Foreign Policy Blogs

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What is intriguing about the latest military conflict between Russia and Ukraine is how similar both countries are culturally and politically. While many ethnic Russians live in Ukraine, and a fair number of Ukrainians live and work in Russia, their cultural, historical, linguistic and family ties are quite deep. As one of the largest and most influential members of the former Soviet Union, Ukraine made up a good portion of the population and territory of the European part of the former Soviet Union. Beyond having mainstay Russian military capabilities like Antonov being based in the Ukraine and until recently, the Soviet/Russian Fleet in Sevastopol as part of the territory of Ukraine SSR, many mixed families are fairly common. Discussions around the dinner table is likely very intriguing on the current political situation in the past few weeks.

There are many military focused websites putting out their predictions on the result of a possible hot war between Russia and Ukraine. The motivation for theories on these scenarios is likely spurned on by Western media promoting the idea that war is inevitable between the two countries. While I disagree with the inevitability of many of their conclusions, the tactical analysis given is likely true, that the Russian Armed Forces would defeat Ukraine’s Armed Forces in battle.

My impression of the capabilities of each force is that while countries like China in 2008, and Russia have invested more recently in many new weapons systems, Ukraine and the rest of the world have mostly relied on updating late Cold War technologies for conflicts that will never match a Cold War scenario. With the exception of US stealth technology and mostly Russian technological antidotes to stealth and drones via anti-aircraft systems, Ukraine is fielding some of the best late Cold War equipment against Russia’s post-2014 weapons systems. The late Soviet Army was likely the most effective it had ever been in the late 1980s, a concern for any invading army going against a force designed as the best defense force in the world, at least when Billy Joel was at the top of the charts.

Ukraine’s 1980s era tank divisions can more or less be described as the technological parents of Russia’s current systems. The T-64 tank that makes up much of Ukraine’s tank divisions was a model that was considered more expensive and more capable than the T-72 tanks, and were reserved for service within the Soviet Union almost exclusively. While the T-80s that came from the T-64 is possessed by both sides, Russia has more of them as well as the more modern T-72 variant, the T-90, with more modern defensive systems along the T-14 Armata modern battle tank. New technology may prove to keep Russian Forces protected, if it works as it should on the field of battle. NATO
Javelin missiles and Ukrainian Forces will certainly cause notable damage.

While stealth technology is possessed by Russia, much of the makeup of the military structure of the former Soviet Union was to defend against attacks from the West. Trauma from the Second World War created a ethos of integrated missile defence during the Cold War, and while the Soviets were not talented in making Bluejeans, they did and still lead the world on the creation of anti-aircraft radar systems and missiles. Ukraine, while likely being in a weaker position, is still one of the most capable armies in the world and do have possession of many advanced missile systems ranging from the TOR, BUK and S-300 missiles that are a major threat to many modern Russian aircraft. With NATO assistance, Ukraine may have been given some radar technology that can burn through stealth technology in close proximity to ground radars based on the battlefield in Ukraine. Computer systems that can manage a larger number of targets in the event Russia swarms them with drones and cruise missiles may also been distributed to them by NATO allies.

The conflict in Ukraine is really one of posturing against weak opposition to place Russia in a better defensive position physically and politically against the West after the disastrous pullout of Afghanistan and what is likely seen as a weak US and EU. Exporting fuel from North America would likely cause the most distress for Russia, reengage Germany and France in the defense of Ukraine, and put Russia into a more modest position while sorting out some inflationary issues at home. Unfortunately, Western leaders would prefer to choose short term strategies to win small victories in their local elections and play Olympics in places that disrespect human rights instead of uniting their people against real threats of war. It is likely not wise to increase inflationary pressures on food and fuel, while alienating those who feed and heat the local population while asking them to possibly donate their sons and daughters to a future war on the frozen plains of Ukraine. It will be no surprise that the adult youth in your town would rather be working to reduce inflationary pressures with much needed, community inspiring employment. What Ukrainians and Russians do know is that propaganda does not put food on the table, and that Western leaders have not figured that out yet. Plus ca change, unfortunately…

There have been some welcomed comparisons published over the last few weeks focusing on elections and the possible political future of countries and regions as a whole. While some regions can be considered too diverse to compare properly to each other, Europe and Latin America share some political, cultural and structural similarities, albeit applied in very different ways over time. Despite this, various countries and their citizens make political calculations based on their own experiences, ones that differ greatly between regions and countries in those blocs.

It is difficult to compare different Latin American countries on why they vote for a left/right President, as it is to compare Europe to all of Latin America. While many of the political campaigns in Europe focus on their refugee policies, there is a notable refugee crisis in Latin America. Millions of Venezuelans escaping left wing Chavista policies have been accepted into other countries in the region and the United States. It is very apparent in the region, and blunts a lot of support for the more extreme policies of the left.

In Mexico this is apparent, as while they have a left wing President, he still works to support economic measures for his nation for the benefit of all of Mexico’s industrial sectors. Policy conflicts with the new USMCA agreement shows that Mexico has been more assertive than Canada in defending their national interests, and was pragmatic in getting a trade deal even though Canada wanted them to gamble some economic sectors to demonstrate a united front against the US. While Mexico has been assertive in defending their rights under the USMCA, Canada who is now getting locked out of many traditional economic areas that were sacrosanct since the 1960s era Auto Pact. In many cases, Canada often enters the disputes after Mexico commits to a strong response. Coming from the nation that on occasion still prides itself on the policies of Cuauhtemoc Cardenas, Mexico is rightly focused on helping diverse sectors of its economy.

As France goes, so does much of Europe. With elections coming soon for French voters, the world is certainly watching. Polling is currently showing France giving a lot of support to the right of Macron, but as in the last election this likely will not give Macron a loss unless he agitates his citizens and destroys his centrist position. Centrists must not give way to more extreme policies from either wing of the electorate, the ending result is that citizens will vote for perceived stability, as occurred in Brazil.

Also approaching an election, Brazil’s electorate may not have forgotten the corruption that personally affected most citizens surrounding international sporting events before the last election. With the current inflationary pressures and an electoral response to past political corruption against all establishment parties, the result will be of great interest. Noting that traditional parties seem to only have ex-President Lula da Silva of the early 2000s era as an option, recent memories of corruption may unbalance the view of Lula’s Presidency from the earlier era. While his past stance of campaigning from the left and governing from the centre may help, it might backfire unless he can be seen as repairing the complex problems that came from the pre-Car Wash Scandal era.

The reality is that stability eventually becomes the issue of the day, and citizens often pull away from establishment candidates by electing other establishment politicians that will likely get counterbalanced by interests in their countries. Separate from corruption and economic tragedies, most functional systems are naturally pushed to the policy centre by the electorate. For the most part this has been the case in Mexico. The healthier alternative is often to run a country from the centre left or centre right with some varied policies to ensure resulting stability. Corruption and economic collapse in Latin America may have the army try and act as a power broker, or in the case of Europe, have the Russian Army perform a similar task. Corrupt governments end up in a spiral of loss and chaos as they switch between corruption of the left, then corruption of the right, then back again, never truly addressing poverty or injustice.

What can be certain is that no one will benefit from extreme policies by any Government. The reality is that extremists feed off each other to the detriment of noble citizens. In Latin America, no one wants a left wing Venezuela situation as now everyone has neighbours telling them in person what they experienced in one of the most naturally wealthy countries in the world. Extreme type policies in Europe would ensure a far right/left victory. Extremist policies always illicit a reaction and produces totalitarianism. An “other” is always needed, is intentional and is the method of governing by selective oppression. Extremists feed off each other, and it is not unique to Europe, Latin America or any other nation.

They Really Don’t Know What We Want.  Do We?

At the outset of 2022, Russia has troops massed on the Ukraine border and China has heightened aerial testing of Taiwan’s defenses. While Russia and China may be coordinating their challenges, each has its own interest in reducing U.S. influence. China claims Taiwan and Russia aims to exclude the West from Ukraine. America, or its rules-based order, impede the interests and threaten the legitimacy of both. U.S. policy engages them in “great power competition,” but with too little thinking about what are we competing over.  As one for instance, do we value Taiwan as a free country or as a cog “in the defence of vital US interests”? If we do not give a coherent answer we let others interpret our goals for their purposes. If we ourselves do not know, we will keep “moving the goalposts” of our objectives as we did in Afghanistan. We will name incoherent priorities and pursue none fully, in a dissipation we cannot afford. No one will have reason to believe any intentions, much less values, we profess. Adversaries will use that mistrust to weaken our partnerships, rules-based order, and democracy.

America has a clear story to tell. Our nation conceived itself in a creed of rights, equal and unalienable to all persons, and of government to secure them by consent of the governed. In this self-conception, the creed defines our nationality. Betrayal, even by inattention, threatens this base of national legitimacy. Many U.S. interests are at stake in relations with China, Russia, and anyone else. Any nation must secure its tangible needs. But America must keep faith with our creed. Today our mounting self-doubts call us to reaffirm that existential base. Crises like Ukraine and Taiwan challenge our geopolitical position, but also offer a chance for reaffirmation. To conduct ourselves coherently across diverse and confusing issues, to answer the question of what we compete for, we need clarity in why we do what we do. With clarity, specific policies will fit together better than in serial reactions to today’s smorgasbord of challenges. If we orient policy by our founding tenets, we display consistent motives globally, set our international relations on our terms, and exhibit our core convictions to the world – and ourselves.

Parsing the Taiwan and Ukraine crises in light of our creed will illustrate how it could guide policy. Two step thinking is needed, one to stabilize the crises, the next to re-cast our relationships by the new theme. Actual dialogue will mix and mingle the two steps. Events, like an actual attack on Taiwan or Ukraine, could disrupt step two. Regardless of any outcomes, America can reaffirm our core purposes amid the crisis. If that potential fades, this speculation for a long term policy approach offers an image of opportunity for future reference.

Starting with Taiwan, Americans should understand that Taiwan is a free country as we understand the term, not some authoritarian regime with an electoral veneer. Like only a few dozen other countries it has repeatedly transferred power freely and without disruption, between parties of very different outlooks. In its entrenched democratic governance it supports not only elections and prosperity, but a society where individuals have great choice in how to live their lives. It grapples with the same issues, from food adulteration to language and gender diversity, as other advanced democracies. Taiwan displays as full a picture of freedom as any country in the world.  

Formally, U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s autonomy cites an old agreement with the PRC. Even we do not recognize Taiwan as an independent country, and though the agreement with the PRC remains in place, the idea of sovereignty gives China a claim to dominion. Also, our commitment to Taiwan originally supported a dictatorship, and we could squelch a PRC attack easily. Today, that geopolitical stance is outmoded and the PRC has developed a major military capacity. But Taiwan has developed in freedom, so America’s commitment to freedom is now on the line alongside Taiwanese autonomy.

Some policy discourse points this way. A Brookings paper of November 2021 rejects PRC faulting of the U.S. for “’creating Issues around’ China’s policies toward Hong Kong, Xinjiang, Tibet and Taiwan.” The rejection reflects America’s creedal core: “these issues touch American values at the heart of its national identity …” Defense Secretary Austin has also echoed strategist Michael O’Hanlon’s concept of “integrated deterrence,” targeting other PRC interests to discourage attack. This effectively elevates Taiwan as a U.S. priority, as China would respond by targeting wider U.S. interests. And even if we cannot win a war, the U.S. should make clear, as O’Hanlon suggested in an autumn panel discussion, that an attack will mean that U.S. – PRC relations “would never be the same.” We should assume the costs, including to our shared interests with China – and in our stretching of the sovereignty principle. Fidelity to our founding tenets demands this full, first, commitment to Taiwan’s freedom.

AEI’s Giselle Donnelly notes an ideological flavor to Sino-American relations, which a creed-based commitment to Taiwan will evoke. But the Cold War’s ideological conflict does not apply, at least not yet. Containment was waged against “an ’irreconcilable’ competitor presenting a ‘mortal’ challenge.” A zero-sum confrontation can spur one of the rivals’ demise, as happened to the USSR. Adopting that stance before explicitly finding China’s ideology irreconcilable and its challenge mortal will co-opt our core interest to the goal of defeating China.

How do we avoid weaponizing our soul on one hand, or appeasing a mortal threat on the other? The Brookings paper offers a start for a next step in relations with the PRC, calling for “calibrated, monitored collaboration” on our shared interests. If the U.S. names our creed as core national interest, we can calibrate relationships to that standard. Assuming a well-designed rubric, America might assess PRC compatibility with our core interest at (say) “2 out of 10;” and “3 out of 10” before their clampdown in Hong Kong, repression in Xinjiang, and increased social surveillance. The two “points” acknowledge the Chinese people’s rising welfare and the CCP’s public-institutional, rather than clan-based, rule. (North Korea would stand at zero.) Calibrated assessments carry our founding tenets yet respect China’s discretion to choose closer or cooler relations. Assessment should not be used as a rhetorical weapon – we could rate our own conduct on this scale too. Rather, the mechanism would set our long term stance in terms of our creed. If the CCP wishes to reduce tensions, it has clear markers of America’s priorities. If it chooses further divergence, free nations stand alerted. The idea that relations would ‘never be the same’ if China attacks Taiwan becomes more explicit.

Thus we can imagine ways, building on serious thinking, to orient policy by our creed.   But invoking our core national interest only over Taiwan would co-opt America’s identity to the purpose of opposing China. U.S. policies must carry our tenets globally. How should we address the Ukraine crisis?

Ukraine is an independent nation, recognized by Russia despite Russian-installed rule over their territory. Ukraine is also freer than Russia, and freedom doesn’t grow when sovereignty is threatened. That said, the U.S. did not contest Soviet invasions of Hungary or Czechoslovakia. Further, while Ukraine is growing in its democracy it does not exemplify our creedal values as Taiwan does. Freedom House rates Ukraine at 60 out of 100 in overall freedom and rights, where Taiwan rates a 94. Russia is rated at 20, well below Ukraine, but still retains electoral forms and Vladimir Putin enjoys some popular support, while Ukraine still suffers from corruption. It is more to the point that Russia’s aggressiveness poses a wider danger to European security, including that of deeply rooted democracies and others developing toward greater freedom. We must oppose Russian threats to Ukraine but our deepest reason is to protect freedom where it holds sway and support its growth in places like Ukraine. Rules of sovereignty and non-aggression serve this end, and we defend those as much as we defend Ukraine itself.

Russia also cites international rules, for its own reasons. As it took over Crimea and eastern Donbas Putin claimed that Ukraine posed a threat. This claim, however contrived, cites NATO expansion, against the historical backdrop of European invasions of Russia. The West can, easily, assure non-aggression against Russia. If we recast anti-Russian sanctions and arms sales to Ukraine as measures to protect international rules, we open a possibility, after Russia drops its threats, of common ground. We could rebase relations on a concept that Russia shares, however our interests in rules. On that new base we could engage Russia for the long term in pragmatic discussion of security, and still protect and nurture freedom. In that engagement we offer – with our allies – what Richard Haass calls “a diplomatic path (including) … a willingness to discuss with Russia the architecture of European security.” On a shared interest in rules, we would trade that voice to Russia for European democracies’ security and Ukraine’s, and others’, space to grow in freedom.

Before any new engagement, though, Putin  “should first put down his gun.” Our first step, underway as of January, must face him down. The second step aims for workable long term relations with Russia – not Putin’s forbearance. The prospect of that second step might nudge him to adopt a new strategy, but no change will be meaningful if negotiated at gunpoint.

Addressing each crisis for its specific impact on our core interest, we value Taiwan for its freedom rather than as a check on China, and open a possibility for clearer relations with China. We oppose Russian designs on Ukraine not over claims for Ukrainian democracy but by rules of non-aggression – which Russia espouses but which also support freedom. These approaches are illustrative speculations. But America’s purpose demands policy orientation around our core interest, keeping freedom’s ethos safe and vibrant, and leaving doors open even for rivals to evolve toward freedom. Full orientation to our creed names the purpose under any pragmatic dealings and gives substance to our abstract founding tenets. Crises, even as ominous as those over Ukraine and Taiwan, offer a reason to examine our policies, and a chance to realize our premises.

Russian President Vladimir Putin, left, and U.S President Joe Biden shake hands during their meeting at the ‘Villa la Grange’ in Geneva, Switzerland in Geneva, Switzerland, Wednesday, June 16, 2021. (AP Photo/Alexander Zemlianichenko, Pool)

The threat of a Russian invasion of Ukraine has been building for some time, and if recent reporting is any indication, the conflict appears to be coming to a head. If there is any way to avert fighting- now is the moment to bring ideas to the table.

If we are going to consider potential off-ramps, the first thing we need to consider is what each of the parties involved would need to see realized in order to walk away from the table satisfied. 

As the target of a potential invasion, it is simplest to identify the core Ukrainian interest. Ukrainian President Zelensky should be able to walk away from this potential conflict with his head held high if he can protect Ukrainian territorial integrity while keeping the long term prospect of Ukraine joining NATO on the table. The United States, coupled with partners in NATO, have a similar set of interests- prevent Russia from asserting itself as an imperial power in Eastern Europe and maintain the integrity of NATO in order to rebuff the threat of Russian expansion in the future.

Russia’s interest, especially if we are looking to identify potential off-ramps, is by far the most complicated to identify. Putin has demanded a promise that Ukraine will not be admitted into NATO now, or in the future. More than that, the Russian “President” has threatened that if this guarantee is not made, Russia may move to place nuclear weapons in Cuba or Venezuela- comfortably within striking distance of the United States and in clear violation of the Monroe Doctrine. The stakes are very high, for the United States, for Ukraine, and for the world as a whole.

The United States is likely to rebuff these demands, and beyond these measures, Putin has not identified other viable alternatives. However, there is one thing we can say with a high degree of confidence- given the very public nature of this armed escalation, Putin cannot afford to walk away from the table empty handed. Without some concession in the direction of Russia’s perceived security, it will be very difficult to avoid a conflict in Ukraine.

Despite these troubling signs, there is still an opportunity to avoid the worst case scenario. More than that, it very well might be in Putin’s interest to find an off-ramp. Given the slow and public build up of tension over the last few months, the Ukrainian military has had ample opportunity to prepare for an invasion. Coupled with direct military aid from the United States and other members of the international community, Putin knows that a conflict in Ukraine would be far from a painless endeavor. 

More than that, there is no avoiding the fact that, regardless of what happens over the next few days or weeks, NATO membership has become more attractive to other nations in Eastern and Northern Europe. Putin should be wary of this fact unless he envisions Russia as totally incapable of winning allies in the region through diplomacy. In a similar way, there are real questions about how willing individual Russians are to participate in a potential conflict, Putin’s preferences put to the side.

When these factors are coupled with the longer-term economic and political consequences that would come in the form of both sanctions and diplomatic distrust, Putin’s attempt to restore Russia to its historical greatness is at odds with alienating itself from the international community through a potential invasion of Ukraine. Personally, I find it unlikely that Russia finds itself better off in the year 2050 if Putin prioritizes small territorial gains over economic development and diplomatic integration. Perhaps Putin sees that truth as well.

Still, the question remains- what might a potential off ramp actually look like? I suggest that we use the Cuban missile crisis and the example set by President Kennedy as a guide. In order to prevent the potential threat of a Soviet backed Cuba possessing nuclear weapons, the administration employed two key tactics. First, similar to President Kennedy’s symbolic show of force by enforcing an embargo around Cuba, it could be argued that the United States has taken similar measures over the last two administrations by providing direct military aid to Ukraine. 

The second tactic, however, is what truly allowed the Kennedy administration to avoid the threat of a nuclear Cuba- namely, the removal of missiles from Turkey. Even though this agreement was carried out in secret, and despite the fact that the missiles based in Turkey were known to be outdated (in fact, the Kennedy administration was rumored to already be considering removing them), Khrushchev was able to save face in front of key domestic power-holders and protect his nation’s security interest.

I believe that a similar measure should be taken today. The United States should work with Russian negotiators to identify existing American or NATO military installations which, in exchange for a promise not to invade Ukraine, could be shut down or de-militarized. Given the strategic flexibility offered by America’s commitment to a nuclear triad, and in light of the gradual end of America’s wars in the Middle East, I am confident that there are a number of NATO military installations that could be shut down without meaningfully diminishing America’s (or NATO’s) ability to act in the region.

Frankly, these efforts may coincide with the closing of some of the NATO bases that were primarily tasked with serving as launch points for NATO missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. This would mirror the approach used by the Kennedy administration even more closely- removing military equipment that is past its peak usefulness in order to achieve an important diplomatic objective.

Perhaps in order to accommodate Putin’s ego and need to save face domestically, the Biden administration will be asked to make these concessions publicly as opposed to privately. In my opinion, so be it. The American people should be tolerant of that. Given the massive reach of the American military, the United States has an opportunity to present Putin with a functionally “free option” in exchange for sustained peace in Eastern Europe. If the Biden administration can take advantage of this potential off-ramp, or another like it, it would be a huge win both for the administration, for Ukraine, and for the freedom loving world at large.

–

Peter Scaturro is the Director of Studies at the Foreign Policy Association

There is widespread fear of an escalation of the current Russian-Ukrainian armed conflict into a large and prolonged inter-state war in Europe. This could lead West European governments to agree to Putin’s key demand of reneging on NATO’s future inclusion pledge for Ukraine and Georgia. Should this happen, the West needs to compensate the two countries for the de facto broken 2008 Bucharest NATO summit promise. Ukraine and Georgia as well as Moldova can be provided with official EU membership perspectives and an assurance that Brussels will start accession negotiations once the three republics’ Association Agreements have been implemented.

In his yearly large press conference on 23 December 2021, Vladimir Putin has raised the stakes of Russia’s current confrontation with the West. In barely coded language, the Russian President has announced that Moscow will increase its military posture in Europe, and extend its current covert military invasion of Ukraine: “We must think about the prospects of our own security. We have to keep an eye on what is happening in Ukraine, and on when they might attack.” Putin is threatening Europe with a major war in its east, if Moscow’s demand for “security guarantees” from the West is not met.

This request is as ridiculous as Russia’s alleged worries about a Ukrainian offensive. Russia controls the world’s largest territory, is one of the two supreme nuclear-weapons states, and has one of the three biggest conventional armies. It is thus one of the militarily most secure countries in the world. The Kremlin recently extended Russia’s territory and has the capacity to erase the whole of humanity several times. Yet, Putin and his assistants represent Russia as a beleaguered underdog in fear of deadly assault from outside.

Playing Mad

Russian government officials and propaganda outlets are, on a daily basis, hammering into national and world public opinion the message that the Russian state is under an existential threat. Allegedly, NATO’s current cooperation programs and possible further enlargement in Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus are posing fundamental risks to the future of the Russian nation. They are nothing less than “a matter of life and death for us,” in the words of the Kremlin’s official spokesman Dmitriy Peskov.

To be sure, few people outside Russia are buying into the Kremlin’s paranoid narratives. It is not the tale about NATO, however, but its deep resentment that the Russian leadership is communicating. Putin is purposefully signaling that he may be losing his mind, could snap, and might press the button if provoked. In 2018, the Russian president said: “An aggressor should know that vengeance is inevitable, that he will be annihilated, and we would be the victims of the aggression. We will go to heaven as martyrs, and they will just drop dead.”

Having had to deal with Russian imperialism for centuries, most East Europeans will see through the calculation behind the Kremlin’s warmongering. The US and UK too may not be impressed by Putin’s arguments. They might instead note the risks emanating from Russia’s continued undermining of the worldwide regime to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Russia is an official nuclear-weapons state, legal successor of the USSR, and, as such, together with the US and UK, a founder of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Despite far-reaching obligations emerging from this status, Moscow has, since 2014, put the purpose of the NPT on its head. Rather than providing security for non-nuclear weapons states, such as Ukraine, the NPT’s provisions have been transmuted into an advantage of an official nuclear-weapons state. The NPT guarantor Russia has increased its territory at the expense of a country forbidden to acquire atomic arms, under this ratified treaty. Moreover, Ukraine had, in the early 1990s, the world’s third larges nuclear warheads arsenal, but chose to give it not only partially, but fully up, in exchange for US, UK, and Russian security assurances, in the now infamous 1994 Budapest Memorandum, attached to the NPT.   

The fundamental incoherence and blatant contradictions in Russia’s current stand may not impede its psychological effectiveness in Western Europe, however. Among continental European political and intellectual elites, geopolitical naivety about the functioning of international affairs and simplistic pacifism oblivious of the reasons for war and peace are widespread. It is thus likely that various West European publics, above all the German, will eventually succumb to Russia’s shrill demands.

The German Predisposition

Germany is neither a nuclear-weapons state, nor a member of the UN Security Council, nor a signatory of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances in connection with Ukraine’s accession to the NPT, nor an exporter of any weapons to Ukraine. The German government has thus little contributed in the past and little to offer in the future to increase Ukrainian hard security. Instead, Berlin has, during NATO’s Bucharest summit in April 2008 prevented, the start of Georgia’s and Ukraine’s accession to the North-Atlantic alliance.

The opening of the first Russian-German Nord Stream pipeline in 2011-2012 lowered Russian dependence on Ukraine’s gas transportation system. Nord Stream as well as Turk Stream, a new pipeline through the Black Sea that started operation in 2020, have deprived Kyiv of one of its key instruments of leverage vis-à-vis Moscow. The Nord Stream-2 pipeline scheduled to become operational in 2022-2023 would end any Russian future need for Ukrainian gas transportation capacity and fully free Putin’s hands regarding the recalcitrant “brother nation.”

Despite its ambivalent role in Eastern Europe, Germany has taken in the past and may also in the future assume a lead in the EU’s relations with Russia. Traditionally conciliatory German and other continental West European approaches to Russian imperialism could thus again trump more consistent and principled Western approaches towards Moscow. We might soon see a replay of the scandalous Germany- and France-promoted re-admission of the Russian delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE). This controversial 2019 decision was an embarrassing reversal of the initial position that PACE had taken after the start of Russia’s military attack on Ukraine. The Russian PACE delegation had been banned from the Assembly in 2014, and none of the conditions for Russia’s readmission had been met five years later. Yet the delegation again became a full part of the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly in summer 2019.

A similarly awkward West European backtracking could now be in the wings concerning the April 2008 NATO Bucharest summit declaration, in which the North-Atlantic alliance had announced that Ukraine and Georgia “will become” its members. NATO’s enlargement decisions are taken by full consensus meaning that each member country has the possibility to veto the accession of a new state to the alliance. Against the background of their 2019 behavior in the Council of Europe, it is possible that countries like Germany and France will, regarding NATO’s position toward Kyiv and Tbilisi, show now inconsistency similar to that about Russia’s membership in PACE.

Berlin, Paris, Rome, or/and other West European capitals may start sending public signals that Ukraine’s and Georgia’s future accession to NATO is conditional upon Russia’s agreement, or that the Alliance’s 2008 promise to them was not meant seriously, or even that the crucial message of the Bucharest declaration is null and void. Such a signal would cause disappointment throughout Eastern Europe and constitute a blow to the credibility of NATO. Still, such a course of events seems entirely plausible in view of Putin’s manifest determination to keep Ukraine in Russia’s orbit, and against the backdrop of earlier West European dovishness vis-à-vis the Kremlin.

The EU as an Alternative to NATO

If it indeed comes to a new self-denigration of the West and its fundamental values, it would be important that Western Europe does, at least, some reputation repair in Europe’s East. Regarding an im- or even explicit reversal of the North-Atlantic alliance’s 2008 entry promise to Ukraine and Georgia, various forms of bi- or multilateral damage control could be imagined. One can consist of a replacement of a serious NATO accession prospect with an official and written EU membership perspective for Ukraine and Georgia. The offer could be extended to Moldova which is also part of these three countries’ so-called Association Trio within the EU’s Eastern Partnership program, and has, like the other two, undesired Russian troops on its territory. An explicit EU membership perspective could especially smoothen Ukraine’s already third betrayal by the West, in the form of the devaluation of the 1994 NPT founders’ Budapest Memorandum, 2008 NATO members’ Bucharest Declaration, and 2014 demonstrative exclusion of Russia from PACE.

The announcement of an official EU membership perspective for Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova would not be a big step, in fact. The three countries already possess fully ratified and especially far-reaching EU Association Agreements (AAs). The complicated multi-year implementation of the three AAs de facto constitutes a veiled preparation of Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova for accession to the Union. A principal inconsistency of the three Agreements signed in 2014 has always been their lack of a membership prospect. The exceptional depth of the integration of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, via the AAs, into the EU’s economic and legal space, is in contradiction to the absence of a statement on the eventual aim of the vast approximation program that these three Agreements are meant to bring about.

Moreover, the EU’s unofficial constitution, the 2007 Lisbon Treaty, already states, in its Article 49: “Any European State which respects the values referred to in Article 2 [respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities] and is committed to promoting them may apply to become a member of the Union.” There can be no doubt that Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova are European countries. Georgia, for instance, has one of the oldest Christian churches in Europe.

An official announcement that the three associated countries have the opportunity to become full members of the EU would thus be little more than explicating an already promulgated general provision. In substance, it would change little in the Union’s future relations with Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova. Sooner or later, the three countries would have – in case they implement their AAs successfully – received official EU membership perspectives, in any way.

Symbolically, however, an official and written confirmation by Brussels of the EU accession prospect for the Association Trio already today would be important. It will constitute an especially appropriate gesture to Ukraine and Georgia once various West European countries start to soften, subvert, or sneak away from, NATO’s 2008 membership promise. A public commitment by the EU could function not only as a psychological compensation, as well as a demonstrative re-affirmation of Western values and solidarity concerning democracy in Europe.

It could also represent an alternative security-political framework for Ukraine and Georgia, as the EU has recently also become an official defense Union. The 2007 EU Treaty’s new Article 42.7 says: “If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with article 51 of the United Nations charter.”

The EU’s mutual aid guarantee is still a weaker security instrument than Washington Treaty’s Article 5 for NATO, to be sure. The EU does not primarily constitute a military alliance and excludes the US as, since 2016, also the UK as nuclear powers. Brussels prefers to use soft rather than hard power in its foreign affairs. Still, the Union’s considerable economic leverage and conventional military strength as well as France’s nuclear capability mean that the EU is, by no means, a mere paper tiger. Against this background, accession of the Association Trio to the EU would lift the three countries out of the geopolitical grey zone they are currently in.

Taking the Wind out of Putin’s Sail

Such a course of events would force Putin into a domestic and international oath of disclosure. The EU is perceived as far less threatening around the world, including in Russia’s population, than NATO (whose alleged aggressiveness is a misperception too). The Union’s enlargement cannot easily be portrayed as an existential military security risk to Russia. This makes the Union’s enlargement less geopolitically significant than NATO’s. It would be more easily justifiable vis-à-vis Russia whose various political and other representatives, before and under Putin, have made numerous and even today make occasionally pro-European statements.

Geopolitical dovishness and fundamentalist pacifism are widespread in Western Europe, including Germany. It is to be expected that the coming months will see a softening, in one way or another, of NATO’s 2008 membership commitment to Ukraine and Georgia. The consistency and coherence of NATO’s and its member states’ public communication have already suffered in the past. While the Bucharest Declaration may remain formally in place, the alliance’s credibility could decline even further in 2022. An EU membership perspective for Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova can save the West’s and especially Western Europe’s face.

Such an announcement would pose a complicated conceptual challenge, to the neo-imperialist Russian elite. The Kremlin’s appetite for inclusion of post-Soviet states and especially of Ukraine into Russia’s sphere of influence would, to be sure, remain in place. In fact, an EU membership perspective for Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine may be seen as more threatening to the powerholders in the Kremlin than NATO’s accession promise. In view of the high popularity of Europe in Russia, it would suggest to ordinary Russians that the future of post-Soviet states is not predetermined by their common past as parts of the Tsarist and Soviet empires. The Kremlin would thus be as opposed to accession of Ukraine to the EU as to NATO.

Yet, the so-far dominant apology for Russian neo-imperialism – namely, its alleged defensiveness – would become implausible in the case of EU expansion. Conjuring up the image of an allegedly existential security threat to the Russian nation would not easily work regarding a possible new enlargement of the EU to the east. A public offer by Brussels to Kyiv, Tbilisi, and Chisinau of the possibility of a future accession of Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova to the EU would create an ultimately unsolvable ideological conundrum for Moscow. It would revitalize the all-European integration process, bolster the international reputation of such countries as Germany and France, as well as energize domestic reform processes in Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova.

Andreas Umland is an Analyst in the Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI), an Associate Professor of Political Science at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, and the general editor of the book series “Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society” published by ibidem Press in Stuttgart. This article was first published by the French website Desk-Russie.EU.

Expected Coverage of Russian S-500 Missile Systems From Kaliningrad, Central Province and Crimea – Militarywatchmagazine.com

Lemberg, known today as Lviv under Ukrainian rule and Lvov/Lwow under former Polish administrations, was the principal city of the region of Galicia that is now split between Ukraine and Poland. The city of Lemberg was the historical name when that region was under the rule of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. After being part of the front during First World War, Galicia switched hands between several different nations with many of the same residents often experiencing the horrific changeovers, ethnic conflicts, war and genocide. With the end of the Second World War, the region was officially ceded to Stalin’s Soviet Government and many of the residents expelled from their home region. Ethnic tensions were often the catalyst for the various bouts of violence, and were used as a cause de la guerre for regional power politics.

A foreshadowing of further military conflict in the region has been the focus on news reports regarding Russian relations with Ukraine. Russia looks to be seeking a reset of its boundaries in an effort to boost local support for its Government and play on national concerns of historic threats to Russia coming from Western powers. With the end of the Warsaw Pact, nations that were once controlled from Moscow and acted as a physical barrier to Germany and NATO were now becoming part of NATO. This placed NATO weapons and radar systems closer to Russia’s borders. The Ukraine, as one of the largest countries in Central/Eastern Europe, was always a large barrier between Russia and the West. Ukraine was always the focus of Moscow’s leadership in negotiations with NATO, placing Ukraine at a distance when NATO had no reservations accepting Poland, the Czechs or Hungarians into their fold.

Modern Russian expansion policy often takes place for tactical reasons, but is shrouded in claims of ethnic divisions in border regions between local people and local citizens of Russian descent living in the disputed territories. Conflicts between Russia and Georgia were based in this policy and lead to a short conflict. Russia assaulting and occupying Crimea also came from a similar catalyst, but it was well regarded as a strategic move as Russia’s Black Sea Fleet was always stationed at Sebastopol; even when under Ukraine’s Government, and is considered a key historic battle ground for Russia’s Government and people.

With Russian influence waning in Ukraine’s Government after the 2014 elections, Russian support for separatist forces in the Donbas region of Ukraine started to mirror Russian moves on Crimea a few months earlier. While political tactics lead to a takeover without much violent conflict in Crimea, heavy fighting took place between Russian supported forces and Ukrainian Defence Forces in the Donbas region. The conflict spilled outside the region and garnered international attention when Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 was shot down by a SA-11 BUK missile over the disputed territory, killing all abroad while the flight was peacefully making its journey from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur.

News of the larger conflict was reduced when the shooting down of MH17 occurred. In the past, international condemnation of the Soviet Union when its SU-15 fighter plane shot down a Korean Airlines 747 with two missiles lead to a permanent scar on Soviet relations with the rest of the world in the 1980s. This is said to have contributed to the fall of the Soviet Union, and President Putin likely was aware of this effect. Blame for the act was mixed with hidden information and spin, and created a blueprint for hiding the blame for these types of murders by military equipment when it occurred again over Iran in January of 2020.

The focus on relations with Russia changed drastically as Russia gave direct military support to Syria in combatting what they likely saw as fascist elements trying to overthrow the Assad Regime after months of gains by ISIS in Syria and Iraq. The US and other allies rhetorically opposed Russia’s increased influence in the Middle East, but did little to counter it, and coordinated with Russian Forces to avoid conflict and perhaps target their mutual enemy. Power politics in the Middle East shifted with Russian Armed Forces participating in the conflict, and showed that the US and Europeans were no longer to be depended on for full support. The long term effect was not only to legitimise Russian Foreign Policy actions in the region, but also took the focus off the Donbas and made US Foreign Policy appear as it was entering a phase of decline.

With a weak United States after the Afghanistan pullout, Russia is likely taking the opportunity to rearm and renegotiate the terms of its historical deal post Soviet Union in Europe. Russian fuel to Western Europe, combined with their influence in the Middle East and modernising military with S-500 missiles has been countered by US military aid to Poland and Ukraine, but has received little attention by media in the United States over the last few years. The Donbas has almost become a forgotten issue outside of Eastern Europe, and current posturing by President Putin may be successful as Americans would never support sending troops to fight in a muddy field in Ukraine when they have daily local political drama to contend with, to Russia’s benefit. While the value of the Donbas region may be limited to a large country like Russia, the current state of global affairs may the the biggest catalyst for the conflict, and Russia is likely using it to expand its distance from NATO to gain local support. Its a situation that will not be resolved by foreshadowing a hot war, insults, nor lost lives of soldiers or locals, but through appropriate and measured foreign policy measures.

Though much has changed in the years since the end of the Second World War, much of the thinking in America’s mainline foreign policy has remained the same. Many Americans look out into the world as if the United States was the lone nation capable of taking on the world’s most daunting challenges, and, as a consequence, many expect the U.S to address major problems independent of cooperation from other nations. The reality, however, is that times have changed- while the United States remains the world’s greatest power, the rise of China, India, and Brazil, and the consolidation of Europe has given rise to a slowly growing list of nations or blocs that are capable of playing a significant role in true global governance. 

Faced with the prospect of rising powers, including some potential rivals, the United States has two meaningful options. First, the U.S. could choose to face this new reality head on and work collaboratively with emerging nations. Or, second, The United States could ignore the development of these nations and potential partners, instead attempting to carry the same amount of global responsibility with relatively less capacity.

Despite important questions about China’s continued rise, the world is slowly returning to a bipolar, or even multipolar order. Put more directly, the gap in “power” (defined as economic, military and even soft power) between the United States is smaller today than it was at the end of the Second World War, or even at the end of the Cold War. This is not to say that today’s America is somehow weaker than the United States was in the 1950’s or 80’s- instead, it is meant to highlight the fact that other nations have grown more quickly between now and those historical moments.

In light of this, it is more important now than it has been at any time in recent memory for the United States to double down on its diplomatic efforts. India and Brazil have both seen astonishing growth since the 1980’s, and both nations have strong, if sometimes flawed, democracies. It is already important to have cooperation from these nations on global issues like climate change and halting the withdrawal of democracy globally. As these nations continue to develop both economically and politically, it will prove even more important for the United States to have a positive relationship with both countries. 

A similar thing should be said about America’s partnerships with the nations in Europe. The troubling situation along the Ukrainian border proves the value of NATO membership, and it comes at a vital moment for Europe following a changing of the guard in Germany and the recency of Brexit.The United States would be wise to resolidify its commitment to NATO and work to promote a politically unified, democratic Europe. Through close relations and thoughtful negotiations, European partners may continue to increase their contributions to NATO.

While these developments have presented new opportunities, they also present a new set of challenges. China has emerged as a global power with undeniable influence and a global vision that is at odds with the Liberal free-market tendencies of the United States. Russia, though certainly not a rising power, has interfered in American elections and continues to disrupt international norms. Other nations like Iran and North Korea, present threats to international stability in a more acute way. Non-state actors like ISIS present a new sort of threat entirely.

Perhaps it is possible that continued economic development in China creates a middle class that actively desires democracy, as some predicted in the early 2000’s. Maybe China’s economy will stall out, and the famed “Grand Bargain” between the CCP and the Chinese people will collapse. It is also entirely possible that China will continue its economic development in the face of the harsh civic and political repression suffered by many Chinese people. In any event, a strong web of partnerships and alliances for the US could serve to both entice China into better behavior or, at a minimum, deter the worst imaginings of China’s global ambitions. A similar list of potential outcomes could be suggested for each of the other problem areas mentioned above, and in every circumstance, the United States will be more effective having strong and consistent partners. 

I have been careful to focus on the upsides of what could take place if the United States walks face first into the emerging bipolar world, but the downsides of failing to do so can be summarized pretty simply. If the United States attempts to take on the full weight of international leadership without cooperation from a long list of committed partners, it will result in overextension, which could bring about the sort of decline that presents a real threat not only to America’s international interests, but to democracy more broadly.

This is why it is important for individual Americans to participate in elections, and remain informed about important issues in both domestic and foreign policy. The next few decades represent a turning point in so many important ways, as climate change, the retreat of democracy, and the rise of China, India, and Brazil all come to a head. Faced with so much uncertainty and so many opportunities, the United States would be wise to make as many friends as it can.

—
Peter Scaturro is the Director of Studies at the Foreign Policy Association

There are a few tricks to surviving an epidemic of Hyper-Inflation that some have learned in those countries that have suffered from it over the last few decades. Unfortunately, much of it involved being so wealthy that you are able to shift your assets overseas using professional services that are only available to few people, and there being a asset or country where your investments would be safe from the inflationary pressures. The rest of us do not have this kind of access, and are dependent on effective policies to sustain our affordability of food, shelter and heat.

Three policy approaches that are likely to transform the inflationary situation into a harsh reality are already being applied. As you read this, in whatever country you currently reside, you are likely noticing it daily.

When a government begins focusing on a new crisis post Covid, even when Covid is still an effective burden on most countries, there is likely the motivation to change from a formally stable economic and political situation to one that benefits a few individuals. While these late 2021 crises are a surprise to many in the community, they always seem to be characterised by a sensational and immediate problem often not realised during Covid or to any great degree before Covid. They almost always tend to try and bypass any regulatory measures and oversight in the rapid application of these virtual emergency policies. While some of these quick applications may benefit the community, any policy that seeks to work around established policies and laws that were formed over time in a democratic and measured process will almost always fail to a degree, and likely will benefit few in a society.

An appropriate Government measure during a time of uncontrolled and severe inflation is to try and reduce the costs of living for average people. Policies by law should not add pressure to families and individuals that may drive them further into poverty, as it will likely keep them there for many years to follow. They effectively have no consideration for the basic needs of their citizens. Any country that has planned tax increases for any reason at this time of worldwide inflation are likely not going to recovery from it quickly and will enshrine a lost generation. A balanced budget is always important, and a measured response to economic pressures is the principal job of community leaders. If a government doesn’t care about you basic costs of living, they don’t care about your family, your shelter, and in cold countries, your heat in winter. Those who offer policies such as these should not be in charge of taking care of anyone. A policy producing added economic pressures on top of inflation is more often than not a corruption tax.

In the past, most countries that suffered from endemic inflation also suffered from systemic corruption. While inflation is not a direct cause of corruption, the measures to control the regulatory and legal structures of a society can be manipulated during these economic struggles to permanently harm a democratic and fair political, economic and legal system. Everyone worldwide is either in an early recovery phase of Covid or are presently dealing with great challenges due to Covid, and are at a weak point in their personal lives. If a government seeks to change society in any major way while its population is distracted and approaching an impoverished state, they are more often than not doing it for their own political and economic benefit. There should be a moratorium on drastic measures to change a society until we have had a few years to return to normalcy.

The post-Covid era is not much different than other eras where we have struggled, and we strived and reconstructed societies back to stability. There are no individuals who will miraculously better a society when it has had hundreds of years of successful and established democracy and diminished poverty by applying a grand policy at the weakest point held by a society. A country spending more in the last two years, than it has in the last century and through two World Wars is not a country that appreciates it own evolution of freedom and democratic stability. Keep your focus on your leaders, and do not allow them to turn your community into their new projects in the coming years.

If one seeks peace in the Caucuses, then there should be cultural and educational exchanges between Armenians and Azerbaijanis, not boycotts of Azerbaijan.  

Since they declared independence from the Soviet Union in the 1990’s, Azerbaijan has been a strategic partner of the United States.  Although too many Americans may not realize it, Azerbaijan is perhaps the one remaining friendly country that America has in the Caspian basin.  

As a secular multicultural majority Muslim nation that prides itself on its pluralism and religious tolerance, Azerbaijan sent soldiers to help the United States fight against the Taliban in Afghanistan. Furthermore, Azerbaijan has also been a full ally of the United States in the struggle against Islamist extremism, serving as a major transit point for American military supplies to Afghanistan and elsewhere. 

Azerbaijan has also been a strategic partner against Iranian hegemony in the Middle East, as their recent war against Armenia fundamentally weakened Iran as Armenia’s main road to the Islamic Republic was cut off, which adversely affected the mullah’s economy, forcing the Iranians to contemplate creating alternative trade routes.    It is critical to note that only an economically weakened Iran can be convinced to end its nuclear program that threatens the entire world.  Thus, the results of the Second Karabakh War where Iran got weakened in the Caspian Sea worked to America’s advantage.   

Yet following the recent border tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan, American Senator Bob Menendez, chairman of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, called on the US to cut military aid to Azerbaijan despite all of these important facts.  However, to take such a measure would be detrimental to the United States.  

According to the Armenian lobbyist group ANCA, “The amendment (#4177) is one of three amendments to the Senate version of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that moves all references to presidential waiver authority of Section 907, a provision first put in place in 2001, and utilized by successive U.S. presidents – including President Biden.  Section 907 of the FREEDOM Support Act is an Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA) -backed measure that would effectively block U.S. military aid to Azerbaijan.” 

However, much of America’s aid to Azerbaijan very much serves American interests.  In recent days in an interview with Jam News, American Ambassador to Azerbaijan Lee Litzenberger stated that a number of American companies have expressed interest in helping Azerbaijan to demine the Karabakh region and he hinted that this is important for America’s national security as well: “They are ready to invest where there are appropriate conditions, and above all, open tenders.” 

According to him, American aid has been instrumental in helping Azerbaijan to not only demine but to engage in other defensive actions: “Azerbaijan has been provided with appropriate scanners, X-ray machines and other equipment. They are used not only on land borders, but also in the Caspian to protect marine infrastructure and oil platforms. This equipment allows Azerbaijan to protect its coast and its sea borders.”  The ambassador noted that this these defensive measures are important, as they help Azerbaijan to block the flow of drugs into Europe and other areas of the world, and defend the vital oil industry in the region: “We are interested in maintaining stability on Azerbaijan’s borders.”  

Thus, if US military assistance is cut off to Azerbaijan, then this would adversely affect not only demining efforts, but also Europe’s struggle against the drug trade, jeopardize energy security in the region and would weaken the recently signed peace agreement, which would adversely affect regional security as a whole.  It should be emphasized that one cannot build a stable peaceful secure society if any child who strays from the road to play soccer can get killed in a landmine.  One cannot build up a stable oil industry in the region that imports to America and Europe if there are landmines throughout vast areas of the country.  And most importantly, no peace agreement can last if one side is encouraging boycotts against the other side.

If America truly wants to encourage peace and stability in the Caspian region, then they should ignore Armenian calls for boycotts of Azerbaijan’s military and instead call upon both Armenians and Azerbaijanis to build up academic exchanges between both countries, so that Armenian and Azerbaijani students can study each other’s culture and language.  Only via the existence of cross-cultural exchanges like this can the peace last between both sides.  Encouraging boycotts just undermines peace, demining efforts and the security of Azerbaijan and the region, as it struggles against radical extremism.   Thus, I call upon America to continue to support one of its few allies in the Caspian Sea and to ignore the ANCA initiatives. 

A Yazidi Refugee in 2016 in Northern Iraq.

It is not the first time someone like Nadia Murad was ignored by those in an institution, a city or a country when they wanted to make them aware of their experiences. Societies did not develop in an instant, and rights for individuals and within a community took generations to develop. Constitutions and modern states were born after others failed, and even then, people moved forward to improve basic rights and educate others on what being human means. In that process, we learned how to value others.

During those generations, the people that are the ancestors of Nadia Murad endured hardship just trying to survive in what we now refer to as Northern Iraq. In 2021, those who call themselves educators want to make sure that her culture, one of the oldest in the world, disappears from the world by silencing her in a country that claims to be a benefactor of those generations of rights.

Nadia Murad is the United Nations representative of the women and girls of the Yazidi people. Nadia, and those like her are the most brutalised women in modern history. Speaking up about the atrocities endured by her and her people won her a Nobel Prize, but a school board in Canada’s largest city does not want to hear anything from her. It appears that they never understood why Never Again matters. They are the most uneducated group of individuals in modern history it seems, and while this story has gone international in order to shame them into a moral position, in their own country it is not considered that newsworthy.

Should we be disturbed that a Western democracy that was built on the ideas of human rights can treat the victims of Genocide in such a fashion? Perhaps looking at their recent track record of ignoring another Yazidi refugee that was silenced by those who should help her when she ran into her torturer in a Canadian city should surprise us, but it was not a major story. A plan to create a Covid vaccine with China’s military was approved by the Government while knowledge of human rights atrocities against the Uyghurs was evident, but Concentration Camps in 2020 wasn’t newsworthy either it seems. A day that was created to recognise their own county’s past acts of human rights abuses against Indigenous children was ignored by their own leader while he went on a vacation of privilege, even though his own father may had a role in those acts. Could it be possible that these attitudes permeated into the Toronto’s District School Board when they wanted to silence Nadia Murad as well? Sadly, there are many more examples that makes those who are tied to refugees in that country feel unwelcome and unsafe.

The Holocaust Museum in Washington DC was established to not only educate others on how the Holocaust came to be, but also to acknowledge and promote education on other atrocities that have taken place in modern history. The purpose of it is clear:

Never Again applies to all victims of Genocide.

This education is important because it acts as a barrier to future Genocides. Responding by silencing victims further entrenches the act itself, as Genocide is committed to silence and exterminate a people, their culture and their lives. Its purpose is to erase history, and the educators in Toronto responsible for silencing Nadia Murad are re-victimizing all of the Nadias in every community that have ever experienced acts of discrimination and extermination. Ignoring brutality are why Human Rights Atrocities become a reality. The reason why the Armenian Genocide did not stop further crimes against humanity only a few years later is because even in 2021, some nations deny it ever took place.

This concept is so crucial that Germany decided to enshrine Holocaust Denial into their legal system as a criminal act. The German people did not all believe in the tenets of Fascism, but assuming that an education on those facts would be offensive to Germans is to assume all individuals had an interested role in the application of that Fascism. The real offense is to presume their acceptance of falsehoods. Unfortunately, some educators in Canada still do not grasp this concept.

The creator of Mosul Eye, Professor Omar Mohammed lived in Mosul, Iraq when ISIS took over his beloved city. A professor that was ejected from his university under ISIS, he secretly lead a video protest and online campaign to bring hope to the people of his city living under the fascism experienced after the takeover of Northern Iraq. He and most people in Mosul did not accept a life under fascism. Iraqis who experienced what he did are not ever going to silence Nadia Murad or anyone like her. This is true because he is a real educator and a survivor.

The border crisis between Poland and Belarus is more complex than a dispute between two sovereign nations. The extension of the EU border into the former Warsaw Pack area and towards the former border of the Soviet Union was always a source of tension as Poland was seen as a barrier to large armies coming from Western Europe. The trauma of the Second World War on Soviet citizens is notable in foreign policy arrangements since that time, and mirrors much of the history of Central Europe as a bulk-ward against the Wehrmacht, The Grand Armee of Napoleon, and many other historical disputes that placed the Polish people in the middle of wider conflicts.

The resulting Realpolitik that motivated the West and East of Europe to be weary of sharing a direct border with each other placed the Polish people into a revolving wheel of suffering and of erased identity. While the Polish people and culture survived and thrived in the areas known as historic Poland, the maintenance of a nation state was often determined by outside forces, making the Polish people strangers without a nation of their own in their historical homelands. The Poland once ruled by Medieval kings was not the same one that Napoleon stepped foot in, and was still drastically different than the Poland that came out of the Second World War. The end result is that Poland was a nation that often remained nameless despite having a rich culture and history. Poland is one of the oldest nations in European history, but remained absent as a state within Europe for much of the last 800 years.

The irony of citizens from Iraq, Syria and Yemen being trapped between the Belorussians and European Union at the Polish border mirrors much of European history as well as their own. As Poland was always the target of power politics in its region, the people of Iraq, Syria and Yemen are now often seen to be citizens of countries in a power vacuum, victims of political agents at home and now abroad that are used as a part of a larger conflict. When negotiations are taking place between Western Powers and those in the region, a missile launched at Iraq that murders its citizens is not mentioned or considered by any negotiators. Despite being indigenous peoples in their own lands, their nations are always at risk of disappearing due to external factors and foreign interests.

In reality, the conflict on the border is not between the Polish people and those from Iraq, Syria and Yemen. This latest clash has mostly been orchestrated by outside forces, wishing to keep their treatment of nameless nations maintained and who deem inequality as the norm. This is an experience Polish, Iraqi, Syrian and Yemeni people have always shared, and negotiations between these nations should reflect their own culture and experiences, not those of the real outsiders.

Haiti has a long history of natural, political, and human catastrophes. What do Haitians do now?

The Port-au-Prince neighborhood of Bel Air. Photo credit: Marcello Casal, Jr., Agencia Brazil, CC BY 2.0 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:EscombrosBelAir7.jpg

A State Department warning to Americans to avoid travel to Haiti follows the kidnapping of 17 foreign aid workers and family members in a long line of tragic stories from Haiti in 2021. Beginning decades ago but accelerating this year with political unrest, natural disasters, and economic and social problems, any prospects for progress in Haiti seem to be demolished by the next catastrophe.

The political earthquake of the year was the July 7 assassination of President Jovenel Moïse. Moïse replaced an interim president in 2017, who had replaced a president who stepped down for constitutional reasons, who himself came to power after 2010 earthquake that killed hundreds of thousands of Haitians and left more than a million homeless. The fallout from this summer’s assassination of Moïse continues, with the arrests of Columbians and former Haitian police officers, questions about former Ministry of Justice official Joseph Badio, and the current interim prime minister’s connections to Badio.

In August, Haiti suffered an actual earthquake, a 7.2 magnitude quake that killed more than 2,000 people and left more than 650,000 people in need of humanitarian aid.

This natural disaster built on years of similar ones. A partial list includes historic storms in 1935, 1954, and 1963, a series of devastating storms in the 1990s, four major storms in 2008, and Hurricane Matthew that destroyed 200,000 homes in 2016. Weeks after this summer’s assassination of Moise and two days after the earthquake, Haiti was hit by Hurricane Grace. Damaging flooding and landslides also hampered relief efforts for earthquake victims.

These political and natural disasters amplified the ongoing economic and social problems in Haiti. USAID assessed that more than one-third of Haitians live with “severe acute food insecurity.” Even before 2021’s troubles, the World Bank called Haiti the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere and one of the poorest in the world, with a negative growth in 2019 and 2020. Sixty percent of the country live in poverty and nearly a quarter in extreme poverty.

Together, these conditions have facilitated the rapid growth of violent gangs in Haiti. Gangs are not new to Haiti, but they are alleged to act with unofficial “governing powers” in some regions and with extrajudicial violence with the cooperation of government officials.

Drack Bonhomme is founding director of Haiti’s international relations think tank and graduate school, L’Ouverture Institute for Diplomacy & Global Affairs (LIDGA). Bonhomme spoke about these natural, political, and social crises at The Catholic University of America’s Institute for Policy Research (IPR).

“The kinematics of Haiti are catastrophic, the picture is really disastrous,” Bonhomme began. The indigenous people called the island Haiti, meaning mountainous land, and now “the problems are like mountains.”

Bonhomme described natural disasters – especially Hurricane Hazel in 1954 – as devastating the economy. Hazel damaged sugar and coffee production as well as tourism. In subsequent decades, disease and natural disaster, including HIV/AIDS and the 2010 earthquake, have had a continuing series of negative impacts.

Haiti’s political troubles also have deep roots, including the family dictatorship of François and Jean-Claude Duvalier. Haiti today faces an “unprecedented constitutional crisis,” said Bonhomme, where “the three branches of government are non-existent.”

Bonhomme believes the limited international responses to Haiti’s current problems are worsened by the all-consuming nature of the Covid-19 pandemic. The international community is too busy with the pandemic, Bonhomme said, to focus on more traditional questions like natural disasters and political crises.

But he believes there is more that Haiti can do to help itself. First is working with donors and aid agencies to help Haitians figure out a way forward themselves – as the Marshall Plan offered reconstruction aid in postwar Europe based on what each country’s own plans were. Second is to draw more from the successful diaspora. The Haitian constitution limits the ways diaspora can contribute, other than remittances, to the re-development of the country.

But Bonhomme is optimistic. “The Haitian people are very resilient, a religiously spiritual people,” he concluded. There is a “hope within the soul of the Haitian people, they keep looking for the light…and that sense of hope is still shining inside of them.”

Watch Drack Bonhomme’s full presentation

There is no planet B

When Congress makes a mistake in determining important economic policy like setting the tax rate or implementing a new trade policy, the results can be pretty awful. Unexpected inflation might take place, jobs might be lost, and personal savings might crumble. In the most severe cases, these disruptions might result in economic recession, or worse, a more sustained depression. It goes without saying, this can be devastating- on a personal, national, and even global level.

However, in the aftermath of even the most severe of these crises, individual people have proven resilient. We “Keep Calm and Carry On”, as the saying goes. Even when the most sensitive economic policy goes awry, the consequences are usually constrained to economic matters. A mistake in tax policy can certainly cause suffering, but it cannot result in the end of the world.

This principle applies for many of the most important matters in the American political landscape. Immigration, education, healthcare, and of course economic policy are critically important, but our collective resilience allows for politicians to gradually tweak policy to match the nation’s needs and mood. The American political system is designed to process these sorts of changes incrementally at the national level while giving local decision makers the ability to implement policy in a way that suits their constituencies. Put another way- for most things in American political life, policy makers have the opportunity to “muddle through” policy making decisions, honing and (hopefully) improving policy over time.

However, there are some policy matters where tinkering around the edges or “finding the middle ground” simply will not do. Climate change is perhaps the most obvious and most pressing of these. There is a strong scientific consensus, backed by the United Nations IPCC report, that in order to avoid reaching the point where climate change becomes self-reinforcing, the global community must become carbon neutral by the year 2050. This is only twenty-eight years away.

To the extent that the world’s governments and the individuals that they represent ignore these warnings, we are gambling with the fate of the whole of humanity. The idea that we can be protected from the worst consequences of climate change by making only incremental adjustments does not fit with intellectually honest political discourse.

Of course, there is still plenty of room for debate regarding the best course of action to address climate change. It is entirely reasonable to debate if the bulk of the responsibility for addressing climate change falls on nations that have emitted larger total sums of greenhouse gases over time but have already begun to reduce their harmful emissions, or if it lies with nations that are currently the world’s chief greenhouse gas emitters. In either case, it is appropriate to shame Russia and China for failing to attend the COP26 climate conference, and it is reasonable to question the follow-through of leaders like Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi when he pledges that India will be carbon neutral by 2070 despite currently working to expanding coal mining operations.

More than that, it can be wise to weigh the virtues of a carbon tax against those of a cap and trade system in our own country. Local decision makers will know far better than distant bureaucrats if subsidies for solar panels or a heightened focus on local agriculture suits your local community’s needs better.

These questions, however, ask which actions and policies are best suited to address climate change- they are elevated beyond the basic question of whether or not drastic action is necessary in the first place.

This is what separates climate change from the other important issues in American life. A failure to address growing inflation is bad, while a failure to appropriately address climate represents a potentially existential threat. More than that, the action that appears necessary to avert the worst of the harm done by climate change remains fully outside of the Overton Window. Forget actually curbing emissions, the United States gives something to the effect of $14.5 billion in subsidies and tax breaks to oil and gas companies- those subsidies outnumber investments in the renewable sector by 7 to 1.

Democrats and Republicans alike need to make dramatic progress in their willingness to take on climate change if they are serious about the current administration’s stated goal of achieving carbon neutrality by the year 2030. Additionally, American political discourse needs to commit itself to curbing climate change regardless of other important policy making, and regardless of our confidence in the follow through of other nations that are sometimes untrustworthy. Without the United States on board, there is little hope for avoiding the worst consequences of climate change. This is true for the United States even as it is true for Russia, India, and China- however, a failure by any of those nations to fulfill their responsibility does not excuse failure by the United States.

The time is now for us to fully shift the conversation from “do we need to address climate change” or “under what conditions should we make a full commitment to addressing climate change” to “what is the most effective way to address climate change”. Despite this somewhat liberal sounding call to action, this sentiment finds roots on both sides of the aisle. Former Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, “the [global warming] debate is over. We know the science. We see the threat, and we know the time for action is now.”

The time for action is now.

—

Peter Scaturro is the Director of Studies at the Foreign Policy Association

The Economist recently published an article on the overarching power of the European Council, a government body of the European Union that was designed to facilitate the discussion and application of policies throughout the EU. The problem that has always persisted in the European Union is how you can get consensus between so many differing ideas, cultures and interest groups that can be applied fairly and transparently throughout all 27 Member States. Part of the solution has been to reduce the number of voices in the process as not to make it so incredibly cumbersome, but many see this as a move towards systemically reducing democratic values in the process.

My experience studying the framework of the EU at a time when Accession was a major topic of the day was characterised by the expansion of the EU into Central Europe along with the addition of new cultures and former Warsaw Pact nations. These countries accepted entrance into the EU at the cost of what many see as an unfair burden on their agricultural sector and shared economic values. Many of those countries who over the last two generations overthrew the tyranny of fascism and the long slow decline of their societies under the Iron Curtain are naturally weary of outside pressures being put on their societies, and the top down structure of the European Council has the very real power of being able to tread on grassroots movements in Member States.

Countries like the United Kingdom always sat uncomfortably within the EU. This was always the case despite being at the top of its power structure and possessing parts of the UK that were happy to have the support of other regional Governments in the application of policies within the UK and EU. While The Economist article humourously compares the power of the European Council to that of a neo-Monarchic power structure, it was always the case that many English people saw themselves apart from Continental Europe, and were proud of their unique British cultural and democratic institutions and in some fashion had longed mourned their lost Empire. While the irony of the British Government having a Queen Monarch as Head of State would be lost on no one, the British Parliamentary system’s culturally based Constitution, assumed Customary Laws and invisible Constitutional etiquette would be hard to codify outside of British Society, and the grumbles against EU power within the UK was ever-present. One of the major factors that lead to Brexit that is often not spoken on is the feeling that democracy could not survive the whims of those not directly elected representing British citizens in a city with no connection to Britain’s culturally based democratic system. The Queen herself, while having the ability to technically apply Absolute power, culturally is at the sidelines and is well aware that interference in party politics may sour the public to the idea of having a Monarch altogether. This wise balance was not possible with UK representatives in Brussels, and it degraded the idea of Britain being in the EU for generations.

To see what the end result could be from those at the top ignoring grassroots politics and using their power to quell democratic traditions, you only need to look at how Canada’s Federated Government took to announcing policies that would greatly affect specific regions of its own country, in an international forum, and not within the region being affected or even Canada itself. The recent announcement of a cap on energy sales at a time where inflation hit record highs and cost of living is placing many in risk of losing their homes in winter is seen as needlessly aggressive policy. With a closed Parliament and no manner to answer to policy, the British Parliamentary system cannot function when Parliament is closed at a time of major policy development. In addition, ignoring the Customary laws of that traditional system means that people may feel their voices are muted, at a time when life is difficult and leadership is required. As the European Council slowly alienated British voters, no region of the world would tolerate a foreign power limiting their ability to produce an income, afford social programs and have an open voice in their own democracy. To keep a union of states or even a nation united, it should not be able to harm to itself as part of its own democratic system. As history has noted, then it is not really a full democracy.

The “Free Tibet” shoes worn by Enes Kanter

Enes Kanter has reemerged on the political stage.

The eleven year NBA veteran made waves after wearing a pair of speakers expressing support for Tibetan independence. The game between Kanter’s Boston Celtics and the New York Knicks was being broadcast around the world, until the feed was abruptly cut off for Chinese consumers by Tencent, the Chinese media conglomerate that is licensed to show NBA games in the Chinese market. On that same day, Kanter posted a three minute video to his twitter feed in which he condemns China’s repression of Tibet, and wore a shirt featuring the Dalai Lama- something that is considered a crime in China.

Despite backlash from Chinese state media, two days after this first public demonstration, Kanter made another post to his twitter in which he highlighted the horrific treatment of the Uyghurs population in China and damned Xi Jinping as a brutal dictator. In the following days, he has continued to make posts directly challenging Xi and condemning the slave labor that he believes takes place in Chinese reeducation camps. 

I highly encourage each of you to listen to Kanter’s statements yourself.

This is far from Kanter’s first serious venture into politics. He has long been a vocal critic of the Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who Kanter considers a dictator, and wears his arrest warrant as a badge of honor. As a consequence of his political activities, Kanter has suffered a tragic personal cost- his father was sent to prison in 2018. 

Additionally, Kanter has been outspoken regarding his views on American politics. Alongside athletes like Colin Kaepernick and LeBron James, Kanter has participated in protests against racist policing in the United States. Earlier this year, Kanter expressed his support for the Covid-19 vaccine, saying that players have a responsibility to be role models and work to promote public health. 

In order to understand what makes Kanter’s public statements on China so interesting, it is important that we understand the tremendous popularity of the NBA in China. Over 500 million Chinese watched an NBA game last year, and the sport has seen tremendous growth following the popularity of stars like Kobe Bryant, Steph Curry, and Yao Ming in China’s domestic market.

Despite the nationalistic rubmilings that appeared on social media in the wake of Kanter’s comments on Xi’s regime, there is reason to believe that the Chinese people continue to love the NBA and its biggest stars. Some 40 million Chinese fans play the NBA 2k basketball video game, and video recordings from NBA games held in Chinese arenas suggest major fan support.

Given the huge support (through both fans and finances) for the NBA in China, and given the wide-reaching censorship employed by the Chinese government, Kanter’s public position could present a problem for both the CCP and the National Basketball Association. China’s dedicated NBA fans will surely notice that all Boston Celtics games have been removed from their servers, and even in the face of Chinese misinformation many fans will become aware of the censorship. More than that, the NBA stands to lose some $1.5 billion in broadcast rights alone over the next five years if China were to completely ban the showing of NBA games. Kanter’s tweets and sneakers have certainly put a lot of very important people on their toes- this is the benefit of speaking truth to power.

Given Kanter’s consistent support for other types of social justice issues, the NBA, Nike, and other groups that do business with China will have a difficult time ignoring his criticism of their behavior. Dismissing Kanter as a consequence of this particular set of political activities -condemning China- would highlight the inconsistency that groups may have regarding their commitment to human rights- like support for Black Lives Matter.

All of this takes place in the foreground to the 2022 Winter Olympics which will be held in China. There are real questions about how the repressive elements of the CCP will respond to athletes who have become increasingly outspoken about social justice and human dignity. Should China respond in traditional “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy fashion to Kanter’s comments, other athletes will surely take notice, and hopefully work to resist the attempt at censorship. 

Politics and sports have long been interconnected. Jackie Robbinson, Jesse Owens, Tommie Smith and John Carlos, Muhammad Ali, Colin Kaepernick and now Enes Kanter, there is tremendous power when public figures use their platforms to fight against injustice and repression. Kanter’s ongoing activism protesting the cruelty of Xi’s government in China is the next leg in this proud legacy.

—

Please join the Foreign Policy Association today, October 28th, in welcoming Mr. Carl Gershman, who was President of the National Endowment for Democracy from its foundation in 1984 until 2021. Mr. Gershman will be delivering the annual John B. Hurford Memorial Lecturetitled, “Reflections on NED’s Past and Democracy’s Future”.  If you are interested, please register for the event here. 

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Peter Scaturro is the Director of Studies at the Foreign Policy Association

Please join the Foreign Policy Association in welcoming Mr. Carl Gershman, who was President of the National Endowment for Democracy from its foundation in 1984 until 2021. Mr. Gershman will be delivering the annual John B. Hurford Memorial Lecture titled, “Reflections on NED’s Past and Democracy’s Future”.  If you are interested, please register for the event here. 

In August, U.S. President Joe Biden announced his administration’s plan to host the “Summit for Democracy” with the first one set to take place from December 9th through 10th of this year, and the second to take place the same time in 2022. The summit will focus on challenges and opportunities facing democracies and will provide a platform for leaders to make both individual and collective commitments to defend democracy and human rights at home and abroad. With democracy around the world under threat, we are pleased to welcome Carl Gershman, who has championed democracy as the first president of the National Endowment for Democracy. Mr. Gershman will share his story on the founding of the NED and his work for nearly three decades as its president, as well as the important role the NED serves in protecting and fostering democracy around the world. 

BEIJING, CHINA – OCTOBER 25: Chinese President Xi Jinping speaks at the podium during the unveiling of the Communist Party’s new Politburo Standing Committee at the Great Hall of the People on October 25, 2017 in Beijing, China. China’s ruling Communist Party today revealed the new Politburo Standing Committee after its 19th congress. (Photo by Lintao Zhang/Getty Images)

Before getting into any of this, I feel that it is important to say that my intention here is to calm tensions between the United States and China, not to heighten them. I believe that the probability of direct military conflict between the United States and China over the next few decades is relatively slim – over the next few paragraphs I will explain why.

Yes, Chinese President Xi Jinping has begun speaking in a more aggressive, perhaps even Maoist tone. Some say that the attention being paid to Taiwan’s current vulnerability is exacerbated by America’s blunder in Afghanistan. Still, despite these potentially troubling indicators, a closer look highlights a string of mounting domestic problems that China must overcome before seriously looking outward. Xi’s famed Belt and Road initiative has resulted in mixed results at best, and the Evergrande real estate crisis highlights the ways in which China remains a developing economy- especially when partnered with the slowing of economic growth in China over the last number of years. Not yet mentioned are the Covid-19 pandemic,  the horrific treatment of China’s Uyghur population, or the broad repression of China’s social and civil sphere.

Under domestic circumstances like these, it is no surprise that an authoritarian leader will use fiery rhetoric to inspire the domestic base. As Americans are well aware, even stable democratic nations are prone to this type of behavior. A careful observer should recognize the difference between outward facing rhetoric that is meant for domestic consumption and serious international messaging that can be understood as strategic signaling.

Certainly, China will look to establish itself as a diplomatically-influential regional power in Asia. However, even these more modest efforts will run into the challenge presented by the rise of a democratic India and strong American alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, and other nations in Asia. These partnerships short-circuit the idea that China might achieve a military victory without real consequence. With this context in mind, in order to establish itself as a well respected and influential power in the region, China will likely work to pursue diplomatic and economic options, both within Asia and around the world.

Over the last few years, polling shows that Americans have become increasingly skeptical of China- over 85% of Americans view China as an enemy as opposed to a partner. This, in part, is due to the common belief that the United States and China are on an inevitable collision course given China’s rapid rise to power. This idea is known as the Thucydides Trap– coined when Greek historian Thucydides wrote that, “It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable.” This idea is strengthened by the important historical fact that twelve of the last sixteen cases in which global leadership has changed hands, armed conflict has occurred as a result. Notably, the Cold War is not one of those instances that resulted in direct conflict.

To get to the point, we need to consider what China’s prospective rise to global hegemony would actually entail.

First, China’s rise to power would mean that China is able to escape the notoriously sticky middle-income trap. Without getting too much into the weeds, the middle-income trap is the theory that “wages in a country rise to the point that growth potential in export-driven low-skill manufacturing is exhausted before it attains the innovative capability needed to boost productivity and compete with developed countries in higher value-chain industries. Thus, there are few avenues for further growth — and wages stagnate.” Unless China can transition its economy in a way that promotes the growth of a true middle class, the Chinese state might struggle to find the tax revenue to fund its global ambitions.

This obstacle is challenging enough to overcome in its own right – people were asking this same question of China ten and twenty years ago- but avoiding the middle-income trap while inching toward active competition with an entrenched global superpower is unlikely at best. To the extent that the Chinese government is fully dedicated towards supporting economic growth, it might be difficult to seriously expand China’s military capacity- and to the extent that China is focused on expanding its military capacity, the nation would be forced to ignore pressing economic realities domestically.

Second, China would need to overcome the United States as the chief diplomatic partner for many of the other significant powers in Asia. The United States is, however, actively, if somewhat controversially, working to strengthen military and diplomatic ties with Australia. Additionally, despite the occasional bit of turbulence, America maintains close ties with Japan and South Korea. Beyond that still, the United States has long maintained good trade andmilitary relations with India, and the two democratic nations appear much more likely to work collaboratively than competitively.

If we are willing to grant that military action against one of these close American partners is off the table, then China’s remaining route towards increased regional influence is through shrewd diplomacy and increased economic ties. If China is able to win the confidence of its neighbors, so be it. Doing so will likely require increased democratization and economic openness. If China succeeds in this way, it highlights a victory for the values that the United States works to endorse. Still, the United States could work to complicate these efforts by preemptively working to further enhance its relationship with existing American partners in Asia.

And third, China’s rise would mean overcoming the legacy of social and civic repression that has long been associated with communism. If economic growth in China stagnates, the long-standing unspoken agreement between the Chinese people and their government falls apart, perhaps resulting in serious domestic disturbances. On the other hand, if China is able to overcome the middle income trap and establish a vibrant and educated middle class, those increasingly worldly and educated individuals will become less tolerant of social and civil illiberalism.

Nobel Prize winning economist Milton Friedman challenged readers to “find any example of a country that has achieved a large degree of political and civil freedom that has not also used private markets and capitalism as the major way of organizing its economy.” More modern research supports Friedman’s suggestion that nations that employ free markets tend to have more liberal political and civil spheres than nations that do not. In this way, China appears trapped between its aspirations to become a larger voice in the international community and its present unwillingness to liberalize the civil and political sector of Chinese life.

Put more directly- either China will need to adopt policies that are more in line with traditional Liberal values, and follow the proven pathway towards increased prosperity and full acceptance in the international community, or China will need to buck the trend and prove that communism and social illiberalism are capable of out-competing an entrenched global power with a generally free market and society. To the extent that a similar set of efforts failed in the post-WWII years, the spread of the internet and crowdsourced communication makes the burden of enforcing  social repression even more costly.

From the perspective of a believer in free markets and democracy, real fear over China’s rise is filled with numerous contradictions. Either communism and social illiberalism are capable of providing a serious challenge to Liberal nations with market economies or they are not. It is my view that free markets and free people will win out. If China achieves global hegemony by adhering to Liberal principles, so be it.

George Kennan made a similar point years ago while writing the Long Telegram. The United States and its network of allies already has China reasonably well contained in Asia, and given the diplomatic authority that comes with being a leading democratic nation, the United States has already worked to insure that in order for China to rise to the status of peer power, China would need to prioritize its diplomatic efforts and open its economy. These two things would likely need to coincide with increased social and civil liberalism. In this way, China’s rise might ultimately be dependent on its ability to sustain economic growth while gradually adopting a more liberal and democratic state. Without development of this nature, China’s economic growth might stall, and civic unrest may follow in the pattern of the USSR in the 80’s and 90’s.

–

Peter Scaturro is the Director of Studies at the Foreign Policy Association

The are a number of increasing stories about how this Holiday season will be met with shortages of the things that make this time of year precious for many. Crucial things for the holidays such as festive foods and even children’s toys are predicted to be in short supply, brought on by many competing factors no one truly expected. In the UK, shelves and fuel supplies are already in short supply due to visa restrictions yet to mature in the post Brexit era, clashing with the tail end of Covid policies that limited the proper flow of goods and fuel.

The United States is also starting to experience many backlogs as well, with ports and shipping containers being queued longer than normal while waiting to unload their often prompt and measured deliveries. While already a matter of discussion in the UK for a few weeks, Americans are now starting to view the end of the year with some fears of a ruined Christmas. With the product driven Holiday season being driven by commercial backlogs at the time of year when retailers make a good portion of their yearly profit, the post Covid retail industry needs this season to return to profit after two years of shut downs.

Part of the problem for auto sellers as well as many other technological products is the shortage of semi-conductors needed for their production. Production of many items are now done overseas, and a strategic push to increase production cannot be done by one Government alone, nor is possible to coordinate many of these companies without their expressed consent to focus their efforts in improving one national economy. While the push by the US, UK and EU Governments enabled companies like Moderna, Pfizer and AstraZeneca to produce vaccines in record time when needed, it was done inside many countries who coordinated these efforts and had local production located outside their windows.

With much of the semi-conductor market being dominated by producers in Taiwan, the recent military escalation with China may exacerbate these shortages even further. It is unclear why this strategic move by China is being done at a time when consumers in the US and EU depend also on Chinese goods for their markets. The negative affect it may have could finally focus public attention on China’s aggressive policies against Western interests while also limiting China’s own manufacturing sales of high end goods via chip shortages, and lower end goods via shipping delays.

Driving up the costs of everything, when the costs are already high, affects people personally. When you see the price of everything going up rapidly, as you likely do wherever you are in the world right now, you eventually start to ask questions and begin to notice who is pressuring you personally. With Covid still scarring many people’s lives after two unforgettable awful years of this disease, the only focus many have is to get out of a life of shortages and depression. While the messaging on who to focus on has become in a way its own industry, many now see politics as personal to limitations in their own lives.

One can imagine that the outgoing German chancellor is unhappy with her legacy in Eastern Europe. In Berlin as well as in Brussels, Angela Merkel leaves considerable headaches about the future of the post-Soviet space.[1] Above all, many East Europeans in Warsaw, Kyiv or Tallinn are likely to be more or less unsatisfied with Merkel’s heritage. In 2005, Germany’s first female chancellor took office at a time when the political situation in Eastern Europe was relatively relaxed and Moscow was still on good terms with the West. Russia was a G8 member, involved in a special council with NATO, and engaged in negotiations for an expanded cooperation treaty with the EU.

Since 2014, much German commentary has insinuated that nationalist Ukrainians, with American support, have destroyed this former harmony. Discussions of Eastern European geopolitics in recent years have been often debates about Ukrainian internal affairs as well as Western errors regarding the recalcitrant country. In fact, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and intervention in the Donets Basin were merely continuations of older Moscow policy patterns in the post-Soviet space, however. The Kremlin’s neo-imperial ambitions that have become manifestly evident in 2014 were earlier observable in its policies regarding, among other countries, Moldova and Georgia.

A paradoxical legacy

In late 2021, Europe’s most important and experienced politician by far will leave her government post at a time when not only most Russian partnerships with Western organizations and states have ended, been damaged, or frozen. Today, Moscow is – as it was before the February Revolution of 1917 or before the late Soviet democratization of 1987 – once again in a fundamental normative conflict with the West. The Kremlin’s new aggressiveness vis-a-vis liberal democratic states has been expressing itself by, among other things, Russian subversion of Western political processes, such as Moscow’s interventions in the presidential elections of the United States in 2016 and – less successfully – of France in 2017.

In particular, old and new confrontations between Russia and its post-Soviet neighbors – most notably territorial disputes with Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova – continue to simmer until today. Moscow is also highly present in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, while the EU, involved in the South Caucasus with a special Eastern Partnership program, has since the second Karabakh War of 2020 played only an observer role. The signs in Russian-Ukrainian relations are once again pointing to a storm. In the worst case, an open inter-state war could break out between Europe’s two largest territorial states. To what extent can Merkel be blamed for the manifest failure of Germany’s and the EU’s Russia and Eastern Europe policies over the past decade and a half?

The paradox of the outgoing chancellor’s apparent failure is that her biography before she took office and her commitment to Eastern policy since 2005 suggested rather good things to come. Merkel was more prepared than any other leading German politician for the challenges facing the Federal Republic and the EU after the end of the Cold War in Eastern Europe. Having grown up in the former GDR, the future chancellor had lived in the Soviet Union as a visiting student and learned Russian. In 1989-1990, she participated in the Velvet Revolution in East Germany. Merkel understood better than most other Western politicians the upheavals in the post-Soviet space of the last twenty years, such as the Georgian Rose Revolution of 2003 or the two Ukrainian uprisings of 2004 and 2013-2014.

As a convinced European and Atlanticist, as well as balancing force within the EU, Merkel has earned a high reputation among Germany’s Western partners. For these and other reasons, the chancellor was able to take an unchallenged leadership role in shaping Western relations with Russia after 2014. Since then, she has been particularly deeply involved in with the lowering of political tensions in Eastern Europe and, above all, with the Russian-Ukrainian war. Despite these and other favorable omens, the Federal Republic’s and EU’s policy toward Russia today stands before shattered remains.

To be sure, the Merkel period also saw a number of achievements in post-communist Southeastern Europe, such as the accession of some Balkan countries to the EU and NATO. The three particularly large EU association agreements concluded in 2014 with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine can also be considered successes. However, much of this progress can only be attributed to limited extent to the German government in general and Merkel’s activities in particular. At best, the chancellor can be credited with the fact that her high level of commitment to eastern policy and her enormous diplomatic engagement in trying to resolve the Russian-Ukrainian conflict since 2014 have prevented worse.

The measure of German responsibility

Are the many good preconditions, intentions, and activities of the German chancellor from 2005 to 2021 sufficient to absolve Germany from all responsibility for the serious domestic and foreign policy aberrations in the post-Soviet space during the past decade and a half? Was the Federal Republic, in the face of major geopolitical shifts outside Berlin’s competence, condemned to a secondary and mediator role, form the outset, that Merkel then filled as best she could? Were the Germans willy-nilly doomed to be spectators of fateful international macro-trends in Eastern Europe that Berlin could have neither hoped to prevent nor been able to steer?

Such flight from liability contradicts the high political influence, international prestige, and economic weight of the Federal Republic in Europe. In addition, the EU – and within the Union, Germany – continues to play a key role in Russia’s foreign trade and thus in the composition of her state revenues, economic subsidies, political rents, and bribery circuits. These and other internal and transnational Russian cash flows are fed primarily by profits from huge exports of Siberian energy to Europe.

For these and other reasons, Germany is a rather large elephant in the East European china shop. It would be inappropriate for Berlin to merely point the finger at other actors in Washington, Kyiv or Brussels to explain why so much has gone wrong in the post-Soviet space over the past decade and a half. A German middle finger to the East is also inapt in view of the World War Two history of, for instance, Ukraine. So why did Merkel’s combination of large experience, considerable wisdom and notable efforts with Germany’s political, cultural and economic power not produce better results in post-Soviet Eastern Europe?

In Germany’s mishandling of Moscow, three Berlin policy decisions stand out that set German-Russian relations and Ostpolitik on a wrong path early before or early on in Merkel’s 16-year chancellorship. These are a German invitation to Putin to speak in the Bundestag in 2001, the start of the infamous Nord Stream projects in 2005, and the unfortunate treatment of Georgia in 2008. The strange tragedy of Merkel’s Ostpolitik was that the highly intelligent and committed chancellor showed herself incapable of departing from the wrong track in Germany’s Russia policy that Berlin had already taken before she took office. It is symptomatic that none of the early German mistakes vis-à-vis Moscow was directly related to Ukrainian affairs, yet that the conflict surrounding Ukraine since 2014 has been marking the fiasco of Germany’s Ostpolitik in the new century.

A fateful Bundestag appearance

Berlin made a momentous blunder long before Merkel came to power and early on in the succession of Putin’s reigns of, so far, two premierships and four presidencies. In September 2001, the Federal Republic’s government invited Russia’s newly minted second president, Vladimir Putin, to address the assembled Bundestag. No other Russian head of government or state has ever received such an honor. This was true for Mikhail Gorbachev as indirectly elected USSR President of 1990-1991 as well as for Boris Yeltsin as the first Russian head of state elected by the people ruling from 1991 to 1999 and for Dmitry Medvedev who was Putin’s liberal stooge in the presidential office in 2008-2012. In light of their world views, these three presidents would have all been more worthy speakers to the German parliament than Putin. At least Gorbachev spoke, as a private citizen, in the Bundestag in 1999 – long after his departure from politics. 

Taken on its own, Putin’s relatively pro-Western 2001 Bundestag speech, delivered in German language, was largely uncontroversial to be sure. But the circumstances surrounding his effective performance in Germany’s national parliament were dubious. The Bundestag reacted with ovations to the courtship of a Russian politician who, as a KGB officer in Dresden, had only a few years earlier been part of Moscow’s occupation machinery in Eastern Germany. Even more worrisome was that Putin had gotten an invitation to speak and was celebrated in Berlin at a time when Russian forces stood illegally in another country.

Unwanted Russian troops were stationed in the Transnistrian region of Moldova during Putin’s 2001 visit to Berlin.[2] They had been there ever since the disappearance of the USSR in 1991, and until today remain illegally in Moldova. In 1994, Moscow had agreed to withdraw its military from Transnistria in a bilateral treaty with Chişinău after it had, in 1992, unlawfully intervened in an internal Moldovan conflict. At a November 1999 OSCE summit, at a moment when Putin was as prime-minister already de facto ruling Russia, Moscow committed itself once more, in the multilateral so-called “Istanbul Document,” to withdraw its remaining troops from Transnistria.

This had not happened, however, by the time Putin gave his speech to the Bundestag in 2001. Nor was there any indication that Moscow would any time soon fulfill its bi- and multilateral obligations vis-à-vis the non-aligned Moldovan state. Merkel attempted to reach a solution to the Transnistrian problem with then-President Medvedev in 2010-2011 as part of the so-called Meseberg Process. However, Merkel’s considerable efforts were unsuccessful. That was because Putin – and not the relatively pro-Western Medvedev – continued to hold the reins of power in Moscow, as Russia’s prime-minister during 2008-2012.

Another questionable aspect of the invitation to the Bundestag was that it happened after Putin had, in September 1999, broken off the Second Chechen War with thousands of civilian casualties. Moscow started this war against the backdrop of some strange terrorist attacks in central Russia after Putin had taken over the chairmanship of the Russian government in August 1999. Apparently, these apartment bombings that were used to justify Putin’s escalation in the North Caucasus had been orchestrated by the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB). As detailed in books by John B. Dunlop, Yuri Felshtinsky, Alexander Litvinenko, Vladimir Pribylovsky, and David Satter, the FSB as the KGB’s main successor organization, headed by Putin until then, had blown up several Russian residential houses.[3]

The cold-blooded mass murder of over three hundred Russian civilians was intended to provide Putin, who had just advanced from the position of FSB Director to that of Prime-Minister, with a pretext for a punitive action against separatist Chechens. Above all, the new head of government and future president was to be given a propaganda template for his incipient accumulation of power in Moscow. Notwithstanding such and other disturbing developments from 1999 onward, the Russian head of state was publicly celebrated two years later in the German parliament by most of the deputies present.

The considerable domestic and foreign policy regressions under Putin, already visible by September 2001, were not a topic of his visit to Germany, to be sure. This omission constituted exactly the problem of Putin’s appearance in the Bundestag and his talks in Berlin at the time. The invitation of the German parliament as well as the reaction of the MPs to Putin’s speech sent a fatal signal to Moscow: Ongoing violations of international and human rights are of secondary importance when it comes to the relationship between the two largest nations of Europe. The chemistry between Moscow and Berlin is more important than the principles laid down in such documents as the 1975 Helsinki Final Act or 1990 Charter of Paris. At least that is how many Russian politicians and diplomats have seemingly understood Berlin’s loud silence on Transnistria and Chechnya in 2001. East-West trade, good personal relations, and fair-weather rhetoric take precedence over Western values, the international order, and European security.

Against this backdrop, a bit of so-called Russland verstehen (Russia understanding) would be appropriate. In light of the applause for Putin in the Bundestag in 2001, one can understand that Moscow was surprised in 2014 when Berlin suddenly displayed a certain firmness regarding Russia’s attack on Ukraine. Why could to Crimea and the Donbas not the same principles be applied as to Transnistria, Abkhazia or South Ossetia (on which more below)? The latter territories were, after all, of much lesser interest to Moscow than the former.

How exactly is the Kremlin supposed to understand the German political class when comparing its reaction to the relatively similar Moldovan and Ukrainian situations of 2001 and 2014, respectively? The Bundestag applauded a Russian president when Moscow troops stood illegally in Transnistria and after they had killed thousands of civilians in Chechnya. Yet, for more than seven years now, Berlin has been supporting EU sanctions in response to Moscow’s activities in Crimea and the Donets Basin. These regions are more obviously part of the “Russian World” than Transnistria which is far away from Russia. “Where is the much-vaunted German stringency and logic?” some in the Kremlin may have asked themselves.

Berlin’s destructive pipeline policy from 2005 onwards

A second fateful decision by Berlin that predetermined the eastern policy of Merkel’s chancellorship was made in 2005, around the time she took office. In the final weeks before the end of Gerhard Schröder’s term as Federal Chancellor as well as in the months that followed, the first Nord Stream project was initiated. Schröder’s subsequent employment by Gazprom (and later Rosneft) and the, since then, massive propaganda of Europe’s allegedly dire need for Russian undersea pipelines set the course for Merkel’s future Ostpolitik. These developments created legal, informal, and discursive frameworks at the beginning of Merkel’s reign that had a lasting impact on her approach to Russia. The serious repercussions of these early decisions continue to shape the German foreign economic and policy debate as well as Berlin’s relationship with Moscow as well as Warsaw, Kyiv or Vilnius until today.

The underwater projects initiated by the outgoing Chancellor Schröder in 2005 and subsequently promoted in his function as chairman of the supervisory boards of Nord Stream and Nord Stream 2 were resolutely implemented despite their energy redundancy. In the apologetic narratives, the projects are presented partly as purely commercial, partly as clever geo-economic, and partly even as smart security policy initiatives. Such stories have broad appeal, even though the ridiculous overcapacity for transferring Siberian natural gas to Europe and serious geopolitical consequences of the new pipelines are now readily apparent.

Reducing Moscow’s crippling dependence on the Ukrainian gas pipeline system by commissioning the first two Nord Stream strings in 2011-2012 was from the outset more than a new Russian foreign trade strategy. As misleading as the thesis of an alleged need for the Nord Stream projects for European energy security was and is, as real was and is the need for the Kremlin to reduce Ukraine’s role as a transit country for Siberian and Central Asian gas flowing into the EU. Only the partial achievement of this goal with the full start of operation of the first Nord Stream pipeline in October 2012 made it possible to continue in Ukraine the Russian policy revanche for the collapse of the USSR, which had been previously implemented in Moldova and Georgia, now also in Ukraine.

Gazprom’s alternative, available from late 2012, of bypassing Ukraine for much of its export to the EU was not a sufficient condition, but a necessary one, for the subsequent increase in Russian aggressiveness toward Ukraine. The Kremlin’s new intransigence manifested itself even before the Euromaidan revolution began. Over the course of the last peace year of 2013, there were a number of belligerent signals and actions by Moscow vis-a-vis Kyiv.

For example, in August 2013, the Kremlin imposed a complete and mutually losing blockade of all trade between Ukraine and Russia that lasted several days. Moscow’s escalating rhetoric and sanctions policy led to rising tensions in Russian-Ukrainian relations before the Kyiv protests began in late 2013. This occurred even though Ukraine was still under an explicitly pro-Russian leadership with then-President Viktor Yanukovych and Prime Minister Mykola Azarov (an ethnic Russian), and their imminent loss of power was not yet in sight. The pro-Russian president was removed from office not by the Maidan revolutionaries, as is often collocated, but after the street fighting had ended, by the Ukrainian parliament on February 22, 2014, which until then had been loyal to Yanukovych, on February 22, 2014.

In response to Yanukovych’s ouster, Moscow shifted its Ukraine policy to the strategy it had pursued years earlier vis-à-vis Moldova and Georgia. Following years of rhetorical, political, and economic attacks on Kyiv, Moscow began a partly military, partly paramilitary intervention and occupation of Ukraine in February 2014 on Crimea and in March 2014 in the Donets Basin, as it had done earlier in Transnistria, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia.

It is surprising that to this day many Western interpreters of Putin fail to recognize the regularity in the Kremlin’s behavior. Despite the older examples of Moldova and Georgia, some commentators known as experts on Eastern Europe, insist on an alleged exceptionality of the Ukraine case as well as key role of wrong EU policies for the escalation in Eastern Europe in 2014. Long before Russia’s attack on its Western-oriented brother state, the republics of Moldova and Georgia did not need to be parts of Eastern Slavic culture or involved in association negotiations with Brussels for a receipt of military punishment by the Kremlin. The two post-Soviet republics had lost control of larger portions of their state territories in the 1990s than Ukraine did in 2014. Chişinău and Tbilisi met their sad fate earlier than Ukraine in 2014, allegedly incited by radical nationalism and Western stupidity.

What is also perplexing about the Berlin debate on the dramatic deterioration in Russian-Western relations since 2014 is that the obvious historical parallels to the results of the New Ostpolitik of the 1970s remain in the background. In 1970, Bonn concluded the largest West German-Soviet financial deal to that date with the Kremlin in the form of the Röhrenkredit-1. Nine years after this agreement to build new gas pipelines, Moscow invaded Afghanistan in December 1979. The Soviet intervention ended the relative détente of the 1970s and ushered in a period of tension in international relations 1980-1985.

The first Nord Stream agreement in 2005 launched Europe’s largest infrastructure project to date at the bottom of the Baltic Sea. Nine years after the German-Russian agreement, Moscow invaded Ukraine in 2014. To be sure, as in the 1970s, today also other developments around the world are disrupting the West’s relationship with the Kremlin. But Moscow’s military intervention in a neighboring country was a major factor in the rise of its tensions with the West in both 1979 and 2014.

One could spin this story into a forecast for the near future of Eastern Europe: In 2015, the Nord Stream 2 deal was concluded. If we add nine years – following the formula of 1970+9 and 2005+9 – to this figure, we arrive at 2024, a year in which not only the currently valid Russian-Ukrainian gas agreement will expire. The regular presidential elections of both Russia and Ukraine are scheduled for 2024. Notorious Russian TV propagandist Dmitry Kiselyov might comment such quirks with his famous conspiracy formula “Sovpadenie? Ne dumaiu!” (“A coincidence? I don’t think so!”).

There is more to such parallels than providing an opportunity for ironic oracles. Moscow’s interventions in Afghanistan in 1979 and in Ukraine in 2014 illustrate the limited effectiveness of Germany’s allegedly new Ostpolitik. The eventual repercussions of large-scale energy projects contradict the pacifist claims of the interdependence theory usually invoked to justify lucrative business ventures with authoritarian states. Not peace, but wars of expansion and escalation of tension followed the 1970 and 2005 starts of Berlin’s mammoth energy projects with Moscow in 1979 and 2014.

The well-known German formula of “Annäherung durch Verflechtung” (“rapprochement through entanglement”) has taken on a meaning that goes beyond a mere metaphor, in recent years. Germany and the Russian sphere of control have since moved closer together not only economically and politically, but also geographically. The almost fateful correctness of Berlin’s popular interdependence formula is confirmed by the fact that not only economically intertwined countries are moving closer together. As practice shows, the reverse conclusion of this law of international relations is also true. Those new gas volumes which since 2011 – via the Baltic Sea – have brought Germans and Russians ever closer together, are correspondingly lacking for the maintenance of Russian-Ukrainian proximity.

As both interdependence theory and the entanglement formula predict, not only does the development of economic ties lead to more peaceful relationships between the countries involved. A parallel reduction of economic ties with third countries may mean less peace for them. As a result of Germany’s increasingly deep energy interdependence with Russia since 2005, the transit states for Siberian gas flows that were simultaneously disentangled suffered a reciprocal alienation from Moscow. In particular, Ukraine’s economic untying from the Russian Federation after completion of the first Nord Stream pipeline in late 2012 led to an increase of tensions between the two countries during 2013. Ultimately, this escalation led to Moscow’s occupation of first southern and then eastern Ukrainian state territory in 2014.

The relative gain in national security from the Nord Stream projects is small for Germany as a NATO state that is located far away from Russia. In contrast, the equivalent reduction of Russia’s dependence on its former colony and neighbor state Ukraine proved be fatal for the integrity of the latter. The all-European loss of stability as a result of Moscow’s Crimea annexation and Donbas intervention in spring 2014 far exceeds the marginal security gains for the EU from the completion of the first Nord Stream pipeline.

While Merkel bears little responsibility for the ill-fated Bundestag invitation to Putin in 2001, she is partly to blame for the Nord Stream projects and their consequences. Merkel may have been no longer able to prevent the completion of the first Nord Stream pipeline in 2012, if she ever to wanted to do that. But the start of construction of Nord Stream-2 in 2015 is a puzzle and creates an impression of cognitive dissonance in Berlin: Had the Kremlin not made its intentions sufficiently clear with regard to Ukraine in 2014?

The double error regarding Georgia in 2008

In 2008, Berlin made two further mistakes that – in contrast to the two Nord Stream projects – have been hardly discussed in Germany, with regard to Georgia. The German signals sent to Moscow at that time were to have far-reaching consequences for Russia’s Ukraine policy, as had been the case with the Bundestag’s invitation to Putin in 2001 and the signing of the Nord Stream contract in 2005. Germany’s double snub of Tbilisi within a year added to the impression already created in Moscow that Berlin tacitly respects Russian hegemony in most of the post-Soviet space.

When Georgia and Ukraine jointly applied for NATO membership in early 2008, they were in different starting positions. In Georgia, more than two-thirds of the population at the time supported the country’s entry into the North Atlantic alliance. At the same time, in Ukraine, nearly two-thirds still opposed NATO membership – a Ukrainian attitude that turned into its opposite only after the Russian attack in 2014.

Also, unlike Ukraine at the time, Georgia had not been a fully sovereign state for some time in 2008 and had sustained troubled relations with Russia. In the regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali – also known as “South Ossetia” – Moscow had already installed separatist satellite regimes in the 1990s that control approximately 20 percent of Georgian state territory. (The Ukrainian territories that came under official or de facto Russian control in 2014 are larger in area than the corresponding Georgian parts of the country; however, they account for only about 7 percent of Ukrainian state territory in total.)

Last but not least, preparations for NATO membership in Georgia were already advanced in early 2008. They had begun the usual process of reforming a country before joining the alliance. At that time, Kyiv had also already fixed the goal of NATO membership in law, to be sure. In 2003, Ukraine’s Law on the Fundamentals of National Security – adopted under pro-Russian President Leonid Kuchma and Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych – stipulated not only accession to the EU but also to the Atlantic Alliance as a state goal. However, the corresponding transformation of the Ukrainian army and legislation by the time of the NATO Summit in April 2008 lagged even further behind the results of the impressive Georgian reform successes.

Against this background, the Bucharest NATO summit marked another unfortunate milestone in Western policies towards the post-Soviet area which was largely due to Berlin’s influence in the alliance and was, above all, Merkel’s doing. During the controversial internal Western deliberations on the alliance’s reaction to the two membership applications in the Romanian capital, Berlin could have proposed a differentiated treatment of Georgia’s membership application as well as that of Ukraine as a compromise. Instead, Germany insisted on a de facto rejection not only of Kyiv’s membership application but also of Tbilisi’s.

Georgia’s advanced preparation for NATO membership could have been rewarded in 2008 with the start of a so-called Membership Action Plan. This would have brought the country directly under the influence of the West and swiftly into the alliance. In the Georgian accession agreement, the non-government-controlled regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali could have been exempted from the Washington Treaty’s mutual assistance Article 5, as is the case for special territories of old NATO member states, such as the United States (Guam, Hawaii), the United Kingdom (Falklands) or France (Reunion). Also, a military reconquest by Tbilisi of the de facto Russian-controlled parts of Georgia could have been ruled out.

Instead, the NATO member states agreed on a contradictory compromise formula for the final declaration of the 2008 Bucharest summit. The alliance did explicitly state that Georgia and Ukraine “will become members.” However, there was no indication of when or how the officially announced entry of the two post-Soviet states into the alliance would actually occur. It remained unclear on what conditions the accession processes of Georgia as well as Ukraine would depend and whether they would proceed in a package or separately. The middle ground the alliance found in 2008 was ultimately worse than an outright and official rejection of Georgia’s and Ukraine’s applications would have been. The membership pledges distracted Kyiv and Tbilisi from pursuing other security-enhancing strategies and created a sense of urgency in Moscow.

The Kremlin intensified both its Georgia and Ukraine policies in response to the Bucharest NATO summit. While Moscow still had sufficient levers of domestic political influence in Ukraine at the time, Georgian domestic politics was already happening largely autonomous. Therefore, in early summer 2008, Putin thawed the frozen conflict in the Tskhinvali region thereby provoking a hasty response from then President of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili and the Russian-Georgian Five-Day War. The Russian invasion of Georgia was ended by the so-called Sarkozy Plan. In the EU-brokered cease-fire agreement, Russia committed in mid-August 2008 to withdraw its regular troops that it had stationed in the Tskhinvali and Abkhaz regions during previous week.

However, in the following weeks, months and eventually years, the Kremlin repeated regarding Georgia its older, above-described pattern of behavior toward Moldova. As in the case of the bilateral and multilateral documents signed by Russia regarding Transnistria in the 1990s, Moscow did not implement the Sarkozy Plan of 2008. In violation of the treaty, Russia left its troops on Georgian territory.

Moreover, the Kremlin transformed the two Georgian separatist regions into the pseudo-states of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Unlike the so-called “Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic” (and later the “Lugansk” and “Donetsk People’s Republics”), Russia even recognized its two satellite regimes on Georgian territory as independent countries; the two quasi-states were also recognized by Venezuela, Nicaragua, Nauru, Syria and Vanuatu. With Moscow’s official confirmation of the statehood of the Russian artificial entities in northern Georgia, the Kremlin went beyond its previous neighborhood policy and entered new territory in its foreign policy and interpretation of international law.

Had a NATO Membership Action Plan begun with Georgia in April 2008 and the country been admitted to the alliance by August 2008, both Moscow and Tbilisi would have behaved differently in the summer of that year. The Kremlin’s risk calculation regarding a NATO accession candidate or member state would have been different. It is likely that the Kremlin’s approach to Georgia would have instead aligned with its patterns of behavior toward the Baltic republics. The Georgian leadership, in turn, would also have been in a different behavioral mode during an ongoing accession process with NATO or after obtaining membership in the alliance; such a context would have limited Tbilisi’s reaction radius regarding Russian provocations.

Instead, NATO – largely at the instigation of Berlin – sent a risky signal to the Kremlin in April 2008. According to the German implicit message, even elementary security interests of Russia’s neighbors who are pro-Western but not integrated with the West are secondary to the Kremlin’s preferences. With its Georgia policy in 2008, Merkel’s government reaffirmed an impression that Berlin had already left on Moscow in 2001 under Schröder with its neglect of Moldovan security interests. For Putin & Co., this – it can be assumed – established a pattern of reassuring continuity in Germany’s eastern policy behavior under different governments.

Worse, Moscow’s manifest violation of the Sarkozy plan and military dismemberment of Georgia into three states officially recognized by Russia remained inconsequential for the Kremlin. Brussels ended the already minimal European sanctions imposed to punish Russia for its war in the North Caucasus. The EU continued its negotiations of a new cooperation treaty with Russia, which had been interrupted in August 2008.

Germany went even further. At the 8th St. Petersburg Dialogue conference from September 30 to October 3, 2008 – i.e. only a few weeks after the Russian-Georgian war and shortly after Moscow’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia – a “Joint Declaration of the Petersburg Dialogue on Shaping the Partnership for Modernization” was signed by the Chairman of the German Steering Committee of this bilateral organization, Lothar de Maizière, and by the Deputy Chairwoman, Liudmila Verbitskaia, the Rector of St. Petersburg University, i.e. Putin’s alma mater. In 2010, the initially German project of a so-called Modernization Partnership with Russia was elevated to the European level and adopted by both the EU and subsequently many member states.

Curiously, after Russia’s invasion, bombing and dismemberment of Georgia, relations between Berlin and Brussels, on the one hand, and Moscow, on the other, did not cool down but warmed up. Of course, the German and other Western European advances toward the Kremlin did not contain any explicitly affirmative signals regarding Russia’s violations of international law and human rights in Moldova, Chechnya or Georgia. On the contrary, both Berlin’s and the EU’s so-called Strategic and Modernization Partnerships with Moscow officially aimed to bring Russia closer to Europe in normative terms by means of hoped-for positive political after-effects of an economic rapprochement.

However, Berlin’s noble intentions and strategic calculations were misguided, as we now know. From the outset, they could not compensate for the high costs of Germany’s rapprochement and interdependence strategy vis-à-vis Russia. The tacit neglect of elementary interests of small successor states of the USSR, such as the Republics of Moldova and Georgia, and implicit acquiescence to the Kremlin’s increasing undermining of principles of international law in the post-Soviet space could not have ended well. German and European forbearance toward Russia’s behavior on the Dniester and in the North as well as South Caucasus have borne no fruit in either domestic or foreign policy terms. While Berlin apparently thought to promote a pro-Western change of direction in Moscow with its undiminished willingness to cooperate, the opposite has been the result.

Ukraine as an aftermath

Russia’s annexation of Crimea and intervention in eastern Ukraine in 2014 appear to many observers as unprecedented aberrations in the course of East European geopolitics after the end of the Cold War. In fact, these developments were mere continuations of older trends. In some respects, they were logical outcomes of earlier domestic political dynamics within Russia, their repercussion for Moscow’s foreign affairs, and inappropriate Western responses to them. With Merkel’s assumption of the chancellorship in 2005, Germany had, what seemed at the time, an ideal occupant in its highest office of government to respond adequately to the new challenges in Eastern Europe after Putin had come to power in 1999.

As it gradually became clear, however, the new chancellor was unwilling or unable to abandon the wrong track Germany had taken in its Russia policy under Gerhard Schröder. Merkel’s diplomatic engagement in Eastern Europe did increase and was particularly notable in 2014-2015. It may be thanks to Merkel that Putin did not push deeper into Ukrainian territory at that time. However, the need for a paradigm shift in Germany’s Russia policy, which became obvious in 2014, failed to materialize – a sad fact that became manifest with the start of the Nord Stream 2 project in 2015.

That Merkel, despite her high level of competence and obvious disappointment with Putin, was unable or unwilling to make the long overdue shift in German Ostpolitik away from Schröder’s approach toward the Kremlin is depressing. Instead, Berlin’s mode of behavior toward Russia’s authoritarian regime remained and remains characterized by fateful decisions of a man who is a political friend of Putin and has been an official employee of the Russian state since 2005. Perhaps, the Eastern European and Caucasian blood toll will have to further rise in order for Berlin to turn away from this position.

[1] A variety of conflicting comments on Germany’s Ostpolitik during Merkel’s first three terms as Federal Chancellor, on which I focus here, have been published over the years. See, among many other contributions, the following statements: Rahr, Alexander: Germany and Russia. A Special Relationship, in: Washington Quarterly, vol. 30, no. 2, 2007, pp. 137-145; Chivvis, Christopher, Rid, Thomas: The Roots of Germany’s Russia Policy, in: Survival, vol. 51, no. 2, 2009, pp. 105-122; Szabo, Stephen: Can Berlin and Washington Agree on Russia? In: Washington Quarterly, vol. 32, no. 4, 2009, pp. 23-41; Stelzenmuller, Constanze: Germany’s Russia Question, in: Foreign Affairs, vol. 88, no. 1, 2009, pp. 89-100; Timmins, Graham: German-Russian Bilateral Relations and EU Policy on Russia. Between Normalization and the “Multilateral Reflex,” in: Journal of Contemporary European Studies, vol. 19, no. 2, 2011, pp. 189-199; Heinemann-Grüder, Andreas: Wandel statt Anbiederung. Deutsche Russlandpolitik auf dem Prüfstand, in: Osteuropa, vol. 63, no. 7, 2013, pp. 179-223; Mischke, Jakob, Umland, Andreas: Germany’s New Ostpolitik. An Old Foreign Policy Doctrine Gets a Makeover, in: Foreign Affairs, April 9, 2014, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/western-europe/2014-04-09/germanys-new-Ostpolitik; Frosberg, Tuomas: From Ostpolitik to “Frostpolitik”? Merkel, Putin and German Foreign Policy toward Russia, in: International Affairs, vol. 92, no. 1, 2016, pp. 21-42.

[2] In fact, there was, in 2001, a second similar case on the territory of Georgia were the legality of a Russian military base in Abkhazia was also questionable. See Vladimir Socor, “Russia’s Retention of Gudauta Base – An Unfulfilled CFE Treaty Commitment,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 3 (99), 22 May 2006, jamestown.org/program/russias-retention-of-gudauta-base-an-unfulfilled-cfe-treaty-commitment/.

[3] Yuri Felshtinsky and Alexander Litvinenko, Blowing Up Russia: The Secret Plot to Bring Back KGB Terror (New York, NY: Encounter Books, 2007); Yuri Felshtinsky and Vladimir Pribylovsky, The Corporation: Russia and the KGB in the Age of President Putin (New York, NY: Encounter Books, 2007); John B. Dunlop, The Moscow Bombings of September 1999: Examinations of Russian Terrorist Attacks at the Onset of Vladimir Putin’s Rule (Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, 2014); David Satter, The Less You Know, the Better You Sleep: Russia’s Road to Terror and Dictatorship under Yeltsin and Putin (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2016).

An edited, somewhat different version was first published by the Center for Liberal Modernity in Berlin

Foreign policy education has been said to be lacking in the modern curriculum. While not as fascinating as it was during the Cold War era, and perhaps dragged out to the point of frustration during regional wars since 1991, error is policy approaches have created serious consequences.

Recently the United States was able to have a prisoner swap with China for a Chinese national who was detained in Canada in exchange for two Canadian nationals kept in poor and confined conditions in a Chinese jail. While the US stands out as doing a great job in this case, Canada was completely dependent on US support for its citizens. Canada made no headway in ensuring the security of its citizens after years of throwing carrots to China. The amount of friendly gestures Canada gave to China while detaining its citizens bordered on the absurd at times. This went from giving them much of the national emergency stockpile of PPE at the beginning of Covid, to inviting Chinese PLA soldiers to train in Canada, trying to reward China with a vaccine development deal while knowing of concentration camps being operated in China, and ignoring a vote by the sitting Parliament on the condemnation of the Uyugur Genocide once it was forced into the legislature by opposition members and human rights groups. While there are still other Canadian nationals in Chinese prisons, some awaiting the death penalty, the narrative has turned to an internal rights focus, one that the Prime Minister ignored, deciding to take a vacation instead.

The United States’ shining light helping two nationals from Canada is only temporary, as they formed a security coalition in Asia leaving out allies like Canada and France, destroying a French Australian submarine purchase deal worth billions. France had some of the biggest casualties fighting alongside the Americans in Afghanistan since the early 2000s and is often the tip of the spear in fighting terrorist groups in Africa. This comes on the tail end of the US repeating the history of their hasty withdrawal from Saigon, now taking place in 2021 in Afghanistan, a historical event that shadowed US foreign policy until the 1990s GPS infused war in Iraq. The loss of Kabul will not get its own soundtrack or award winning movies made about it, as the Afghan withdrawal has mostly disappeared from the public narrative. There are still supporters of Western nations and their allies trapped there, there are reports of human rights atrocities taking place as you read this post.

This week a major challenge has struck relations between China and Taiwan, with China’s Air Command and Navy pushing into Taiwan’s air defense perimeter. While no shots have been fired, it looks as if China is trying to measure the capabilities and responses of Taiwan and its US allies in support of the island. With so many foreign policy errors in such a short period of time, the lack of focused coordination by the US and unwise rifts with its allies has shown the US to be weak on the world stage in regards to threats to its interests. The United States is the only country that can stand up to larger powers. When the US eventually returns to their position in the world, it will be a much more complicated and dangerous place.