Ideas on Europe Blog

Mainstream political parties across Europe attempting to see-off far-right political parties by copying them instead of challenging them hasn’t worked. It can’t work. It won’t work.

Or as historian Timothy Garton Ash, Professor of European Studies at Oxford University said on the BBC Radio 4 Today programme:

“There is good evidence that politics of appeasement by mainstream liberal centre-right parties trying to win back voters by adopting some of the more extreme rhetoric and policies doesn’t work.

“Because voters say why should I have the dog whistle when I could have the real dog?”

Today, in seven EU countries, electorates have voted for the “real dog” meaning that their governments include far-right parties. In another four EU countries, “the dog” is close to winning.

In Austria, The Freedom Party (FPÖ) secured almost 29% of the vote in the September 2024 parliamentary elections and is about to form the government, marking Austria’s first far-right-led administration since World War II.

In Italy, The Brothers of Italy, a right-wing nationalist party, leads the government under Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni.

In Finland, the Finns Party, a right-wing nationalist group, secured 46 seats in the Eduskunta (parliament) during the April 2023 general elections, becoming the second-largest party with 20.07% of the vote.

In Hungary, The Fidesz party, under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, has been in power since 2010. Fidesz is known for its national-conservative and sovereigntist policies.

In Slovakia, The Slovak National Party, a right-wing nationalist party, is part of the governing coalition.

In Sweden, The Sweden Democrats, a nationalist party, have significant influence over the government through a confidence and supply agreement, despite not being formal coalition members.

In The Netherlands, The Party for Freedom (PVV), led by Geert Wilders, has gained substantial support, leading to the formation of a right-wing government.

As of January 2025, several European countries have far-right or right-wing nationalist parties that are gaining significant support and are close to achieving governmental power.

In Romania, Pro-Russian far-right candidate Călin Georgescu is leading in the polls for the upcoming presidential election, with over 40% support.

In Germany, The Alternative for Germany (AfD), a right-wing populist party, has been increasing its vote share in recent elections.

In France, the National Rally (Rassemblement National, RN) led by Marine Le Pen is a far-right party making significant gains and securing Members of the European Parliament (MEPs).

In Spain, Vox Party is one of several far-right and right-wing parties gaining voters.

And in the UK?

In last year’s general election, the far-right Reform UK party (yes, it is far-right) gained 5 seats with just over 14% of the vote share. Its leader, Nigel Farage, is convinced that he will be Britain’s next Prime Minister.

How did this happen?

Because liberal-thinking, middle-of-the-road parties and politicians, who should have known better, let the blame-game grow. The anti-immigration, anti-refugee, anti-EU, pro-Brexit message gained momentum without being properly challenged.

In the process, both the Tories and Labour have transitioned from being pro-EU parties to basically Brexit parties.

I have written multiple articles about this. For example, ‘How freaky hair ‘won’ in the Netherlands and Britain’

Even today, Labour promotes an anti-migrant message, and continues to support Brexit, even though the way ‘Leave’ won the referendum was fraudulent and undemocratic; Brexit is doing huge harm to Britain; it cannot be ‘made to work’, and polls consistently show that most people think it was a mistake.

Instead of attempting to ape the far-right, now is the time all good parties to come to the aid of the people by powerfully exposing the false diagnoses and empty promises promoted by far-right politicians.

YES, people need affordable homes, decent wages, better access to medical care, good education for their children. And NO, it’s not the fault of migrants.

Properly fixing those problems will see off far-right parties that always exploit hardship by wrongly scapegoating others.

Going down the far-right route will simply cause division, hatred, and societal decay, and still won’t give us affordable homes, decent wages, better access to medical care, or good education for our children.

Good politicians everywhere, be brave, be bold.

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• Related article from 2025: ‘The Brexit nose job’

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• Related article from 2023: ‘How freaky hair ‘won’ the Netherlands and Britain’

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• Related article from 2023: ‘Brexit is unfinished business by a long way’

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• Related article from 2021: ‘What they really want – the end of the EU’

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• Related article from 2017: ‘How did we get stuck with Brexit?’

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• Related article from 2016: ‘Tim Faron versus Nigel Farage’

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• Related article from 2015: ‘Nigel Farage: Ban terminally ill migrants’

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• Related article from 2015: ‘Who do you think you are kidding, Mr Farage?’

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• Related article from 2014: ‘Why did UKIP win in Clacton?’

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• Related article from 2013: ‘What Nigel Farage told British expats in Spain’

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• Related video: ‘Rise of the far-right? British newspapers are to blame’

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• Related video: ‘When Nigel Farage was caught out’

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The post Tories and Labour to blame for rise of Farage appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

by Gilles Pittoors (KU Leuven)

To kick off 2025, the JCMS blog is highlighting some of the excellent work published in JCMS in autumn 2024. In this blog, we feature ‘Everything Everywhere All at Once? Introducing a Field-Theoretic Model for Party Politics in the European Union’  which puts forward a new approach to the European political party system.

Much like the debate on EU democracy at large, ideas about the role political parties play in the EU’s political system are caught in a dichotomy. On the one hand, those who think of the EU as a collection of national democracies consider supranational democratic politics unrealistic or even undesirable, instead contemplating the role of national parties in structuring the political debate in Member States and translating this to the European level. From this perspective, European party politics comes down to coordinating often loose networks of like-minded national parties. On the other hand, those who perceive the EU as a kind of proto-federal system put more emphasis on supranational democratic politics, banking on the polity-building capacities of strong ‘Europarties’ and a democratic praxis that will Europeanise national politics.

Both of these models are rooted in the experience of the coherent nation-state and thus neither capture the reality of European politics: the former takes too little account of the structure inherent in European party politics, while the latter creates unrealistically hierarchical expectations for what a European party (system) could be. Therefore, a new model is needed that departs from the nation-state as  ultimate reference point, and instead theorises parties as genuine multilevel actors whose behaviour can only be understood by appreciating the dynamic European context in which they operate.

Beyond the nation-state

I argue that simply applying models from the national context to the EU does not do justice to the complexity of European politics, and therefore introduce the European Multilevel Party Field (EMPF) as a novel concept to study party democracy in the EU. I argue that the EU is a polity characterised by non-domination in which politics occur simultaneously in every direction all the time — it is a situation of ‘everything everywhere all at once’. Fundamentally, the EU is not a state, but “a multi-state, multi-democracy, multi-people political order” that circumscribes Member States without itself being a state. In this messy context, structure is not characterised by constitutional hierarchy or hegemonic domination, but by a form of mutual dependence among actors that need to collaborate across levels and territories. Indeed, actors’ political activities are no longer bound to the neatly delineated territory of nation-states, but extend beyond their familiar borders and across levels of governance.

Despite excellent research on the nature of the EU’s political system and complex party politics, both scholars and practitioners continue to grapple with the question of how to capture and understand the fundamental nature of party politics in the EU. While most scholars would subscribe to Schattschneider’s assertion that “modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of parties”, the impact of European integration on party politics remains difficult to pinpoint. Moreover, in addition to bridging citizens and politics, whose disconnect is at the core of the EU’s democratic deficit, parties in the EU could act as vehicles of cross-level linkage, transnational policy diffusion, and inter-institutional coordination. Such potential is the main motivation behind the EU’s increasing support for Europarties, hoping these would act as “transmission belts” from citizens to ‘Brussels’.

However, it is one thing to say that parties play an important role in European democracy, and quite another to consider whether the prevailing conceptual models underpinning these arguments make sense in the EU context. At the end of the day, parties have a clear task to fulfil: to represent their constituents, a task that spans from the local to the European level in a messy multilevel context that no longer reflects the neatly organised nation-state. The discussion on EU party politics has paid too little attention to this messy nature of EU politics as characterised by non-domination and far-reaching mutual dependence, which is fundamentally different from the politics of the nation-state in which most of our notions of political parties and party systems have emerged.

An alternative model

Building on organisational field theory, the EMPF presents an alternative model that acknowledges both the agency of actors and the structuring framework in which they operate, making it more suitable to capture the cross-level (multilevel) and cross-border (transnational) interactive nature of EU politics. Conceptualising the European party system as a political field and Europarties as inter-organisational alliances, the EMPF asserts that parties in the EU behave in accordance with their position in the field, interpreted in terms of dynamic and relative power relations to other actors. This position is defined by the dominant rules and norms of the field, as well as by the relative capital of each actor.

Parties act based on their interpretation of what is the best thing to do in a given circumstance, whereby the ultimate purpose is to gain competitive advantages over their rivals and achieve their political goals. In turn, each action triggers a reaction across the field, perpetuating a permanent renegotiation of the field’s balance of power, political configuration, and actors’ distribution in it across political levels and national borders. The messy nature of the EU’s political system is thus structured through the bottom-up creation of field-wide alliances that impose jointly defined rules and norms, while enabling parties to influence EU policies in a way that reflects their and their voters’ preferences.

This approach can be used to address a wide range of topics in EU party politics; from the formation and development of Europarties, to the strategic behaviour of individual actors. As such, the EMPF presents an original model that allows for capturing how EU party politics work in real life, without using the nation-state as a reference point. A key task for future research is the operationalisation of the EMPF for application to empirical (case) research: to figure out how the field’s structure can be concretely measured, which specific factors motivate actors, which variables can predict and explain outcomes, and how this has changed over time (particularly in relation to EU enlargement). This would allow for the development of the EMPF into a comprehensive theory of European party politics, enabling researchers to predict political outcomes and offering insights into what kind of policies can and cannot emerge. Furthermore, field theory has previously been used to describe parliamentary, bureaucratic and civil society networks in the EU. Future research should elaborate how the EMPF relates to these approaches, and whether integrating these into a broader field-theory of European integration would be possible.

Finally, the EMPF also opens new perspectives on EU party democracy as characterised by a dynamic and continuous interaction between mutually dependent actors across different levels and political arenas that cannot be disentangled. For instance, connecting to recent research on citizen participation in the EU, a field approach could be used to argue in favour of the bottom-up transnational engagement and socialisation of parties, civil society and individual citizens. Importantly, I do not posit the EMPF as the ultimate democratic model for the EU, but extend an open invitation to future researchers to further elaborate on this field-theoretic approach in the process of making sense of the EU as a democratic polity.

Dr Gilles Pittoors is Lecturer at the KU Leuven’s Department of Political Science and Research Associate at Ghent Univeristy. He has previously worked at the European Parliamentary Research Service, the Université Libre de Bruxelles and the University of Groningen. His research focuses primarily on questions of transnational democratic governance and the Europeanisation of national politics.

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Just before the EU referendum, the then USA President, Barack Obama, visited the UK and said he hoped that Britain would stay in the EU.

Nigel Farage was having none of it. An American President, he said, had no right to meddle in British affairs. The President, in short, should “butt out”.

The Mirror ran the headline:

“Nigel Farage tells Barack Obama to keep his nose out of the Brexit debate.”

Zoom forward almost nine years and spot the difference.

Now, Nigel Farage is actively encouraging his close ally and incoming President, Donald J. Trump, together with the unofficial deputy President, Elon Musk, the world’s richest person, to meddle in British affairs.

Mr Musk spends considerable time trashing Labour Prime Minister, Keir Starmer, on his X platform (formerly Twitter). He has described Reform as the UK’s “only hope” and has urged Britons to vote for it.

On 16 December, Mr Farage – who believes he is going to replace Sir Keir as Britain’s Prime Minister – met Mr Musk at President Trump’s Mar-a-Lago resort.

The meeting came following widespread media reports that Mr Musk is considering a sizeable donation to Mr Farage’s Reform Party – maybe as much as $100m – as a “f*** you Starmer payment”.

Mr Farage, the leader of Reform, formerly leader of UKIP and Brexit parties, was reported to say that the two had discussed money and that there will be “ongoing negotiations” with the tech billionaire.

Under UK law, a foreign person is not allowed to donate to a UK political party, although a foreign business based in the UK can.

So, maybe it should come as no surprise that four days before the meeting – on 12 December – Mr Musk registered a new limited company in London called X.AI London Ltd.

However, a foreign-owned company based in the UK can only donate to a UK political party if it is carrying on business in the UK at the time of the donation.

A mere registration in the UK does not qualify. The company must actively conduct business within the UK. For example, it should have operational activities, employ staff, or generate revenue within the country.

So far as can be ascertained, X.AI London Ltd has not yet started to trade here.

There is already considerable evidence that Putin’s Russia has meddled deeply into Britain’s affairs and helped to fund and fuel Brexit. See my video at theRussianConnection.co.uk

Now, expect more meddling by Trump and Musk into UK politics, aided and abetted by PM wannabe Nigel Farage for his own ends.

Mr Farage has offered to broker a new US-UK free trade agreement to turn the UK further away from the EU. He said:

“The US is our most important relationship in the world – forget Brussels.”

Is this a trap for Sir Keir?

If he accepts the trade agreement, Farage will take the credit. If he doesn’t, Farage will claim that the Labour government has damaged Britain’s prospects.

“Take back control” was the Brexit mantra. But since Brexit, outside actors seem to be controlling our affairs.

What do you think?

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David Irion

On 9 September 2024, the world’s press gathered in Brussels. On that day, Mario Draghi, former Italian Prime Minister and previous President of the European Central Bank, presented his eagerly awaited report on “The Future of European Competitiveness”. The publication of the so-called Draghi report was timed to coincide with the start of the Commission’s next mandate, which the Commission itself has declared to be the decisive phase in its fundamental reorientation. The Commission intends the Draghi report to have a significant impact on policy-making and priority-setting in the European Union (EU) in the coming years.

The Draghi report provides a comprehensive analysis of the challenges and opportunities facing the EU and develops strategic approaches to promote stability. Draghi notes that growth in the EU is slowing down, mainly due to weak productivity. He also sees recent negative developments in foreign trade, energy supply and external security as a threat to the EU’s previous growth model. But one of the main reasons for him is the poor performance in terms of breakthrough innovation and the initial concentration of innovation activities in medium to low R&D intensive sectors, which is forcing the new European institutions to adopt a new approach to EU R&D policy.

The report recommends creating science as a ‘fifth freedom’ and a ‘Research and Innovation Union’ to reduce the R&D spending gap between the EU and its main competitors. Draghi’s view is undoubtedly that the future of the EU hinges on the success of science and research and its policy.

 

On the way to centre stage

Against this background, the question arises as to how science and research have become such an important policy area in the EU today. This question is addressed in a special issue recently published in the Journal of European Integration History entitled “EUropeanisation in and through Science: Unveiling the Long-Term Dimensions of European Integration” (Irion & Volf 2024). The six contributions to this special issue, written by historians and political scientists, take a multi-angle view of the impact of integration within the political framework of the European Union and its predecessors, covering a wide historical range of almost seventy years – from the formative years of post-war European cooperation to contemporary debates on research infrastructure.

The articles highlight that an indispensable part of the EU’s complicated journey to its present form is the fascinating but often overlooked story of the Europeanisation of science and research which comprises two interrelated strands: the transformation of European science and research in the wake of political, economic and monetary integration, on the one hand, and the transformative impact of scientific research on the evolving European Union, on the other.

 

One policy, many forms, many forums

Each contribution explores this symbiotic relationship, examining in detail how the various actors, institutions, practices and policies have been shaped by the process of European integration and, conversely, how they have influenced the development of the EU. In doing so some authors even look at networks and institutions that have emerged on the margins or even outside the EU framework, but have interacted with its structures in a lively way. One example is the European Organisation for Nuclear Research (CERN), which in the 1950s was one of the first major instances of scientific cooperation in post-war Europe. Another is the Standing Committee for the Social Sciences of the European Science Foundation (ESF), which was set up in the 1970s and is another organisation independent of the EU.

Looking at the EU itself, the Commission’s initiative for the so-called Framework Programmes illustrates how research is being integrated into the fabric of European governance in the 1980s. The special issue also looks at the evolution of key concepts within European research policy. It examines the evolution of ‘scientific excellence’ in European research, tracing its transformation from a critical concept in the early 1990s to a normative standard within the European Research Council (ERC) since 2007. The European Research Infrastructure Consortium (ERIC), launched by the European Commission in 2009 and which represents a turning point in the organisation and management of European research infrastructures, is also investigated.

Taken together, the articles sketch the landscape of European scientific cooperation and examine its various forms and impacts, but there is still much to be explored in this area. We would therefore like to provide a starting point and some food for thought.

 

David Irion is a PhD candidate and research fellow at the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität in Munich (Germany). His current research focuses on the emergence and development of European research policy since the 1980s.

 

Reference:

Irion, D. & Volf, D. (2023) EUropeanisation in and through Science: Unveiling the Long-Term Dimensions of European Integration – Introduction. Journal of European Integration History, 30(2): 205–216. https://doi.org/10.5771/0947-9511-2024-2-205

 

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Marina Cino Pagliarello

In the evolving landscape of the global higher education market, higher education institutions (HEIs) have transformed from  ivory towers  into dynamic hubs of innovation and societal engagement. Influenced by technological advancements and the growing complexity of global issues – such as pandemics and climate change – universities now play a crucial role in integrating scientific knowledge into policy-making processes. Beyond the traditional use of higher education in science diplomacy as soft power tool for governments, universities now play a more dynamic and independent role as actors of “informal” diplomacy. They engage in addressing global issues not only through the application of knowledge but also through activities and initiatives such as the establishment of joint universities, multi-disciplinary research networks, new universities alliances, and partnerships with industries. This shift prompts intriguing questions: what is informal diplomacy in the context of higher education? Are universities simply extensions of state-centric actions, or do they possess autonomy and agency in their own right?

 

Universities in traditional (science) diplomacy

The use of higher education as a tool of soft power is not a new concept. Soft power, defined as the ability to influence others through attraction and persuasion rather than coercion, has long been associated with science and technology. These fields are considered crucial sources of soft power, with science contributing to enhance a country’s reputation, building trust, and fostering collaboration. Science diplomacy, defined as leveraging scientific collaboration and engagement to address global issues and foster cooperation, is therefore a means to advance national interests by bolstering influence, promoting a country’s values, and pursuing strategic objectives aligned with national priorities.

In this more traditional understanding of science diplomacy, HEIs serve as channels for state-led soft power initiatives. Notable examples include the Fulbright programme, the British Council and the controversial Confucius Institutes. Similarly, European Union (EU) programmes such as Erasmus+ and Horizon Europe, are important vectors for promoting European values, fostering collaboration, and enhancing mutual understanding. Taken together, these initiatives that promote the exchange of students, faculty, culture, research, knowledge, and expertise, can be regarded as diplomatic activities essential for developing mutual understanding and promoting foreign policy objectives through soft power.

In essence, whereas soft power refers to a country’s ability to influence others through cultural appeal and attraction, science diplomacy focuses on international scientific cooperation to foster mutual understanding and address global challenges. At the same time, among these more traditional science diplomacy initiatives and activities, new trends are also emerging, exemplified by the proliferation of international branch campuses (IBCs) that are overseas extensions of educational institutions, strategically deployed as ‘embassies of knowledge’. The evolution of China’s stance towards IBCs is emblematic of this shift, transitioning from a recipient to a prominent host. Opening Fudan University’s IBC in Hungary amid political tensions and collaborating with Russia on a new IBC, underscores China’s strategic deployment of IBCs for geopolitical influence.

 

Universities as informal diplomatic actors?

In parallel with government-led diplomatic efforts, we are witnessing the emergence of autonomous ‘informal’ diplomacy driven by universities themselves. This form of diplomacy is characterized by a structured and unstructured exchange of knowledge, ideas, and initiatives among academic institutions and stakeholders outside formal diplomatic channels. Unlike traditional diplomacy, which revolves around political and economic negotiations, this type of diplomacy places emphasis on the role of ‘knowledge’ as a key factor in fostering understanding, cooperation, and addressing common global challenges.

For instance, the German Jordanian University (GJU) exemplifies informal diplomacy through its collaborative initiatives and partnerships with industry. Through student delegations, research collaborations, and dual studies programs, GJU serves as a dynamic platform for fostering international connections and promoting mutual understanding. Similarly, Brown University’s Humanitarian Relief Initiatives also demonstrate the tangible impact of higher education diplomacy. By working directly with communities in need, particularly in regions like the Philippines, Brown University fosters cross-cultural understanding and collaboration, enhancing the university’s leadership in disaster response.

In addition, the rise of university alliances further illustrates the diplomatic role of HEIs. University alliances are transnational collaborative networks formed by higher education institutions from different countries to address common problems, promote knowledge exchange, and foster international cooperation in various fields. For example, the European Universities Initiative alliance, operating at the EU level and currently comprising 64 Alliances and over 500 universities, serves as an example of universities as informal diplomatic actors coming together around specific ‘missions’ to address global ‘grand challenges’ and promote cross-border collaboration. Finally, universities are also engaged in practical actions that contribute to Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) goals without relying solely on formal diplomatic channels. For instance, Western Sydney University, named the world’s number one university in terms of its contribution to the United Nations SDGs, exemplifies how universities can play a role not only in engaging in education and research projects but also in advancing sustainable development worldwide.

 

Challenges, tension, and the way forward

While universities  increasingly position themselves as autonomous agents of diplomacy, they may face potential challenges and tensions when navigating between being conduits of state action and autonomous agents pursuing their own initiatives seeking to influence policy-making. For instance, they may face constraints on academic freedom and cooperation and encountering obstacles in fostering scientific exchanges across borders. Additionally, ethical considerations are also essential, especially when collaborating with institutions known for questionable research practices or human rights violations.

Moreover, limited funding and resources might make it difficult to sustain international research projects and cover essential expenses, particularly amidst competing budgetary priorities. In striving for equitable partnerships, universities must address power imbalances between institutions from developed and developing nations while also facing severe dilemmas of responding to rising tensions impacting campuses and students’ demands, including the risk of universities being ‘instrumentalised’ or ‘geopoliticised’ by governments. For instance, Pro-Palestinian protests on US university campuses have escalated globally, with students and faculty members demanding academic institutions divest from companies linked to Israel’s military campaign. These protests have led to various demands, including severing financial ties with Israel and its affiliated entities, transparency over financial connections, and amnesty for protesters. The impact has been significant, with Columbia University and California State Polytechnic University Humboldt closing due to the occupations, Portland State University pausing financial ties with Boeing over its links to Israel, and Trinity College Dublin agreeing to end certain investments in Israeli companies.

This underscores the complexities and challenges universities face in addressing geopolitical tensions while upholding their academic mission and values. In this respect, another crucial aspect for universities is managing public perception and trust. Effective science communication and transparent engagement are essential for building public support and understanding for diplomatic efforts, countering scepticism and ensuring the legitimacy of university-led initiatives in the informal diplomacy arena.

As universities continue to evolve into dynamic hubs of global engagement and diplomacy, stakeholders must recognize and embrace the opportunities and challenges presented by this (r)evolution. Key questions arise from this discussion: How can universities maintain their autonomy while navigating geopolitical tensions? What mechanisms ensure equitable partnerships amidst power imbalances and challenges in international collaboration? And how do knowledge activities intersect with diplomatic power? These questions are not merely academic; they are at the heart of redefining diplomatic norms in the 21st century, enabling universities to shape a more interconnected, sustainable, and peaceful world.

 

Marina Cino Pagliarello is Marie Skłodowska-Curie Research Fellow at the Florence School of Transnational Governance, European University Institute (Italy), Visiting Fellow at the London School of Economic and Political Science European Institute, and honorary lecturer at the Department of Political Science, University College London.

 

 

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This week’s vote on the Consent motion was unremarkable enough that there was hardly any media coverage in the run-up, even in Northern Ireland itself.

Positions had been long-known and the result (a simple majority) was a given, despite the (sometimes long-winded) efforts of some MLAs to convince others.

For a mechanism that had raised so much interest back in 2023 in the Windsor Framework, this might be seen as a victory for boring politics.

But to watch the debate unfold – as I did for a few hours – was to be struck by the shallow foundations on which the entire NI Protocol rests. There was scarcely a voice raised that thought the Protocol was a good thing for Northern Ireland.

Instead, those voting in favour of its continuation for another four years spoke of it being a necessary consequence of a decision to leave the EU that had been foisted upon the region by voters in England, and the least bad option among a menu of all bad options.

Likewise, even if Unionist arguments about EU laws being imposed upon Northern Ireland without local agreement were somewhat undercut by others observing that the Unionists had said how wonderful the Windsor Framework would be only 18 months ago, there was still some sympathy for the view that the Protocol wasn’t what Northern Ireland would have chosen for itself.

As we now move into the UK’s own review of the Protocol, perhaps some of these dynamics will come out more properly, to allow for the finding of some common ground. But even if Unionists can reconcile with others about what to do, they still need to convince both London and the EU that this is worth reopening a topic that caused so much grief last time around.

Northern Ireland is thus likely to find itself locked into a system that it barely tolerates and in which there is limited scope to build durable accommodations. A fundamental shift in British policy – towards joining the customs union or single market, say – is far beyond the horizon, so the local arena is likely to remain the primary one.

As attention drifts away from Belfast, the danger of an accidental crisis grows: someone in Brussels forgets to check the implications of a piece of legislation; someone in the Assembly doesn’t realise the effects of some routine directive; someone in London fails to connect broader developments in relations to the Northern Irish case.

While I think we can all agree that a return to the ‘hot Brexit’ period is very much to be avoided, that should not blind us to the perils of more mundane relations.

PDF: https://bit.ly/UshGraphic123

PDF: https://bit.ly/UshGraphic133

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It’s time to say goodbye to the UACES family, where I’ve had the honor of serving as Communications Manager and Interim Chair over the past two years. Like everything in life, this journey came with its ups and downs, successes and challenges. Yet, I wouldn’t trade a single moment of it. I can genuinely say that this experience has been incredibly rewarding, and I wholeheartedly encourage all of you to become part of this amazing community. 

This experience has been truly unique and unforgettable for many reasons. First, UACES introduced me to processes I never imagined I’d be part of—not just individually, but as a member of the entire Graduate Forum Committee. From organizing conferences and arranging events to participating in discussions about academic journal management and even coordinating the timing of pre-event cocktails, I found myself immersed in aspects of academia I had previously only observed. These experiences not only allowed me to contribute but also offered me fresh perspectives on the academic world. 

Second, thanks to the incredible people I met along the way, I now feel like I have a door waiting to welcome me in almost every European city. I won’t be visiting as an unwelcome guest but as a close friend, having shared unforgettable memories through UACES events. The friendships I’ve formed within the UACES community go beyond casual connections. They are colleagues and collaborators I look forward to growing with, standing in solidarity with, and learning alongside throughout what I hope will be a long and fulfilling career in academia. 

Finally, perhaps my favorite part of this journey has been the feeling of being surrounded by hundreds of mentors—offering both personal and professional guidance for navigating potential challenges I face now or may encounter in the future. The PhD journey is filled with new experiences, and part of the process is learning to manage expectations and time while prioritizing mental health to ensure a sustainable path forward. As part of the UACES Graduate Forum, I had the privilege of being in constant contact with incredible colleagues—from rising-star postdocs to well-established professors. I truly don’t think I could have found an equivalent experience anywhere else. 

Overall, I wholeheartedly encourage you to become part of this wonderful family. You will enjoy every moment of it. If you have any questions or need advice, please don’t hesitate to reach out to me! 

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Faced with the current state of international politics at the moment, many have been questioning what is the place for diplomacy? With the rise of far-right governments who seek to undermine the role of multilateral cooperation, one could ask: does it even exist anymore? And if so, why is it relevant to study it? My PhD research seeks to understand precisely how it is possible that international cooperation is able to take place, despite overall rhetorical contestation.

In order to better understand it, my research takes the case of the cooperation between the European Union (EU) and Brazil. While bilaterally, this partnership is often faced with contestation, in the multilateral fora, namely in United Nations Human Rights Council, this is not always the case. To comprehend how this cooperation is taking place, I wanted to go beyond the textual analysis of resolutions and go to where this cooperation takes place: Geneva.

In this sense, I was very lucky that the UACES microgrant allowed me to pursue a week of field work in Geneva to conduct interviews with diplomats working at the Human Rights Council. During my short stay in Geneva, I was also able to observe one of the sessions of the Universal Periodic Review, which allowed me to see how delegates work with each other in action. Thus, this research trip was crucial to the development of my research, and to understanding how the process of cooperation, and mostly how diplomacy has a significant – yet frequently overlooked – impact in world politics. In fact, international relations and diplomacy studies are often seen as different fields of research and with distinct purposes. Nonetheless, if there is one key takeaway from my fieldwork in Geneva is that it is incredibly valuable to not forget that world politics takes place in the form of human interactions.

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Photo taken during field work: Mauna Kea is shrouded in clouds in the background

Anna-Lena Rüland

Large science projects, also known as “Big Science”, are typically presented as a win-win for all stakeholders involved, including for the local community. Yet research has shown that local opposition to Big Science is common, although it tends to be short-lived and often fails to raise wide-spread awareness. Some argue that this is because activists that oppose Big Science struggle to appear legitimate while criticizing a project that is generally associated with economic development and scientific progress.

The story is different for the kiaʻi mauna (Hawaiian for protectors of the mountain). The kiaʻi have sustained opposition to the Thirty Meter Telescope on Mauna Kea, Hawaiʻi Island, since 2011, and have managed to raise wide-spread attention of their resistance. In a recently published article, I investigate why the kiaʻi have succeeded in sustaining such momentum. Based on interviews that I conducted with community members, local astronomers, and kiaʻi, I found that there are six factors which explain the resilience of local resistance to the Thirty Meter Telescope. To the local community, most of my findings are unlikely to be a revelation. But for those that are not familiar with Hawaiʻi, a deep dive into the Thirty Meter Telescope controversy holds valuable lessons about science-society relations.

Hawaiʻi is a unique case with a unique history, much of which has considerably shaped local resistance to the Thirty Meter Telescope. To provide some of the background knowledge that is needed to understand the controversy, I draw on the excellent work of Hawaiian scholars that have meticulously chronicled the history of astronomy development on Hawaiʻi and local opposition to it. Their research indicates that a multitude of factors have triggered local opposition to astronomy development on Mauna Kea. For instance, it has been argued that astronomy development on Mauna Kea, a volcanic mountain of great cultural significance to many Native Hawaiians, infringes on indigenous practices and rights. Existing research also indicates that past mismanagement of the mountain, that has seen the construction of 13 telescopes over 40 years, has led to local discontent. Finally, some scholars contend that local opposition to astronomy development on Mauna Kea mirrors a broader struggle to decolonize Hawaiʻi, whose annexation by the US in 1898 is politically and legally contested.

Within this tense context, the proposal to build the Thirty Meter Telescope, a construction that rivals imposing landmarks like the Parisian Arc de Triomphe, almost instantly triggered local resistance. When the Thirty Meter Telescope was first proposed in 2010, local opposition materialized in the form of legal challenges. Later, in 2014 and 2015, a growing number of local community members, by then known as kiaʻi, engaged in non-violent direct action to prevent the telescope’s construction. Between 2015 and 2019, during the height of the Thirty Meter Telescope controversy, thousands of kiaʻi blocked access to the telescope construction site. Only the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 eventually put a halt to the blockade.

In my article, I identify six factors that help to explain why the kiaʻi have succeeded in sustaining opposition to the Thirty Meter Telescope since 2011. These six factors are:

• Multi-generational leaderful organization

Including different generations of (Native) Hawaiians in the resistance was essential because each generation was able to contribute different skillsets and experiences. Over time, this facilitated effective task division. For instance, younger kiaʻi were able to publicize local opposition on social media. Kiaʻi of an older generation that had participated in past Hawaiian movements, in turn, helped to shape kiaʻi strategies by sharing their knowledge of which tactics had proven successful in previous resistance movements. Having several leaders, or in other words a leaderful organization, was crucial for similar reasons. This organizational strategy enabled the effective distribution of responsibilities among a group of individuals that had the willingness, capacity, and skills to take on leadership tasks. As local resistance continued, distributing leadership responsibilities among several individuals also ensured that leaders did not burn out.

• Grassroots resources

Sustained local opposition would not have been possible without a continuous flow of tangible and intangible grassroots resources like money, food, and time. These were needed for the kiaʻi to vary the use of tactics throughout their struggle and to draw attention to local grievances.

• Versatile tactics

Combining different tactics such as legal challenges, non-violent direct action, and campaigning on social media significantly stalled telescope development and helped the kiaʻi to bring attention to their cause. Especially social media campaigns helped the kiaʻi to recruit likeminded individuals for their struggle and to gain additional supporters, both of which were needed to sustain resistance and to raise wide-spread awareness.

• Anti-science counterframing

Local opposition furthermore sustained momentum because the kiaʻi successfully framed the Thirty Meter Telescope controversy as a multidimensional issue, where not science itself but rather questionable research practices of “mainstream” science were up for debate. Making this distinction in framing the Thirty Meter Telescope controversy was crucial for the kiaʻi because it helped them to counter popular media frames which presented the issue as one of “science vs. religion” and portrayed the kiaʻi as anti-science.

• Local and national political opportunity

The kiaʻi also succeeded in sustaining momentum for their advocacy because the local and national political context were conducive to it. At the national level, advocating to protect a place of great cultural significance to an indigenous population resonated with a greater awareness of indigenous (land) rights. At the local level, the kiaʻi experienced little pushback as those in favor of the telescope were not as well organized and media-savvy as the kiaʻi. Local community members that supported the Thirty Meter Telescope moreover tended to be less vocal than the kiaʻi because their pro-telescope activism was met with disapproval and, in some cases, harassment.

• Place attachment-driven commitment

Finally, local opposition persisted because activists were deeply committed to preventing further astronomy development on Mauna Kea. This commitment was largely driven by a strong attachment to the mountain, including to its unique environment and the cultural sites that it harbors.

What do we learn from this? I believe that there are at least two important take-aways from the Thirty Meter Telescope controversy. First, it demonstrates that there are instances where activists succeed in framing their struggle against Big Science as legitimate. This, in turn, is an important precondition to sustain and raise wider support for it. Second and more broadly, the controversy also underlines the need for Big Science proponents to be knowledgeable about and respectful of the distinct circumstances and historical grievances of the local community which is or will be hosting a project. This especially applies to contexts where particular groups have been or continue to be marginalized. Acquiring such context sensitivity requires Big Science proponents to engage with and, where possible, thoroughly embed themselves in the local community. This is easier said than done, but community-based research practices that have been introduced in fields like archaeology or anthropology may provide a blueprint for the effective inclusion of local communities into the planning, design, and outreach activities of Big Science initiatives.

 

Dr. Anna-Lena Rüland is a research fellow at University College London. In her current research, she focuses on science diplomacy, research security, and European science, technology and innovation policy.

 

References

Rüland A-L (2024) Sustaining Local Opposition to Big Science: A Case Study of the Thirty Meter Telescope Controversy. Technology in Society 78: 102597. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techsoc.2024.102597.

Salazar JA (2014) Multicultural Settler Colonialism and Indigenous Struggle in Hawaiʻi: The Politics of Astronomy on Mauna a Wākea. University of Hawai’i at Manoa, Honolulu.

TMT International Observatory (2022) About. Available at: https://www.tmt.org/page/about (accessed 11 September 2024).

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On Tuesday 5 November 2024, the EUHealthGov network held its second event. This one-day knowledge exchange workshop brought together academics, policymakers and practitioners to discuss health law and governance in the context of growing uncertainty and intertwined crises. The COVID-19 pandemic has not unfolded in isolation from other overlapping, interacting, and mutually reinforcing crises: from climate change, the war in Ukraine and in Palestine, sharply rising socioeconomic inequities and the cost-of-living crisis, to an exacerbated distrust in liberal democratic institutions, Brexit, and the rise of the far-right and Euroscepticism reflected in the newly elected European Parliament. At the same time, EU law and policy appears increasingly characterised by a state of permanent crisis, which institutionalises governance architectures and tools associated with emergency responses.

The purpose of this workshop was to exchange ideas, experience, and work-in-progress around one question: how do contemporary uncertainties and crises affect health law, policy, and governance in the EU, the UK, and their evolving relationship?

First, Dr Tomislav Sokol (Member of the European Parliament), joined us online and shared an exhaustive and detailed overview of the health-related priorities currently on the agenda in the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety. The workshop was taking place a few months after the European Parliament elections and in the middle of the Commissioner hearings determining the confirmation of the new college of Commissioners for Ursula von der Leyen’s second term.

Examining these ongoing developments, Dr Louise Bengtsson (Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies), provided her analysis of the new von der Leyen mandate and the role of health policy in this new political landscape. She highlighted the increased overlap and fluidity between Commissioner portfolios, as well as the central focus on competitiveness and security. Amidst the growing role of the EU in health since COVID-19 highlighted by Bengtsson, Dr Mechthild Roos (Augsburg University) presented her current research, which uses the framework of input/throughout/output legitimacy as a lens to understand the European Parliament’s involvement during the crisis phase of the pandemic. She highlighted how the Parliament sought to balance its support for swift, necessary emergency responses on one hand, and the need to prevent the risk of institutionalising modes of governance that bypass ordinary legislative procedures on the other hand.

Diving into the legal and political ins and outs of specific health crises, Juan Collado Pérez-Llantada (University of Liverpool) shared his insights into the role EU law can play in regulating antimicrobial resistance through a ‘OneHealth’ approach. He outlined the existing legal framework. But he also emphasised the difficulty inherent to governing this multifaceted and multilevel crisis, visible notably in the lack of action on the environmental spread of AMR and the issues of competence limitation. Another pharmaceuticals-related crisis was discussed by Mark Dayan (Nuffield Trust). He focused on the medicine shortages in the UK and EU, highlighting the global drivers of the crisis in the nature of pharmaceutical markets and recent disruptions caused by COVID-19 and the war in Ukraine. He also discussed the UK, EU and Member State responses – including industrial policy approaches and stockpiling.

Finally, the presentations of our two last speakers zoomed out and broadened the geographical scope of analysis even further, putting the EU in a global context. Dr Asha Herten-Crabb (LSE) presented her research on the EU as an emerging global actor. Drawing on critical postcolonial theory, one of the key elements of her research puzzle is to understand how the EU perceives itself and constructs its relationship within the global health architecture in the context of growing decolonisation and anti-West rhetoric. Prof Gabriel Siles-Brügge (University of Bristol) focused the global health crisis represented by non-communicable diseases – and how measures to tackle these were being challenged within the World Trade Organisation’s Technical Barriers to Trade Committee. The crisis in the global trading system has increased interest in such committees amongst the trade officials involved, including within the EU, as they exist outside of the limelight.

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I was fortunate enough to receive a UACES microgrant to help fund a month of conducting PhD fieldwork and research in Spain. I am pleased to say the trip was a success, and I gathered not only crucial archival evidence but also managed to establish key original strands of investigation through such findings, which will prove vital in shaping the argument at the crux of my thesis.

The trip was predominantly centred around making use of a number of Spain’s archivos estatales, however I also managed to integrate attending a conference in my very field of research into the stay, which would not have been possible without this financial backing. The Archivo Histórico Nacional in Madrid was my main base during the stay, and I used the PARES portal to find relevant archives and document them in relation to my key research questions. I particularly wanted to find out why a particular type of Spanish literature, known as the picaresque, was re-emerging in modern times – most notably in Spain’s postwar period, and here I found ample evidence that the popularity and trend of this type of writing was not only resurfacing, but being used as a tool for political defiance and a guise for the hypocritical bemusement of a generation marred by the depravity and austerity of a Civil War. The Archivo General de la Administración in nearby Alcalá de Henares also archived a return of the picaresque in not only a literary outlet, but through film, proving of its capability to adapt to the times and transcend boundaries. However, one key theme remained – despite European emulations of such work, it remained inherently Spanish. But why?

A breakthrough in my research trip came from my time spent at the Centro Documental de la Memoria Histórica in Salamanca, where the knowledgeable staff were able to discuss gaps in my research with me, leading to the discovery of a wealth of resources which could frame Spain’s postwar inwardness in stark contrast to the wider outfacing dynamic of Europe during this watershed period of war and enmity. I also made ample use of the digitalised archive collection to grasp a better understanding of conditions within Spain during this time, and the ties these had with the picaresque as not only a mere literary genus, but also as a watershed way of feeling, thinking and acting; ergo a trait of intrinsicality to the contemporary Spaniard. Following on from this part of my fieldwork, I then travelled to León to attend a conference specifically on the picaresque which was organised by the University of León in conjunction with the academic organisation CELPYC. At this event I was able to not only become familiar with current research being undertaken in my field, but also share my recent findings with like-minded academics, who have asked me to present my research at their upcoming congress in Santander in June 2025.

Sarah Ellis, Department of Languages Cultures and Film, University of Liverpool

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Headaches in the morning

Maybe it’s some kind of Stockholm Syndrome, but since the Tories left office I have not felt the same urge to write about British European policy.

Equally possibly, it might be because I feel a bit broken by another government with a lack of clear purpose in this domain. Labour, like their predecessors, seem to be stuck at the point of realising this whole Europe thing might be a bit more complicated than they thought, so extemporise until they can work it all out some more.

This was brought to a certain head last week for me off the back of some comments I made in an interview. In it, I said:

“The secrecy right now lets others claim he [Starmer] has no plan – or worse, is just looking to make deals where he can.”

Various people have pushed back on this, mostly by reading it as ‘Starmer actually has no plan’. While I’m not quite arguing that, the impression that this is the case seems somewhat self-evident: communication is focused on what won’t happen – free movement of people, membership of Customs Union or Single Market – and on the nebulous ‘reset’.

This needs more thought and reflection, because there are several things going on here, all of them consequential and none of them clearly determinant.

First up, we need to be a bit clearer about what we’re/I’m talking about. In the broadest terms, there’s a difference between what we might term a vision, a strategy and a plan.

David Henig’s fine piece speaks to this difference by noting that we know what the UK wants of working with the EU; namely cooperation in any and all areas within the envelope of non-membership of the Customs Union, Single Market or full EU membership. That includes the usual litany of items such as an SPS agreement, fisheries access and security.

That is a plan (or rather, a series of plans); specific and localised actions to take. But it’s not really a strategy or a vision.

The UK has long failed to settle on – or even consciously discuss – its vision for relations with the EU and its predecessors. The point of relations sits uneasily in the wider uncertainties of how the UK wants to position itself in the wider world or of what kind of place it wants to be. You can insert your favourite Dean Acheson quote here [although seeing the other two ascribed to him, it might become my least favourite one].

Below any high-minded vision of who we are and what’s our place in the world, there is strategy, which starts to translate down towards the broad thrust of activity. In this case,  the questions are whether the current red lines are fixed and whether they derive from some higher purpose or instead are a function of party politics of the last few years.

Put differently, there’s nothing wrong with red lines, but you need to be able to understand why they exist and what purpose they serve if you are to defend them and to use them in your negotiations with the EU.

In this, I’m rather old-fashioned in thinking that party politics most usefully stops at the water’s edge and that external relations should speak to the needs of the country as a whole. But your mileage may vary on this.

At present, the defining mechanism seems to be one informed by the imperatives of trying to neutralise a tricky topic in party political terms, while also recognising specific needs and asks, combining to produce the external relations version of the Woolie’s pick and mix: lots of choice, lots of things you’ve never seen before and not the most sustaining of diets.

Secondly, we have to be alive to why people talk about wanting a vision/strategy/plan.

Clearly, the lack of strategy or vision is not for lack of ideas out there. The absence of a more articulated Labour policy has left groups from across the political spectrum to offer programmes and priorities (this is a good place to get some overview).

Because these are typically isolated from the need to attend to the party politics that the government has decided to be hemmed in by, they come with their own visions and strategies.

Right now, a lot of that comes from pro-European voices that take doing (much) more with the EU as A Good Thing. The youth mobility impasse has been a recent rallying point for them, both on what they see as intrinsic merits and on wider signalling or a desire to multiply connections.

Even my own position – that the government needs its own vision and strategy to create a durable relationship with the EU – still comes with an agenda of wanting to avoid big swings in policy.

From the government’s perspective, this is a complication: moving on a specific point risks opening up broader implications for relations just at the point when they seem to wish to hold off such things. Hence, havering on youth mobility despite very broad backing from interested groups and public opinion.

Again, this comes back to the lack of a robust vision and strategy that the government can lean on as justification for what it’s doing.

Finally, we have to separate rhetoric and action.

Just because politicians and pundits talk in a particular way, it doesn’t mean that they follow through on that in their action. In the present case, there is clearly a huge amount of interaction and activity between the UK and EU (again, a good overview here).

Last year’s fun over EV car batteries is a case in point, where lots of work went into avoiding a mutually-damaging situation: exactly the kind of issue that bubbled along in the specialist media, but which would have been a much bigger problem if not addressed.

To that extent, lacking a strategy hasn’t held back a lot of work, on things that need dealing with now.

But working towards any kind of relationship that is robust and resilient requires more than just reactive management of stuff that pops up. As the 2000-2010s showed very vividly, lots of small choices and steps can lead to radical outcomes: ‘not banging on about Europe’ became ‘let’s not talk about it’, leaving others to fill the gap.

—

To pull all this together, Labour’s issue appears to be not that dissimilar to David Cameron in the 2000s: a desire to park the ‘Europe’ issue and deal with other things that needed attention (and don’t cause so much anguish) leaves the field open to others to make their play for agenda-setting, which probably results in outcomes that are ultimately more adverse for the government than would otherwise have been the case.

This points to the need for finding a happier medium between obsessing and ignoring EU relations. Like any other significant part of public policy, there has to be sufficient engagement to follow through on agendas/visions if that is not to become a point of instability.

Knowing what you aim to achieve – and why – would be a helpful start in determining that level. To delay will only reduce options and make it harder to impose order and stability over the relevant activity.

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Abstract 

This paper examines the European Union’s (EU) approach to artificial intelligence (AI) governance, focusing on the period from the publication of Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI (2019) onwards. It explores the EU’s strategy to address its “digital gap” in AI development and adoption. The study employs a theoretical framework synthesizing concepts of AI policy as a “horizontal area” (Niklas and Dencik 2020), “tentative governance” (Kuhlmann and Rip’s 2018), and an “ethics first” approach (Floridi 2018). The analysis reveals and discusses the EU’s distinctive prioritization of ethical considerations in AI development, manifested through substantial public investments and flexible regulatory interventions. 

 

Introduction and Theoretical Framework 

“Europe’s digital gap”: this is how analysts at the McKinsey Global Institute in 2019 described Europe’s lagging behind global leaders such as the USA in the realm of AI development and adoption. They cautioned that while digitization is essential for the advancement of AI, Europe continues to lag approximately 35% behind the United States; a trend that has not diminished in recent years. More recently, the State of the Digital Decade 2024 report highlights both progress and challenges in Europe’s digital transformation, including in AI adoption. While there has been advancement in areas such as 5G coverage and digital skills, the report notes that the percentage of enterprises using AI increased by a mere 0.4% in 2 years, from 7.6% in 2021 to 8.0% in 2023, significantly below the 75% target for 2030 (see State of the Digital Decade Report, 2024, Annex 2). The analysis emphasizes the need for European Union (EU) countries to strengthen their actions and be more ambitious in achieving the Digital Decade’s goals, in order to ensure EU’s future economic prosperity. 

Europe’s technological divide is not only evident in the slow adoption of AI technologies but also in the stark disparities in AI investment between Europe and global leaders, like North America. A European Commission’s (EC) 2018 report illustrates the severity of this investment disparity, revealing that private AI investments in Europe totalled only €2.4-3.2 billion, compared to a much higher €12.1-18.6 billion in North America. This significant difference in investment underscores Europe’s struggle to foster a competitive AI ecosystem, one capable of stimulating innovation at the same pace as its counterparts. Scholars, such as Mazzucato (2017) caution about the impact of chronic underinvestment in high-risk, early-stage research, emphasizing the importance of public investment in fostering innovation, and warning that underfunding in these critical areas can lead to stagnation in technological advancement and economic growth. In the case of AI this gap is particularly concerning, because the transition from basic research to practical application can be extraordinarily short (Sepp Hochreiter, 2023), and many European enterprises still lag behind global competitors due to challenges in rapidly translating research into practical applications (State of the Digital Decade Report, 2024, Annex 2). 

The persistent digital divide underscores the critical importance of pan-European AI policy initiatives in accelerating AI adoption. To analyse this complex landscape, the present discussion adopts a theoretical framework that synthesizes three key theoretical concepts from existing literature and policy approaches. First of all, this is Niklas and Dencik (2020) theorization of AI policy as a “horizontal area” that spans multiple domains and sectors. The scholars highlight the dual role of state intervention in this process, which encompasses both public funding for research and regulatory oversight for industry. Secondly, Kuhlmann and Rip’s (2018) concept of “tentative governance” refers to flexible and adaptive regulatory approaches needed to address the dynamic and rapidly evolving nature of AI technologies. Thirdly, the “tentative governance” policy concept is extended by drawing upon Floridi’s (2018) guidance about “ethics first” approach to AI development and governance.  

The EU’s regulatory stance distinctively prioritizes ethical considerations in AI development and deployment, a principle firmly established by the 2019 Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI, which have laid the foundation for subsequent AI policy frameworks. Thus, the subsequent brief chronological analysis will examine key European AI-related policies and programs from 2019 onwards through these three theoretical lenses, focusing on how these initiatives aim to bridge the digital divide while adhering to principles of responsible and ethical AI development through flexible and adaptive “tentative governance” approaches. 

In accordance with the theoretical guidance about the dual role of state intervention in AI policy, the discussion will first explore public funding as a catalyst for ethical AI innovation, followed by an assessment of key recent EU AI policy interventions. This structure reflects the complementary nature of research funding and regulatory measures in shaping the European AI landscape. 

 

Public Funding as Catalyst of AI innovation 

In response to the challenge of the “digital gap,” Europe has increasingly relied on public funding and collaborative research initiatives as strategic tools to bridge this divide. Importantly, these funding initiatives integrate the ethics-first approach, ensuring that ethical considerations remain at the forefront of EU’s AI development strategy. 

Horizon Europe, with its substantial budget of €93.5 billion for 2021-2027 (note that this total includes all areas of research and innovation, not just AI), serves as the centrepiece of this strategy, deliberately committing to “act as a synergetic force across the EU funding programmes.” Within this, a significant portion is allocated to digital technologies, including AI. For instance, the “Digital, Industry and Space” cluster, which encompasses AI research, has been allocated €15.3 billion. Public investment acts supports innovation in critical technologies, while also emphasizing the development of ethically aligned AI systems. For example, Horizon Europe’s Ethics Appraisal Process is designed to ensure compliance with ethical standards throughout EU-funded research projects and now includes a mandatory ethics appraisal procedure for proposals that raise ethical issues. 

This approach is complemented by other initiatives within the European AI ecosystem. The Digital Europe Programme (DIGITAL), while separate from Horizon Europe, synergizes with it by focusing on building strategic digital capacities and deploying digital technologies. DIGITAL has an overall budget exceeding €7.9 billion for 2021-2027. The programmes will collectively invest €1 billion per year in AI, which totals €4 billion over four years (2021-2027). Both Horizon Europe and Digital Europe require ethics review procedures, even though they are more robustly defined within Horizon Europe compared to DIGITAL. This integrated funding strategy aims to establish a seamless continuum of support from foundational research to market deployment, with ethical considerations embedded throughout.  

European initiatives emphasize not only funding for research projects but also support for training and mobility programs. For instance, the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions, with a budget of €6.6 billion under Horizon Europe, specifically targets researchers in AI and other cutting-edge fields, while also promoting ethical awareness in AI research. Additionally, the European Innovation Council (EIC) has allocated €10.1 billion to promote breakthrough innovations, including AI, from laboratory settings to market products, with a focus on responsible and ethical development.  

Individual member states are also making substantial investments in AI. For example, the German Federal Government (2020) has pledged €3 billion for its AI strategy up to 2025, which includes a strong emphasis on “AI made in Europe” that adheres to European ethical standards. France’s National Strategy for AI (SNIA) had a budget of €1.5 billion in public funds for five years (2018-2022). The second phase of France’s national AI strategy (promulgated in 2021) dedicated a total of €2.22 billion for AI over the next 5 years, of which €1.5 billion in public funding and €506 million in private co-financing, with ethical AI development as a key priority. 

Collectively, the investments discussed in this section represent a substantial commitment to AI advancement. In its Coordinated Plan on Artificial Intelligence Review (2021), the European Commission estimates that the combined public and private investments in AI in Europe could reach €20 billion per year over the next decade. This level of investment represents a significant step towards closing the AI investment gap and fostering a thriving AI ecosystem in Europe that prioritizes ethical considerations. 

 

Regulatory Interventions 

The ensuing brief overview will discuss key European AI-related policies and programs promulgated since 2019.  

The analytical exposition begins with the publication of the Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI by the High-Level Expert Group on AI. These guidelines laid the ethical foundation for Europe’s approach to AI development. An emphasis was placed on principles such as human agency, privacy, and non-discrimination, reflecting an “ethics-first” approach to AI governance. This initial step was of great importance in establishing the foundation for future policies. It signalled Europe’s commitment to developing AI systems that not only push technological boundaries but also align with fundamental European values. The guidelines has served as a compass, guiding subsequent regulatory efforts and shaping the European vision of “trustworthy AI.” 

Recognizing that AI development is intrinsically linked to data availability, the EU launched the European Strategy for Data in 2020. This strategy aimed to create a single market for data and envisioned a future where data flows freely within the EU while adhering to strict privacy and data protection rules. Moreover, it sought to democratize AI development by ensuring fair access to data, preventing the concentration of power in the hands of a few large tech companies.  

In 2021, the EU launched the Digital Decade policy program, setting ambitious targets for Europe’s digital transformation by 2030. This program recognized AI as a key technology for achieving these goals and emphasized creating a “secure and performant sustainable digital infrastructure.” The Digital Decade program marked a shift from isolated policies to a more comprehensive vision of Europe’s digital future. It contextualized AI within broader digital transformation goals, highlighting the interconnectedness of various technological advancements and societal changes. 

Proposed in 2021, the AI Act is a landmark legislation that would become the cornerstone of European AI regulation. As analysed by Veale and Zuiderveen (2021), it adopts a risk-based approach, categorizing AI systems based on their potential societal impact and implications for individual rights. This nuanced approach allowed for stringent oversight of high-risk applications while fostering innovation in lower-risk areas. Therefore, the act exemplifies the concept of tentative governance, providing a flexible framework that could adapt to the rapid pace of AI development.  

In 2022, the EU introduced the Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act. While not AI-specific, these acts played a crucial role in shaping the regulatory environment for AI technologies in Europe. They set rules for online platforms and digital markets, indirectly influencing the development and deployment of AI technologies. These acts demonstrate tentative governance through their layered approach to regulation, with different rules applying to different sizes and types of digital platforms, allowing for adaptability as the digital landscape evolves. 

Running parallel to these regulatory efforts is Horizon Europe, the EU’s key research and innovation program for 2021-2027. While not exclusively focused on AI, Horizon Europe provides significant funding for AI research and development, fostering collaboration between academia, industry, and the public sector. Horizon Europe embodies tentative governance through its adaptive funding mechanisms and focus areas, which can be adjusted to address emerging AI challenges and opportunities. 

As seen from this brief exposition, from the ethical guidelines of 2019 to the risk-based approach of the AI Act and the adaptive research funding of Horizon Europe, there is a consistent pattern of flexible, adaptive governance strategies, which prioritise ethical considerations. These strategies allow the EU to navigate the complex and uncertain landscape of AI development while maintaining a balance between technological innovation and ethical considerations.  

 

Conclusions 

The EU must proactively harness the potential of AI to prevent becoming merely a consumer of solutions developed elsewhere and to capitalize on the transformative opportunities this technology presents. The EU’s approach to AI governance combines increased public funding with increasingly more flexible and adaptive regulatory frameworks. It aims not only to close the AI gap with global leaders but to establish Europe as a pioneer in human-centric, trustworthy AI that balances innovation with ethical considerations and societal needs.

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The sum total of all human knowledge, spanning hundreds of thousands of years or more, is an amazing feat.

But there is no single human on earth who knows all this knowledge, nor any group of humans who could assimilate or understand it all, not even the tiniest fraction of it.

Artificial intelligence, however, is on track not only to eventually assimilate all knowledge ever gathered by humans, but also to understand it, analyse it, and uncover new knowledge yet to be discovered by humanity.

Professor Geoffrey Hinton, known as the “Godfather of AI” and who recently won the Nobel Prize for Physics, recently said that in future AI will always win any argument with a human because AI will be vastly more intelligent and knowledgeable than any human or humans.

That of course represents both an opportunity and a threat to all Homo sapiens.

Already, AI knowledge and intelligence have made dramatic strides in rapid time, with more enormous developments anticipated soon.

With that in mind, I asked AI (Chat GPT 4o) to write a hypothetical essay imagining, “What would Europe be like today if the EU never existed?”

It produced a 1,200-word article in just five seconds, which I am publishing below.

I could not have written it better, and certainly not in five seconds. (I now feel redundant!)

• EUROPE WITHOUT THE EU? – written by Artificial Intelligence

The European Union (EU), born out of the ashes of two devastating world wars, has reshaped the continent’s political, economic, and cultural landscape over the last seven decades.

Imagining Europe today without the EU requires rethinking the history of post-war integration, cooperation, and peace, all of which are tied closely to the Union’s existence.

This hypothetical essay explores the possible political, economic, and social outcomes of a Europe where the EU never came into being. Such a scenario likely would have featured more nationalist tensions, economic fragmentation, and weakened global influence.

• Political Fragmentation and Rising Nationalism

One of the EU’s greatest achievements has been maintaining peace among European nations, especially between historical rivals such as France and Germany.

Without the EU, it is possible that Europe’s political landscape would have remained far more fragmented, and nationalist sentiments, which have historically fueled conflict, might have taken a stronger hold.

The post-war period was a fragile time, and without the push for cooperation through institutions like the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and later the European Economic Community (EEC), the continent might have experienced ongoing territorial disputes and rivalries.

In this scenario, the absence of the EU would have likely led to a weaker and less coordinated approach to political crises.

European countries might have formed smaller, more regional alliances based on shared interests or historical ties, such as between France and the Benelux countries or between Scandinavian nations.

However, without the overarching EU framework, these alliances could have been less stable and more prone to collapse in the face of diplomatic challenges or economic downturns.

Moreover, individual countries might have pursued more inward-looking policies, potentially leading to heightened xenophobia, ethnic tensions, and populist movements, especially in response to crises like migration.

• Economic Instability and Trade Barriers

The EU has been instrumental in fostering economic cooperation, trade, and development across Europe.

Without it, Europe’s economy would likely be more fragmented, with less integrated markets and higher barriers to trade.

The Single Market, which allows goods, services, capital, and people to move freely across borders, would not exist, resulting in numerous customs checks, tariffs, and different regulatory standards between countries.

The economic powerhouses of Europe, like Germany and France, may have dominated trade agreements, potentially sidelining smaller nations.

Southern and Eastern European countries, which have benefitted enormously from EU development funds, might have struggled to modernise their economies and infrastructure without access to this financial support.

Regions that are today economically aligned with stronger economies through EU mechanisms would be left more vulnerable to recessions and financial crises.

Moreover, the absence of the euro would likely result in a patchwork of national currencies, which would be subject to frequent fluctuations and speculative attacks. Exchange rate instability could cause market volatility, hampering investment and long-term growth across the continent.

Countries that might have otherwise adopted the euro would remain vulnerable to currency crises, similar to what some European nations experienced in the early 1990s before deeper monetary integration began.

• Weakening of European Global Influence

Today, the EU stands as one of the world’s largest economic blocs and an influential political entity in global affairs.

Without the EU, Europe’s ability to project influence on the world stage would likely be diminished. Individually, European countries, even major players like Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, would have less leverage in global institutions such as the United Nations, World Trade Organization (WTO), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The EU’s collective bargaining power has allowed it to negotiate favourable trade agreements with other major economies, such as the United States, China, and Japan.

Without this united front, European nations would have to rely on their individual negotiating power, which would vary significantly between large and small countries.

Smaller nations, in particular, would struggle to secure favourable terms in bilateral agreements with economic giants like the US and China.

Additionally, the EU’s strong stance on environmental protection and human rights would be much weaker without its existence.

Many of the region’s most progressive policies on climate change and digital privacy, for instance, have come from the EU’s ability to implement regulations that transcend national boundaries.

A Europe without the EU could mean less ambitious climate goals and fragmented environmental policies, hindering global efforts to combat climate change.

• Social and Cultural Divide

The EU has also played a significant role in promoting cultural exchange, education, and the free movement of people, which has fostered a greater sense of European identity.

Programs such as Erasmus, which allow students to study abroad in different European countries, have enriched lives and increased understanding between cultures.

Without the EU, the free movement of people would likely be restricted, making it harder for Europeans to work, study, or live in other countries.

A Europe without the EU might have maintained stricter immigration controls, not only between EU members but also between other European countries, such as those in the Balkans or Eastern Europe.

This could lead to fewer cultural exchanges and less intermixing of ideas and traditions across borders. Countries would be more inward-looking and nationalistic, which could deepen cultural divides and reduce the cohesion that the EU has sought to foster.

Furthermore, the EU has been at the forefront of human rights and democratic values, pushing countries to improve their governance in exchange for membership or access to its market.

In a scenario where the EU never existed, there would be less incentive for countries in Eastern Europe, for example, to embrace democratic reforms after the fall of the Soviet Union.

This could lead to more authoritarian regimes in Europe and potentially a rollback of the democratic principles that have flourished since the end of the Cold War.

• Security Concerns and Fragmented Defence

One of the EU’s most significant, if sometimes underappreciated, roles is its contributions to collective security.

Through the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and its coordination with NATO, the EU has helped maintain peace and stability in Europe. Without the EU, defence cooperation between European nations would be less integrated, potentially making Europe more vulnerable to external threats.

The continent would likely rely more heavily on NATO, but the absence of EU-led initiatives for crisis management and peacekeeping could lead to a weaker, more disjointed response to security challenges.

Without the EU, European nations might have pursued more individualistic defence policies, which could have strained relations between countries, leading to a less secure and less cooperative region.

Countries in Eastern Europe, which today benefit from EU support in facing pressure from Russia, might have faced greater vulnerability without the backing of a united Europe.

• Conclusion

A Europe without the European Union would likely be a more divided, unstable, and economically fragmented region.

Without the EU’s framework for political and economic integration, European nations might have struggled to maintain peace, coordinate on global issues, and compete in the global economy. Fragmentation, both political and economic, could have deepened, making the continent more susceptible to internal tensions and external threats.

While it is impossible to predict every outcome in this hypothetical scenario, the EU’s contributions to peace, prosperity, and cooperation are undeniable.

Without the EU, Europe today might resemble the fractured and conflict-prone continent of the early 20th century, rather than the relatively peaceful and prosperous one we know today.

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Anna P. Lohse

Facilitated by the freedom of movement within the European Union (EU), the Erasmus programme established in 1987, and the Bologna Process initiated in 1999, physical intra-European student mobility has become a taken-for-granted aspect of higher education. Student mobility—whether for a short-term stay or the completion of an entire degree—is the core phenomenon of higher education internationalisation. The latter has gained significant importance on the policy agenda of countries worldwide over the past decades in light of short- and long-term economic goals (e.g., generating tuition fees, recruiting skilled migrants), the strengthening of international cooperation, and an increase of academic quality and students’ intercultural competencies. Internationalisation strategies now exist on national and institutional levels (Crăciun, 2019); outlining goals and measures involving various stakeholders including education ministries, foreign ministries, national higher education agencies such as the DAAD, British Council, or Campus France; university administrations, and interest groups.

 

An age of disruption

Brexit and the COVID-19 pandemic greatly disrupted established practices and regulations of higher education internationalisation. After the Brexit referendum, there was uncertainty about whether the United Kingdom (UK) would continue to participate in the Erasmus programme and whether EU students would still have visa-free, discounted access to British degree programs. With the COVID-19 pandemic, global student mobility largely came to a halt for the first time in history. There was speculation about whether Brexit and the COVID-19 crisis would mark a turning point in higher education internationalisation. Regarding Brexit, some predicted, for instance, that British-European higher education relations would never be the same as before the referendum. Concerning COVID-19, there was speculation that the pandemic might usher in an era where physical mobility would no longer be the core focus of internationalisation, but rather transnational online degree programs.

However, when we look at the literature on institutional change and stability (e.g., Mahoney, 2000, Ebbinghaus, 2005), we find that societal institutions such as the church, nation states or higher education systems are relatively resistant to change—even in the face of major disruptive events. This is because of path dependencies, which exist, for instance, due to powerful actors preventing change in order to stay in power or because new policies and practices are not considered ‘normal’ by society.

 

Examining the disruptions’ impact in three major European higher education systems

The uncertainty about the status quo of European student mobility, combined with the diverging expectations of contemporary witnesses and the institutionalist literature, is the setting of my dissertation monograph Higher Education in an Age of Disruption. Comparing European Internationalisation Policies. In my book, I explore how Brexit and COVID-19 impacted student mobility policy and practices in England, France, and Germany between the years of 2016 and 2021. The three selected countries are not only among the top destinations for degree-seeking international and Erasmus students, but also represent different types of higher education systems. England is comparably market-based, while France is more state-dominated, and Germany traditionally follows the Humboldtian tradition of being state-financed while featuring a relatively strong academic self-governance. These differences allow for pertinent insights into how different higher education systems dealt with the disruptions.

 

Analytical approach of the study

The study involved 44 interviews with internationalisation experts from the three country contexts. These experts included heads of international offices of medium-sized to large universities and staff members from national education ministries and higher education internationalisation agencies (British Council, Campus France, DAAD). In addition, 234 documents were analysed, providing insights into events, debates, and changes related to Brexit and the COVID-19 pandemic in the higher education sectors of England, Germany, and France. These documents included newspaper articles, parliamentary records, law changes, policy briefs, and statements from higher education stakeholders.

To assess whether and what kind of change occurred in higher education internationalisation, I developed indicators of the institutional dimensions of student mobility. According to Scott (2008), every institution consists of a regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive dimension.

In the regulative dimension of student mobility, country-specific immigration and university admission laws must be followed, as well as the statutes of mobility programmes (e.g., Erasmus). The normative dimension is reflected in the values and norms that internationalisation actors refer to in their daily practice. Of particular interest here is whether student mobility is pursued primarily for academic, political, economic, or cultural reasons (Knight, 2012). Furthermore, specific norms and activities in the higher education system are institutionalized through funding programs (e.g., by the EU or internationalisation agencies). The cultural-cognitive dimension includes fundamental perceptions and approaches that actors consider self-evident. Such taken-for-granted aspects include whether higher education is viewed as a fundamentally public or private good and, relatedly, whether a higher education system is predominantly market-based or state-led. These assumptions, in turn, influence whether higher education internationalisation is primarily conceived within a collaborative or competitive logic.

I coded both the expert interviews and documents according to the institutional dimensions and developed an analytical framework involving different types of overall institutional change. I classified no substantive change in all three institutional dimensions as overall institutional stability, change in one or two dimensions as partial change and change in all three dimensions as radical change.

 

Key findings

In all country-disruption combinations, I found partial change. That is, the regulative and/or the normative dimension of higher education internationalisation were altered in response to Brexit/the COVID-19 pandemic, but the cultural-cognitive frameworks underlying higher education internationalisation remained stable.

 

The regulative impact of Brexit on higher education internationalisation

Brexit was accompanied by substantive regulatory changes for student mobility. After years of protracted negotiations, the United Kingdom (UK) left the EU on February 1, 2020. Since January 1, 2021, EU students are required to apply for a paid visa for studying in the UK. Additionally, European students lost their right to reduced tuition fees. On December 24, 2020, the British government unexpectedly announced its withdrawal from Erasmus and the creation of its own mobility program. The non-reciprocal Turing Scheme, which solely provides scholarships for British outgoing students and not for incoming students, was presented as an optimized Erasmus program that would offer taxpayers “greater value for money” (Department for Education and The Rt Hon Sir Gavin Williamson CBE MP 2020).

For Germany and France, Brexit resulted in the UK being re-categorized as a third country. As a consequence, British students in France now need to apply for a visa, while in Germany, they require a residence permit.

 

Normative impact of Brexit

In terms of normative aspects, the British government, in the wake of Brexit, intensified its focus on exporting educational offerings to non-EU markets. In the second national internationalisation strategy, “Global potential, global growth,” adopted in 2019, Europe hardly finds mention. Leaving the EU is portrayed as an opportunity to reposition the UK as an educational provider in the European and especially global market. In student exchange, the focus is shifted to Commonwealth countries and the Anglosphere, which also play a central role as target regions in the Turing Scheme. While the British government distanced itself from the EU and non-economic internationalisation motives, the English higher education sector intensified its efforts towards European university partnerships and exchanges. English universities emphasized the shared European history and values, openly expressing criticism of the British government’s actions through position papers and symbolic protests, such as flying the EU flag on university buildings.

Both the French and German higher education sectors reacted with dismay to Brexit. However, this initial dismay quickly gave way to a defiant attitude regarding the importance of European cooperation. In both countries, Brexit led to an increased pursuit of partnership agreements with Northern and Eastern European countries. These countries’ offerings of English-language programs were seen as an attractive alternative to the lost British Erasmus partnerships. French President Emmanuel Macron’s 2017 speech at the Sorbonne University provided the impetus for the creation of the European Universities Initiative (EUI). The rapid implementation of this proposal, which by mid-2024 has resulted in over 60 university alliances involving more than 500 universities, is considered the most significant European internationalisation policy since the Bologna Process.

 

Cultural-cognitive impact of Brexit

While Brexit-induced changes occurred on both the regulatory and normative levels in all three countries, the changes remained anchored in culturally-cognitive, institutionalized societal perceptions. The normative clash between the British government and the pro-European higher education sector represents a continuation of the divided post-war British politics and identity, characterized by British exceptionalism—representing idea of the UK’s special role within Europe and the world—while simultaneously being involved in European integration processes. While the British government used Brexit as an opportunity to institutionalize the departure from the EU through new regulations, English universities actively worked against this, for example, by joining the EUI.

Thus, the central cultural-cognitive conflict between British exceptionalism and competitive internationalisation on the one hand, and European integration and collaborative internationalisation on the other, continues to persist. In the case of France and Germany, the regulative and normative changes signal a continued commitment to a higher education internationalisation fundamentally oriented towards Europeanization and collaborative activities

 

The regulative impact of COVID-19 on higher education internationalisation

The COVID-19 pandemic posed very different regulatory challenges for the English higher education sector compared to the German and French higher education sectors. The key factor here is the market-based nature of the English higher education system. Since international students represent a vital source of income for English universities, the expected long-term decline in international student numbers at the beginning of the pandemic posed an existential threat to the financial stability of the sector.

In response, English universities began compensating for the anticipated loss of international students by gaming established admissions practices: they sent an unusually high number of study offers to domestic secondary school graduates to outcompete other universities. This approach threatened to throw the entire higher education sector into chaos, prompting the British government to temporarily reintroduce the student number cap, a limit on the number of students universities can admit. This cap had been abolished in 2015, thereby introducing full-on market conditions. However, when international student numbers unexpectedly increased rather than decreased during the pandemic, this regulatory change was abolished, and the sector returned to the previous conditions of a fully market-based system—despite the pandemic highlighting significant weaknesses in the system and triggering widespread calls for reform from within the sector.

In contrast, the state-funded higher education systems of Germany and France faced different regulatory challenges. Since—unlike in England—online teaching was not widely practiced in either country before the pandemic, their face-to-face-based regulations had to be expanded in a very short time. This included, for example, enabling the use of online platforms like Zoom, conducting online exams, and allowing online enrolment for students who would not initially be able to physically enter the host country. In Germany, this involved creating an enrolment status for students who participated exclusively in digital classes. In France, the pandemic accelerated the implementation of the digital visa process for international students, a measure that had already been decided under the Bienvenue en France strategy.

 

Normative impact of COVID-19

In the normative dimension, the COVID-19 pandemic in England reinforced the focus on profitable internationalisation activities, particularly the recruitment of international students, to ensure the survival of universities. In Germany and France, norms regarding the acceptance of digital teaching and administration changed. Virtual exchange and Collaborative Online International Learning (COIL) formats gained significant traction as ways to compensate for the loss of physical mobility. In Germany, the DAAD launched several funding lines shortly after the outbreak of the pandemic to systematically advance the digitalisation of internationalisation. It is noteworthy that the increasing digitalisation of internationalisation was already on the agendas of universities and the internationalisation agencies DAAD and Campus France before the pandemic. However, limited financial and personnel resources had previously hindered the rapid implementation of digitalisation reforms.

 

Cultural-cognitive impact of COVID-19

The observed developments in the three country contexts point to stability of the cultural-cognitive dimension in the three higher education systems. Although the pandemic exposed the risks of a market-based higher education system, England maintained its status quo. Demands for funding reforms demanded by higher education actors fell on deaf ears on the part of the British government.

In France, pandemic measures and the continuation of the Bienvenue en France strategy were largely directed by a crisis management team within the French government, pointing to a comparably strong state involvement. In Germany, coordination of pandemic measures occurred at both the state level and nationally through the DAAD, and there was a comparably strong focus on the pedagogical component of digital internationalisation. Both France and Germany continued to emphasize international collaboration during the pandemic through virtual exchange programmes with partner universities. Contrary to the expectations of some higher education actors, more market-oriented activities, like transnational online programs, did not become a part of France’s and Germany’s internationalisation portfolios during the pandemic.

 

Summary

The comparative study found that Brexit and the COVID-19 pandemic did not lead to radical changes of existing internationalisation strategies in the three country contexts. Instead, both disruptions created windows of opportunities that accelerated ongoing gradual changes and reinforced existing internationalisation logics. This was particularly evident in the country-specific stances towards Europeanisation and the digitalisation of higher education.

 

 

Anna P. Lohse is a postdoctoral researcher at the Institute for Education at Technical University Berlin, Germany. She received her PhD from the Hertie School – The University of Governance in Berlin and holds an MA in International Education from New York University.

 

References

Crăciun, D. (2019). Systematizing National Higher Education Internationalization Strategies: Reconceptualizing a Process. PhD thesis. Central European University. https://ris.utwente.nl/ws/portalfiles/portal/222724257/craciundaniela.pdf

Department for Education & The Rt Hon Sir Gavin Williamson CBE MP. (2020). New Turing scheme to support thousands of students to study and work abroad. Retrieved March 14, 2023 from https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-turing-scheme-to-support-thousands-of-students-to-study-and-work-abroad

Ebbinghaus, B. (2005). Can path dependence explain institutional change? Two approaches applied to welfare state reform. Discussion Paper 05/2. Cologne: Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.

Knight, J. (2012). Concepts, rationales, and interpretive frameworks in the internationalization of higher education. In D. K. Deardorff, H. de Wit, J. Heyl & T. Adams (Eds.), The SAGE Handbook of International Higher Education (pp. 27–42). SAGE Publications.

Lohse, A. P. (2024). Higher Education in an Age of Disruption. Comparing European Internationalisation Policies. Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-57912-7

Mahoney, J. (2000). Path Dependence in Historical Sociology. Theory and Society, 29(4), 507–548.

Scott, W. R. (2008). Institutions and Organizations: Ideas and Interests (3rd ed.). SAGE Publications.

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This blog draws on my paper presentation in the Digital Governance: Emerging Technologies and Evolving Accountability Settings in the European Union panel at the 54th UACES 2024 Annual Conference in Trento, Italy. I want to thank the UACES for the Microgrant funding that supported my participation in the conference.

 

My Experience at the UACES 54th Annual Conference:

In September, I had the privilege of attending the UACES Annual Conference in Trento, an enriching experience for any PhD candidate like myself. For doctoral researchers, attending academic conferences is crucial for professional growth and meeting degree requirements. These events offer opportunities to present research, receive feedback, and engage in vital scholarly discussions. However, limited financial resources often make participation in such gatherings challenging, potentially hindering students’ ability to acquire the experiences necessary for an academic career. This is why initiatives like the UACES Microgrant are invaluable—they help PhD students and early career researchers to reach essential milestones. The UACES funding support allowed me to attend this conference, share my research, and actively engage with the European studies community. It marked a major step toward completing my PhD and provided an exceptional platform to network, collaborate, and learn from experts in the field.

 

Presenting My Research:

During the conference, I presented the paper The EU Cybersecurity Strategy: Promise and Paradox of a Human-Centred Approach in the Digital Governance: Emerging Technologies and Evolving Accountability Settings in the European Union panel. The paper sought to explore the human-centred approach to cybersecurity within the EU, examining how the EU has framed these cybersecurity policies within a comprehensive and holistic digital governance framework by asking how the EU framed human-centred cybersecurity policies.

Cyberspace and cybersecurity governance have emerged as one of the most significant geopolitical challenges of the 21st century. The European Union (EU) has prioritised developing a comprehensive framework for cybersecurity governance, focusing on specific rules and institutions related to cybersecurity, the digital economy, and the protection of digital human rights. This approach comes at a time when cyberspace is increasingly seen as the merging of internet technologies with various human activities—such as communication, commerce, education, and even warfare—activities that were once confined to the physical world. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic compelled the migration of daily activities (such as education, healthcare, and work) to the online sphere, resulting in a proliferation of digital threats. This underscored the difficulty of safeguarding individuals and their security in the digital realm.

Recognising the crucial importance of cyberspace and focusing on European values based on democracy, equality, the rule of law, and the promotion of human rights, the EU launched in 2020 the European Union Cybersecurity Strategy for the Digital Decade and subsequently, in March 2021, the Digital Compass 2030: the European Path to the Digital Decade, both with a vision focused on the digitalisation of the economy and society. The documents emphasise the EU’s commitment to a secure, protected, sustainable, and people-centric digital transformation in line with the EU’s values and fundamental rights. This strategy aims to strengthen European collective resilience against cyber threats, ensuring that all citizens and businesses benefit from secure and reliable digital services and tools. Nevertheless, this strategy presents the EU’s vision of reconciling market and societal digitalisation, promoting the industrial and technological resources necessary to benefit from its ambitious Digital Single Market.

The Paradox of a Human-Centred Approach

EU has adopted a cybersecurity strategy labelled a human-centred approach in the digital domain, aspiring to be a human-centric digital development model to create a digital environment that prioritises the well-being and rights of individuals. However, the strategy often emphasises frames such as strategic autonomy, geopolitical commission, digital sovereignty, and digital leadership. While crucial for the EU’s competitiveness and influence, these frames create a complex dynamic when positioned alongside a human-centred approach. My paper delved into this paradox, exploring how the EU faces a significant dilemma: maintaining its relevance as a global actor in the digital space while safeguarding its core values, including protecting individual rights and fostering an open, secure cyberspace. The challenge lies in reconciling the EU’s pursuit of digital sovereignty with its commitment to ensuring a safe and inclusive digital environment for all its citizens.

 

A Transformative Experience

Attending the UACES 54th Annual Conference was a transformative experience for me. It provided an opportunity not only to present my research but also to engage in meaningful discussions on the future of digital governance and cybersecurity in the EU. The exchange of ideas and the feedback I received were invaluable for my academic journey, and the connections I made will likely influence my work in the future.

I am deeply grateful to UACES for their financial support, which made this experience possible. As I progress with my research, I look forward to continuing my engagement with the broader European studies community.

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In September 2024, I was delighted to attend the UACES Annual Conference, held at the University of Trento, largely thanks to the financial support I received through a UACES Microgrant. PhD students frequently have issues obtaining funding for such activities, which greatly affects their capacity to participate in academic workshops, seminars, and conferences—key events for their professional growth and degree completion. Thus, opportunities such as those provided by the UACES Microgrant are not only critical for fulfilling graduation requirements but also essential for acquiring the certifications and qualifications needed to pursue an academic career after earning a PhD. UACES’ support allowed me to travel to Trento and witness in person the results of my work as co-convenor of the European Green Deal thematic track, as well as to present my work on Chinese green technology policy and its relevance for the EU in the wake of the myriad of anti-subsidy investigations that have recently been completed or are currently underway. 

The European Union (EU) and China are currently entangled in a critical debate over subsidies in the green energy sector, highlighting the complex intersection of trade, competition, and climate policy. As both sides vie for dominance in the burgeoning market for renewable energy and electric vehicles (EVs), investigations into state subsidies reveal deeper tensions about market fairness, economic competitiveness, and the future of the global green economy.

 

The Rising Tide of Chinese EVs in Europe 

China has rapidly emerged as a global leader in the electric vehicle industry, both in terms of production capacity and technological innovation. Chinese automakers such as BYD, NIO, and Geely have become household names in China and are now expanding aggressively into international markets, including Europe. In fact, Chinese EV brands have been growing their market share in the EU, partly due to their lower price points, which attract budget-conscious consumers. 

In contrast, European automakers, including companies like Volkswagen, BMW, and Stellantis, have faced challenges in scaling up their EV production, particularly due to higher labour costs, supply chain bottlenecks, and less direct state support compared to their Chinese counterparts. As the EU pushes toward its ambitious Green Deal, which includes plans to ban the sale of new internal combustion engine vehicles by 2035, European automakers are under pressure to scale up their EV production quickly to meet both consumer demand and regulatory requirements. 

However, the influx of cheaper Chinese EVs has raised alarms in the European automotive industry. For European automakers, the concern is that their higher production costs—driven by strict labour laws, environmental regulations, and less generous subsidies—are putting them at a competitive disadvantage. Many fear that without protective measures, the European EV market could soon be dominated by Chinese imports, much like what has happened in the solar panel sector, where Chinese manufacturers now control a significant share of the global market.

 

The EU’s Investigation into Chinese Electric Vehicle Subsidies 

In September 2023, the European Union announced a formal investigation into what it claims are unfair Chinese government subsidies for electric vehicle manufacturers. According to the EU, China’s financial support for its domestic EV producers allows them to sell vehicles in Europe at significantly lower prices than European counterparts, undermining the competitiveness of European automakers. 

The investigation, spearheaded by the European Commission, focused on the allegation that Chinese EV manufacturers are able to flood the European market with artificially low-priced vehicles due to the massive state support they receive at home. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, in her annual State of the Union address, framed the issue as one of fairness, asserting that the EU must defend itself against a flood of cheap Chinese products that benefit from state-backed financial advantages. She warned that this practice puts European companies at risk, particularly those working in an already competitive and capital-intensive industry like EV production. 

As a result of the investigation, the EU has proposed provisional countervailing duties on Chinese EV imports, ranging from 17% to 36%. The investigation process allows Chinese automakers and other interested parties to submit evidence, as the Commission seeks a balanced approach that complies with both EU and World Trade Organization rules. Chinese companies, meanwhile, argue that such measures could harm consumers by raising EV prices in Europe and slowing down the region’s green transition. The final determination is expected by the end of October 2024, with any duties likely to remain in force for five years. The EU’s decision will have far-reaching implications for its relationship with China and its ability to protect key green industries from external competition​.

 

China’s Response and Retaliatory Threats 

China has reacted sharply to the EU’s investigation, describing it as a form of protectionism that could damage the otherwise strong economic relationship between China and the European Union. The Chinese government has long maintained that its green energy sector, particularly its electric vehicle industry, has grown largely through technological advancements, economies of scale, and operational efficiency, not solely because of state subsidies. Chinese officials argue that European consumers benefit from the lower prices of Chinese-made EVs, which help accelerate the transition to cleaner energy. 

Beijing has also signaled that it may retaliate if the EU investigation leads to punitive measures such as tariffs or restrictions on Chinese imports. The potential for a tit-for-tat trade conflict looms, which could affect not only the automotive sector but also other areas of economic cooperation between the EU and China, including renewable energy technologies, where both sides are key players. 

China’s Ministry of Commerce warned that the investigation could have a negative impact on EU-China relations and undermine global efforts to combat climate change. China views itself as a critical partner in the global green energy transition and contends that international cooperation, not trade barriers, is essential for meeting global climate goals.

 

The EU’s Broader Concerns About Chinese State Subsidies 

The investigation into electric vehicle subsidies is part of a broader European concern about China’s growing economic influence in key sectors, particularly those related to green technology. Over the past decade, China has made substantial strides in industries like solar power, wind energy, and battery production, often supported by state-backed subsidies and low-interest loans. Chinese companies, benefiting from government policies aimed at fostering innovation and expansion, have gained significant market shares globally, in some cases overwhelming European and U.S. competitors. 

The solar panel industry provides a clear example of this dynamic. In the early 2010s, Chinese manufacturers rapidly scaled up production of photovoltaic panels, quickly becoming the world’s largest producers and exporters. European solar panel manufacturers struggled to compete with the low prices of Chinese products, which many argued were made possible by state subsidies and cheap labor. The result was a wave of bankruptcies among European solar companies, and today China controls the majority of the global solar panel supply chain. 

European policymakers fear that a similar pattern could emerge in the electric vehicle sector. The EU, through its Green Deal, has ambitious plans to lead the world in green technologies and achieve carbon neutrality by 2050. However, this vision is complicated by the reality of China’s competitive edge in industries like EVs and renewable energy infrastructure, where European companies face stiff competition from their Chinese rivals.

 

Conclusion 

The EU’s investigation into China’s green energy subsidies, particularly in the electric vehicle sector, represents a critical moment in the evolving relationship between two of the world’s largest economic powers. While both sides are committed to addressing climate change and advancing the green energy transition, their economic competition in key industries like electric vehicles and solar energy is becoming harder to ignore. 

For Europe, the challenge lies in finding a balance between protecting its domestic industries and remaining open to the benefits of international trade and competition. For China, the investigation is a test of how its growing economic influence will be managed on the global stage, particularly in areas where state subsidies have played a key role. 

As the world shifts toward a more sustainable future, the outcomes of these investigations will not only shape EU-China relations but also set important precedents for how green technology markets will evolve globally.

The post Global Green Tensions: Unpacking the EU-China Dispute Over Electric Vehicle Subsidies appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Author: Pramiti Parwani.

Pramiti Parwani is a PhD Fellow at AIGHD, and is also based at the Amsterdam Law School at the University of Amsterdam (in the Law Centre for Health and Life and the Amsterdam Centre for European Law and Governance (ACELG)). Her PhD examines how the legal and institutional frameworks in the European Union and India influence the ‘capabilities’ of least developed countries to access pandemic vaccines for their populations. She combines third world approaches to international law (TWAIL) with the Capabilites Approach in her work, to examine barriers at different stages of the vaccine supply chain- from research and development, to manufacturing capacity to regulatory approval.

This blog draws from my PhD thesis, and is based on my presentation in a EUHealthGov panel at the UACES 2024 conference. My thanks to the EUHealthGov network for funding to support my participation at the UACES conference, and to the participants for the insightful discussions during the panels. Any mistakes remain my own.

Following the export restrictions and vaccine hoarding during the COVID-19 pandemic, concerns about global vaccine inequity still remain during the mpox outbreak. These health crises have clearly demonstrated the risks of over-reliance on foreign sources for pandemic health supplies, including vaccines, and underscore the urgent need to strengthen local vaccine manufacturing capacity—especially in regions where local production has been minimal or non-existent. While calls to expand local pharmaceutical production, including vaccine manufacturing, have long been prevalent, these efforts have received a significant boost during and after the COVID-19 pandemic. In Africa, while local vaccine production collectively only meets 1% of the total demand of the continent, a new plan for regional vaccine manufacturing intends to scale up vaccine production to be able to supply 60% of the total demand in the continent by 2040.

Consistent with the stated objective in the EU Global Health Strategy to strengthen its leadership as a global health actor, the EU invests in health-related infrastructure projects around the world. In order to mitigate fragmentation of overseas development cooperation from different Member States, the EU has introduced Team Europe Initiatives (TEIs) to develop a streamlined approach to its external financing. Team Europe Initiatives form a crucial part of the Neighborhood, Development, and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) – Global Europe (Regulation (EU) 2021/947). By pooling resources from both EU institutions and Member States, TEIs enhance coordination amongst them, enabling more cohesive and structured overseas development assistance. This approach strengthens the EU’s image as a unified actor in its external actions and reinforces its influence on the global stage.

One of the most politically high-profile TEIs is the Manufacturing and Access to Vaccines, Medicines and Health Technologies (MAV+) programme. With the aim of facilitating equitable access to safe, effective, and affordable medicines in Africa, the MAV+ initiative seeks to provide support for scaling-up vaccine production capacity on the continent. The project was announced in 2021, and  brings together the EU, 16 EU Member States, and the European Investment Bank, to provide financial, technical, and policy support across three components –supply aspect, demand aspect, and a broader facilitating environment for pharmaceuticals production.

The supply side focuses on industrial growth by involving the private sector, maintaining quality assurance systems, and supply chain management. The demand side includes trust-building activities and health promotion to overcome vaccine hesitancy. It also tackles the issue of fragmented market demand, which can impede the expansion of manufacturing capabilities across the continent. Lastly, the initiative also aims to improve pharmaceutical development by improving the underlying enabling environment – by facilitating access to finance in order to foster private investment, strengthening regulatory systems to accelerate pharmaceutical approvals, and intellectual property management. The MAV+ project was launched with a €1 billion financial commitment – an amount that has been the subject of some confusion. While this amount was initially understood by African partners as new funding, in reality, the amount mainly consists of previously allocated funds.

It was further understood that the initiative would be complemented by private funds and efforts, although further details are scarce. The most notable private component comes from  BioNTech, a German company, which in 2021 announced its plans to establish mobile vaccine production units – called ‘BioNTainers’ – in Africa. The BioNTainers are shipping containers repurposed for vaccine manufacturing, and were promoted as a “modular system, scalable and turnkey solution for local manufacturing” to provide a fast-track solution to expanding vaccine manufacturing capacity in Africa. The press release announcing the BioNTainers mentioned that BioNTech staff would initially run the BioNTainers, before providing training to local personnel to take over.

In 2023, the first BioNTainer facility was inaugurated in Rwanda. Although the funding for the facility comes from BioNTech, the MAV+ project provides indirect support by strengthening the business and regulatory ecosystem in Rwanda. In 2022, Team Europe actors launched a twinning project with the Rwandan National Regulatory Authority as part of the MAV+ program, with the aim of enhancing the the regulatory environment for the approval of health products. Around the time of the inauguration of the BioNTainer facility in Rwanda, Team Europe also pledged an additional €40 million through the MAV+ project to support vocational and technical education to cultivate a workforce for pharmaceutical manufacturing in Rwanda, in addition to fostering a start-up ecosystem within the country. Further, the launch of the BioNTainer facility in Rwanda was attended by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and a Vice President of the European Investment Bank, another partner in the MAV+ initiative. In her speech at the inaugration, President von der Leyen highlighted the Team Europe approach.

Such support, even where indirect, to private manufacturers from public funds, should include associated requirements for technology transfer and increased access to affordable medicines. Currently, however, there are no binding obligations for BioNTech to share its technology with other manufacturers. Many observers argue that BioNTech could have more effectively facilitated timely access to safe and effective vaccines in Africa by collaborating with existing African manufacturers through the WHO mRNA technology transfer hub and independent licensing agreements. In contrast, the BioNTainer “cut-and-paste model” of exporting portable, modular vaccine production units does not  support technology transfer, and has been criticized for being little more than a “neo-colonial stunt”. Human Rights Watch had previously identified at least seven manufacturing facilities in Africa, and an additional 100 facilities in other low-and-middle-income countries, which had capacity to establish or expand vaccine production at a short notice, provided that existing vaccine manufacturers would be willing to share their technology.

In light of the concerns mentioned above, and given the EU’s considerable external impact through the Team Europe Initiative, some key points need attention as the MAV+ project progresses. First, to ensure the success of the project, it is essential that African partners, such as the African Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (AfricaCDC) and Partnerships for African Vaccine Manufacturing (PAVM), maintain ownership and control over important decision-making processes, considering the unique local circumstances and needs. This approach is crucial for fostering a sustainable production and knowledge ecosystem on the continent while minimizing excessive reliance on external support.

Second, the importance of this ownership becomes even more pronounced when EU support – directly or indirectly – helps establish a favorable business and regulatory environment for EU companies abroad. Further study is necessary to better investigate the indirect market-making effects of overseas development cooperation by the EU.

Third, when EU support indirectly serves the interests of EU private entities, this should be leveraged to better regulate their activities. As discussed above, while BioNTech gains access to new markets in Africa and benefits from an improved drug regulatory authority in Rwanda through the MAV+ project, the BioNTainer model is not best suited for strengthening Rwandan local production capabilities. Therefore, there should be a greater emphasis on technology transfer, which is currently only addressed in a limited and ad-hoc manner in the MAV+ project.

The EU’s commitment to emerging as a global health leader comes with a responsibility to ensure that it oversees development cooperation efforts through the Team Europe Approach to enhance health sovereignty in partner countries. There is a need to optimise efforts under the MAV+ project in a manner that prioritizes local ownership and technology transfer to help foster sustainable health systems.

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Author: Ricardo Pereira, School of Law and Government, Dublin City University. Ricardo Pereira is a PhD candidate in Politics and International Relations at Dublin City University. He serves as a data coder for the project ”EXCEPTIUS Exceptional Powers in Times of Sars-CoV-2 Crisis.”. His research has primarily revolved around topics, such as Private Security Companies, EU Health Security, and Securitization studies.

During the 54th UACES annual conference in Trento, the paper about the collective securitisation process of COVID-19 carried out by the European Union (EU) was discussed under the panel The EU as a Global Health Actor – Between Securitisation and Cooperation organised by the EUHealthGov network. The paper aimed to understand how the Union in March 2020 became empowered by the member states to assume the role of coordinator of the EU response against the pandemic and its consequences across social, economic, and health sectors by asking How the EU discourse, particularly the Commission, did reflect the collective securitisation of COVID-19, between 2020 and September 2021. As argued by the literature in EU Health law and policy, the shared competence of the EU on health was bumbling at the time the pandemic emerged. The pandemic instigated the debate about the competence of the EU on health as stated by the president of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen as well as by the Commissioner for Health and Food Safety Stella Kyriakides.

The ongoing research has already looked at 52 speeches from the Commission between 2020 and 2021 under discourse analysis. It is possible to identify three paths of securitisation: threat construction; security construction; and announcement of measures. The first relates the EU discourse regarding COVID-19 as a threat to referent objects such as EU citizens, EU values, and EU institutions, while the second describes the call of the Union for a unified front against the pandemic. The third path refers to the implementation of measures. These three paths should be seen as interdependent and overlapped, once the analysed speeches presented the EU’s position as a security actor facing a multidimensional threat such as the COVID-19 pandemic through (extra)ordinary measures.

The present analysis took the work of Bengtsson and Rhinard (2019) about the collective securitisation of health in the EU as the initial status quo to analyse the evolution of the Union’s response to the pandemic. Following the model of collective securitisation of Sperling and Webber (2019), the research aims to analyse how the organisation constructed COVID-19 as a threat; how the Union developed its role as a health security actor capable of responding in a coordinated and cooperative approach to such a threat; and understand the recursive interaction between EU institutions that led to the implementation and possible routinisation of measures into new practices, agendas, and vocabulary.

In this vein, the research has tracked four periods of securitisation carried out by the EU already. The first comprehends the period between February and March 2020. During this time, COVID-19 was described as a test of EU core values of cooperation and solidarity. The Commission discourse constructed COVID-19 as a brutal threat by defining the pandemic as a global health crisis, following the international community discourse of main organisations such as WHO and NATO. Furthermore, the EU called for attention to pandemic consequences for the EU as an institution and its values by highlighting the impact that a sanitary nationalist approach could have. At the same time, the Commission called for a central response to the pandemic by appealing to a European memoir of cooperation and coordination. Historical memories such as the reconstruction of Europe after World War II were used to develop a sentiment of unity across member states. Consequently, this move would result in the beginning of the EU’s empowerment to respond to the pandemic in one voice, despite existing punctual divergences across time such as in the cases of Poland and Hungary. The joint procurement of personal protective equipment based on a stockpile under rescEU, as well as the development of financial mechanisms such as green lanes, and the activation of the general escape clause, are some examples of this move.

The second period between April and September 2020 could be named as the Marshall Plan for the post-COVID-19. Although the decrease in infections and deaths, the concern regarding the damages caused in the economic and financial sectors, led the Commission to describe the pandemic event as “the largest recession in 100 years”. The COVID-19 pandemic should be seen this way as a multidimensional event. It has not just impacted people’s health, but also the social and economic spheres around the globe. The Commission’s construction of COVID-19 as a multidimensional threat, relying on the interdependence between health, economic, social, and environmental sectors, would create a space for the discussion about the competence of the EU on health. In the summer of 2020 mechanisms such as SURE aimed to support jobs across the Union, also, during this time the draft for a European BARDA started. During the third period, the number of infections and deaths rose and the brutal threat discourse was back in the daily EU vocabulary. The role of the EU as an actor in the fight against the pandemic was established and its agenda was focused on strengthening the public health structure of the Union by empowering institutions such as ECDC and EMA, as well as implementing a strategy for vaccination across the EU territory at the end of the year.

During 2021, the fourth and last period of analysis, the Commission framed COVID-19 variants as the new exceptionality of the pandemic. The international role of the EU was coined by the Commission as “the pharmacy of the world” due to its move from scarcity at the beginning of the crisis to one of the main exporters of protective equipment and vaccines in the world. In this regard, the EU’s role in the African continent should be also underlined with the construction of vaccine factories, although critique can be addressed to the process of how it was designed. There has not been effective investment in logistical processes to deliver these vaccines to remote populations, and the know-how has not been shared with the communities where these factories are located. At the EU level, extraordinary measures of surveillance were implemented through the use of the digital certificate or the creation of Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority (HERA).

To conclude, preliminary conclusions can be highlighted. Regarding the threat construction, the characterisation suis generis by the EU of COVID-19 as a brutal threat through the classification of a global health crisis. As a securitising actor, the EU showed a more stable process of conducting the process. In the words of Charles Michel and Ursula von der Leyen, the EU member states during the pandemic agreed to empower the Union to respond to the pandemic under three keywords: coordination, cooperation, and solidarity. Moreover, the pandemic represents a window of opportunity to discuss the competence of health in the EU as well as new approaches to public health in the Union. To conclude, the next steps of this research will contemplate, empirically, the analysis of the following years of the EU4Health programme. The research aims to assess if measures developed to respond to COVID-19 were routinised on the Union structure. Furthermore, theoretically, the present research pretends to look for representations of security integration in the health domain, arguing this way for the utility of collective securitisation for security and integration studies.

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Over the past decade, the European Union has increasingly experimented with novel forms of public engagement, most recently as part of a New Push for European Democracy. A paradigm of deliberative and participatory innovation that envisages unmediated forms of citizen involvement is advocated by a network of political actors, civil society organisations, and academics. The European Commission in particular has sponsored processes that engage (small sets of) citizens in dialogues and mini-publics; institutional competition over a discourse of “citizen centred” democracy has the European Parliament propose a European Agora with citizens “deliberating on the EU’s priorities” on a regular basis. 

An important narrative justifying the salience of such institutional innovations is that Europeans want greater citizen involvement – which pertains to broader claims about shifting expectations towards democratic politics as citizens would seek more individualised and direct forms of participation. Initiatives such as the Conference on the Future of Europe are said to bolster the democratic legitimacy of the EU because participatory and deliberative innovations could answer such a demand. Crucially, this narrative is anchored in statistical evidence: the public resonance of participatory innovations are connected to (very) large majorities of survey respondents supporting notions such that “citizens should have a bigger say in EU decision making” (Bertelsmann; cf. Eurobarometer) – an empirical proposition that also features in domestic contexts such as the first citizens’ assembly of the German Parliament. 

However, political psychology and public opinion scholarship caution us against straightforward interpretations of this kind of survey data – least to infer strong expectations about the legitimation and trust-building value of participatory and deliberative innovations. Both regarding general statements about citizens’ “say” or “voice” as well as responses to specific forms of involvement such as mini-publics (e.g. PEW), it remains unclear what (different groups of) citizens mean when they react to these questions. The issue is exacerbated in the context of public perceptions of the EU which are mediated by ambivalence, misinformation, and the strong role of national frames for opinion formation. 

How do citizens form opinions on participatory innovations? 

Against this background, my research scrutinises the narrative about the public resonance of citizens involvement in the EU and poses the question: how do different groups of EU citizens form opinions about participatory innovations (PIs) such as mini-publics? While there is a growing body of scholarship that seeks to measure the effects or the external legitimacy of PIs, the state of the literature remains ambivalent: not only is there conflicting evidence but consistent findings e.g. about the influence of demographic or political factors are open to various theoretical interpretations. 

To get a better understanding of the way that citizens form opinions about PIs, I develop a qualitative empirical design that utilises (focus) group interviews to gauge the discourse of participants in three Western EU member states. 32 groups of three to four participants (n=120) were sampled in Germany, Ireland, and Italy on the basis of education, residence (urban/rural), and political vote choice (GAL-TAN). To further address methodological limitations of existing studies, video vignettes were developed which introduce a participatory and deliberative decision-making scenario in a realistic way. 

Fieldwork in Italy: group interviews 

The costly fieldwork was kindly supported by a UACES scholarship, which allowed us to host eight group interviews in the North and in the South of Italy. With my co-author, Elena Pro, we recruited participants in Tuscany and Campania and conducted the interviews in Florence and Naples – with further support at the EUI and Parthenope University. 

With a view to the practical requirements of the research design, I could not have realised the project without the additional support from UACES. It was crucial to travel to the field in-person: Outsourcing recruitment and/or moderation would not only have been beyond the budget of my doctoral research but also methodologically risky in that I would have lost significant control over the process. The scholarship subsidised expenses for two one-week field trips in April and July. 

Funding for doctoral research 

I am grateful for the support by UACES, which allowed me to study how Italian citizens form opinions about participatory and deliberative innovations in the EU. Dedicated research and fieldwork grants for doctoral students are scarce, while the possibilities to collect original empirical data as part of a PhD seem greater than in the past. Digital applications and connectivity lower the bar to implementing comprehensive research designs and the UACES grant allows early-career scholars like me to realise them as part of their PhD.

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