Defence`s Feeds

Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron FOUR (HSC-4) recently made a video about the squadrons operations in the past year.

Based at NAS North Island in San Diego, HSC-4 is tasked with Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) missions as well as Search and Rescue, Combat Search and Rescue, Special Operations Support and Logistics.

The squadron is assigned to Carrier Air Wing TWO (CVW-2).

Also known as the Black Knights, HSC-4 flies the MH-60S Knighthawk, a helicopter that features a glass cockpit with active matrix liquid crystal displays specialised in ASW, Vertical Replenishment (VERTREP) at Sea, Humanitarian Disaster Relief, Search and Rescue, Combat Search and Rescue, Aero Medical Evacuation, SPECWAR, Organic Airborne Mine Countermeasures, and Logistical support.

The video below shows HSC-4 Knignhawk helos fly in tactical formation at low level over the desert, perform winching operations and operate on warships, including aircraft carrier USS Ronald Regan.

H/T to HSC-4 for the heads-up

 

Related articles

• Replenishment At Sea: even Nuclear-powered Aircraft Carriers need fuel and supplies
• Here’s the position of the two U.S. Navy warships off Sochi for Olympics Security
• U.S. aircraft carrier and part of its escort “sunk” by French submarine during drills off Florida
• Chinese Su-27 Jet Threatened U.S. Surveillance Aircraft with a barrel roll stunt over the top of it
• [Video] U.S. Special Forces Hostage Rescue Demo in Downtown Tampa
• Italian Air Force bids farewell to the HH-3F Pelican C-SAR helicopter
• U.S. Navy’s new surveillance plane is full of flaws and not yet effective

Jorge Domecq, EDA Chief Executive, today met with Jan Selstrand, Swedish State Secretary to the Minister of Defence to exchange views on the preparation of the European Council in June 2015 and Sweden’s participation in EDA projects. 

“It has been a very fruitful meeting with Jorge Domecq. It is of great importance that we not only exchange views ahead of the European Council in June 2015, but that we also discuss how we can further deepen our participation and cooperation in EDA projects”, said Swedish State Secretary Jan Salestrand. 

“Sweden is an active member of the European Defence Agency. It is for example involved in the Agency’s work on maritime capabilities where the EDA runs projects focussing on unmanned maritime systems, maritime surveillance, as well as maritime mine counter measures. Sweden is also the lead nation of the MIDCAS project developing a mid-air collision avoidance system which will contribute to the safe integration of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems into normal airspace. This project reached an important milestone end of April with the successful completion of a series of flight tests”, Jorge Domecq said after the meetings. 

The visit in Sweden is part of a series of visits by Mr. Domecq to all EDA Member States following his appointment as EDA Chief Executive and ahead of the Ministerial Steering Board on 18 May 2015. So far, Mr. Domecq visited Spain, Lithuania, Latvia, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Germany, Portugal, the Netherlands, Ireland, France, Romania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Croatia, Estonia, Poland, Slovenia, Greece, Cyprus and Finland. He will next travel to Italy.

 

More information:

• News "Jorge Domecq in Luxembourg to discuss cooperation" (5 May 2015)
• News "Defence cooperation talks in Cyprus" (23 April 2015)
• News "Chief Executive meets Hungarian Minister of Defence" (23 April 2015)
• News "EDA Chief Executive visits Athens" (22 April 2015)
• News "Jorge Domecq in Poland for defence discussions"(20 April 2015)
• News "Jorge Domecq meets Estonian Minister of Defence" (20 April 2015)
• News "Meeting with Croatian Defence Minister in Zagreb" (17 April 2015)
• News "Slovenia welcomes Jorge Domecq" (15 April 2015)
• News "EDA Chief Executive visits Czech Republic" (13 April 2015)
• News "Jorge Domecq in Bulgaria to discuss defence cooperation" (8 April 2015)
• News "EDA Chief Executive travels to Romania" (8 April 2015)
• News "EDA Chief Executive meets French Minister of Defence" (30 March 2015)
• News "Jorge Domecq exchanges views with Irish Minister of Defence Simon Coveney T.D." (25 March 2015)
• News "EDA Chief Executive visits The Netherlands" (23 March 2015)
• News "Discussions on European defence in Portugal" (19 March 2015)
• News "Jorge Domecq meets German Secretary of State" (19 March 2015)
• News "Belgium and EDA discuss future defence cooperation" (18 March 2015)
• News "Jorge Domecq in the UK for cooperation talks" (25 Feb 2015)
• News "Latvia and EDA discuss cooperation opportunities" (19 Feb 2015)
• News "EDA Chief Executive visits Lithuania" (17 Feb 2015) 

Instead of being resolved, the long power struggle between parliament and the Provincial Councils (PC) about how much and what kind of authority the councils would have has entered a new round in 2015 – with no end in sight. In 2014, under the previous president, a new law was designed to solve this issue. But it was caught in a three-way controversy between the new head of state, parliament and the councils during which the authorities demanded by the councils were taken away and returned and taken away again. The PCs reacted with street protests, asking for a presidential decree. They got one of a lesser status that resulted in some clarifications and even restored their desired “oversight” authority. But the decree still needs to be turned into law – and parliament has no reason to approve it this time. AAN’s Ehsan Qaane and Thomas Ruttig reveal how the controversy evolved, provide an update on the state of the affair and take a closer look at why it is still unresolved and bogged down in confusion – it is a story of poor previous legislation, conflicting interests and shifting positions.

Since they were elected for the first time in 2005, Afghanistan’s Provincial Councils (PCs) have been suffering from ill-defined and, its members think, too little authority. Those elected to the councils ten years ago found out, once in their positions, that they had few facilities and no budget and that governors were often reluctant to work with them. The key issue is ‘oversight’ – which could be of any or all – or none – of the following: government budgets spent in the province, government services, the implementation of development projects and detention centres.

A new provincial council law signed by former president Hamed Karzai in 2007 contained wording that gave the PCs “oversight” authority in their respective provinces, but it remained vague in defining this authority. Even this was too much for the Wolesi Jirga, the parliament’s lower house. Arguing with a provision in the constitution, it claimed exclusive “oversight” rights for itself, and wanted only to concede an “advisory” function to the PCs (for previous reporting, see here). Ever since, this has remained the unresolved core issue.

The PCs’ quest for a new provincial council law

After the 2007 law was passed, the provincial councils started to lobby for another amendment of the law that would define their “oversight” authority, with the purpose of generally increasing their role. Four years later, in May 2011, with still no satisfactory solution in sight, the chiefs of all 34 PCs met for the first time to organise joint action (see here). After that meeting, which took place in Herat, the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG), in charge of coordination between the various branches of government at the local level, started drafting another law.

This took another three years. During that time, the draft law was first submitted to the Ministry of Justice (MoJ), which has to ensure that all laws are in accordance with existing law but which also has the authority to change draft laws without going back to the author. This is exactly what it did in this case: It removed the PCs’ oversight authority. Then the revised draft was put before the Council of Ministers for decision. The Councils of Ministers, ignoring IDLG’s lobbying to retain the original text, approved the MoJ version and sent it on to the Wolesi Jirga, the lower house of parliament, in January 2014. In another attempt to lobby for their oversight right, representatives of all 34 provincial councils met the administrative board of the lower house and asked it to adopt the IDLG version of the draft (see here). The lower house, instead, approved a version of the law that gave “advisory” rather than “oversight” authority to the provincial councils (for more details see here).

The provincial councils did not take this in silence. They met with the senators a week later, in the presence of IDLG representatives (see here and here), demanding that the senators return the oversight authority into the law. (The senate, the upper house, has to approve all laws passed by the Wolesi Jirga.) The senate did indeed amend the law again on 20 April 2014 and subsequently managed to convince the lower house members in the joint commission (that now needed to hammer out the differences) to return this authority to the provincial councils. Finally, both houses approved a version of the law on 20 October 2014 that did indeed give oversight authority to the provincial councils. The law was sent to the president for his signature on 16 November 2014.

On 29 December 2014, the president sent the law back, unsigned. According to the lower house speaker, Abdul Rauf Ibrahimi, addressing the house on 28 January 2015, the president had refused to sign the law because he was not happy with the oversight authority for the provincial councils. (1)

When the president refuses to sign a law, the lower house – according to Article 94 of the constitution – can still pass the rejected draft by a two-thirds majority. This authority is given to uphold parliament’s role as the main legislative body and to prevent the president from overruling it.

On 28 January 2015, before the lower house discussed and voted on the rejected law again, Ibrahimi appealed to the MPs to exert their authority “to approve the law by a two thirds majority or amend the law in the normal process.” (In the latter alternative, the law would be sent back to one of its 18 commissions for more discussion, then would be voted on again in the lower house, then would move on to the upper house and to the president for his signature.) Instead, however, the MPs did both; they amended the law and then accepted it by a two-thirds majority. Noticing that the president supported their initial position, they reneged on their compromise with the senate and removed the PCs’ oversight authority again.

The majority of the MPs argued that such authority was against the constitution, as it only mentions an advisory role for local government institutions, (Article 139). Overseeing government activities, both at the national and local level, they say, is the exclusive responsibility of the lower house and a shared authority would cause conflict between it and the provincial councils. Indeed, controversies have erupted over how responsibilities should be divided. On 19 April 2014, for example, MPs from Jawzjan province accused members of the Jawzjan provincial council of interfering with their tasks, circumventing the MPs and discussing provincial affairs directly with some ministers – after PC members accused them of carelessness towards the local population;  (see here).

This argument – that giving PCs oversight of local government institutions is unconstitutional – had, however, already been rejected by the Independent Commission for Oversight over the Constitution’s Implementation (ICOCI); it had earlier ruled that neither giving nor withholding such an authority would be against the constitution.

What is really at stake?

The lobby for a new law focused on three main issues. The first and most important was to increase the role of provincial councils by boosting their oversight authority. According to the 2007 PC law, they could only oversee the effectiveness of provincial budget expenditures. (2) The new draft law, rejected by the MPs and the president, gave PCs the authority to also oversee the implementation of development projects, the quality of these projects and service delivery by the local government. (3) A second issue was increased financial independence. In the 2007 law, the provincial governor’s office was to pay PC members’ salaries and expenditures, which made them dependent on the governor’s office. In the new draft law, salaries and expenditure was provided by the central government through the IDLG. (There were also problems with the wording, which needed to be corrected.)

The main point of contention has been the oversight authority. Supporters of this authority argued that boosting the role of the elected PCs could help control corruption and abuse at the local government level. Others, however, argued that the greater power could further corrupt PC members, or enhance their chances to use their position for exacting undue influence, for example by pushing for the appointment of people close to them. This is what, according to Ahmad Khamush who is in charge of IDLG’s Local Council Affairs Unit, the president refers to when he says this authority could lead to “new cycles of corruption” at the local level (see also here).

A decree, instead of a law

In response to the Wolesi Jirga’s turn-around on the law, on 29 January 2015, 16 of the 34 provincial councils closed their offices in protest and sent representatives to Kabul to make their case. They met President Ashraf Ghani on 3 February 2015 who, according to this Palace statement, said that he now agreed with the supervisory role of provincial councils but “within a specific set of criteria with transparent accountability.”

On 4 February 2015, Ahmad Khamush from the IDLG, which initially drafted the new law and advocated for adding the oversight authority, in a press conference – reported by Afghan media – tried to explain this shift in the president’s position:

President Ghani rejected the provincial council law because some members of the provincial councils misused their authority in the past. The president thought giving such authority to the provincial councils would create a new cycle of corruption at the local level. But after the president met with representatives of 16 provincial councils, on 3 February, he agreed with the nature of oversight authority for the Provincial Councils, but he stressed this authority should be implemented based on specific mechanisms and within particular scopes [sah-e nezarat].

But although the president apparently now agreed to the oversight authority in principle, no practical action was taken. So PC members – including the heads of all 34 provinces – stepped up their campaign, came to Kabul and took to the streets in protest, blocking the road to Kabul’s international airport on 12 February 2015 (see here and here). On 16 February 2015, second vice-president Sarwar Danesh met PC representatives (see here) and promised on behalf of the president that a presidential decree would be issued in the next cabinet meeting, planned for 25 February 2015 (see here). On 26 February 2015, Ali Yazdanparast, a member of Kabul’s provincial council told AAN that the cabinet had indeed decided to return the oversight authority by a presidential decree, but that no one had seen the decree yet.

When faced with further delays, the PC representatives staged a two-day sit-in at the Office for Administrative Affairs (see here) on 3 and 4 March 2015, refusing to leave until the president issued the decree they demanded. Finally, after 38 days of protests, Ghani issued an ‘administrative’ decree – as opposed to a full-fledged ‘legislative’ one – on 5 March 2014 (see here).

Why an administrative decree and what does it say?

The president can issue two kinds of decree: administrative and legislative. An administrative decree is a directive for governmental officials and does not need the approval of the parliament. A legislative decree, usually simply called a ‘presidential decree,’ however , has the status of a law. The president can issue such decrees on pressing issues when the parliament is in recess, but they should be approved by the parliament as soon as it returns. (4)

After the parliament went into its winter recess (and after it had voted down the PCs’ oversight authority) in January 2015, the provincial councils asked for a legislative decree. The cabinet approved the request on 25 February, but the president, instead, issued an administrative decree. A reliable source within the palace told AAN that after the cabinet agreed to issue the decree, some of the president’s advisors persuaded him not to confirm the decision of the cabinet. That at least an administrative decree was issued appears to have been the result of the pressure of the provincial councils’ sustained protests.

The decree on the PCs’ oversight authority has three articles. Based on these articles, they have been given back the oversight authorities that were contained in the 2007 law. However, the provisions in the decree also do not exceed those already given in the 2007 law, and the exact mandate and mechanisms continue to remain vague. Nevertheless, the IDLG is now tasked with providing the facilities to implement the new provisions. (5)

The 2007 PC law mentions the word oversight (nezarat) twice. The first time, in Article 2, it says that the “Provincial Council . . . advises the local administration and oversees [it]” and the second time, in Article 4.2, the law gives power to the PCs to “advise on and oversee the effective use of financial resources at the provincial level.” The law, however, does not specify the mechanism: how practically a provincial council should oversee the provincial administration and what it can do with the oversight authority. The law is also silent about the responsibility of the local administration, in particular whether and how it should react to the provincial council’s recommendations and if not, what the next step would be. In fact, referring back to the 2007 law with regard to the overseeing authorities means a continuation of uncertainties – one of the things that those lobbying for the new law had hoped to address.

Following the issuance of a law with a clarifying decree, as president Ghani did, is not unprecedented. Former president Hamed Karzai did something similar after the issuance of the 2007 PC law when, on 11 May 2007, he issued a decree (6) saying that the provincial governors should prepare their development budget plans together with the PCs and that the plans should be approved by them before submitting them to the central government. Karzai’s decree also made the provincial governors responsible for providing PCs with facilities and specified that the councils’ oversight authority included “monitoring the implementation of law, balanced reconstruction, reform and good governance.” The mechanism for overseeing and the obligation to implement decisions of the provincial councils were, however, also not addressed in Karzai’s decree. This decree is no longer valid.

Whereas Karzai’s decree was mainly a clarification of the law existing at the time, one could argue that Ghani’s decree in practice overrules the law. Although the newly adopted law does not explicitly say that PCs cannot have oversight authority, this provision was clearly removed from the final version of the law. According to a source from the presidential office, the decision to issue an administrative decree rather than a legislative one was taken after some of the president’s advisers argued that returning the oversight authority would damage the relationship between the president and the Wolesi Jirga. This was particularly relevant as the government, at that point, still needed the lower house’s vote of confidence for the remaining members of its cabinet. So far none of the MPs has reacted against the decree.

The president’s conditions

When the president said he would return the oversight authority to the provincial councils, he did so under two conditions: The oversight should be based on a specific mechanism, and the PCs should issue quarterly reports of their activities to him. Or as described in this palace statement:

[The] President added that the supervisory role has to be in the frame of a clear contract bearing mutual accountability. The IDLG has been instructed to come up with a draft identifying the legitimate supervisory discretion of Provincial Councils, continued President Ghani stating that the amendment will, after Provincial Councils’ consensus, be placed before the parliament.

This is based on Article 40 of the current PC law that gives authority to IDLG to approve procedures (such as how the PCs can use their oversight authority in practice), in coordination with PC heads. According to the customs of Afghanistan’s legislative system, administrations have the right to develop and approve procedures by themselves, and there is no need for confirmation by the president or the Council of Ministers. The drafting of the procedure also would, finally, involve PC members in fixing what and how they can exercise their oversight right and how their findings will be dealt with.

Accordingly, the IDLG drafted a procedure and presented it to the PC representatives on 7 February 2015. The representatives suggested certain amendments, including making oversight a daily authority on topics that can be suggested by individual members and, specifically, adding oversight of the detention sector. A revised version of the draft procedure was presented during a conference in Kabul on 2–4 May 2015, to which all members of the 34 provincial councils were invited by the senate.

The current draft, which AAN has seen, has 13 articles and says that PCs can oversee the following fields: provision of services by the local governmental authorities, detention centres, budget expenditures, the implementation of development projects and project indicators. The procedure stresses that, because these responsibilities require technical knowledge that members of the provincial councils may not have, they will need to use the services of experts. (The procedure for hiring such experts remains open, again.)

The oversight mechanism is also clarified in the procedure and seems designed to prevent individual meddling. The PCs are instructed to exercise their oversight authority through permanent committees (in Dari: kamitaha-ye muwazaf) – somewhat similar to the parliament’s commissions – the structure of which they can decide themselves. In case of necessary investigations into wrongdoing in the province, they can become active on their own initiative, after confirmation by a two-thirds majority of all members, or based on complaints from residents on a particular issue. (In the second case, the procedure concerning how many PC members must agree to form such a committee is left open.) The committees are not allowed to send their recommendations directly to the involved local institutions; instead they should go through the provincial governor’s office. If the local institutions ignore their recommendations, the PCs can forward their recommendations to the president or the parliament through the IDLG.

The procedure would make local government authorities responsible to report regularly to the PCs. For example, provincial administrations are instructed to share their budgets within 20 days of the parliament’s approval of the national budget and to quarterly provide reports on the progress and challenges of the projects and expenditures of both the development and ordinary budget.

The procedure also lays down some limitations for PC members: they are not allowed to fire or appoint any employee; they cannot intervene illegally (ie outside the oversight process) to ask the provincial government to stop or implement any action; and they cannot sign contracts or support anyone to get a contract with the local administration. All these are currently widespread practices. Finally, the procedure gives the right to residents of a particular province to complain against PC members or the PC as a whole. This complaint is then addressed by the Code of Conduct Committee (Kumita-ye Usul-e Raftari) of the same PC or by the IDLG. If the complaint brings up legally culpable offences, the Code of Conduct Committee should send it to the Attorney General’s Office for prosecution.

There is only one problem. Despite the oversight right, in principleconfirmed by the president’s March 2015 decree, it has not yet been made law. And this needs to involve the Wolesi Jirga, which is sticking to its principled opposition to the PCs’ oversight rights.

More opposition

In addition, PCs are still opposing the compromise that the president’s decree might have made possible. The discussion of the draft during the conference in early May was meant to result in its confirmation by PC members and to wrap up the whole debate. But this did not happen. PC members avoided publicly expressing either their support or opposition to the draft procedure. But at the margins of the conference, a number of them argued, when speaking to AAN, that the procedure was meaningless, because now the oversight authority is not backed up by a proper law, and because it unduly limits their authority. (AAN did not hear a single voice of support for the procedure.) They also raised further points that should be included in the procedure (for example, the right to oversee procurements on the provincial level) or dropped (for example, the provision that a two-thirds majority is required for setting up ad hoc committees).

Since the PCs failed to accept IDLG’s procedure on the oversight authorities at the early May conference, the issue of the PC law is, in essence, back at square one. The Wolesi Jirga has not given up its principled opposition to the PCs’ oversight rights, while the PCs – in their dealings with the IDLG – are constantly upping the ante. They also reject the compromise laid out in the president’s decree and the procedures developed on its basis.

The protracted conflict over the PCs’ oversight authority is more than just a controversy over details of an administrative issue. It reflects how poor legislation inherited from the previous government (regardless of whether the shortcomings represent a lack of capacity and understanding or are the result of political intent) continues to affect the working of the current one. Another inheritance from the Karzai era is the strained relations between the executive and the legislative – the latter was often outmanoeuvred by the former and therefore is hitting back wherever opportunity arises. Provincial councils are caught in the middle.  However, they are not fully unselfish in this case; after all, Afghans know how elected and other positions are used to bargain for favours. With their resistance to the IDLG procedure, and their constant advancement of new preconditions, they try to defend ‘rights’ of influence that parliamentarians ‘traditionally’ had but which do not fit within the new constitutional framework.

Although this issue has not yet been raised by the PCs, how the PCs are subordinated to control by the executive is also problematic. Lines between the executive and the provincial-level element of the legislative, the PCs, are blurred by at least two factors: they report to the president (it would be more ‘natural’ for them to report within the legislative, to parliament) and the IDLG has budgetary control over the PCs. The IDLG both drafts the PCs’ budgets and is responsible for hiring their administrative staff.

All in all, the PC law controversy is a case study in how weak political institutions remain, and how easily vested interests can exploit holes in the law and, in this case, prevent necessary checks-and-balances from emerging on a subnational level.

What’s possible next?

Now, despite the mutual blockade between the Wolesi Jirga and the PCs, some PC members are still arguing for another attempt at overhauling the law. Some politicians support this, at least verbally. Muhammad Alam Izedyar, first deputy chairman of the senate, promised the PC members at the same conference that the lower house would start another amendment process, based on Articles 95 and 97 of the Constitution (7) that give such a right to both houses of the parliament. While a legal base for recognising the PCs’ oversight authority is an essential need, it is however unclear whether Izedyar will be able to muster the required support of ten senators for such an initiative, and then get a majority in the house. But even if this happens, the amended law also needs to go through the Wolesi Jirga again. Under the current circumstances, however, it is difficult to see why the Wolesi Jirga should give up its principled opposition to the PCs’ oversight authority this time.

 

(1) According to some there might be an issue with the date of the rejection, given that the draft of the Provincial Council Law was initially sent to the government on 16 November 2014. The Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs, which is in charge of communication between the government and parliament, however sent the draft back for spelling and grammar corrections after which the parliament resent it on 16 December 2014. President Ghani then rejected the law on 29 December 2014. According to Article 94 of the constitution, if the president disagrees with an approved draft of law, he can reject and resend the draft to the lower house within 15 days of receiving the draft. If the president neither signs nor rejects the law within 15 days, it will be automatically applicable, without the signature of the president.

Tayeba Khawari, head of the Bamyan provincial council (Afghanistan’s first female provincial council chair), argued on her Facebook page, that because the president had rejected the draft of provincial council law too late, 42 days after it was sent, it would automatically become law (here). She said that none of the related laws and regulations say that the Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs has the authority to resend drafts to the parliament; once the draft is issued by the parliament and sent to the government, only the president can sign or reject the draft. In practice however draft laws are regularly sent back to the parliament for corrections before being sent on to the president.

(2) Relevant article in the 2007 provincial council law on the provincial councils’ oversight authorities:

Article 4:

Para 2: [Provincial councils] give advice and do oversight on the efficiency of the expenditure of the provincial budget.

(3) Relevant article in the original 2014 provincial council draft law (which was not adopted):

Article 8:

Para 3: [Provincial councils] give advice to the provincial governor and the related governmental organisation and oversee the effective use of the financial resources and their [the provincial governor and other related governmental organizations] activities with the purpose of filling the gaps and boosting the quality of services.

Para 13: [Provincial councils] advise and oversee the development projects with the purpose of boosting the quality and quantity of governmental services.

(4) See Article 79 of the Constitution: During the recess of Parliament, the Government shall, in case of an immediate need, issue legislative decree except in matters related to budget and financial affairs. Legislative decrees, after endorsement by the President, shall acquire the force of law. Legislative decrees shall be presented to the Parliament within thirty days of convening its first session, and if rejected by the Parliament, they become void.

(5) Full text of the decree on oversight authority of the provincial councils:

Article 1: The provincial councils can use the oversight authority as stipulated in the provincial council law that was issued in official gazette 920 on 30 Hamal 1386 (20 April 2007).

Article 2: The Independent Directorate of Local Governance is in charge of providing facilities for the implementation of the first article of this decree.

Article 3: This decree is enforceable from the date issued.

(6) Presidential Decree, number 862

Date of issue: 11/5/2007

According to Article 139 of the Constitution and Article 4 of the Provincial Councils Law, the below points with purpose of making cooperation and better understating between the local governors and the members of the Provincial Councils and boosting the importance and role of the Provincial Councils in the society and strengthen of the foundation of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, is approved.

1-  The Provincial Governors shall prepared the provincial development plans together with the Provincial Councils and submit it after verifying of the Provincial Council.

2-  The Provincial Governors shall provide a better space for all activities of the Provincial Councils that include oversight from the implementation of law, balanced development, reform and other important sections.

The authority of overseeing on implementation of this decree is given to Office of Administration Affairs, OAA (Edareh Omor).

Hamed Karzai

The President of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

(7) Article 95: The proposal for drafting laws shall be made by the Government or members of the Parliament or, in the domain of regulating judiciary, by the Supreme Court, through the Government.

Article 97: . . . If the proposal for drafting a law is made by ten members of either of the two houses, it shall be after approval of one fifth of the House where it was initiated, included in the work agenda of the House.

 

This year, the renowned Integrated Air and Missile Defence conference is branching out towards a special Eastern Europe-focused summit to be held in Warsaw this July. Senior ministers and officers from Poland, as well as the likes of Romania, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the

A stunning view of the flypast over Moscow.

The following clip was aired by Zvevda, the Russian TV network owned by the Russian Ministry of Defence.

Filmed with GoPro cameras inside and/or outside Russian Air Force Yak-130s, Mi-28s, Ka-52s, Su-27s, Su-34s, Su-25s and Mig-29s the footage shows the biggest ever Victory Day parade over Red Square, on May 9, from a privileged point of view.

 

Related articles

• Finnish Air Force Hornet jets have taken some cool snapshots of Russian bombers skirting Finland’s airspace
• Dutch F-16 took an interesting video of armed Russian Su-34 attack planes intercepted over the Baltics
• Norwegian F-16s took some stunning pictures of Russian Su-34 fighter bombers flying off Norway
• New Russian Air Force Aerobatic Team (the fifth one) to Debut during the Moscow Victory Day Parade
• Russian Su-34 attack planes “conquered” the North Pole. Mig-31 interceptors prepare to.
• Russia is working to modernize its strategic aviation to maintain a deterrence capability
• Here are some cool images of Russian Su-34 attack planes intercepted by Spanish Typhoons over the Baltic

This year, there were a lot of foreign defense ministers participating in the Moscow Conference on International Security. In fact, there were so many that the organizers had to take an unscheduled break as the conference running well over time, with Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu notably absent after the panel resumed. In this post, I will summarize the most interesting of the presentations. Videos of all the plenary speeches are available on the Russian Defense Ministry website.

Not surprisingly, the first slot in this lineup was given to Chang Wanquan, the Minister of Defense of the People’s Republic of China. Minister Chang focused on the development of a multipolar world as the center of gravity in international affairs has moved in recent years. He noted that some countries (not mentioning the U.S. by name) have been trying to obtain absolute security, which has complicated the international situation. China has been promoting a comprehensive vision of global security, focused on the need for a fair international order, the idea that common development enables security, and the primacy of dialog and cooperation over threats and the use of force. He noted that the PLA has been focused on safeguarding national sovereignty and territorial integrity, as crises on China’s periphery have been causing insecurity for the country. He also mentioned the role of the PLA Navy in conducting evacuations from Yemen and Libya and conducting other humanitarian missions such as disaster assistance and providing medical help for the Ebola crisis in West Africa. He highlighted the need to commemorate the victory over Nazism in World War II and the steps that China has been taking to promote development through the AIIB Bank and various Silk Road initiatives. Minister Chang concluded with a discussion of new efforts to conduct military dialog and increase military cooperation between China and the United States as part of efforts to counter terrorist threats and violent extremism. The overall perception from the speech was of China performing a careful balancing act between supporting Russia as the conference host while telegraphing that it was not interested in getting involved in any kind of confrontation with the United States.

Panos Kammenos, the Greek Defense Minister, was the only senior military official from a NATO country to make a presentation. He began with a statement highlighting the strong ties between Greece and Russia based on spiritual and historical connections, as well as on the two countries’ joint fight against fascism. He mentioned the dangers posed by terrorism and by new asymmetrical and hybrid security threats. The financial crisis that has affected the European Union has led to an increase in instability. Traditional security problems have been joined by new threats, such as ethnic and religious conflict, mass migration, and the dissemination of arms to non-state actors. He argued that the greatest security threat is posed by terrorism and religious conflict in the Middle East and the role of Greece as the bastion of Europe in this area. In this context, he mentioned the significance of Greece’s Hellenic initiative to protect Christians in the Middle East. He concluded by noting that security cannot be divided into internal and external areas. The same terrorist groups are attacking both the U.S. and Russia, so there is no choice but to have both countries working together to resolve this crisis.

The Pakistani Defense Minister, Khawaja Muhammad Asif, highlighted the emergence of new security threats in the last years. He noted that the radicals of the Islamic State have created a transregional crisis that has heightened the danger of the fragmentation of the modern state order. Conflicts in Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen can all be viewed as outcomes of failed regime change, the Arab spring and regional conflict. The old order in the Middle East is dying, while external powers are the only force preventing the emergence of a new order based on religious radicalism. Local extremists in Southeast Asia and Africa are losing foot soldiers to transnational groups such as the Islamic State and Daesh. The region needs a comprehensive social, economic, and political reform package that must be combined with ongoing military actions. 200 thousand Pakistani soldiers are currently fighting terrorists in northwest Pakistan. We need to compromise on principles to ensure that the conflict ends (referring to Charlie Hebdo and Muhammad cartoons).

The Iranian Defense Minister, Hossein Dehghan, started by describing ISIS as a global cancer that has support from foreign states. He blamed the United States and Israel for using these groups to change the strategic balance in the region. He made a very strong statement against Saudi aggression in Yemen, arguing that as a result in the future Saudi Arabia will face the same situation as Saddam Hussein did. He argued that Saudi Arabia has killed many civilians through its aerial bombing campaign and needs to stop supporting terrorism in the Middle East. The international community needs to stop foreign interference in Yemen. Iran, by contrast, is a factor for stability in the region. He then turned to U.S. cyber attacks on Iran and the role of the U.S. as a threat to international security. He proposed a multilateral cooperation initiative between Iran, Russia, China, and India against U.S. missile defense and other international threats. He highlighted that Iran is focused on the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

The North Korean Defense Minister, Hyon Yong Chol, did not pull any punches in his speech. He started by arguing that the U.S. is the greatest threat to world peace and has caused an increase in the risk of war on the Korean peninsula by its actions. He called the U.S. and South Korea a cancer, because they want to overthrow the DPRK and dominate northeast Asia in order to put added pressure on Russia and China. He called the 1953 armistice worthless and argued that North Korea has been threatened by a U.S. nuclear attack. Efforts to have dialog with the U.S. did not achieve any results as it became clear that the U.S. just wanted to eliminate North Korean nuclear weapons without creating a peace deal. “If we had peace, we would not need nuclear weapons.” If the U.S. were to suspend joint exercises with South Korea, North Korea would stop its nuclear program. Instead, the U.S. is trying to create an Asian NATO.

The Indian Defense Minister, Rao Inderjit Singh, highlighted that most nations have now given up some of their sovereignty to various transnational bodies, as the have recognized that traditional state instruments are not adequate to respond to modern threats. Non-state actors are becoming orchestrators of conflict. States can’t reign them in or are even tacitly encouraging them in some cases. Responses need to combine hard and soft power. Conventional wars have declined in recent years, as have civil wars. Now, multi-polarity is allowing old rivalries to reemerge.  In addition, there are new forms of threat from resource scarcity and climate change. Armed forces have to be prepared to fight both high end threats and irregular warfare. Space, cyberspace, and even underground warfare are now part of the war environment and have to be taken into account. Rapid technological innovation will help wealthy states and local entrepreneurs of violence, while potentially hurting the middle powers.

Events this year have reinforced the dynamic of operational demands that Colombian Armed Forces are currently facing. In January, it was announced that 32 8x8 wheeled combat vehicles would be purchased in order to enhance security measures along the Venezuelan border. Defense Mini

Events this year have reinforced the dynamic of operational demands that Colombian Armed Forces are currently facing. In January, it was announced that 32 8x8 wheeled combat vehicles would be purchased in order to enhance security measures along the Venezuelan border. Defense Mini

There’s buzz around Boeing’s Super Hornet sale to Kuwait Kuwait is drawing near to buying up to 40 F/A-18 E and F Super Hornet stri

/Voir la version française plus bas/

One of the new A400M military transport aircraft crashed Saturday, May 9 near Seville in southern Spain. It was a test flight, conducted systematically before a new airplane is delivered to the customer. This usually occurs with a reduced crew. This is the first accident of this type of device since its commissioning. The aircraft informed the control tower to report a problem, before rushing toward the ground. The crew was Spanish and the accident has cost four lives.
The manufacturer Airbus Defence and Space, a subsidiary of European aerospace group (former EADS, up to 2013), which assembles the A400M at its factory in Seville, Andalusia, said in a statement that the plane was destined for Turkey. Airbus was not able to provide details of the accident, but has formed a crisis unit.

The first copy of the new European aircraft was delivered to France in 2013. Since then, Turkey and Germany have also taken delivery. Equipped with four turboprop engines, the A400M can carry up to 37 tons on 3300 km, land on unprepared terrain like sand, with a cargo of tanks or helicopters. The device has experienced many delays in its production and in its deliveries and accumulated an overbudget of 6.2 billion euros (around 30%).
Airbus has high hopes for this device that hits the market when its US competitors are at an end, including the C-130 developed there over 50 years. A total of 174 copies have been ordered to date, including 50 from France, 53 from Germany, 27 from Spain and 22 from the UK.

Following the crash of the Saturday A400M, Germany, the UK and Turkey have decided to stop their planes. If other countries are waiting for the identification of disaster`s causes, France has meanwhile decided to keep its six A400M in service but only "for priority flights," said the Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian.

In March 2015, the Royal Air Force has received its second A400M transport aircraft "Atlas". And one of the six aircraft delivered to the Air Force will going to fly, this March 6, around the world, in 15 days, 11 stops and 3 days, 2 hours and 20 minutes of cumulative flight (Transall C-160 would require three times as long). And that in order to ensure the commercial promotion of the device in Australia, check the availability of land and Faa'a Tontouta in New Caledonia and measure crew`s fatigue and alertness during the long trips.

These appearances are deceiving. After being rescued in 2010 while additional costs and delays mounted, the A400M program traverses a zone of turbulence again, which led to the replacement of Airbus military aviation branch`s director, Domingo Ureña-Raso by Fernando Alonso. The first A400M delivered in December to the German army, would have been found some "875 shortcomings" ... Hence the severe criticism of the manufacturer by Berlin, which also wants to replace as soon as its C-160 Transall suffering a serious problem of availability. "There is more at stake than the single image of an industrial company, it is question of the reliability of Germany in its alliances' military even said Ursula von der Leyen, the German Minister of Defense. And estimate that Airbus "seemed to have a problem with understanding the quality of a product". French Air Force was to receive 4 planes in 2015, it will have to settle for just 2. And Again, if all goes well as the delivery of the second aircraft is expected to occur at the end of the year.

----

L`une des nouveaux avions de transport militaire A400M s'est écrasé samedi, le 9 mai près de Séville, dans le sud de l'Espagne. Il s'agissait d'un vol d'essai, réalisé systématiquement avant qu'un nouvel appareil soit livré au client. Il s'effectue généralement avec un équipage réduit. C'est le premier accident de ce type d'appareil depuis sa mise en service. L'avion a informé la tour de contrôle pour lui signaler un problème, avant de foncer vers le sol. L'équipage était espagnol et l`accident a coûté la vie à quatre personnes.

Le constructeur Airbus Defence and Space, filiale du groupe aéronautique européen (EADS jusqu`à 2013) qui assemble l'A400M dans son usine de Séville, en Andalousie, a indiqué dans un communiqué que cet avion était destiné à la Turquie. Airbus n'a pas été en mesure de donner des détails sur l'accident, mais a constitué une cellule de crise.

Le premier exemplaire de ce nouvel avion européen a été livré à la France en 2013. Depuis, la Turquie et l'Allemagne en ont également pris livraison. Équipé de quatre turbopropulseurs, l'A400M peut transporter jusqu'à 37 tonnes sur 3.300 kilomètres, se poser sur des terrains non préparés comme le sable, avec à son bord des blindés ou des hélicoptères. L'appareil a connu de nombreux retards dans sa fabrication puis dans ses livraisons et a accumulé un dépassement de budget de 6,2 milliards d'euros (environ 30%).
Airbus a de grands espoirs pour cet appareil qui arrive sur le marché quand ses concurrents américains sont en bout de course, notamment le C-130 conçu il y a plus de 50 ans. Au total, 174 exemplaires ont été commandés à ce jour, dont 50 par la France, 53 par l'Allemagne, 27 par l'Espagne et 22 par le Royaume-Uni.

Suite au crash de l'A400M de samedi, l'Allemagne, le Royaume-Uni et la Turquie ont décidé d'immobiliser leurs avions. Si les autres pays attendent que soient identifiées les causes de la catastrophe, la France a quant à elle décidé de garder ses six A400M en service mais seulement "pour les vols prioritaires", a précisé le ministre de la Défense Jean-Yves Le Drian.

En mars 2015 le Royal Air Force vient de recevoir son deuxième avion de transport A400M « Atlas ». Et un des six exemplaires livrés à l’armée de l’Air va boucler, ce 6 mars, un tour du monde accompli en 15 jours, 11 escales et 3 jours, 2 heures et 20 minutes de vol cumulé (un Transall C-160 aurait besoin de trois fois plus de temps). Et cela afin d’assurer la promotion commerciale de l’appareil en Australie, de vérifier l’accessibilité des terrains de Faa’a et Tontouta en Nouvelle-Calédonie et de mesurer la fatigue et le niveau de vigilance des équipages sur de longs trajets.

Ces apparences sont trompeuses. Après avoir été sauvé en 2010 alors que les surcoûts et les retards s’accumulaient, le programme A400M traverse à nouveau une zone de turbulences, ce qui a conduit au remplacement du directeur de la branche aviation militaire chez Airbus, Domingo Ureña-Raso par Fernando Alonso. Sur le premier A400M livré en décembre à l’armée allemande, il aurait été constaté quelques « 875 manquements »… D’où les sévères critiques adressées au constructeur par Berlin, qui veut par ailleurs remplacer au plus vite ses Transall C-160 qui souffrent d’un sérieux problème de disponibilité. « Il y a plus en jeu que la seule image d’une entreprise industrielle, il est question de la fiabilité de l’Allemagne dans ses alliances » militaires, a même déclaré Mme Ursula von der Leyen, le ministre allemand de la Défense. Et d’estimer qu’Airbus « semblait avoir un problème avec sa compréhension de la qualité d’un produit ».L`armée de l’Air française devait recevoir 4 avions en 2015, elle devra s’en contenter de seulement 2. Et encore, si tout va bien étant donné que la livraison du second avion devrait avoir lieu à la fin de l’année.

Source : Sudouest.fr et Zone militaire

Language English Tag: A400M

European Commission head Jean-Claude Juncker called again for the bloc to build an army, saying a flock of hens posed more of a threat than its current military capabilities. "A bunch of chickens looks like a combat formation compared to the foreign and security policy of the European Union," Juncker told a Brussels forum in typically lively language.
"I always call for a European army as a long-term project. It is not something you can build from scratch tomorrow morning," he said. Juncker has consistently backed the idea that the EU's 28 member nations — all no strangers to a bloody, war-torn past — should accept a military arm, a need highlighted by the Ukraine crisis. "A common army among the Europeans would convey to Russia that we are serious about defending the values of the European Union," he told Germany's Welt am Sonntag in March.

A joint EU force would also rationalize defense spending and drive further EU integration. For many European Union states, however, defense is a no-go area, with Britain especially hostile to sacrificing what it sees as a core sovereign prerogative to Brussels.Britain also insists that NATO, the US-led military alliance set up to hold the Cold War line against the Soviet Union, should remain the focus of European defense efforts. Juncker told the forum that considering the current fragmented state of EU military readiness, it was perfectly "right that central and eastern European countries put their trust primarily in NATO." "The 28 armies are just not up to it," he added.

EU leaders are due to review the bloc's security policy at a June summit to take on board the threat posed by a more assertive Russia and turmoil across North Africa and the Middle East. Analysts say it is unlikely to lead to radical changes in the current very limited joint military operations undertaken by the EU, such as the Atalanta anti-piracy mission off the Horn of Africa.

Source

Tag: JunckerCFSPCSDP

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

Jorge Domecq, EDA’s Chief Executive, was invited to speak at the European Parliament Subcommittee on Security on Defence on 6 May. In the session on European defence capabilities, Mr Domecq explained his view on the Agency’s role in the future, the preparation of the June European Council and an update on EDA’s capability programmes.

Mr. Domecq explained that he saw EDA’s development along three main strands: as an enabler for Member States’ level of ambition in cooperatively developing capabilities; to support the European defence industry notably through stimulating R&T; and to act as an interface of military views in wider EU policies.

On the preparation of the June European Council on defence, the Chief Executive emphasised the need of the meeting to be more than a stockpiling exercise and the need to maintain sustained top-down impetus from the highest political level. 

He concluded his presentation with an update on the EDA’s key capability programmes on air-to-air refuelling, cyber defence, governmental satellite communications and Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems. 

Members of Parliament showed support for the work of the Agency and called upon Heads of State and Government to fully use the June European Council in order to achieve maximum results. 

 

More information:

• Jorge Domecq’s speech is available for download here.
• The audiovisual recording of the SEDE meeting is available here. 

On top of a hill in Kabul’s southeast is a unique community. It is locally known as Zanabad (“Women’s Town”) and has survived all turmoil of the last decades. A group of widows started building homes there for themselves as far back as the 1990s. Initially, the people of the neighbouring communities looked down on the women, who broke taboos by living alone and building their own village, but they have come to respect them. The story of Zanabad is a story about the challenges that Afghan widows face, but more so it is a story about women’s ability to overcome these challenges. In a country where women are usually reported on as victims, AAN’s Naheed Esar – who used to worked in Zanabad as a research assistant focusing on the ethnography of everyday lives of widows and who has visited again this year – wanted to share a different story.

When I visited the widows on the hill for the first time back in 2007, one of them welcomed me to her house. 12 women were seated on her mud floor, learning how to read and write. They were using a well-illustrated grade one textbook. My host, Bibikoh, had organised the literacy course herself. She also had found the teacher, Zarghuna, who additionally taught them basic health care, based on a book called Where There Is No Doctor. The book, provided by an NGO, Care International, was in English, but Zarghuna used the pictures and translated the text for  her students.

The house was on the top of a stony and rather steep hill in Kart-e Naw, a large settlement in Kabul’s southeast. Kart-e Naw means “new quarter,” because it was built by Afghans displaced during the 1980s wars who were looking for a new place to settle. When it rained, the steep roads became very slippery, and as the area then still lacked water and electricity, the widows had to carry buckets or pots of water from the formal settlements below, at the foot of the hill. Bibikoh’s house was small, with two rooms only – one for living and one for guests, with no separate kitchen – and the toilet was still under construction. The women sat in the guest room and talked about their weekly classes and how they were building their houses, in fact their community, with their own hands. The community became known as Zanabad – “Women’s Town” or also “Built by Women.”

None of the widows or any the authorities in the area recall when exactly Zanabad came into being or the women who established it. It seems to have happened during the political chaos in the early 1990s, after the fall of President Najibullah’s government in 1992. The war of the 1980s and the following wars produced an enormous number of widows. According to Beyond 9/11, a US-based non-profit group that provides direct financial support to Afghan widows and their children, Afghanistan had around 1.5 million widows in 2008, of which 50,000 to 70,000 live in the capital, Kabul. Official data on the current number of widows in the country does not exist, but both Care (in a phone conversation with AAN) and the UN estimate that today there are more than two million. (1) This amounts to one of the highest numbers of widows (proportionate to the total population) in the world.

The average age of Afghan widows is just 35 years, says Beyond 9/11. About 94 per cent cannot read and write. About 90 per cent have children, four on average. Widowed women are also at greater risk of developing “emotional problems and impaired psychosocial functioning than either married women or men, typically because of social exclusion, forced marriages, gender-based violence and lack of economic and educational opportunities,” says the organisation. Officials of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MoWA) add that shelter, food, earning a living and social protection are among the most pressing issues for widows. To survive, many Afghan widows weave carpets, do tailoring, beg or even engage in prostitution. But nevertheless they still lack strong governmental and community support.

However, the collapse of the Najibullah regime also created opportunities. People were able to take over government land. (2) The hill, on which Zanabad would emerge, was one such piece.

Bibikoh’s story: From ‘head eater’ to community mobiliser

Many widows still remember vividly how hard it was to build their houses with their own hands. One of them, Humaira, a young, shy widow in her late 30s, recalls this time as dawa-ye talkh, bitter medicine. The construction work was often “beyond her physical ability” and caused her “physical trouble” – but she also said that building her own house in this community had “cured” her in the long run as it gave her life-long shelter.

Bibikoh adds that, at times, they had to fight to defend their houses. She recalls how she protected another widow by throwing a stone at a policeman who was trying to beat her. The police would regularly come and try to knock down the widows’ illegal houses. She also recalls how at first other families living nearby, those with men, would not mingle with them, as these determined, independent and house-building women broke taboos. These neighbours looked down on them, even calling them prostitutes. But meanwhile they have come to respect the widows because they all – neighbours and widows alike – are socio-economically in somewhat the same position.

Bibikoh – her actual name is Bibi ul-Zuqia – is in her mid-60s and the engine of the Zanabad community. She came here in the early 2000s, after she was widowed for the second time. Against a payment – actually a bribe – of 5,000 Afghanis (about 100 dollars) to police officers who guarded a military arsenal on the hill, she was allowed to take a plot of land where she started building. Today, she claims, her house is worth 500,000 Afghanis – 10,000 dollars. Because of the arsenal, police patroled regularly on that hill. Humaira told AAN that if it hadn’t been for these night patrols, she would not have felt safe moving here with her five children and without an adult man in the house. The safety of the area was a main point of attraction for several widows AAN talked to.

Bibikoh’s first husband died when a rocket hit their house, in her province of origin, Parwan, north of Kabul. Her second husband, who had been her brother in-law and a mujahedin fighter, died on the battlefield in Parwan. However, after becoming a widow for the second time, Bibikoh’s status in the community changed dramatically. All of a sudden, she was seen as a bad omen and, despite her six children, lost the respect and support she had among the in-laws. She was called kala-khor, head eater. The abuse reached its peak when she was thrown out of the neighbourhood altogether.

The fall from grace that Bibikoh experienced has to do with the ‘traditional’ socio-economic status of women in Afghan society. Before marriage, a woman is identified as the daughter of her father, after marriage as the wife of her husband. She always belongs to the male head of the family, as a kind of commodity, and also embodying the ‘honour’ of the family. Widowed women, however, in the eyes of society and their families, become “women without identity and protection”; deg-e be-sarposh – a pot without a lid – is the derogatory term. In most cases, they are either returned to their father’s home or married to a brother-in-law – as happened to Bibikoh after her first husband’s death. But either way, they are often seen as a burden, an additional economic liability. This is even stronger in wartime when many families come under additional economic strain.

Bibikoh, though, neither went back to her father nor did she marry any relative of her husband. She chose another way. A widowed friend who already was a resident told her about Zanabad and encouraged her to join. In her new community, she organised weekly gatherings for the widows. The women continued to gather weekly over the four years I was working there, to study but also to discuss daily events. They also looked outside of their group and started spreading knowledge in the wider community. Some of the 12 I met on this first day in Zanabad would hold gatherings with other widows and enthusiastically share what they had learned.

Bibikoh also conducted surveys in her area to help NGOs such as Care to provide monthly rations to needy widows, consisting of a seven-ser (49 kilogram) bag of flour, oil and beans. The widows claim that if it weren’t for Bibikoh’s work, such NGOs would never have found the truly needy ones. (Among the widows were some women who pretended to be widows in order to benefit from the NGO rations.) According to Bibikoh, over the past 11 years, about 400 widows of the area benefited from the rations. Because of her work to educate and teach them how to be financially independent, she is now widely known as a community mobiliser. She regained the respect she had lost before, and also earned her respectful nickname: Bibikoh – the “grandmother from the mountain.”

Security and sisterhood

Zarghuna, the woman who taught the widows how to read and write, noticed that beyond the educational aspect and the discussions, the gatherings of the women also became a place to share painful stories and, by telling them, to overcome the pain. With support from the International Centre for Transitional Justice, the women also used participatory theatre –where the performers interact with the audience – for this purpose. (Interestingly, this method was also used by civil society actors after the recent Kabul lynching of Farkhunda.)

The safe environment of Zanabad, Humaira said, created a sense of sisterhood among the members of the community. She gave the example of two young women, a widow and a divorcee, who came from other parts of Kabul to live on the hill. The other widows consistently accompanied the two women in their daily activities; sometimes they even spent the nights with them to make them feel safe.

Some widows in the community described their shared pain as the main cause for the sisterhood felt in the community, but the shared work and assistance to each other also contributed. In this community, said Anisa, one of the widows who had built two houses in the area, the widows have become each other’s sar-posh, each other’s cover.

Getting legal

When our research project ended in 2011, most of these 500 widows of Zanabad had finished building their houses. Some had become literate and, as a result, were able to find jobs. Some work at other people’s houses, while others have started small businesses, mainly cooking and selling Afghan food – namely bulani, mantu, ashak and shor nakhod – in the markets. Some widows teach in a girls’ school in Zanabad. Some, including Bibikoh and Anisa, now even work as government employees at the local police station. Few of them have continued working in their old occupation, which is begging in the streets.

Improvements continued. Today, the community looks more colourful, as many of the building are now painted. In Bibikoh’s house, the floors are now covered with red Afghan rugs. But the windows are still covered with plastic sheets, ‘poor people’ style. Outside, most of the junk from the wars – wrecked tanks, artillery pieces and rocket launchers – have been cleared away. Remaining land has been occupied by newcomers, both widows and families. Humaira is hoping to buy her neighbour’s land and build a new house, where she could bring her parents. Anisa has finished painting her second house and is now renting it out for 3,000 Afghanis (60 dollars).

The road up the hill is still slippery. But since early 2014, the government has been providing electricity and water, thereby acknowledging the widows’ right to live in Zanabad. The government also has taken over the girls’ school. The widows still do not possess legal documents for the land they live on, though, and Zanabad is not yet part of Kabul’s official city map. Bibikoh said they are in the process of convincing the government to give them land certificates. Once their status is fully legalised, the success of Zanabad might even become a model to other homeless widows.

Bibikoh and the other widows of Zanabad have challenged, with their unusual decision to take matters into their own hands, the pervasive idea that widows have no independent identity, cannot survive without protection and cannot be economically productive. They have not only re-gained their social status, but they gave the community they live in a very special, feminine identity.

(Editing by Thomas Ruttig)

 

(1) UN Women (formerly UNIFEM) even speaks of two million war widows. Deutsche Welle, in a 2013 article, apparently citing an Afghan women’s organisation, put the figure of widows at 2.5 million – which then would be almost 12 per cent of the entire Afghan population. This article is also interesting because it describes how women in Jalalabad and a rural area of Wardak province live.

With the on-going conflict and casualty rates continuing to rise in the Afghan security forces and the civilian population, the number of widows continues to increase.

(2) An unwritten law says that, if you can build the four walls of your house 1.5 meters high over one night on a ‘free’ piece of land, even the government cannot evict you if the land does not belong to you. This is, apparently, how strongmen have grabbed a lot of government land.

 

Our author told the story to a Washington Post journalist who wrote about Zanabad in 2011. You can read his story here.

Length of video : 131'
You may manually download this video in WMV (1.2Gb) format

Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

Conflict and poverty have a circular relation: violence negatively affects development and vice versa – poverty is often one of the root causes of conflict. The EU has long recognised the need for conflict prevention, resolution and peace building, as well as for addressing the root causes of conflict, which include poverty, weak governance and human rights abuses. The EU increasingly works to better harmonise its security and development objectives, as well as to coordinate its external policy tools in a 'comprehensive approach'. The European Parliament (EP) has welcomed this coordination, while also asking that anti-poverty objectives not be marginalised, and that humanitarian aid not serve political ends. The EU has dedicated financial instruments for promoting peace; they include the African Peace Facility and the Instrument contributing to Security and Peace. The EP has also underscored the need for a long-term engagement with fragile states and for ensuring that women participate in resolving conflicts and building democracy.
Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

Length of video : 199'
You may manually download this video in WMV (1.8Gb) format

Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

On 9 May the European Defence Agency (EDA) will celebrate Europe Day. That day, the EU institutions open their doors to the public. Pass by and meet the EDA staff at an information stand in the building of the European External Action Service in Brussels.

Every 9 May, the European Union celebrates peace and unity on 'Europe Day'. The event marks the anniversary of the day in 1950 when Robert Schuman, one of the founders of the EU, made his 'Schuman Declaration', outlining a vision to unite separate European states into a single community.

For more information on Europe Day and the celebrations in Brussels, click here.   

EU Open Doors at the European External Action Service

Time: 10.00 - 18.00 hrs
Address: EEAS Building, 9A Rond Point Schuman, 1000 Brussels

 

More information is available here.