European Union

Even this is not going to cut it…

Earlier this morning – a bit before 8am, in fact – a family friend turned up at our house, ‘for breakfast’. This turned out to be a misunderstanding of what we had thought was a jocular exchange of texts last night and certainly was not one the house was prepared for. Of course, being archtypes (of a type), we just put the kettle on and had a laugh about it.

I mention this as a very mundane example of a perception gap, the mis-signalling of intentions and actions. In much of our lives, we can just have a cuppa and move on, but this week is demonstrating how sometimes that process can run away from people. Today’s European Council is a case in point.

It’s as depressing an agenda as you’ve ever seen, from Greece to Calais, with a detour to the UK over dinner. It looks very hard for anyone to pull much positive news out of that little pile.

But rather than dwell on that aspect, it’s perhaps more productive to consider the perception gap between the UK and the EU.

For those critical of the EU, we might break down their views of the different problems into the following categories:

“The EU is ineffectual”

The Calais strikes and attendant migrant crisis have been treated with much restraint by the Government, who recognise that annoying the French authorities isn’t any kind of productive option right now. But sceptics have been much more free-flowing in their attacks.

To take just one example, the UKIP MEP Nathan Gill tweeted: “Absolute chaos at Eurostar as all trains cancelled due to migrants storming the tunnels. #NoThanks to EU open borders” Quite what he thinks the EU should have done to stop or remove the strikers or the migrants isn’t clear, but the failure to have (relatively) free movement is clearly a stick with which to beat those in favour of integration.

Likewise, criticism of the French government for allowing migrants to traverse France to get to Calais in the first place highlights a lack of understanding about Schengen, not to mention a questionnable attitude to the use of profiling in police checks. Would they be any happier if the gendarmerie stopped anyone who looked like an ‘illegal migrant’? A difficult stance, especially for UKIP with its professed non-racist or xenophobic position.

“The EU is other people’s problems”

As today and tomorrow will expose all too clearly, one country’s problem is actually every countries’ problem in the EU. This has always been true, but until the Union institutionalised the interdependencies that wasn’t always so evident. Thus what happens with Greece has material impacts on all other member states, regardless of whether they are eurozone members or not.

Which makes the heterogeneity of Cameron’s talking point all the more obvious. In a system of give and take, he has to sit through long discussions about Greece - without being a eurozone member – and the migrant crisis – without being a Schengen member, and having made clear the UK won’t take any quota of migrants – before asking everyone to do him a favour. Small wonder that attitudes have been cool and distracted: other member states’ governments appear more comfortable with accepting that they are part of a system that requires some leaning-in and helping out, not just injunctions to ‘sort it out’.

“The EU has no future”

The concatenation of problems now facing the EU makes this argument seem ever more compelling. One does not have to look far to see the signs of discord and tension, from Hungary questioning its Dublin Convention commitments, to Marine Le Pen talking of leaving the Union, to Renzi’s secretive ‘Plan B‘ to handle the influx of Mediterranean migrants. Everyone looks hacked off, everyone seems on edge.

In the British context, that has some impact on the referendum debate, as the ‘No’ side continue to paint a picture of a deadweight EU, dragging down the UK. Business for Britain’s ‘Change or Go‘ report – being slowly released this week – is very much in this vein of thinking.

That might all be true, but the great unknown is whether any of the alternatives facing Europe are any better. If the EU breaks up, then what happens to the liberalisation of markers that has run far ahead of the rest of the world? What happens to an Eastern Europe confronted by a Russia that is already highly adept at exploiting division? What happens to all the other institutions of cooperation, like NATO? If we can’t prosper together, why should we apart?

This is the point where someone accuses me of doom-mongering, and I guess there is an aspect of that, but it would surely be remiss not to at least consider such questions, at least to come to answers that provide some reassurance.

The EU isn’t perfect, but perfection is impossible. Perhaps if we worked to make what we have better, rather than scrap it all, we might make some progress.

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IMF's Christine Lagarde, right, and EU economics chief Pierre Moscovici in Brussels Wednesday

As expected, the standoff between Athens and its creditors that exploded into the open on Wednesday has focused on pension reforms – a point made clear in a document obtained by the FT’s correspondent in Athens, Kerin Hope.

According to the five-page list of “prior actions” – which are always the real nitty-gritty in any bailout agreement, since it lists the specifics that the sitting government must implement and the calendar for implementation – creditors have asked for wholesale changes to the pension proposals made earlier this week by Alexis Tsipras, the Greek prime minister.

We’ve posted the document here.

In order to achieve savings of 1 per cent of gross domestic product – or about €1.8bn – starting next year, creditors are demanding a significant rewriting of Tsipras’ pension reform plan.

First, rather than gradually raising the effective retirement age to 67 by 2025 as Athens has proposed, creditors want that moved up to 2022 (Athens had originally shot for 2036 in one of its earlier proposals). The creditor plan would allow for retirement at 62, but only for those who have paid into the system for 40 years. Those measures would become law immediately, under the counterproposal.

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The EU is struggling to regain its lost popularity. There’s a sense of foreboding in Brussels that the radical and generally eurosceptic parties like Spain’s Podemos, Germany’s AfD, the Front National in France and even Britain’s UKIP and Greece’s Syriza are not the fleeting flash-in-the-pan phenomena they were first thought to be. Unless the EU can raise its game on communications and outreach, these ‘fringe radicals’ may soon be Europe’s game changers.

Anyone familiar with Brussels would probably agree that the institutions of the European Union generally prefer the detail of dossiers to the ‘big picture’. That’s understandable, given the sheer complexity of the technocratic issues that are the daily business of the EU. But it is also regrettable, and increasingly a problem.

Public opinion across Europe is rarely concerned with the minutiae of economic policies or even social measures. What the voters register are the things ‘Europe’ is or isn’t doing to confront the major challenges that feature so prominently in TV news bulletins.

There are times when such threats are indeed headed-off and defused by the EU; bird flu or the menace of jihadist terrorism are readily understandable examples of how Europe’s cross-border cooperation is invaluable. Most people also see the single market for goods and services as hugely beneficial.

Whether they see the underpinnings of the European economy as necessary trade-offs for what the EU’s critics call Brussels’ “high-handed interference” is less certain. The years of austerity have taken a heavy toll of people’s unquestioning support for the European project.

But the EU still has opportunities to demonstrate its value, not just within Europe but to the wider world. It should tackle the problem of refugees displaced by conflict in the Middle East and by poverty in Africa. Their plight has so far highlighted Europe’s impotence in the face of the huge humanitarian crisis on its doorstep, and the selfishness of the many European governments refusing to offer help. But it’s a chance for the EU to show its worth.

The drama of boatloads of people risking their lives to cross the Mediterranean, along with TV reports of teeming but flimsy refugee camps, is striking a chord with Europeans that’s more than a passing moment of sympathy. They feel their governments should be doing more, even though they themselves may want to resist immigration and a more multi-cultural Europe.

Jean-Claude Juncker and his fellow EU commissioners have been trying to rally member states to act, with little real results. The EU, they say, doesn’t itself have the instruments and funds to make a difference. But it does have a voice.

The refugee problem is just a symptom of the EU’s failure to grasp the dangers that follow the Arab Spring. Brussels should launch a truly ambitious long-term strategy for addressing the economic and security weaknesses of the countries that these refugees are fleeing from. It couldn’t resolve this crisis overnight, but it could show that Europe is about people, and not just red tape.

 

IMAGE CREDIT: CC / FLICKR – European parliament

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Written by Suzana Elena Anghel Gavrilescu and Ralf Drachenberg

The June European Council has a comprehensive list of topics to discuss, including the situation in the Mediterranean, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), fighting terrorism, economic governance aspects, and the digital agenda. In addition, a presentation by the British Prime Minister on the future role of the United Kingdom is on the agenda.

Migration is the main topic of this June European Council. Heads of State or Government will discuss the recently published European Agenda for Migration and take stock of the progress made since the extraordinary European Council meeting on migration in April 2015. The European Council will discuss the European Commission’s proposal for a temporary relocation mechanism, which envisages relocating 40 000 persons from Italy and Greece to other Member States.

The European Council should also agree on a new CSDP roadmap and set the objectives for capabilities development, fostering the defence industry and the defence market, and strengthening relations with international organisations (i.e. the UN, NATO, the African Union). The Heads of State or Government will decide on a timeline for the completion of the strategic review process, most probably by June 2016. Within the broader context of discussing security aspects, the European Council will also examine the implementation of the informal February 2015 European Council‘s decisions on the fight against terrorism. 

During discussions on the 2015 European Semester the European Council endorse the Country Specific Recommendations that Member States should implement to ensure sound public finances and to make their economies more competitive. Whilst on the topic of better economic governance in the euro area, the ‘Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union’ report is expected to be presented to the Heads of State or Government.

The European Commission’s recent Digital Single Market strategy for Europe will be tabled for examination, and the European Council will most likely call for a rapid adoption of pending legislation in this field, such as the European Single Market for Electronic Communications, the Directive on Network and Information Security and the proposal for a Regulation on Data Protection.

This European Council meeting will also hear United Kingdom Prime Minister, David Cameron outline his vision for renegotiating his country’s relationship with the EU.

Read the complete ‘Outlook for the European Council of 25 – 26 June 2015‘ in PDF.
Filed under: BLOG, Policy Cycle Tagged: briefings, counter-terrorism strategy, CSDP, digital agenda, economic governance, EPRS briefings, European Council, Pre-European Council Briefing, Ralf Drachenberg, Suzana Elena Anghel Gavrilescu

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations is embarked on a bold integration initiative that will increasingly align the member states, including through the ASEAN[1] Community to be declared in late 2015 when the region’s leaders meet in Malaysia. The enduring vision and ambition of ASEAN leaders has been the creation of a dynamic, people-centered, inclusive, integrated and globally important collective.

This ambition matters. If ASEAN were a single country, it would be the world’s 7th largest (World Bank 2013 statistics). Or, better still, 4th in World Bank purchasing power parity (PPP) terms. That puts ASEAN just behind the United Kingdom in raw GDP or just behind the combined weight of Germany and the United Kingdom in PPP terms. From 2006-11 ASEAN average growth was 5.14 %, while the EU achieved 1.03 %. Not bad for a region that barely registered in global economic terms before the 1980s.

ASEAN has the world’s 3rd largest population, with over 630 million people. It ranks behind China and India, but ahead of the EU (507 million in 2014) and the United States.   By 2020 around half of the region’s population will be under 30, creating market growth and employment opportunities.   By comparison, in 2014 about one third of the EU’s population was under 30, down from over 40 per cent in 1994 (Eurostat). In 2010 only 5.6 per cent of ASEAN’s people were aged over 65 (EU 18.5 per cent: 2014).   In addition to the population dividend that ASEAN will continue to enjoy, increasing urbanization and rapid uptake of new technology add to the attractiveness of the region as a market and partner.

ASEAN’s drive to integrate has been long in the making.   It was born out of the original wish of the six founding members of ASEAN to work together to ensure the security of their region and to increase the prosperity of their people. Emerging from colonialism and post-war conflicts involving great powers, conscious also that their development levels were low, poverty was endemic, and they had no natural ally, the original members of ASEAN agreed in 1967 to work together for mutual benefit.   Since then the membership has grown, the language and vision have evolved, but the impulse remains the same. ASEAN realizes that their best interests are served by working together to ensure their prosperity and security.

Their current objective is the establishment of an ASEAN Community at the end of year Leaders’ Summit in Malaysia. This comprises three pillars: economic, political-security, socio-cultural.

The economic pillar aims to create a single market and production base, a highly competitive regional economy, equitable economic development to narrow development and wealth gaps, and full integration into the global economy. Many building blocks are in place and others aligned with the blueprint are underway, such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership free trade negotiations involving ASEAN and its free trade partners (Australia, China, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea and New Zealand).

The political security pillar focuses on a rules-based community with shared values and norms. Some elements relate to political and institutional development within ASEAN. Good governance, human rights and anti-corruption endeavours are among the elements. Others focus on regional interests, like the South China Sea and the implementation of ASEAN’s nuclear free zone. ASEAN already sits at the centre of regional architecture, including through its leadership in the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Regional Forum, and it wishes to cement this positioning.   There’s also work underway to develop common ASEAN positions on foreign policy issues, but this looks likely to be a long haul endeavour.

The socio-cultural pillar seeks to forge a common identity in a people-centred and socially responsible framework.   The broad-ranging elements include cooperation in areas like education, health, sport, culture, disaster risk management, humanitarian activities, sustainability and science and technology.   Narrowing the development gaps within and between countries features in this pillar, as in the economic one.

ASEAN officials have been working hard to advance the many elements of the overall Community project.   It has long been clear that the 2015 outcome will not be a complete, shining edifice that will transform links among the ASEAN countries and further strengthen their ability to meet the world.   It’s not an EU-style union. Nor at the economic level is it the kind of open partnership in goods, services, investment and labour that New Zealand and Australia have achieved.   Such comparisons ultimately miss the point.

ASEAN is forging its own unique set of arrangements that will bind its members ever more closely, while recognizing the massive differences among them not only in economic and development terms, but also in matters of language, culture and confidence. They looked at other models, but are shaping their own course at a pace and in a direction that works for them.   The progress they achieve with small, often over-worked bureaucracies is remarkable.   The 2015 outcome will reflect the start of the next phase of their journey – they will improve, tweak and nuance it over time. In short, the ASEAN Community represents a milestone, rather than a destination, in the long journey of regional integration.

Indeed, ASEAN has already begun talking about their next vision looking beyond 2020. That determination to keep moving, to keep improving, is a powerful driver for a region that does not want to be left behind and which aspires to have an ever more significant global presence.

To be sure there are challenges and problems that ASEAN must confront.

The Asia-Pacific region remains one of critical strategic significance. It has benefitted from the leading role the United States has played in supporting peace and prosperity. China’s rapid recent development has also presented fresh opportunities for ASEAN. Yet the current South China Sea debate highlights evolution in the regional dynamic. ASEAN recognizes that it needs to remain nimble, cohesive and neutral in the wider context if it is to remain at the heart of regional processes. As Indonesia’s former foreign minister Marty Natalegawa used to say, ASEAN has to earn its place in the driver’s seat of regionalism.

Within ASEAN there are challenges also. In integration terms, for example, labour mobility is currently a long term dream for most. Then there are various bilateral issues that create awkwardness among certain member states from time to time. And despite the commitment of their leaders to ASEAN, they are still working on getting the region’s people to fully embrace the notion that ASEAN should now be part of their DNA (Europe faces a similar challenge). And so on.

At its core, gradual evolutionary improvement in every facet of life and activity within the ASEAN community will make those countries stronger, with higher levels of development, improved regulation, stronger economies and fewer challenges. That will heighten their attractiveness as partners. Along the way, there will also be greater opportunities to work with ASEAN to help the grouping achieve its vision in each of the three pillar areas.   Each external dialogue partner, including the EU, is already deeply engaged in helping ASEAN in areas where there are skills and capabilities to share.   This creates an excellent base for further development of existing relationships and partnerships and the development of new ones. The EU has in fact just decided to take its relationship with ASEAN to a “strategic level”.

ASEAN is rising, quickly. The integration initiative takes account of regional realities, needs and aspirations and is unique – it does not parallel other integration efforts in other regions. It has set the grouping on a course that will have far-reaching consequences.   The opportunities for partnership and deeper engagement will increase over time as ASEAN progresses its integration project.     May ASEAN continue to have bold dreams.

[1] ASEAN members include Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand). Vietnam joined in 1995, Laos and Burma in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999.

 

IMAGE CREDIT: CC / FLICKR – Prachatai

The post With integration comes opportunity: the ASEAN story appeared first on Europe’s World.

A mother holds her child outside a migration centre in Rome last week

Brussels may be obsessed with the prospect of Grexit, and much of the focus of the two-day EU summit that starts on Thursday may be Brexit. But the issue worrying many EU diplomats going into the summit is something else entirely: migration.

For the first time, a draft conclusions sent around to national capitals on Monday (we have posted a copy here) includes language on how leaders will deal with the massive influx of refugees from North Africa. If you’ll recall, an emergency summit held in April explicitly left out any targets for numbers of refugees washing up on Italian and Greek shores that would be “relocated” in other EU countries.

Then the European Commission decided it would propose 40,000 of those refugees would be relocated and even came up with European schemes for relocation and resettlement (pdf) that divvied up how many each country would accept. National capitals were not too pleased with that.

The European Commission seems relatively happy with the new draft communiqué. The figures — 40,000 people, over two years — are still there. Likewise, the call for “rapid adoption” — perhaps at a meeting next month — of their migration proposals is stronger than some within the Berlaymont had feared.

But the conclusions do not mention the word “mandatory”, which has raised red flags since many fear that without resettlement quotas, countries will be hard pressed to avoid political pressure to keep refugees out. But it should be noted that the original proposals didn’t mention the word “mandatory”, either.

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Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

There is now a long list of conflicts and security threats that affect Europe directly or indirectly. As well as Ukraine, the list includes Syria, Iraq, Libya, Egypt, the Central African Republic, South Sudan, Somalia, Nigeria, Mali, Yemen, Afghanistan and Pakistan. This list isn’t exhaustive, but it highlights the worsening international security situation, and for EU countries it means an increased terrorism risk, waves of people trying to escape the horrors of war and a need for more humanitarian aid than ever.

Europe’s number one security concern, of course, is Russian aggression in Ukraine. The Russia-Ukraine conflict, and the reaction of democratic societies to it, has gone through several phases. With the benefit of hindsight, one might well say the EU lacked effectiveness in the pre-conflict period. Before the Vilnius summit in November 2013, there had been no EU consensus on whether to conclude an Association Agreement with Ukraine. EU governments either didn’t want to commit themselves to a European perspective for Ukraine, or were using the imprisonment of Yulia Tymoshenko as an excuse. The real reason for the delay was an unwillingness to take the step forward with Ukraine that the association agreement would have meant. And by the time they finally reached agreement it was too late. Russian pressure on Ukraine had become so great that the then president Viktor Yanukovytch didn’t dare to sign the agreement with the EU. The moment had passed, and the world knows what happened once the Maidan protests began.

“We in Estonia, and in other Baltic states, must clearly understand that in this tense situation we must be able to make choices that are free of external pressures”

Yanukovytch was ousted and Russia began its military aggression in Ukraine to prevent the country from moving westwards and away from Russia´s sphere of influence. Russia basically repeated the events of 2008 when it attacked Georgia and fostered ‘breakaway’ governments in the frozen conflict regions of South-Ossetia and Abkhazia with the aim of dashing Georgia’s hopes of NATO membership.

The illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia in March 2014 prompted Europe along with democratic countries elsewhere to adopt a fundamentally more active stance towards the Ukraine crisis. At first, European sanctions were imposed. But the essence of the conflict had yet really to make an impact on public opinion in western Europe. The Ukraine conflict tended to be seen as merely another example of slavic bickering that had little or nothing to do with western Europe. It took a horrible tragedy to change that; for this war reached western consciousness last July, when Malaysian Airline’s Flight MH17 was shot down with the loss of all its passengers and crew. The shift in European public opinion was such that suddenly Estonia and other like-minded countries were no longer seen as “Russophobic”.

NATO took steps to strengthen security on its eastern wing, and the NATO-Russia Council was suspended. Additional planes had already been sent by the U.S. in March to strengthen the protection of Baltic airspace, and in April NATO decided to step up security, with Estonia’s Ämari airport to become the base for Baltic air policing. By the beginning of May, Ämari had become host to Danish fighter jets, which were replaced at the end of August by German planes. With U.S. army units now permanently based in Estonia, the clear message is that NATO is a well-functioning security organisation.

When President Barack Obama visited Tallinn in early last September, he made it plain that protecting Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius is as important as protecting Berlin, Paris and London. Shortly afterwards, the NATO summit in Wales was being hailed as a success in Estonia because it defined the alliance’s reinforced presence in our region as the ‘new normal’.

The unconcealed presence of Russian troops in Eastern Ukraine by the end of August last year finally made the EU act more forcefully. This mostly took the form of strengthened sanctions against Russia, and it will take time for these to have an effect. Unfortunately, there are not many alternatives to sanctions when political and diplomatic efforts have brought no success.

“There can be no political solution in Ukraine if that were to mean permanent new areas of frozen conflict”

We must keep on trying to find a political solution to the crisis, but that will be difficult as long as Russia continues preventing Ukraine or any other former Soviet Union country from moving closer to either the EU or NATO, and tries to either keep them or bring them back into its own sphere of influence. The EU’s sanctions should therefore not be lifted until the reasons for those sanctions have disappeared, which does not seem likely to happen any time soon. On the contrary, fighting continues in eastern Ukraine, there have been reports of human rights violations in Crimea and in both hundreds of thousands of people have fled from their homes.

These developments make it all the more embarrassing to hear some EU leaders call for the lifting of sanctions and a return to business as usual. The EU cannot afford to be split, while the trend towards closer co-operation between Moscow and both far left and far right populist parties in Europe is alarming, especially when financial support is involved. And there are already many members of the European Parliament whose views are clearly influenced by Russia.

There can be no political solution in Ukraine if that were to mean permanent new areas of frozen conflict. Both Crimea and Donbas are already in that situation because of Russia’s activities. Of six EU partnership countries, five have either one frozen conflict and sometimes even two; South-Ossetia and Abkhazia, in Georgia, Moldova has Transnistria, Armenia and Azerbaijan have Nagorno-Karabakh and now Ukraine has Crimea and Donbas. Russia’s purpose in creating these frozen conflict areas is to influence the choices open to these countries.

The communiqué issued after NATO’s Newport summit in Wales noted that Russia´s aggressive actions against Ukraine fundamentally challenge the vision of a Europe whole, free and at peace. This kind of message would have been unthinkable a year before. Russia had previously been treated as a partner, but its use of military force against a neighbour and the forceful changing of a country’s borders as a means for dealing with disagreements has created a new situation. The security policy positions of Estonia and likeminded countries have thus become the mainstream of European security thinking.

In light of all this, one might ask whether the crisis has led to the collapse of Europe’s security architecture. For 20 years Europe has built a system relying on security collaboration with its underlying principles of refraining from either threatening or using force, of respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity, the inviolability of borders, and the right of states to choose freely their allies. These principles are contained in the UN Charter and in such underlying documents of European security as the CSCE’s Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris, and also in the Founding Act on NATO-Russia relations.

“The EU’s sanctions should not be lifted until the reasons for those sanctions have disappeared, which does not seem likely to happen any time soon”

Russia violated these principles when its troops set foot in Ukraine. But that violation does not necessarily mean the end of Europe’s security architecture. A violation of agreed principles doesn’t make them automatically null and void, for this crisis has both unified and strengthened Europe. But even if the basic principles of that architecture still apply, the security environment has clearly changed. Borders have been changed by force and the predictability of international relations has been seriously reduced.

We in Estonia, and in other Baltic states, must clearly understand that in this tense situation we must be able to make choices that are free of external pressures. Our EU and NATO membership has given us the sense of security we never had before. Yet countries in our neighbourhood have had to experience such Russian actions as constant airspace violations in Finland and Sweden, the dangerous manoeuvres of Russian warplanes in the European airspace, the re-opening of charges against Lithuanian nationals who refused to join the Soviet army or the abduction from Estonian territory of police officer Eston Kohver and his unlawful detainment in Russia.

So what future actions are open to Europe? We have been accustomed to seeing the EU in the positive light of a soft power. In many parts of Europe, theis perspective has led old enemies to accept and respect each other. Europe faced almost no external opposition to its enlargement processes, let alone to its association agreements. But now that Europe’s soft power has clashed in Ukraine with Russian hard power, a whole new situation has been created that we must adjust to.

Europe values the sanctity of human life, the liberty of individual, including freedom of expression and conscience, the comprehensive protection of human rights, democracy and compliance with agreements. But to the east of our neighbourhood there are powers that question these values. Freedom of expression, including internet freedom, is being suppressed by various means and free media replaced by propaganda. The interests of state administration are more important than private property rights, so we are entering a new phase of ideological confrontation. On the one side there are the democratic values on which our prosperity is built, and on the other a “civil religion” that gives priority to the interests of the authorities. We in the EU and NATO know which is the right side to be on.

 

IMAGE CREDIT: CC / FLICKR – George Layne

The post The Ukraine crisis is a threat to Europe’s security architecture appeared first on Europe’s World.

Tomorrow, on 24 June 2015, the European Parliament is expected to approve the legal details of Jean-Claude Juncker’s investment plan and the related European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI). This plan has been sold as a major innovation, but our research has shown that it is actually the continuation of existing EU policies, just at a larger scale. Does it still mean we are on the way towards political budget cycles in the EU?

Next week, we – Klaus H. Goetz (with whom I work here in Munich) and myself – are going to present a paper* titled “From Politicised Budgeting to Political Budgets in the EU” at the Milan International Conference on Public Policy.

At the centre of our attention is the Juncker investment plan and whether it is a sign that we are going to see more pronounced political budget cycles in the European Union in coming years. With the promise of achieving up to € 315 billion in new investments, more than double the amount of the EU’s annual budget, Juncker’s initiative definitely looked like something was in the air into that direction when we started working on our paper.

What we find (see Section V. of the paper) is that there are quite a number of ways to interpret what the Juncker plan means for the future – from a just a gradual move in the direction of multiple paths that have started years ago to a quite a radical post-electoral politicisation of EU budgeting.

More interestingly, we found that the leveraging model that was presented as Juncker’s ‘baby’ and innovation has not just been around for ten years but that it was actually already on the political agenda of Barroso five years ago, just a little less ambitious.

To see the striking similarity between Barroso’s and Juncker’s plan, see first this quote from the Juncker’s political agenda in 2014:

I do believe that we can make much better use of the common EU budget and of Union financial instruments such as the European Investment Bank (EIB). We must make use of these public funds available at Union level to stimulate private investment in the real economy.

Now, see the the second quote from Barroso’s political agenda in 2009:

We should work more closely and imaginatively with the European Investment Bank and the private sector. Within the existing instruments, we must further improve the blending between grants from the EU budget and EIB loans, in order to increase the overall leverage effect.

If you read our paper (in particular Section IV) you will understand more in detail how the Juncker plan has evolved over time from an unknown EU policy, and how it was  made something ‘big’ and ‘new’ by increasing scope but also by using quite some political communications to make it look novel and big. How to interpret this in the wider development of EU budgeting is part of a debate worth having.

I’d be happy to hear your thoughts on our paper and our findings. If you happen to be at ICPP in Milan next week, don’t hesitate to contact me in advance for a chat!

Update: See also yesterday’s background paper by the European Parliament Research Service on the EFSI.

*The paper is part of a research project on budgeting in international organisations as part of a larger Research Unit on International Public Administrations, financed by the DFG.

 

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