Diplomacy & Crisis News

Projecting how a war will end can be a fraught enterprise. Hoping for the complete collapse of the Russian military and a putsch overthrowing Vladimir Putin is pure fantasy at this point. It is also absolute hubris to argue that the next “new” weapon will transform the conflict, providing either Ukraine or Russia a free run at the opposition. 

Initially, it was the grand hopes of artificial intelligence and cyber operations, with cyber providing a “thunder run” opportunity for Russia to open the gates of Kyiv. At this point, a laughable conjecture is offered by very serious pundits. AI has also proven just as frustrating, playing a more significant role in battle coordination behind the scenes or for facial recognition of the dead rather than facilitating the emergence of a modern AI general to lead the military.

While the precision strike complex has transformed modern combat since the 1980s, enabling the massive destruction of armor on the battlefield, mines and layers of trenches remain the natural obstacles. Active surveillance facilitated by drones and satellites helps keep constant eyes on the battlefield, lessening the fog of war. Yet, this has been true since the advent of old-fashioned balloons and reconnaissance aircraft, as old as World War I.     

The latest hope is delivering the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMs). An advance in the range from the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), an ATACM can reach 190 miles behind the front lines while HIMARS can reach forty-three miles. Unfortunately, these are not transformative weapons because the United States has too few, and Ukraine needs to advance further to hit critical targets deep in Crimea. 

Instead of advanced weapons transforming the war, we are witnessing the continuation of the security dilemma. As John Herz argued, advances in security cause a perceived decrease in the opposition’s security, facilitating a constant action-reaction search for a way out of the conflict spiral. Sadly, conflict spirals never end. Likewise, no magic weapon will facilitate the termination of this war. 

Advanced or even primary weapons supplied by the West will not win the war for Ukraine, nor will emergency supplies from North Korea or Iran deliver victory to the Russian side. All these developments will achieve is the revival of the military-industrial complex worldwide. There is no magic solution; the only thing left is to settle for a political solution or the slow attrition of either side’s will to fight. As Margaret Mead argued so long ago, war is a social invention, a poor and inefficient one that will only facilitate constant suffering and death until humans develop a better way. 

Brandon Valeriano specializes in military innovation and cyber security. He teaches at Seton Hall University and is also a Senior Fellow at the Royal Danish Defense College, the Marine Corps University, Gray Space Strategies, and the Cyberspace Solarium Commission 2.0.

Image: Shutterstock. 

Both China and Russia are eager to assert their own authoritarian models of national “greatness.” Related to this goal is knocking down the international order forged by the United States and its allies after World War II, an open, rules-based international system that brought prosperity to so many nations (including China once Beijing embraced it). 

But national greatness, whether political influence, soft power, or military might, is largely a function of economic power. By participating in (and in many cases gaming) the open, capitalist trade and economic system, China has built economic power. China and the world are now economically interdependent. Many depend on China’s exports, and global companies want to keep access to the Chinese market. 

Meanwhile, Russia has lost it. With a GDP the size of Italy and the hemorrhaging of its best and brightest after the invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s economy is a literal Potemkin village. Once weaned of dependence on Russia’s oil and gas, nobody needs Russia’s economy. The only way for Russia to assert influence in the world and to maintain the fiction of “greatness”—is by destructive military actions. 

Now, China risks losing its true source of power and influence—its robust, entrepreneurial, globally entangled economy. President Xi Jinping is reining in entrepreneurs and free speech, frightening away foreign businesses, investors, and Chinese entrepreneurs. China is losing business abroad as many countries and companies work to decouple from China’s corrupting, surveilling, and stealing state-run economic apparatus. China’s birth rate is dropping, growth is slowing, and political leadership is congealing around a “strongman” more focused on control at home and saber-rattling abroad than economic prosperity.

Most observers predicted that China’s rise would eclipse America’s economic and political influence in the world. That’s the story of American decline and China’s rise promoted by Xi Jinping. Conventional wisdom also sees this dynamic as the most likely source of a military clash between China and the United States. An “empire” in decline threatened by a rising power leads to conflict.

But this doesn’t describe the current reality. The United States and its allies are working hard. So far, they are keeping the economic high ground by making disruptive innovations like the fastest chips and artificial intelligence that drive new businesses and maintain national security. Russia’s innovation economy is gone, and China is chasing its own away, exposing the fragility of a system propped up by state spending, and political versus market direction.

However, this is not all good news. As we have seen, an increasingly isolated and diminished power like Russia chooses to lash out militarily. A China beginning to lose the underpinnings of its new-found international influence could prove even more dangerous—and more eager to assert its “greatness” through military adventures and political and economic coercion. 

Avoiding war requires a delicate balancing act. We in the United States must acknowledge the aspirational and identity-based yearnings of the Chinese people: namely, the desire to be recognized as a great nation and to rise economically.

We need to say to China: we welcome your rise as a great nation, a great culture and people. We have no desire to keep you “down.” But we don’t welcome political and economic coercion of other nations and peoples, acts of military force. We will, working with allies (that we still have), check and contain these efforts at every turn.

John Austin is a Nonresident Senior Fellow with the Brookings Institution and the Chicago Council on Global Affairs.

Image: U.S. Department of Defense.

One of the more closely guarded mission sets within the U.S. military is Personnel Recovery (PR). As defined by the Department of Defense’s Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA), the PR mission is the “sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to prepare for and execute the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel.” In simplest terms, when a U.S. service member goes missing in combat, is captured, or in some other way becomes isolated from other U.S. forces, the military sets in motion its personnel recovery efforts.

Those efforts range from preparing service members on how to become and behave as a prisoner of war – through committing to the U.S. military’s Code of Conduct – to classified rescue missions to bring them home. In between those benchmarks fall the diplomatic and civil efforts, as well as Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) training, part of which involves training a service member to resist and escape captivity.

There are also highly classified programs that fall within the category of the personnel recovery mission set, the existence of which only a few in the entire Department of Defense (DOD) are aware. The U.S. military takes the PR mission very seriously, as we want our military to keep faith with the individual service members and make every effort to bring them home.

The various components of U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) can all play a role in the PR mission, as required. For example, when Army PFC Jessica Lynch was injured and captured in Iraq, she was rescued by a combined Joint Special Operations Task Force, with support from the Marines. Similarly, when wounded Navy SEAL Marcus Luttrell was forced to escape and evade following compromise by enemy forces in Afghanistan, he was rescued by a contingent of U.S. Army Rangers and Afghan National Army soldiers. Both operations are good examples of the PR mission as executed by U.S. SOF combined with conventional forces.

Further, PR missions are almost always supported by the U.S. intelligence community through the provision of on-the-ground human and technical intelligence reporting, as well as satellite imagery and other methods of support. The whole U.S. national security and defense structure in a given theatre, in other words, becomes involved in trying to bring home a lost or captured service member.

Here, it is worth placing a special emphasis on the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) and its unique role in the PR mission. AFSOC’s Special Tactics Pararescuemen (PJs) are widely considered the premier force in the U.S. military when it comes to rescuing lost service members (in particular, downed U.S. pilots). The PJs are in fact the only DOD force specifically trained to conduct both conventional and unconventional rescue operations. Their primary function is to be personnel recovery specialists.

What differentiates the PJs from other SOF units that also conduct PR missions is both the advanced medical training they receive, as well as the broad range of technical rescue disciplines on which they train. These techniques range from technical extrication of trapped personnel from damaged/wrecked airframes, to rope rescues and water rescues, and everything in between. Therefore, PJs are of special importance when it comes to personnel recovery.

In contrast, a Navy SEAL element, for example, would primarily act as a direct action force in a combat PR mission. Similar to the Lynch and Luttrell rescues, the SEAL element would essentially be assigned to raid a target location, neutralize any on-scene enemies, and effect the rescue of the U.S. service member. Ofte a PJ contingent of one or two personnel will accompany a SEAL or other SOF element on such a raid, to take primary control of the possibly wounded U.S. service member who has just been rescued. The PJs would then be the primary responsible party for treating, packaging, and transporting the patient through the exfiltration process.

The PR mission is a complex and difficult one, and a mission that requires integration across different U.S. military components – both conventional and unconventional – as well as other parts of the larger U.S. government. Diplomacy could be involved, and both intelligence collection and special activities are also almost always required. Few operations will focus the mind in a combat zone like the rescue of missing U.S. personnel. Such missions become an “all hands” effort and are carried out with a sense of purpose and urgency that differentiates them from other more run-of-the-mill operations.

Frumentarius is a former Navy SEAL, former CIA officer, and currently a Captain in a career fire department in the Midwest.

This article was first published by Sandboxx News.

Image: U.S. Military/Creative Commons.

In August, Washington and Manila announced their intention to begin conducting joint maritime patrols before the end of the year around the West Philippine Sea—the Philippines’ official name for the parts of the South China Sea that are within its exclusive economic zone. A few weeks later, Australia and the Philippines made a similar announcement. Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, said the decision marked ‘a watershed moment for relations between Australia and the Philippines’.

Beijing has been gradually increasing its hostile behaviour towards Filipino and Vietnamese vessels in the contested waters. In August, the Philippines published a video showing a China Coast Guard vessel firing a water cannon at several Philippine Coast Guard ships conducting a resupply mission at Ayungin Shoal in the Spratly Islands.

The incident, along with many others over recent years, offers insights into China’s hybrid tactics in the region. But more importantly, it’s a call to Manila and its allies to strengthen their deterrence posture and face Beijing’s assertiveness.

The patrol announcements represent a positive step in responding to China’s aggression in the South China Sea. It’s important for Australia to increase its presence in this way in a region it defined as ‘the most important geostrategic region in the world’ in its 2023 defence strategic review. Notably, Japan and Vietnam—two of China’s closest neighbours—have also announced plans to increase their presence in the South China Sea.

Tokyo has been keen to support Manila in its efforts against the China Coast Guard and China’s maritime militia. Japan recently provided a grant for a satellite communications system to be installed onboard the Philippine Coast Guard’s multi-role response vessels, enhancing their maritime domain awareness capabilities.

Japan has embarked on a major program to modernise its naval capabilities with a staggering increase in its defence budget as part of its ‘strengthening [of] the defense architecture in the southwestern region’. This will also include equipping Japanese air and ground defence forces along the Ryukyu Islands with anti-ship and anti-aircraft missile units to form a stronger defensive barrier to Japan’s south.

Positioned on the front line of China’s growing ambitions in the South China Sea, Vietnam will also have an important role to play. Hanoi has regularly expressed concerns over Beijing’s behaviour in the region and the potential consequences, and the defence cooperation agreement it recently signed with the US could have a strong impact on the region’s security dynamics and support a more assertive role for Vietnam and its allies.

All these countries, including Australia, must strengthen their presence in the South China Sea to defend the international norms enshrined in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which Beijing is undermining with its claims. As the late Australian Rear Admiral James Goldrick argued, ‘to accept China’s claims … acquiesces to Chinese coercion through the use of armed force’. The war in Ukraine is a compelling example of what could happen if these claims aren’t properly contested by China’s neighbours.

At the end of the day, presence (with ships and sailors) is the decisive element for success in any maritime competition. As US naval strategists J.C. Wylie and James Holmes put it: ‘The ultimate determinant in war is the man on the scene with a gun.’ If allies don’t maintain a presence in the region, China’s home-ground advantage will remain unchallenged.

Following Rear Admiral Wylie, Professor Holmes claimed: ‘You must be on the scene to control something. Or you have to leave no doubt in the minds of important audiences … that you will inevitably show up to take control should the antagonist buck your will.’ The determination shown by Japan, Vietnam and others is a good starting point in the quest to mount a credible deterrent posture, but building a more cohesive coalition must be the next step. As Goldrick argued, ‘Australia must be there for the long haul … Making an effective case for the South China Sea not to become a “closed sea” is fundamental.’

Australia’s defence strategic review says that ‘deterrence is about compelling an actor to defer or abandon a planned strategy or activity by having in place steps and responses to change its risk assessment and, therefore, decision-making’. Now Canberra, Manila and the rest of their allies must live by this and show up in the contested regions. They must be there to deter Chinese aggression, making the point that Beijing won’t succeed in its quest to claim the South China Sea for itself. And they must remain there with determination, for as long as it takes.

Gonzalo Vázquez Orbaiceta is a junior analyst at the Spanish Naval War College’s Center for Naval Thought. The views expressed in this article are his own.

This article was first published by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

Image: Shutterstock.

In late September 2023, a Russian government document relating to its preparations for a very large civil defense exercise involving a nuclear war scenario was leaked to the Russian press. It reportedly described the planned October 3 Russian civil defense exercise indicating that, “Russia will stage its first nationwide nuclear attack exercise across 11 time zones in preparation for potential nuclear war.” The document reportedly stated, “In some constituent entities [regions] of the Russian Federation, as a result of emergencies or other types of physical impact, complete destruction of life support facilities and up to 70% of the housing stock is possible.” The reference to the destruction of “life support facilities” apparently means the loss of electricity, communications, water, and transportation.

The leak of such a document before the Russian Grom strategic nuclear exercise (which usually happens in late October but sometimes as late as December), is apparently unprecedented. The large Russian civil defense exercise is normally held every year in early October. It could be an unannounced part of the Grom strategic exercise. Grom usually involves simulated large scale strategic nuclear strikes and sometimes involves simulated non-strategic (tactical) nuclear strikes and strategic air and missile defense operations.

The content of the leaked document was not reported in the major Russian state media outlets that publish in English, which is also unusual considering its being leaked to the press. The inclusion of a damage estimate to Russia in the leaked document is also particularly unusual. The actual civil defense exercise itself was also not reported in Russia’s state media but was reported in the Russian press. “In some areas, schoolchildren were taught how to wear gas masks. In other areas officials were forced into bunkers. The exercise was based on the assumption of a giant nuclear attack from the West.”

The Russian press frequently gloats over the massive destruction its simulated Russian nuclear strikes inflicted in its Grom exercises as well as other Russian nuclear exercises. (In a 2010 Russian large nuclear exercise, a Russian press report proudly declared that, “…throughout the world, the mushroom clouds rose skyward.”) Russia’s pro-regime media treatment of a nuclear war usually ignores the consequences for Russia from retaliatory nuclear strikes.

The document reportedly stated that the Putin regime had “…taken a decision to develop measures aimed at increasing the readiness of civil defence forces and means to take measures to protect the population, material and cultural property on the territory of the Russian Federation, including general evacuation from danger zones.” Russian officials have bragged about its civil defense measures before, but a nationwide exercise just before Grom in the current political environment is ominous. Just before the exercise, Deputy Chairman of the Russian National Security Council Dmitri Medvedev said that the West was “actively pushing us to World War III.” The leaked document reportedly said that the nuclear scenario assumed that martial law had been declared in Russia and that there was a full military mobilization.

President Putin considerably increased Russian spending on civil defense in 2005. During this time period, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu was the head of Russian civil defense. Russia has reportedly built some 5,000-7,000 bomb shelters in Moscow. A 2017 report of the Defense Intelligence Agency said Russia had 289,000 civil defense personnel, a large increase from the 20,000 in 1996 and 18,250 in 2008.

Since its initial attack on Ukraine in 2014, Russia has enhanced its nuclear capability and its civil defense efforts. In 2018, Rossia-24, Russian state television “…instructed viewers to stock up on food and water in case a war breaks out with the United States, playing on fears that a U.S.-led airstrike against Moscow’s ally Syria could lead to a military escalation.”

Threats of general nuclear war have been common from the Putin regime since its attack on Ukraine in February 2022. A couple of days after the civil defense exercise President Vladimir Putin declared Russian nuclear retaliation “…will be absolutely unacceptable for any potential aggressor, because seconds after we detect the launch of missiles, wherever they are coming from, from any point in the World Ocean or land, the counter strike in response will involve hundreds – hundreds of our missiles in the air, so that no enemy will have a chance to survive. And [we can respond] in several directions at once.” (This was in response to a question from Sergei Karaganov, a former Kremlin advisor who in 2023 advocated a nuclear attack against NATO, saying “…if we correctly build a strategy of intimidation and deterrence and even use of nuclear weapons, the risk of a ‘retaliatory’ nuclear or any other strike on our territory can be reduced to an absolute minimum.” If the initial attack did not get the desired result (NATO capitulation on Ukraine), he advocated hitting “… a bunch of targets in a number of countries in order to bring those who have lost their mind to reason.” Putin’s threat is included in paragraph 19 of his June 2023 nuclear doctrine and involves a nuclear attack on the West before Russia even knows that the attack against it is nuclear and with the attack involving as few as a single missile launch.

In the October 2022 Grom exercise, Russia’s Minister of Defense General of the Army Sergei Shoigu told President Putin that Russia’s nuclear exercise was “a training session” which involved “delivering a massive nuclear strike by strategic offensive forces….” Russian state television stated it was practice for an attack on the U.S. The 2019 version of the Grom exercise had the announced involvement of about half of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces (about 250 missiles) which were reportedly launched. The distinguished Russian journalist Alexander Golts noted, “We’re talking about rehearsing ways to conduct all-out nuclear war. Such a war will start with the use of non-strategic forces (cruise missiles) and end with a mass nuclear strike, which will mean the death of everything living on Planet Earth,” and there was no room for “misinterpretation” about this. Hyperbole aside, Golts outlined the essence of Russian nuclear escalation strategy. He also pointed out another notable fact about Putin: “The world that Putin inhabits is far removed from reality.”

A common political objective of Russian nuclear exercises (and Russian nuclear threats) is to scare the West because of the belief among Russia’s leaders that Western fear of nuclear warfare can be exploited to allow Russia to win against Ukraine and then NATO. Russian nuclear strategy is similar to that of Sergei Karaganov but not quite as extreme.

The Australian Financial Review suggested that the purpose of the “evacuation drills” was to prepare for a “nuclear ultimatum,” quoting the editor of state-run RT to the effect that the “ultimatum” was imminent. If the Australian Financial Review is accurate in its assessment, the “ultimatum” would likely come after an expanded version of the Grom exercise. It is noteworthy that Russia began its attack on Ukraine after what amounted to an ultimatum against NATO aimed at reviving the Soviet Union.

The British Defense Ministry noted that the October 2023 Russian civil defense exercise involved a scenario of “…large-scale international armed conflict,” that civil defense in the Soviet Union and Russia goes back decades, and that it is “…unlikely that Russia had significantly changed its posture of national preparedness in recent months.” Certainly, there are reports of large scale Russian civil defense nuclear exercises in the recent past. For example, Russia’s Civil Defence Department Director Oleg Manuilov said that the 2016 exercise involved “…more than 40 million people, more than 200 thousand professionals (sic) rescue units and 50 thousand pieces of equipment.”

Reportedly, on civil defense day “…Russia traditionally hosts festive events: solemn commencement ceremonies for students of the Ministry of Emergencies of Russia, exhibitions of special fire and rescue equipment, relay races, etc.” This does not exactly seem to be a description of the October 2023 exercise which reportedly assumed an all-out nuclear war. This exercise comes after a report earlier this year in The Moscow Times that, “Bomb shelters across Russia are undergoing systematic inspections and repairs following a Kremlin order to upgrade the country’s crumbling Soviet-era infrastructure, according to current and former officials who spoke to The Moscow Times.”

What is most dangerous about Russian civil defense is that in the context of Putin’s world of political fantasy it is a potential crutch on which he might convince himself that he could fight and survive a nuclear war even if he was wrong about his belief that the West would not retaliate against his initial small nuclear strikes. It is important to remember that in 2015 the Russian military leadership was claiming that “Moscow’s layered air defense grants 99% effective defense against air attack…” due to the deployment of S-400 and SA-20 air defenses. The Putin regime has been making nuclear threats since 2007. However, the scope of Russian aggression supported by these nuclear threats vastly increased after the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

In 2016, the deputy head of Russian civil defense Andrei Mishchenko said, “The Moscow underground facilities will be able to protect 100% of the population of the city.” Although this is likely an exaggeration and certainly while civil defense can significantly reduce casualties, even the Russian civil defense leadership recognizes that most Russians don’t know where the shelters are located. However, they almost certainly tell Putin what he wants to hear, which is the military dominance of Russia’s armed forces.

There is nothing wrong with having strong civil defense capabilities but its implications in the light of Putin’s nuclear irresponsibility are quite ominous. The idea of nuclear war without Russian casualties due to active and passive defenses is just the sort of fantasy that the self-isolated President Putin might believe as he pursues his expansionist agenda. This is the man who believed that Russia would capture Kiev in two days. Indeed, in 2014, Putin stated, “If I wanted, Russian troops could not only be in Kiev in two days, but in Riga, Vilnius, Tallinn, Warsaw or Bucharest, too.” In 2014, he also said that “We’ll strangle all of them [NATO] ourselves!”

In Putin’s neofascist fantasy world, Russia’s scripted military exercises are reality and his nuclear threats will prevent any effective opposition. Hopefully, he has learned something from his failure in Ukraine, but it is dangerous to depend on this. He is pursuing victory in Ukraine on the basis of his willingness to accept great casualties. His self-isolation results in his constant reinforcement of failure.

In light of the current crisis, the United States should be maximizing its nuclear deterrent capability but it is not. For the first time in a major nuclear crisis situation, the Biden Administration has done nothing to enhance the U.S’ nuclear deterrence posture. Worse yet, in June 2023, the Biden Administration announced it would not numerically match Russian and Chinese nuclear capabilities. It said it was going to deter Russian nuclear escalation by space and cyber capabilities and by arms control. Concerning nuclear deterrence, the level of technical fantasy in the Biden White House rivals that in Putin’s Kremlin, almost in exactly the opposite direction.

Dr. Mark B. Schneider is a Senior Analyst with the National Institute for Public Policy. Before his retirement from the Department of Defense Senior Executive Service, Dr. Schneider served as Principal Director for Forces Policy, Principal Director for Strategic Defense, Space and Verification Policy, Director for Strategic Arms Control Policy and Representative of the Secretary of Defense to the Nuclear Arms Control Implementation Commissions.  He also served in the senior Foreign Service as a Member of the State Department Policy Planning Staff.

This article was first published by RealClearDefense.

Image: Free Wind 2014 / Shutterstock.com

Israel’s intention in ordering the evacuation of civilians from Gaza City is to create a free-fire zone where anyone who remains can be assumed to be a member of Hamas. The next phase of its coordinated air, ground and naval offensive in Gaza will be putting in ground troops to secure northern Gaza, which will allow specialist units to start searching and destroying the Hamas tunnel system.

This phase could be costly in terms of Israeli lives because Hamas fighters underground will have access to the surface to inflict casualties on Israeli troops—in much the same way as Islamic State fighters did in Mosul when they inflicted heavy casualties on advancing Iraqi soldiers.

Gaza tunnel entrances are hidden under houses, mosques and schools, while the territory’s narrow streets and alleyways are expected to be infested with booby traps and command-detonated improvised explosive devices. It will also be difficult and dangerous for the Israel Defense Forces to clear a path through collapsed buildings and areas blocked by rubble.

Use of tunnelling is not a new insurgent tactic. Australia had experience of it in South Vietnam where A Company, of the 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, was ambushed from and uncovered the famous Cu Chi tunnel system. Insurgent forces that lack the capability to take on regular forces head to head can use tunnels to fight a survivable war of attrition that may eventually lead to war weariness and a negotiated settlement.

Once Israeli Special Forces get into the tunnel system, their aim will be to kill Hamas leaders, destroy Hamas fighters and weapons—particularly the rocket arsenal—and free any Israeli hostages held in the tunnels. However, it will be a costly process because Hamas is intimately familiar with the environment and has had time to booby-trap the tunnels and prepare defensive positions underground.

Indeed, Hamas has spent two decades building the labyrinth of deep, defensive tunnels to resist any ground assault by Israeli troops. It started building them in Gaza even before Israel withdrew its troops from Gaza in 2005. Hamas ramped up the construction after both Israel and Egypt imposed a blockade on the area in 2007.

The extensive tunnel network is believed to be as much as 30 metres beneath the surface in some places and is an integral part of the Gaza defences Hamas has spent years preparing.

After the last flare-up of fighting between Israel and Hamas in 2021, the IDF claimed to have destroyed more than 60 miles of tunnels. Hamas responded, saying that only 5% was damaged and that its underground infrastructure comprised 300 miles of tunnelling.

Daphne Richemond-Barak at Reichman University in Israel, an expert on the tunnel system, said the tunnels beneath Gaza were deeper and more sophisticated than the cross-border tunnels used to access Israeli territory.

She noted: ‘The tunnels inside Gaza are different because Hamas is using them on a regular basis. They are probably more comfortable to be in for longer periods of time. They are definitely equipped for a longer, sustained presence. The leaders are hiding there, they have command-and-control centres, they use them for transport and lines of communication. They are equipped with electricity, lighting and rail tracks.’

Jonathan Conricus, an IDF spokesperson, said in a briefing last week: ‘Think of the Gaza Strip as one layer for civilians and then another layer for Hamas. We are trying to get to that second layer that Hamas has built. These aren’t bunkers for Gazan civilians. It’s only for Hamas and other terrorists so that they can continue to fire rockets at Israel, to plan operations, to launch terrorists into Israel.’

Even if the Israeli forces are able to destroy the tunnels and clear Hamas out of northern Gaza, they will then have to decide whether to occupy the territory—which could take large numbers of troops—or to withdraw.

Tom Beckett, executive director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in the Middle East, said: ‘If the IDF attempts to mount a garrison large enough to control Gaza while continuing to protect the country from threats emanating from the West Bank, southern Lebanon and Syria, its capacity will soon be stretched thinly.’

Israel had clearly become complacent under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu about its ability to contain the Hamas threat and control Israel’s Palestinian population. The latest round of violence shows once again that Israel will at some point have to engage in a negotiated settlement with the Palestinian leadership, whoever that may turn out to be.

Even if Israel decides to force more than a million Palestinian civilians out of northern Gaza on a permanent basis, it still has to contend with the more than three million disaffected Palestinians living in the occupied West Bank and Jerusalem.

Clive Williams is a visiting fellow at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University. He was an infantry platoon commander in Vietnam in January 1966 when his platoon discovered a well-concealed entrance to what is now known as the Cu Chi tunnel complex. During that operation, several Australian soldiers were killed by Viet Cong operating from the extensive tunnel complex. They fired at the advancing diggers and were then able to reappear in ‘cleared areas’ from concealed tunnel entrances to cause more casualties.

This article was first published by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

Image: Anas-Mohammed / Shutterstock.com

In the wake of the shocking invasion of southern Israel by Hamas militants on Oct. 7, 2023, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu vowed to destroy Hamas.

“We are fighting a cruel enemy, worse than ISIS,” Netanyahu proclaimed four days after the invasion, comparing Hamas with the Islamic State group, which was largely defeated by U.S., Iraqi and Kurdish forces in 2017.

On that same day, Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant went further, stating, “We will wipe this thing called Hamas, ISIS-Gaza, off the face of the earth. It will cease to exist.” They were strong words, issued in the wake of the horrific terrorist attack that killed more than 1,300 Israelis and culminated in the kidnapping of more than 150 people, including several Americans.

And in a telling comparison, Israeli Ambassador to the U.N. Gilad Erdan compared the attack with the toppling of the World Trade Center and the attack on the Pentagon in 2001, declaring, “This is Israel’s 9/11.”

As a scholar of military history, I believe the comparison is interesting and revealing. In the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks by al-Qaida on the United States, President George W. Bush made a similar expansive pledge, declaring, “Our war on terror begins with al-Qaida, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.”

The U.S. response to 9/11 included the American invasion of Afghanistan in league with the Afghan United Front, the so-called Northern Alliance. The immediate goals were to force the Taliban from power and destroy al-Qaida. Very little thought or resources were put into what happened after those goals were attained. In his 2010 memoir, “Decision Points,” former President Bush recalled a meeting of the war cabinet in late September 2001, when he asked the assemblage, “‘So who’s going to run the country (Afghanistan)?’ There was silence.”

Wars that are based on revenge can be effective in punishing an enemy, but they can also create a power vacuum that sparks a long, deadly conflict that fails to deliver sustainable stability. That’s what happened in Afghanistan, and that is what could happen in Gaza.

A war of weak results

The U.S. invasion toppled the Taliban from power by the end of 2001, but the war did not end. An interim administration headed by Hamid Karzai took power as an Afghan council of leaders, called a loya jirga, fashioned a new constitution for the country.

Nongovernmental and international relief organizations began to deliver humanitarian aid and reconstruction support, but their efforts were uncoordinated. U.S. trainers began creating a new Afghan National Army, but lack of funding, insufficient volunteers and inadequate facilities hampered the effort.

The period between 2002 and 2006 was the best opportunity to create a resilient Afghan state with enough security forces to hold its own against a resurgent Taliban. Because of a lack of focus, inadequate resources and poor strategy, however, the United States and its allies squandered that opportunity.

As a result, the Taliban was able to reconstitute its forces and return to the fight. As the insurgency gained momentum, the United States and its NATO allies increased their troop levels, but they could not overcome the weakness of the Kabul government and the lack of adequate numbers of trained Afghan security forces.

Despite a surge of forces to Afghanistan during the first two years of the Obama administration and the 2011 killing of Osama bin Laden, the Taliban remained undefeated. As Western forces largely departed the country by the end of 2014, Afghan forces took the lead in security operations, but their numbers and competence proved insufficient to stem the Taliban tide.

Negotiations between the United States and the Taliban went nowhere, as Taliban leaders realized they could seize by force what they could not gain at the bargaining table. The Taliban entry into Kabul in August 2021 merely put an exclamation point on a campaign the United States had lost many years before.

A goal that’s hard to achieve

As Israel pursues its response to the Hamas attack, the Israeli government would be well advised to remember the past two decades of often indecisive warfare conducted by both the United States and Israel against insurgent and terrorist groups.

The invasion of Afghanistan ultimately failed because U.S. policymakers did not think through the end state of the campaign as they exacted revenge for the 9/11 attacks. An Israeli invasion of Gaza could well lead to an indecisive quagmire if the political goal is not considered ahead of time.

Israel has invaded Gaza twice, in 2009 and 2014, but quickly withdrew its ground forces once Israeli leaders calculated they had reestablished deterrence. This strategy – called by Israeli leaders “mowing the grass,” with periodic punitive strikes against Hamas – has proven to be a failure. The newly declared goal of destroying Hamas as a military force is far more difficult than that.

As four U.S. presidential administrations discovered in Afghanistan, creating stability in the aftermath of conflict is far more difficult than toppling a weak regime in the first place.

The only successful conflict against a terrorist group in the past two decades, against the Islamic State group between 2014 and 2017, ended with both Raqqa in Syria and Mosul in Iraq reduced to rubble and thousands of men, women and children consigned to detention camps.

Israel has the capacity to level Gaza and round up segments of the population, but that may not be wise. Doing so might serve the immediate impulse of exacting revenge on its enemies, but Israel would likely receive massive international condemnation from creating a desert in Gaza and calling it peace, and thus forgo the moral high ground it claims in the wake of the Hamas attacks.

Peter Mansoor is Professor of History, General Raymond E. Mason Jr. Chair in Military History, at The Ohio State University.

This article was first published by The Conversation.

Image Credit: IDF/Creative Commons. 

After 56 years of occupation and a 16-year blockade, the Gaza Strip (Gaza) is now subjected to what Israel’s defence minister described as a “complete siege”. Water, food, energy and fuel supplies have been severed as further retaliation for Hamas’s attacks.

Gaza’s estimated 2.3 million citizens are used to struggle. And as a political ecologist researching food sovereignty in Gaza City and Khan Yunis, a city in southern Gaza, with local specialists, I’ve seen how the food system has already been stretched to breaking point.

Gaza’s single power station has now ceased to function, as the current dark night skies – save for explosions – bear witness. Without fuel or electricity, farmers will be unable to pump water to irrigate crops, or to process and safely store food.

Before the latest hostilities, 70% of Gaza’s households were already classified as “food insecure”, unable to afford their daily requirements. Two-thirds of people are refugees, reliant on UN aid. As a captive market, most of what is imported comes from Israel. Palestine is Israel’s third largest export market after the US and China.

Food and farming have long been complicated by repeated airstrikes, occupation and blockade. In good years, Gaza remains self-sufficient in fruit and vegetables, much produced intensively in polytunnels and greenhouses.

According to data I obtained from the Palestinian Ministry of Agriculture, in 2021 Israeli exports to Gaza included seeds, over a million litres of pesticides and herbicides, and 4.5 million litres of fertiliser. Nitrates from fertiliser and treated wastewater applied to farmland that leach into groundwater are a major source of pollution, doing long-term damage to Gaza’s agroecosystems.

This dependency is compounded by a third of Gaza’s farmland being in no-go zones along the border, resulting in low cereal production and availability of animal protein. Most animal products came from (or through) Egypt, via the Rafah crossing, which has been a vital lifeline and was closed at the time of writing.

Small family farms and more intensive commercial farms still provide a source of livelihood for a significant proportion of Gaza’s population. Many home gardens, too, are used for food production, either for family consumption, sharing or bartering to ameliorate the stresses of blockade.

But as families now seek shelter from Israeli bombardment, the harvesting that takes place at this time of year will have come to a halt. Essential crops will spoil, and winter crops needing irrigation will perish.

Water

Israel controls all water resources across Palestine. Mekorot, Israel’s national water company, extracts water from the coastal aquifer that lies beneath bedrock along the coast of Gaza and Israel, to irrigate large-scale intensive Israeli agriculture. It then pipes and sells water into the Gaza Strip. This supply has now been cut off.

What is left comes from the aquifer, or groundwater polluted by untreated wastewater and nitrates. Over-exploitation of the aquifer, due to demands from Gaza’s population and Israel’s irrigation, has resulted in seawater intrusion and salinity levels so high that it is now considered unfit for human consumption.

Without fuel for pumps, no water extraction is possible. And the municipal desalination plant that supplied Gaza with 15% of its water has ceased to function.

Elsewhere, repairs of ageing and damaged infrastructure from previous bombardments have consistently been hampered by the blockade, affecting water pumping, desalination plants and sewage treatment.

In 2008, strikes on Gaza’s largest sewage treatment plant resulted in 100,000 cubic metres of sewage being released into homes and farmland. Further strikes in 2018 resulted in discharges of raw waste into the Mediterranean threatening the fish stocks Palestinians depend upon.

Just a few weeks ago, Gaza had eight wastewater pumping stations for sewage treatment, requiring 55,000 litres of fuel a month. An official I know at the mayor’s office tells me two of these were destroyed on the first day of Israel’s airstrikes. Without fuel to operate the ones that remain, a repeat of 2008 is already unfolding, with grave implications for ecosystem and human health.

Invasion

It is impossible to predict how disastrous a ground invasion would be. Over the past 15 years, damage to Gaza’s infrastructure is thought to amount to $5 billion (£4.1 billion) across four previous wars.

After the 22-day invasion from December 2008 to January 2009, the UN documented wide-scale damage to fields, vegetable crops, orchards, livestock, wells, hatcheries, beehives, greenhouses and irrigation systems. Over 35,750 cattle, sheep and goats and more than one million poultry were killed.

The UN mission stated that the destruction had degraded land, by “mechanical ripping and removal of trees, shrubs and crops”, and that the “passage of heavy tracked vehicles has compacted the soil”, hampering future cultivation.

With each war, Gaza’s dependence on Israeli imports of water, energy, fuel, food and agricultural inputs only increases. Meanwhile, Israel’s economy has become intricately bound to its illegal occupation of Palestine, to the tune of exports worth $4.16 billion in 2021, creating a perverse mutual dependence.

A complete siege on Gaza is arguably a contravention of international human rights law which states that Palestinians must be “supplied with the food, medicine and other basic needs to allow the population to live under adequate material conditions”.

The situation for Gazans is dire. Sheltering from military strikes, farmers unable to harvest or distribute food, added to blocks on water, food and energy, all in Gaza are acutely vulnerable to disease and malnutrition.

It is eight years since the UN predicted that Gaza would soon become “uninhabitable”. It said that years of blockade had “shattered” Gaza’s ability to provide for its people, “ravaged its already debilitated infrastructure” and “accelerated de-development”. A total siege will go a long way towards turning that prediction into a gruesome reality.

Georgina McAllister is Assistant Professor in Stabilisation Agriculture at the Centre for Agroecology, Water & Resilience, at Coventry University.

This article was first published by The Conversation.

Image: Anas-Mohammed / Shutterstock.com

When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Georgia’s government and citizens sought to join Western institutions. Accordingly, the government pursued aggressive anti-corruption policies to eliminate graft throughout the country.

Initially, the hard work paid off. Soon, Georgia discussed with organizations such as NATO how to join its ranks. This first occurred during the 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest. The organization welcomed Georgia’s membership aspirations. At the time, Georgia also ranked sixty-seventh out of 180 countries on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. According to the organization, the index “measures the perceived levels of public-sector corruption in a given country.” Georgia’s strong ranking suggested that it had made significant progress in its reform efforts.

Fifteen years later, the Georgian government is a former version of itself. Over the past few years under Georgian Dream, the ruling political party in Georgia, the country has started to regress in its democratization efforts. The Georgian opposition and citizens are puzzled by the party’s decision. Georgian Dream has made very unpopular decisions, many of which have been criticized by the Georgian public.

For example, the ruling Georgian government attempted to introduce a bill that would force Georgian organizations to declare themselves as “foreign agent” if they received 20 percent or more of their funding from international donors. Critics argued that it would allow Georgian Dream to target opposition organizations, and after much political opposition, the bill was dropped. Meanwhile, Georgian Dream also introduced a bill allowing authorities to “increase the duration of covert surveillance.” President Salome Zourabichvili immediately spoke out against the proposal, stating that the legislation would “further restrict human rights.” Finally, Georgian Dream “unlawfully obtain[ing] and purposefully edit[ing] audio recordings from an opposition media newsroom.” These are just some examples of the questionable decisions Georgian Dream has pursued over the past two years. Their efforts are also not in line with the Georgian public.

For example, since its independence in 1991, Georgian citizens have supported integrating with the West. They have also pressured their government to become more democratic, and they want to enjoy the benefits of being part of Western institutions. This support increased following the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 and 2022. According to a recent survey conducted by the National Democratic Institute, Georgian citizens overwhelmingly support potential integration with the European Union.

Despite this position, Georgian Dream continues to distance itself from Western institutions. Most precariously, the ruling Georgian party has opted to strengthen its relationship with Russia despite Russia having occupied parts of Georgia since 2008.

For example, following the start of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, numerous countries around the world sent defense, humanitarian, medical, and financial aid to Ukraine to help it during its time of need. The international community also enforced stiff penalties on Russia to punish it for its behavior. But for whatever reason, Georgia is not one of the countries that has provided Ukraine during the war. In addition, Georgia has yet to implement sanctions on Russia for its war in Ukraine. 

To make matters worse, Georgia is pursuing policies to enhance its relationship with Russia. For example, a flight ban from Georgia to Russia was lifted earlier this year. Visa restrictions on Georgian nationals visiting Russia were also removed, making it easier for Georgian citizens to visit Russia. These developments suggest that Russia’s influence in Georgia is growing.

Meanwhile, as Georgian Dream strengthens its relationship with Russia, it is also currently distancing itself from its long-time ally Ukraine. It also damages the country’s relationship with the European Union and the United States. Last month, the ruling party falsely accused Ukraine of attempting a coup in Georgia. In the baseless accusation, Georgian Dream falsely stated that Georgian foreign legion groups in Ukraine would leave their defensive positions and they would return to Georgia to start an armed insurrection. The Ukrainian government swiftly denounced these claims, stating it does “not interfere and does not plan to interfere in the internal affairs of Georgia.”

Second, Georgian Dream attacked European officials. Earlier this year, the party withdrew its observer membership with the Party of European Socialists (PES), a progressive pan-European group. Georgian Dream alleged that PES failed to support its efforts and “failed to benefit Georgia on its path towards European integration.” PES immediately dismissed the claims.

Similarly, Georgian Dream has targeted pro-European politicians in Georgia. In a news series of baseless allegations, the party alleged that pro-European officials in Georgia were planning to “overthrow the [Georgian] state.” No evidence was provided to support these false claims. The Georgian State Security Service attempted to help Georgian Dream in these allegations, but the organization failed to provide information that supported these outlandish statements.

Finally, and most recently, Georgian Dream made baseless claims against the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). It claimed that the American organization was working with the opposition movement in Georgia to start a revolution. Like its previous allegations, Georgian Dream failed to provide any evidence to support them.

Unfortunately, Georgian Dream is attempting to scare Georgian citizens into believing that Western organizations and officials are infiltrating Georgia. This fear-mongering, however, has attracted very little attention, and it has not fooled anyone. The allegations they have made are simply tactics to harass the Georgian opposition, and it is an attempt by Georgian Dream to remain in power. Despite these attempts, the Georgian opposition and everyday citizens have continued to fight back peacefully.

Now, time will tell how political matters develop in Georgia. Having gained no traction, Georgian Dream is concerned about its position in the upcoming 2024 parliamentary election. Seeing that the Georgian Dream has deviated from the people’s desire to strengthen relations with the West, it can be hypothesized that Georgian citizens will vote in favor of candidates who support anti-corruption reforms, democratization efforts, and transparency in Georgia. Voters will also support parliamentarians who want to strengthen Georgia’s relationship with the EU and other Western organizations.

Nothing is guaranteed in the 2024 parliamentarian elections, but Georgia’s democratic backsliding can certainly be altered. If Georgian citizens work hard with the Georgian opposition, and should pro-European politicians win their campaigns, then it is likely that Georgian Dream will no longer be the ruling party in the Georgian parliament. It will not be easy, and it will take a lot of hard work and effort, but the Georgian populace has the opportunity to change their country for the better. They must not squander this opportunity. Otherwise, should they fail to remove Georgian Dream’s majority, then the current democratic backsliding will continue. This will only strengthen Russia’s hand in the region.

Mark Temnycky is a freelance journalist covering Eurasian affairs and a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. He can be found on X @MTemnycky.

Image: Eval Miko / Shutterstock.

Few would dispute that Nicaraguan president Daniel Ortega has imposed an authoritarian government on his country and that he is willing to use all resources available to retain power, come what may. This has been evident since at least 2008, when he rigged the mayoral election results in Managua to prevent his chief rival from challenging him. Since then, intimidation, legal manipulation, or outright fraud has been used to guarantee Ortega’s victories, not only in the presidential election of 2011 but also in the 2016 and 2021 votes.

Nicaragua’s internal opposition is essentially non-functional as Ortega’s Sandinistas have gained near-total control of the Congress and regional governorships. Opposition parties may be banned (just recently, YATAMA, a party representing the indigenous peoples of the Atlantic coast, has met this fate) or hindered by the Sandinista-controlled courts, allowing the government to pick who will run against it. And, of course, as a last resort, the ruling party effectively controls the ballot counting process.

Crossing the Line

But in recent years, Ortega (governing in tandem with his wife and Vice President Rosario Murillo) has moved decisively from the authoritarianism of merely controlling politics to what can only be considered as totalitarianism—extending control to nearly all of Nicaraguan public life. 

Nicaragua’s headlong rush in this direction has been highlighted by the recent seizure of its two most prestigious centers of higher learning, the Central American University and the Central American Institute of Business Administration (UCA and INCAE, respectively).

Political scientists have debated the exact meaning of totalitarianism since it was first used to describe Mussolini’s fascist conception of the state. A good recent characterization can be found in “Iron Curtain,” Anne Applebaum’s recounting of the imposition of Soviet rule in Eastern Europe:

Strictly defined, a totalitarian regime is one that bans all institutions apart from those it has officially approved. A totalitarian regime thus has one political party, one educational system, one artistic creed, one centrally planned economy, one unified media and one moral code. In a totalitarian state there are no independent schools, no private businesses, no grassroots organizations, and no critical thought.

Attacks on Universities, Civil Society Organizations, and the Press

This most recent example of the totalitarian impulse, the suppression of UCA and INCAE, seems particularly egregious given that they were Nicaragua’s only centers of higher learning with significant international reputations. UCA was a Jesuit foundation with close ties to American counterparts such as Georgetown and Fordham Universities. INCAE, founded in the early 1960s in the spirit of President John F. Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress, aimed to provide students in the region with a U.S.-style MBA.

The seizure of UCA has its roots in the massive protests against the regime in 2018, shaking it to its foundations and galvanizing its push to acquire control of previously independent elements of society. As is typical in Latin America, the university was a hub of the protests and a place where participants sought refuge from repression.

For the regime, this was unforgivable. The university’s physical plant and bank accounts were seized and its Jesuit professors evicted from their homes on campus. UCA has been renamed Casimiro Sotelo State University after a former Sandinista student activist killed by former dictator Anastasio Somoza’s forces in 1967. However, it does not appear to function normally yet, leaving students to wonder if they will ever be able to finish their degrees.

The seizure of the INCAE business school seems more mysterious, as it did not host political dissent like UCA. However, its continued existence as an independent, professionally oriented entity with strong international links was a standing reproach to the ruling regime. However, it should be noted that its rector, Enrique Bolaños Abaunza, is the son of Ortega’s conservative predecessor as President of Nicaragua. And, of course, its handsome campus and considerable financial resources were doubtless tempting targets.

While Nicaragua’s other private universities are smaller and have had lower profiles than UCA and INCAE, twenty-seven have been closed or taken over by the state, for instance, Martin Luther King University, an institution associated with evangelical Christianity. While some still survive, their future is dim.

Ortega has taken an axe to Nicaraguan civil society—shutting down hundreds of non-governmental and private voluntary organizations under the pretext that they have not met paperwork requirements. Entities closed range from fairly obscure groups such as the Equestrian Federation of Nicaragua to prominent human rights and feminist advocacy groups. 

In some cases, the aim seems quite clear. For instance, the Nicaraguan Foundation for Economic and Social Development (FUNIDES), a prestigious think tank and a key source of independent policy analysis that could challenge government claims, was closed in 2022 following a campaign of harassment of its board members. 

The apolitical Nicaraguan Red Cross has also been closed—in a country of pervasive poverty subject to recurring natural disasters. The safety net provided by the Nicaraguan state itself is gossamer-thin, but the fact that the Red Cross provided treatment to individuals injured in the 2018 protests was apparently unacceptable.

Nicaragua’s independent press has also been squeezed out of existence. The daily La Prensa and its owners, the Chamorro family, had a vital role first in the struggle against Somoza, then against Ortega and the Sandinistas after they took power by force in 1979. When it pushed back against Ortega following his return to power in 2007, it was initially tolerated, although subjected to harassment. However, in the post-2018 environment, its presence was no longer permitted. The newspaper was shut down in 2022, and its editor, Cristiana Chamorro, suffered eighteen months imprisonment before her release into exile.

La Prensa now exists only in internet form based outside of Nicaragua. The same is true of Confidencial, a newsletter published by Cristiana’s brother, the distinguished journalist Carlos Fernando Chamorro. They are thus available only to the relatively small number of Nicaraguans with consistent internet access. Certainly, Barricada, the Sandinista propaganda sheet, which consistently glorifies Ortega and Murillo, is no substitute.

In underdeveloped countries such as Nicaragua, radio is the principal means for the average citizen to hear the news—often barely rewritten from newspaper articles. The regime, however, destroyed the network of independent radio stations that existed in the capital, Managua, and elsewhere. Nicaraguans now live in an information desert.

The Suffocation of Religion and Business

Ortega has sought to prevent Roman Catholicism, the faith of the majority of Nicaraguans, from having any role in public life. This had been a consistent element of Sandinista rule during its first period in power, 1979–90. But when Ortega returned, he initially sought to co-opt the Church. 

He and his wife proclaimed themselves Catholics. They established a relationship with the aging Miguel Obando y Bravo, the former archbishop who had once been their fierce opponent. But the current hierarchy kept its distance, and as it raised its voice against increasing human rights violations, the government turned to confrontation.

Church-related entities, such as the Jesuit-affiliated UCA mentioned earlier, and Church-owned radio stations have been seized. Certain traditional religious festivals have been curtailed. The regime is averse to any large-scale activities in the streets which it does not control.

Priests have been arrested, including Rolando Alvarez, the Bishop of Matagalpa, who was given a twenty-six-year prison sentence for “treason,” a step reminiscent of those taken by governments in Eastern Europe under Soviet domination. Alvarez was offered release into exile but refused and remains imprisoned. 

The Vatican had generally sought to avoid direct confrontation in keeping with its historical preference for quiet diplomacy. Still, when Pope Francis felt compelled to make a sharply critical statement, the reaction was swift. The government expelled the papal nuncio, cutting off a direct conduit between the Nicaraguan Church and Rome.

Evangelical Christianity has faced a similar trajectory from co-optation to intimidation. Ortega initially made positive gestures, seeking allies among the many different denominations present in the country. This included restoring diplomatic relations with Israel, for which evangelicals felt a pronounced sympathy. However, their environment has become ever more complicated, and they, too, have gotten the message that the regime will not tolerate criticism. Evangelical groups who support the regime even receive some financial aid from the state.

The other main opponent the government has refused to tolerate is the organized business community. The pattern resembles relations with the Catholic Church: co-optation, then repression. The Higher Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP) had been among the Sandinistas’ leading opponents during their post-revolutionary rule, and when Ortega returned to power in 2007, relations were initially tense.

However, particular business interests sought an easier relationship with the government. They promoted new leadership within COSEP, seeking an implicit deal with Ortega in which the private sector would be left alone in exchange for eschewing any broader political role. Indeed, it appeared that Ortega had abandoned Marxist policies of nationalization and state management of the economy that had characterized his first period in power.

Instead, what has taken place has been the slow absorption of many businesses by members of Ortega’s own family, often with opaque financial relationships with the Nicaraguan state, leading to a situation that more than anything resembles the pre-revolutionary Nicaragua of the Somoza era. 

As this went on, and as COSEP began once more to take a stricter line vis-a-vis the state, the regime considered any organized business community a potential threat. COSEP was shut down, as were various sectoral business chambers. Its head was imprisoned and then exiled.

“Totalitarianism-Lite”?

Nicaragua is losing its independent institutions: its private universities, its civil society organizations, its press, its business associations, and its religious establishments. That said, while one can fairly characterize Nicaragua as a totalitarian state, it is still somewhat short of the “ideal-type” totalitarianism exemplified by Maoist China or today’s North Korea. 

The Ortega government preserves the rhetoric and symbology of its initial Marxist era, together with its classic denunciations of U.S. “imperialism” and affection for Russia and China (from whom political, economic, and security support is welcomed). Revolutionary martyrs are honored. But beyond that, there is little serious ideological content to its governance.

Although the regime can muster large numbers of government employees and union members (the labor unions are Sandinista-controlled) for its rallies and to control the streets if needed, it does not seem interested and perhaps is incapable of permanently mobilizing and organizing the broad mass of the populace. It has demolished such independent organizations as existed before, but for the most part, it has not replaced them with government-controlled alternatives in the classic communist or fascist manner.

Instead, it seems content with an anomic society in which Nicaraguans are preoccupied with getting by under ever more difficult circumstances. The poor try to maintain eligibility for the minimal social benefits the state provides, and the small business and professional class keep their heads down to avoid trouble.

Ortega’s goal is to ensure that, beyond the long-neutered political opposition, no force can arise to challenge the regime’s monopoly on power, and no repetition of the 2018 protests can occur. At the same time, the role of the Ortega family in the economy continues to increase, and it appears that the long-term aim is a transition of power to the next generation. What we see in Nicaragua may be “totalitarianism-lite,” but it is still totalitarianism.

Richard M. Sanders is a Senior Fellow, Western Hemisphere at the Center for the National Interest. He is also a Global Fellow of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. A former member of the Senior Foreign Service of the U.S. Department of State, he served as Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Nicaragua, 2007–10.

Image: Barna Tanko / Shutterstock. 

In recent times, the world has borne witness to heinous acts of violence and aggression committed by authoritarian regimes. The actions of Hamas in Israel, supported by Iran, and Russia’s activities in Ukraine serve as stark reminders that autocratic governments not only oppress their own citizens but also threaten global peace. In the face of such challenges, it is imperative that democracies across the world come together with resolute determination to safeguard freedom and promote peace.

One fundamental truth is that democracies do not typically wage war against their fellow democratic nations. In contrast, autocracies often engage in acts of aggression and expansionism, frequently supporting one another in pursuing their revisionist goals.

The alliance between Russia, Iran, and North Korea is a glaring example. Russia acquires military equipment from these autocratic states, while they, in turn, offer diplomatic support to Russia on international platforms like the United Nations. Additionally, these nations bolster Russia economically by purchasing its energy resources and supplying products essential to its military industry.

Hamas, a terrorist organization, receives financial support, military equipment, and training from Iran, making its attacks on Israel possible. These conflicts, like all wars, are devastating. What makes them particularly heinous is the deliberate and widespread targeting of innocent civilians, including children, and the appalling acts of violence against women.

Democracies must unite to defend against autocratic aggression and to preserve global freedom and peace. Unfortunately, the United Nations, while a vital forum for international diplomacy, often falls short of delivering effective responses. Authoritarian regimes often vote for their counterparts in the General Assembly and exploit the veto system to paralyze the workings of the Security Council. Therefore, democracies must supplement their UN efforts with partnerships between like-minded nations dedicated to upholding world freedom and peace.

Several democratic partnerships already exist and have proven valuable, warranting reinforcement. NATO, one of history’s most successful military alliances, remains relevant in the face of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. However, there is an urgent need to address the issue of too many NATO members failing to meet the alliance’s 2 percent military spending requirement.

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, comprising the United States, Japan, Australia, and India, promotes a free and open Indo-Pacific. This coalition should expand its security cooperation and broaden its contributions to encompass shared research in cutting-edge technologies. It could evolve into a “pentagonal” by inviting South Korea, another regional democracy with substantial military capabilities, to join its ranks.

The G-7, which brings together the largest industrialized democracies and the European Union, plays a crucial role in coordinating responses to the increasingly dangerous actions of autocracies. In light of these challenges, the G-7 should evolve into a G-9 by including Australia and South Korea, both advanced economies and vibrant democracies.

In addition to strengthening existing partnerships, there is a pressing need to establish new ones. For example, an economic version of NATO’s Article V should be formed to counter economic coercion by autocracies. Such protocols would enable democracies to retaliate against aggressive, autocratic regimes and provide economic assistance to the affected democracies.

Another essential coalition, a Tech-12, would comprise the top techno-democracies, including the G-7 nations, Israel, South Korea, the Netherlands, Taiwan, and Finland. Rapid technological advances, particularly in fields like artificial intelligence (AI) and telecommunications, impact every aspect of our lives. Technology must be harnessed for good and not manipulated by autocracies to oppress their citizens or undermine democracies. A Tech-12 coalition can ensure that democracies, not dictatorships, establish global technology standards.

Lastly, these partnerships should adopt an inclusive approach, welcoming imperfect democracies and even non-democratic states willing to counter the malign actions of aggressive and revisionist autocracies. The goal is not to certify perfect democratic behavior but to create a united front against autocratic threats.

The recent barbaric attack supported by Iran and Russia’s continued aggression in Ukraine stand as grave reminders that evil still exists in our world. Democracies must remain vigilant in defending global freedom and peace, and building partnerships is critically vital because unity amplifies strength.

Michael Fisch is the Founder and CEO of American Securities and a member of the Executive Committee of the Board of Directors of the Atlantic Council.

Dan Negrea is the Senior Director of the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center and served as an official in the State Department from 2018 to 2021.

Image: Andrea Izzoti / Shutterstock.

Vladimir Putin is expected to travel outside the borders of the former Soviet Union for the first time in 20 months to meet China’s Xi Jinping on October 17. The visit, if it happens, is likely to entrench a relationship in which Russia has become a useful tool in a broader Chinese strategy to consolidate its influence in Europe and the Americas.

The occasion of Putin’s likely trip to Beijing is the tenth anniversary of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), an ambitious Chinese project to expand global trade routes with other nations and extend transport and infrastructure links.

To mark this event, China’s president, Xi Jinping, will host representatives from some 130 countries in Beijing on October 17 and 18.

Putin is likely to be the star guest. According to Russian sources in September, Putin accepted Xi’s invitation, although Beijing has refused to confirm this.

The two presidents would undoubtedly have lots to discuss. Since they announced their no-limits partnership in February 2022, just before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the world has dramatically changed and keeps changing.

Instability has gripped the South Caucasus and the Middle East – both areas where Russia and China have interests at stake.

Yet their no-limits partnership has become a much more one-sided affair. Where Moscow and Beijing may once have coordinated their approaches, it is now likely that Russia aligns its policies to suit Chinese interests. The Ukraine war has weakened Russia and diminished its influence, at least for now, not only in the Middle East and the South Caucasus but also in central Asia. This has allowed China to become the dominant power there and cement its ties with the region.

Though now clearly a junior partner to Xi, Putin’s expected trip to Beijing still signals that Russia and China share a common agenda when it comes to ending a western-dominated international order and curtailing US and European influence in what both view as their zones of privileged interest across Eurasia.

Russia keeps emphasising alignment with China, not least because it has few other options except international pariah states such as North Korea and Iran.

Western sanctions against Russia in response to Moscow’s war against Ukraine have severely reduced trade along the New Eurasian Land Bridge (an overland rail link between China and Europe), once a major transport corridor for Chinese exports to European markets.

Instead, transport routes avoiding Russia have gained in importance, including the Middle Corridor linking China across central Asia, the Caspian Sea and the South Caucasus to the EU. This has also dented Russian hopes of closer integration between the BRI and Moscow’s post-Soviet economic integration initiative, the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).

While the fact that Putin received an invitation from Xi to come to Beijing is important, it is also noteworthy that this is not a purely bilateral affair. In contrast to Xi’s visit to Moscow in March 2023, Putin’s trip will at best offer the Russian president an opportunity for talks with Xi in the margins of a summit designed to celebrate the BRI, a project closely associated with Xi personally.

Also, China has, and pursues, other options in its foreign relations. There is still a possibility of a meeting between US president Joe Biden and Xi at the Apec summit in San Francisco in November. And the EU’s foreign policy chief, Josep Borrell, visited China, possibly to prepare of an EU-China summit later this year.

What Xi wants to achieve

None of this implies that Xi is about to drop Putin as an ally. The key question is how Xi will balance his support for Putin with his need to stabilise relations with the US and prevent large-scale European “de-risking” – limiting technology exports to China, scrutinising investment from China, and decreasing dependency on China-only supply chains – that would further limit the access to EU markets for Chinese goods, services and capital.

Given the increasingly apparent conflict fatigue among Ukraine’s western partners and the likely benefits that Putin will reap from the current violent escalation in the Middle East, Xi is unlikely to disown Putin.

He may, however, see an opportunity to facilitate a settlement more on Russia’s terms than on Ukraine’s – a face-saving way out for Putin to claim victory that restores a modicum of stability across a region that remains crucial for the long-term success of the BRI and ultimately for China’s superpower aspirations.

If Xi were to pull this off, it would also cement China’s role in a future Euro-Atlantic and Euro-Asian security order.

While this would simultaneously turn Russia into a possible permanent second-order power in China’s shadow. It might also be Putin’s best hope of avoiding the humiliation of a never-ending war. That prospect, however, remains firmly on the cards, especially if China and the west maintain their current levels of support for Russia and Ukraine, respectively, which offers just enough for either side to avoid defeat.

Stefan Wolff is Professor of International Security at the University of Birmingham.

This article was first published by The Conversation.

Image: Muhammad Aamir Sumsum / Shutterstock.com