Defence`s Feeds

On 16 November 2015, the European Defence Agency (EDA) conduced its Annual Conference to address most up-to-date questions on the condition of European defence, and to propose a way ahead in various defence-related areas.  

Hosted at the Brussels’ Albert Hall, the conference gathered about 400 frontline leader and decision-makers in European defence from the worlds of military, politics, industry and academics. The conference began with one minute of silence to pay tribute to the victims of terror attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015. 

Welcome speeches 

Jorge Domecq, the EDA Chief Executive urged for more cooperation in defence: “it needs to be part of our DNA,” and the necessity to underpin a political will by actions: “We will only be able to adequately respond if the Union’s foreign policy ambitions are backed by the right defence capabilities at the right time, supplied by a globally competitive and technologically advanced industrial base in Europe.”

Elżbieta Bieńkowska, the European Commissioner for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and Small Medium Sized Enterprises (SME), a keynote speaker, stressed that Europe is able to provide security and contribute to international peace and stability. She underlined the importance of synergies between defence and industry. She also presented the EU Commission’s  approach to defence, the work plan to follow as well as some ideas for stimulating defence research. Among other things, she insisted on reversing declines in spending to stimulate research: “European funding of research priorities can be a strong tool to bring all relevant actors together.”

Roundtable talks on defence capabilities 

During the first roundtable discussions Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert, Minister of Defence of the Netherlands, General Mikhail Kostarakos, (designate) Chairman of the EU Military Committee, Giovanni Soccodato,  Executive Vice President Strategy of the Markets and Business Development at Finmeccanica and Daniel Koštoval, Deputy Minister for Armaments and Acquisition of the Czech Republic, shared their ideas on how to improve EU defence capabilities. 

Among the conclusions of the vivid discussions, there was a need formulated to noticeably increase defence cooperation and restrain from spending in national isolation on defence capabilities. The lack of a proper political guidance as well as too much of a national focus were recognised as prime reasons for a too slow-paced progress in terms of cooperative capabilities development. A financial aspect and a popular phrase “doing more with less” was considered outdated by the speakers who underlined the gravity of European defence capabilities. In this context, a new financial instrument, the VAT exemption for EDA-led programmes and projects, was accessed positively.

Second part of the conference

The second part of the conference initiated Conrad Bruch, Director of Defence at the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of Luxembourg, who took the floor on behalf of Etienne Schneider, Vice-Minister, Minister of Economy & Minister of Minister of Defence: “We welcome work on a global strategy that will encompass all the tools at our disposal to create a stronger and more secure Europe,” he said. He also emphasised that closer cooperation is necessary to avoid threats and challenges to “come closer”, and gave examples of  Luxembourg’s involvement in cooperative projects and missions. 

Special addresses 

The highlight of the annual conference were two special addresses delivered by Federica Mogherini, Head of the European Defence Agency, High Representative and Vice-President of the European Commission, and Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary General. Both prominent guests emphasised solidarity, partnership of the EU and NATO as well as the need to stand united to face the current threats. The both condemned the terrorist attacks conducted on 13 November 2015 in Paris. “We will strengthen our resolve,” Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary General, stated. 

“We cannot afford to act without a rational strategy and a vision what we want to achieve and how we want to get there,” said Federica Mogherini about a global strategy for Europe that is currently being prepared. As she admitted, defence and security will be part of each chapter. Federica Mogherini also stated that the EU is a security provider for many and it is ready to mobilise all the instruments, including the military ones. She reassured the need to cooperate with the EU neighbours and emphasised the relations with NATO.  “There is no security without defence, there is no defence without capabilities and no capabilities without industry,” said Federica Mogherini addressing the capability dimension of defence and stressed the important role of the European Defence Agency when it comes to deepening cooperation and capability development. 

Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary General stated that “security is interconnected” and reassured that both organisations are determined to develop closer cooperation. He also listed possible areas for stronger partnership, including countering hybrid threats or helping partners in neighbourhood. “We share the same values and commitment to freedom, democracy and human rights. Those valued are under threat; this is what we saw in Paris on Friday. Those values must be defended by us. That is why we work together and that is why we will take our cooperation to the next level: not just side by side but also hand in hand,” said Jens Stoltenberg about the EU-NATO partnership.  

Roundtable talks on defence research

The second and also the last panel discussion of the Annual Conference brought defence research on the agenda. Recognised as a key factor for capability development, defence research funding has experienced a significant decrease in the recent years. Along with the Preparatory Action, the EU might finance defence research for the first time in history, which may steer research development. 

The experts – Michel Barnier, Special Adviser to the European Commission President on defence matters, Antoine Bouvier, President & Chief Executive Officer of MBDA Millie Systems, Ana Gomes, Member of the European Parliament and Tassos Rozolis, Chief Executive Officer of AKMON and Chairman of the Hellenic Manufacturers of Defence and Security Material Association – discussed the requirements to set the level of ambition in Research & Technology and to define a way ahead. They also stressed the need to translate political will into concrete programmes and procurements in order to help a strong European defence industry base to develop. Ideas of balancing the co-existence of Small Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs) and big players as well as the implications of dual-use technologies were also widely discussed. 

A final word

"There is no alternative to defence cooperation," said Jorge Domecq, the EDA Chief Executive, in a summary for this year’s Annual Conference. He also underlined the necessity of better spending of available resources and supporting industry in order to develop a strong European industry base.  

More information 

• EDA website on Annual Conference 2015 
  
  
  
  

More than 400 participants attended this year's EDA Annual Conference. High-level speakers shared their vision on European defence cooperation. Several of the speeches are now available here below.

Elżbieta Bieńkowska, European Commissioner responsible for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs opened the conference with a keynote speech underlining the importance of synergies between defence and industry. 

Federica Mogherini, Head of the European Defence Agency, High Representative and Vice-President of the European Commission and Jens Stoltenberg, Secretary-General of NATO delivered special addresses emphasising among other things EU-NATO complementarity and partnership in facing common challenges.

You can access their speeches as well as the welcome word of Chief Executive Jorge Domecq via the links below.

More information:

• News "The first part of EDA Annual Conference" (17 Nov 2015)
• News "EDA Annual Conference: the second part" (17 Nov 2015)
• PDF "Welcome words by Jorge Domecq, Chief Executive of the European Defence Agency" (17 Nov 2015)
• Video "Opening keynote speech by Elżbieta Bieńkowska, European Commissioner" (17 Nov 2015)
• Video "Special address by HR/VP Federica Mogherini" (17 Nov 2015)
• Video "Special address by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg" (17 Nov 2015)
• EDA Annual Conference 2015

In this interview, Anthony Bargar,Cyber Security Specialist at US-based Sypris Electronics, discusses the best ways to upskill cyber teams and detailing the current demand for cyber security solutions. He also explains the evolving nature of cyber threats facin

In July 2015, Hacking Team (HT), a well-known cyber surveillance firm, was itself the victim of a cyber attack, losing over 400GB of confidential data that included source code, internal documents and sensitive emails. Found among the data – which was subsequently dumped online f

The second part of the European Defence Agency (EDA) Annual Conference held on 16 November 2015 was built around a question on research opportunities at the EU level.

Prior to the fruitful discussions on various aspects of research and the “dual-use” concept, the floor was taken by Mr Conrad Bruch, Director of Defence at the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of Luxembourg, who represented Etienne Schneider, Vice-Minister, Minister of Economy & Minister of Minister of Defence: “We welcome work on a global strategy that will encompass all the tools at our disposal to create a stronger and more secure Europe,” he said and continued: “We need to become more effective in facing crisis, we have the right tools and structures at our disposal,” he said, also mentioning the role of the European Defence Agency.

Special addresses

Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary General, and Federica Mogherini, Head of the European Defence Agency, High Representative and Vice-President of the European Commission, marked their presence during the conference and delivered special addresses. “We cannot afford to act without a rational strategy and a vision what we want to achieve and how we want to get there,” said Federica Mogherini about the upcoming global strategy, stating that defence and security will be part of each chapter. High Representative also emphasised the European Defence Agency’s achievements in terms of capability development.

A common element of speeches of both Federica Mogherini and Jens Stoltenberg was the focus placed on the EU-NATO complementarity and partnership in facing common challenges. As NATO Secretary General stated: “European security is interconnected”. He also emphasised that determination for closer cooperation is on both sides: “it is not something we should do but something we must do.”

Roundtable 2 „New research opportunities at EU level: a game changer for the industry?”

The discussions of the second roundtable were steered by Michel Barnier, Special Adviser to the European Commission President on defence matters, Antoine Bouvier, President & Chief Executive Officer of MBDA Millie Systems, Ana Gomes, Member of the European Parliament and Tassos Rozolis, Chief Executive Officer of AKMON and Chairman of the Hellenic Manufacturers of Defence and Security Material Association.

The speakers were especially referring to the reduced  funding of European defence research as well as the Preparatory Action, which is expected to include financing defence research by the EU budget for the first time in history.

“No Member State has the means to ensure the full capability spectrum,” admitted Michel Barnier. Antoine Bouvier drew attention to the need of identifying the level of ambition and “set a new dynamics in Research & Technology”. Also Ana Gomes stated there is a need for political will that will be translated into concrete programmes. Tassos Rozolis called for an industrial strategy so that “the industry knows where it should go” and underlined the importance of practical implications of the programmes that shall lead to procurements.

The Annual Conference was summarised by the EDA Chief Executive, Jorge Domecq.

More information:

• News "Annual Conference 2015: Speeches available" (17 Nov 2015)
• News "The first part of EDA Annual Conference" (17 Nov 2015)
• PDF "Welcome words by Jorge Domecq, Chief Executive of the European Defence Agency" (17 Nov 2015)
• Video "Opening keynote speech by Elżbieta Bieńkowska, European Commissioner" (17 Nov 2015)
• Video "Special address by HR/VP Federica Mogherini" (17 Nov 2015)
• Video "Special address by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg" (17 Nov 2015)
• EDA Annual Conference 2015

The first part of this year’s European Defence Agency's (EDA) Annual Conference “European Defence Matters” has been accomplished. Prominent decision-makers and frontline leaders in European defence from the worlds of military, politics, industry and academics met on 16 November 2015 to discuss European defence.

The conference participants observed one minute of silence to pay tribute to the victims of terror attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015. In the light of these tragic events, the discussion on European defence has been given a very realistic dimension, proving that European defence does matter.

“Crisis situations are not reducing; they are on the increase. The demand for the EU to act as a security provider will continue to increase. We will only be able to adequately respond to this if the Union’s foreign policy ambitions are backed by the right defence capabilities at the right time, supplied by a globally competitive and technologically advanced industrial base in Europe,” said Jorge Domecq, the EDA Chief Executive. He also underlined the necessity to underpin political will by actions, and to translate it into military objectives. Jorge Domecq stressed that “Cooperation in defence is not a natural reflex. It needs to become so: to be part of our DNA.”

Keynote Speech

A keynote speech was delivered by Elżbieta Bieńkowska, the European Commissioner for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and Small Medium Sized Enterprises (SME). She underlined the importance of synergies between defence and industry. She also presented the Commission’s approach to defence, the work plan to follow as well as some ideas for stimulating defence research.

Elżbieta Bieńkowska stressed that Europe is able to provide security and contribute to international peace and stability. Regarding research, she insisted on reversing declines in spending to stimulate research: “European funding of research priorities can be a strong tool to bring all relevant actors together.” "We will only be successful if we are work together: the Commission, the European Parliament, the European Defence Agency, the European External Action Service and the Member States and industry,” she concluded.

Roundtable 1: „European defence capabilities: what’s next?”

The first roundtable discussions on the European defence cooperation and capabilities were led by prominent guests: Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert, Minister of Defence of the Netherlands, General Mikhail Kostarakos, (designate) Chairman of the EU Military Committee, Giovanni Soccodato,  Executive Vice President Strategy of the Markets and Business Development at Finmeccanica and Daniel Koštoval, Deputy Minister for Armaments and Acquisition of the Czech Republic.

The panel discussion raised the question of the future of European defence capabilities. Moreover, defence cooperation was analysed from a political, military and industrial viewpoint.

Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert assessed that “we do not need more wake-up calls” and insisted that the only way to protect national sovereignty through military means is by defence cooperation. She also called for sharing plans for capability development plans among the Member States.

General Mikhail Kostarakos drew attention to the defence spending stating that “to do more with less” is no longer a good solution as it may lead to loosing combat capabilities.

Daniel Koštoval emphasised that “a political will is required to allocate more money to defence and formulate where we are going”. He also identified the need to maintain “balanced armies” taking into consideration the whole spectrum, the light and heavy equipment. 

Giovanni Soccodato stressed the need for a common European market and a proper environment  for defence industry to consolidate.

The speakers recognised an important role of the European Defence Agency to play in terms of capability development.

More information:

• News "Annual Conference 2015: Speeches available" (17 Nov 2015)
• News "EDA Annual Conference: the second part" (17 Nov 2015)
• PDF "Welcome words by Jorge Domecq, Chief Executive of the European Defence Agency" (17 Nov 2015)
• Video "Opening keynote speech by Elżbieta Bieńkowska, European Commissioner" (17 Nov 2015)
• Video "Special address by HR/VP Federica Mogherini" (17 Nov 2015)
• Video "Special address by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg" (17 Nov 2015)
• EDA Annual Conference 2015

Continuing my preference to poke at the sacred in military affairs, #CCLKOW this week presents the conundrum of what should be done with the ISIS rank and file in Iraq. Inspired by an article which tells a simple tale of one Iraqi ISIS fighter, this week’s post is focused on the singular question of how the various parties – local, regional, and global – will move forward when the war machine is defeated. Read the post, consider the issue, and join the discussion on Twitter on the hashtag.

 

The Nazi enterprise and war machine were unmistakably a blight upon history and the very complexion of European civilization. They fundamentally altered the demographics of a continent and laid bare the basest of human potential. Whether by ruthless war or an even more sinister program of genocide, the death toll for which they were responsible still boggles the mind. At the end of the war, it was very clear that those in positions of authority would have to be held responsible for these acts. Nevertheless, while the leadership was held to account, it was equally recognized that to punish the collective rank and file of the German armed forces would serve no purpose.

In the wake of a very dark night in Paris, the furthest thing from anyone’s minds is the thought of humanity for any ISIS fighter.

But I read today an article, “What I Discovered from Interviewing ISIS Prisoners,” by Lydia Wilson of ARTIS Research, about the profile of the average Iraqi who has joined the fight. I would highly recommend that folks go forth and read the whole thing, both to understand this piece as well as for the general consideration of the conflict in Iraq. However, what matters to this post is what came at the very end, this excerpt which confronts the reader:

These boys came of age under the disastrous American occupation after 2003, in the chaotic and violent Arab part of Iraq, ruled by the viciously sectarian Shia government of Nouri al-Maliki. Growing up Sunni Arab was no fun. A later interviewee described his life growing up under American occupation: He couldn’t go out, he didn’t have a life, and he specifically mentioned that he didn’t have girlfriends. An Islamic State fighter’s biggest resentment was the lack of an adolescence….They are not fueled by the idea of an Islamic caliphate without borders; rather, ISIS is the first group since the crushed Al Qaeda to offer these humiliated and enraged young men a way to defend their dignity, family, and tribe. This is not radicalization to the ISIS way of life, but the promise of a way out of their insecure and undignified lives; the promise of living in pride as Iraqi Sunni Arabs, which is not just a religious identity but cultural, tribal, and land-based, too.

The purpose of highlighting this point is not to join the chorus of blame, which serves little purpose beyond political point scoring. Rather, it is to shed a small bit of the light of humanity upon the issue of these ISIS fighters.

Returning to the opening, somehow, in the thoughts of leaders at the end of WWII, it was recognized that there was something in the German experience of the period between the end of WWI and the rise of Hitler’s Reich which made the horrors of that regime more palatable than rationality. If you want a visceral understanding of those dark days, I can recommend nothing more highly than the 1925 opera “Wozzeck” by Alban Berg. (Full version here.) The dismal and blighted life of the characters is set against possibly the most chilling and discordant music which combine to reflect the cost of the past war and the sense that something far worse was coming. If the mass of the population fell prey to Hitler’s awful promise, it is not difficult to understand why or how. And contemplating the lives of Iraq’s generation which had no youth, a similar perspective is possible.

Nothing can excuse the decisions and choices of the ISIS leadership. A Nuremberg of their own awaits those who survive to the end. I have a very special place of vengeance in my heart for those who have unleashed this current hell upon the region and now to Europe and very likely beyond. However, whether the same standard applies to all must be in some doubt. At the end of mankind’s last worst moment, some bit of humanity prevailed. After so much death and horror, perhaps it was decided there had been enough. We should consider that the same may be true in this time as well, that this interregnum of violence is not best ended with a further orgy of death.

And so my simple question for this week is, can we imagine any space for humanity for Iraq’s lost generation swept along by the currents of an abhorrent promise?

 

In the international discussion on Pakistan´s many problems, the low-level conflict in its Balochistan province does not get much attention. The issue of nuclear arms, for instance, is considered more immediately frightening; Balochistan is just the area where these arms are tested. But the province is also the arena for a long-standing, complex and multi-faceted conflict, which, with every new upturn, is becoming more intractable. Even in Pakistan itself, the situation in Balochistan tends to be ‘crowded out’ by other dramatic events. The lack of media access to areas under military control is another cause for whatever goes on in Balochistan to remain in the background. Yet, the province is crucial to several infrastructural mega-projects, among them the huge investment programme signed with the Chinese government in April 2015. These projects are regional in nature – and so is the conflict in Balochistan. Ann Wilkens, member of AAN’s Advisory Board, provides an overview of this complex issue and concludes that political dialogue is urgently needed, if economic investment is to bring the intended, regional uplift and, most importantly, bring peace to a long-suffering population.

The province, the people

With around 46 per cent of the total area, Balochistan is Pakistan´s largest province, but it has the smallest population, representing around five per cent of the country’s total. (1) This is not the only dichotomy. While, as the name indicates, Balochistan is the home of the Baloch, there is also a large Pashtun contingent, making up around 40 per cent of its population, and the Pashtuns form the majority in the province´s capital, Quetta. Another spill-over from Afghanistan, dating back to the rule of Abdul Rahman Khan in the 1890s, is the Hazara community, who form the third largest ethnic group, also with a strong presence in Quetta. Another ethnic group, normally included in the Baloch but originating from Southern India, are the Brahui, whose Dravidian language is spoken by a dwindling population mainly in central Balochistan, notably in and around the former princely state of Kalat, the historic centre of the Baloch quest for self-rule.

Balochistan is the least developed province of Pakistan. Marginal living conditions have prompted a large part of the population to leave in search for a better existence, mainly in Karachi or abroad. But the province has huge reserves of natural gas, as well as other natural resources yet to be fully explored, which have the potential to provide a basis for economic development. Geographically, it is on the path of several regional infrastructure projects, which have been stalled for various reasons, one of them being the lack of stability in the region, including in Balochistan. Thus, lack of stability results in lack of development, while lack of development is also a major source of instability.

Economic migration aside, the Baloch are spread over three countries. The largest group is in Pakistan, around six million, but there is also a sizable Baloch population in Iran, around two million, and a smaller group in Afghanistan, estimated at around 600,000, most of them in the southwestern province of Nimroz. (2) Balochi is an Iranian language (like Farsi, Pashto and Kurdish). The majority of the Baloch are Sunni Muslims. For the Iranian Baloch in the equally deprived Iranian province of Sistan Balochistan, the marginalisation of the Sunni sect is an important reason for conflict with the Shia-led theocracy in Teheran, regularly resulting in attacks directed at the Iranian state, which in turn accuses Pakistan of hosting these opponents (see for instance here).

Regional interface

During the course of the Pakistani Baloch insurgency, the militants among them have become increasingly secessionist and are now commonly referring to Pakistan as an occupying state, rather than a problematic homeland. In Pakistan, after the breakup of the original nation and the forming of Bangladesh in 1971, secessionist talk has been a trigger of existential anguish, and that may be one reason why intransigence rather than dialogue has been characteristic of the Pakistani state’s response to Baloch insurgencies. Moreover, although rooted in a more or less secular orientation, many militants are becoming increasingly radicalised in religious terms, in tune with a growing global movement of religious extremists transcending national borders.

With the concept of ‘Greater Balochistan’ overshadowing the borders of three countries, the Baloch national issue provides a reflection of the Kurdish conflict in the Middle East, as well as other areas around the world where ethnic, linguistic and cultural identity do not square with geographical boundaries. From the point of view of the Baloch tribespeople, many of them still nomads, their territory stretches across the boundaries between Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan, a vast area where they believe they have ancestral rights to move around.

From the point of view of the three governments involved, however, such movements add to the already complicated relations between them. Support for each other’s rebel groups is a component in this picture, which may be used in a tit-for-tat manner. For instance: India, claiming that Pakistan is infiltrating insurgents across the Line of Control into India-controlled Kashmir, may respond by cooperating with Afghanistan to support Baloch rebels. Pakistan may be irritated when Baloch leaders fleeing from Pakistani security forces are allowed to settle in Afghanistan, but Afghanistan may then point to the presence of the leadership council of the Afghan Taleban, known as the Quetta shura, on Pakistani territory.

At the same time, there are grave, humanitarian aspects of the cross-border movements. While large waves of Afghan refugees have been received in Pakistani Balochistan, particularly during the last decades of war, there are also Pakistani Baloch refugees in Afghanistan (for more on the latter, see here).

Quite another facet of the regional interface is the drugs trade, which continues to flourish in what looks like a rare bird of functional, regional cooperation. This is a sign that, when profits are high enough, barriers can be transcended: where there is a will, there is a way.

A history of insurgency

Historically, Balochistan has never been a comfortable part of the Pakistani nation state which was initiated with the division of the subcontinent in 1947 and promoted by a movement of Urdu-speaking, urban Muslims in what is now northern India, who never had much in common with Baloch tribesmen. British Balochistan, which did not include the princely states, was integrated into Pakistan with a special status as a Chief Commissioner´s Province, and was raised to the status of Governor´s Province only in 1953. As for the 570-odd Indian princely states, four of which were in the territory of today´s Balochistan, the provision was that they could opt for independence but, in the end, most of them were integrated into either India or Pakistan. However, for the Baloch princely states, a history of extended autonomy made the situation more fluid, especially for the most well-known one, the Khanate of Kalat, which wanted to retain its independence and tried to establish itself as a tribal monarchy. This did not succeed for long and its accession, under pressure, to Pakistan in March 1948 triggered the first wave of armed revolt against the state.

The imposition of military rule in Pakistan on 6 October 1958, when General Ayub Khan took over the country as ‘Chief Martial Law Administrator’, again exacerbated the situation in Balochistan, where tribesmen refused to turn in their weapons at the local police stations. The following scheme of assembling all of West Pakistan into ‘one unit’ (as opposed to East Pakistan, later Bangladesh) was bitterly opposed until 1960, when the rebels thought they had negotiated an exception to this policy, as well as safe conduct and amnesty for themselves. Instead, they were arrested and seven of them executed. This did not end the opposition to Ayub Khan´s centralisation efforts and a third round of conflict characterised the latter part of the 1960s.

The fourth, and more extensive, uprising in Balochistan came in 1973, again as a reaction to the thwarting of provincial autonomy. After the loss of Bangladesh, Pakistan´s president Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto wanted to strengthen centralised rule in what was left of the country. He was also under pressure from the Iranian government, which feared that its Baloch province might be drawn into a movement towards strengthened indigenous rule in Pakistan´s Balochistan. On a flimsy pretext, Bhutto dismissed the elected provincial government and used the ensuing calls for secession as an excuse to send in the army. The armed clashes peaked in the winter of 1974-75, but did not cease until three years later, when Bhutto was overthrown by General Zia ul-Haq, who again imposed military rule but at the same time tried to restore peace in Balochistan through political and economic means. Accordingly, there has been no consistent and direct link between military rule in Pakistan and active conflict in Balochistan. Rather, disregard for Baloch sensitivities has run through Pakistan´s short history, under various rulers.

The fifth, and still ongoing, Baloch uprising started in 2004, during the military rule of General Pervez Musharraf. While the Marri and Mengal tribes had been at the centre of previous rebellions, this time it was the Bugti tribe that led the uprising and was subsequently targeted. On 26 August 2006, Nawab Akbar Bugti, who besides leading the Bugti tribe had also served as both governor (1973-74) and chief minister (1989-90) of Balochistan, was killed in a clash with the army at his hideout in the hills in north-eastern Balochistan. This provided the nationalist rebels with a martyr of renown beyond the province.

Economic issues were at the centre of this round of conflict, among them the construction of the Gwadar port without much Baloch participation in either the decision-making process or the actual construction work. Another bone of contention was the distribution of the proceeds from the Sui gas fields, situated in the Dera Bugti area, as well as the distribution of the gas itself (which was said to be used to heat Punjabi homes and run Punjabi industries, while the Baloch were literally left out in the cold). Enhanced military presence in the Sui area followed from the conflict, and then subsequently added to it.

Human rights abuses and violence

As usual in situations of conflict, human rights suffer. Among the Pakistanis who have ‘disappeared’ during recent years, presumably after having been abducted by the security forces, young Baloch nationalists form a distinct and particularly recurrent group. Many of them have later turned up as corpses by the roadside bearing marks of torture. Despite attempts by various organisations, including Pakistan’s Supreme Court, to map the disappearances (see for instance here) and end the impunity surrounding them, no clarity has been achieved and bereaved families are still looking for closure. Accordingly, the number of victims cited in this context differs widely, from the tens to the ten thousands – it should be safe to say that at least hundreds of Baloch have disappeared in this way.

The conflict between Baloch nationalists and the Pakistani state aside, the continuing turmoil and lack of strong governance in a multi-ethnic setting has brought a wider range of serious crimes against human rights, as well as a high level of criminal activity, both of which add to the difficulties faced by civilians trying to build a decent life. Various actors are contributing to this sad state of affairs, sometimes reflecting conflicts of interest between different population groups, and sometimes lending themselves to exploitation by, for instance, anti-state militants and/or perpetrators of sectarian violence. Punjabi settlers in the province, in many cases going back several generations, have been targeted by Baloch nationalists, leading to the exodus of a relatively well educated segment of the population. The Hazara Shia population in Quetta has also been particularly targeted, through a series of sectarian bomb attacks leading to hundreds of casualties.

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

It is in this environment of multi-faceted conflict that the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor programme (CPEC) is anchored. The programme amounts to over 45 billion US dollars and was agreed between the two countries in April 2015. The corridor has its starting point in the Chinese-built port of Gwadar, on Pakistani Balochistan’s southern coast at the Arabian Sea, and is linked to Chinese-funded, infrastructural mega-projects that are regional in nature, (for more, see here).

The programme has been flaunted as a turning point for the fragile Pakistani economy and an upcoming backbone of regional connectivity, which is supposed to create jobs and prosperity for everyone, the Baloch included. The government’s reasoning seems to be that, once the recalcitrant Baloch nationalists discover the benefits of improved infrastructure, they will return to the fold of the Pakistani motherland. However, until this spirit of cooperation takes root, the Chinese workers involved in the project will be protected by an additional security division comprising army battalions, as well as civil armed forces.

This smacks of wishful thinking. At the core of the recurrent insurgencies lies the resentment that the Baloch have been marginalised in their own country, and that Punjabis in particular, and the Pakistani state in general, are colonising and exploiting them. For the insurgents the socio-economic backwardness of the province serves as proof that this is so, whereas, on the government side, the argument may go the other way around: Balochistan is perceived to be poor and backward as a consequence of a tribal structure which benefits only self-serving feudal lords and stands in the way of the government’s efforts towards progress and development. So far, neither side has shown much willingness to negotiate and compromise, with both sides preferring to play a zero-sum game. The looming presence of a growing number of Chinese labourers and engineers, working under armed protection, seems more likely to increase the tensions than soften the positions. Even if the programme delivers all the goods promised, it is difficult to see how the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor programme can become the silver bullet leading to stability in Balochistan. Again, the province seems to be stuck in a vicious circle: investments could bring stability, yes, but investments need stability to be carried out and take effect.

Opening for political settlement?

While throughout the history of Pakistan coercion has been the main instrument in dealing with Baloch insurgency, there have also been recurrent attempts to settle the conflict through dialogue and compromise. The present time seems to be such a period, or to at least have the potential to become one. In an interview with the BBC Urdu service in August 2015, Brahumdagh Bugti, the grandson of Nawab Akbar Bugti and the most well-known of the Baloch separatist leaders, did not exclude talks with the government, provided that military action was ended and security forces withdrawn from Balochistan. Even the core question of separation could be discussed, according to Bugti, “if our friends, allies, comrades and the Baloch people want this.” From the government side, the chief minister of Balochistan welcomed this conciliatory overture and expressed the hope that talks might start after the recent Eid holiday. According to a recent report, talks have, indeed, been going on between the two sides and Brahumdagh Bugti might soon return to Balochistan, after having been in exile since the death of his grandfather in 2006.

However, facts on the ground still send mixed signals. Enforced disappearances are still reported and security operations have escalated as a result of the National Action Plan to crack down on terrorism, which was adopted after the army school massacre by the Pakistani Taleban (the TTP), in Peshawar in December 2014. According to the provincial interior minister well over 8,000 people had been detained by the end of September 2015, while over 200 persons had been killed in these operations. Among them, presumably, is Allah Nazar Baloch, the leader of the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF), who was reported killed by security forces in an intelligence-led operation in July 2015. Allah Nazar was the most prominent of the Baloch separatist leaders still in Pakistan. His organisation has been behind a number of deadly attacks, including the one that killed three Chinese engineers in Gwadar in May 2004.

Still, the recent overtures indicate an increased willingness for dialogue on both sides and, thus, provide hope that the vicious circle characterising the development in Balochistan, where rounds of violence have continuously fed into each other, could finally begin to be reversed. Concrete and constructive commitment is now needed. The urgency of the situation is underlined by global trends. The winds of radicalisation continue to sweep through the Muslim world, carrying with them, first and foremost, frustrated young people with poor prospects, such as potential Baloch militants.

In Pakistan´s turbulent history, Balochistan seems to have always come in as the last priority. In the long run – and it is already a long-running conflict – this high-handedness may backfire, and, with it, the infrastructural investments now set in motion. On the other hand, in the alternative scenario of serious dialogue aimed at solving political and economic grievances, these investments could enhance the peace dividend in a long-suffering but potentially prosperous part of the world.

 

(1) Figures differ between different sources. The figures cited here are taken from “Jago Pakistan – Wake Up, Pakistan”, Report of The Century Foundation International Working Group on Pakistan, May 2015, 53.

(2) These figures, by no means exact, are weighted from several, different sources.

 

Sources:

Axmann, Martin: Back to the Future, The Khanate of Kalat and the Genesis of Baloch Nationalism 1915-1955, Oxford University Press 2009

Lieven, Anatol, Pakistan, A Hard Country, Allen Lane 2011

Jalal, Ayesha, The Struggle for Pakistan, A Muslim Homeland and Global Politics, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 2014

Indian Shaurya Short- and Medium-Range Ballistic Missile

The on-going “exodus” of Afghans – now the second largest group entering the EU – has contributed to the increasing refugee numbers across Europe. This, in turn, has led to heated debates and an increased political polarisation between pro- and anti-refugee movements and parties. As governments and citizens struggle to handle the influx of refugees, their numbers – real and perceived – have become an instrument in domestic politicking. Several countries have tightened their laws and tried to close their borders, while others are considering doing so. Germany, whilst it initially generally welcomed refugees, has begun to take a much tougher line, for example, declaring it will deport Afghan asylum seekers whose applications are rejected. AAN co-director, Thomas Ruttig, pulls together figures, looks at trends and disentangles categories of refugees that are often mixed in the political debate. He also refers to an extensive interview with Richard Danziger, head of the office of the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) in Afghanistan, which can be listened to exclusively here (link at the end of the text).

Europe has been facing an enormous influx of refugees (1) this year. Most have been coming from Syria, whilst Afghans make up the second largest group. Social services in the receiving countries are increasingly strained, particularly at the local level. Citizens, politicians and governments are more and more split about whether to welcome the refugees or to increase the legal and practical hurdles for their entry. Xenophobic political groups are becoming more vocal as they try to push governments to take a more restrictive stance, but their impact on recent election results has been mixed so far: a win in the Swiss general election and gains lesser than predicted in the Danish one and in the Vienna mayoral elections. (The Austrian capital is on a major transit route for refugees travelling to Germany and northern Europe.)

Several countries, including Germany and Austria, have amended laws to try to deter more refugees from entering. Sweden became the latest country to re-introduce temporary border controls on 11 November. In late October, Germany as the first country announced specifically that it considers deporting Afghan refugees who have had their asylum applications rejected; the statement came from interior minister Thomas de Maizière whose portfolio includes refugee affairs. A final decision, though, has not been taken yet, and foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier has reportedly called such deportations “barely possible” given a “dramatic” deterioration of the security situation in Afghanistan. (2) There is also the suggestion by the interior ministry to deny Afghan refugees access to German language courses, which are key to integration arguing that refugees from countries with an acceptance quota below 50 per cent had “no prospects to stay” in Germany. (46 per cent of Afghan asylum seekers, on average, were given a refugee status or some other form of protection in 2014; the latest available data, for October 2015, indicated a 44.9 per cent acceptance rate.)

The EU has failed so far to come up with a system of burden-sharing that is acceptable to all member states. At the same time, large numbers of volunteers continue to work to accommodate the refugees and help fill the gaps when authorities are either unable or, sometimes, even unwilling, to find ways to cope.

With the increasing political polarisation, refugee figures have become a tool in mainstream domestic politics. Figures are sometimes exaggerated and often mixed up, and categories confused (see footnote 1 again). For example, the number of people entering Europe differs from the number of asylum requests. At the same time, the numbers of asylum requests are also higher than that of the actual asylum seekers, as many refugees request asylum in several countries during their odyssey through Europe. Similarly, in August 2015, of the 11,522 Afghans who entered Germany, only 2,270 requested asylum.

The deportation debate: Germany

Germany, once considered one of the EU countries with the softest line on refugees, was the first country where the government has confirmed that it has plans to deport large numbers of Afghan refugees whose asylum application had been rejected after years of allowing them to stay. According to Pro Asyl, the largest non-governmental organisation in Germany working in this sector, 7,000 Afghans might be affected by this threat of deportation.

Other European countries have already deported rejected Afghan asylum seekers, including Norway and Sweden. In Great Britain, the deportation of 60 Afghans as part of a larger group, was stopped in August 2015 at the last minute, after the Lord Chief Justice ruled it was only safe to return Afghan asylum seekers if sent to the three provinces of Kabul, Bamiyan and Panjshir (read here and here).

As is the case in many countries, the deportation debate in Germany focuses on whether the security situation in Afghanistan allows for deportations and whether there are, at least, ‘safe areas’ within the country to which people could ‘return’. The government says yes, while commentators, even on mainstream government-funded media, have, in an unprecedented way, sharply attacked the government’s arguments. One commentator , on Germany’s TV channel for the world, Deutsche Welle, called the generally overly positive portrayal of the security situation in Afghanistan by the government “untenable,” particularly after Kunduz, the former main base of the German ISAF troops, fell into the hands of the Taleban for two weeks in September/October this year. Up until 2009, the German government did not even accept that a “war” was going on in Afghanistan. After the Taleban takeover of Kunduz, interior (and former defence) minister de Maizière only commented that “of course, in Afghanistan security is not as good as elsewhere.“ (3)

Meanwhile, a report by the German Embassy in Kabul quoted in the media has come to more grave conclusions. The report speaks about an “extension” of Taleban influence, a “highly” or “extremely” dangerous situation in half of the country’s districts and a “rapid” deterioration of the security situation even in areas so far considered safe and (cited here, in German). According to conflict and peace research institutes (see, for example, here), the conflict in Afghanistan is still a “high-intensity internal armed conflict”. This is also proven by the rising rate of civilian casualties (AAN analysis here).

Another remark by the minister – that “as large amounts of development funds are sent to Afghanistan, one can expect that Afghans remain in their country” – was called “particularly cynical” by another commentator on the leading TV network, the ARD.

One point of debate is how the large numbers of Afghans leaving their country would further increase the burden on Germany. According to a report by the German Joint Analysis and Strategy Centre for Illegal Migration (in German: Gasim) up to 100,000 Afghans currently leave their country every month. (4) Gasim reports are not usually publicly available, and its figures were first published in the right-wing daily newspaper Die Welt on 28 September 2015. It seems that, in this case, the report had been intentionally leaked, possibly to influence the heated political debate taking place, even within Chancellor Angela Merkel’s coalition.

According to Richard Danziger, head of the Afghanistan office of the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), his organisation does not have figures on the number of Afghans leaving the country:

Yes, I think we can talk about an exodus, [but] to be frank, we cannot talk about numbers. We know the numbers on arrival in Europe. Now we have been looking at all possible sources of information: passport applications, we talked with the [authorities at the] airport; we have offices at the border with Iran, so we looked to see whether there had been more deportations, which could mean more people on the way to Europe. We haven’t been able to piece anything together that could really give us the [full] information.

We do know the people are selling more bus tickets to Nimroz [province bordering Iran] for example. We know from the people at the airport – there are not many flights to Iran but – that flights to Iran are full of young men but return flights are definitely not full at all, so that’s an indicator. So, yes, I think we can talk about an exodus but we cannot put a number on it.

With regard to the often-cited increase in passport applications at the Afghan interior ministry’s passport office, Danziger urges caution, even though the indications are that numbers are increasing. The number of passport applications had indeed increased from about 3,000 per month earlier in the year to almost 8,000 by late September 2015, as reported by German broadcaster ARD quoting the office’s head General Sayed Omar Sabur from Kabul.

According to Danziger, the rush to obtain a (new) passport has also been attributed partially to the government implementing an international aviation regulation in May 2015 that no longer allows Afghans to use their old handwritten passport for travel abroad. This decision is almost certainly, or at least in part, the result of pressure on the Afghan government by western countries, where such passports have not been used for a long time and are looked upon with suspicion. Given the already difficult situation and lengthy procedures in Kabul to obtain a visa for nearly any country, this has put many Afghans into a state of near panic, as they fear they may no longer be able to travel in the future. This includes, in particular, students and post-graduates who have received overseas fellowships, and families who need to take relatives abroad for medical treatment (for Afghans, the most popular destination is India). Other applicants hope to obtain a passport in order to look for work in Iran, Turkey or the Gulf states.

Furthermore, not everyone who leaves Afghanistan necessarily arrives in Europe (let alone Germany). There are many stories of Afghans, who were discovered and detained by Iranian authorities, either at the Afghan, or the Turkish border, and then sent back to Afghanistan. Those who do eventually make it to Europe often do so only after a long and arduous journey, as Danziger also points out:

You have to consider that those people arriving in Europe now may not have left this year, because a lot of people move in stages. They may go to Iran, work to get enough money, go to Turkey, work [again]. They might have left in the past year, or two years ago.

The Afghan Ministry for Refugees and Returnees estimated, in a statement published on 2 November 2015 that, altogether, 120,000 Afghans have left the country this year, both “legally and illegally.”

General refugee figures

According to the latest UN estimates nearly 800,000 refugees crossed the Mediterranean into Europe this year. More than 218,000 did so in October 2015 alone — which is a record monthly tally and higher than the overall figure for the entire year of 2014, which was 216,000. By far most of them crossed the sea from Turkey to Greece, which is the preferred route for Afghan refugees, who usually travel via Iran and Turkey. Others crossed the Turkish-Greek or Turkish-Bulgarian land borders.

An incident at the border between Bulgaria and Turkey on 15 October 2015 was the latest “milestone” (as stated by Bulgarian President Rossen Plevnelyev) in the drama that refugees go through: a young Afghan – his name continues to remain unreported – became the first refugee shot dead at an EU border. The authorities of Bulgaria, where the incident happened, claim he was hit by a stray warning shot fired at a group of about 50 young Afghans trying to cross the border illegally. Many more refugees, among them many Afghans, have lost their lives when their boats have sunk in the Mediterranean. (5)

According to the latest available official EU figures, there were 399,000 “first-time asylum seekers” in the first half of 2015 in all EU countries combined. These figures, and all the following ones, are based on the first and second quarter reports by Eurostats, an EU agency  (see here and here), unless otherwise sourced.

Germany had the highest number of asylum applications in the first half of 2015 (154,000 = 39 per cent of all submitted in Europe), followed by Hungary (65,400), Italy (30,100) and France (29,800). Taken by per capita of their population, Hungary, Austria, Sweden and Germany were at the top during that period. By October 2015, the total number of asylum seekers in Germany for that year had already increased to 331,226, according to official national figures. Sweden had 120,000 asylum applicants at the same point, compared to 75,000 in 2014.

The Afghans among the refugees

Over the first and second quarters of 2015, Afghans became the second largest group among the asylum seekers after the Syrians. According to the UN estimates, 19 per cent of the nearly 800,000 refugees that crossed the Mediterranean were Afghans, some 150,000 people.

In the first three quarters of 2015, 88,205 Afghans requested asylum in all EU countries. In the first quarter, they represented seven and in the second quarter 13 per cent of all EU asylum seekers (third quarter figure not yet available). At the end of the second quarter, the number of Afghans was 39,900 altogether, showing that the third quarter number was more than double that of the first two quarters together. By comparison, 37,810 Afghans had requested asylum across the EU in 2014 and 22,580 in 2013.

Most Afghans requested asylum in Hungary and in Germany in the first half of 2015. Hungary registered 17,660 Afghan asylum seekers – almost half the overall EU figure. Germany received 20,434 asylum requests (6.2 per cent of all asylum seekers in the country in this period) from January to October 2015, while 82,817 Afghans arrived there in the same period, 31,051 in October alone (up from 11,522 in August). According to these figures, Afghans were still only the fourth largest group of asylum seekers in Germany. In the first and second quarters, Afghanistan was not even among the top ten countries of origin.

The relatively low number of asylum seekers, compared to the number of arrivals, in Germany reflects the fact that only a relatively small portion of the incoming Afghans actually remain in the country. Only one in four Afghans coming to Germany asks for asylum there. Many travel to other countries, or are sent back to other EU countries (based on the Dublin Regulation that stipulates that a refugee must apply for asylum in the first EU country of entry). Alternatively, the choice is to go underground without applying. (6)

The situation in Sweden, for example, is different. According to Swedish officials, almost all refugees arriving in the country also apply for asylum there; only a few travel on to Norway. By 1 November 2015, Sweden had 21,551 asylum applications by Afghans. Between 2 and 8 November only, Sweden had over 10,000 incoming refugees, 42 per cent of them (4,333 individuals) Afghans. Of those, 2,299 were unaccompanied minors. In January this year, only 350 Afghans arrived in Sweden.

In 70 per cent of all Afghan asylum cases registered in the EU in the second quarter of 2015, a refugee or other protection status was granted. Germany’s overall acceptance rate for Afghans was 44.9 per cent from January to October 2015, based on 4,929 cases decided in this period. In 1,361 of these cases (27.6%), the applicants were recognised as refugees; only 37 of them (0.75%) were granted full political asylum, which would allow for full integration. 853 (17.3%) received a ‘non-refugee’ status of protection. 574 (11.6%) applicants were rejected; the other applications were solved in other ways, mainly by handing over the cases to other countries based on the Dublin agreement. By comparison, the number of cases decided in 2014 was almost three times higher, with 12,999, at a 46.9 per cent recognition rate. Also, the percentage of Afghans granted full political asylum in general is very low but was higher in 2014, with 1.2 per cent (87 cases).

In practice, most Afghans have been staying on, regardless of their status, as the German government (and many others in the EU) had exempted them from deportation for humanitarian reasons due to the on-going war in their country. These Afghans have now become increasingly vulnerable to deportation, particularly in Germany.

Historically, Europe has absorbed at least three earlier large waves of Afghan refugees: first, after the Soviet invasion in 1979, second, after the mujahedin victory in 1992, and, third, after the Taleban takeover in 1996 (read here and here). The Afghan community in Germany, the largest in Europe, grew from 51,370 in 1994 to 126,334 in 2009 (49,081 of them holding German citizenship). Afghan refugee communities – some of them significantly larger than in Germany – exist in Pakistan, Iran, Russia, Gulf countries, the US and Canada.

Reasons for the Afghan exodus

German ambassador Markus Potzel, in an interview with IRIN news agency published on 10 November 2015, remarked that Germany understood the reasons people were leaving Afghanistan to be “bad security, bad economy, bad prospects, no trust in the National Unity Government” but also added that his country’s authorities were “overwhelmed” with processing the growing number of asylum requests and that “the mood among the [German] population has changed. Instead of welcoming them, people are more and more afraid.”

A central element in the current debate is whether the refugees arriving now represent asylum seekers, civil war refugees or economic migrants. In the case of Afghans, at least, this distinction is often difficult to make. Danziger, in his interview, spoke of reasons related to: “a mixture of insecurity and the poor economy. One feeds into the other. […] There isn’t anyone saying I am just leaving because of the insecurity or I am just going for an opportunity to make a living or a better living.” He also mentioned the “family pressure on young people,” who are sent abroad as an “anchor” in case the situation deteriorates further. This is not surprising: the older generation of Afghans have witnessed no less than nine mostly violent regime changes since 1973.

Danziger in his interview also discusses the “brain drain” that is harming Afghanistan, given the many young Afghans among the refugees who could be a key resource for any reconstruction of the country. He mentions also that many of them may not be fully aware of the obstacles they are likely to face on their journey to Europe:

Every Afghan knows what is going on in the Mediterranean, the deaths and so forth. I think what they are unaware of is what is awaiting them in Europe – that you do not automatically get asylum, that in each country the laws are different, that while your asylum application is up you cannot work, that you are not put up in a great flat. So, it is really about telling them what they need to expect. Then they have to make their own decision.

In terms of stemming the tide of the “exodus,” he outlines several possible paths for action: donor countries must “put Afghanistan back on the radar,” “live up to the commitments they made on financial support for the government,” and, also, “really face up to the fact that they have to completely review their migration or immigration policies.” He pointed out finally that “Afghans actually have a very good reputation as immigrants, in terms of not being happy to [rely on] hand-outs, getting on finding jobs, opening businesses etc.”

The interview with Richard Danziger, recorded by ARD South Asia correspondent Sandra Petersmann, has been partly published by the ARD. AAN has acquired the full version, which can be listened to here, with the kind permissions of both interviewer and interviewee.

 

(1) Article 1 of the Geneva Refugee Convention, as amended by the 1967 Protocol, defines a refugee as:

A person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.

In this text, the author uses the term “refugee” in this meaning.

At the same time, “refugee” is also a legal term under national law. In Germany, this term is used for people whose application for political asylum has been accepted. This group is divided into two sub-categories: (a) those who have received political asylum (they can stay for an unlimited time); and (b) those who have been recognised as a “refugee”, which grants them temporary protection and their cases are reviewed after a certain period. Persons who do not qualify as a “refugee”, but are threatened by the death penalty, torture or other grave violations upon return to the country of origin, can be granted “subsidiary protection” according to EU law. There is also the option of “protection from deportation” to particular countries, including provisions for rejected asylum seekers. Status (c) and (d) can be terminated at any time. After a recent change of law, a deportation does not need to be pre-announced. This means that the refugee cannot employ legal means to contest the deportation.

For those granted the status of refugee or any other status of protection, the term “refugee” will be qualified in this text.

(2) This statement, given through his political director to the CDU/CSU (the largest governing party) group in the Bundestag, was reportedly based on an internal assessment of the security situation of the German embassy in Kabul.

(3) Members of the German government spoke about a “stabilisation mission” (Defence Minister Franz Josef Jung, 2009) and “war-like conditions” (his successor Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, also in 2009). In 2010, Guttenberg switched the terminology to a “civil war with international participation,” saying it was “colloquially a war,” but not in legal terms. The UN, when mandating the ISAF troops with Resolution 1386 (2001) of the Security Council, avoided such a definition and made ISAF a peace-enforcing mission under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. According to the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict (RULAC) project of the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, the conflict in Afghanistan is a “high-intensity internal armed conflict” between the Afghan government “assisted” by international forces and “non-state armed groups.”

(4) The following institutions contribute to Gasim reports: the Federal Police (formerly Federal Border Police), the Federal Criminal Police Office (the ‘German FBI’), the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, the foreign and domestic intelligence services (BND and Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution) and the foreign office.

(5) There are at least three projects that try to document, by name, the refugees killed on their way to Europe: the “List of Deaths” of the Amsterdam-based NGO United against Racism, the blog Fortress Europe by Italian journalist Gabriele del Grande and The Migrant Files, a journalist consortium that tries to merge the former two. Neither has the name of this Afghan.

(6) Moreover, decision-making on asylum cases is lagging behind. In the second quarter of 2015, 117,800 applications were decided upon in all EU countries. 46 per cent of them received a positive answer, granting the applicant either refugee or another protection status. Among the cases on which decisions were taken were only 2,500 who were Afghans. In Germany, by the end of 2014, Afghans, on average, had to wait more than 13 months for their cases to be decided. Austria – which is among the top four countries taking in arriving Afghan refugees (10,500 in the first eight months of 2015) – just changed its law so that Afghans have to wait for a decision, possibly up to three years. Finland recently stopped processing asylum claims from Afghans for ‘security concerns’. (The country had 9,276 asylum-seekers this year so far. )

Although relatively small in scale, Russia’s military operation in Syria has highlighted some major improvements in Russian military capabilities.

Beyond its purely geopolitical goals, Russia’s operation in Syria has been designed to test improvements in Russian military capabilities that have resulted from the military reform carried out over the last seven years and to highlight these improvements to potential adversaries. While the jury is still out on how successful the operation will be in helping the Syrian government turn the tide against its various opponents, it has already shown that the military reform has resulted in a significant increase in Russia’s warfighting capability.

Compared to the 2008 Georgia War, which was the last time the Russian Air Force operated in a combat environment, the Russian military appears to have made great strides in increasing operational tempo and improving inter-service integration. It has also made significant advances in its ability to carry out expeditionary operations and showcased its recently developed stand-off strike capability.

….

Originally published by the Lowy Institute Interpreter. Click here to read the rest of the article.

South African ZT3 Ingwe Anti-Tank Guided Missile

Length of video : 203'
You may manually download this video in WMV (1.8Gb) format

Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

Key Points Full development and qualification of the RADIUS scalable warhead technology are anticipated between 2017 and 2020 'Dynamic bomb drops' with RADIUS-equipped systems are expected within the 2019-20 timeframe. MBDA Germany's warhead design house subsidiary, TDW GmbH, has progressed the

This feature seeks to provide a long-term outlook for global armoured vehicle production, highlighting in particular where potential investors in the protected mobility industry should be looking, in order to secure the highest possible return. Several major defence primes across Europ

Americas

• Boeing has been awarded an Air Force contract modification covering Foreign Military Sales production of GBU-39 Small Diameter Bombs. The $130.1 million modification covers deliveries of the weapons to foreign partners, with the contract modification running to 2019. Israel and Italy operate the munition outside of the United States. First initial production of the SDBI began in 2005, after a controversial decision to award Boeing a production order.

• The Air Force is considering pushing back the retirement schedule for the A-10, following a spike in demand from US forces operating in the Middle East. The venerable Close Air Support platform has been on the service’s chopping block for years, with recent efforts to retire the aircraft early blocked by lawmakers in September. The Air Force also recently released a RFI to identify sources for a new A-10 re-winging program, with the Thunderbolt Lifecycle Program Support effort intended to extend a portion of the Air Force’s A-10 fleet out to 2028.

Middle East North Africa

• The United Arab Emirates is reportedly close to signing an agreement for Rafale fighters, with the sixty-aircraft deal slated to value approximately $10 billion. Similar talks between the UAE and manufacturer Dassault collapsed in November 2011, but were revived in April 2015.

• United Arab Emirates is also reportedly discussing technology export controls to assist the Gulf state’s emerging space program, with a joint committee now established to build dialogue between the two countries. The UAE wants to import space technologies and expertise through offset agreements with US contractors, with the country looking to place systems on Mars by 2021, through its ambitious Mission to Mars program.

Europe

• France is looking to buy four C-130J transport aircraft through the US’ Foreign Military Sales program, with the State Department approving the sale. Previous reports indicate that the sale could be intended to plug a gap in Airbus A400M delivery schedules to the French Air Force, with French officials meeting with Lockheed Martin in June. The French defense budget for FY16 includes the provision of $1.7 billion for four C-130s, with the FMS request running to $650 million, including communications and self-protection systems and support services.

• Meanwhile, the US Air Force awarded Lockheed Martin a $968.7 million contract action modification for the production of 17 C-130J variants, including six C-130J-30, one HC-130J, nine MC-130J and one KC-130J aircraft. The Air Force and Lockheed Martin reached an agreement in October to fund a five-year deal for C-130Js, covering 83 aircraft for the Air Force, Marines and Coast Guard.

• The United Kingdom has requested 500 AGM-114R Hellfire II Semi-Active Laser missiles from US stocks, with the State Department approving the sale. The potential deal – estimated to value $80 million – also covers logistics support and spares. The UK already operates the Hellfire I, with Italy and France also recently requesting Hellfire missiles, for use with Reaper UAVs and Tiger attack helicopters respectively.

• Russia is reportedly planning to begin trialling its new armed Arctic transport helicopter, the Mil Mi-8AMTSh-VA. The Russian Defense Ministry could purchase a hundred of the aircraft, with the Russians also beginning construction of Arctic support ships in October. The new helicopter is scheduled to be handed over to the Russian military in late November, with the new design boasting an ability to start in temperatures approaching -50 degrees Celsius, as well as fly using an inertial navigation system (something also set to equip upgraded MiG-31 interceptors).

• Kongsberg has completed testing of its Joint Strike Missile in the US, with the missile designed to fit stealthily inside Norway’s future F-35A Joint Strike Fighters. This first flight test involved dropping the weapon [Norwegian] from an F-16 at 22,000ft, with further flight testing planned over the next two years. The JSM is being co-developed by Kongsberg and Raytheon.

• Finland has requested guided rocket pods to equip its Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (GMLRS), with the potential deal worth an estimated $150 million. The Lockheed Martin-manufactured M31A1 Unitary and A31A1 Alternative Warhead Missiles will equip the country’s GMLRS, converted from standard MLRSs in May 2011 through a $45.3 million contract with Lockheed Martin.

Today’s Video

• The Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS):

SDB concept
(click to view larger)

Nov 1/10: Boeing in St. Louis, MO receives a $106.4 million contract modification, exercising the Production Lot 7 (FY 2011) option for GBU-39 small diameter bombs, carriages, and technical support. At this time, the entire amount has been committed by the AAC/EBMK at Eglin Air Force Base, FL (FA8672-11-C-0034). Boeing’s Nov 9/10 release states that Lot 7 covers 2,700 GBU-39s and 280 GBU-61 carriages. Production Lots 1-5 delivered approximately 7,000 bombs and 1,200 carriages to the USAF, and Lot 6 production of 2,613 bombs and 472 carriages is more than 3 months ahead of schedule.

Unlike Raytheon’s GBU-53 SDB-II, Boeing’s SDB-I isn’t designed to attack moving targets. Instead, this GPS-guided weapon is more like the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), with a number of key design modifications. This specially shaped 250-pound bomb’s thin and pointed shape gives it extra punch against buildings and hardened targets, even though its warhead is only 50 pounds of explosive. Its pop-out glide wings and guidance set give it extended range, depending on the launching aircraft’s speed and altitude. The bombs are carried on a smart BRU-61/A 4-rack carriage, or in the internal weapon bay of planes like the F-22A Raptor. Either way, the SDB-I’s weight and compact design let aircraft carry far more smart bombs than they could otherwise.

Contracts & Events

November 12/15: Boeing has been awarded an Air Force contract modification covering Foreign Military Sales production of GBU-39 Small Diameter Bombs. The $130.1 million modification covers deliveries of the weapons to foreign partners, with the contract modification running to 2019. Israel and Italy operate the munition outside of the United States. First initial production of the SDBI began in 2005, after a controversial decision to award Boeing a production order.

NSM test launch
(click to view full)

Kongsberg’s stealthy new Naval Strike Missile (Nytt SjomalsMissil), which continues its development and testing program, has already shown potential in the crowded market for long-range ship attack and shore defense weapons. NSM’s Joint Strike Missile counterpart may have even more potential, as a longer-range air-launched naval and land strike complement to Kongsberg’s popular Penguin short-range anti-ship missile.

The market for anti-ship missiles is a crowded one, and the distinction between anti-ship and precision land strike weapons is blurring fast. Aside from a bevy of Russian subsonic and supersonic offerings, naval buyers can choose Boeing’s GM-84 Harpoon, China’s YJ-82/C-802 Saccade, MBDA’s Exocet, Otomat, or Marte; IAI of Israel’s Gabriel/ANAM, Saab’s RBS15, and more. Despite an ongoing shift toward supersonic missiles, Kongsberg chose not to go that route. So, how do they expect to be competitive in a crowded market? The F-35 Lightning II may hold the key.

The F-35 is a fairly stealthy plane, so long as it is mostly unarmed. About five sixths of its armament capacity must be carried externally, effectively rendering it visible to radars. That has been one of the several good arguments as to why stealth development may have been a low bang-for-buck result. Australia announced that it was going in with Kongsberg to adapt the Joint Strike Missile to fit inside the F-35’s armament bay. We helpfully suggest that the new variant be named the JSM-III Sardine.

Kongsberg’s Naval Strike Missile/ Joint Strike Missile NSM: Ship-Launched NSM test flight
(click to view full)

The 3.96m/ 13′, 407 kg/ 900 pound, stealth-enhanced Naval Strike Missile aim to be a generation beyond the USA’s GM-84 Harpoon. A rocket booster and Microturbo TRI-40 turbojet power it to a 185+ km/ 100+ nautical mile operational range, which is at the low end of the standards for its class. Global Positioning System/Inertial Navigation System (GPS/INS) guidance flies these missiles toward their target, aided by terrain profile matching (TERPROM). Internal programming is designed to create an unpredictable, maneuvering flight path that makes targeting difficult. During the final attack phase, an imaging infrared (IIR) seeker with automatic target recognizer (ATR) is used to refine final approach targeting, which can reportedly include specific features on a ship. Once NSM locks on, it strikes ships or land targets with a 120 kg/ 265 pound titanium warhead and programmable fuze.

Note the lack of a traditional radar seeker head, which is part of the missile’s signature reduction. IIR makes the NSM completely passive, offering no warning from shipboard ESM systems that detect radar emissions. At the same time, its stealthy shape offers little warning from its target’s active radar sweeps. This is a missile optimized at all levels for stealth, making supersonic speed less necessary.

An in-flight data link makes the missile reprogrammable in flight, if its target disappears or a higher priority threat appears.

In order to speed deployment, Kongsberg and the Norwegian government overlapped the NSM’s development phase and its production phase, referred to as the transition phase. That phase was tied to Norway’s commitments to Navantia, with a view to scheduling the NSM’s phase-in on the 4th vessel of Norway’s new Nansen Class AEGIS frigates. That integration is now complete.

To date, NSM has also been chosen for Norway’s Skjold Class air cushion catamaran FACs, and Poland’s land-based coastal defense batteries will use it to defend the country’s narrow Baltic Sea approaches.

JSM: Air-Launched NSM/ JSM
click for video

The air-launched “Joint Strike Missile (JSM)” variant is designed to be carried and launched internally from the F-35 Lightning II fighter’s 2 internal bays (1 missile per bay), or carried on external hardpoints by any aircraft type that has integrated the weapon with its systems. This isn’t quite the same missile, though it shares many characteristics. Kongsberg changed the wings, moved the intake to the missile’s sides, and added other modifications as the missile progresses through the development phase. Size shrinks slightly to 3.7m/ 12’2″, and weight drops to 307 kg/ 677 pounds. Because it’s air launched at speed, range expands to over 280 km/ 175 miles/ 150 nautical miles, with greater range enhancements if launched from higher altitudes.

Development has completed Phase 2, including detail design and integration/ fit checks for the F-18, F/A-18 Super Hornet, and F-35A. Phase 3 will complete development and leave Kongsberg ready for production.

The JSM’s tighter profile has also made it the base for 2 future designs: a submarine-launched variant that can fit inside a 533mm torpedo tube capsule, and a vertically-launched variant that adds a booster for use from strike-length naval vertical launch cells like the Mk.41.

RNoAF F-16
(click to view full)

Norway is aiming for a 2020 JSM in-service date, but that may have to involve its F-16s, which have lost their Penguin missiles. F-35A Integration will begin with the fighter’s Block 4 software fit, in 2022 – 2024.

That lateness and forced switch might be a blessing in disguise. JSM would be very appealing to many F-16 customers, and Kongsberg is also hedging its bets by testing JSM on the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet. Forced inclusion of other platforms from the outset could create early customer pickup beyond home sales, including existing F-35 prospects like Australia. Later, the prospect of stealth-enhancing internal carriage, plus out of the gate integration with the F-35 Lightning II, give the JSM a strong entry hook for committed F-35 customers like Norway, Australia, The Netherlands, et. al.

Confirmed current export targets include Australia (NSM & JSM), Canada (NSM & JSM), Italy (JSM), and the USA (NSM). A live-fire showcase at the RIMPAC 2014 exercise has the potential to add more Pacific prospects.

Kongsberg’s JSM development partner Lockheed Martin has a similar air-launched land-attack product in its AGM-158 JASSM, which has been developed into the air or sea-launched LRASM. Other competitors exist, from MBDA’s Storm Shadow/Scalp, to Taurus’ KEPD, to Boeing’s anti-ship and land attack SLAM-ER. The JSM’s biggest differentiator would be internal F-35 carriage, which is unique. The other differentiator is its F-35 integration schedule. At present, JSM’s only ranged strike competitor in F-35 Block 4 will be Raytheon’s unpowered AGM-154C-1 JSOW glide bomb.

Contracts and Key Events 2014 – 2015

JSM Phase 3 contract & costs; Poland will accelerate 2nd coastal battery; Kongsberg tries to crack the US market, partners with Raytheon for OASuW; Live-fire showcase in the Pacific; Test-firing from LCS 4. F/A-18F w. JSMs
(click to view full)

November 12/15: Kongsberg has completed testing of its Joint Strike Missile in the US, with the missile designed to fit stealthily inside Norway’s future F-35A Joint Strike Fighters. This first flight test involved dropping the weapon [Norwegian] from an F-16 at 22,000ft, with further flight testing planned over the next two years. The JSM is being co-developed by Kongsberg and Raytheon.

Jan 15/15: VL-NSM Update. Kongsberg told Navy Recognition that the firm has been in consultation with Lockheed on MK 41 integration, and that the model that has been making the rounds at trade shows in the Kongsberg booth has been geared to drum up interest from potential customers, which essentially means the U.S. Navy. Lockheed’s LRASM would seemingly be a competitive offering. The jockeying comes as the aging Harpoon missile is thought to be going to be replaced with an Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare Increment 2 procurement.

Oct 25/14: VL-NSM. Kongsberg is displaying a vertically-launched variant of its missile at AUSA 2014. The missile design is actually based on the air-launched JSM, whose compact form is easier to fit into vertical launch cells. A large booster motor would help restore comparable range.

Note that is just a model at the moment; call us when they test-fire one. Then again, the logo on the side also says Lockheed Martin. That firm makes the Mk.41 VLS, and is also signed up to help Kongsberg complete development and integration of the base JSM with the F-35. Sources: Navy Recognition, “Kongsberg showcased a Vertical Launch Joint Strike Missile (VL JSM) during AUSA 2014”.

LCS 4 fires NSM

Sept 23/14: USA. A live fire test of the Naval Strike Missile (q.v. July 24/14) done aboard USS Coronado [LCS 4] is successful, via a launcher mounted on the flight deck. The Navy is noncommittal about issuing a requirement that would lead to NSM integration with LCS, beyond deployment as part of any SSC derivatives. Sources: US Navy, “Navy Successfully Tests Norwegian Missile from LCS 4” | Kongsberg, “Successful test firing of KONGSBERG’S Naval Strike Missile from US Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship” | USNI, “Norwegian Missile Test On Littoral Combat Ship Successful.”

July 24/14: USA. The US Navy confirms this week that USS Coronado [LCS-4] is scheduled to test-launch the NSM at their Point Mugu, CA test range. NAVSEA says this isn’t about any specific requirement, it’s just a one-off event to test the ship’s ability to handle more advanced weapons, and “provide insights into the weapon’s stated capabilities of increased range, survivability and lethality.” This test does then take place successfully on September 23, but you have to wonder what firing a missile from a launcher put on the flight deck really demonstrates.

Amazingly, the US Navy is still wondering whether it should confine itself to weapons that work only within the ship’s unaided detection range, despite the fact that 500-ton Fast Attack Craft fielded by other countries carry full-range anti-ship missiles. It’s possible that NSM could fit into the LCS SuW mission module at some future date, with the LCS using UAVs etc. to close the kill chain at range.

On a related note, the NSM is an OASuW candidate (q.v. July 15/14) to eventually replace the sea-skimming, radar-guided RGM-84 Harpoon missiles aboard US Navy ships, and a full range anti-ship and surface attack missile will be critical to the USA’s Small Surface combatant frigate program (q.v. April 7-8/14). Since the Navy’s approach makes it hard for anything other than an adapted LCS to succeed, this test has significant long-term implications for the Independence Class. Sources: Gannett’s Navy Times, “LCS to conduct test of Norwegian missile”.

July 15/14: USA. Raytheon Company and Kongsberg Gruppen form a teaming agreement around the JSM for OASuW’s air-launched component, effectively displacing Raytheon’s JSOW-ER as a contender. The switch gives Raytheon a more advanced offering, while offering Kongsberg technical cooperation and stronger marketing clout. The 2 firms have a history of cooperation, and Kongsberg’s NASAMS remains the centerpiece of Raytheon’s mid-tier air defense offering.

They’ll still compete for OASuW’s ship-launched component, however; Raytheon has no intention of giving up on its RGM-109 Tomahawk. Sources: Kongsberg Gruppen, “Raytheon and Kongsberg team to provide air-launched Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare solutions”.

USA: OASuW partner

July 2/14: Phase 3. The Norwegian Defence Logistics Organization (NDLO) signs a NOK 1.1 billion ($178.3 million) Phase III contract with Kongsberg to complete Joint Strike Missile development, and prepare it for integration on the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). This brings total Phase III contracts to NOK 1.58 billion (q.v. Nov 29/13). Norway’s MoD adds that Australia is about to get involved:

“Australian authorities have indicated that they want to help integrate the JSM on the F-35… a more detailed agreement will be in place within the next 6-12 months.”

Sources: Norwegian MoD, “Phase 3 In the Development of JSM Underway” | Kongsberg, “KONGSBERG signs NOK 1.1 billion JSM contract with the Norwegian Armed Forces”.

JSM Phase III

May 23/14: Phase 3 & Costs. A bill in Norway’s Storting would finance JSM Phase 3 final development, but the cost has expanded by NOK 1 billion to NOK 3.7 billion (about $622 million). Overall cost increases have pushed the overall project from NOK 6 billion (about $1 billion) to NOK 8.2 billion (about $1.38 billion), and most of this 37% increase will be covered by the government. At the same time, however, Kongsberg will be investing more on their own side. They see a clear opportunity for JSM/NSM, but elements like NSM Vertical Launch System compatibility etc. will take added work if they want to capitalize.

The good news is that a recent independent evaluation confirmed that JSM has the technological maturity required at this stage of development. Phase 3’s problem is the variety of different systems, rules, control regimes and operational requirements involved in a globally exportable missile. Norway hasn’t done that since the smaller and simpler Penguin missile was developed decades ago, and integration is harder now because the missile and platforms are both more complex. So the final phase involves more testing, integration, and documentation than the firm had expected. On the bright side, Kongsberg has sold over 1,000 Penguin missiles since the 1970s, and the current Mk3 remains relevant and on the market. They’re hoping for similar success, despite an early disappointment:

“The goal has been, and remains, to bring in other F-35 partner countries to help cover the cost of integrating the JSM on the F-35. However, in spite of extensive efforts by Norwegian authorities and Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace, this goal has yet to be achieved. This is partly due to the financial situation in a number of partner countries and partly due to varying status of partner country decision making processes. The partner nations showing most interest in the JSM have been, and continue to be, Australia and Canada, and to some degree, Italy and the United States, all of which have expressed an operational requirement for a future airborne maritime strike capability. As a consequence, until such time as another partner joins the integration process, Norway’s cost of integrating the JSM on F-35 increases by about NOK 1.15 billion (USD 193 million).”

Norway remains committed, partly because of the potential market, and partly because it’s important to them to maintain their aerospace/ missile industrial cluster. JSM Phase 3 development is expected to finish by the end of 2017, in plenty of time for inclusion in F-35A Block 4 during 2022-2024. Or full integration with existing fighters like the Super Hornet etc. (q.v. Nov 6/13). Sources: Norwegian Ministry of Defence, “Joint Strike Missile (JSM) – A Considerably Strengthened Norwegian Threshold Against War and Conflict” | Kongsberg Defence, “The Norwegian Government today presented a bill to the Parliament to further development of the Joint Strike Missile (JSM)” | Reuters, “Cost of Kongsberg’s JSM missile rises by 37 pct”.

Phase 3, costs and opportunities

April 11/14: Poland. In light of renewed tensions from Russia, Poland intends to accelerate their purchase of a 2nd coastal defense battery of NSM:

“The third very important part of the modernization program of the Navy was the delivery in June 2013 the Coastal Missile Squadron. Achieving its full combat readiness, after the delivery of the final number of missiles Kongsberg NSM (in 2014 and 2015, it is planned shipment of 12 missiles per year), is to take place by 2015. Deputy minister Mroczek additionally informed that later this year a proceeding of acquiring a second Coastal Missile Squadron is to begin.”

Sources: Dziennik Zbrojny, “Current status of the Polish naval modernization program”.

April 9/14: Exports. Norway is beginning to promote the missile abroad in earnest. HNoMS Fridtjof Nansen will sail to the Pacific Ocean to take part in RIMPAC, where the frigate will launch an NSM at a target ship provided by the US Navy. Nothing like a concrete demonstration for the other countries to look at.

Norwegian Navy Cmdr. Tony Schei confirms that “Kongsberg sees the JSM able to fit in a Mark 41 vertical launch system,” and says that Australia and Canada are being offered this weapon for their future frigates. It would be surprising if they weren’t also targeting Britain’s future Type 26 frigates. Sources: Defense News, “Norway’s Naval Strike Missile Aims for the Pacific”.

April 7-8/14: USA. With the USA considering its options for 20 frigates as a follow-on to the Littoral Combat Ship program, and expressing a preference for modified LCS designs, Kongsberg is presenting scale models of LCS variants with NSMs at the Sea-Air-Space 2014 Exposition. The Freedom Class gets 12 NSMs in 2 recessed modules above the helicopter hangar, while the trimaran Independence Class ends up with 18 NSMs in 2 recessed launchers just behind the bridge, and a 3rd in the hull behind the naval gun.

Those loadouts would make the ships formidable surface combatants. If they control multiple UAVs for surveillance and targeting, their strike role actually starts to look like an aircraft carrier with 1-launch strike aircraft, and this configuration wouldn’t require ship radar upgrades. That could even position Kongsberg for a post-2019 Surface Warfare Module upgrade within the existing fleet, if the Navy decides that it has to upgrade to serious anti-ship capability.

From Kongsberg’s point of view, the challenge is to find footholds within the US military and position themselves as a viable replacement to Boeing’s Harpoon. The F-35 offers them a trump card, but they’ll need a warship platform to really compete. Success with LCS and/or its follow-on frigate would give them a head-start, and make them a strong contender for OASuW if the vertical launch problem can be solved. Sources: Naval Recognition, “Sea-Air-Space 2014 Show Daily News – Kongsberg NSM”.

March 26/14: USA. Navy acquisition chief Sean Stackley says that the initial buy of 90 LRASM missiles from FY 2017 – 2019 is a special justification and authorization buy following DARPA development, in order to get the air-launched version onto USAF B-1 bombers (which will already have JASSM integrated) and USN F/A-18E/F Super Hornet fighters. US budgets actually show 110 missiles from FY 2017 – 2019. He also says that the main OASuW buy of ship and air launched missiles for anti-ship and surface strike missions will be competed.

The most important aspect of that OASuW program involves launch from ships’ Vertical Launch Cells, in order to correct a tactical deficit in USN ships that is becoming strategic. Raytheon could find itself well positioned with an upgraded xGM-109 Tomahawk, or they could widen JSOW-ER’s capabilities. Kongsberg’s Naval Strike Missile will almost be qualified on the F-35 by that point, but the firm will need to either add shipborne Mk.41 vertical launch system compatibility, or find another angle. Sources: Reuters, “U.S. Navy plans competition for next-generation missile”.

March 20/14: USA. Inside Defense reports that the Pentagon has rejected bids from Kongsberg (NSM/JSM) and Raytheon (JSOW-ER), and has approved Lockheed Martin’s LRASM for a major follow-on development contract to prepare it for production in FY17. Sources: Inside Defense, “DOD Expands LRASM Development, Rebuffs Alternate Bids From Raytheon, Kongsberg”.

2012 – 2013

1st naval launch; 1st live warhead strike; Australia’s plans; JSM scheduled for F-35 Block 4; Go early with F-16 and F/A-18E/F in response? Gotcha
(click to view full)

Nov 29/13: Bridging contract. Norway’s DLO signs a NOK 480 million ($78.4 million) JSM bridging-phase development contract with Kongsberg, in order to keep the workforce moving ahead until the Stortinget (Parliament) approves the final Phase 3 budget for development & testing.

Phase 2 included detail design and integration/ fit checks for the F-18, F/A-18 Super Hornet, and F-35A. Phase 3 will complete development and leave Kongsberg ready for production, including captive carry and live fire tests from successive platforms. Kongsberg adds that “The international F-35 user consortium, with the USA as the largest, is showing great interest in the JSM.” Source: Kongsberg, “KONGSBERG signs contract with the Norwegian Armed Forces for bridging-phase leading to phase three development of JSM”.

Bridging contract

Nov 6/13: Super Hornet. Boeing and Kongsberg take the 1st step toward integration with the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet fighter family. All they did was ensure that the weapons fit on the aircraft’s external pylons. Next, they have to conduct wind tunnel tests in early 2014. That will assess the effect of the missiles on the plane’s aerodynamics, and likely stress on the pylons. Live captive carry testing will be needed to verify their conclusions, and of course full integration with the aircraft’s electronics will be its own separate effort.

Norway doesn’t fly Super Hornets, but potential JSM partner Australia does (q.v. May 16/13), and so does the US Navy. F-35 integration won’t be ready until 2021-2022, but successful F/A-18 integration would give the JSM an early deployment option with any future Super Hornet customers. It would also provide an incentive for Australia to commit to JSM early and deploy the missiles well before 2025, by offering them a much more immediate fleet upgrade. Finally, Super Hornet integration would provide an opening to put JSM forward as an AGM-84 Harpoon missile replacement for the US Navy, if the higher-end LRASM program falls to coming budget cuts. Sources: Boeing, Nov 6/13 release.

June 4/13: Live Fire. The Norwegian Navy carries out the first live-warhead NSM trial at a range “outside Norway”, firing the missile from the Skjold Class Fast Attack Craft KNM Steil to hit a decommissioned Oslo Class frigate. The missile hits at close range, and does a reasonable amount of damage, as the accompanying photo shows. Looks like they used a pop-up and dive attack profile. See also Flight International.

May 16/13: Australia. During Parliamentary hearings by the Joint Committee On Foreign Affairs, Defence And Trade, DMO’s New Air Combat Capability program manager, Air Vice Marshal Kym Osley, discusses the JSM and Australia, in response to a question from Sen. Fawcett. With Norway’s government fully finding the missile through F-35 integration in Block 4, Australia doesn’t need to be involved in that financially, and they haven’t made any commitments to JSM yet beyond discussing requirements etc.

Australia’s near-term plan is to use the AGM-154C-1 JSOW glide bomb as their initial maritime strike weapon, first on their F/A-18F Super Hornets and next on their F-35As. They believe that the USAF and US Navy will also make JSOW part of Block 4, which is planned to finish in 2020 and release to the fleet in 2021. Software development remains very behind, but Australia hopes to have JSOW available on their F-35As by the RAAF’s own planned F-35A Full Operational Capability date, in 2023.

Beyond 2023, Australia’s JP3023 program will be looking at a new maritime strike platform for use across its navy surface combatants and air force (F/A-18F, F-35A, P-8A). The NSM/ JSM is expected to be a strong contender, but by then it’s likely to face competitors from America’s OASuW program, as well as current market offerings. Internal carriage in the F-35A would remain the JSM’s trump card, unless a new entrant can duplicate that. Hansard Australia [PDF].

April 26/13: F-35 Integration. The Norwegian government submits a formal Parliamentary request to authorize 6 F-35As for delivery in 2017, and shifts its buying approach. Read “F-35 Lightning II Wins Norway’s (Fake) Competition” for full coverage.

The government also announces that the JSM now has a firm slot for integration: F-35 Block 4. Block 3 is the final version that will emerge from development in 2018 – 2019, which means Block 4 would be ready around 2021 at the earliest. Even that date would make their missile the platform’s first long-range strike option. Norwegian MoD.

JSM integration: F-35 Block 4

Nov 30/12: JSM. Norwegian officials unveil the first completed fuselage for the new Joint Strike Missile, developed by Kongsberg for the F-35. The JSM will undergo a Critical Design Review during the summer of 2013, after which preparations will begin for its final stage of development and full F-35 integration. Norwegian MoD.

Oct 12-15/12: The Norwegian Navy announces that it has conducted successful NSM firing tests from Skjold Class Fast Attack Craft HNoMS Glimt and Fridtjof Nansen Class frigate HNoMS Roald Amundsen. The launch from HNoMS Glimt was the NSM’s 1st naval firing. Navy Recognition.

1st naval launch

June 15/12: Norwegian Defence Minister Espen Barth Eide announces that the Norwegian Government has signed its contract for the first 2 F-35A fighters, and put all of the required elements in place for JSM development and F-35 integration.

Norway actually began the Phase II JSM development contract in June 2011 (q.v.), but needed American support to integrate the missile with the fighter. US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta recently confirmed that support, which allowed Norway to move forward. The JSM program will also feed back into the ship and land-launched NSM, by laying the groundwork for future upgrades.

The F-35 currently has no powered strike missile planned for internal or external carriage by the end of its development phase, in 2018. An early start for Kongsberg could give it a leg up for future orders. Kongsberg Defence Systems President Harald Ånnestad believes the JSM program could be worth as much as NOK 25 billion (currently $4.2 billion), and translate into 450 long-term jobs at Kongsberg alone. Norwegian MoD | Kongsberg.

May 31/12: F-35 studies. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co. in Fort Worth, TX receives a $19.8 million fixed-price-incentive-fee (firm target) modification to the F-35’s Low Rate Initial Production Lot 4 contract, which covers Norway’s Joint Strike Missile (JSM) Risk Reduction Study. Efforts will include physical fit checks, wind tunnel tests, engineering analysis, and designing and building of an emulator and adapter to determine next steps in integrating the JSM into the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.

Work will be performed in Fort Worth, TX (70%); Arnold AFB in Tullahoma, TN (20%); and Kongsberg, Norway (10%), and is expected to be complete in May 2014. US Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD manages this contract (N00019-09-C-0010)

2011

JSM Phase II. NSMs for Poland. F-35A JSF
(click to view full)

Dec 28/11: Poland. Kongsberg finalizes the Dec 7/10 preliminary contract with Poland, whose scope has increased along with its cost (now NOK 712/ $119.5 million). Deliveries of NSM missiles, in conjunction with a command and weapon control system similar to the firm’s NASAMS air defence system, are expected to begin in 2012, and the order will be booked as a Q4 2011 transaction.

Kongsberg adds that will be subcontracting with a large number of Polish enterprises, adding that the coastal defense network’s radar system, communications system and the trucks to carry the launch ramps are all being developed and delivered by Polish industry. Kongsberg Defence.

Poland

June 30/11: Kongsberg signs a NOK 543 million (about $100.9 million) contract with the NLDO for Phase II development of the air-launched Joint Strike Missile variant. It builds on the NOK 166 million JSM Phase I contract, signed in 2009. Kongsberg.

JSM Phase II

June 30/11: Kongsberg announces the first ever live-fire of the surface-launched NSM against a land target. It was actually a land-land firing, as the Polish Navy Coastal Squadron fired the missile from a land-based platform, to hit its land-based target over 150 km away.

Naval ships will also use the NSM, beginning with Norway’s own Skjold Class corvettes and Fridtjof Nansen Class AEGIS frigates. Deliveries for these platforms, and the Polish coastal defense batteries, are scheduled for 2011-2014.

June 16/11: Norwegian Parliamentary approval to buy 4 initial F-35A fighters, and begin JSM Phase II to equip those fighters with an internally-stowed anti-ship missile. VNN | F-16.NET | Reuters | Stortinget Prop. S110 [Nynorsk, PDF].

June 6/11: Defense Minister Grete Faremo is called in to an open Parliamentary hearing about the F-35A, but she also discusses the NSM/JSM. Translated from the Norwegian statement issued by the Forsvarsdepartementet:

“JSM: The operational level of ambition for new combat aircraft capability requires long-range anti-surface weapons by sea and land attack capability. The Joint Strike Missile – JSM – is considered to be the only weapon in development that will meet these operational requirements, and can be carried inside the F-35. The fact that the missile can be carried inside the plane is a very central point, namely, it means that the plane keeps its stealth capabilities – which is not the case if the missile is hung outside the wings in the traditional manner.

JSM Development Step 1 is completed, and to continue with the development of JSM in step 2 is crucial to provide operational capability – and it is an important signal to potential customers and it will create a necessary degree of credibility in our ongoing efforts to establish international collaboration for the integration of the missile.

There is considerable interest in the JSM from several other nations. I have taken the initiative include the establishment of a bilateral working group with U.S. to follow up there in particular. A clarification about the participation of other nations, including the United States, is essential in order to include them in the integration phase, which is expected to begin within the next 12-18 months.”

Dec 7/10: NSMs for Poland. Kongsberg Defence Systems announces a NOK 660 (about $110.4 million) million contract with the Polish Ministry of Defence, which includes Naval Strike Missiles (NSM) and support equipment. The contract is not final yet, pending approval of the related industrial offsets contract. Some of Poland’s naval ships currently operate Saab’s RBS-15 naval strike missile, but the NSM missiles appear to be destined for coastal batteries that would cover Poland’s Baltic Sea approaches.

Poland

2008 – 2009

NSM production. JSM phase I. Skjold Class
(click to view larger)

June 29/09: Kongsberg announces that:

“Today, the Kongsberg District Court served KONGSBERG a writ regarding a lawsuit being filed by the Swedish company SAAB in Poland against both the Polish Ministry of Defense and KONGSBERG. The lawsuit refers to the award of a contract which KONGSBERG signed with the Polish Ministry of Defence in December 2008 for the delivery of a coastal artillery system featuring Naval Strike Missiles (NSM). SAAB claims the contract to be declared void.”

April 27/09: Kongsberg Gruppen anounces a NOK 166 million (about $25 million) contract with the Norwegian Defence Procurement Division for the first phase in the development of the Joint Strike Missile. The contract is scheduled to run over the next 18 months.

JSM Phase I

Feb 2/09: Kongsberg announces a successful test firing of the Naval Strike Missile (NSM):

“Fired at the Pt. Mugu artillery range in the US state of California, the missile completed the planned trajectory prior to striking the target ship. During its flight, the missile conducted a large number of advanced manoeuvres that clearly place it far ahead of competing systems.”

May 25/07: Production deal. In the largest order Kongserg has landed to date, the firm signs a NOK 2.746 billion (about $466.4 million) contract with the Norwegian Armed Forces’ Logistics Organisation for serial production of the new Naval Strike Missile (NSM). This includes the transition contract for NOK 200 million (about $34 million).

This contract covers the production of NSMs for Norway’s Nansen Class AEGIS frigates, and Skjold Class catamaran-hovercraft fast attack craft. Production under this contract will run until 2014, and will ensure employment for 200 – 250 individuals in Kongsberg, as well as work for nearly 120 of their 1400 Norwegian subcontractors in Akershus, Buskerud, and Oppland counties. Tom Gerhardsen, president of Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace, adds in the firm’s release that the contract will also:

“…give us the references we need to sell the missile to other countries’ naval defence forces. Several countries have already indicated an interest in the NSM.”

NSM Production

2004 – 2007

Tests. Joint marketing with LockMart. NSM: Early concept

Jan 31/07: Lockheed Martin and Kongsberg sign a a joint marketing agreement for an aircraft-version of the new Naval Strike Missile (NSM), to be known as the Joint Strike Missile (JSM) and adapted for deployment on Lockheed Martin’s F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. A study for making adaptations to both the missile and the fighter craft is already in progress, funded jointly by Norway and Australia. It is expected that the adaptations will take 3 years to reach the technological maturity required for deployment on the F-35.

Jan 15/07: Kongsberg announces 2 more successful NSM test firings in California, USA, as part of the Norwegian Navy’s final approval of the development phase. The tests were conducted in the U.S. because the Americans have a test firing range that allows the missile to be tested over land and sea alike, which is essential for testing several of the missile’s functions.

Aug 2/06: Kongsberg announces a pair of successful NSM missile tests in California, on April 1/07 and July 21/06.

The test firings are part of the Norwegian Navy’s final approval of the NSM development phase. The test was conducted in the U.S. because the Americans have a test firing range that allows the missile to be tested over land and sea alike.

Dec 13/05: Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace attempts to fire an NSM missile at a testing facility in France, but the test is aborted before the missile left the launcher due to a malfunction in the launcher’s systems.

A successful test is required before the project can enter the final part of the development phase, in which the missile system’s performance and functionality will be verified against the contract specifications issued by Norway’s Armed Forces’ Logistics Organisation. Kongsberg’s release says that the missile’s schedule will be unaffected.

April 26/04: In Recommendation No. 54 to the Storting (Norway’s parliament), the Government asks for authorization to sign a contract for the Naval Strike Missile (NSM) transition phase. The contract is valued at approximately NOK 200 million.

Full implementation of the production phase will be initiated only upon formal completion of the development phase and be based on a decision by the Storting at a later date. At this point, development phase is scheduled for completion in late 2005. Kongsberg release.

NSM contract

Additional Readings

• Kongsberg Defence – Naval Strike Missile.

• Kongsberg Defence – Joint Strike Missile.

• Naval Recognition – NSM Naval Strike Missile – JSM Joint Strike Missile.

• DID Spotlight – F-35 Lightning II Wins Norway’s (Fake) Competition.

• DID – LRASM Missiles: Reaching for a Long-Range Punch. Based on the air-launched AGM-158B JASSM-ER, this stealthy, sub-sonic air- and sea-launched missile will offer more range than NSM/JSM, and is designed to fit Mk.41 VLS launch cells on ships. It will also be more expensive, and its size won’t allow internal carriage in the F-35.

• DID (Feb 2/07) – Lockheed & Kongsberg Partner to Bring NSM to JSF.

Dassault Rafale
(click for cutaway view)

Will Dassault’s fighter become a fashionably late fighter platform that builds on its parent company’s past successes – or just “the late Rafale”? It all began as a 1985 break-away from the multinational consortium that went on to create EADS’ Eurofighter. The French needed a lighter aircraft that was suitable for carrier use, and were reportedly unwilling to cede design authority over the project. As is so often true of French defense procurement policy, the choice came down to paying additional costs for full independence and exact needs, or losing key industrial capabilities by partnering or buying abroad. France has generally opted for expensive but independent defense choices, and the Rafale was no exception.

Those costs, and associated delays triggered by the end of the Cold War and reduced funding, proved to be very costly indeed. Unlike previous French fighters, which relied on exports to lower their costs and keep production lines humming, the Rafale has yet to secure a single export contract – in part because initial versions were hampered by impaired capabilities in key roles. The Rafale may, at last, be ready to be what its vendors say: a true omnirole aircraft, ready for prime time on the global export stage. The question is whether it’s too late. Rivals like EADS’ Eurofighter, Russia’s Su-27/30 family, and the American “teen series” of F-15/16/18 variants are all well established. Meanwhile, Saab’s versatile and cheaper JAS-39 Gripen remains a stubborn foe in key export competitions, and the multinational F-35 juggernaut is bearing down on it.

Dassault’s Rafale: Variants Rafales
(click to view full)

The Rafale is a 9.5 – 10.5 tonne aircraft powered by 2 SNECMA M88 jet engines, each generating up to 16,500 pounds thrust with afterburner. Canards are used to improve maneuverability, especially for snap-shots in short-range dogfights, and radar shaping lowers the aircraft’s profile relative to 4th generation competitors like the Mirage 2000 or F-16. Carrier capability was a prime motivator behind France’s decision to go it alone with the Rafale program, and variants exist for both land-based and carrier use.

Despite its size, the Rafale can carry an impressive set of ordnance beyond its 30mm DEFA 791 cannon: up to 9.5 tonnes of weapons and stores on 14 pylons (1-2 on center fuselage, 2 below engine intakes, 6 underwing and 2 wingtip pylons), 5 of which are “wet” pylons that can carry heavy stores or fuel tanks. Its Thales RBE2 mechanically-scanned array or RBE2-AA AESA radar can direct MBDA’s MICA RF missiles, and future integration of the long-range Meteor is also planned. A combination of Thales/SAGEM’s OST Infrared Scan and Track optronics, and MBDA’s MICA IR medium-range missiles, allows the Rafale to supplement its radar-guided missiles with passively-targeted, no-warning attacks on enemy aircraft from beyond visual range. At present, this capability is only duplicated by Russian aircraft: Sukhoi’s SU-27/30 family, and advanced MiG-29s.

Rafale Variants: Types and Tranches Dassault: Power of One

The Rafale comes in several broad types, and also comes in different capability tranches.

Carrier-capable Rafales are single-seat fighters, and are referred to as Rafale Ms. They will become the French Navy’s only fighters, replacing the F-8P Crusader fighter, Etendard IVP reconnaissance aircraft, and Super Etendard strike aircraft. They feature the usual set of carrier modifications, including lengthened and strengthened landing gear, strengthened airframe and arrester hook for landings, and carrier landing electronics. The front-center pylon is deleted on this version, in order to make room for that robust landing gear.

French Air Force Rafales come in 2 broad types: the preferred 2-seat Rafale B, and the single-seat Rafale C. They will eventually replace the SEPECAT Jaguar, Dassault’s Mirage F1, and most of the Mirage 2000 family in French service.

Rafale & Mirage 2000D
over Afghanistan
(click to view full)

Within those designations, Dassault’s Rafales also come in capability tranches that are common across all versions.

Initial Rafale F1s are limited to air superiority missions, and included only Rafale-Ms intended as urgent replacements for the French carrier force’s 1950s/60s era F-8P Crusader air superiority fighters. Rafale F1s are capable fighters, and represented a huge upgrade for the Marine Nationale. Even so, they lack the wide weapons fit of 4+ generation counterparts like the JAS-39 Gripen or modern F-15 Strike Eagles, the optimized cockpit of EADS’ Eurofighter, or the price advantages of Sukhoi’s SU-30 family.

Surviving Rafale-M F1s will be upgraded to the F3 configuration, swapping out the core mission computer and cockpit displays, and changing the plane’s radar, electrical wiring, SPECTRA countermeasures system, and hardpoints. The 1st upgraded plane was delivered in October 2014.

Rafale F2. The F2 standard, which adds the ability to carry and use precision ground attack weapons. This standard includes 2-seat air force Rafale-Bs, single-seat Rafale-Cs, and naval Rafale-Ms. Key additions include radar ground attack and terrain-following modes, carriage of laser-guided bombs and Storm Shadow/ Scalp cruise missiles, MICA IR missile capability using the OSF IRST sensor, a Link 16 datalink, and a buddy tanker pod for Rafale Ms. The biggest thing the F2 standard lacks is integration of independent laser targeting capability, which is why French Rafales over Afghanistan had to operate in conjunction with Super Etendard and Mirage 2000D fighters.

F2 Rafales have now been upgraded to F3 status, which was much easier than it is for the F1s.

ASMP-A4 on Rafale
(click to view full)

Rafale F3. Since 2008, all Rafales have been delivered in the F3 standard, and most have now been upgraded to it. Initial changes added the ability to carry French ASMP-A air-launched nuclear missiles, allowing the Rafale to replace the Mirage 2000N in that nuclear strike role. Other modifications include full integration with the Reco NG reconnaissance pod, implementation of all currently planned modes for the RBE2 radar, anti-ship attack with the Exocet or follow-on ANF, and support for an improved tanker pack.

Further changes were forthcoming within F3. Full integration with Thales’ Damocles surveillance and laser targeting pod was executed, and Damocles-equipped Rafales were used over Libya in 2011. The current standard is F3.3, and F3.4 is expected to debut in early 2014.

The Rafale’s radar took a quantum leap forward as of Rafale #C137, with Thales’ RBE2-AA AESA radar replacing the mechanically-scanned RBE2 array on previous aircraft. The new radar has hundreds of active T/R modules, and involves about 400,000 lines of code all by itself. This compares to about 2 million lines of code for the aircraft’s entire original avionics suite. In exchange, AESA radars generally create roughly 2x-3x better range or resolution than current PESA technologies. Note that older Rafales don’t currently have AESA radars, but they’re expected to see upgrades under a EUR 1+ billion F3R program.

Nuclear ASMP-A capability is irrelevant to exports, but the addition of an AESA radar and full independent precision strike capability will go a long way toward making the Rafale more competitive with challengers like American F-16/15/18s, Saab’s JAS-39NG Gripen, EADS’ Eurofighter Typhoon, and the oncoming F-35 program.

Thales Inside

Rafale F3Rs features software enhancements to make full use of the RBE2-AA radar, Meteor long range air-to-air missile integration, SBU-64 dual mode laser/GPS AASM smart bomb integration, improvements to Thales SPECTRA self-defence system, an Identification Friend or Foe interrogator/transponder with full Mode-5/ Mode-S-compatibility. Diagnostic improvements will make maintenance easier and more cost-effective, and there are reports that F3R will improve an overall pilot interface that has been consistently rated below the Eurofighter’s. As of September 2013, the DGA started referring to these planes as the 4th tranche (4T), and January 2014 saw a full commitment to develop all of these upgrades for fielding by 2018.

Efforts to include MBDA’s Meteor long-range air-air missiles are underway already, but it won’t be ready until 2018. That will make Rafale the last European fighter to integrate the Meteor, about 3-4 years later than the JAS-39 Gripen. It will also be the only fighter with a 1-way Meteor datalink instead of a 2-way link.

The Rafale remains behind in 2 other areas.

Its new Damocles surveillance and targeting pod’s 320 x 240 infrared array is far behind other international offerings, even with an architecture that effectively gives 640 x 480 resolution. Current performance is adequate, but this gap will continue to widen until the improved PDL-NG surveillance and targeting pod’s debut in 2018 with an effective 1280 x 1040 array. That’s about the same as some rival offerings in 2014, so by 2018, the Rafale is likely to modernize from a gross competitive disadvantage in a critical technology to a noticeable competitive disadvantage.

The 2nd gap is even more consequential. While the Rafale has a wide Head Up Display, an installed Helmet Mounted Display that would allow the Rafale to take full advantage of its wide-borseight MICA missiles remains the type’s most important missing piece, even after F3R.

Dassault’s Rafale: Program Le Bourget, 2005
(click to view full)

The French Senat tallied the Rafale program at EUR 43.56 billion over 40 years, at 2011 prices. That figure was for 286 forecast aircraft, and the EUR 152 million per-plane figure was similar to the Pentagon’s “PAUC” metric, amortizing development costs as well as flyaway purchases.

Current plans call for delivery of 225 Rafale B/C/M aircraft by the end of the program, which will stop sometime around 2017 without export orders. Cutting production totals to 225 worsens per-plane raises the development cost average per plane, and slowed production will raise actual per-plane fixed costs.

If the Rafale is expensive, it’s also the heart of French military power. Its carrier and nuclear roles are irreplaceable, and the 2011 Libyan operation demonstrated that it has evolved to play a central role in French conventional wars. The Rafale program equally important to France’s aerospace industry, as the heart of France’s advanced military aerospace research. The Rafale has been responsible for significant steps forward in French materials science, engine design, computing, sensors, etc. at Dassault, Thales, and Snecma. Not to mention over 500 sub-contractors. In total, the aircraft is said to be responsible for 7,000 direct and indirect jobs.

As of September 2013, 121 Rafales had been delivered: 38 Rafale-M, 39 Rafale B, and 44 Rafale C. As of October 2014, the total had risen to 133.

Rafale Program: History Production line
(click to view full)

Unfortunately, 1985 proved to be a perilous start date for an expensive decade-plus weapons project. The end of the Cold War led to a severe funding crunch. Development took a long time, and fielding was delayed for many years. That delay left Rafales with great potential as a 4+ generation fighter, but limited operational capabilities that compared unfavorably with the planes it was trying to replace. That has come back to bite Dassault, and France.

The first operational Rafale-M aircraft was delivered in 2000, to the Marine Nationale, and the type entered full service in 2004, in the F1 configuration. Plans call for eventual delivery of up to 60 Rafale Ms, delivered or upgraded to at least the F3 standard.

The end of 2004 saw initial delivery of 2-seat Rafale B fighters to the French air force, and 2005 saw delivery of the 1st single-seat Rafale C. The aircraft entered service with the air force in 2006. All Rafale B/C fighters have been delivered as F2s or F3s.

By 2006, the French armed forces had ordered just 120 Rafales (82 Rafale A-C for the Armée de l’Air, 38 Rafale M for the Marine Nationale) of the planned 294. About 70 had been delivered by 2009, when a new French purchase raised the order book to 180 Rafales; but 2009 also saw production cut from 14 to 11 aircraft per year. This is seen as the minimum necessary to maintain the production line, and keeping the line at even that minimum capacity required an extra EUR 1.1 billion during 2009-2014 budget period, to bring forward 17 orders planned for later years.

The challenge for the following 2015-2019 budget period was to finalize the export orders necessary, in order to maintain production while French orders were cut again.

The Rafale Program: What’s Next? Rafale F3
(click to view full)

Additional multi-year buys will be required, but absent major export orders, a combination of deteriorating global finances, future demographic crunches in Europe, and the advent of unmanned UCAV projects like the nEUROn, will all compete with additional French Rafale orders. As those orders are squeezed, Dassaut won’t be the only firm feeling the pain. The effect would be felt throughout France’s aerospace sector, as Snecma, Thales, and their subcontractors would be forced to rethink their plans – or even their existence, in the case of some lower-tier suppliers.

That leaves 2 options for the platform.

As the British have demonstrated, one way to improve a jet’s affordability is to improve maintenance contracts. In 2008, the French defense ministry’s SIMMAD signed a 10-year “Rafale Care” contract with Dassault that paid for availability and flight-hours, rather than spares and man-hours. The British approach has been to build toward a contract that makes 1 firm responsible for all sub-contractors as well, but in 2012, a decade-long contract between SIMMAD and Thales made it clear that France prefers a set of modular performance-based contracts instead.

Once the French approach has several years of data behind it, that kind of future cost certainty could be helpful on the export front.

That would be timely, because after over a decade of failure, exports may offer the program a 2nd ray of hope. Rafale versions were picked as the preferred choice in India’s MMRCA competition, and have several potential export contenders in the wings. They need to close a few of these deals – but that hasn’t been easy.

Rafale’s Export Issues French Mirage 2000C
(click to view full)

For previous French fighters, domestic production has been supplemented, and subsidized, by strong export sales. The Mirage III was exported to around 20 countries, and was so successful that its export profits could have financed almost 25% of France’s oil imports! The Mirage F1 was exported to only 10 countries. The Mirage 2000 has 8 customers. Rafale? None.

To date, the Rafale has lost export opportunities in Algeria (SU-30MKA – Rafale a long shot), Brazil (JAS-39E/F Gripen NG – Rafale the initial favorite), Greece (Eurofighter, then F-16), Morocco (F-16C/D – Rafale the favorite), The Netherlands (F-35A), Norway (F-35A), Oman (Eurofighter – Rafale a long shot), Saudi Arabia (Eurofighter), Singapore (F-15SG), South Korea (F-15K, Rafale won but politics reversed the pick), Switzerland (JAS-39E Gripen NG), and the UAE (F-16E/F, but could win next competition). Other losses have been rumored over the years.

Europe’s 4G+ trio

In a March 2012 statement, Dassault CEO Charles Edelstenne threw its export issues into sharp relief. Translated:

“When one is in a country like India which is an open country and in which Americans do not have the same weight as countries that are their private hunting preserve, we have a chance. And this chance, we got it… The market for the Rafale, it is countries that do not want or can not buy or American countries who want to have a second source while buying American. Now all countries, except two, where we lost, were countries that did not fit this definition.”

There’s some truth to this statement, but it also elides many of the Rafale’s genuine problems. Questionable precision ground attack capabilities for Rafale F1-F2s, coupled with limited integration beyond French weapons, hurt the aircraft badly on the export market until mid-2011.

Ground attack capabilities have been fixed, but the Rafale’s EUR 100+ million price tag leaves it occupying a high-end market segment that has historically been responsible for just 25% of fighter export sales. That price gap beyond competitors like Saab’s Gripen, Lockheed Martin’s F-16, and Sukhoi’s SU-30 has also cost Dassault sales, most recently in Brazil and Switzerland.

Despite Dassault’s rosy projections for the global fighter market as a whole, therefore, their lack of foreign orders has choked expected investments, and started to feed back into platform modernization issues.

It’s also affecting the rest of the French air force. Lack of exports is forcing extra French funding, in order to keep the Rafale production line at its minimum sustaining rate. That extra spending is delaying the much-needed modernization of France’s Mirage 2000 fleet, and is beginning to pose an operational risk for France.

Current export opportunities for Dassault include:

• India (~126). Preferred choice, but no contract yet.
  
• Qatar (36). Could rise to 72 over time. The QEAF is looking to replace their 12 Mirage 2000D fighters and 6 combat capable Alpha Jet light aircraft, but the growing power vacuum is pushing them toward a larger buy. Competition: Eurofighter, F/A-18 Advanced Super Hornet, F-15 Strike Eagle.
  
• The UAE (60). Mirage 2000 customer. Negotiations have dragged for a long time.

Secondary opportunities include:

• Bahrain (12-18). Considered a low odds bid. Competition: Eurofighter, likely F-16V and F/A-18 Advanced Super Hornet.
  
• Canada (~65). F-35 partner. Very unlikely there there will even be a real competition.
  
• Kuwait (18-24). Considered a low odds bid. Competition: Eurofighter, F/A-18 Advanced Super Hornet.
  
• Malaysia (18). MiG-29N replacement on hold. Competition: JAS-39E/F Gripen NG, Eurofighter, F/A-18 Advanced Super Hornet, Sukhoi SU-30MKM.

Contracts and Key Events 2014-2015

Rafale F3R upgrades ordered; 1st export contract to Qatar?; Indian workshare agreement negotiated. 2013 French Air Force

November 12/15: The United Arab Emirates is reportedly close to signing an agreement for Rafale fighters, with the sixty-aircraft deal slated to value approximately $10 billion. Similar talks between the UAE and manufacturer Dassault collapsed in November 2011, but were revived in April 2015.

October 26/15: French firm Dassault has offered the Rafale fighter to Canada as an alternative to the F-35. The new Canadian PM looks set to withdraw from the international Joint Strike Fighter program, pushing up the cost of the other partners’ fighter in the process, although this still remains to be officially finalized. Dassault has offered the country its Rafale fighter.

October 23/15: France has reportedly agreed to invest half of the value of the contract for 36 Rafale fighters in Indian industry, with negotiations ongoing. The offset agreement is now thought to have paved the way for further negotiations over the sale of the fighters, which was first originally announced in April, following the collapse of the M-MRCA competition. The negotiations reached a sticking point in August over offset arrangements, with high level intervention in September kicking talks forward. Another potential issue has been identified as the Indian insistence on installing the indigenous Astra missile on the French fighters.

August 17/15: One sticking point in the ongoing government-to-government negotiations between India and France over the procurement of 36 Rafales has reportedly been identified. The Indian Air Force wants to modify the fighters to carry the indigenous Astra air-to-air missile, with the French refusing to do so; citing the associated cost increases with the required recertification such a move would entail. These contract negotiations have been playing out since the Indian Prime Minister announced the acquisition in April. The French government has lowered the per-unit cost of the deal, dropping this by 25% in May. They are offering French missiles instead of the Astra, likely manufactured by European missile house MBDA. The Indian Air Force also wants to integrate an Israeli-manufactured helmet display system, something which the French are unlikely to allow.

Additionally, French negotiators have reportedly rejected Indian proposals for a 50% offset arrangement in the Rafale contract negotiations. The French government has responded by offering to manufacture aircraft in India through future contracts, under the ‘Make in India’ procurement framework. Indian insistence on an offset will drive up the price of the 36 Rafales, which are currently on offer for the same price being paid by the French Air Force, following the aforementioned price drop in May.

July 30/15: France is anticipating an additional pair of export orders for its Rafale fighter, with Malaysia and the United Arab Emirates reportedly the most likely candidates. Reuters also reported Thursday that negotiations between India and France are now also discussing the possible supply of additional Rafales on top of the 36 ordered in April. Malaysia is looking to replace its MiG-29 Fulcrums, with the UAE recently restarting negotiations for the Rafale as it looks to swap out its fleet of Mirage 2000-9 fighters. The Gulf state has previously articulated a potential buy of sixty Rafales.

July 21/15: Rafale manufacturer Dassault is increasing the production rate of the fighter in anticipation of more export orders. The French jet has become an export success in recent months, following orders from Egypt, India and Qatar. The production line has recently come under strain because of the mounting orders, with the delivery rate from Dassault’s assembly line in Merignac, south-west France, set to double from the current rate of eleven per year by 2018, according to the company’s CEO.

July 17/15: Photos have emerged showing Rafale fighters flying in Egyptian colors. Egypt ordered twenty-four of the French aircraft in February, recently opting to buy AASM Hammer precision air-to-ground missiles to equip its new fleet. The first three Egyptian Rafales are due for delivery before 5 August.

May 7/15: France reportedly offered India a 25% price drop in order to seal the deal for 36 Rafales in April. The French also agreed to an extended maintenance schedule, with the 36 fighters thought to be the minimum number they would sell. The deal is thought to bring the per-unit cost of the Rafale to around $220 million, far below the approximate $300 million pricetag which became the death-knell for the Indian negotiations with Dassault. The recently announced Qatari order saw a comparable cost of $290 million per aircraft.

May 5/15: Following the acquisition of 36 Rafale fighters in April through government to government negotiations – side-lining India’s negotiations with manufacturer Dassault – the Indian Defense Minister announced on Monday that further negotiations between the French and Indian governments will begin this month. The Rafale’s selection as preferred bidder in the country’s MMRCA competition subsequently stagnated, with Prime Minister Modi bypassing the negotiations following pressure from the Indian Air Force. The French Defense Minister will visit India later this week, during which time the opening negotiations for more government to government Rafales are expected to begin.

March 10/15: Egypt says yes. Egypt will buy 24 Dassault Rafale fighters. Egypt already flies predecessors Mirage Vs and Mirage 2000s, and was once looking at upgrading its already large fleet of F-16s to more modern versions. Dassault’s fighters have the benefit of not having many political strings attached, and for a government arguably installed by coup, this has a certain charm.

Feb-17/15: India recalculates that Dassault wasn’t low bidder.The negotiation-via-newspapers exchange continues between France’s Dassault and India in regard to the Indian purchase of Rafale fighters. India’s MoD is now saying that upon thinking about it a bit more – for three years – they think the Dassault offer is going to be more expensive than some other, rejected bidders. Being India’s first life cycle costing contract, the RFP for 126 fighters did not demand specific information on some items relevant to that cost cycle, according to an unnamed official involved with the contract negotiation committee.

Feb-16/15: India’s hardcore negotiating not phasing Dassault. India has been sending messages through the press that it is ready to walk away from the Rafale deal. Dassault, for it’s part, isn’t biting, expressing confidence in the 126 fighter deal. Some reports indicated India is pressuring Dassault to make unspecified guarantees regarding the manufacture of the fighters. The French procurement agency DGA defended Dassault, indicating that Dassault will not be responsible for HAL-built fighters.

Oct 6-17/14: F3.4+ Testing. The French DGA tests the F-3.4+ software upgrade at Mont-de-Marsan AB. It should enter operational service in early 2015.

The F3.4+ builds on the current F3.3 standard’s improvements to Link-16 and integration of laser-guided weapons includes many software improvements, adding full compatibility with NATO’s MGRS geographic format for GPS-related functions, radar improvements in terrain following mode, new warnings for low altitudes and unusual positions that are designed to snap pilots out of disorientation, and warnings to prevent overloading the landing gear brakes during take-off. Sources: French AdlA, “Le Rafale F3.4+ experimente a Istres”.

Oct 3/14: F1 to F3. Dassault Aviation in Merignac, France re-delivers aircraft M10 to the Marine Nationale, after upgrading it from F1 to F3 status under a EUR 240 million contract for 10 aircraft.

Modifications include swapping out the core mission computer and cockpit displays, and changing the plane’s radar, electrical wiring, SPECTRA countermeasures system, and hardpoints. In return, the jump to F3 status adds implementation of all currently planned modes for the RBE2 radar, incl. radar ground attack and terrain-following modes; full integration with the Reco NG reconnaissance pod and Damocles surveillance and targeting pod; MICA IR air-to-air missile capability using the OSF IRST sensor; carriage of laser-guided bombs and Storm Shadow/ Scalp cruise missiles;anti-ship attack with the Exocet or follow-on ANF; nuclear strike capability using the ASMP-A missile; a Link 16 datalink, and a buddy tanker pod. They do not include the RBE2-AA AESA radar antenna, but the jet could reportedly be refitted with that later on.

Of the 180 Rafales ordered by France to date, 133 have been delivered, including Rafale-M F2s and F3s for the Marine Nationale. The contract only applies for the first 10 orders, which were delivered as Rafale-M F1s. Rafale fighters are currently executing missions against ISIS in Iraq, after seeing combat use in Afghanistan, Libya, Mali, and Central Africa. Sources: French DGA, “La DGA receptionne le premier Rafale Marine retrofite” | Dassault Aviation, “The French defense procurement agency (DGA) takes delivery of its 1st retrofitted Rafale “Marine” from Dassault Aviation” | Navy Recognition, “The French procurement agency takes delivery of its 1st retrofitted Rafale M from Dassault Aviation”.

QEAF Mirage 2000-5
(click to view full)

June 19-23/14: Qatar. Reports continue to predict that Sheikh Tamim Ben Hamad Al-Thani’s visit to Paris on June 23/14 will herald a contract for 36 Rafales, with an option for 36 more. The move would represent the Rafale’s 1st export contract, and a dramatic expansion of Qatar’s fighter force from the current fleet of 12 Mirage 2000s.

With that said, the best source is France’s La Tribune. They cite government sources who are pleased with the progress of negotiations, while cautioning readers about the deal’s complexity, and doubting that the Rafale deal will be signed in Paris. That turns out to be correct: France’s Alstom wins a $2 billion light rail contract, but all “a source close to French President Francois Hollande” will says after ward is: “They discussed it. Negotiations are continuing.”

Qatar is a significant customer for French defense equipment, and their support of the Muslim Brotherhood has given then an anomalous position within the Gulf Arab states. France recently sold them A330 aerial tankers and NH90 helicopters as part of a $23 billion global splurge, and are reportedly negotiating to sell the Emirate VBCI wheeled APCs and FREMM FREDA air defense frigates on top of the Rafales. Sources: La Tribune, “Le Qatar veut le Rafale de Dassault Aviation” | Bloomberg, “Dassault Said to Close in on Rafale Contract to Lift Exports” | Reuters, “France wins Qatar tram deal, discusses Rafale jets”.

May 28/14: Qatar. La Tribune says that France’s Rafale has emerged as Qatar’s 1st choice for its new fighter fleet, against competition from the Eurofighter Typhoon and an American offer that was not the F-35 (i.e. F-15 Strike Eagle or F/A-18 Super Hornet – q.v. Nov 26/13). Talks reportedly resumed in March 2014, with Qatar inquiring about a range of options from 12-72 aircraft. The pick is expected to be announced by Sheikh Tamim Ben Hamad Al-Thani on June 23/14, when he visits Paris.

The stakes are high for France, whose recent multi-year budget would buy only 26 Rafales from 2014 – 2019, despite a minimum required production rate of 11 jets per year. The French order would only last until the spring of 2016. Given the contract penalties involved in falling below minimum production, France would be forced to move its own orders forward, unless significant export orders arrive to rescue the production line. Sources: La Tribune, “Le Rafale de Dassault sur la piste d’envol au Qatar?” | AFP, “Qatar nears exclusive talks on buying Rafale fighter: Report” | Gulf News, “Qatar nears talks to buy ‘unpopular’ Rafale fighter jets”.

March 2/14: India. Dassault and HAL have reportedly established an initial workshare agreement for Indian Rafales, after long and difficult negotiations. Dassault will provide the first 18 planes from its own factories in fly-away condition. After that, HAL will be responsible for directing 70% of the work in India, while Dassault remains responsible for 30%.

Negotiations have included industrial coordination, as well as straight workshare. For instance, RBE2-AA AESA radar production will be outsourced to state-owned Bharat-Electronics Ltd (BEL) in Bangalore, while the corresponding radome will be manufactured by HAL. One step toward the agreement involved HAL setting up a new facility close to the one that BEL has in Bangalore, so that issues with radome or radar production won’t create compatibility problems that leave India’s Rafales unable to meet acceptance tests.

The MoD has already spent this term’s capital budget, so the deal will have to be finalized by whichever government wins India’s May election. Which turns out to be a landslide for the BJP opposition. Sources: Indian Express, “India seals Rafale jet deal with French firm” | NDTV, “A big step in India’s Rafale jet deal with France”.

India: workshare deal

Jan 22/14: Canada. Dassault SVP of NATO affairs Yves Robins is quoted as saying that they’re offering Canada unrestricted transfers of technology if it picks the Rafale, including software source codes for servicing the planes. That’s something Canada won’t get with the F-35, and it’s being touted as a long-term cost savings that will let Canadian firms do more of the required maintenance. They’re also pushing the government to declare a competition.

The CBC report goes on to show that the broadcaster doesn’t really grasp the issues, asking about the Rafale’s ability to operate alongside the USAF. France replies that this worked over Libya, but that isn’t the real question. The question is whether Canada could use its American weapons with the Rafale, without having to conduct expensive integration and testing programs. In most cases, the answer is no. Which is why Rafale is a long shot, in the unlikely event that Canada even declares a competition. Sources: CBC News, “Dassault Aviation ramps up CF-18 replacement pitch”.

Jan 10/13: F3R. French defense minister Jean-Yves le Drian hands Dassault Chairman and CEO Eric Trappier the Rafale F3R development contract, during a visit to Dassault Aviation’s Merignac plant. The contract, which is reported to be worth about EUR 1 billion ($1.32 billion), had actually been ratified by the DGA on Dec 30/13.

Key additions to the Rafale F3R include full integration with the SBU-64 laser/GPS AASM smart bomb and the Meteor long-range air-to-air missile, improvements to Thales SPECTRA self-defence system, an Identification Friend or Foe interrogator/transponder with full Mode-5/Mode-S-compatibility, and assorted incremental improvements to the plane’s navigation systems, data links, and radar.

At the same time, the DGA announces the expected EUR 119 million development deal with Thales Optronics for the F3R’s new PDL-NG surveillance and targeting pod, under the 2014-2019 budget. That’s on top of the initial EUR 55 million risk-reduction phase that confirmed the system’s architecture, integration, and development schedule (q.v. Jan 28/13). The French military expects to order 20 pods during a subsequent initial production phase, with 16 delivered between 2018 – 2019. The full program is expected to order 45.

French Rafale orders currently stand at 180 production aircraft, with 126 delivered: 39 Rafale-M naval single-seaters, 42 Rafale-B twin-seaters for the air force, and 45 Rafale-C single-seaters for the air force. Sources: French DGA, “Lancement du nouveau standard du programme Rafale” | French DGA, “La DGA lance le developpement du PDL-NG” | Dassault Aviation, “RAFALE “F3 R” standard launched” | Usine Nouvelle, “L’Etat debloque un milliard d’euros pour rendre le Rafale exportable” | Thales Group, “Thales begins development of New Generation Laser Designation Pod”.

Rafale F3R & PDL-NG pod development contracts

2013

Rafale program to end early in France, putting the pressure on exports; Loss in Brazil doesn’t help; Qatar competition delayed into 2014; PDL NG targeting pod development; Rafale F3R. Rafale w. Damocles

Dec 18/13: Brazil. Earlier press reports that the competition was stalled for another 2 years are proven wrong by a somewhat unexpected announcement from the Ministerio da Defesa. Brazil has picked Saab’s Gripen-NG as their preferred bidder, and expects to buy 36 planes for $4.5 billion. That’s currently just an estimate, as negotiations need to sort themselves out. A final contract and financing arrangements are expected in December 2014, and deliveries are expected to begin 4 years later. Dassault shares fall by about 2% on the news, despite statements by French Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Driana that this was a:

“…disappointment on a target that wasn’t a priority…. Brazil was not the priority target for the Rafale. We have more important targets in India and the Gulf (Arab states)…. We have good reason to think that in India and the Gulf (Arab states) there will be results.”

The Gripen NG contract figure tracks exactly with previous reports by Folha de Sao Paolo, which means an additional $1.5 billion contract can be expected for long-term maintenance and support. Saab was the cheapest of the reported offers, beating Boeing ($5.8 billion) and Dassault ($8.2 billion, reportedly reduced) by significant margins. Once Edward Snowden’s revelations of NSA spying on Brazil’s government killed Boeing’s chances, there was no middle ground. The Rafale’s reported $10.2 billion purchase + maintenance total made it 70% more expensive than Saab’s Gripen. Brazil’s economic slowdown, and the Rousseff government’s focus on entitlement spending, made that cost chasm a big factor. Dassault issued a terse statement pointing out the presence of US parts on Gripens, and positioning the Rafale in a different league. Which may or may not be true, but it’s indisputably true that global fighter buys have historically been heavily weighted toward a less-expensive league. Gripen is within that low to mid price range, and Rafale isn’t. Sources: DID full report, “F-X2: Brazil Picks Saab’s JAS-39 Gripen-NG over Rafale, Super Hornet” || See also: Dassault, “FX2 contest – 2013/12/18” | Le Monde, “A qui la France peut-elle encore vendre le Rafale?” | Reuters, “France soothes nerves over Dassault jets after Brazil setback”.

Loss in Brazil

Dec 10/13: Sub-contractors. PTI reports that Dassault Aviation and India’s NYSE-listed Reliance Industries are planning to set up a Bangalore facility to produce Rafale wings for India’s future order, and reportedly have the approvals they need to do so. The facility would reportedly cost about INR 10 billion ($248 million) to build, but the ultra-modern facility would leave Reliance in a strong position to leverage additional civil and defense-related aerospace work. That would be a new sector for Reliance, but Dassault is impressed with them, and reportedly wanted to use Reliance as the Rafale’s main Indian manufacturing contractor.

India’s government insisted on the state-owned HAL instead, but Dassault may still see a larger opportunity. If Reliance can produce quality assemblies at a cost savings, outsourcing some production for future orders could help Dassault lower their cost per jet, while meeting India’s targets for industrial offsets. Sources: FirstPost.Business, “Reliance, Dassault may join hands to make wings for Rafale fighter jets”.

Nov 26/13: Qatar. La Tribune cites a number of French export opportunities in Qatar, including 22 NH90 transport/naval helicopters (bought), up to 480 VBCI wheeled infantry fighting vehicles, Gowind ASW corvettes, FREMM air defense frigates, and SAMP/T Mamba air and missile defense systems.

The Rafale has been helped by the USA’s failure to respond to the fighter RFP (q.v. Nov 10/13), and their Swedish Gripen competitor wasn’t even invited to bid. Qatar already uses French weapons on their Mirage 2000s, and their defense purchases are far more straightforward than India’s, leading to optimism that the Rafale’s 1st export sale could take place in the Middle East. If Qatar really does want a mixed fleet, the Rafale’s competition narrows to only the Eurofighter. Sources: La Tribune, “La France au Moyen-Orient (3/5) : le Qatar premier client du Rafale?”.

Nov 10/13: Qatar. Qatar’s competition will be delayed because the US Dept. of State couldn’t get their act together in time to issue all of the necessary export approvals. The QEAF is looking to replace their 12 Mirage 2000D fighters and 6 combat capable Alpha Jet light aircraft, but the neighborhood’s growing dangers are pushing them toward a larger buy. A split buy within their maximum total of 72 is seen as a real possibility, and some observers even see a potential split buy among the initial planned set of 36 planes. The initial decision was supposed to come down by the end of 2013, but will now take place in mid-2014.

Dassault already has a foothold here, and the Qataris are exactly the kind of customer they need to win. Eurofighter buys in Saudi Arabia and Oman have opened the door in the Gulf, and a UAE turn toward the platform could cement it as the Gulf Cooperation Council’s future standard. On the flip side, Rafale wins in the UAE and Qatar could open doors to tougher GCC customers like Bahrain and Kuwait.

The US State Department was reportedly wrestling with a pair of Boeing platforms as alternatives: the F/A-18 Super Hornet, and the F-15 Strike Eagle family. The later group includes the stealth-enhanced F-15SE, as well as the Saudis’ new F-15SA standard. Despite ongoing rumors regarding interest in the F-35 stealth fighter, Defense News reports that it isn’t a factor yet. Sources: Defense News, “US Bid Delays Qatar Jet Competition”.

October 2013: Need for Exports. As France is working on its 2014-19 defense budget law, the need to finalize an export order becomes ever more acute. To meet the French government’s baseline financial scenario, 7 out of 11 planes delivered in 2016 would already have to go abroad, which means a firm order has to be locked in by mid-2014 as jets for foreign customers would have their own configuration. France’s DGA procurement agency pays for Rafales in 3 installments. If exports don’t pan out in time, they may have to face difficult cash management trade-offs. Source : Les Echos, Rafale : le plan B de Dassault et de la DGA [in French] | LPM 2014-19: MINDEF, Legifrance [both in French].

October 17/13: India. Deputy chief of air staff Air Marshal S. Sukumar said during a conference that the contract with Dassault will be finalized before the end of the government’s current fiscal year, which ends on March 31st, 2014. Sukumar is a former flying instructor with 4,000+ flight hours who took his current job in December last year. Dassault was really hoping to get this done in 2013, but the sudden death of chief negotiator Arun Kumar Bal on October 2 must not have helped an already slow process. Source: Reuters, India to finalize Rafale deal this fiscal year.

October 2013: Canada. Yves Robins, a senior vice-president for corporate communications at Dassault Aviation, pitched Diane Finley, Canada’s Minister of Public Works and Government Services, during an Aerospace Summit luncheon. Robins urged Canada to run a full competition to replace its CF-18s and played the industrial cooperation card by reminding the minister that Dassault buys engines from Pratt & Whitney Canada for its Falcon business jets, and promising full technology and intellectual property transfer.

Mr. Robins is familiar with the fact Canada so far selected the JSF without a competition, as this came up when he met with the National Defence Committee in Parliament 3 years ago. At the time Robins insisted on the Rafale’s open design which would let it host Canada’s US-made weapons, though he refrained to say how much that would add to the price tag. Montreal Gazette: Aviation execs seek wide open competition for Canada’s fighter jet contract | National Defence Committee on Nov. 4th, 2010.

Sept 19/13: 4th tranche. The French DGA confirms that they’ve received the 1st “4e tranche” Rafale, a twin-sea Rafale-B for the air force. It includes the new RBE2-AA AESA radar, an improved electronic warfare system, and upgraded IFF. All are part of the “Rafale F3R,” but Meteor missile integration won’t happen until 2018.

The DGA also offers a snapshot of deliveries to date: 121 aircraft, including 38 Rafale-Ms, plus 44 Rafale-C and 39 twin-seat Rafale-B fighters for the air force. Source: French DGA.

Sept 13/13: Weapons. Russia’s Tactical Missile Corporation (TRV) told journalists at MAKS 2013 that they’re negotiating with Dassault Aviation for the possible use of their missiles on India’s Rafales. India bought MBDA’s MICA air-to-air missiles for its Mirage 2000s, and Paveway-II guided bombs are already in use by the IAF, but Rafale-compatible weapons don’t otherwise feature prominently in India’s existing stocks.

The ability to use Russian weapons would help the Rafale in some export competitions, but it doesn’t come for free. Unless the TRV/Dassault partnership develops a Universal Weapon Interface for TRV’s products, and probably modifies a number of the missiles themselves, that kind of integration and testing is time-consuming and expensive. How much less expensive than buying new weapons? And what’s the capability/ reliability payoff if India buys French products instead? That’s what negotiations, and Indian business analysts, need to determine. Sources: TRV Products page, via WayBack 2013 | AIN, “Russian Missiles for India’s Rafales?”

June 20/13: India. IANS reports that India’s Minister of State for Defence Jitendra Singh told an audience at the 50th Paris Air Show that the Rafale deal:

“…is not stuck anywhere. It is the biggest deal of its kind in the world and, of course, a very complex one too. They are talking to HAL and the private sector companies in India as well; so it is progressing…”

In his first Le Bourget press conference as Dassault CEO, Eric Trappier had made a similar-sounding statement a week earlier.

June 20/13: Qatar. AFP says that the Middle Eastern Emirate intends to launch its RFP for 24-36 fighters “soon.” They own a fleet of Mirage 2000-5s, which recently flew to enforce the no-fly zone over Libya.

French President Hollande will visit Doha for high-level economic talks on June 22, and France has close ties with the Emirate, but the Qataris aren’t waiting around. They reportedly spent time in May 2013 evaluating the Eurofighter Tornado with the RAF, and will soon host a Eurofighter team in-country for flight trials. Boeing also remains in the mix. Agence France Presse.

June 12/13: French defense minister Jean-Yves Le Drian reminds Dassault that they will need to rely on exports after French orders are done. They can’t be all that surprised, given a minimum delivery of 11 planes per year, and the April 29/13 White Paper’s reduction of the French fleet to 225 planes.

With 180 already ordered and 120 received, orders will stop sometime between 2016-2019, probably in 2017. The problem with these kinds of public reminders is that they make negotiations more difficult for Dassault, and may end up reducing export sales instead of spurring them. On the other hand, there have been reports of frustration in Paris over Dassault’s pricing and flexibility; if true, this kind of public reminder is one way to send a message. L’Usine Nouvelle [in French].

May 16/13: Meteor. The Rafale team continues to work on integrating MBDA’s Meteor long-range air-to-air missile in time for 2018, which will make the Rafale the last core platform to become operational. It will also be the only platform with a 1-way datalink, as Rafale uses the same transmit-only system for MICA and Meteor.

Saab’s JAS-39 Gripens will be operational by 2014, and Eurofighter GmbH eventually signed a June 2013 contract with a 2017 in-service date. Both fighters will have 2-way datalinks.

Late May will see over-water release trials begin at the Cazaux flight test centre, with 2 tests (high-g, and high angle of attack) scheduled before the end of 2013. The 1st controlled and boosted launch is slated for 2015. France placed an initial order for 200 Meteors in January 2011, and missile production began in June 2012. Flight Global.

April 28/13: Coming cuts. France releases their defense white paper (Livre Blanc) for 2013, which aims to set their force structure to 2025. With respect to the air assets, by 2025 they’re planning for:

“…les forces aériennes comprendront notamment 225 avions de combat (air et marine), ainsi qu’une cinquantaine d’avions de transport tactique, 7 avions de détection et de surveillance aérienne, 12 avions ravitailleurs multirôles, 12 drones de surveillance de théâtre, des avions légers de surveillance et de reconnaissance et 8 systèmes sol-air de moyenne portée.”

Translation: 225 fighters (all Rafale, cut from 234), about 50 tactical transport aircraft (A400Ms and CN-235s), 7 E-3F AWACS planes, 12 A330 MRTT aerial tankers and transports, 12 MALE drones and an unspecified number of light surveillance planes, and 8 SAMP/T long-range air and missile defense batteries. Note that original plans for the Rafale had involved 294 planes. Livre Blanc 2013 [PDF, in French].

March 8/13: Brazil. Brazil has asked the 3 F-X2 finalists to extend their bids for another 6 months from the March 30/13 deadline, as the Brazilian commodity economy remains mired in a 2-year slump. The competitors had hoped for a decision by the time Brazil’s LAAD 2013 expo opened in April.

The length of the cumulative delays could create changes for the bids, and it effectively squashes any faint hopes that the new jets would be able to fly in time for the 2014 World Cup. Reuters.

Feb 25/13: With Rafales flying combat missions again, in Mali, Jane’s reports that France will designate a new round of improved Rafales as “F3R”. They’ll include a major software upgrade that allows the aircraft to take fuller advantage of the new Thales RBE2-AA AESA radar, improves their Thales SPECTRA self-defence systems, adds Mode-5/Mode-S capable Identification Friend or Foe, and allows the Rafale to deploy MBDA’s Meteor long range air-to-air missile. IHS Jane’s.

Feb 7/13: India. While a French Rafale-B performs at Aero India 2013, negotiations grind on. India’s defence minister, A K Antony, describes negotiations as a 6-7 layer process, which then has to be sent to the Ministry of Finance. There will be no deal during Aero India, as the contract simply isn’t ready. Antony adds that coming defense budget cuts won’t delay the Rafale deal, but an election looms in 2014.

India’s Financial Express cites anonymous “highly placed sources” who say that remaining friction involves industrial issues. The Dassault team that visited the HAL facility in Nashik were said to have been disappointed by the infrastructure in place, and concerned that HAL will have trouble absorbing the required technology. They’re also reportedly wrestling with India’s insistence on giving HAL ‘lead integrator’ responsibility for decisions about workshare with other companies, while sticking Dassault with overall responsibility for the project. The French are trying to use the RFP as a starting point for discussions, while India insists that the RFP’s terms are the final word. Economic Times | Financial Express.

Jan 28/13: PDL NG The DGA commits a EUR 55 million risk reduction contract for Thales to develop the next-generation PDL NG surveillance and targeting pod, as the successor to the Damocles pod. Another EUR 115 million tranche is expected by year end, and deliveries are expected to take place beginning in about 5 years, from 2018-2022.

The DGA touts this as a boost to the export attractiveness of French fighter jets, which is true. Targeting pods have become such an important ancillary that the Rafale can’t really remain competitive without one that meets modern high-end standards. It’s essentially part of the Fighter’s life-cycle modernization plan. Damocles’ 320 x 240 IR resolution is far behind the 1280 x 1024 arrays in current Sniper SE or LITENING SE pods, and needs improvement. Unlike its European competitors, which use LITENING-III pods from Israel, France is keeping full control over the technology and exportability by designing its own.

The bad news is twofold. One is that the Rafale will receive a pod in 2018 whose doubled-scan 640 x 520 array (effectively 1280 x 1040) is roughly equal to Sniper-SE and LITENING-SE pods being delivered in 2013. High design modularity ensures that both of its competitors will continue to evolve, swapping in better sensors and new technologies by the time PDL-NG appears.

The 2nd bit of bad news is that France’s need to do this themselves results in a final expected cost per targeting pod of EUR 10 million, in order to equip the French Rafale fleet with 45. Exports could help boost PDL-NG production, but first the Rafale must win some foreign orders. India, whose Mirage 2000s are getting life extensions, is an important target for both the Rafale and PDL-NG – and a committed customer for RAFAEL’s LITENING pod across several of their fighter fleets. French DGA | Les Echos | Usine Nouvelle.

PDL-NG pod development

2012

Thales MAESTRO maintenance contract; Preferred in India; Not taking “no” for an answer in Switzerland; Rafale with AESA radar delivered. Rafale-M
(click to view full)

Oct 30/12: From Damocles to PDL NG. The unofficial site Rafale News quotes the latest issue of Air & Cosmos (N°2305), who says that the Rafale’s future surveillance and targeting pod won’t be an upgraded Damocles pod, whose 320×240 infrared sensor is very small compared to competitors.

Instead, France is reportedly planning to invest EUR 450 million to develop and produce 45 PDL NGs (Pod de Designation Laser Nouvelle Generation), to equip both Rafales and Mirage 200Ds. The new pods will reportedly have a 1280×1024 equivalent IR resolution, by using a 640×560 array plus a micro-scanning technique. Better GPS/INS geolocation will have accuracy that matches the new AASM smart bombs. In terms of its shape and design, PDL NG is expected to offer carrier landing compatibility, and provide a lower radar cross-section.

Oct 4-10/12: Meteor. Rafale B301, operating from Cazaux DGA Flight Test Center in southwestern France, successfully completes 2 successful tests of the Meteor long-range air-to-air missile.

Oct 2/12: Thales and Dassault deliver the 1st production Rafale equipped with the RBE2-AA AESA radar, an air force Rafale C. Aircraft C137’s delivery makes the Rafale the 1st European fighter in service with an AESA radar, though older American designs (F-15 retrofits, F-16 E/F, F/A-18E/F Block II) have had this equipment for several years now. French DGA [in French] | Thales Group | Usine Nouvelle [in French].

1st Rafale with AESA

Sept 27/12: Media are forecasting a signed M-MRCA fighter deal with India before the end of their fiscal year, in April 2013. That’s certainly possible, but India’s history suggests that any such expectation is a very risky bet. Usine Nouvelle [in French].

Sept 20/12: Exocet qualified. The French Navy qualifies the air-launched AM39 Exocet anti-ship missile on its Rafale fighters, using Rafale-M number 27 launched from FS Charles de Gaulle [R 91]. The firing conditions were deemed to be fully representative of an operational mission. MBDA.

AM39 Exocet

Aug 23/12: India. L’Usine Nouvelle say that any India deal will be done as a series of agreements to produce specific items, with the scope growing over time. They also say that over 50% of initial production will remain in France, even after the initial 18 fighters are delivered, until Indian production expands. Beyond the engines, which are very likely to remain in France, the article cites complex electronics, and especially Thales RBE2-AA AESA radar, as being difficult to transfer. India’s failure with its Tejas fighter’s multi-mode radar, which was a generation behind AESA, does lend credence to that view.

Meanwhile, highly placed Russian and German sources say that India and Russia are having trouble coming to agreement on technology transfer and price, and say that the M-MRCA competition isn’t closed yet. The Hindu | IBN Live | Times of India | L’Usine Nouvelle [in French].

July 11/12: India. Indian defense minister Antony effectively ends contention over the Rafale’s selection as L1, the lowest evaluated bid. Replying to the Feb 27/12 letter from Rajya Sabha member MV Mysura Reddy:

“The issues raised by you were examined by independent monitors who have concluded that the approach and methodology adopted by the Contract Negotiations Committee (CNC) in the evaluation of the commercial proposals thus far, have been reasonable and appropriate and within the terms of the Request for Proposals (RFR) and Defence Procurement Procedure, 2006.”

India’s history shows that this is a big moment for the M-MRCA program, preventing its derailment and allowing negotiations toward a contract to continue. Hindustan Times.

July 9/12: Sim upgrade. Thales announces that France’s DGA procurement agency has accepted the 1st F3.2 simulator upgrade, to the first 2 cabins at the simulation centre in Saint-Dizier. The Rafale Transformation Squadron in Saint-Dizier has a total of 4 cabins, and the 2 upgraded simulators will faithfully replicate the F3 Rafale’s ability to use AM39 Exocet anti-ship missiles, ASMP/A nuclear missiles, the advanced Reco-NG surveillance pod, and the Damocles targeting pod.

The 2 cabins at the Rafale simulation center in Landivisiau will be upgraded to the F3.2 standard in the summer of 2013.

July 7/12: Brazil. The FAB has asked the 3 bidders (Boeing, Dassault & Saab) to renew their F-X2 fighter offers. It’s the 4th consecutive 6-month extension, while Brazil dithers over its choice and the timing of the buy. France24.

July 7/12: Wi-Fi of Doom. Raytheon announces that it has integrated its dual-mode GBU-49 Enhanced Paveway II laser/GPS guided smart bombs onto France’s Rafale-M fighters, after successful tests at Bisacrosse. The Marine Nationale had been using the 250 kg weapons for 6 years on their trans-sonic Super Etendard Modernisee naval fighters, and they wanted their supersonic naval Rafales to have the same capability. The challenge was how to do that without spending all the time and money that full weapon integration usually requires.

Enter Raytheon’s WiPAK. The WiPAK kit consists of a small wireless transmitter in the cockpit, a pilot interface, and a small receiver affixed to the Paveway weapon. Raytheon VP Harry Schulte explains that “WiPAK uses wireless connectivity technology similar to what is being used in laptop and tablet computers.” Hopefully, it’s more resistant to jamming. Raytheon describes WiPAK as “a combat proven system, used operationally on counterinsurgency aircraft.”

The tests open the door to competition against Safran’s emerging dual-mode SBU-64 AASM Hammer smart bombs. France’s air force already uses GBU-49s from their Mirage 2000D fighters, so a similar conversion for AdlA Rafale-B/Cs is an obvious opportunity.

July 2/12: Crash. A Rafale-M aboard FS Charles de Gaulle crashes during exercises with the USS Eisenhower’s F/A-18s. The pilot ejected, and American helicopters picked him up and transfer him to the de Gaulle. The cause of the crash is under investigation. US Navy | French MdlD [in French] | Navy Recognition | Usine Nouvelle [in French].

Crash

April 20/12: Refit. The DGA’s Christophe Carpentier discusses some of the complexities involved in the 10-plane Rafale-M refit, which is upgrading these F1 aircraft to an F3 standard that will add precision ground attack, reconnaissance, and even nuclear warhead delivery to their capabilities. The biggest challenge is that the upgrades take place on the Rafale production line, so careful scheduling is essential to avoid disrupting new-plane production. French MdlD [in French]. See also Nov 30/09 entry.

March 30/12: 1st RBE2-AA. Thales announces that they have delivered the 1st RBE2-AA AESA radar to the Dassault Aviation production line in Merignac, France. The radar will now be installed on Rafale C137, which is scheduled for delivery to the French defence procurement agency (DGA) in summer 2012.

A comprehensive 3-month flight test program conducted at the Istres air base has already been held to demonstrate the radar’s performance, and the RBE2 AESA radar was delivered in line with the contract schedule.

1st AESA

March 22/12: Rafale exports. Dassault CEO Charles Edelstenne discusses the Rafale’s export issues, while making the most of the Rafale’s win against the Eurofighter in India. His characterization is unpromising, since it concedes American dominance of the global fighter market, leaving the Rafale as the choice of countries that don’t buy American, or make reduced dependence on American arms a priority.

There’s some truth to this, as shown by Dassault’s experience in South Korea. On the other hand, it’s also true that the Rafale has lost export competitions over price and technical features. Usine Nouvelle [in French]

March 22/12: India. Indian Defence minister A.K. Antony orders the Ministry to probe all of the allegations made by Rajya Sabha (Parliamentary upper house) member M.V. Mysoora Reddy. The Telgu Dessam party representative filed an official complaint on Feb 27/12, over alleged irregularities in the evaluation process that designated France’s Rafale as the L-1 lowest cost option for India. The probe is expected to delay the process by a couple of months, if nothing surfaces. If the claims get any traction, India’s procurement process could come to a complete halt. Read “India’s M-MRCA Fighter Competition” for full coverage.

March 20/12: Canada? As Canada’s government gives conflicting signals about its F-35A commitment, and braces for a scathing Auditor General report about their pledged buy, Dassault’s Rafale may get an opening:

“The likeliest contenders, should there be a competition, are U.S.-based Boeing, maker of the F-18 Super Hornet, and Dassault of France, maker of the Rafale… “In our world we’re already in a competition,” one industry insider said. “(Associate Defence Minister) Fantino himself said we’re basically looking at our options. There’s a team at (Department of National Defence) looking at the market. So it’s already on.”

Despite this report, Canada’s considerable stockpile of American-made air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons adds huge additional switching costs to an already-expensive Rafale aircraft, and makes it a very unlikely challenger. Post Media.

Feb 22/12: UK Rafales? French DGA head Lauren Collet-Billon tells a press conference that the extent of carrier cooperation with Britain will depend on Britain’s final plans and choices. With respect to fighter jets, Defense Aerospace quotes him saying that the F-35:

“…is an ambitious program, and like all ambitious programs it faces a number of challenges… If one day we have to lend Rafale Ms to the Royal Navy, why not? Personally, I’d find that very pleasing.”

Issues with the F-35 program are indeed putting Britain in a bind, but cost issues with the CVF carriers’ catapult retrofit may make any catapult-launched fighter problematic for Britain.

Jan 31/12: India’s preferred plane. Dassault’s Rafale is picked as the “L-1” lowest bidder for India’s 126-aircraft M-MRCA deal, even after the complex life-cycle cost and industrial calculations are thrown in. Some reports place its cost as $5 million lower per plane. Next steps include the negotiation of a contract, in parallel with parliamentary approval and budgeting. If a contract is signed, it would help extend the Rafale’s production line beyond 2021, which is its current closure date without export orders.

Until a contract is actually signed, however, India’s procurement history reminds us that even a “close” deal is just 1 step above a vague intention. Read “India’s M-MRCA Fighter Competition” for full coverage.

India’s pick

Jan 31/12: What is the Rafale to France? L’Usine Nouvelle’s article asks: “A quoi sert le Rafale?” – The short answer is that it’s at the heart of French military power thanks to its carrier and nuclear roles, as well as its central role in French conventional wars. It’s also the industrial heart of France’s advanced military aerospace research, responsible for significant steps forward in French materials science, engine design, computing, sensors, etc. at Dassault, Thales, and Snecma. Not to mention over 500 sub-contractors, all of whom are made nervous by uncertainty. In total, the aircraft is said to be responsible for 7,000 direct and indirect jobs.

Unfortunately, lack of exports is forcing extra funding to keep the Rafale production line at its minimum. Which is delaying the much-needed modernization of France’s Mirage 2000D fleet, and beginning to pose an operational risk for France.

Jan 29/12: Swiss cheese. Dassault makes Switzerland a new offer: 18 Rafale fighters for SFR 2.7 billion (EUR 2.24 billion, $2.96 billion), instead of 22 Gripens for SFR 3.1 billion.

This is, frankly, the kind of approach that has cost Dassault sales in other countries. If this offer is substantially less than Dassault’s earlier offer to the Swiss, the Swiss could be forgiven for asking what has changed, and why the previous offer was so high. Meanwhile, submitting offers after a competition is done doesn’t win many friends in military or ministry circles.

In this case, however, the audience is the Swiss parliament, which is supposed to begin discussing the fighter buy on Feb 13/12. Hans Hess of parliament’s security commission confirmed to Le Matin Dimanche that he had received the letter. What’s deeply troubling is that Swiss defence minister Ueli Maurer told the Sonntags Zeitung that he wasn’t aware of the offer. If that’s true, the decision to blindside the minister reflects even more poorly on the Dassault executive responsible. That kind of behavior goes well beyond a normal political battle, and can create powerful enemies whose grudges are deep, personal, and lasting. AFP via Yahoo | France 24.

Jan 10/12: Support. Thales announces a 10-year MAESTRO (MAintien en condition operationnelle des Equipements B et des moyens de Soutien Thales du Rafale Optimise) fixed-price contract from France’s SIMMAD, with specified availability metrics, to support Thales equipment on board French Rafales.

Thales announced a 5-year base contract for that service on Feb 2/10, but that one was from Dassault, as a sub-contractor. This one is directly with SIMMAD, alongside Dassault’s “Rafale Care” contract (vid. Dec 12/08), and reported deals with Snecma for engine maintenance (vid. Feb 24/10). Under the terms of this contract, Thales is responsible for supporting the Rafale’s RBE2 radar, SPECTRA electronic warfare system, avionics (displays, onboard computers, etc.), optronics (OSF front-sector optronics, cameras, etc.) and communication systems. They’ll also be in charge of optimizing replacement parts management, logistics management, and equipment repair processes; and will deploy technical and logistics advisers to work directly on military bases. Thales Group.

MAESTRO support

2011

Performance against Libya; Swiss loss; Doubts in Dubai; Bulgaria RFI; Progress for RBE2-AA radar, Reco NG pod. Off to Libya after all…
(click to view full)

Dec 1/11: Swiss Loss. Switzerland announces their choice – and it’s Saab’s JAS-39 Gripen. Swiss Defence Minister Ueli Maurer estimates the cost of the envisaged deal at up to CHF 3.1 billion (currently $3.5 billion, probably more by 2014), for 22 planes. The DDPS explicitly stated that Gripen also won because it offered lower maintenance costs that made it affordable over the medium and long term. Dassault wasn’t very happy, though they did concede that the Gripen beat them on price:

“The RAFALE’s capacities would enable the Swiss Confederation to meet its operational requirements with a smaller number of aircraft [emphasis DID’s] at an equivalent or lower cost, as was demonstrated during the assessments… The “Swiss-tailored” GRIPEN only exists on paper. Its technical development and production risk significantly increasing the financial efforts required of the Swiss Authorities to accomplish the country’s fighter aircraft program. RAFALE INTERNATIONAL extends its sincere thanks the 250 Swiss companies that took part in its industrial partnership project in the 26 cantons of the Swiss Confederation.”

The next step is for the DDPS and Saab to negotiate a draft contract, including details of the required matching value (100%) industrial offsets program in Switzerland. Contract options are scheduled for presentation by February 2012, whereupon the package will be proposed to the Swiss national parliament as part of the 2012 weapons plan. The catch is that the buy requires about CHF 600 million in savings from elsewhere. The government’s strategy is apparently to tie that savings program to the fighter order if a referendum is required, and even the proposal isn’t expected before 2013. This means that it’s likely to be 2014 before Saab has a production contract they can rely on. Swiss DDPS in French | German | Italian || Saab Group | Rafale International | Agence France Presse | Flight International’s The DEW Line.

Swiss loss

Nov 16/11: What’s up in the UAE? The UAE is either engaged in the mother of all hardball negotiations, or the potential Rafale sale is crashing. Meanwhile, the UAE may be about to cut its planned new jet order and buy more F-16E/F Block 60s, regardless of what happens next. Read “Derailed Denouement in Dubai: What’s Up With the UAE’s Fighter Deal?” for a snapshot.

June 20/11: Defense News’ Paris 2011 Show Scout covers Dassault executive chairman Charles Edelstenne’s comments re: the Rafale & M-MRCA. It includes this important point:

“The French government has made export of the Rafale a “priority” because of the perceived importance of the fighter industry in political, technological and economic terms, and also because of the domestic budgetary needs, Edelstenne said. France has written into its defense budgets export of the Rafale, and if those foreign sales fail to appear, funding must be found from other defense programs to finance an annual output of 11 aircraft, the minimum deemed for economic sense.”

May 31/11: Libya Report. In the wake of a 2-day tour of the Rafale detachment at Solenzara, Corsica, which flies France’s missions over Libya, Giovanni de Briganti of Defense Aerospace submits a report. As one might imagine, the tour wasn’t conducted to showcase unhappiness, but the reports do offer a number of useful tidbits.

One is that the Rafale has now emerged as the multi-role plane it was promised to be, using Damocles targeting pods, advanced Reco NG reconnaissance pods, GPS guided weapons, and more. The other is that the Rafale is now moving France out of narrow squadron stovepipes, and toward the full multi-role orientation the USA began embracing in the 1990s. Lacking American resources, the French AdlA is even being pushed toward the next step of that orientation, where stovepipes break down completely and one plane may fly SEAD(suppression of enemy air defenses), precision strike, air superiority, and reconnaissance tasks within a single sortie. Whether coached or serendipitous, the pilots’ special praise for their air conditioning system, and ability to cite their SPECTRA integrated self-defense system’s protection when flying early missions deep into Libya, are also significant. They’re 2 less-obvious capabilities, but both are considered especially valuable by the Rafale’s most likely buyers in Brazil, India, and the UAE. Additional excerpts:

“Pilots… routinely take off with four MICA air-to-air missiles, three or six AASM Hammer precision-guided bombs, a Thales Damocles laser targeting pod or a Reco NG reconnaissance pod and two drop tanks… [for a] six- or seven-hour sortie… “Two Rafales carry as much ordnance as two Mirage 2000-5 and four Mirage 2000D combined,” notes [pilot] Pierre G., adding that their sensor capabilities “are much greater even than that.”… “MICA is not just a missile, it’s an extra sensor as well,” says Pierre G., and its detection range is much longer than generally supposed…

Transit to Libya is flown at 50% power setting, which translates to Mach 0.9 cruise speed even with six AASM bombs and two large underwing drop tanks… Since Operation Harmattan (the French designation for enforcing the Libya No-Fly Zone) began on March 19, the detachment has flown 2,200 flight hours with over 1,500 in-flight refuellings… Aircraft turn-around, even with live weapons on board, requires only 90 minutes and an engine change requires one hour, although none have been changed during current operations… Maintenance requirements of the Rafale are about 25% lower than for the Mirage 2000, and there is no scheduled or preventive maintenance; maintenance depends only on the type of mission flown, and on the condition of components… detachment commander Lt. Col. Pierre G. says that the availability rate is close to 100%.”

See also: Flight International.

Libya experience

April 27/11: India finalist. After a close call where it was nearly drummed out of India’s future fighter competition, the Rafale rallies. India’s M-MRCA competition is now a one-on-one duel between the Rafale, and EADS/ BAE/ Finmeccanica’s Eurofighter Typhoon.

Feb 15/11: AREOS Reco NG. As the Rafale F3 prepares to take over the reconnaissance role from older Mirage F1 and Super Etendard planes, it is preparing to fully qualify Thales’ new digital AREOS Reco NG pod. The French air force has already ordered 12, and the Navy 8. Now, battlefield trials based on a hundred test flights enabled the CEAM military aircraft test center to validate the pod for basic employment, from land and from aircraft carriers.

The 1,100 kg/ 2,420 pound AREOS Reco NG pod is 4.6 meters/ 15 feet long, and can als be deployed on the Mirage 2000 if needed. Its identification range of several tens of kilometers is 2-3x the range of the Presto pod currently deployed on Mirage F1CR aircraft in Afghanistan, and it supplements high and medium altitude coverage with a low-altitude sensor that supports high speed horizon to horizon photography at an altitude of only 60 m/ 200 feet. The pod operates automatically, within its intermittent, zone coverage or terrain-following modes, and always knows its exact position in space, thanks to an inertial reference system, correlated with data from the Rafales nav-attack system. As soon as the shots are taken, they are automatically overlaid on a digital elevation model, geo-referenced, and assembled to provide a complete mosaic, then stored on a hard disk in the pod. They can be also transmitted to a ground image receiving and processing station in real time, via a high-speed microwave link. The pod can also operate in video mode by using successive images, and estimate a moving object’s speed.

The first Rafale/ AEROS crews from operational units were trained at CEAM in summer 2010. Several weeks later, the system reached its initial operational capability, and is now deployed on the FS Charles-de-Gaulle aircraft carrier. By the end of the 2011, it will open its operating envelope to include terrain following during penetration flights, at which point it will officially be in service with full operational capabilities. Dassault.

RECO NG pod ready

Feb 9/11: RBE2-AA. Thales announces that “a comprehensive programme of flight tests conducted between September and December 2010” have validated its new AESA RBE2 radar for the Rafale. The announcement makes the Rafale the first of the 4+ generation European fighters to qualify with an AESA radar.

By confirming that the radar’s performance complies with the “Roadmap” contract, awarded by the French DGA, Thales can begin series production for installation into the Rafale Tranche 4 planes that were ordered in 2009, and will be delivered by Dassault Aviation to the French Air Force beginning in 2013.

Feb 4/11: Bulgaria RFI. Bulgaria issues another fighter replacement RFI, soliciting information from Boeing (F/A-18E/F), Dassault (Rafale, Mirage 2000), EADS (Eurofighter), Lockheed Martin (F-16), and Saab (JAS-39 Gripen) re: 8 new and/or second-hand fighter jets, to replace its existing fleet of 12 MiG-21s.

Bulgaria issued a similar RFI in 2006, for 20 jets, but the global economic crash, and Bulgaria’s own issues in trying to pay for past defense purchases, forced a hold. The Defense Ministry has taken pains to emphasize that this is just an exploratory request, and is not the start of a purchase tender. Nevertheless, November 2010 saw the formation of a National Steering Committee and an Integrated Project Team, to draft preliminary fighter replacement operational, technical, and tactical requirements. That followed October 2010 remarks by Bulgaria’s Defense Minister Anyu Angelov, who discussed spending BGN 1 billion (around $725 million) for the purchase of an uncertain number of new fighter jets to replace its MiG-21s, while modernizing its fleet of 16 MiG-29A air superiority jets. Sofia News Agency.

Jan 6/11: UAE. French media report that during a vsit to Paris in mid-December 2010, UAE armed forces commander Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan asked France to renew its proposal to sell up to 60 Rafales to the UAE.

The recent purchase of 200 Meteor missiles by the French government reportedly removed one of the UAE’s concerns. Other equipment like the Damocles targeting pod has been integrated late, due to budget constraints, but the French purchase ensures that this won’t happen to the long-range Meteor missile as well. A partial squadron of Rafale F3s equipped with Reco NG and Damocles pods is reportedly operating from a new French base in Abu Dhabi, in support of deployments to Afghanistan as well as the UAE sale. That still leaves issues of AESA radar capabilities, improvements to the Snecma M88 engines, disposal of the UAE’s 60+ plane Mirage 200 fleet, and possibly airline landing rights near Paris as items of contention.

On the other hand, both Qatar and Kuwait have early-stages programs going to select new fighters for their air forces, and the UAE is a very respected and influential weapons buyer in the region. A sale to the UAE would make a huge difference to Dassault, and the UAE would reap royalties if Rafales with its requested extra features are bought by other countries. Aviation Week | Reuters | UAE’s The National.

2010

Nuclear-ready Rafales; Qatar opportunity; Kuwaiti interest & opposition; UAE breaks negotiations; Algeria goes for SU-30s; M88 engine improvements; ACMI upgrade for Red Flag exercise; Active stealth?; Rafale-M crash; Joint French AF/Navy training. Rafale-M
(click to view full)

Dec 16/10: UAE. Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed al Nahyan and French President Nicolas Sarkozy reportedly discussed the potential Rafale deal in Paris during the Prince’s visit. Negotiations aren’t formally on again yet, but this is a form of progress. TopNews Arab Emirates | Reuters.

Nov 29/10: Splash one. The French MINDEF announces that a Rafale F3 from FS Charles de Gaulle crashes due to a mechanical failure, in Pakistani territorial waters 100 km offshore, following a mission over Afghanistan. MdlD release:

“Dimanche 28 novembre 2010, en debut d’une mission d’appui aérien en Afghanistan, un pilote de Rafale qui opérait depuis le porte-avions Charles de Gaulle , s’est ejecté de son avion en mer, au large du Pakistan.”

The pilot was recovered by helicopter, and is receiving medical treatment. An inquiry is being conducted into the accident.

Crash

Nov 17/10: Program cost change. The French Senat’s foreign affairs and defense committee releases a report on the draft budget law for 2012. It updates the Rafale program to EUR 43.56 billion over 40 years at 2011 prices, including both purchase and development costs for all 286 forecast aircraft. That’s a EUR 2.86 billion increase from the previous EUR 40.7 billion, and raises the per-plane program cost (similar to the USA’s PAUC figure) to EUR 152 million.

Some inflation factored into this increase, but other increases involved the F3/F4 standard’s technology, including upgraded M88 engines, the RBE2-AA AESA radar, the Damocles laser designation pod, the Reco NG reconnaissance pod.

In the immediate term, about EUR 1.1 billion in 2011-2013 increases stem from the Rafale’s lack of exports, which forced France to increase its 2009-2014 order by 17 planes in order to fund the plane’s minimum production rate. This is an uncomfortable position for France; the period’s orders now stand at 69. L’Usine Nouvelle [in French]

Program costs

Nov 15/10: UAE. France’s La Tribune reveals [in French] why the UAE broke off negotiations, and the new condition they’ve added for the sale:

“Après avoir gelé les négociations pourtant très avancées au coeur de l’été en raison d’un article dans “Le Figaro”, propriété de Dassault, qui a fortement déplu, Abu Dhabi a récemment rajouté dans les discussions une nouvelle exigence pour acquérir le Rafale. Selon plusieurs sources concordantes, les Emiratis mettent désormais dans la balance des droits de trafic supplémentaires (autorisations de vols) en France, essentiellement à Roissy, pour leurs compagnies aériennes Emirates (Dubai) et surtout Etihad, le transporteur d’Abu Dhabi.”

Translation: The UAE suspended Rafale negotiations because of an article in Le Figaro, which Dassault’s ownership structure also owns. Must have been quite some article.

The new condition will be familiar to Canadians – the UAE wants to double the number of reserved slots for Emirates Airlines and Etihad Airways at Roissy airport, France main passenger hub near Paris. France had rejected this request when it was made recently, as its national airline Air France objected. In Canada’s case, the request was to double slots at Pearson airport in Toronto, the country’s busiest and largest passenger hub. Air Canada objected, Canada refused, and in October 2010, the UAE kicked Canada out of its “Camp Mirage” base, and denied overflight rights for Canada’s defense minister on his way to Afghanistan.

Nov 8/10: Qatar. Aviation Week reports that Qatar plans to pick its new fighter in 2012, and the Rafale is a contender to replace the current Mirage 2000v5 fleet:

“The size of the program is still under discussion, with 24-36 fighters likely to be acquired… The service is evaluating a broad spectrum of aircraft, including the Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and F-15, Eurofighter Typhoon and Dassault Rafale, says Al-Khayarin. Saab officials note they also have entered the competition [with their JAS-39NG].”

Oct 4/10: UAE suspended. French media confirm that negotiations with the UAE for up to 60 Rafale fighters have been suspended. Issues reportedly included the range of enhancements requested, and associated terms if they’re sold in future aircraft; and requests that Dassault exchange the UAE’s 63 Mirage 2000s as part of a deal. Usine Nouvelle initial article and follow-up [in French].

Sept 13/10: UAE. Defense News reports that The UAE has requested technical information on the Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet. An unnamed source cites no need to develop the platform further, which would avoid a $2+ billion effort to upgrade the Rafale with a longer-range AESA radar, better electronic warfare systems, and uprated engines. On the other hand, the UAE has seen returns on such developments before, via royalties when the Mirage 2000v5s it helped to develop were sold abroad.

Defense News says that it’s “not immediately clear why the UAE is exploring a U.S.-made option.” It could be technology. It could be politics. Or, it could just be smart negotiating tactics.

Aug 7/10: India. India’s Times Now news show reports that the M-MRCA trials will leave only Dassault’s Rafale and EADS’ Eurofighter in the race. There is no official confirmation. Brahmand | Livefist.

June 22/10: Joint French Training. The 3rd COMORAC (COMite d’ORientation de l’Aviation de Chasse) meets, as the French Air Force and Navy discuss joint management of Rafale training. They sign an agreement establishing an ETR (Escadron de Transformation Rafale), which would serve both branches from the St. Dizier air base, beginning in September 2010. Rafale-M and Rafale-B pilots will now have a common initial processing and training, and initial personnel assignments are beginning.

Part of the co-ordination effort also involves work at the Istres-Le Tubé air base near Nice. It would take over land-based carrier landing simulations from the nearby Naval Air Station Nimes Garons, which also serves as a civilian airport. These initial improvements will be made during the summer 2010, with the goal of having the French carrier’s air wing embark at Istres beginning in September 2010. French Navy [in French].

June 6/10: Nuclear strike ready. France declares the Rafale B operational in the nuclear strike role with EdC 1/91 at St. Dizier-Robinson air base. The Rafale will eventually replace all 62 Mirage 2000Ns as the launch platform for France’s ramjet-powered ASMP-A nuclear missile, which has a 500-600 km range and is carried on the centerline pylon. Combat Aircraft, August 2010.

Nuclear-ready

March 22/10: M88 upgrade. The first test flight of a Rafale fighter powered by the Snecma M88-4E “TCO Pack” engine takes place for 1:30 at the Istres air base in southern France. In January 2008, French defense procurement agency DGA awarded Snecma the “TCO Pack” contract to improve the M88-2 engine, modifying the high-pressure compressor and turbine and extending service life and time between inspections.

The first ground test of the engine was performed in September 2009. Development engines are now undergoing ground performance and endurance tests, and a series of altitude chamber tests was completed in late February 2010. The engine has been on 10 test flights, and the test program comprises some 70 flights in 2010, with different engine configurations. Qualification and delivery of the first production-standard M88-4E is now slated for the end of 2011. Snecma release.

April 29/10: UAE. Arabian Aerospace magazine repeats long-standing rumors that Dassault/ France will be asked to buy back, or find a buyer for, the UAE’s 62 Mirage 2000v9 aircraft, as a condition of a Rafale sale. The article goes on to detail the Mirage 2000v9’s capabilities and key equipment differences from earlier models; many revolve around the incorporation of technology that was also used on the Rafale.

April 5/10: No win in Algeria. Looks like the always-slim Algerian opportunity for Rafale has vanished. RIA Novosti reports that Algeria will replace its rejected MiG-29s with SU-30MKA aircraft, to complement 28 less-sophisticated SU-30MKs it has received under a 2006 deal.

Algeria

April 5/10: Active stealth? Aviation Week’s Air and Cosmos reports that France is developing active stealth for the Rafale F5 (2 versions hence). Bill Sweetman explains:

“Active cancellation means preventing a radar from detecting a target by firing back a deception signal with the same frequency as the reflection, but precisely one-half wavelength out of phase with it. Result: the returned energy reaching the radar has no frequency and can’t be detected. It’s quite as difficult as it sounds… This may not be the first French attempt to implement AC on the Rafale. At the Paris air show in 1997, I interviewed a senior engineer at what was then Dassault Electronique… [DID: which became Thales, then Dassault became Thales’ largest private shareholder]”

Sweetman goes on to explain that Moore’s Law of improved processing power may make the project more achievable now. MBDA and Thales have since confirmed that they are working on active cancellation for missiles as part of the Rafale’s SPECTRA defensive suite, and research in this area is underway in several other countries.

April 2/10: Oman loss. Oman, which was always seen as a likely Eurofighter customer but had been offered Rafales, confirms that it intends to buy the Eurofighter. As of 2012, however, it has yet to sign a formal contract. Read “British Eurofighters to Oman?” for full coverage.

Oman

April 1/10: SPECTRA. Aviation Week runs a picture taken by the new imaging infrared missile warning system being developed for the Rafale’s DDM NG warning system against incoming infrared missiles – part of the wider SPECTRA system. DDM NG lacks the level of coverage found in the F-35’s DAS, but the picture’s breadth and clarity are an impressive illustration of how far IIR has come. The DDM-NG system is slated for fielding on new Rafale F3s.

March 21/10: Kuwait. The 4-member Islamist “Reform and Development Bloc” in Kuwait’s 50-member Parliament issued a statement against Kuwait’s proposed Rafale purchase, reiterating “…its firm rejection of this suspicious deal, especially following information that the latest technical reports have recommended the rejection of the deal.” The Bloc also cites the Rafale’s failure to win other export orders to date, as a reason to avoid the aircraft. Defense Minister Sheikh Jaber Mubarak al-Sabah, on the other hand, continues to maintain that the Rafale deal remains a priority.

The word “suspicious” is code for “involves payoffs,” in a monarchy that has dissolved Parliament 3 times from 2005-2009, in order to avoid scrutiny of the royal family. In November 2009, some opposition MPs claimed the proposed 14-28 plane contract was over-inflated. In response, Kuwait’s parliament voted unanimously to ask Kuwait’s Audit Bureau to probe 3 planned arms deals with the United States and France for C-130J Super Hercules transports, an ammunition plant, and the Rafale.

The bloc’s claims regarding the technical reports are difficult to verify – a technical defense ministry team has been assessing the deal, following Sheikh Jaber Mubarak al-Sabah’s approval, but its findings have not been made public. Al Defaiyah | Kuwaiti Times | Zawaya | Defense News | France 24 | UPI.

Feb 24/10: Defense News reports that the French defense ministry’s ministerial investment committee has approved a “power-by-the-hour” type arrangement with M88 engine maker Safran. Rolls Royce has trademarked the term, which refers to a contract that pays for hours flown, rather than time and maintenance costs. The M88 arrangement would reportedly include a guaranteed number of flying hours, plus the spares and support required to meet those benchmarks.

The report refers to a “contract” running from 2010-2014, with optional extensions and adjustments available from 2014-2020. At this point, however, it’s not 100% clear whether a formal contract exists, or the ministry has just given approval to negotiate a contract along specific lines.

Engine support

Feb 20/10: Kuwait. Middle East Newsline reports that France and Kuwait have resumed high-level defense talks to finalize an estimated $3 billion order for up to 28 Rafales.

Feb 2/10: Rafale Care. Thales Group announces a 10-year, fixed price sub-contract with Dassault Aviation, to provide a range of extended services and maintenance support for avionics equipment on Rafale combat aircraft in service with the French armed forces. These services will include “obsolescence management,” which is always a hazard given the short production cycle of many electronic components, and involves guaranteed availability rates.

The avionics support agreement with Thales flows from the SIMMAD contract noted in the Dec 12/08 entry, whose initial 5-year base period is followed by 5 further options of 1 year each.

Jan 22/10: ACMI. Dassault Aviation announces that it has configured the Rafale fighter to carry MBDA’s Semac Air Combat Maneuvering Instrumentation pod on its wingtip, enabling it to participate in the USAF’s multinational Red Flag exercise. In early 2008, the Dassault Aviation design department in Saint-Cloud had been asked to assess the impact of the new pod in early 2008, ensuring that it didn’t create aerodynamic problems, or interfere with other aircraft electronics. By the end of July 2009, Dassault had submitted this file to the authorities, and received flight authorization. In early August, 4 Rafale fighters participated in the Red Flag 2008-04 exercise.

ACMI pods relay and store position and performance information during exercises, and can also simulate the firing of missiles and calculate hit probability. The combined transmissions of participating fighters creates a complete command picture for those running the exercises, who can also replay engagements to the fighter pilots later on.

2009

France orders 60 more. modernizes 10 Rafale-M F1s; Preferred in Brazil; UAE rumors; Oman offer; Libya looking elsewhere; Crash 2 Rafale-Ms. Rafale w. Meteors
(click to view full)

Dec 31/09: 60-plane order. Defense Aerospace reports that on this date, France’s DGA awarded Dassault Aviation a multi-billion euro, multi-year production contract to deliver 60 Rafale F3 combat aircraft (50 Armée de l’Air, 10 Navy) under “Commande Globale no. 4” (global order #4). Deliveries are expected to begin in 2015, at an average rate of 10.5 aircraft per year (q.v. Nov 12/09).

A supplementary deal would cover the modernization of 10 Rafale-M F1 naval fighters to the current F3+ standard (q.v. Nov 30/09 entry).

Defense Aerospace says that the orders have been confirmed by a DGA spokesman, while Dassault declined to comment. Related contracts have also reportedly been awarded to Snecma for M-88 engines, and to MBDA for weapons, but values and particulars were not disclosed. France does not have the same disclosure requirements as countries like the USA, and news outlets have reported that invidious comparisons between the Rafale’s French price and export price helped sabotage a sale to Morocco in 2007.

To date, France remains the fighter’s only customer. Commande Global IV reportedly brings the total number of Rafales ordered by France to 180, out of a planned total of 286 (228 air force, 58 navy). An option to order 9 additional aircraft under this order could return the program plan to 295 aircraft.

60 Rafales

Nov 30/09: F1s – F3s. Defense Aerospace reports that French defense minister Hervé Morin has committed EUR 300 million to modernize 10 French Navy Rafale-M (F1) fighters. This would bring the French Navy’s in-service Rafales to 26 F3 aircraft, plus any new-build aircraft delivered in the interim.

The retrofits were originally expected in 2012, but were moved up to 2010 as part of the French government’s economic stimulus program. Aircraft M2 – M10 will be moved from Landivisiau naval air station to the existing Rafale F3 production line, and retrofitted over a period of 12-18 months. When delivered, they will replace 11F Squadron’s modernized Super Etendard fighters, which are nearing the end of their safe flying life.

10 Rafale-M F1s to F3s

Nov 26/09: French Defense Minister Hervé Morin is quoted regarding the September 2009 crash of 2 Rafales. Both recorders have been recovered and sent to France’s Bureau of Accidents Enquiring and Analysis (BEAD) for investigation. Morin says the report is complete, adding that: “It’s evident… It’s very probable, very certain to be a human error.” China’s Xinhua.

Nov 15/09: At the Dubai 2009 air show, Thales representatives discuss the expected French contract for 60 more planes, and export opportunities. Flight International:

“[The inclusion of RBE2-AA AESA radars] is paving the way in terms of technology for the export process,” says [Thales aerospace senior vice-president Pierre-Eric Pommellet]. “Negotiations with the UAE on Rafale are ongoing,” he says. “I’m sure that this will be a very important topic at Dubai. This is the biggest project that we are involved in in this region.” Kuwait is also emerging as a strong prospect. “There have been some state-to-state talks, including on the Rafale. Kuwait could be a good customer for us, but it’s their decision on whether to progress,” he says.”

Nov 12/09: 60 approved. Defense minister Hervé Morin and France’s Comité ministériel des investissements de défense (CMI) approve a multi-year, 60-plane order of Rafale fighters for the French air force and navy, per France’s multi-year defense budgeting plans. These aircraft would be equipped with new RBE2-AA AESA (Active Electronically Scanned Array) radars and improved self-protection systems, in addition to the standard Rafale F3 fit-out.

Order estimates hover around EUR 6-7 billion, but exact costs, delivery date, and order composition will now be negotiated by France’s DGA procurement agency. The multi-year commitment is designed to provide both assurance to the supply chain, and confidence on the part of potential export customers. The DGA itself acknowledges that the presence or absence of those exports will affect overall schedules and delivery dates. Key firms involved will include Dassault Aviation, Thales, Safran, and MBDA, among about 100 firms in the overall supply chain. French DGA [in French] | Avio News | Flight International | StrategyPage.

Oct 23/09: Kuwait. As Kuwait and France sign an umbrella defense agreement to enhance bilateral cooperation, reports surface that Kuwait is investigating Dassault’s Rafale as a possible successor to its fleet of F/A-18C/D Hornets. UPI:

“Obviously,” said [Kuwaiti Defense Minister Sheik Jaber al-Hamad] after meeting with his French counterpart Hervé Morin, “we would be proud to have the Rafale in the heart of the armed forces in Kuwait.” Jaber, also deputy prime minister of the emirate, told reporters he was awaiting terms of the deal from Paris.”

Oct 19/09: Libya. Libya’s potential Rafale purchase could be in danger. Russia’s Interfax media agency reports that Libya plans to buy 12-15 Sukhoi Su-35 multirole fighters, another 4 Su-30s as an immediate interim order, and 6 Yakovlev Yak-130 trainer and light attack aircraft aircraft. Reports indicate that a contract could be signed with state arms export agency Rosoboronexport by the end of 2009, or early 2010.

The UPI report adds that Libya is also interested in the long-range, high-altitude S-300 air-defense system, the shorter-range Tor-M2E and BUK-M1 surface-to-air missile systems, combat helicopters, T-90 tanks, and at least one diesel-powered submarine.

Libya has also been in talks with France to buy its Rafale fighters since late 2007. Any signed Sukhoi deal is likely to end the Rafale’s near-term chances in Libya. Libya would later help the Rafale gain international credibility – but through use in theater, rather than a sale.

Sept 24/09: Crash. A pair of French Rafale-M fighters collide and crash in the Mediterranean, about 30 km off the French coast. The crash reduces the Rafale M fleet from 17 to 15 aircraft, and kills one of the pilots involved. Aviation Week | Defense News | Flight International: body located.

Crash 2

Sept 7/09: Brazilan Rafales? Brazil’s Ministerio Da Defesa announces that Dassault Aviation is now the F-X2 competition’s preferred bidder, and the country will order 36 Rafales subject to further negotiations. Subsequent events lead to partial backtracking from the government, as the competition is still not over, and the Brazilian Air Force hasn’t delivered its recommendations yet. The Rafale has definitely achieved front-runner status, however.

This sale would be France’s 1st export order for its Rafale fighter, after numerous attempts spanning more than a decade. French technology transfer across a broad range of projects was reportedly the critical factor in the deal, and Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim reportedly said that the decision to begin talks with Dassault “was not adopted in relation to the other two” competing companies. President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva described the move as “definitively consolidating a strategic partnership we started in 2005” – one that would now produce helicopters (EC725), submarines (nuclear-powered and diesel-electric), transport aircraft (KC-390) and possibly fighters (Rafale). Read “Brazil Embarking Upon F-X2 Fighter Program” for more details, and full updates.

June 5/09: UAE. Rumors surface that the UAE, who chose to develop the F-16E/F Block 60 Desert Falcon instead of buying the Rafale, may be willing to replace its Mirage 2000v9 fleet with Rafale aircraft in a $10 billion deal.

If they do, however, they reportedly want some changes to the platform, including engine thrust growth from 16,500 pounds each to 20,000 pounds, an AESA radar, and integration with MBDA’s Meteor long-range missile. Funding from the UAE could help France finance Rafale upgrades, as their key requests are all already planned or in development. where negotiations become interesting is the quid pro quo. A follow-on article in UAE’s The National discusses past licensing-for-exports deals associated with funded modifications to their Mirage 2000 and F-16 platforms. Those deals made the UAE several hundred million dollars when the Mirage 2000v5 modification it helped finance were sold to other countries. Al Defaiya | UPI | UAE’s The National.

Feb 10/09: Oman. France enters the fray with an offer to sell Oman Dassault’s Rafale fighter, instead of the 24 Eurofighters reportedly on offer from Oman’s historic ally Britain. The offer was reportedly made by visiting French President Nicolas Sarkozy during a meeting and dinner on Tuesday with Sultan Qaboos bin Said. Report.

2008 (Partial)

10-Year Rafale Care contract; Dassault becomes Thales’ largest private shareholder. Rafale-M F1
(click to view full)

Dec 19/08: Alcatel-Lucent SA sells its 20.78% stake in major defense electronics firm Thales SA to Dassault Aviation SA of St. Cloud, France. The sale price is reported to be EUR 38 per share, or about EUR 1.57 billion (about $2.25 billion). Dassault already owns 5.2% of Thales, but this purchase will make it Thales’ second largest shareholder after the French government’s 27.1%. Read “Dassault Takes a Major Stake in Thales.”

Thales et Dassault

Dec 12/08: Rafale Care. Dassault announces that France’s Structure integrée de maintien en condition opérationnelle des matériels aéronautiques du ministère de la Défense (SIMMAD) has signed a 10-year contract to maintain the 120 Rafale fighters France has ordered to date for its Air Force and Navy.

This contract follows the nascent global trend toward pay for performance in military maintenance. The 10-year “Rafale Care” global contract does use maintenance payments based on operational availability and flying hours, rather than materials and labor. The contract also includes a commitment to reduce those costs per hour over time, in a similar manner to many corporate outsourcing agreements. Unlike Britain’s fully comprehensive “future contracting for availability” model, however, “Rafale Care” covers the aircraft but not the engine (Snecma), radar (Thales), countermeasures or weapon systems.

Costs were not disclosed, but Defense News quotes a Dassault spokesman as saying that the larger twin-engine Rafale costs about 15% more per flight hour than the Mirage 2000 lightweight fighter. The French Armée de l’Air also refused to provide figures, sidestepping the question by saying that costs were heavily dependent on key variables like flight and mission profiles. Dassault Aviation | Defense News.

Rafale Care

Additional Readings

Readers with corrections, comments, or information to contribute are encouraged to contact DID’s Founding Editor, Joe Katzman. We understand the industry – you will only be publicly recognized if you tell us that it’s OK to do so.

Background: Rafale & Ancillaries

• Dassault Aviation – Rafale

• Dassault Aviation – Rafale for India. Promotional site.

• Air Force Technology – Rafale Multirole Combat Fighter, France

• Air Vectors – The Dassault Rafale

• L’Usine Nouvelle, via WayBack – Infographie : le Rafale en 19 chiffres et 11 usines. Program infographic includes costs, main industrial sites, material composition percentages, etc.

• Sagem, via WayBack – GERFAUT/ Aircraft Modernization. Gerfaut is/was a Helmet Mounted Display for the Rafale.

• Dassault Aviation, via WayBack – Rafale F3 and AREOS Reco NG: the 21st century reconnaissance team.

News & Views

• Defense Aerospace (May 31/11) – Rafale in Combat: “War for Dummies”. Discusses experiences over Libya. Predictably rosy views, but seems to confirm Damocles pod integration aty last, and notes the effect it’s having in breaking down previous narrow functional foci among squadrons.

• Flight International, via WayBack (Sept 11/09) – FLIGHT TEST: Dassault Rafale – Rampant Rafale. Flight test of an F3 model.

• DID (Nov 3/08) – French President Tries to Set French Defense on a New Course. Details France’s current multi-year defense budget and force plans.

• DID (Feb 14/08) – French Adding GPS to Paveway-II Bombs. In part, to give Rafales their own smart bomb option before French ASSM weapons arrive.

• Dassault, via WayBack (May 2007) – Rafale over Afghanistan. These F2 models lack their own laser targeting, and require Mirage 2000D escorts.

• Aviation Now, via WayBack (Le Bourget 2001) – French Industry Plans Upgraded Rafale for Export Markets.

Argentine minister of defence Agustín Rossi had reached technical agreements with Israel to buy 14 IAI Kfir C.10 multirole fighters for the Argentine Air Force, but at the last minute the deal was put off for the next presidential administration. According to various reports, the contract was