Diplomacy & Crisis News

Christopher Cottle

China, Asia-Pacific

Attempts by China to expand its influence are not new, but the past three years have shown a doubling of its efforts. More nations are aligning with China at an increasing rate.

The next great military threat to the United States could be brewing on a chain of islands that’s so small it doesn't appear on most world maps.

Most people have never heard of islands like Kiribati, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. That could be because the United States has ignored the South Pacific for too long, and its neglect is pushing the inhabitants towards China. 

Sitting directly west of the International Date Line, Kiribati’s islands are the first to welcome the sunrise of each new day. They are minuscule—with a total land area of just over 313 square miles—but the chain covers an area of the ocean approximately the size of Russia, spanning as far east as Fiji, and as far west as Hawaii. The few who can spot Kiribati on a map are probably aware of the role the islands served in World War II: the Battle of Tarawa, what combatant Dick Hannah called in the title of his book on the topic Tarawa, Toughest Battle in Marine Corps History. The battle took place on an island that covers less than 31 square kilometers, and whose highest point is only 4 meters above sea level. Yet the battle was crucial for inching closer within striking distance of Japan. Between 1941-1942, the world did not notice as Japan began to occupy and expand its power in the Pacific Ocean. Similarly, many in the world today have yet to notice as China continually expands its influence in the South Pacific. The United States needs to counter this trend before it's too late.

In fact, it may already be too late. On September 19, 2019, Kiribati allied with Beijing, ending its long relationship with Taiwan. The pivot was so sudden that even Teburoro Tito, Kiribati’s ambassador to the United Nations, was not aware of the situation. He was in the office of the secretary-general arguing for Taiwanese representation when he received the news. It came as quite a shock to Tito, as the former Kiribati president has always been a strong advocate for Taiwan.

In 1941, war was being waged with bullets and tanks. Today it is fought with checkbooks and diplomacy. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is not content with its current geographic situation. China is exerting its influence on its neighbors through loans and influence. Why so suddenly? China is hemmed into the region by Japan and South Korea to the east, India to the west, Russia in the north, and farther south Australia and New Zealand. China has been motivated to become more involved in Southeast Asia because of its geopolitical outlook and, more recently, beyond to the Pacific. 

And China’s strategy in Southeast Asia and the Pacific has been quite effective. Vietnam, Laos, the Philippines, and Indonesia have begun to align with Beijing despite local protests. In 2020, China entered into the Regional Cooperation Economic Partnership, with the notable absence of India who pulled out of the agreement in the final hour. Making China the biggest economy in the trade deal will give them more leverage in future negotiations. Most recently, China has been backing the military coup in Myanmar that overthrew its democratically elected government in favor of a pro-China general. Most recently, China awarded the military government $6 million in aid. In exchange for one less Taiwanese ally, the CCP paid Kiribati $60 million for two airplanes and boats. But it’s more than a Taiwanese ally; Tito expressed concern regarding Chinese military bases in his county. The United States should also be concerned as Kiribati lies just 1,300 miles south of Hawaii. And Kiribati is not the only island China is trying to win over. The Solomon Islands, which changed allegiances to Beijing four days before Kiribati, has had government leaders accused of taking bribes.

Not only has the United States lost influence during the Trump administration, but it actually appears to be getting worse. The Pacific Islands Forum of 2021, a time for the nations to meet with Australia, France, New Zealand, and the United States, ended in a total disaster. When it came time to elect the forum's new secretary-general, which typically rotates regions, Australia, New Zealand, and France upended the vote, instead backing Polynesian Candidate, Henry Puna. Micronesia’s five nations felt so disrespected that they left the meeting and pulled their membership from the forum. The increasing isolation of these nations will only push them further towards China. In an already tumultuous year for fiscal debt, coupled with the failure of the Pacific Island Forum, Beijing is in a position to capitalize on the chaos.

The United States decided to start taking the region seriously, sending Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin to Palau, as well as an agreement for the island to host a U.S. base in 2020. Under the Biden administration, the United States hopes to leverage China’s peculiar geographic situation with allies and like-minded nations to curtail China’s behavior. Certainly, the United States does have many allies around China, however, direct contact with China has not been productive. The U.S.-China Summit did not advance discourse but resulted in both sides throwing insults at each other. In 2018, Australia committed to working more in the region to push back against China but its behavior at the Pacific Island Forum proved otherwise.

Attempts by China to expand its influence are not new, but the past three years have shown a doubling of its efforts. More nations are aligning with China at an increasing rate. China successfully filled the void of much-needed funding and loans that were not provided by Western powers. This is not the first time Kiribati has been offered money in exchange for strategic islands; in 2017 the Russian Monarchist Party offered to buy three islands for $350 million, but Kiribati rejected the offer. After seeing great success, it is safe to project that China will continue to advance into the Pacific. The United States is entering the game at halftime, but it’s not too late to pull out a win. Increasing aid and loans in the region is a start, but what these islands really need are solutions to their most pressing problems of climate change, public health, and, of course, Chinese political interference. The United States shouldn’t just be the number one investor in the region, it needs to become the leader in solutions before it’s too late.

Toph Cottle studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and the University of London SOAS. He lived in Kiribati for three months.

Image: Reuters.

Stephen Silver

Coronavirus, Asia

Moon Jae-in wants to combat the coronavirus threat alongside Kim Jong-un.

Ever since the coronavirus pandemic began, North Korean officials have claimed that its citizens have not been infected by the virus. But at the same time, the nation has taken mitigation members, sometimes stringent ones. Meanwhile, North Korea is facing a known starvation crisis. 

Recently published analysis indicates that North Korea does not have a coronavirus mitigation strategy, with Pratik Jakhar of BBC Monitoring noting in an op-ed published by Foreign Policy that Kim Jong-un’s regime appears in no hurry to vaccinate its population. 

“News of countries vaccinating their people or life returning to normal is rarely, if ever, transmitted within North Korea, perhaps over fears that it might trigger resentment against the regime for its failure to secure shots,” Jakhar wrote in his op-ed. “In contrast, the propaganda apparatus has been unusually quick to report on cases rising abroad and the spread of COVID-19 variants.”

Now, there’s a new report that South Korea is offering to cooperate with North Korea on cooperation. 

According to NK News, South Korean president Moon Jae-in has made another pitch to cooperate with the North on coronavirus mitigation. The pitch from Moon came in his speech on the occasion of the seventy-sixth anniversary of Korea’s independence from Japan. It involves inviting North Korea into the Northeast Asia Cooperation Initiative for Infectious Disease Control and Public Health. That initiative currently consists of South Korea, Japan, China, Russia, Mongolia, and the United States. 

Per NK News, the objectives of the Cooperation Initiative include “information sharing, shared stockpiling of medical supplies and joint training of COVID-19 response personnel.” 

Moon formally proposed the initiative last year. 

“The Initiative proposed by President Moon Jae-in in his keynote speech at the UN General Assembly in September is a regional cooperation initiative aimed at strengthening joint response capacity among regional countries that are geographically close to each other and carrying out robust people-to-people and material exchanges, in response to transboundary health security crises including COVID-19 and the emergence of other new infectious diseases,” according to a South Korean government document from last December. 

“It is clear that the COVID-19 threat is not temporary, which makes [the initiative] even more important,” Moon said in the speech. Moon had proposed welcoming North Korea into the initiative back in March. 

Moon, who is set to leave office next May, also called for reunification between the two Koreas. 

“For us, division is the greatest obstacle to our growth and prosperity and a tenacious barrier that obstructs permanent peace,” Moon said in the speech. “We can also remove this barrier.” 

Stephen Silver, a technology writer for the National Interest, is a journalist, essayist and film critic, who is also a contributor to The Philadelphia Inquirer, Philly Voice, Philadelphia Weekly, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Living Life Fearless, Backstage magazine, Broad Street Review and Splice Today. The co-founder of the Philadelphia Film Critics Circle, Stephen lives in suburban Philadelphia with his wife and two sons. Follow him on Twitter at @StephenSilver. 

Image: Reuters

Rupert Stone

Pakistan, Afghanistan,

Maybe the United States could have had better luck strong-arming Islamabad in the early years of the Afghan war, when the Taliban was still heavily dependent on Pakistani sanctuary, financial largesse, and military advice. But that ship sailed long ago.

As the Taliban rampaged through Afghanistan last week, seizing one provincial capital after another, irate Afghans took to Twitter to protest Pakistan’s support for the militant group. Spearheaded by Canada’s former ambassador in Kabul, Chris Alexander, the hashtag #SanctionPakistan became a rallying point for those exasperated with Islamabad’s role in Afghanistan’s collapse.

Such demands are not new. U.S. politicians, including current Afghanistan special envoy Zalmay Khalilzad, have in the past proposed designating Islamabad as a state sponsor of terrorism. And they may grow even louder now that the Taliban has toppled the Afghan government and looks set to resurrect its emirate. The group’s rejection of liberal democracy and alliance with Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations could trigger new calls for Pakistan to cut ties.

But sanctions will likely fail. No manner of economic pain would coerce Islamabad into ending its relationship with the Taliban. And, even if it did, the militant group has become increasingly self-sufficient and independent of Pakistani tutelage, a process culminating in the recent seizure of power in Kabul. The Taliban’s entry into government will limit Islamabad’s influence even more.

Sanctions are a prominent but not especially effective tool of U.S. foreign policy. Economic penalties have not driven the Venezuelan or Syrian leaders from power, they have not expelled Russia from Ukraine, and they have not forced North Korea to give up its nuclear arsenal. Nor did President Donald Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran translate into meaningful Iranian concessions.

Sanctions have proven to be particularly useless in Pakistan’s case. The United States penalized Islamabad repeatedly for its development of nuclear weapons but failed to stop the testing of a Pakistani bomb in 1998. Since 9/11, periodic suspensions of military assistance, most recently by Trump in 2018, have not dented Pakistan’s support for the Taliban, Haqqani Network, and other militant organizations.

#SanctionPakistan has not specified what sanctions it would like to see: sweeping measures against Pakistani institutions, or more targeted instruments against nefarious intelligence officers? Too narrow, and the sanctions would have little impact; too harsh, and they could capsize Pakistan’s fragile economy and unleash a storm of unintended consequences, ranging from civil unrest to militant violence.

Sanctions are at their most effective when they are multilateral, but China—Pakistan’s “all-weather friend”—may well veto any measures at the UN Security Council. The United States would therefore have to go it alone, perhaps with the European Union in tow. Again, these aren’t subtleties that #SanctionPakisatan seems keen to consider. The campaign is more an outburst of rage than a rational attempt to change Pakistan’s behavior.

In any case, past experience shows that Islamabad won’t budge on issues deemed critical to its national security. As Robert Hathaway writes in The Leverage Paradox, “There is little in the historical record to support the contention that Pakistan can be bludgeoned into taking steps it believes dangerous to its security.”

The development of a Pakistani nuclear deterrent was seen as essential to warding off its arch-enemy, India. Supporting the Taliban was deemed necessary to minimize Indian influence in Afghanistan and prevent encirclement by New Delhi. This explains why sanctions have so far failed to alter Pakistan’s policies, and would likely fail again.

Moreover, Pakistan has in the past managed to cushion the impact of sanctions by relying on other countries. For example, when the United States sanctioned Pakistan after its 1965 war with India, it turned to Beijing for weapons. When U.S. military aid was cut after the annus horribilis of U.S.-Pakistan relations in 2011, which saw the Bin Laden raid among other episodes, Islamabad reached out to Russia and deepened ties with China.

Sanctions could not only backfire by driving Islamabad further into the arms of U.S. adversaries—no small thing given the size of Pakistan’s army and nuclear arsenal—they could also intensify the very problem they are supposed to prevent: support for militant proxies. A state reeling from sanctions has a greater incentive to use terrorist groups as tools of foreign policy, as they are less expensive than conventional military forces.

When Pakistan was under U.S. sanctions in the 1990s, it backed an array of militant outfits, including the Taliban, Lashkar-e Taiba, and other groups. Besides, Washington is unlikely to be receptive to #SanctionPakistan now. It has become increasingly reliant on Pakistan in its dealings with the Taliban and will likely depend on Islamabad even more as a diplomatic intermediary now that the insurgents have seized power.

Indeed, sanctions could undermine U.S. policy goals in the region. Pakistan would likely block American access to its territory in retaliation for such measures. That would prevent the United States from conducting “over the horizon” counterterrorism missions in Afghanistan, as there is no alternative to Pakistani airspace (Iran is obviously out of the question). So, if a major terrorist threat developed in Afghanistan, the United States would be powerless to stop it.

Even if sanctions had compelled Islamabad to cut off support for the Taliban insurgency, it would have made little difference to the militants’ fortunes. As the group seized more and more of Afghanistan, it no longer needed sanctuary in Pakistan, especially with U.S. airpower withdrawing and with it the threat of targeted airstrikes. And now that it is entering government, the movement doesn’t need to hide in Pakistan at all.

The Taliban was also financially self-sufficient long before its seizure of power. It has diversified its revenue streams to include not just narcotics but also mining and transit trade, along with taxes levied on local people and money from customs posts. It didn’t need Pakistani guns, either, given the amount of gear it seized from government weapons caches and the assistance of other states, such as Iran.

True, there have recently been reports of Taliban recruitment and training in Pakistan, and of wounded fighters receiving treatment in Pakistani hospitals.

But the Taliban has deliberately tried to reduce its dependence on Pakistan over the years. It established its political commission in Doha for that very reason. It also strengthened its ties to Iran, apparently opening an office in Tehran and receiving military advice from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). There have also been reports of Russia arming and funding the militant group.

Islamabad has repeatedly struggled to influence Taliban decision-making. The government of former President Pervez Musharraf tried and failed to pressure the Taliban regime at Washington’s behest. After much arm-twisting, Pakistan forced the Taliban to the negotiating table in 2015, but couldn’t deliver any concrete results. A more recent attempt to cajole the group into attending a conference in Istanbul flopped.

The Taliban have come to resent Pakistan for its meddling. Multiple Taliban have reportedly been arrested and abused in Pakistani custody, hardly a recipe for a cordial relationship.

#SanctionPakistan would, therefore, have failed to halt the Taliban’s takeover and will not achieve anything going forward. Maybe the United States could have had better luck strong-arming Islamabad in the early years of the Afghan war when the Taliban was still heavily dependent on Pakistani support. But that ship sailed long ago. With the Taliban now in power, it no longer needs the patronage of Big Daddy in Rawalpindi.

Rupert Stone is a freelance journalist working on issues related to South Asia and the Middle East. He has written for various publications, including Newsweek, VICE News, Al Jazeera, and The Independent.

Image: Reuters.

John Cicchitti

Lawfare,

If the Biden administration truly wants to harden American critical infrastructure against attack, it will include protecting U.S. legal institutions in its strategy.

The Biden administration is prioritizing the protection of critical U.S. infrastructure, but its plans are missing one big target for adversaries: the American legal system. Repressive, adversarial state actors are using the United States’ legal system to advance their nefarious causes. Efforts to secure America’s cyberspace, its physical infrastructure, its energy network, and its election processes are welcome developments but will be for naught if U.S. leaders fail to protect the foundations of democracy. If the Biden administration truly wants to harden American critical infrastructure against attack, it will include protecting U.S. legal institutions in its strategy.

Moscow is the world’s leading practitioner of so-called grey area operations, which include cyber-attacks, information operations, economic coercion, the use of surrogates and criminal organizations, and leveraging membership in international organizations. Among these, Russian intelligence operatives have meddled in or attempted to meddle in U.S. and European elections. Hackers from Russia also recently disrupted a significant chunk of America’s energy sector by strangling the Colonial Pipeline and holding it for ransom.

U.S. leaders have prioritized preventing these attacks on American infrastructure. The Department of Defense, for instance, has secured much of its network using verification programs like Comply to Connect, while critical infrastructure is using technology like Binary Armor to harden systems.

Beyond its underhanded actions, Russia has committed overt acts of aggression, including invading countries, conducting political assassinations, and exerting economic pressure on Eastern Europe. Moscow’s rising encroachments are driving its neighbors to reinforce their militaries, such as Poland’s planned purchases of the M1 Abrams tank and the F-35 fighter jet. 

Russia has added lawfare to its bag of grey area tricks. Moscow has resorted to manipulating international legal processes to achieve repressive ends. For example, it takes advantage of Interpol’s Red Notice system to pursue dissidents and opponents of Russian president Vladimir Putin’s regime. A Red Notice is the equivalent of an arrest warrant, requesting that Interpol members’ domestic law enforcement detain and extradite the target to the notice issuer. Russia is the most prolific user of these notices, accounting for almost forty percent of Red Notices, despite having less than two percent of the world’s population.

These Red Notices endanger targets by bestowing a veneer of legitimacy on cross-border repression. In perhaps the most famous example, Russian law enforcement produced a Red Notice to intimidate American-British human rights activist Bill Browder, whose work to expose government corruption in Russia put him at the top of the Putin regime’s hit list. In another instance, Moscow used fake reports of Red Notices to embarrass politicians in Moldova who supported orienting the country toward Europe rather than Russia.

This abuse of Red Notices has unfortunately spread to the United States. In some instances, it has led to U.S. law enforcement acting as an arm of the Putin regime. Complying with what appeared as a legitimate law enforcement request, Immigration and Customs Enforcement arrested Russian dissident Gregory Duralev in response to a Red Notice issued through Interpol. Moscow charged Duralev with fraud after he wrote a thesis on political corruption in Russia and issued a Red Notice. This was enough to produce an arrest and detention, even though the notice was “nearly incomprehensible.” Duralev’s case is now tied up in U.S. courts as he attempts to avoid extradition and deportation back to the country that is persecuting him.

Even more troubling, Russian agents are using the U.S. court system itself to hunt dissidents. These efforts often appear as innocuous legal maneuvers. One example is Moscow’s pursuit of Sergey Leontiev, a prominent supporter of Russian democratic activist Alexei Navalny. Leontiev escaped the Russian government by fleeing to the United States, but Moscow forced his business into bankruptcy and initiated proceedings against the entity. The Russian government then brought its dispute to an American court, asking a judge to force Leontiev to turn over documents in the case. This fishing expedition into Leontiev’s businesses is a clear attempt to silence Putin’s critics. The Russians pursuing Leontiev in court are Putin cronies, some of whom were sanctioned under the U.S. Magnitsky Act, a law designed to punish human rights abusers.

The judge ruled in favor of the Russian government and ordered Leontiev to submit to discovery despite the fact that these documents would end up in the hands of Magnitsky Act-sanctioned individuals. Comity among international judicial systems was among the main reasons the judge supported the Russian action, even though it’s unlikely a Russian court would ever return the favor. Instead, the judge’s ruling has allowed Moscow to manipulate American legal mechanisms to spy on and harass Putin’s opponents.

Unfortunately, U.S. legal institutions have naively failed to recognize these dangers. The Department of Justice (DOJ) celebrated a 2017 settlement with Prevezon Holdings, a corrupt Russian firm, for $5.9 million—even though the underlying offense was a $230 million fraud scheme involving the Russian government. Such a small penalty will not deter Russia’s export of corruption.

Subsequent developments illustrate Russia’s nefarious use of lawfare in the Prevezon case. In 2019 the DOJ announced perjury charges against Prevezon’s lawyer, Natalya Veselnitskaya. The charging documents detail Veselnitskaya’s efforts to launder Russian disinformation into an American courtroom to exonerate Prevezon. Veselnitskaya presented a dubious Russian investigation into the Prevezon claims as exculpatory evidence. However, she declined to inform the court that she herself had worked with Russian officials to draft the documents. In essence, Russian officials were trying to use American courts to launder their corrupt investigation into a legitimate legal victory. 

This laundering of shady Russian legal claims into American courts is a disturbing pattern the federal government must address. Continuing to allow Russian kleptocrats to infiltrate America’s legal infrastructure would turn our system of laws into a tool of repression. Like U.S. and Eastern European efforts to protect against Russian attacks in other sectors, the West must add the U.S. legal system to its security priorities. It must train DOJ personnel and American jurists in the characteristic features of Russian lawfare. Failing to do so would leave America’s democracy undefended against Russia’s number one export: corruption.

John Cicchitti is a program manager at the Lexington Institute. He is also a law student at George Mason University’s Antonin Scalia Law School.

Image: Reuters

Richard Douglas

Guns,

Designed to be durable and easy to use, the short action is paired up with a barrel that has been cryogenically treated for stress relief.

There are plenty of excellent choices if you are looking for a long-range precision rifle. However, if you want the best top-shelf precision rifle, Rock River Arms has quite a contender for the title. The RBG-1S, released in 2019, is a magnificent long-range rifle that I’ve recently had the pleasure to test and evaluate.

One of the luxuries that you’ll get for the $4,500 price tag is the ability to customize your rifle from the factory, as well as in the field. The RBG Series includes the .308 and 7.62 bolt gun or the 6.5 Creedmoor. The 1:8 twist stainless steel barrel has three options for length at 20, 22, or 24”. My .308 has a 24” barrel and an overall length of 43.5”. All in, this rig weighs about eleven pounds empty without its accessories. After you decide how much rifle you want, there are three color options (black, tan, and green) on the table to choose from as well.

Some other features that stand out on the RBG-1S include a well-placed short top-Picatinny rail with counterpart lower rail. Neither rail is very long, but they are both all I need or expect on a big precision hunter. My best optics are well-mounted and secure atop the RBG-1S. An oversized bolt handle is very generously sized and operates the 3-lug bolt system with smooth-as-silk motion.

With an ideal blend in the action, stock, and barrel, Rock River Arms has done a marvelous job with the RBG’s design to set me up for optimum Sub-MOA accuracy. Designed to be durable and easy to use, the short action is paired up with a barrel that has been cryogenically treated for stress relief. The operation of the controlled round feed is tailored to me, with an incredibly versatile chassis. A comfortable straight pistol grip leads the way. The fully adjustable stock and comb ensure I can make whatever adjustments are needed to fit me perfectly. A Remington-style safety is within easy reach and the bottom feed box mag can be swapped out with any AICS mag. The clean trigger is snappy and feels lighter than its actual weight, which was an enjoyable discovery on my long range.

Everything about Rock River’s top-shelf precision shooter shines bright with quality. From out-of-the-box feel to the practical on-range performance, this is an heirloom rifle if I’ve ever seen one. Named quite simply, the RBG-1S stands for Rock Bolt Gun, 1st generation short action. That tells me that Rock River has every intention to continue to improve on this impressive rig. I can’t wait to see what they come up with next.

Richard Douglas writes on firearms, defense, and security issues. He is the founder and editor of Scopes Field, and a columnist at The National Interest, 1945, Daily Caller, and other publications.

Image: YouTube

Trevor Filseth

Coronavirus,

Because the vaccination gives one a 99.999 percent chance of survival against the Delta variant, anyone who receives a vaccine should be relatively assured that they are safe.

Around the United States, many jurisdictions that lifted their coronavirus lockdowns in the spring, following an initially successful vaccination drive, have now re-implemented them. The main cause of this has been the surge in cases from COVID-19’s “Delta variant,” a new strain of the virus that is more transmissible than the original.

While new infections and deaths are still significantly lower than they were during the winter, they have trended steadily upward over the summer—and some of them, albeit far fewer per capita, have been “breakthrough infections,” cases from Americans who had previously been inoculated from the virus.

Around 165 million people, or just more than half of the U.S. population, are now fully vaccinated against the coronavirus. For this reason, there is understandable concern about the potential for breakthrough infections to affect them.

Scientists have argued that the vaccines continue to be effective, and the fact that breakthrough infections occur in a small minority of those who have been vaccinated highlights how effective the inoculations are in a more broad sense.

The data collected by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) highlights this point. Per the information that the agency has collected, 7,101 people in the United States who have received both doses of the vaccine were later hospitalized for the disease, and of that group, 1,507 later died of the disease.

According to this data, a person who has been vaccinated has a 0.005 percent chance of being hospitalized for the disease and a 0.001 percent chance of dying from it.

This is not to say that only 0.005 percent of people who receive both shots are likely to contract COVID-19 later. The vaccines were billed as being ninety to ninety-five percent effective against the virus, meaning that, on average, one or two out of every twenty people will develop an infection later. However, because the vaccine’s immunity protects against the worst symptoms of the virus, these cases often go unreported. A person is unlikely to take a COVID test unless they are already feeling ill, which many people affected by mild cases do not.

Still, because the vaccination gives one a 99.999 percent chance of survival against the Delta variant, anyone who receives a vaccine should be relatively assured that they are safe.

It is important to note that some of the CDC’s data is outdated, and comes from the months before the Delta variant was as widespread as it is today. However, current statistics still overwhelmingly show that vaccinated Americans are far safer than unvaccinated ones. A Kaiser Family Foundation survey, published in July, found that ninety-five percent of COVID-19 hospital patients in eighteen reporting states were unvaccinated people. Comparatively, vaccinated Americans have little to fear.

Trevor Filseth is a current and foreign affairs writer for the National Interest.

Image: Reuter

Prakhar Sharma

Afghanistan, Asia

If the United States doesn’t urgently provide material and symbolic support to the Afghan people and ensure that the Taliban exercises moderation in its governance, the ambition of a democratic Afghanistan may be forgotten forever.

The new Afghanistan is dying. A dream was conceived in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks: to enable the development of a progressive, pluralistic, democratic Afghanistan, liberated from the draconian Taliban regime and its regressive legacies. That dream of a new Afghanistan is now lamentably truncated as the Taliban took over Kabul, buoyed by their success in several other provinces, and enabled by the Biden administration’s indifference. If the United States doesn’t urgently provide material and symbolic support to the Afghan people and ensure that the Taliban exercises moderation in its governance, the ambition of a democratic Afghanistan may be forgotten forever. It will be a shame for the United States—the boldest champion of democratic development in the world. It will also be a setback for democracy aspirants and offer exactly the kind of reassurance that America’s competitors—Russia and China—are seeking.

For the last twenty years, the vision of a new Afghanistan that would democratically represent the aspirations of its largely young population, negotiate its internal strife, and become a meaningful stakeholder in regional development inspired millions of young Afghans. After experiencing unceasing death, destruction, and despair brought by the Soviet invasion, civil war, and by the Taliban regime, Afghans longed for peace and stability and a political order that would be representative of their collective aspirations. That dream was mercilessly compromised, first by a desperate deal between the United States and the Taliban that would relegate the Afghan state to the role of a spectator in its own future, and then by a hasty withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan, leaving the Afghan forces vulnerable to the Taliban.

Scores of Afghans have been perishing daily, mostly in the hands of the Taliban—a Pashtun-dominated armed group that was ousted from power in 2001 and is now back in Kabul after a twenty-year-long war. Members of the Afghan government and its armed forces; private organizations; civilians, activists, and artists; schoolteachers and students; men, women, and children—No one in Afghanistan is spared the humiliation of living in a context where daily survival from violence is now an unstated accomplishment.

Many would argue that the Afghan state is fundamentally flawed, corrupt, deeply unstable, predatory, and ineffectual. The incompetence of the Afghan state, they would contend, fueled support for the Taliban. They are right. The Afghan state is unable to communicate its moral authority to most Afghans, and it is hapless against the inflating expectations of the population. But many of its imperfections are hard to separate from U.S. policies in Afghanistan. It was irresponsible for the United States to encourage and incentivize deal-making over formal institution building for twenty years and then blame Afghan culture for not being ripe for democratic development. Or to create a winner-takes-all electoral system and then pin the electoral chaos on Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani. Or fight proxy wars by empowering warlords and delegitimizing the very government it supported. Or build Afghan national security forces in a way that would have them rely heavily on American equipment, and then decide to withdraw without a plan to sustain those arrangements. So, while we rightly point to the dysfunctions of the Afghan state, we should also take a moment to reflect on the U.S. role in systematically enabling those dysfunctions.

Rebuilding a country after war is a formidable task. History offers few examples that would inspire the confidence of state-builders. No one would argue that Afghanistan was an easy engagement. The state’s architecture had to be resurrected in 2002 after two decades (now four decades) of violent conflict. Scores of development agencies were rallied to provide services to the population while the new Afghan state was being incarnated. Western and Eastern diplomats were engaged to legitimize and enable the aspirations of the new Afghanistan. Efforts in the last twenty years created a flawed state, but it was also one that enabled millions to pursue education, embrace media and technology, connect with the rest of the world, and express themselves. Those gains are now likely to be compromised with the Taliban in power.

As news of death and destruction from Afghanistan appear with alarming ferocity on our social media feeds, there is a temptation to fall for the false comfort of easy characterizations such as victory and failure—terms that may be useful to strategists but are not meaningful to millions of Afghans who are braving violence, fear, and anxiety every day. Now is the time to prioritize targeted humanitarian assistance and lend support to democracy aspirants in Afghanistan. This can range from championing democratic aspirations at the grassroots level, holding the Taliban accountable for its governance, ensuring the Afghan minorities and women continue to live freely and independently, and maintaining diplomatic and cultural links between the two countries.

The Taliban’s recent successes mean more than the pain it inflicts on innocent communities. For the first time in over a generation, we, the members of the international community, are witnessing the dismantling of the very state in Afghanistan that we enabled. We are also, simultaneously, witnessing the development of the new Taliban emirate. The Biden administration’s indifference to this reality is unbecoming of a superpower. It also betrays America’s moral commitment to its allies and its responsibility to protect Afghans whose lives are now held hostage by the Taliban’s theocratic absolutism.

Most of these Afghans—young Afghans armed with the ambition of a secular society—have dared to dream of a new Afghanistan that would overcome the legacies of their dark history, correct the mistakes of their previous generations, and embrace western ideals. These are the green shoots of optimism in an otherwise bleak context. America must not give up on them.

Prakhar Sharma is a Ph.D. candidate in Political Science at Maxwell School, Syracuse University. He is writing his dissertation on nation-building in Afghanistan. He has studied Afghanistan since 2006 and lived in the country for four years between 2006 and 2016.

Image: Reuters.

Ryan Nabil

Artificial Intelligence,

As the EU falls behind China and the United States in technological innovation, the continent needs more technological innovation and investment. By imposing these costly requirements, the EU risks a brain drain of its smartest entrepreneurs and innovative businesses. 

The European Union is now considering what could become the world’s first comprehensive legislation on artificial intelligence (AI). The aim is to promote European leadership in emerging technology. The proposed regulation seeks to limit government involvement in surveillance, but it actually threatens innovation in several ways. American policymakers should pay attention to avoid making a similar mistake. 

The EU’s proposed Artificial Intelligence Act (AIA) would classify AI activities into different categories according to their perceived level of risk. For example, it would ban some intrusive AI-enabled government activities—such as social credit scoring systems and biometric surveillance—that pose high risks to individual privacy and limit AI usage in law enforcement facial recognition systems. These are a step in the right direction. 

But the EIA’s proposed regulation also poses significant challenges to innovative European businesses. First, it adopts an overly vague and expansive definition of AI, which would potentially allow regulators to impose costly requirements on a wide variety of businesses. For example, the EU’s definition of AI includes software that employs machine learning approaches “using a wide variety of methods.” According to the Commission, software using “statistical approaches” and “Bayesian estimation”—a common field of statistics—could become subject to regulation as artificial intelligence. That is especially a problem because as many as three-fourths of all EU businesses might use AI by 2030. 

Companies would need to undergo expensive compliance requirements if they offer products in high-risk activities such as biometric identification. But the EU’s proposed definition of high-risk activities is so broad that it would classify use of AI in a wide range of sectors—including “education, finance/insurance, health, IT, technical/scientific activities, social work, and critical infrastructure”—as potentially high-risk activities. Together, these sectors account for thirty-five percent of the EU’s combined GDP. According to one estimate, the proposed legislation could reduce AI investment in Europe by twenty percent and cost the EU economy €31 billion ($36.4 billion) over the next five years. 

Take education, for example. An AI-enabled English proficiency test recently developed by the language-learning app Duolingo would be subject to regulation under the EU’s high-risk category simply because it uses an algorithm to evaluate “participants in tests commonly required for admission to educational institutions.” 

The AIA will particularly hobble innovation by startups and small businesses. According to EU estimates, small- and medium-sized enterprises (SME)—defined as businesses with up to fifty employees or €10 million ($11.74 million) in turnover—that offer a single high-risk AI product could be subject to total compliance cost burden of up to €400,000 ($469,000). Given that the average SME has a profit margin of ten percent, the AIA is expected to reduce SME profits by forty percent for such products. In face of such an increased compliance burden, many European businesses might simply turn away from innovating in many sectors.

Even worse, the most innovative European businesses can simply move somewhere else, like London and Silicon Valley, with a friendlier regulatory environment. If so, the proposed act will have the opposite effect of what the EU needs. As the EU falls behind China and the United States in technological innovation, the continent needs more technological innovation and investment. By imposing these costly requirements, the EU risks a brain drain of its smartest entrepreneurs and innovative businesses. 

The EU’s recent efforts at developing AI legislation have important lessons for American policymakers. America’s hands-off approach to technology regulation has been more innovative than Brussels’ top-down one. While the United States has yet to enact federal AI legislation, individual states and ultimately Congress could pass laws related to privacy and artificial intelligence. In that case, they should avoid the EU’s overly restrictive definition of AI and the burdensome regulations it entails. 

Ryan Nabil is a Research Fellow at the Competitive Enterprise Institute in Washington, D.C, and Fox International Fellow at the Institut d’Etudes Politiques (Sciences Po) in Paris.

Image: Reuters

Mohammed Al-Sulami

Afghanistan, Asia

Afghanistan has been an open arena for disputes between major world powers and for competition between regional powers for centuries, and this has not changed today.

Events in Afghanistan are moving at a rapid pace and escalating. The fragile government in Kabul has collapsed, and the Taliban has taken complete control over all of Afghanistan’s territories without facing much resistance.

This rapid escalation of events prompted the Afghan government to agree to hand over power to the Taliban and form a transitional government. As developments accelerated, however, two Taliban officials told Reuters that there will be no transitional government in Afghanistan, with the group expecting a full transfer of power to it.

There is no doubt that the impacts of these developments will not be confined to Afghanistan. The Taliban has an overwhelming desire to restore its leadership in the country despite it facing vast disapproval in light of its negative image among huge segments in society—especially among women, minorities, and the young.

Afghanistan has been an open arena for disputes between major world powers and for competition between regional powers for centuries, and this has not changed today. Yet it may be the case that what is happening now is not merely the result of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan after years of extensive talks with the Taliban in Doha. Anyone looking at Afghanistan’s strategic location between China and Russia and its place in China’s Belt and Road Initiative will realize Afghanistan’s significance in Washington’s confrontation with Beijing, particularly since Beijing has thwarted the U.S. naval blockade in the South China Sea by developing overland trade routes and transit corridors going through Pakistan.

In other words, from Washington’s strategic perspective, the latest step against China could be to use Afghanistan to encircle Beijing, cutting off vital overland roads passing through Afghanistan by restoring chaos in a country that is accustomed to being an arena for global powers to settle their conflicts.

In addition to trade, there is also a security dimension in the context of U.S.-China competition. In recent years, U.S. officials and media outlets have become increasingly focused on the predicament of Uighur Muslims in China’s Xinjiang region. Xinjiang represents the “line of contagion” between China and Afghanistan, with no official border crossings in this area due to the region’s harsh terrain. From this perspective and in light of the chaos unfolding in Afghanistan—which is already fertile ground for new extremist groups to emerge—it is totally plausible that a newly rebranded version of Al Qaeda or ISIS will emerge there and swiftly infiltrate the Sino-Afghan border to cross into China, hence creating a security challenge for Beijing and undermining its new commercial artery.

Sensing this potential danger, Beijing has already begun intensifying its communications with the Taliban and recently welcomed a high-profile delegation of Taliban officials. This visit came amid leaked reports, which seem implausible, of a deal underway between the Taliban and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) whereby China will provide the Taliban with money, weapons, and equipment in return for cooperation in cracking down on the Uighurs and crushing separatism in the region of East Turkestan.

It is possible that the Taliban is seeking to dupe both the United States and China by planning to exploit each side’s concerns and objectives by selling deceptive promises until it manages to fully take control of Afghanistan. Regardless, the phase that follows the Taliban’s full exertion of control over Afghanistan will provide answers to many of the questions raised, which remain unknown for the time being.

Iran has interests in Afghanistan, too. Thus far, the Iranian leadership is said to be deeply suspicious of the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan. As a result, Tehran is doing more observing than acting, watching as the situation plays out across the border. Many analysts focus on the classical approach underpinning the relationship between the Taliban and Tehran, arguing that because the two have opposing religious ideologies that they will have divergent relations. While this was true prior to 2001, the nature of this relationship changed massively after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, with strong bridges being built (although some may insist that this relationship is based on realpolitik, necessity, and shared interests) from the provision of Iranian logistical and intelligence support for the Taliban, which opened an office in the Iranian city of Mashhad near the border with Afghanistan and regularly visited Tehran to meet with senior officials.

Those who have monitored Iran’s comments regarding the Taliban in recent years would have noticed a softening of Tehran’s general position towards the group. For example, in an interview conducted by the Afghan Tolo channel, former Iranian foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif said, 

As you pointed out, the Taliban killed eight of my colleagues before doing so with others. Therefore, our definition of the Taliban is that the Taliban has committed many terrorist acts. Before naming the Taliban as terrorists, the Taliban is a group in Afghanistan that has committed terrorist acts and it is necessary now to consider the Taliban as part of a future solution, not [the whole] future solution for Afghanistan. There is a big difference in it… Look, the Taliban has committed many terrorist acts. Regarding recognition of the Taliban as a terrorist group, we have not removed the Taliban [from our list of] terrorist groups, in our laws.

Here, it is necessary to point out that the new generation of Taliban leaders may not embrace the complex set of ideological tenets espoused by the group’s founding fathers. Nowadays, they have adopted a more pragmatic approach regarding political objectives that significantly impact the decision-making process among the group’s senior leadership.

It is possible that the Taliban could turn a blind eye to the fact that Iran played a pivotal role in the fall of its former government. But the Taliban’s approach to Iran in the upcoming period depends on the nature of its relations with the remaining actors, especially the United States and China.

On balance, it seems probable that Iran will seek to take advantage of the panic currently gripping Afghan society, especially among Shiites, in order to attempt to legitimize the presence of the Iran-aligned Afghan Shiite militia, the Fatemiyoun Brigade. This militia, created and controlled by Iran, was deployed in Syria to fight alongside the forces of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad and the other Iran-aligned militia deployed across Syrian territory.

Considering regular Iranian statements about forming a Shiite army in Afghanistan that would resemble Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces, and that many of the Fatemiyoun Brigade’s members have returned to the country, Tehran has created an essential base for rendering such a plan successful. Indeed, informed sources have told me that Iran opened discussions with the Afghan government on this issue some weeks ago, with Ashraf Ghani’s government reportedly requesting some time to study the proposal.

Yet a few hours after I tweeted this news, the Fatemiyoun Brigade issued a statement denying and dismissing the claims as baseless. The Fatemiyoun Brigade’s statement was reported by multiple Iranian media outlets, primarily the semi-official Tasnim news agency affiliated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). However, we should be mindful of the fact that the IRGC’s elite Qods Force is the prime architect of all Iran’s militias in the region. Its incumbent commander, Esmail Ghaani, was a heavyweight field commander in Afghanistan and Pakistan while the former commander, Qassem Soleimani, who was killed in a U.S. drone strike in Baghdad in January 2020, was responsible for coordinating with the Iran-linked militias in the Arab nations.

The challenge for Iran on this issue is how to strike a balance between acting smartly on the Afghan stage in a way that serves its interests while simultaneously avoiding angering China. As long as Tehran remains economically reliant on Beijing, the Iranians will have to tread carefully. 

The fourth nation involved in Afghanistan’s future is Pakistan, which is considered to be the chief inspiration of the Taliban, with accusations repeatedly leveled against Islamabad that it provides the Taliban with money and weapons and directs the group to carry out its instructions. While there may be some exaggeration about Pakistan’s control over the Taliban’s decision-making process, India, Pakistan’s arch-foe, believes that the Taliban’s control over Afghanistan creates new strategic depth for Islamabad and poses an acute danger to New Delhi in the medium run, especially when it comes to the disputed region of Jammu and Kashmir.

Considering the depth of Pakistan’s strategic economic relationship with China, any attack or actions by the Taliban on China’s territory could adversely affect the nature of Pakistani relations with the Taliban by damaging Pakistan’s interests. Thus, it is possible that China could exploit its relations with Pakistan to neutralize any danger that the Taliban could pose to China and its interests. 

These developments and the Taliban’s sudden ascendancy in Afghanistan should not be surprising to any close observer of Afghan affairs, especially after the marathon negotiations in Doha. Despite all the initial pragmatic commitments that the Taliban has made, whether with the United States or with China, the group will now find itself in a position that allows it to re-evaluate its interests and how best to achieve its objectives. Previous political analyses on the Taliban’s strength and the degree of approval domestically and internationally are now largely irrelevant and unhelpful in light of the new fait accompli on the ground. Time will reveal how the region adapts.

Dr. Mohammed Al-Sulami is the founder and president of the International Institute for Iranian Studies (Rasanah) based in Riyadh, KSA. He tweets @mohalsulami.

Image: Reuters.

Mark Episkopos

Hypersonic Missile,

Russia’s hypersonic Tsirkon missile has undergone yet another round of testing, bringing the weapon a step closer to combat readiness.  

Here's What You Need to Remember: The Russian Navy has reportedly decided to fast-track the remainder of Tsirkon’s state trials, with a flurry of testing activity planned over the course of August.

Russia’s hypersonic Tsirkon missile has undergone yet another round of testing, bringing the weapon a step closer to combat readiness.  

Russia’s Ministry of Defence announced on Monday that its Navy had performed a test launch of the Tsirkon test launch from the White Sea at a notional surface target on the coast of the Barents Sea. “According to live monitoring data, the Tsirkon missile successfully hit a target directly at a range of over 350 km. During the test, the tactical and technical characteristics were confirmed. The flight speed reached nearly 7 Mach,” the defense ministry said in a statement. Additionally, the Ministry of Defence published a brief video clip from the exercise on its Youtube channel. The footage showed the Admiral Gorshkov-class frigate Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Gorshkov, clearly demarcated by its pennant number 454, moving into firing position. The video then showed the Tsirkon missile being launched and flying at an upwards trajectory from several different angles.

Tsirkon, also known as “Zircon,” was launched at least four other times from Admiral Gorshkov since January 2020, hitting both ground and sea targets at distances ranging from 350–500 kilometers. Tsirkon is a winged, hypersonic anti-ship missile that is reportedly capable of reaching speeds of up to Mach 9 and performing mid-flight maneuvers. Tsirkon’s operational range remains unclear, with estimates ranging from 1,000–2,000 kilometers depending on the circumstances of the engagement. A defense insider recently told TASS news that Tsirkon boasts a range of roughly 1,500 kilometers for ground targets and “slightly less” than that for hitting naval targets. Tsirkon appears to have the potential to hold U.S. Navy Carrier Strike Groups at risk and to significantly impede these formations from operating effectively.  

The Russian Navy has reportedly decided to fast-track the remainder of Tsirkon’s state trials, with a flurry of testing activity planned over the course of August. “The first launch from the Admiral Gorshkov frigate within the state trials is planned for the first part of August,” a defense industry insider told TASS state news. “The second part of August will see flight trials of Zircon from the Severodvinsk nuclear submarine," the source added. 

Live-fire tests from submarines are the next major step on Tsirkon’s path to combat readiness, as the hypersonic missile is expected to figure prominently into the capabilities of Russia’s new Yasen-class of nuclear-powered cruise missile submarines. Reports surfaced earlier this month that the Admiral Gorshkov-class frigate Admiral Golovko will become the first active-service vessel to receive the Tsirkon upgrade. Other possible Tsirkon fittings include the Kirov-class battlecruisers Admiral Nakhimov and Petr Velikiy. Russia’s Ministry of Defence is also eying select corvettes from the Gremyashchiy-class and Karakurt-class. Russian president Vladimir Putin previously appeared to suggest that a land-based Tsirkon variant is in the works, but the status of those development efforts remains uncertain.

Defense industry insiders told Russian state media earlier this year that Tsirkon is expected to enter service in the “first half of 2022,” pending the success of its upcoming submarine trials.

Mark Episkopos is the national security reporter for the National Interest. 

This article first appeared earlier and is being reposted due to reader interest. 

Image: Reuters

A case of Ebola virus has been confirmed in Côte d’Ivoire for the first time since 1994, the country’s Ministry of Health has confirmed. The World Health Organization (WHO) is coordinating the delivery of vaccines to the country.

Voilà bien un pays destiné par nature à connaître des troubles. L'endroit où il se situe pourrait être aujourd'hui, comme son histoire l'a démontré dans le passé, l'un des points vitaux stratégiques du monde, entre la Russie, le Pakistan et la Chine. C'est en passant par ses défilés montagneux que les (...) / Afghanistan, URSS, Politique, Relations Est-Ouest, Diplomatie, Frontières - 1965/12

Washington ignored Islamabad funding and supplying the Taliban. Now Afghans are paying the price.

Mark Episkopos

Guns,

A more formidable Glock 22 that’s not only more accurate but offers better handling and improved durability. 

Here's What You Need To Remember: The Glock 22, along with its smaller Glock 23 counterpart, was recently upgraded to the Gen4 standard. But in 2020, the Glock 22 made the leap to Gen5—Glock’s latest handgun platform. 

One of America’s most popular service handguns, the Glock 22 got even better in 2020 with the vaunted Gen5 upgrade.  

First introduced in 1990, the Glock 22 is a .40 S&W version of the iconic Glock 17. The .40 Smith & Wesson round was designed specifically for law enforcement in 1990, following the infamous 1986 Miami Shootout in which eight FBI agents were outgunned by just two robbers. The Glock 22 became one of the first mass-produced .40 S&W guns, widely adopted by police departments across the United States. Their visual similarities notwithstanding, the Glock 22 employs a slightly different frame from the Glock 17 to account for its heavier .40 S&W rounds. It also carries two less rounds, for a total of fifteen as opposed to the Glock 17’s seventeen. The baseline Glock 22 is only slightly heavier than the Glock 17 but boasts an identical barrel length and trigger pull.  

In the decades that followed, Glock released a steady stream of revisions—dubbed “generations”—to keep pace with competitors. The informal second generation brought minor frame revisions and caliber options for certain models; Gen3 was a more comprehensive upgrade package, offering numerous ergonomics updates in addition to a universal accessory rail for mounting such tools as lights or lasers. Introduced in 2010, the Gen4 revision featured a new backstrap system and Rough Textured Frame (RTF) surface for additional grip support, among other quality of life improvements.

The Glock 22, along with its smaller Glock 23 counterpart, was recently upgraded to the Gen4 standard. But in 2020, the Glock 22 made the leap to Gen5—Glock’s latest handgun platform. Gen5 brings nDLC  (diamond-like carbon) coating for added protection against scratches and corrosion, the new  GLOCK Marksman Barrel (GMB) with superior rifling, flared magwell for more streamlined reloads, ambidextrous slide stop, smoother and more ergonomic trigger design, and the removal of finger grooves to better accommodate all possible hand sizes.

The Gen5 Glock 22 is available in two variants: the baseline model, and the Modular Optic System (MOS) variant that adds compatibility with popular aftermarket optics solutions. The Gen5 iteration of the Glock 22 has little interchangeability with prior models.  

Not terribly impactful by themselves, Gen5’s slew of small-but-thoughtful changes quickly add up to produce a more formidable Glock 22 that’s not only more accurate but offers better handling and improved durability. Nevertheless, the .40 S&W caliber’s popularity has declined precipitously in recent years; even the FBI, which originally commissioned the round, has stopped using it, returning instead to higher-capacity, softer-shooting, and more compact 9mm guns. Although too unwieldy for law enforcement, the 10-millimeter caliber has recently resurfaced as an increasingly popular option for consumers (especially some hunters) who want the stopping power and don’t mind the recoil.

The Gen5 upgrade breathes much-needed new life into Glock’s .40 S&W range, but it likely won’t be enough to reverse the .40 S&W ongoing downwards spiral in the consumer and law enforcement markets. 

Mark Episkopos is a national security reporter for the National Interest.

This piece first appeared earlier this year and is being reprinted due to reader interest.

Image: Creative Commons

Mark Episkopos

Tempest Stealth Fighter,

There's no hiding from the cost. 

Here's What You Need to Remember: The Tempest project’s current partners include Italy and Sweden. The government, which has always been clear that the financial solvency of the Tempest project hinges on securing a steady stream of foreign investment, is also currently exploring partnership opportunities with Japan.

The United Kingdom is forging ahead with its ambitious project to produce a home-grown stealth warplane, even as it strives to retain its status as one of the core partners in the F-35 stealth fighter jet program.

London is doubling down on plans to indigenously produce its upcoming BAE Systems Tempest jet fighter, a next-generation successor to the United Kingdom’s Eurofighter Typhoon fleet. In a March 2021 Command Paper to Parliament, the British Ministry of Defense (MOD) reiterated that the Tempest fighter will be a major procurement priority into the coming decades. “Tempest will exploit our unique industrial base to create a 6th generation combat air enterprise centred in the UK,” the paper reads. “This fully digital enterprise will transform delivery, achieving pace and lowering cost and disrupting traditional approaches to defence procurement.”

The Tempest project’s current partners include Italy and Sweden. The government, which has always been clear that the financial solvency of the Tempest project hinges on securing a steady stream of foreign investment, is also currently exploring partnership opportunities with Japan.

As with most other next-generation fighters, the Tempest fighter will offer its own form of sensor fusion. The fighter’s ambitious Tempest’s Multi-Function Radio Frequency System (MFRFS) data collection protocols will be “four times as accurate as existing sensors in a package 1/10th the size,” according to defense contractor and Tempest partner Leonardo. The MFRFS will filter the battlefield information it collects through its onboard processor suite, generating a dynamic picture of the battlefield that can include everything from enemy movements to terrain layout. Like the F-35 jet, the Tempest fighter can also act as a flying command and control center by feeding some of that information to nearby friendly units. The Tempest project is betting big on future-oriented experimental avionics systems, with BAE Systems working on a “wearable cockpit” interface that replaces both analog and digital inputs with augmented reality (AR) display, supported by an integrated network of artificial intelligence (AI) features.

The Tempest’s project’s preoccupation with unorthodox prototype technologies extends to its weapons loadout. At a Rome seminar on missile defense, Italy’s General Enzo Vecciarelli suggested that the Tempest fighter could incorporate directed-energy weapons to counter hypersonic missiles. “On Tempest there will be a large amount of energy available and I don’t rule out the use of directed energy,” Vecciarelli said. It was previously confirmed that the Tempest fighter will also carry hypersonic missiles of its own, in addition to being able to operate drone swarms.

As the Tempest project moves further along in the development stage, the fate of the UK’s massive F-35 jet procurement plans hangs in the balance. As a “Level 1” partner in the F-35 program, London previously stated it will purchase as many as 138 units of Lockheed Martin’s fifth-generation stealth fighter. London, however, has so far only ordered forty-eight F-35 jet fighters. The MOD says it plans to “grow the [F-35] Force, increasing the fleet size beyond the 48 aircraft that we have already ordered,” but is dragging its feet on whether or not it remains committed to an acquisition target of 138 F-35 fighters.

The Tempest fighter is projected to reach Initial Operating Capability (IOC) by 2035.

Mark Episkopos is a national security reporter for The National Interest.

Image: Reuters.

Tightly bound kinship networks aren’t vestiges of the past. They’re a modern—and effective—form of political organization.

Ethen Kim Lieser

Child Tax Credit, Americas

There were still some concerning numbers, such as nearly 30 percent of adults in households with children had a hard time paying for their household expenses in the previous week, which was down only slightly from the previous month.

There only has been one round of payments from the expanded child tax credits, but it appears that it is already having a sizable impact on millions of struggling Americans amid the ongoing coronavirus pandemic.

According to the latest Census Bureau Household Pulse Survey that was released earlier this week, parents who have received the funds reported less trouble affording food and paying for household expenses.

The poll added that approximately 10 percent of American households with children sometimes or often didn’t have enough to eat over the past week—the lowest percentage registered since the pandemic started a year and a half ago.

However, there were still some concerning numbers, such as nearly 30 percent of adults in households with children had a hard time paying for their household expenses in the previous week, which was down only slightly from the previous month.

How Money Was Spent 

Outlining how the tax credits were spent, paying for school expenses topped the board. Nearly 60 percent tapped into at least part of the direct cash to pay for books and supplies, tuition, tutoring, school transportation, or after-school activities. Moreover, nearly half of parents used at least some of the money for food, 28 percent forked over cash for the Internet, cell phones, and other utilities, and about 25 percent targeted more clothing.

The survey further revealed that about 27 percent of parents admitted that they already have spent the child tax credit payment and 32 percent said that they mostly saved the funds. About 40 percent of the respondents said that they used the money to settle outstanding debt.

As for when eligible parents can expect to see the second batch of payments for this month, do take note that they are expected to arrive two days earlier because the usual pay date of the fifteenth falls on a Sunday.

Thanks to President Joe Biden’s $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan, the federal government is now allowing eligible parents to receive as much as $3,600 per year for a child under the age of six and up to $3,000 for children between ages six and seventeen.

Broken down further, what this all means is a $250 or a $300 payment for each child will be deposited into the bank accounts of parents each month through December.

CTC’s Future

There also has been increasing talk regarding continuing the expanded credits for years to come. One recent report put together by the Annie E. Casey Foundation showed that a permanent expansion of the credits could potentially lift more than four million children out of poverty.

“Every child needs food, health care, and safe and stable housing. Millions of households with children already lacked these necessities before the pandemic,” the report noted.

“To continue on progress already made on recovery, the foundation recommends: making the expansion of the federal child tax credit permanent,” it added.

Furthermore, the Center on Poverty and Social Policy at Columbia University has estimated that the credits will cut U.S. poverty by over half.

Ethen Kim Lieser is a Washington state-based Science and Tech Editor who has held posts at Google, The Korea Herald, Lincoln Journal Star, AsianWeek, and Arirang TV. Follow or contact him on LinkedIn.

Image: Reuters.

The president is taking flak from all sides, but the timing of the Taliban takeover could minimize the political damage.

As desperate Afghans were trying to escape the Taliban and board planes, during chaotic scenes at Kabul airport on Monday, UN Secretary-General António Guterres called for international unity on Afghanistan, in a briefing to an emergency session of the Security Council. 

Mark Episkopos

Drones,

They call it "Thunder."

Here's What You Need to Remember: The Grom drone can deliver “precision strikes” against enemy infrastructure or high-value targets without putting its accompanying aircraft at risk.

Fresh details have emerged concerning the new, next-generation Russian combat drone that was previously described as the “loyal wingman” to the Su-57 fifth-generation fighter.

The manufacturer of the upcoming Grom (Russian for “thunder”) unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), Kronstadt, gave a far-reaching interview to the Russian outlet TASS earlier this week, noting that it will be able to control a swarm of ten smaller Molniya (“lightning”) drones. These Molniya drones, added Kronstadt, can be operated in strike or reconnaissance configurations: “Reconnaissance drones are capable of flying back. Strike drones, as in the case with loitering munitions, are kamikaze UAVs. Molniya drones will constantly interact with each other and the carrier drone,” said the Kronshtadt representative.

“Molniya drones constantly exchange data among themselves. It is possible to alter an assignment for each member of the swarm,” Kronstadt explained. “They can transfer leader roles and are interchangeable. Artificial intelligence allows a group of drones to fulfil its assignment without constant communications with the carrier aircraft.”

Grom was unveiled, alongside a slew of other attack and reconnaissance drones, at Russia’s ARMY-2020 military exhibition. Though it was previously known that the Grom UAV can operate a drone swarm, Kronstadt’s interview has shed light on the Molniya drone’s operational flexibility and ability to carry out tasks without direct orders from the lead aircraft.

Aside from acting as a swarm drone carrier, the Grom UAV can is designed as a robust combat platform. The UAV, which appears to have a length of 13.8 meters and a wingspan of around ten meters, will have a payload capacity of 1.3 tons, take-off weight of seven tons, and operational range of around 800 km. Grom’s four hardpoints can accept a wide range of weapons, including the Kh-38 air-air-surface missile, KAB-250 and KAB-500 guided bombs, and a new “item 85 smart air bomb.” The Grom UAV not only bears a striking outward resemblance to the U.S.-made Kratos XQ-58 Valkyrie, but offers some of the same capabilities.

The Grom drone can deliver “precision strikes” against enemy infrastructure or high-value targets without putting its accompanying aircraft at risk. Additionally, the Molniya drones could be able to saturate and potentially even eliminate certain types of air defense systems. They can also perform unspecified electronic warfare tasks in conjunction with the head aircraft.

Grom’s interoperability with the Su-57 was not explicitly mentioned in Kronstadt’s recent TASS interview—in fact, the manufacturer did not discuss compatibility with any specific aircraft. However, Kronstadt’s Head Designer Nikolai Dozhdkov previously confirmed to Russian media that Grom will be compatible with both the Su-57 and Su-35 fighters.

The Su-57 was also confirmed to pair with the S-70 Okhotnik-B, a stealth-capable multipurpose drone from the same family of Russian next-generation UAV’s as Grom. It is possible that Grom is being developed as an alternate loyal wingman choice for missions requiring swarm drone capability. Whereas Okhotnik-B is scheduled to enter service in 2025, no development or production timeline has been provided for Grom.

Mark Episkopos is the new national security reporter for the National Interest. This article first appeared earlier this year.

Image: Russian Ministry of Defense