task of lawyers at all – because a good practising lawyer is supposed to rather apply law as precisely as possible than to make a new law through interpretation (be it critical or not).

Then – where from and how to draw extralegal concerns into law? With the aim to justify illegal acts?

Because if every judge or other person applying law would independently justify by moral concerns – such could easily laed to a situation, where, say, judge A would justify a behaviour by poststructural “praise” of pleasure, whereas judge B would justify the same behaviour by Islamic understanding.

Could there exist a common understanding of which religion (if religion to be brought into play at all) or which morals or politics to follow in case law is silent or just does not seem right. (Could such be allowed at all, as by such law looses some of its authority.)

If still needed, could a “common frame of reference” be here possible for global governance? Because – according to Aristotle, democracy is only democracy if everyone feels s/he belongs, and no one feels oppressed, excluded or disempowered.

Politics of framing in global Agenda-setting.

Legitimacy is one of the magic words, justifying moral grounds. Hanecke who has interpreted Hegel, talks about psychological need for Recognition, and I would connect that somehow with legitimacy.

Then – can legitimacy take place of normative orders and morals, and if so – who would shape in media and educational processes the common understanding of situations? Who would guide communitarism?

Klabbers and Piiparinen pose such: Who would decide (for common people) what qualifies as legitimate?

The most reasonable way seems to find a reason from history of philosophical thought – and therefore, I would suggest History of Philosophy for the modern society to replace the position, Marxism had before its aims collapsed. Such common theory as one common frame of reference, could demonstrate how politics and law are always contextual and historically situated. There is no such thing as a purely original idea, but development based on previous developments, changing in line with changing contexts.

Not a small problem is that the so-called “Western” philosophical thought could not be understandable (and thus, acceptable) by the rest of the World, which means that if we base international decisions on Western morality solely, we might only be legitimate in the eyes of the Western part of the world.

I ended here, I did not explain, although in the beginning I intended to, why did I head my presentation as “On Alternative(s) to Neoliberal Globalization” instead of “On Alternative(s) to Neoliberal Democracy,” that could have demanded analysis of democracy and offering alternatives to democracy. As I could not think out more other than meritocracy, it was easier for me to talk about globalization instead.

Theory or ideology – as cultural artefact –may well be replaced by some other cultural artefact. This also applies toward neoliberalism. It is difficult to agree upon political action that could be regarded as “best utopian practice.” The question is how to reach an agreement btw. different multicultural actors on some basis of equality that applies toward democratic law-making procedures as sth. similar to Kantian theory of law describing all legal philosophies, while critical interests are only subjective and everyone’s critical interests cannot be the same over all history. I would not dare to say that sth. ontologically new should emerge, but development has entailed certain rules – a new development always builds on previous development.

Questions my presentation received (as far as I am able to de-/reconstruct):

-Is Mouffe arguing for de-antagonistic politics?

-Why did socialist movements emerge? And don’t they emerge anymore as capitalism is still criticized by socialist ideas?

-What is legitimacy?

-Doesn’t legitimacy mean institutional legitimacy? (I explained that L. has different dimensions and levels; in addition, today I started to think that L. probably may mean Hegelian “Recognition,” too.)

Other important questions raised:

The post On Alternative(s) to Neoliberal Globalization appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

This week I’m in Moldova, for a workshop of our TEMPUS project INOTLES. You’ve probably not been to Moldova, but Chisinau is a very pleasant city around which to walk, albeit one in which the local UNDP office looks like one of the more important buildings.

To be here – in a country that has possibly the lowest GDP per capita in Europe and a geographical location that might best be described as exposed – the world looks a lot different from the view afforded to those living in the UK. Which makes it all the more important to reflect on those differences.

Over the past couple of weeks David Cameron has continued to get his proverbial ducks in a row on the EU referendum. That’s meant both more talks with counterparts elsewhere in the EU and an increasingly fraught passage of the referendum bill through Parliament. That Tory backbenchers are not going to let Cameron get away with anything at all is now very evident, their obstinacy only being encouraged by his apparent unwillingness to defend any position for long.

But the issue for the external observer – perhaps in the Moldovan foreign ministry across the road from where I write – is that the entire enterprise of renegotiation and referendum looks ill-timed and ill-conceived.

For Moldova – and for a lot of other places like it – the EU remains a veritable cornucopia of economic opportunity and safety. This is a country that has suffered at the hands of various forms of external rule, colonialism in all but name. The Transnistria conflict remains frozen after 15 years, and the ructions in Ukraine feel too close for comfort. The EU might be a difficult partner, but at least is one that offers an implicit security guarantee and an institutionalised voice at the table.

That might sound like it’s all well and good for Moldova, but so what for the UK?

The argument would be that the UK is just as exposed as Moldova, albeit for very different reasons. The latter can get by through virtue of being small and having (relatively) small objectives. The former has much bigger objectives – to be a consequential player on the world stage – and so it has to play a different game.

Where the UK has continued to struggle is in its view that the EU is an ‘either/or’ proposition: either you put all your eggs in the one basket with other member states, or you have nothing to do with them.

A moment’s regard to France – still pursuing its own foreign policy – or Germany – still accessing export markets – should demonstrate that the Union is actually a ‘also/and’ organisation: membership is an occasion to further bolster one’s objectives. As I’ve argued here before, European integration can be largely understood as a way for states to secure things that they cannot by themselves.

In addition, there has to be a recognition that the fates of individual European states are bound up together: Moldovans will know this better than Brits, but it’s true for both. As the absolute tragedy of Greece is demonstrating, what happens in one part of the continent matters for everywhere else.

This is not to preach some kind of universalism about European integration, that it accommodates everyone, all the time. However, in a globalising and changing world, the song that drifts across the western Steppe sounds particularly mellifluous: we would do well to listen to it harder across the Channel.

The post The view from Chisinau: Cameron’s fantastic(al) luxury of choice appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

There’s of course nothing wrong with the commemoration of historical battles. Quite the contrary: each time I took students to the D-Day landing beaches in Normandy, they got a better idea of why European integration might actually be a good idea. And most of the four-year-long commemorative flow on World War I is produced, if not always in perfect taste, at least with mostly good intentions.

The bicentenary of Waterloo, however, seems to produce the kind of re-enactment and narrative that leaves a sour aftertaste. The very name of the battle is already too closely linked to the Napoleonic epic, and commemoration almost inevitably drifts into the realm of myth and legend. All over the 19th century literature, music, art and historiography have patiently and steadily built the Napoleonic myth of ‘the Great Man’ – whether despised as megalomaniac tyrant or glorified as hero – and it’s difficult to emancipate from this heavy cultural conditioning.

Waterloo has been the object of works by the most prominent novelists and poets of the 19th century. As early as 1815, some months only after the actual event, William Wordsworth, Clemens Brentano and Casimir Delavigne already had made it the topic of their poetry, Lord Byron followed one year later. In the 1830s and 1840s, Balzac, Stendhal, Grabbe, Chateaubriand, Thackeray and Victor Hugo also gave in to the morbid fascination of a battle that had left a minimum of 47,000 dead on a single day.

Emile Erckmann and Alexandra Chatrian.

The best antidote to any temptation of nostalgic glorification of historical warfare, however, can be found in the very credible account of a fictitious French conscript named Joseph Bertha created by Emile Erckmann (1822–1899) and Alexandre Chatrian (1826–1890) from Alsace-Lorraine. Published in 1864 (and quickly sold in over 1.5 million copies to a mostly rural public), their Waterloo takes the form of a ‘flashback’, in which an old man recollects his memories, emotions and lessons from fifty years ago.

The anti-militarist and anti-nationalist attitudes expressed by the protagonist, who is drawn by force into a war he does neither understand not approve, are a remarkable counterpoint to the zeitgeist of a late 19th century rather characterised by jingoism and revanchism. And the utter realism of his account of battle – clearly based on extensive research by the authors – made even Emile Zola refer with admiration to the authors’ ‘extreme power of description’.

Joseph Bertha as old man. Illustration to the Erckmann-Chatrian novel by Riou (1833-1900).

What is particularly convincing in Joseph Bertha’s narration is the fact that he must admit that as young man he had not been insensitive to ideas of ‘grandeur’ et ‘gloire’, rather easily manipulated by demagogic nationalist brainwash, and even prone to a certain admiration for ‘L’Empereur’. Fifty years later, however, his judgement is unambiguous:

‘I know well that these things are called “glory”, but people would be well advised not to glorify individuals of this kind…’

Erckmann’s and Chatrian’s seemingly ‘naïve’ novel of 1864 is a more than interesting companion through the commemorative frenzy of 2015. It is a stunning account of the reality of war at an age where there were no photographs or amateur videos. And it is a most welcome reminder that ‘greatness’ or ‘glory’ are dangerous and altogether meaningless categories, both for individuals and entire nations. In the Europe of the 21st century they sound hollow and empty, and it’s good to know that they already did for some enlightened Europeans a hundred and fifty years ago.

Albrecht Sonntag, EU-Asia Institute, ESSCA School of Management.

The post An antidote to any nostalgia of ‘grandeur’ or ‘glory’ appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Yesterday, 15 June, Britain celebrated the 800th anniversary of Magna Carta. The text proclaimed some of what we now call “human rights”, related to fair trial and the rule of law. It was meant to be a peace treaty between English barons and a particularly bully monarch, King John. Magna Carta did not really apply at the time, war resumed soon after and most of the text was repealed throughout history. However, yesterday, the birthday was greeted with royal splendour and the Prime Minister said that Magna Carta “changed the world”. Not bad for someone who not long ago didn’t know the literal translation of Magna Carta (it’s “Great Charter”, by the way).

David Cameron is not alone in his enthusiasm. Others have claimed that we still enjoy the rights “won” in 1215. BBC refers to Magna Carta as “the document that heralded modern democracy”. And the rather obsessive-looking historian David Starkey is convinced that the proclamation of property rights in Magna Carta was “the foundation of everything else”, in a way that other countries, like China and Russia, have not experienced to this day; Magna Carta was “unique in Europe” and Americans and continental Europeans learned about civil liberties from it.

I must confess my fascination. As a citizen of Spain, I think democracy and civil liberties only got to my home country during the short republican experience between 1931 and 1936, and more strongly, in the late 1970s after Franco’s death. I now live in England and I am impressed to see that my host country has apparently enjoyed freedom and rights at least for seven more centuries.

I suppose Brits must have learned quite a lot over time. I am eager to hear all the lessons should they care to share.

Yet, leaving that aside for now, something else calls my attention. What do the celebrations mean about Britain and the British idea of human rights?

Politicians, scholars and discussants have managed to reconstruct the Magna Carta as a document deeply rooted in the history and the identity of the nation. (Incidentally, England? Britain? UK? I never know! But, then, I hold a Spanish passport, so who am I to speak about nationality!?) The rights enshrined in that text would be British-born and therefore detached from the surge of the idea of human rights in continental Europe, with civil rights from the Enlightenment and social rights from workers’ movements in the 19th century.

There is something else, though. The narrative suggests that human rights would also be the product of a negotiation between the Crown and an élite, which at the time was represented by aristocracy. This idea claims that human rights would come from a gentlemen’s agreement among equals, or rather, as if equals. Moreover, it assumes that the top stratum accurately represents the wishes and interests of everybody, regardless of their socioeconomic origin.

The message goes approximately like this: We invented human rights in Britain, or at least we invented the idea of human rights that applies in these islands. We have had these rights for centuries. We agreed on them much earlier than anybody else. We won’t tolerate intrusion. And human rights are not supposed to generate conflict among us. We are all together on this, as a nation of free men (and women, but later… ehem).

I am not a historian, but I consider the idea of human rights truly appealing, and therefore I find hard to believe that one country could keep this wonderful discovery from its neighbours for centuries.

However, this rosy story about Magna Carta and its role in British history and identity can serve political purposes pretty well. And so does PM Cameron, who wrote in The Sun just yesterday:

Britain will not be told what to do on human rights by euro judges because we invented them 800 years ago.

It’s also about restoring the reputation of rights.

We should all be proud of what happened 800 years ago. So let’s celebrate today’s anniversary. Let’s put human rights right.

To those who say we can’t, I say of course we can – we’re the country that wrote Magna Carta; that has one of the oldest democracies and most respected legal systems the world over.

Human rights weren’t invented with Labour’s Human Rights Act – they’ve been part of the fabric of our country for decades.

If we are lucky, yesterday’s pompous celebration does not say as much about Britain as it does about Tory manifesto. Now, only if we are super-lucky and we work on it, we will manage to save the Human Rights Act.

(Find out more about why it’s worth fighting for the Act here).

Koldo Casla

@koldo_casla

(Cartoon: Steve Bell in The Guardian)

The post What the celebration of the 800th anniversary of Magna Carta tells us about Britain’s idea of human rights appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Nobody should take anything for granted when it comes to Britain’s vote to stay or leave the EU. Many of the mistakes and inaccurate assumptions that have overshadowed recent votes could be repeated with the EU vote and lead to Britain leaving the EU.

A British referendum on its EU membership vote was not something many in the EU (and some in the UK) wanted. A renegotiation and referendum are seen as an unwanted headache for a union with enough already on its plate. An exit would be unprecedented, opening a Pandora’s Box of problems for both sides.

Some pro-Europeans may now seek comfort in analysis that argues that when all is said and done the British won’t actually vote to leave. They’ll be buoyed by some polling data, arguments that Cameron is the best Prime Minister to secure an ‘in’ vote, that British businesses will be behind membership, that UKIP will lead ashambolic and divided ‘out’ campaign and so forth. Given what is at stake it pays to take a more cautious analysis.

Do you believe pollsters anymore?

Polls might point to an uphill struggle for the ‘out’ campaign, but we should all be cautious of taking polls too much for granted after the polling farce of the 2015 UK general election (the most polled vote in UK history). Pollsters also made a bad call over last year’s Scottish independence referendum. They correctly tracked the growth in support for independence, but the final result of 55:45 was much wider than many had thought in the final weeks. Despite the few polls in the closing weeks of the independence referendum, there have only ever been a few that point to Scottish independence. By contrast there have been numerous polls pointing to a vote to leave the EU.

Will Cameron secure a renegotiation?

It’s not clear if Cameron can secure much by way of a renegotiation. Britain’s EU debate is often blind to how the rest of the EU must agree to its demands. The rest of the EU wants to see reform, but survey the member states and you find limited sympathy for a UK that can appear to be blackmailing them. What they will offer is therefore unclear. The crunch area of free movement of people in particular looks set to cause tensions throughout the EU. If Britain’s 1975 renegotiation is anything to go by then Britain will get largely token changes.

Will the British public believe in Cameron’s renegotiation?

Nobody should assume the British people will swallow another token renegotiation. Eurosceptics, the media, academics, perhaps even some supporters of an ‘in’ vote (those uneasy with the nature of the renegotiation) will shine many lights on and through the deal. When in a 2011 referendum the British people rejected AV they did so in large part because the referendum turned into a vote on the popularity of Liberal Democrat leader Nick Clegg, but also because they recognised that AV – to quote Nick Clegg himself – was a ‘miserable little compromise’. After the experiences in Scotland, voters are also now likely to see through any last minute commitments in the face of a rising ‘out’ vote.

Is Cameron the best Prime Minister to win a referendum?

Cameron is hailed as the best man to lead the UK through a referendum because he can guarantee a large proportion of the Conservative party and its supporters will follow him in a vote to stay in. Yet he is a prime minister who has played fast and loose with the unity of the UK and the UK’s membership of the EU. He governs with a majority of 12. He led a lacklustre election campaign that seemed to win by accident. He has struggled to hold his party together over Europe, making repeated concessions to Eurosceptics. Finally standing up to them may split his party and lead to a leadership challenge. His concentration could turn to holding his party and premiership together more than holding the UK in the EU. It is unclear whether he will bind ministers through collective cabinet responsibility, or punish those reluctant to back fully any ‘in’ campaign. If his position becomes exposed then expect leadership hopefuls to sense danger in backing him and the ‘in’ vote. Other parties may back off if they sense a danger from tying themselves too closely to the leader of a losing campaign. This was one reason behind Labour leader Ed Miliband’s reluctance to get behind Nick Clegg in the AV referendum.

Will ‘in’ or ‘out’ run the most shambolic campaign?

Both campaigns will struggle to define a clear message and strategy thanks to political differences, personal dislikes and financial problems. The ‘in’ campaign is likely to break-up as soon as the referendum is concluded. UK pro-European campaigns have a record of struggling to exist let alone campaigning effectively. Similar problems beset Scotland’s unionist campaign. There has been much speculation whether the ‘out’ campaign would be better off not relying on UKIP and the one-man show of Nigel Farage. But UKIP can provide some single-party unity that if played right could mirror the SNP’s role as the core of the independence movement. The ‘out’ campaign may struggle to find the grass roots movement that drove Scotland’s independence campaign. That said, UKIP has shown that it can sometimes reach out to disaffected voters by presenting itself as a party apart from the Westminster elite. Like the SNP, the ‘out’ campaign could also be buoyed by the campaign, coming to see any defeat as a tactical as opposed strategic one. UKIP will likely continue to grow, fuelled by factors that are not just about Europe. Left wing Eurosceptic groups, until now largely hidden in the UK, will be given attention thanks to their rejection of what they see as the EU’s imposition of neo-liberal agendas on the whole of Europe.

Who will be better at selling an unknown?

The ‘out’ campaign will struggle to set out a clear agenda for a post-EU Britain. Even UKIP is vague about what relationship it wants the UK to seek. This does not mean the ‘in’ campaign will be in a stronger position. The ‘in’ side will have to await Cameron’s renegotiation deal and not all may back in completely. Some ‘in’ supporters – especially on the left – will be uneasy with any deal that limits such things as workers rights. The ‘in’ campaign may resort to a repeat of ‘Project Fear’, the term applied (especially by their opponents) to the approach taken by unionists in Scotland of arguing about the unknowns and dangers of independence rather than making a positive case for staying. This is in no small part down to the larger unknown of what it is that the EU itself is, ‘ever closer union’ being a vague aspiration.

Who can win hearts and minds?

Scotland’s pro-union campaign relied largely on facts and figures to back the case for remaining in the UK. Its lack of emotional appeal was a key weakness. When it comes to the EU, banging on about trade and jobs can be effective but only gets the pro-EU side so far. Britain’s political debate has long yearned for more than a commitment to the EU. Arguing Britain should accept a reduced place in the world doesn’t work as an optimistic vision to be sold to a people that still embrace a global identity. Ideas of ‘independence’ or ‘freedom’ from Europe might be completely overblown in reality, but they play to deep national desires. Growing English nationalism means using the term ‘Little Englander’ will turn hearts against the ‘in’ campaign. Arguments the EU is a project to create peace won’t work when the Cold War let alone the Second World War are distant memories. Eurosceptics will also appeal to the heart by arguing you can love Europe – embrace a European identity that ranges from food and sport to philosophy and science – while opposing the EU.

Can you bank on the business community for support?

Britons might not be sold on the idea of ‘ever closer union’ but even some Eurosceptics are uneasy at the idea of leaving the Single Market. At the same time, problems in the Eurozone, Europe’s relative decline and emerging markets mean the EU is no longer the economic future it appeared in the 1970s when Britain was the ‘Sick man of Europe’. Britain’s decision not to join the Euro does not appear to have cost it as heavily as some once warned. Business support is therefore no longer as united as it was. Some business backing could actually be harmful to the ‘in’ campaign. The City of London might be vital to the UK’s economy, but it is viewed with a great deal of suspicion. Small and medium sized enterprises, which today make up the majority of the UK economy, do not rely as directly on the links the single market creates. If inward investment is not clearly affected by fears of a Brexit – as has so far been the case – then we should expect people to be sceptical of any economic warnings.

Will the media support an ‘in’ vote?

Just as the business community is no longer as overwhelmingly in favour of UK membership, so too is the UK media. A print media beset by declining sales will continue playing to a Eurosceptic agenda which portrays Europe as a hostile other. Some titles may pinch their noses while they urge their readers to vote to stay in, but some of their columnists will not hold back. Local newspapers, still widely trusted, could be easily overlooked. When it comes to online media, one only has to read the comments sections of most online discussions on EU stories to witness how prolific ‘Cyberkips’ can be. The role of twitter or other online campaigning can be overplayed, but its growing role leaves Eurosceptics with an added edge.

Will the British people be patronised?

But surely the British people will see sense once they wake up to the horrible predictions of what would follow a Brexit – of 3 million jobs gone, of a Britain doomed to be stripped of its UNSC seat, of London sliding into irrelevance and a property slump. There will of course be costs from an exit. But the warnings can be deeply patronising and appear over the top. Pro-Europeanism can be associated with an aloof, metropolitan elite living in a bubble of their own, detached from the reality of the daily struggle of the average British man or woman. No nation’s citizens like being told what to do by other states or an elite who think that only they know best. The British are no exception.

Will the referendum really be about Europe?

All referendums run the risk of becoming votes on something else and the EU vote could be no exception. Talk of holding the vote in 2016 instead of 2017 reflects a desire to get the issue out of the way while Cameron still enjoys something of a honeymoon. Holding such a vote towards the middle of any government’s time in office risks turning the vote into one on the government’s – and in particular, Cameron’s – popularity. But 2016 might not be possible if the Lords delays the referendum bill or the EU refuses to agree any speedy renegotiation. The day chosen may itself affect the result thanks to anything from bad weather through to an unexpected event. Finally, have the political class fully understood what it is that the British people are angry about with regard to the EU? Is the key issue immigration, trade, sovereignty, suspicion of foreigners or anger at the dysfunctional nature of the UK’s political system? UK political parties have often misjudged what has been driving Scottish nationalism. They could do the same over Europe.

Will Scotland be a factor?

The SNP does not want to see Scotland forced to leave the EU by a UK-wide ‘out’ vote. Nevertheless the vote could provide the SNP with the reason to call another independence referendum, should Scotland vote in favour of remaining in the EU while the rest of the UK votes to leave. The SNP will also be uneasy at forming part of a grand-alliance with those UK parties it accuses of neglecting Scotland. The possibility of Scotland splitting from the UK if the UK splits from Europe may not lead some – largely Conservative – politicians to reappraise their opposition to the EU. The connections between Euroscepticism and English nationalism mean that some in England would welcome an England separated from Europe and Scotland.

Will European events sink a British vote?

The EU today is not something that can be sold with much of a positive image. If a Grexit comes about and the EU struggles to cope then any UK ‘in’ campaign may find itself overwhelmed by hostility to staying in what can appear to be a deeply dysfunctional union. Britons might underestimate the extent to which Britain can separate itself from such events, but there could still be a strong desire to reject any close relationship. It may not take any cataclysmic event to influence the vote. Smaller disputes over the budget, controversial new laws or policy, or questionable behaviour in the EU’s institutions and leadership would be jumped on – as they have long been used – by the ‘out’ campaign as evidence of the EU’s inherent flaws.

Who gets to vote?

Recent headlines that ‘immigrants’ would be denied a vote in the referendum (except Commonwealth and Irish immigrants) highlighted tense feelings on both sides of the campaign about the inclusion of EU citizens, seen as highly likely to vote to stay in the EU. The UK is home to several million citizens from other EU state. The potential influence of their vote may not be as big as some might believe. The same might be said of voters who have lived outside the UK for more than 15 years (and are therefore excluded), and 16 and 17 year olds who some would like to be given a vote, as happened in Scotland. But if the vote is a close one then the government may rue the decision to exclude these people. A similar decision to exclude Scots living elsewhere in the UK from voting in Scotland’s independence referendum may have cost the unionist side crucial votes. Excluding these groups has setup a potential fight with both the House of Lords and some other EU member states, potentially delaying the date of any referendum.

Will it settle the issue?

The European question is about more than whether to be or not to be in Europe. Referendums rarely settle issues that are this complex. As with the Scottish referendum it merely provides a temporary way of managing an issue. Had Scotland voted to leave the UK what would have followed would have been decades of bitter debates about implementing separation, the meaning of sovereignty, managing shared responsibilities and coming to terms with changing identities. An EU referendum is unlikely to be any different, especially if the majority is a slim one. Britain could easily face another referendum sooner rather than later.

This article first appeared on E!Sharp. 

The post Why it might not be all right on the Euro-referendum night appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The European Parliament (EP) descended into disarray earlier this week as MEPs failed to speak with one voice about the way negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) are being handled by the European Commission. A key discussion and vote on the controversial trade agreement between the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) had been scheduled for midday Wednesday 10 June but Parliament President Martin Schultz announced late the night before that this would be postponed.

Following months of debate within the EP political groups a common position was due to be adopted but has fallen apart as divisions in the Socialist and Democrat (S&D) party risked the collapse of the consensus. The primary sticking point has been and remains the Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanism. This would allow individual corporations which have invested in a given country to sue that country’s government for anticipated harm to speculative investment; for instance, if a policy to protect public health by banning alcohol advertising were shown to damage alcohol company profits, the company would be able to claim financial compensation. Notable cases that have been launched under current ISDS mechanisms include Phillip Morris v Australia, where the tobacco giant is contesting the introduction of plain packaging laws, Phillip Morris v Uruguay, where the same corporation is suing for profits lost in light of legislation requiring health warnings on tobacco products, and Achmea v Slovakia, where the company investing in health system privatisation sued the government for its lost profit as a result of renationalisation.

ISDS foresees that cases such as these should be dealt by a private arbitration tribunal, overseen by high-level lawyers agreed by the parties, rather than by a national or international court, without judicial review, circumventing the authority of national and EU legal systems and giving preferential legal treatment to foreign investors. MEPs, civil society and the general public have expressed significant reservations about ISDS but the US and the European Commission continue to insist upon its inclusion.

The draft resolution which was due to be voted on by the EP plenary in Strasbourg this week contained a compromise text in favour of a cosmetically reformed version of ISDS. The S&D group, the second-largest political group in the Parliament, is opposed to the ISDS provision but the final compromise that it reached at committee level supported the inclusion of a ‘reformed’ ISDS. A group of unhappy S&D MEPs joined with colleagues in the Green (Greens/EFA), European United Left (GUE/NGL), European Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD) and EPP groups to table a stronger amendment, excluding the ISDS mechanism completely. This split the S&D party line and presented the wavering plenary consensus with a choice between different ISDS positions. On Tuesday night it became apparent that holding the vote would risk rejection of the full resolution and the president took the decision to postpone. Shortly after the announcement the two biggest groups, S&D and EPP, took to Twitter to blame each other for the breakdown.

Within the rest of the EP, support for ISDS hangs in the balance. Politico reported on Wednesday that the EPP, the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats (ALDE) and the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) had been prepared to veto the whole resolution if the anti-ISDS amendments were included. However, there are sceptical MEPs in most groups and five of the 13 Committees which have offered opinions on the resolution have included provisions to limit or exclude ISDS, including the Legal Affairs (JURI) Committee. To compound the issue, the European Ombudsman, Emily O’Reilly, published a report in January which heavily criticises the Commission’s conduct in the TTIP negotiations, denouncing the lack of transparency and public access to documents, meetings and information about lobbying activity. Public opinion is also overwhelming against inclusion of any form of ISDS. The Commission received over 150,000 responses to its public consultation on ISDS and TTIP in mid-2014, the most ever received for a consultation of this kind, and more than 97% of the contributions rejected ISDS.  Many civil society organisations have criticised the Commission for obscuring the extent of this opposition and ploughing ahead with its commitment to inclusion of the mechanism.

Negotiations between US and Commission officials are ongoing based on the negotiating mandate given by the Member states and continue behind closed doors. In the EP, the file has been sent back to committee level so is now unlikely to be agreed before the next plenary session in July, meaning that it will be September before a plenary vote is held. This adds considerable pressure, since TTIP is high on the agenda for President Obama and his administration are eager to finalise before the US elections in November 2016.

The post TTIP debacle in the European Parliament appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

On 6 March 2015, the Finnish Parliament passed the Finnish Climate Change Act (FCCA), the first of its kind in Finland. Pro-environmental organisations and political parties generally heralded the act as a symbolic success, as it enshrines the goal to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 80% by 2050. However, the act has also been described as relatively unambitious[1], given that it focuses mainly on administrative procedures and monitoring and does not require, for example, interim carbon budgets – a specific amount of carbon dioxide equivalent that can be emitted over a 5-year period, a key aspect of the related UK Climate Change Act.[2] The FCCA thus reflects Finland’s role as a follower, rather than leader, on climate change in Europe. But does this ‘backbench approach’ reflect the attitudes of the Finns or merely of their political elite? In this post, we consider to what extent the FCCA is in line with climate policy preferences among the Finnish public. Drawing on nationally representative survey data from the Finnish Climate Barometer 2015[3], we focus on the design of the Act, as well as the public’s preferences for Finland’s role in international climate change politics.

Climate Change in the Finnish Mind

A good starting point to gauge general attitudes towards climate change is how concerned people are about the issue. In the Finnish Climate Barometer survey, 69% of the Finnish population indicated that they were either concerned or very concerned about climate change (Figure 1). This finding squares with a 2014 Eurobarometer survey on climate change where, compared to other European countries, nearly a quarter of the Finnish population ranked climate change as the ‘single most serious problem facing the world as a whole’. A similar survey focusing on climate change attitudes among Finnish businesses found similar results.

Figure 1. Responses to ‘I am concerned about climate change’

This high level of baseline concern about climate change translates into an even higher sense of urgency to address it. 78% of the Finnish population – an overwhelming majority – indicated that addressing climate change was either urgent or very urgent (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Responses to ‘Addressing climate change is urgent’ 

These high levels of concern about climate change and a clear sense of urgency to do something about it generally provide fertile ground for strong climate policy. It is thus not surprising that the previous Finnish Parliament approved the FCCA and that the newly-appointed government’s programme promises active measures to mitigate climate change. But to what extent is the FCCA in line with general policy preferences among the Finnish population? 

Mandatory interim targets?

As we discussed above, the FCCA is mainly procedural and largely symbolic. For example, it clarifies Ministerial responsibilities and specifies regular planning activities for long-term, mid-term and adaptation policy plans, but fails to enshrine clear, stepwise targets to reach its goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 80% by 2050.[4] However, it has also been pointed out that the Act does provide for more transparency – which could in turn create “political pressure for more effective policy measures if monitoring shows a discrepancy between objectives and performance”.[5] But is this approach in line with general policy preferences in the Finnish population? To this end, one survey question asked people whether they would prefer a carbon budget approach similar to the one used in the United Kingdom, where there are absolute limits on carbon emissions over five-year periods. Results indicate that 65% of Finns would prefer a stronger approach to climate policy similar to that of the UK, while about 15% did not know (Figure 3). Thus, the new legislation falls short of a more ambitious and serious climate approach based around interim targets favoured by most Finns.

Figure 3. Responses to ‘Finland should imitate the UK’

Finland as a climate leader?

How does this desire for greater climate ambition fare when Finns consider what other countries are or should be doing? Figure 4 reports to what extent Finns thought that Finland should reduce its greenhouse gas emissions regardless of what other countries do. Again, a clear nearly two-thirds majority of the Finns surveyed (60%) agreed or strongly agreed that Finland should address climate change regardless of what others are doing. These responses thus indicate Finns wish to see Finland as a leader, rather than a follower. This vision is clearly out of sync with the rather unambitious FCCA and the national energy and climate strategies adopted so far. 

Figure 4. Responses to ‘Finland should mitigate regardless of others’ 

Where next?

A new government has just taken office in Finland and is currently in the process of specifying its policy priorities. So far Finland has been a backbencher on national climate policy, indicated by a willingness to accept EU-level climate targets, but with little ambition to exceed them and take leadership. A weak signal of greater ambition can be detected in the new government’s programme that sets as its target to reach the EU 2020 climate goals by the end of the current legislature in early 2019. The FCCA can support this, but is in itself a very cautious step to develop climate policies. The survey data presented here indicate a strong desire in the general public for Finland to become a real forerunner in addressing climate change. Indeed, vast majorities of the population are concerned about climate change and would prefer their government to take much more decisive, carbon budget-driven steps to address the issue. Future evaluations of Finnish climate policies will show if the relatively unambitious FCCA can support such radical change.

[1] Pölönen, I. (2014). The Finnish Climate Change Act: Architecture, Functions, and Challenges. Climate Law, 4(3-4), 301-326.

[2] Benson, D., & Lorenzoni, I. (2014). Examining the Scope for National Lesson‐drawing on Climate Governance. The Political Quarterly, 85(2), 202-211.

[3] The survey was commissioned by the Ministry of the Environment, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, the Ministry of Employment and the Economy, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Finnish Funding Agency for Innovation (Tekes) the Finnish Environment Institute (SYKE), the independent fund reporting to the Finnish Parliament (Sitra) and an independent think tank Demos Helsinki. TNS Gallup Oy collected a sample of 1005 persons between 15–74 years of age across Finland using Gallup Forum – (Response Panel 5.–14.3.2015). The margin of error is approximately +/- 3 percentage points.

[4] Pölönen, I. (2014). The Finnish Climate Change Act: Architecture, Functions, and Challenges. Climate Law, 4(3-4), 301-326.

[5] p. 314 in Pölönen, I. (2014). The Finnish Climate Change Act: Architecture, Functions, and Challenges. Climate Law, 4(3-4), 301-326.

The post The Finnish Climate Change Act – In Line with What Finland’s Public Wants? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

- This article was originally published with ‘E-International Relations (www.e-ir.info)  on     11 June 2015-

British politics has gone through turbulent times since the public referendum on Scottish independence took place in September 2014. A majority of Scottish voters narrowly backed remaining part of the United Kingdom after the opinion polls in the weeks before the referendum had indicated that the Scottish National Party (SNP) would succeed in its ambition to make Scotland independent from the rest of the UK (Nardelli, 2014). The 55 per cent no vote against Scottish independence was essentially achieved through a concerted effort made by the leaders of the three main Westminster parties. Conservative prime minister David Cameron, Labour leader Ed Miliband and Liberal Democrat leader Nick Clegg signed a vow which was printed in the Scottish daily newspaper Daily Record on September 16th 2014, two days before the referendum took place. In the vow the three leaders publicly committed themselves to devolving ‘permanent and extensive new powers’ to Scotland (Clegg, 2014). Most significantly, the Labour Party in Scotland decided to throw their weight firmly behind the ‘no’ vote, with former prime minister Gordon Brown acting as an outspoken advocate of maintaining the Union in the final days of the campaign. In his firebrand speech for the pro-union ‘better together’ campaign Brown compared Scottish independence with an ‘economic trapdoor’ from which there would be no escape once the decision had been made (Watt, 2014).

Prime minister Cameron swiftly backtracked on the pledges made in the vow. Already in his first statement on the morning after the referendum he emphasised that the devolution of further powers to Scotland should only occur if voting rights of Scottish MPs in the House of Commons on English laws were restricted:

So, just as Scotland will vote separately in the Scottish Parliament on their issues of tax, spending and welfare, so too England, as well as Wales and Northern Ireland, should be able to vote on these issues and all this must take place in tandem with, and at the same pace as, the settlement for Scotland. (Cameron, 2014)

This statement resulted in a surge of SNP support in Scotland which most of all damaged Cameron’s referendum allies, the Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats. Both parties lost all their seats but one to the SNP in the UK general election on May 7th. The SNP landslide and the almost complete collapse of electoral support for pro-union parties in Scotland could indeed be an indication that, as long as Westminster fails to deliver further devolution of powers, public support for independence will grow. Alistair Crighton argues that the long-term goal of the SNP is to hold a second referendum which, in the post-general election absence of strong and credible pro-union voices North of the border, is almost certain to result in a resounding ‘yes’ for independence (Crighton 2015).

The re-election of David Cameron as prime minister with a narrow Conservative majority has made it certain that a referendum on Britain’s EU membership will be either held next year or by 2017. If the majority of voters in England opt for Brexit while a majority of Scots decide to stay in the EU, the SNP is almost certain to demand another independence referendum to be held in Scotland. SNP leader Nichola Sturgeon has warned the British government of a ‘groundswell of anger’ if Scotland was forced to leave the EU on the basis of a UK-wide overall majority. Sturgeon demands that the Brexit should only be possible if  in all four regions of the UK (England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland) a majority is in favour of leaving the EU (BBC News, 2015). Scotland has traditionally displayed a more pro-European attitude than many parts of England, which is reflected in opinion polls on EU membership. The latest major survey on attitudes towards EU membership in the UK, which was conducted by Populus in April this year, shows that 48 per cent of Scots would back staying in the EU. Support in English regions for staying in ranges between 34 and 44 per cent, with the Midlands showing a clear majority for Brexit (Populus, 2015). It is therefore quite possible that the EU referendum may result in a split between an overall majority support for Brexit in England and against in Scotland.

It is obvious why Scotland shows a stronger affiliation with the EU than most English regions. Britain’s reputation as an ‘awkward partner’ in the EU (George, 1998) emerged mainly from the sceptical attitude of the English political class towards the project of institutionalised European integration. For the English eurosceptics, who can be mostly found in the Conservative Party and the English nationalist party UKIP, engagement in the EU’s system of multi-level governance boils down to a constant and difficult battle to defend national sovereignty (Usherwood 2015). In the Westminster-focused and London-based media the perception that the EU’s policies and regulations undermine Britain’s national interest has been promoted for decades. At the same time no British government  has been bold enough to make a sustained and outspoken argument in favour of the economic and political benefits EU membership offers to the UK.­­­ In contrast to the predominantly negative English public debate, people in Scotland seem to be more aware of the political and economic benefits that being part of the EU Single Market has for their region. These range from the export market for the Scottish whisky industry, gas and oil production (Springford, 2015) towards benefits for Scotland’s business, society and the country’s infrastructure provided by the financial support under the EU’s Structural Fund Programmes. Scotland continues to receive substantial financial support under the EU’s Social Fund and Regional Development Programmes (Scottish Government 2014).

Like in the case of the Irish Republic, Scotland seems to perceive EU membership as an indispensable tool to maintain economic and ultimately also political independence from England. For the Irish Republic joining the European Community in 1973 was an important symbolic political step to re-emphasise their political independence from the UK (Fitzgerald and Girvin, 2000, p. 273). Ultimately the significant financial support from the EU Ireland received since its accession in 1973 provided the platform for the development of its investment-friendly Celtic Tiger Economy in the 1990s. EU funds helped Irish governments to keep corporation tax on the lowest level in the whole of the EU and to invest in the infrastructure of business parks across the country (FitzGerald, 2004, p. 72). These attracted major North American high-tech companies in the computing sector as well as in the pharmaceutical industry. Major companies such as Dell, Google, Facebook, Bayer, Glaxo SmithKline and Roche positioned their European headquarters in the Irish Republic.

Former SNP leader Alex Salmond hence not only controversially compared Scotland’s pro-independence movement to the ‘Irish freedom struggle’ (Peterkin 2015). Salmond also argued that an independent Scotland in the EU could replicate the pre-financial crisis economic dynamism of the Celtic Tiger by creating a ‘Celtic Lion’. In his speech at Harvard University in 2008 Salmon argued that as a small nation Scotland, like the Irish Republic, could achieve economic success by offering investors a flexible environment that is built on a strong political consensus on the country’s national interest and overall economic strategy. The crucial factor for this success would however be membership of the EU:

Where this occurs within the framework of a European Union and single market place of 600 million people, it creates the ideal environment within which small nations can take the most of their comparative advantage. (Salmond, 2008)

Scotland can of course not assume that it would automatically remain in the EU if another independence referendum was held in the aftermath of a Brexit decision. Former EU Commission president Barroso warned the Scottish government in 2014 that it would be ‘extremely difficult’ for an independent Scotland to join the EU (BBC News 2014). Barroso’s intervention was nevertheless widely considered as an attempt to strengthen the pro-union camp in the September 2014 referendum rather than a statement of legal facts. In their assessment of the road to EU membership for an independent Scotland, constitutional experts Stephen Tierney and Katie Boyle from the Centre on Constitutional Change in Edinburgh point out that an independent Scotland would have to apply to join the EU. Accession of a independent Scottish state would ultimately depend on the unanimous agreement of all existing EU members (Centre on Constitutional Change 2014). The concerns raised in the report about potential hostility of the UK and other EU member state towards an the accession of an independent Scotland’s appeared in the context of the circumstances of the 2014 referendum. If Scotland held another independence referendum after the UK referendum had opted for Brexit, the situation would be entirely different. The departing rump United Kingdom, consisting of England, Wales and Northern Ireland, would certainly no longer have the ability to veto Scottish accession to the EU. Moreover, it can be expected that the remaining 27 EU member states will show a positive attitude towards gaining Scotland as the new 28th member state. Rejecting Scotland would not only be against the EU’s general spirit of national self-determination and devolution of power which it has been promoting under the subsidiary principle since the 1993 Maastricht Treaty. Most obviously the collective EU Council is unlikely to reject the application of a small country which has been part of the internal market since 1973 and could help to partly fill the economic gap that will be opened up by Brexit (Keating 2015, p.  204).

Brexit within the next two years, followed by another Scottish independence referendum is not an inevitability. The British public may overall turn out to be pragmatic about EU membership and decide to vote in support of continuing membership. This outcome is of course more likely if David Cameron manages to achieve the substantial renegotiation of British membership terms and possibly even wider institutional reform through the revision of the Lisbon Treaty. The latter is, however, unlikely to be achievable within the short timeframe of the next two years. It is therefore more realistic to assume that Cameron will return from Brussels with a half-baked compromise deal on the freedom of movement and further safeguards for the UK to be sucked into the deepening of political integration in the eurozone. The hard-line eurosceptics in the Conservative Party, UKIP and in large parts of the UK’s foreign owned tabloid press are unlikely to be satisfied with such a deal. Cameron will therefore encounter great difficulties to sell a weak negotiation result to both his party and the British public, even more so because he will be a lone voice amongst what has become a rather deserted pro-European camp. In the absence of charismatic pro-European voices, such as Robin Cook, Mo Mowlam, Charlie Kennedy but also David Miliband, who continues to remain in the political exile in the US, the pro-EU camp will struggle to make its voice heard against a barrack of eurosceptic voices. If British pro-Europeans fail on this historic occasion to make the convincing case for staying inside the EU the days of the United Kingdom as we know it may indeed be over for good.

References

BBC News (2014) ‘Scottish independence: Barroso says joining EU would be “difficult”‘, 16 February.

BBC News (2015) ‘Nicola Sturgeon warns of EU exit “backlash”’, 2 June.

Cameron, D. (2014) Scottish Independence Referendum: statement by the Prime Minister, 19 September.

Centre on Constitutional Change (2014) ‘An Independent Scotland: The Road to Membership of the European Union’, 20 August.

Clegg, D. (2014) ‘David Cameron, Ed Miliband and Nick Clegg sign joint historic promise which guarantees more devolved powers for Scotland and protection of NHS if we vote no’, Daily Record, 15 September.

Crighton, A. (2015) ‘The UK is now a failed state: Why the SNP’s unprecedented landslide victory means an end to Union’, Aljazeera, 11 May.

Fitzgerald, R. and Girvin, B. (2000). ‘Political Culture, Growth and the Condition for sucess in the Irish Economy’, in Nolan, B., O’Connell, P.J. and Whelan, C.T. (eds), Bust to Boom? The Irish Experience of Growth and Inequality, Dublin, Institute of Public Administration: 268-285.

Fitzgerald, G. (2004), ‘The Economics of EU Membership’, in Hourihane, J. (ed), Ireland and the European Union: The First Thirty Years, 1973-2002, Dublin: Liliput Press: 67-80.

George, S. (1998) An awkward partner: Britain in the European Community. Oxford, University Press.

Keating, M. (2015) ‘The European Dimension to Scottish Constitutional Change’, The Political Quarterly, 86 (2), April-June: 201-208.

Nardelli, A. (2014) ‘Were Scottish independence opinion polls misleading?’, The Guardian, 19 September.

Peterkin, T. (2015) ‘Scottish independence referendum: Salmond claims links to Irish freedom struggle‘,The Scotsman, 4 June.

Populus (2015) ‘EU Exit, Party Leaders, and the Budget Deficit’, April.

Salmond, A. (2008) Free to Prosper: Creating Celtic Lion economy, Speech at Harvard University, 31 March.

Scottish Government (2014) European Structural Funds: Approved Operational Programmes 2014-2020.

Springford, J. (2015). ‘Disunited Kingdom. Why “Brexit” endangers Britain’s poorer regions’. London, Centre for European Reform, April.

Usherwood, S. (2015), ‘Britain and Europe: A Model of Permanent Crisis’, in: Demetriou, K.N. (ed), The European Union in Crisis: Explorations in Representation and Democratic Legitimacy, Heidelberg, Springer: 3-14.

Watt, N. (2014). ‘Gordon Brown makes passionate appeal to Labour voters in final no rally’.

The post The UK after the 2015 General Election: Doomed to Be a ‘Failed State’? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Welcome to the Brexit Blog. This blog is not simply about British debates over the UK’s future in the EU. It is more about what Britain’s debate, attempted renegotiation, referendum and the outcome of that referendum could mean for the rest of Europe. As a start I’ve compiled below an overview of the literature that exists on what the ‘British question’ could mean for the rest of Europe.

The Conservative party’s victory in the May 2015 UK general election leaves the EU facing its British question sooner than many were expecting. It also means the EU faces an issue that only a few have given much in-depth thought about. This is not to say the idea of a British renegotiation, referendum and exit have not been hot topics of discussion for some time. They have been much discussed over dinners in Brussels or coffees in Berlin, Paris and elsewhere. There has also been a range of short pieces in the media, blogs and comments by politicians, sometimes at a series of events in the UK and elsewhere held to discuss the subject. The governments of some other EU member states, along with allies such as the USA, have undertaken private discussions and analysis.

Detailed publicly available analysis, on the other hand, has been more limited. This is especially so when compared to the plethora of research about what a Brexit or renegotiation might mean for the UK (the House of Commons Library has produced a short bibliography of the literature and its own review of the potential policy implications of a Brexit). Talk about what a Brexit might mean for the EU and people soon shift discussion to what it might mean for the UK. Undoubtedly the consequences for the UK would be far greater. But the question of what it might mean for the EU still stands.

This does not mean there has been no detailed analysis on which to prepare for the forthcoming negotiations and referendum. There exists a range of English language reports and papers that specifically analyse the EU’s position vis-à-vis the UK. There also exist a range of sources (often shorter than full reports, but more focused on specific issues) that provide broader insights. Further reports will emerge over the course of the renegotiation and referendum. Taking into account the EU’s perspective will also be of direct interest to the UK. Deadlock and failure will come from the UK failing to appreciate what is and is not in the interests of the EU and therefore what is a plausible relationship for Britain either as a member of the EU or for UK-EU relations if the UK leaves.

• A good overview of what a Brexit could mean for the EU is the September 2013 30-page report by the SWP entitled ‘Europe without Britain: assessing the impact on the European Union of a British withdrawal’. It covers everything from what the UK contributes to the EU to what a Brexit might mean for Europe’s geopolitics.

• In February 2014 Nicolai von Ondarza of the SWP published a 31-page report (in German) entitled, ‘Großbritannien und die EU-Reform: Empfehlungen für den Umgang mit den britischen Forderungen an die Europäische Union’ (Britain and EU reform: recommendations for dealing with British demands for EU reform). It examines in detail how to approach any UK attempt to renegotiate its relationship.

• The DGAP’s September 2014 report – ‘The UK and the EU: what would a Brexit mean for the EU and other states around the world’ – which I edited with Almut Möller, is made up of 26 views of a Brexit written by people from research institutions and universities from sixteen EU member states (France, Germany, Poland, Ireland, Slovenia, Austria, Romania, Bulgaria, Denmark, Hungary, Sweden, Italy, Spain, Finland, Greece, the Netherlands) nine non-EU countries (Canada, USA, China, Norway, Switzerland, Australia and New Zealand, Japan, Singapore and Brazil), and a view from the EU’s institutions in Brussels. It provides the most wide-ranging overview of how a variety of EU and non-EU countries might respond to the UK’s demands for reform or exit from the EU.

• Mark Leonard of the ECFR published a 2015 report ‘The British problem and what it means for Europe’ which examines what is driving demands for reform or exit, what a Brexit could mean for the EU, and how the EU might respond.

• In December 2013, Open Europe ran the first ever simulation – a war-game – of a UK-EU renegotiation followed by a negotiation over a UK exit. The online archive contains videos and a final report of the day’s proceedings. Open Europe have also written extensively on what the impact of a Brexit might be for the UK, with some of this analysis touching on possible implications for the rest of the EU.

• In September 2014, Deutsche Bank published a 20 page report analyzing the possible implications of a Brexit, especially economic ones, for the EU. A similar but shorter 8 page report was published by the Bertlesmann Foundation in April 2015.

• In 2013 the RUSI Journal published several short pieces on the possible defence and security implications for Europe of a Brexit. A January 2013 report from the International Security Information Service and NATO Watch also considered the defence implications. Europeangeostrategy.org has produced a series of posts (here, here and here) about the possible geopolitical implications of a Brexit.

• The legal side of a Brexit has been covered by a range of authors writing on how a member state might withdraw from the EU. See here for a report by Phoebus Athanassiou for the ECB examining the legal side to a withdrawal with attention in particular on Greece. Adam Lazowski of Westminster University has written in academic journals on the legal side of the UK exiting the EU, and has a forthcoming book on the topic. The UK and Article 50 is also examined in a blog piece by Steve Peers. Phedon Nicolaides 2013 article for the Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law also considers the effects of Article 50 on a withdrawing state. In April 2014 Clifford Chance undertook a legal review of the implications of a Brexit for the UK and EU financial sectors.

• In July 2013 the House of Commons Library produced a lengthy research paper examining how the UK might leave the EU, examining issues such as procedures and some passing analysis of possible implications for the EU, although the report’s focus is largely on the UK.

• The potential consequences for the EU have also been covered in some of the UK’s pro-withdrawal literature. Admittedly a great deal of the literature gives scant thought to the issue. They are more interested in what end Britain should seek in leaving the EU, meaning they can overlook analysing the ways and means by which to secure this, something only possible if the EU’s likely positions are also taken into account. Nevertheless they do offer some interesting insights. The IEA’s 2014 €100,000 Brexit prize produced a series of proposals. The winner by Iain Mansfield can be found here with a wider-ranging report by the IEA here. There also exist other proposals – to name but a few – such as Richard North’s proposal for a ‘Flexit’, David Campbell-Bannerman MEP’s ‘Time to Jump’, Dan Hannan MEP’s proposals (for the Centre for Policy Studies), proposals from Fresh Start, the Mayor of London, and Civitas, (click here for a second 2015 Civitas report and here for a report by them on the potential impact on the UK and EU car industries).

• The UK has also been the source of numerous proposals for how to reform the EU. Especially notable here is the work of the CER with its many reports. Its director, Charles Grant has written extensively on how the UK-EU relationship could develop in ways beneficial to all.

• One reason for there being so little analysis of what UK positions could mean is because there is a lack of clarity over what the UK itself is seeking. The UK’s Balance of Competences Review provides not only some insights into what may be up for renegotiation, but also one of the most detailed analyses ever undertaken of the EU’s powers. The best overview of the review is by Michal Emerson (ed.) for the Centre for European Policy Studies.

• In the academic literature the idea of European disintegration remains largely under-researched, the assumption being integration is a forward moving process. Douglas Webber’s January 2013 article in the European Journal of International Relations, ‘How like is it that the EU will disintegrate? A critical analysis of competing theoretical perspectives’ provides an excellent overview of what different theories of European integration can tell us. My own attempt, written for an academic conference, to apply a Brexit to Webber’s approach to the theories can be found here. There is also Hans Vollaard’s ‘Explaining European disintegration’ for the JCMS, and the Journal of Democracy October 2012 special issue on European disintegration. Later this month the Global Society will be publishing my article ‘Europe’s British Question: the UK-EU Relationship in a Changing Europe and Multipolar World’. The work in this area has built on some discussions at several academic conferences.

• Analysis of differentiated integration and opt-outs has been covered by a range of authors, for example Rebecca Adler-Nissen’s 2015 book ‘Opting out of the EU: diplomacy, sovereignty and European integration’.

• Some books and reports discussing the UK’s European debate include brief discussion of the possible implications for the EU. The book by Roger Liddle, Tony Blair’s former special adviser on Europe, ‘The Risk of Brexit’ (for Policy Network) provides some insights into how the rest of the EU may respond to British demands. Some other national perspectives can be found in the Foreign Policy Centre’s 2014 report ‘Renegotiation, reform and referendum: does Britain have an EU future?’, edited by Adam Hug. In May 2015, The Guardian asked five journalists from other European countries to give their thoughts on what a Brexit might mean for their states and the rest of Europe. The Guardian’s report on what might happen if the UK leaves the EU touches on some of the possible implications for the EU. As the UK and the EU move through a renegotiation and referendum we can expect more pieces such as that by The Telegraph examining how other EU member states are responding to British overtures.

It is not clear how much more time there will be to prepare further research on what a Brexit or renegotiated relationship might mean for the EU. Cameron is moving quickly to get a referendum bill through Parliament.  A referendum in 2016 instead of 2017 looks difficult, but is a possibility.

The post European thinking on its British Question appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Farah Purwaningrum

My book ‘Knowledge Governance in an Industrial Cluster. The Collaboration between Academia-Industry-Government in Indonesia’ examines the diverging strands of normative, social and territorial order of the science system. The insights from one of dynamic Asian countries – Indonesia provide interesting comparisons and contrasts with higher education and innovation policies in European countries. Several key findings of my research on Indonesian science system are as follows:

Lack of coordination

The institutional space afforded by the normative order shows a fuzzy and inconsistent norms and lack of coordination between ministries in Indonesia involved in the science and industrial sector. The Ministry of Research and Technology’s (RISTEK) science policy is geared towards national innovation system. The national research agenda composed by the National Research Council (DRN) and RISTEK is centralistic. It is decided in the capital city Jakarta. DRN itself act as a unit of RISTEK. The production of knowledge is aimed at seven areas: food security, energy, technology, transportation management, information and communication technology, defense and security, medicine and health technology, and advanced materials.

Romanticizing on the past of high-technology during the former President Habibie is also evident in the vision of IPTEK (ilmu pengetahuan dan teknologi/science and technology) for the welfare and progress of civilization. IPTEK and the knowledge produced from it is viewed as a panacea. The national innovation system strategy was later on carried out as a project by RISTEK due to the apathetic response from the local government. Indeed the matter of research and development depends substantially on the regional government commitment, which can be restricted due to limited local budget capacity and clientele related matters.

Liberalization agenda

Directorate of Higher Education (DIKTI) in Ministry of National Education (MENDIKNAS) are taking measures to liberalise the higher education system. However, it is temporarily halted due to the Constitutional Court Decision that regards education as a public good and secures the right to education for Indonesian citizens. The Court is a lonely guardian of the citizen rights in contrast to the liberalization agenda pursued not only by MENDIKNAS but also Ministry of Industry. The recent legal reform proposes the introduction of non-profit legal entity (Badan Layanan Umum) for the state universities in the end of 2012. Profit or non-profit character of the organization is to be dictated by empirical reality instead of normative purview.

Industrial policy is also emphasising the liberalization agenda by reliance of its fiscal policy through tax incentives rather than through standardization mechanism. The current Master-plan for the Acceleration and Expansion for Indonesian Economic Development 2011-2025 is ambitious in its plan of connecting diverging hubs in different islands in Indonesia. The capital demands of this Master-plan is considerable large namely up to 400 billion US dollars, this is six times of Indonesia’s GDP in 2010. Java Economic Corridor focuses more on services, the remaining corridors are still largely based on natural resources.

From the analysis of the clusters related policies it becomes evident that 35 clusters specified do not point out to a bounded area of cluster either in a specific area such as the one in Ceper, or in Jababeka where there is natural industrial agglomeration. The extent of the feasibility of this policy in practice is contentious first due to the patchy bottom up planning and second due to sectoral planning due to lack of coordination between ministries. The Investment related laws exhibit friendliness towards tax holidays, tax incentives and labour policy. Less is shown in terms of reliance of smart regulation as incorporated in the technical engineering standards or national standardisation norms. The automotive industry policy also shows fiscal intervention in terms of import duty and luxury tax. There is a vacuous absence of industrial policy for knowledge transfer in the automotive sector, which exemplifies the reliance of the knowledge transfer process from the principal customers.

Research system: patronage, entrepreneurship and scattered resources

Universities are the main scientific knowledge producing organizations in terms of research as well as national publication activities. The pattern I observe from the statistical inference of the allocation of Insentif (research incentive programme) RISTEK grant from 2008-2010 and from the publication of scientific national journal indicates is geographical disparity of knowledge distribution. Practices of research-based organizations indicate that the science system still represent the tension of patronage, personal linkage harnessed with good relations. These practices enact the social space of interaction between actors. Centralization still persists. Researchers cope with the lack of funding by resorting to taking up additional jobs. Some are being entrepreneurial.

Moreover, the fluid character where ministries have their budget for research creates different doors to attain research funding. This underlines the fact that the existing capacity of research is restrained, resources are scattered due to ‘shared poverty.’ Further research is evaluated in terms of completing administrative requirements in the fiscal year, which may hamper the linkage between industry and research institutes. Nonetheless there is linkage between academia and industry as exemplified in the case of Biomaterial R&D and the Toyota case. The different modes of representation of academia and in industries may inhibit the knowledge flow. The case of Polymer Technology Center indicates how an academia is becoming more entrepreneurial.

Decentralization: connecting knowledge with locality

The territorial order then asks for the progress on decentralization and how the decentralized government as encapsulated in the pemekaran (splitting of administrative regions) process partake the role in development of bonded zone, and connecting knowledge with the locality. There is a plan of developing a bonded zone which will include Jababeka, Lippo & Delta Silicon, Hyundai, EJIP, Bekasi Fajar, MM2100 and Deltamas. It is likely that the bonded zone in the Bekasi district which will have the same fate like Batam, it will be relying to the central government funding, facilitated by the West Java Province with Estate Companies.

The District Government of Bekasi is facing challenges due to bureaucratization. The bureaucratization process is interwoven in the practices of the officials in which there is a high regard for more lucrative administrative positions than for functional positions. The rapid rotation of manpower also implies the loss of knowledge in the government. Constraints in the usage of budget is visible, this is aggravated with patron-client relations between the parliament and the local government and corrupt practices in the usage of budget. Pemekaran contributes to the bureaucratization process and the rise of bureaucratic elites. Thus pemekaran allows the geographical space in a decentralized government unit for a competition for resources.

This sketches the picture of the science system in Indonesia, where the authority relations and practices of the policy that keep the order of science system arises from differing orders. They signify on the one hand, the continuities of past practices of patronage, ‘shared poverty’ and centralization, and on the other hand formally there is increasing regulatory trend to expand and liberalize even more spaces. This collaboration, competition, centralization and liberalization construe the spaces of the science system in Indonesia.

Dr. Farah Purwaningrum is a sociologist with an interdisciplinary background in law. She holds law degrees from Universitas Islam Indonesia, Yogyakarta and the London School of Economics and Political Science, UK. She completed her Dr. phil. in Rheinische Friedrich Universität Bonn, Germany in 2012. She currently holds a lectureship in sociology at the Institute of Asian Studies, Universiti Brunei Darussalam. She has a keen interest to do research in areas of science policy, science system and knowledge governance. She will present her recent research at the ERA CRN section on the global governance of knowledge policies at the ECPR General Conference in Montreal, Canada, August 2015. 

The post Knowledge Governance in an Industrial Cluster: the Collaboration between Academia-Industry-Government appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

So here we are, about a month into the new government. How’s it shaping up with the EU referendum thing? For me, four things stick out so far.

Firstly, David Cameron has conformed to type in his approach to the matter. Assuming that he was a surprised as the next man (that next man being Ed Miliband) to win the election, he has set about things in as pragmatic a manner as possible. That has meant some dashing between continental capitals to sound out/reassure/lobby (in that order) key interlocutors; tying in key sceptics into the negotiation team (most obviously Hammond, May and Osborne) and generally trying to keep a lid on things. The unexpected nature of his electoral victory has given Cameron a (very) brief window of opportunity with his party, and he’s using that to full effect, not dawdling on negotiations.

The obvious trade-off is that Cameron still doesn’t have a good idea of what he can achieve or ‘win’. The continued absence of a clear agenda of policy points strongly reinforces the impression that he’s biddable on most things. As the useful Cicero Group summary showed, much of what has been discussed is actually a matter for HMG itself to do, rather than any change in EU treaties or legislation: likewise, the continuing muddle about the ECHR doesn’t give great confidence that anyone in Number 10 is building a constructive agenda of work. This despite the arrival of Mats Persson of Open Europe as Cameron’s special advisor, a level-headed if critical voice.

This feeds into the second point, namely that the UK continues to navel-gaze. The debate so far has been very largely about getting something for the UK out of this, and how ‘Europe’ might try to stifle (or, more rarely, help) that. Almost completely absent have been frames of making things better for the whole EU: Cameron’s comments in Riga a couple of weeks ago suggest the tone. For Cameron, his negotiation team and most of his party, this will be not only presented as ‘us’ against ‘them’, but pursued as such.

Where the more constructive/engaged frame has emerged (as here) it has come from the few pro-EU voices to have put their head above the parapet. This is, in of itself, something to note, since there was a widespread assumption that it would take an actual referendum for the pro campaign to stir itself. Fair to say that neither side has really got going yet (this, this, this, this and this as a small sample) in part because of the uncertainty about what’s happening with the renegotiation element and in part because of the obvious personality politics involved.

The third observation is that the election itself continues to exert an influence on matters. Labour and the LibDems are busy regrouping and lack leadership to challenge Cameron’s plan; Cameron’s enhanced position vis-a-vis his backbench has already been noted; and the SNP are finding that more MPs doesn’t really help when they have little to leverage against the government. Most interesting (for me, at least) has been the winding in of UKIP in the aftermath of the Farage (un)resignation: without his presence in public, the party has lost a lot of the profile it had in the media pre-election. A quick check of their website shows they are still pumped out content and comment, but without much pick up. the Blatter/Farage comparisons also suggest that the latter has suffered at least some damage to his teflon reputation.

And so, finally, to the continuing apathy of most people, something that has been deeply palpable. There’s some evidence of a recent upswing of interest, as the chart from Google Trends (below) shows, but only back to the sort of level seen in the aftermath of the Constitutional Treaty a decade ago: far from the burning, predominant issue it sometimes is presented as. More anecdotally, there isn’t a sense of febrile political debate on the subject in the street and in the pubs of the country: it’s certainly more AV referendum than Scottish independence referendum  to date.

 Added to this, we have more polling evidence (insert witty observation about reliability issues here) that the British public is increasingly supportive of EU membership, and it’s as clear as ever that this referendum – when it does come and pretty much regardless of its content – will solve little of the underlying problems. Already, critical voices talk of a second vote, or of a set-up. Unless the renegotiation agenda firms up, and a more meaningful public debate develops, this is unlikely to be anything more than a costly diversion from the serious issues facing both the EU and the UK.

The post The coming referendum appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Last week, interior ministers of the 15 countries sitting at the UN Security Council met to discuss foreign fighters. They did so as part of the follow-up of

Resolution 2178 (2014), which defines foreign fighters as people “who travel or attempt to travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality, and other individuals who travel or attempt to travel from their territories to a State other than their States of residence or nationality, for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts, or the providing or receiving of terrorist training”.

This is hardly a new phenomenon, but foreign fighters are getting more and more attention in relation to Syria and Iraq. The number of foreign fighters in both countries could exceed 20,000, and according to the Director of Europol, between 3,000 and 5,000 of them would come from EU countries.

In Resolution 2178, as well as previous ones since 2001, the Security Council urges states to adopt legislative and criminal measures to prevent terrorism and bring suspects to justice.

With the intention to operationalise the mandate of the Security Council, the Council of Europe is working on a draft protocol to the 2005 European Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism. This text criminalises the action of joining a group and “participating” in its activities “for the purpose of committing or contributing to the commission” of terrorist offences (Article 2), “receiving training for terrorism” (Article 3), “travelling abroad for the purpose of terrorism” (Article 4), “funding travelling abroad for the purpose of terrorism” (Article 5), or “organising or otherwise facilitating travelling” for that purpose (Article 6).

As noted by Scheinin, the formulation of these provisions relies on the intent (“purpose”) of the person to participate or contribute towards the commission of a terrorist offence.

The draft protocol, therefore, does not call for the criminalisation of travelling to conflict zones, and individual countries have not modified their criminal legislation to punish travelling per se. The subjective element of intent is required.

However, a variety of measures are already being taken in relation to foreign fighters, ranging from passport confiscation (Germany), attempts to bar foreign fighters from acquiring national citizenship (Austria), stripping known foreign fighters of access to social services (Belgium), or revoking naturalised nationality (UK and Netherlands) (see reports here, here and here).

So far, these measures are targeting Islamic foreign fighters travelling to conflict areas with a religious motivation. However, there is no reason why these measures could not be potentially applied to other conflicts. For example, Spanish authorities recently detained eight nationals that had fought in Ukraine on the pro-Russian side. Apparently their actions may have infringed Spain’s neutrality, and therefore compromise the country’s “peace or independence”.

(Spain has recently modified its criminal legislation to persecute and punish “jihadist-style international terrorists”. Incidentally, this legislative reform coincides with a restriction of the principle of universal jurisdiction in the country. Prosecuting international terrorists is going to be easier, but doing so with genocidaires and war criminals is becoming nearly impossible in Spain.)

Thankfully, the UK, the US and tens of other countries did not think along those lines when George Orwell, Ernest Hemingway and 30,000 other international brigadiers travelled to Spain to fight Franco during the Spanish Civil War (1936-39).

The reader may argue that defending freedom and democracy against fascism is not exactly what pro-Russians and Islamists are doing in Eastern Ukraine and Syria/Iraq, respectively.

My point is different, though. The criminalisation of foreign fighters with the discourse of terrorism poses a fundamental challenge to the jus in bello, that is, to the law that regulates acceptable wartime conduct.

Terrorism is not a condition (“to be a terrorist”), but an action (“to commit a terrorist act”), and it is already prohibited in International Humanitarian Law (IHL): Articles 33 of the 1949 4th Geneva Convention, 51(2) of the 1977 Additional Protocol 1, and 4(2)(d) and 13(2) of the Additional Protocol II, of the same year. The International Committee of the Red Cross has authoritatively established that:

“The term ‘terrorist act’ should be used, in the context of armed conflict, only in relation to the few acts specifically designated as such under the treaties of IHL. It should not be used to describe acts that are lawful or not prohibited by IHL. While there is clearly an overlap in terms of the prohibition of attacks against civilians and civilian objects under both IHL and domestic law, it is believed that, overall, there are more disadvantages than advantages to additionally designating such acts as ‘terrorist’ when committed in situations of armed conflict (whether under the relevant international legal framework or under domestic law). Thus, with the exception of the few specific acts of terrorism that may take place in armed conflict, it is submitted that the term ‘act of terrorism’ should be reserved for acts of violence committed outside of armed conflict.”

Being a human action and not a human condition, terrorism (the act of terrorism) is a matter of jus in bello, not jus ad bellum (acceptable justification to engage in war).

In other words, the determination of whether an act should be considered terrorist does not depend on the legitimacy of the use of force, but rather on whether such an act meets the objective and subjective elements of the crime, as defined in IHL.

Being an action, therefore, terrorist crimes can be potentially committed by ISIS as much as by the Free Syrian Army, by the Ukrainian army as much as pro-Russian groups, by Hitler as much as by the Allies in Dresden.

Again, this does not question the legitimacy of the use of force by Brits against the Nazi Germany (for which Europeans will never be grateful enough). It is not a sign of agnosticism regarding Ukrainian national integrity either. And it does not ignore that ISIS violates the human rights of the Iraqi population under its control in all imaginable ways.

The point I try to make here is that by using the discourse of terrorism in relation to foreign fighters, and by extending criminal jurisdiction over the foreign territories where these conflicts take place, we are breaching the fundamental distinction between the acceptable behaviour in warfare and the acceptable justification to use military force.

Countries must indeed hold accountable those who have allegedly committed war crimes. But the criminalisation of travelling, receiving training or joining forces in countries at war is not the way to do it, as much as we may loathe ISIS, prefer the Free Syrian Army to Al-Nusra, and fear Russia.

The post Against the criminalisation of foreign fighters with the discourse of terrorism appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Ten years ago today, the French voted down the European Constitution Treaty, which was supposed to replace existing EU Treaties and institute key changes such as the appointment of a EU foreign minister. This was followed by an even stronger ‘No’ in the Netherlands three days later. These ‘No’ votes succeeded where the Danish 1992 ‘No’ to Maastricht and the Irish 2000 ‘No’ to Nice had failed, forcing EU leaders to come-up with a new reform Treaty, the Lisbon Treaty.

At a time when the UK is gearing up for the in/out referendum on EU membership, this post reflects on the 2005 referendum campaigns and their aftermaths in France and the Netherlands. It highlights key similarities – the ‘No’ votes revealed how disconnected European elites and the general population had become – as well as central differences in the ways the two countries re-engaged with Europe since these votes. I explore these differences in “European strategies” by looking at French and Dutch engagement with EU environment and climate policy.

From pro-Europe to confused-about-Europe

The 2005 referendums revealed the thin consensus on Europe among both citizens and elites in France and the Netherlands. In 2005 the main French left party, PS (Parti Socialiste), was divided with the ‘Yes’ staunchly defended by the infamous former IMF chief Dominique Strauss-Kahn and the ‘No’ upheld by current Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius.[1] Both main right and left wing parties stood officially together for ‘Yes’, leading to an infamous picture of Francois Hollande and Nicholas Sarkozy – both party leaders at that time – standing next to each other.

Sources:  France Culture, Paris Match and Grasset

In the Netherlands, Eurosceptic parties remained at the margins throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, but put increasing pressure on the mainstream parties[2]. The clear ‘No’ vote showed how the Dutch political elite (and the Dutch media) were out of sync with the public, leaving the political class “divided and confused[3]”.

The referendums thus left the two countries’ relations with Europe in shambles – pushing these member states toward disengagement with European affairs. This is because the referendums made the EU toxic for the French socialist party, striving to mend the breach between the ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ sides, and for the Dutch parties in the subsequent 2006 election, who avoided raising the European issue. The referendums opened the way for a more openly critical attitude to the EU among political elites in both countries. In the Netherlands this critical view was at its strongest under the first Rutte government (2010-2012), the country’s first minority government supported by the Eurosceptic party PVV (Partij voor de Vrijheid). In France the 2012 election saw both Nicolas Sarkozy and François Hollande going “EU-Negative”, with Hollande criticising the European Budgetary Pact and Sarkozy pledging to revise Schengen rules.[4]

Reengaging with Europe – two distinct strategies

The two countries’ trajectories diverged when it came to re-engaging with Europe. Dutch positions on the EU before the referendum were often presented as paradoxical, “for, as well as against”. On the one hand, the Dutch turned more negative on defence cooperation, intergovernmental efforts in general, any favouritism for big member states and on migration policies. On the other hand, the Dutch policy supported economic integration and a strong European Commission – but also, conventionally, environmental legislation. After the referendum the Netherlands held on to their position, supporting further European integration only in certain areas.[5]

Recent Dutch governments have been strong advocates for subsidiarity and proportionality in EU actions, and for reduced EU ‘red tape’.  Over the last ten years Dutch influence on these issues grew,[6] while crucially EU environmental policies changed status – from favoured policy to potential ‘red tape’. For example, in 2009 the Dutch Prime Minister asked for a review of Nature Policies, in 2013 the Dutch Foreign Minister, Frans Timmermans, produced a subsidiarity review, and the Dutch government initiated the “Make It Work” initiative with the UK and Germany to review EU environmental legislation. The Dutch position on green ‘red tape’ grew more influential when Timmermans became First Vice President for Better Regulation and Subsidiarity in the Juncker Commission. Subsequently, the new Commission’s 2015 working programme came under criticism for hindering environmental policy expansion, and pledging to update key nature policies.

Whereas the Netherlands were instrumental in changing the way the Commission worked in the last ten years, France appears to have grown weaker in Brussels: this is supported by its weakness inside the European Parliament, a smaller number of high ranking French officials in the Commission and constantly changing European Ministers. France has long had a problematic relationship with EU environmental policies – from the opposition of its hunter lobby to the birds’ directive, to implementation problems on nitrates pollution from farm activities or to its fisheries’ impact on young fish stocks. Thus a weakened France could in principle have been good for environmental policies. But despite its decreasing weight in “everyday” Brussels, France still managed to influence EU environmental legislation at critical points – both positively and negatively. For example, Sarkozy’s 2008 European Presidency signalled a “return to Europe” – building on the success of the 2007 German presidency it yielded a deal on the Climate and Energy package. But one should not exaggerate the impact of this French “victory” for climate policy: France did not become a green leader after 2005. This is perhaps best illustrated by the recent 2013 Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reform, where France opposed CAP greening, and thus undermined a key attempt to mainstream environmental policy in the EU.

Ten years later, it may be up to Laurent Fabius, then advocate of the ‘No’ to the Constitution Treaty, now head of Paris COP21[7] in December, to signal further French re-engagement with Europe. The climate negotiations offer the French another opportunity – indeed an obligation – to lead on environmental issues on behalf of the EU. But, irrespective of the outcome of COP21 and of the French flair for shining in high politics, the last ten years saw a degradation of French influence and engagement in Brussels, which will take long – and more than a successful COP! – to fix.

Lessons for the UK Referendum

While the UK situation differs considerably, the two referendums offer useful lessons: first, referendums cast a long shadow on national politics – it can be very difficult to return to ‘normal’ after a lost referendum. Second, although some issues may be given prominence during campaigns before a referendum, the outcome impacts all policies – thus, the UK in/out referendum is not ‘just’ about migration or even the welfare state. Finally no two referendums are the same: the variety of political systems in the EU means that different states will find their own unique way back in – or out – of Brussels.

[1] Previously, the French right had split on the narrowly won Maastricht Treaty referendum in 1993.

[2] Startin and Krouwel (2013, p.67)

[3] Rood (2009, p.70)

[4] Vassallo (2012, p.79)

[5] Rood (2009, p.71)

[6] See for example the diffusion of the Dutch Standard Cost Model across Europe and at EU level.

[7] Conference of Parties

The post Ten Years after the French and Dutch ‘No’: How the Two Countries Reinvented their Relationship with Europe appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

It has been sixty years between the idea to create a truly pan-European competition for football clubs and the Champions League final in Berlin between Barcelona and Juventus next week. But it has not been a linear evolution from the first tournament launched with sixteen clubs handpicked by the journalists from L’Equipe and today’s huge multi-million euro business. Right in the middle of these sixty years, on 29 May 1985, there was a traumatic watershed moment after which nothing was the same anymore. ‘The Heysel’, as the tragic event is still referred to today across the continent, has become a European lieu de mémoire.

The Heysel stadium is named after King Beaudouin today, but that does not exorcise the haunting memory of European football’s darkest hour, when 39 mostly Italian supporters died in the Brussels football stadium in a stampede after Liverpool hooligans had invaded the section reserved for Juventus supporters just before kick-off of the European cup final. Six hundred more were severely injured.

Whatever the name given to it – ‘disaster’, ‘massacre’, ‘tragedy’ – the Heysel is a European traumatism. The ‘live televised death’ as La Repubblica labelled it, left a deep mark on the millions of Europeans that had switched on their television set in excited anticipation for what was expected to be a summit of European football culture. As Michel Platini, who scored the decisive goal in the match that took finally place despite what happened around the pitch, declared in 2010, no one who witnessed this tragedy ‘will ever be able to erase it from their memory’.

In an excellent chapter in a recent book on European football memory (1), Clemens Kech describes how the simultaneous Europe-wide media coverage turned this event first into a collective experience perceived to be massively shared across national borders, then into a genuine ‘European site of memory’ by making a European public engage in the discussion and evaluation of what had happened.

He also shows how over time the interpretation of the event slowly changes. At first, there is a strong emphasis in public debate on the archaic barbarism and brutal savageness displayed on that day. Among the different emotions triggered by this perception, the most powerful is no doubt a sort of collective shame across the continent, a reaction that comes close to the phenomenon of ‘moral panic’. Most importantly, this panic was felt and expressed by a clearly transnational public despite the well-known linguistic and cultural barriers within the European media landscape. Emotions were explicitly expressed in the name of ‘European values’ or ‘European civilization’.

Years later, in the collective commemoration of the event – whose remembrance is never completely extinguished but regularly activated with peaks every five years – the symbolic value assigned to it started to shift towards issues of crowd control and security issues. From today’s perspective, ‘the Heysel’, whose impact was reinforced by other disasters like ‘Hillsborough‘ (1989), marks a turning point in the organisation of large football events. It may be considered a watershed not only in the perception of football violence in general, but also in international cooperation on European level with regard to stadium design and regulations, crowd policing and spectator safety.

One way or another, the Heysel, which has a wikipedia entry in over twenty languages, will continue to be remembered as ‘a symbol of manmade tragedy’ as Clemens Kech summarises. It has become a reference point in the history of a common, transnational culture.

(1) European Football and Collective Memory,
edited by Nils Havemann and Wolfram Pyta,
London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2015, published
within the ‘Football in an Enlarged Europe’
book series.

The post 30 years ago – European football’s major lieu de mémoire appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

In my previous post I analyzed the first ruling at the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), “S.A.S v. France”, concerning the full-face veil. The ECtHR introduced the principle “living together” as a legitimate aim to ban the burqa and niqab in France, on the basis that wearing the full-face veil hinders communication among individuals. I thought that ruling was dangerously opening the door to prohibit the full-face veil in other countries. Last Friday, the Dutch cabinet approved a proposal for a partial ban on face-covering Islamic veils on public transport and in public areas such as schools and hospitals.

The recent legitimate aim, “living together”, introduced by the ECtHR at “S.A.S v. France”, seems to justify a general prohibition of the Islamic full-face veil. However, I believe that these types of generalized prohibitions, apart from dangerously opening the door to prohibiting the full-face veil in other countries, will not eradicate a tradition with strong cultural and religious roots among Muslim women. Hidden under the disguise of a general prohibition is not only a fear of discrimination, but an apprehension to pluralism at its deepest core, which makes uncovering the veil a more comfortable option for westerners. This hesitation to what is foreign is that what must be altered, to learn to value and appreciate the beauty and uniqueness of that which is different. It is only when foreign ideas are viewed with acceptance and respect under a universal vision, that integration and mutual tolerance will thrive, steering far away from prejudice and inequality.[1] In fact, a general ban implies shunning that which opposes one’s views, with the idea that the foreigner should adopt the traditions of the host country. Therefore, instead of restricting such a manifestation of religion, efforts should shift toward a more inclusive approach to strengthen dialogue between states and the Muslim organizations. Such an approach would encourage communication and understanding of wearing the full-face veil throughout Europe, promoting values of respect, acceptance, and coexistence in a social, plural, and democratic state.

This blog post is based on the research I conducted for my Master Thesis at Erasmus University Rotterdam, which led to the publication “Pertinence of a General Prohibition of the Burqa and Niqab in Spain: A Human Rights Perspective” in the Yearbook on Humanitarian Action and Human Rights.

[1] See Dogru v. France, §62. See also S.A.S. v. France, §128

The post Dutch Partial Ban on Islamic Veil in Public Spaces appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

A spokesman for the British Prime Minster said:

“This is a big decision for our country, one that is about the future of the United Kingdom. That’s why we think it’s important that it is British, Irish and Commonwealth citizens that are the ones who get to decide.”

But the voting franchise on who can vote in the UK has more to do with Britain’s distant past than its future.  Its roots go back to Britain’s Empire, when countries across the world were ruled by Great Britain.  At one time or another, Britain invaded almost 90% of the world’s nations.  At the Empire’s peak, atlases showed half the world coloured pink, signifying British rule.

Over time, as the British reign softened, many of these countries became self-governing whilst retaining Britain’s monarch as Head of State.  The Commonwealth of British Nations was formed in 1949 with membership on a voluntary basis.  The last two countries to join The Commonwealth – Rwanda and Mozambique – have no ties with Britain’s Empire.

Including Britain, 55 countries across the world are members of The Commonwealth, and all citizens from those countries resident with ‘leave-to-remain’ in the UK will be able to vote in the Referendum. 

They include citizens living in the UK from Australia, Canada, Ghana, Malaysia, India, Pakistan, Singapore, South Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe.  Just two EU countries are members of the Commonwealth, Malta and Cyprus, and citizens from those countries resident in the UK will also get a vote.

The right-to-vote in the UK elections doesn’t end when Commonwealth membership ends.  The UK’s Electoral Commission told me yesterday, “Commonwealth citizens retain their voting rights even if the country of which they are a national has been suspended from the Commonwealth.”

In addition, citizens living in the UK from 15 ‘British Overseas Territories’ will also have a say on Britain’s future in Europe, including those from Anguilla, Bermuda, Cayman Islands and Montserrat.  The British government has announced that residents of its Overseas Territory, Gibraltar, whether living there or here, will also be able to vote in the Referendum.

Citizens of the British Crown Dependents of the Isle of Man and the Channel Island also have the vote.  And as a result of a special treaty signed between Britain and Ireland, Irish citizens living in the UK will also have a vote in the referendum.

But citizens from 24 EU countries who have made Britain their home, who reside here, work here, pay taxes here and many of whom have started families here, will have no vote on whether Britain will stay a member of the EU, even though the decision directly affects them.   Many of these EU citizens have been living in Britain for over 30 years.  They hadn’t taken out British citizenship because, under EU rules, they all have European Citizenship, meaning that, like all EU nationalities, they can move to any other EU country and enjoy the same rights as native citizens of that country.

Except that residents here from other EU countries do not enjoy the same voting rights as British citizens – or those of over 70 nationalities across the world, who because of Britain’s imperial past, still retain the historical right to vote here in our General Elections and the forthcoming referendum.

EU citizens living in the UK denied a referendum vote include French, German, Italian, Spanish, Polish, Danish, Romanian and Swedish residents  – all denied a vote, whilst those living here from nations including Grenada, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, the Seychelles and Sri Lanka will have a say on Britain’s future in the EU.

Also excluded from the referendum vote will be British citizens who have lived abroad for over 15 years – an arcane rule that the Conservatives promised in their manifesto would be scrapped. But it seems that the rule will not be changed in time for the referendum.

Uniquely for the referendum, members of the House of Lords will be given a vote, but unlike in last year’s Scottish referendum on independence, 16 and 17 year-olds will not. (In the Scottish referendum, EU migrants were also permitted to vote). However, the fact that the UK government can amend the rules on who can vote in the referendum, means that it is politically and practically possible to change the voting franchise for what will be a once-in-a-generation (or-two) event.

Yesterday I contacted No 10 Downing Street, the home of British Prime Minister, David Cameron.  A spokesman told me that the voting rights and rules for the referendum will be broadly the same as those of a British General Election.  But, he added, it would be subject to the consent of Parliament.

Maybe our Members of Parliament will see sense and realise that there is a serious democratic deficit in allowing so many different nationalities to vote in the forthcoming EU referendum, but to specifically exclude most nationalities living here from the rest of Europe, as well as denying a vote to many British people living abroad.  

#EUReferendum: who can and can’t vote and is it fair? Read @Jon_Danzig on our Facebook page http://t.co/nha8RDX0Xa pic.twitter.com/b7U5NoP72U

— New Europeans (@NewEuropeans) May 27, 2015

Other articles by Jon Danzig:

• Can’t vote or don’t vote?
• Britain’s human rights law: endorsed by Churchill, written by British lawyers, adopted by 47 European countries
• Censored by The Daily Telegraph

The post The Referendum – who can and can’t vote? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

On the 21th of May 2015 I had for the first time in my life the honour to present my research paper as a Panelist at the VIII International Student Conference “Politics & Society in Central and Eastern Europe” at the University of Wroclaw, Poland. The heading of my Paper was “Transformation of Politics in Estonia – Contextualizing Political Accountability in the European Union” and it was built on my presentation held at the CBEES Annual Conference at Södertörn University in December 2014.

The Conferece took place in the framework of 21-22 May Dni Politologa: http://politologia.uni.wroc.pl/index.php/instytut-2/wydarzenianew/522-dni-politologia , and hosted very interesting research results from University of Wroclaw, University of Warsaw, University of Bucharest, Vytautas Magnus University Lithuania, Masaryk University in Brno Czech Republic, Babes-Bolyai University of Cluj-Napoca Romania, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University, Iasi Romania, University of Donja Gorica in Podgorica Montenegro, and an independent researcher was representing Iran.

Not to talk about managing technical problems (and this time, in addition to the problems with the computer, I was myself too focused on the text of the presentation and concepts – to the extent that I completely forgot that it usually is an advantage to have a clear structure in the beginning of one’s presentation), I was talking about the scientific and normative concepts of political party and political party operating at European level (Europarty), the political history of Europe, comparatively about the Europarties and political parties of the EU Member States, political representation in the European Parliament. I mentioned political foundation at European level as different from Europarties and gave an overview about Europarties and Estonia’s representation in those. The overall aim was to better understand governance and accountability in the European Union (by demonstrating those through political and historical context).

The presentation distinguished between party competition / political competition (duopolism as an example of party competition) and political opposition as known from the Cold War era / understood very generally as East-West opposition (not connected with a State government solely but as applicable toward World governance). These are different phenomena and the relevance of the difference can be explained followingly: while one can see continuity in party competition, one can see discontinuity in such political opposition / conflict as referred above, maybe similarly to continuity and discontinuity in human rights history. And, being a lawyer with human rights research background, I would claim that although human rights are political rights, requiring existence of political mechanisms for their validation and implementation, that the real “career” of human rights for Europe  developed after the II World War, and that politicians have used and use human rights for achieving political aims (marking their discontinuity), human rights are emanating from something more continuous than political processes, being connected with human nature and nature of societal co-existing.

The post Contextualizing Political Accountability in the European Union appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

On Tuesday I went to one of my alma maters, LSE’s European Institute, to listen to a panel on Britain’s EU policy. As well as storifying it, I’ve also been thinking about the discussion and particularly three of the things mentioned by Simon Hix, one of the panellists.

“Never underestimate the EU’s ability to find a way to muddle through”

As has been discussed on this blog before, crisis is in many ways the dominant mode of the EU and its predecessors: there’s always something that’s a problem and which requires urgent (and improvised) action. If we can accept that, then the British situation is merely another in a long line stretching from the EDC and the Empty Chair crisis, and there will be a way to sort something out.

In this context, that might mean agreements for the UK that are not embodied in treaty reform per se, but instead in some novel form, such as declarations or intergovermental accords, or the like. As was pointed out at the event, some of the key British objectives might be secured through amending directives, a much more manageable (if still tricky) process than opening a new IGC.

Of course, the danger here is that if too many people come to believe that ‘a way will be found’, then that potentially increases the risk that it doesn’t happen, because everyone assumes someone else is doing it (indeed, that’s what I’m doing here too: I’m not offering any creative solutions): it’s a bit of a ‘tragedy of the commons’ situation, only partly mitigated by the presence of one party who have a strong interest in finding a deal: the British. Now that he is locked on this path, Cameron will not want to turn up empty-handed from any renegotiation, if only for his personal reputation and for getting through the next five years with his backbench, which gives him a good reason to find solutions.

“Never underestimate British arrogance”

However, there’s a second problem. As Hix notes, the dominant way that Brits talk about themselves is a great power (think Empire, sun never setting, UNSC permanent chair, beacon of all that is good, etc.): there’s not a great deal of humility going around, certainly not with this government. The German debate of tying oneself into a European system to protect oneself and others simply wouldn’t happen in the UK. And why should it, you ask?

Exactly.

Naturally, such a view is not universal – it’s one of the reasons that recent Tory governments have been rather suspicious of the Foreign Office – but they are deeply resonant. And in the context of a renegotiation, a view that ‘they need us more than we need them’ is likely to make matters more difficult to resolve. Yes, the UK is a big market for other EU member states, but it’s not as big as the EU market is to the UK: miscalculations of strength/influence raise the risk of an impasse.

And it’s not just the negotiators: the British public will have to be convinced that a meaningful and ‘successful’ deal has been struck by Cameron, if he is to benefit from that stage of the process. If we are going for novel, non-treaty based changes (as above) then that becomes easier to challenge.

“The renegotiation deal doesn’t actually matter at all: it’ll all come down to calculations of the benefit of membership”

In Hix’s view, this might not really matter in any case, because hardly anyone will be too bothered about any ‘deal’: they’ll follow broader cues and perceptions about the value of the system. In this, it’ll be 1975 again, where Wilson’s ‘renegotiation’ really didn’t come into matters at all.

I’ve got some sympathy for this view, since it’s clear that most people don’t have a strong (in the sense of being deeply held) view on the EU, but rather pile it into a wider understanding of their situation: limiting migrant worker benefits by a couple of extra years is neither here nor there.

What does become more important is the bigger picture of the EU’s situation: all the panellists agreed that if the Greek situation worsens, then that will badly damage the ‘yes’ campaign: why shackle yourself to a corpse, in the colourful metaphor of some sceptics. That a resolution in this looks to be no closer than before doesn’t bode well.

As this referendum campaign starts to gather pace, not least with next week’s unveiling of a referendum bill in the Queen’s speech, we are likely to see more of these dynamics. Enjoy the ride.

The post The Brexit referendum: some underlying dynamics appeared first on Ideas on Europe.