European Union

On November 3 1988, computer users were surprised by one of the first large-scale malware attacks. The so-called Morris Worm paralysed an estimated 10% of all computers connected to the internet. The incident also motivated the creation of CERTs – Computer Emergency Response Teams dedicated to cyber-security.

Since then, the internet has gone through dramatic changes. In 1988, it connected just 60,000 computers. Today there are 3.2bn users, 40% of the world’s population. By 2020, the number of connected devices is expected to reach 50bn – from refrigerators to “smart” jewellery. Computers control services and devices that make our daily life work. Attacks on them could damage the core functions of society, threatening the health and well-being of citizens and the security of any state.

In 2015 cyber-attacks have become a 24/7 reality. Yet policy makers seem to have only a fragmented understanding of their nature. Most cyber-security discussions centre on improving defensive instruments and systems, forgetting that the most effective defence is actually interrupting attacks and striking at the attackers’ motivation.

“Most cyber-security discussions centre on improving defensive instruments and systems, forgetting that the most effective defence is striking at the attackers’ motivation”

The cyber-security market today seems to focus on the business of building fences and locks without really knowing who they are defending against. It is common in high-level cyber-security discussions to hear statements comparing computer users with gun owners, placing blame on average users whose computers are hijacked for use in cyber-attacks without their knowledge. This kind of approach seems to forget some basics: that a computer in itself is not a high-risk threat source; that average users are probably unable to defend themselves against advanced attackers; and that responsibility for attacks should first and foremost be placed with the attacker who has created a malicious use for technology.

In order to find cyber-security solutions, it is therefore important to focus on the real threat – the attacker. There are as many ways of stopping attackers as there are motives behind the attacks. From the international law perspective, substantial work has already been done, such as within the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare, to clarify perspectives for the use of force against cyber-attackers.

However substantial gaps remain in both legal policy and instruments for international co-operation in situations that fall below those where the use of force could be evoked. Most of the attacks that cyber-security professionals are faced with on a daily basis fall into this category, outside the context of military conflict. Even these can however endanger critical infrastructure and may pose a direct threat to human life.

Has a private person the right to defend himself or herself in a cyber-attack in a same way as with physical attacks? Timid discussions about the possibilities for active defence measures have so far been held mainly within the viewpoint of military conflict.

Yet in everyday life, people responsible for handling cyber-incidents are faced with a grim choice: when all passive measures have been exhausted, can the defender stop the attacker’s access to platforms being used for the ongoing attack? What if this platform is physically located in another country and requests for help directed at authorities there go unanswered? It seems quite clear such action to protect life, property and the state should be possible and legal if all other means to stop the attack are ineffective.

However, although work on the second volume of the Tallinn Manuel should provide a more transparent and sophisticated approach to self-defence in cyber-space from a nation state’s military perspective by 2016, there is a lack of similar discussions on the right of self-defence for citizens or companies.

“In many countries cyber-security agencies operate under different institutional frameworks, with varying working methods and mandates that hinder effective cross-boarder collaboration”

International co-operation in the cyber-security domain is not easy. In many countries cyber-security agencies operate under different institutional frameworks, with varying working methods and mandates that hinder effective cross-boarder collaboration. One solution could be to standardise risk-management and notification procedures so authorities can better understand the frameworks and practices used by others.

This is where the Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive currently under discussion in the European Union could come into play. The directive should improve member states’ national cyber-security capabilities. It should boost co-operation between member states, and between public and private sectors. It will require key internet services as well as companies in critical sectors – such as energy, transport, banking and health – to adopt risk management practices and report major incidents to the national authorities.

Discussions on the directive showed, that although state practices in cyber-security vary, there is a shared level of concern and an acknowledgement of the need to improve co-operation across the EU.

Cyber-security co-operation among state authorities, and between the private and public spheres, should be quick and efficient taking into account the often rapid escalation of cyber-attacks. Artificial bureaucratic barriers must be overcome.

Cyber-security is vital to the security of European citizens and the defence of state security. It can only be achieved through practical co-operation that keeps its focus on the attackers themselves. EU policy seems to be moving in the right direction, but states must work together more.

The post Strengthening cyber-security in the EU appeared first on Europe’s World.

The human tide of refugees and migrants finding their way north via the Western Balkans, primarily to Germany, showed how ill-equipped and underfunded to cope with them the Balkans countries are. It also underlined the fact that the refugee crisis may well deepen in months and years to come. In any case, it has come almost exactly a year after European Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker’s declaration that the time has come for the EU to “take a break from enlargement”, so that new members will join over the next four and a half years.

Juncker was just stating the obvious; none of the aspiring members will be able to tick all the boxes on their pre-accession “to-do” lists during the mandate of this Commission. True, accession country leaders would have preferred Juncker to state the obvious more gently, as that would have made their lives back home easier, not least by quietening their local eurosceptics. Juncker has, however, a duty to keep his finger on the pulse of opinion in EU member states, and for some time now that opinion has definitely not been in an enlargement mode.

“I myself do not believe there is a standstill, even if I do acknowledge the general lack of enthusiasm for further enlargement”

The refugee/migrant crisis, the eurozone crisis, Greece, Ukraine, foreign fighters in the Middle East and the UK threat of a Brexit all weigh on the minds of EU citizens. There is simply no interest in enlarging a European Union that already has enough problems of its own. But although Juncker needs to bear this kind of public sentiment in mind, he should do so only up to a point. He could also try to shape public opinion and lead it in the direction that is best for the EU. And embracing the Western Balkans is good not just for the region but for the EU as a whole.

It isn’t just a question of rounding off the geography of Europe and avoiding a black hole in its south-eastern corner. Nor it is a question of honouring promises made by EU leaders at the 2003 Thessaloniki summit and repeated several times since. It certainly isn’t a question of making the EU stronger by boosting its numbers – the six Western Balkan candidates would represent little more than a glitch in the EU’s demographic and economic statistics. It is all of these things and more, and it is a move that makes perfect sense.

The EU is above all a system of values – even though the EU itself sometimes seems to forget that. Insisting on a thorough and comprehensive adherence to the accession criteria of democracy, human rights and market economy by the Balkan candidates would be a timely reminder for all EU members of the values enshrined in the Union.

At its inception, the EU was primarily a peace and reconciliation project, and as such has become the most successful in history. Yet 16 years after the end of wars in the Western Balkans, it is disappointing we in the region have still to find common ground for a genuine and successful reconciliation. Most of the initiatives we have seen have come from outside the region, primarily from the EU.

Continuation of the accession process is vital to maintaining the momentum of reconciliation efforts, and Brussels is clearly aware of that and will continue to encourage, cajole and push forward reconciliation. We in the Regional Cooperation Council take a proactive approach based on our mission statement, which tells us to focus “on promotion and enhancement of regional co-operation in South East Europe” and on supporting the European and Euro-Atlantic integration of aspiring countries.

Like many others who are now part of the EU, we in the Balkans come from societies that have little in the way of democratic tradition. We went from feudal monarchies to autocratic dictatorships, fascism and communism. Then came a long and painful transition from socialist societies and centralised economies into the world of democracy and market forces. Democracy, we all know, is more than just rules, principles and multiparty elections; it is primarily a state of mind that takes time and careful nurturing to establish its roots and to flourish. The purpose of the RCC is to help that process. In 1999, after the final battles in the break-up of Yugoslavia, the Stability Pact for South East Europe was established by the international community to assist the region in overcoming the wounds of war and speed up Euro-Atlantic integration. Less than a decade later, it was felt that the Balkans had become stable enough to take ownership of the process, so the RCC came into being.

“Continuation of the accession process is vital to maintaining the momentum of reconciliation efforts, and Brussels is clearly aware of that”

Seven years on, huge progress has been made in bi-lateral and multi-lateral relations, on reconciliation, administrative reform and freedom of the media. One Balkan country – Croatia – has “left” the region and put an EU star on its shoulders. Everybody involved in that accomplishment deserves kudos. Most of the other Balkan countries now have candidate status, but it has to be admitted that the road to EU membership is still long and full of potholes. For each and every success, there is a problem left unsolved. That is the RCC’s focus – to help in overcoming the problems and to try to fill the potholes and ensure a smoother and faster ride to membership.

A lot of our work is political, as the RCC is the focal point of efforts not only to benefit individual members but also to create a climate for regional co-operation. The RCC engages with the wider region and with overseas friends who want to help us overcome the burdens of the past and to take our place in the EU.

An indication of the path towards that membership is the Berlin Process initiated in 2014 by Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel. This explicitly endorses regional co-operation as the main engine of EU accession for the Western Balkans, and identifies the RCC as the main platform for it. In the economic field, the RCC’s chief tool is the SEE2020 strategy, which details ways and means for spreading economic growth. Connectivity is one of the crucial elements for this and this sector got a boost last August at the Western Balkans Vienna Summit which cemented agreements and EU investments via infrastructure projects to the tune of 600 million Euro.

To return to Jean-Claude Juncker and the so-called “enlargement standstill”, I myself do not believe there is a standstill, even if I do acknowledge the general lack of enthusiasm for further enlargement. I genuinely do not think we are talking about enlargement fatigue, or that the EU citizens have suddenly been bitten by a strange bug called “Scepticus Balkanicus”. It is simply that we are living in an era when the EU is going through yet another re-examination of its role and purpose in a world burdened with problems. In such a climate, the region needs to work extra hard to smooth its road to accession.

Beyond the political and reconciliation potholes, there are economy, unemployment and poverty problems. The region has been suffering from the global economic downturn, made worse by our own domestic troubles – endemic corruption, organised crime, shoddy privatisations, and political and familial nepotism. The list goes on, and much of the job remains undone. Unless we sort out these problems we cannot hope for a change in the climate of opinion when it comes to our EU accession prospects. To be accepted, we have to be recognised – if not yet as equals, then at least as peoples and nations who share the same values, aim for the same goals and accept the same principles. The RCC is committed to smoothing out these potholes, so that when the next European Commission and Parliament take office, Balkan candidate countries will be ready to move towards membership.

The post There’s no enlargement standstill – just a springboard appeared first on Europe’s World.

On Black Friday, the biggest shopping day of the year, Catherine Armitage takes a look at e-commerce in the EU and asks, is online shopping the key to the Digital Single Market?

Today is Black Friday – the biggest day in the e-commerce calendar. It started out as an American phenomenon, marking the busiest shopping day of the year (falling on the day after Thanksgiving) and signalling the start of the Christmas shopping period. However, over recent years Black Friday has spread across the Atlantic and retailers across Europe are now embracing Black Friday too. It’s not only Black Friday – there’s also ‘Cyber Monday’ which takes place next Monday.Wikipedia tells us this was actually invented as a ‘marketing term’ to encourage people to shop online. Online shoppers in France are currently seeing advertisements for ‘Cyber Week’ on e-commerce sites, and Amazon in the UK is announcing a full week of ‘Black Friday deals’.

So, on this momentous day (or, rather, week) for the e-commerce world, it seems appropriate to write this blog post about e-commerce in the EU and the Digital Single Market.

The European Commission’s Digital Single Market (DSM) strategy is increasingly looking more and more like it’s all about e-commerce. This is no surprise to many, like me, who have been excitedly following the DSM since the strategy was launched 6 months ago. The strategy document itself has a short ‘e-commerce’ section, which only appears to cover consumer protection. But a careful reading of the full document reveals that e-commerce is at the heart of the Commission’s DSM strategy. Online consumer protection is a start, but there is much more that could have a profound effect on any businesses that buy, sell or trade online.

Geo-blocking, for example, is all about e-commerce – now that it’s not about copyright (see my previous blog post on geo-blocking). Companies that use geo-localisation techniques to offer shoppers relevant information based on their location will need to persuade policymakers at the Commission why this is a positive, useful way of helping consumers navigate e-commerce websites. And they’ll need to show how this compares to the offline world.

The Commission’s ‘comprehensive assessment of the role of platforms’ announced in the DSM strategy will also touch on e-commerce sites, as well as services which enable online payments. In the public consultation on platforms, which was launched in September, the Commission mentions specific online market places (Amazon, eBay, Allegro, Booking.com) and payment systems (PayPal, Apple Pay). There are also measures which impact the whole ecosystem of online shopping, such as parcel delivery and harmonising VAT across the EU. Anyone working in the retail sector today will know just how much these two things can help or hinder selling online across the EU.

Finally, for any e-commerce sites which allow vendors to sell on their platforms, the Commission is looking at changing the rules on ‘mere conduit’, which would mean that in the future e-retailers could be required to actively police third-party listings on their sites and remove any content which breaches copyright rules – both for virtual goods (e.g. films, music) and physical goods (e.g. fake designer handbags).

So, even though only 1 out of the 15 sections of the DSM strategy is labelled ‘e-commerce’, online shopping is the thread that runs through a huge part of the Commission’s ambitions to create a true digital single market. To make it clearer, the team at Fleishman Hillard have developed a useful timeline which brings together all the e-commerce elements from the different bits of the DSM. As you can see, there’s a lot to digest. The DSM has the potential to fundamentally change the e-commerce landscape in the EU over the next five years. So, to all those who say the DSM is complicated, I say not at all – it’s simple. It’s all about shopping.

 

Catherine Armitage

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

The European Union is clearly the most successful regional organisation in human history. It represents the gold standard for regional co-operation, yet it is not perfect. It still suffers from structural flaws that will need to be remedied if the EU wants to go from Version 1.0 to Version 2.0.

One great paradox surrounding the EU is how on the world stage it can be both an economic giant and a political dwarf. Its economic might, despite the recent challenges to the euro, is indisputable. Indeed, its capacity to overcome the eurozone crisis shows its economic resilience. By contrast, when it comes to major geopolitical challenges like the rise of China or the challenge of ISIL, EU remains a marginal player.

Is there a structural cause for this political marginalisation of the EU? Is there something about its decision-making structures that leads to this? The answer is probably yes. But it is a complex yes; complex because in theory the EU has a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and new institutional structures to deliver its CFSP. The EU is represented in international negotiations by its High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, currently Federica Mogherini.

“To make matters worse, the EU allowed the U.S. to set the agenda for the EU’s relations with its Islamic neighbours”

That’s the theory. In practice, the voice of Europe in international negotiations is relatively weak because the EU has to spend most of its time negotiating internally to arrive at a common point of view. And it is not easy to arrive at a shared viewpoint because even Europe’s three key global actors – Germany, the UK and France – have different interests. To protect their anachronistic interests as permanent members of the UN Security Council, the UK and France refuse to have their hands tied by a common EU policy. Germany, on the other hand, has a greater vested interest in a common position. And even when these three key actors agree, the EU then has to work hard to bring on board its remaining 25 members. The result tends to be an EU position that represents the lowest common denominator.

With this kind of decision-making structure, it is virtually impossible for the EU to come out with bold visionary proposals that take into consideration the EU’s common interest in dealing with a long-term challenge. There are many obvious long-term challenges coming down the road towards the EU. They include the rise of China, Asia’s renaissance, the resurgence of the Islamic world, the need to re-engage Russia and dealing with Africa’s demographic explosion.

It doesn’t take a strategic genius to anticipate the long-term geopolitical challenges that face the EU. But it will take a strategic genius to figure out solutions that will enable the EU to think and act long-term. Although there is no easy “silver bullet” solution, it may be useful to consider the creation of a high-powered strategic planning unit (SPU) whose mandate is to study, anticipate and formulate responses to all these long-term challenges.

Such a SPU should be given a clear mandate to ignore contemporary challenges, whether they be in Ukraine or ISIL, and instead to focus only on the long term. Its task should be to suggest appropriate EU strategies to deal with these challenges, and a few examples might help to illustrate this process.

Let’s take the case of the EU-U.S. relationship. The result of the years of the Cold War is a historical legacy of EU subservience to American strategic interests. During the Cold War there was a strategic rationale for this subservience, but in the post-post-Cold War era the question is whether there will always be a convergence of interests between the EU and the U.S.

“It may be useful to consider the creation of a high-powered strategic planning unit whose mandate is to study, anticipate and formulate responses to all these long-term challenges”

This is the kind of audit that the SPU should do, clearly and objectively. If the audit shows a continuing convergence of interests, the EU should move to a certain set of geopolitical impulses. If it shows a growing divergence of interests, the EU will need to fashion different impulses. To the best of my knowledge, no EU institution has tried to do such an audit. Why not? It has become an article of faith in the EU that the transatlantic alliance must remain an eternal feature of the geopolitical landscape.

Maybe it should. In the economic arena, when the EU negotiates with the U.S. over the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), it strongly and shrewdly defends its economic interests. However, when it comes to geopolitical interests, Europe’s natural tendency is to be subservient to the U.S., even though their interests could diverge significantly.

The biggest problem that the U.S. faces along its southern border is Mexico. Migration flows from Mexico have always been seen to be a challenge, and the U.S. has wisely tried to manage this by negotiating and implementing the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to export jobs to Mexico lessen the migratory pressure of Mexicans seeking jobs in the U.S.

The EU’s biggest problem on its southern border is North Africa. Migration flows from North Africa could be anticipated 20 years ago. In a 1993 article in The National Interest, entitled “The West and the Rest”, I myself wrote: “If the belief and expectation of economic development can be planted in the minds of billions of people, massive migrations may be averted. Those western Europeans who are already fearful of such migrations from North Africa should do some fundamental strategic re-thinking and begin viewing the challenge from East Asia in a different light. What is a short-term challenge could bring long-term strategic redemption.” In short, western Europe should 22 years ago have encouraged the countries of North African to learn from the successful economic development of Muslim states like Malaysia and Indonesia.

“The EU can never walk away from North Africa’s problems, and should have been careful and pragmatic in dealing with them instead of allowing the ideological interests of the U.S. to trump its own pragmatic interests”

Europe’s current migration crisis, like the Mexican migration problem, could have been anticipated. The EU should have signed a North African Free Trade Area (NAFTA) to match the American NAFTA. Yet none was proposed or even considered. Why not? The simple answer is that the U.S. has intelligence and security agencies that focus on long-term challenges, and they anticipated the Mexican challenge. The EU has had none, and failed to identify the looming migratory pressures.

To make matters worse, the EU allowed the U.S. to set the agenda for the EU’s relations with its Islamic neighbours. When the Arab spring began in Tunisia in December 2010, the EU allowed the U.S. to take the driver’s seat in dealing with the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. The U.S. was able to take ideological positions because, separated by the Atlantic Ocean, it could walk away from these problems.

The EU can never walk away from North Africa’s problems, and should have been careful and pragmatic in dealing with them instead of allowing the ideological interests of the U.S. to trump its own pragmatic interests.

North Africa is only one example of diverging interests between the EU and the U.S., and over the long term there may well be other divergences. This is why, should the EU even set up an SPU, its mandate must not be to pass political judgements. Its sole role should be to objectively identify common challenges that EU countries will almost certainly face. Such an agency could help the EU to develop a capacity for strategic foresight. By 2035, the EU could become both an economic and a political giant on the world stage.

The post Here’s how the EU should start to think long-term appeared first on Europe’s World.

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Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

Verein für Konsumenteninformation
Approximation of laws
An increase in telecommunications charges in accordance with a consumer price index does not allow subscribers to withdraw from their contract

Spain v Commission
State aid
The General Court confirms the Commission’s decision ordering the recovery of State aid granted by Spain to the operators of the terrestrial television platform

Hungary terror suspects are WWII enthusiast, court rules
BBC News 26/11/2015

A court in Hungary has ruled that four men detained as suspected terrorists were in fact World War Two enthusiasts.
The men were arrested after visiting the site of a wartime tank battle at the weekend, carrying old weapons they had found with a metal detector.
News of their arrest drew heightened attention in the wake of this month's Paris attacks in which 130 people died.
But the judge in Budapest said there was no evidence the four men had links to terrorism.
The judge denied a prosecutor's application for the main suspect, known only as Roland S, to be held in custody.
'Looking foolish'
The four men were detained after old weapons explosives were found in their car during spot-checks by Hungary's anti-terrorist police following the 13 November Paris attacks.
The co-ordinated attacks - which were claimed by Islamic State - targeted a series of sites in the French capital.
After the weekend arrests, Hungary's anti-terrorist police chief Janos Hajdu said machine guns, silencers, and even a bomb-making laboratory had been found at the home of one of the suspects
He also added that links to Islamist radicals could not be ruled out.
But the Budapest court said on Wednesday that "circumstances of the case point to the opposite".
The main suspect, it said, had no links with extremists and no criminal record.
It said the man "lives with his mother and stepfather and is a World War Two enthusiast".
The BBC's Nick Thorpe in Budapest says the anti-terror squad have been left looking rather foolish.
All four, however, remain under investigation for unlicensed possession of equipment capable of making explosives.

Hungary seizes live weapons from Brad Pitt World War Z film
Telegraph 3:00PM BST 11 Oct 2011

Nearly 100 live weapons to be used in Brad Pitt's "World War Z" film were confiscated by Hungarian authorities, according to reports.

The weapons included machine guns, rifles and pistols, security officials said.
The weapons arrived from London to Budapest's Ferenc Liszt Airport on Saturday and were discovered at a nearby duty free zone, Janos Hajdu, head of Hungary's Counterterrorism Centre, said. He said he could not confirm they were meant for the film.
"It's possible that all the weapons were brought in for the film, but this would not be allowed by Hungarian law," as the weapons had not been fully deactivated and could easily be used to fire live ammunition, Mr Hajdu said. "This is a very complicated case."
Mr Hajdu said the weapons had been shipped to a Hungarian company, whose representative was being questioned by investigators.
Mr Hajdu explained that in Hungary weapons were considered to be deactivated only if the process "was irreversible," while the weapons seized could still be fired even though screws had been used to fill the end of the barrels.

Xpat Opinion: Terror Police Arrest 'Luke Skywalker' In Budapest
Xpatloop.com

The fearsome ‘terror police’ or TEK of Orbanistan-Hungary on Wednesday raided the oldest technical university in Europe (BME) after an emergency call alerted them to a student roaming the premises armed with a handgun.
The student was arrested and cuffed, as the terror police extracted him from the building. It was later revealed that the student was enacting scenes from Star Wars and was holding a toy gun while being dressed in the robes of none other than Luke Skywalker.

Fidesz officials commented: TEK was just doing its job. Despite this, the affair is one in a chain of embarrasing blunders by the elite swat team.
Just recently, the unit was being laughed at after its captain Janos Hajdu (the PM’s former body guard) tried to contact fake editors of a website, requesting correction of an article. In older news, TEK had confiscated a stash of weapons (actually props) belonging to Brad Pitt, who was about to film in Budapest.

According to Hajdu, the Skywalker incident should not be laughed at, as every call has to be taken seriously. “If it had been a real gun, many would have died that day,” added the hardened veteran.
By Andras M. Badics, published on XpatLoop.com with the permission of BudapestReport.com

The New Hungarian Secret Police
Paul Krugman NYTimes Blog

Another Hungary post from my Princeton colleague Kim Lane Scheppele, after the jump.
The New Hungarian Secret Police
Kim Lane Scheppele
Tuesday 17 April 2012

Brad Pitt knows all about the TEK, Hungary’s new counter-terrorism police.
When Pitt was in Budapest last October shooting World War Z, an upcoming zombie-thriller, TEK agents seized 100 machine guns, automatic pistols and sniper rifles that had been flown to Hungary for use as props in the movie. The weapons were disabled and came with no ammunition. But the Hungarian counter-terrorism police determined that they constituted a serious threat.

The dead-pan seizure of movie props made TEK the laughing stock of the world. As David Itzkoff joked in the pages of the New York Times, “If Hungary ever finds itself the target of an undead invasion, its police force should now be well supplied to defend the nation.”
Few have taken TEK seriously. But that is a big mistake. In fact, TEK seems to be turning into Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s own secret police. In less than two years, TEK has amassed truly Orwellian powers, including virtually unlimited powers of secret surveillance and secret data collection.

The speaker of the Parliament, László Kövér, now has his own armed guard too, since the Parliament yesterday passed a law that creates a separate armed police force accountable to the Parliament. It too has extraordinary powers not normally associated with a Parliamentary guard. The creation of this “Parlia-military” gives Hungary the dubious distinction of having the only Parliament in Europe with its own armed guard that has the power to search and “act in” private homes.

About the Parlia-military, more later. First, to TEK.
TEK was created in September 2010 by a governmental decree, shortly after the Fidesz government took office. TEK exists outside the normal command structure of both the police and the security agencies. The Prime Minister directly names (and can fire) its head and only the interior minister stands between him and the direct command of the force. It is well known that the head of this force is a very close confidante of the Prime Minister.

TEK was set up as an anti-terror police unit within the interior ministry and given a budget of 10 billion forints (about $44 million) in a time of austerity. Since then, it has grown to nearly 900 employees in a country of 10.5 million people that is only as big as Indiana.

Why was TEK necessary? When it was created, the government said that it needed TEK because Hungary would hold the rotating presidency of the European Union starting in January 2011. During the six months it held this office, Hungary could be expected to host many important meetings for which top anti-terrorism security would be necessary. But even though Hungary’s stint in the EU chair is over, TEK has continued to grow.

Eyebrows were raised when János Hajdu, Orbán’s personal bodyguard, was appointed directly by the prime minister to be the first head of this new agency. Since TEK’s job also included guarding the prime minister, some believed that Orbán had set up the office to get his trusted bodyguard onto the public payroll. Patronage turns out to be the least of the worries about TEK, however.

TEK is now the sort of secret police that any authoritarian ruler would love to have. Its powers have been added slowly but surely through a series of amendments to the police laws, pushed through the Parliament at times when it was passing hundreds of new laws and when most people, myself included, did not notice. The new powers of TEK have received virtually no public discussion in Hungary. But now, its powers are huge.

What can the TEK do?

TEK can engage in secret surveillance without having to give reasons or having to get permission from anyone outside the cabinet. In an amendment to the police law passed in December 2010, TEK was made an official police agency and was given this jurisdiction to spy on anyone. TEK now has the legal power to secretly enter and search homes, engage in secret wiretapping, make audio and video recordings of people without their knowledge, secretly search mail and packages, and surreptitiously confiscate electronic data (for example, the content of computers and email). The searches never have to be disclosed to the person who is the target of the search – or to anyone else for that matter. In fact, as national security information, it may not be disclosed to anyone. There are no legal limits on how long this data can be kept.

Ordinary police in Hungary are allowed to enter homes or wiretap phones only after getting a warrant from a judge. But TEK agents don’t have to go to a judge for permission to spy on someone – they only need the approval of the justice minister to carry out such activities. As a result, requests for secret surveillance are never reviewed by an independent branch of government. The justice minister approves the requests made by a secret police unit operated by the interior minister. Since both are in the same cabinet of the same government, they are both on the same political team.

TEK’s powers were enlarged again in another set of amendments to the police law passed on 30 December 2011, the day that many other laws were passed in a huge end-of-year flurry. With those amendments, TEK now has had the legal authority to collect personal data about anyone by making requests to financial companies (like banks and brokerage firms), insurance companies, communications companies (like cell phone and internet service providers) – as well as state agencies. Data held by state agencies include not only criminal and tax records but also educational and medical records – and much more. Once asked, no private company or state agency may refuse to provide data to TEK.

Before December 2011, TEK had the power to ask for data like this, but they could only do so in conjunction with a criminal investigation and with the permission of the public prosecutor. After December 2011, their data requests no longer had to be tied to criminal investigations or be approved by the prosecutor. In fact, they have virtually no limits on what data they can collect and require no permission from anyone.

If an organization (like an internet service provider, a bank or state agency) is asked to turn over personally identifiable information, the organization may not tell anyone about the request. People whose data have been turned over to TEK are deliberately kept in the dark.

These powers are shocking, not just because of their scope, but also because most Hungarians knowledgeable about constitutional law would probably have thought they were illegal. After the changes of 1989, the new Hungarian Constitutional Court was quick to dismantle the old system in which the state could compile in one place huge amounts of personal information about individuals. In its “PIN number” decision of 1991, the Constitutional Court ruled that the state had to get rid of the single “personal identifier number” (PIN) so that personally identifiable data could no longer be linked across state agencies. The Court found that “everyone has the right to decide about the disclosure and use of his/her personal data” and that approval by the person concerned is generally required before personal data can be collected. It was the essence of totalitarianism, the Court found, for personal information about someone to be collected and amassed into a personal profile without the person’s knowledge.

With that Constitutional Court decision still on the books and not formally overruled, the Fidesz government is reproducing the very system that the Court had banned by creating a single agency that can gather all private information about individuals in one place again. What, one might ask, is left of constitutional law in Hungary?

One might also ask: Are there any limits to TEK’s power?

The law specifies that TEK operates both as a police and as a national security agency. When it is acting as a police unit, it has the jurisdiction to spy on any person or group who poses a threat of terrorism, along with anyone else associated with such persons. Hungary, like many countries after 9/11, has a broad definition of terrorism that includes, among other things, planning to commit a “crime against the public order” with the purpose of “coercing a state body . . . into action, non-action or toleration.” Crimes against the public order include a long list of violent crimes, but also the vaguer “causing public danger.” In addition, TEK also may arrest “dangerous individuals,” a term not defined in the criminal law. It is difficult from the text of the law itself to see any clear limits on TEK’s powers.

And TEK is very active. On April 7, TEK agents were called in to capture a young man in the small village of Kulcs who killed four members of his family with a machete. And then, in the early morning hours of Friday, April 13, TEK agents conducted a major drug bust in Budapest, arresting 23 people. According to news reports, fully 120 TEK agents were involved in the drug operation, raising questions about whether the drug bust was thought to be part of the anti-terrorism mission of the agency or a rather broad extension of the concept of the “dangerous individual.” Either way, the drug ring looked like garden-variety crime. If that is within TEK’s jurisdiction, it is hard to imagine what is not.

A You-Tube video of the April 13 drug bust, made available by TEK itself, shows what a middle-of-the-night raid by TEK officers looks like, complete with the use of heavy-duty tools to cut open an exterior door.

Given that this is the video that TEK wanted you to see, one can only imagine the activities of TEK that are not recorded for posterity. (It would be interesting to know, for example, why the audio cuts out at certain points in the clip, as well as what happens between the time that TEK breaks open the door and the time the various suspects are seen lying handcuffed on the floor.)

While its videos are crystal clear, TEK’s legal status is blurry, as some parts of its activities are authorized under the police law and others parts are authorized under the national security law. Different rules and standards apply to police agencies and to national security agencies. Moreover, TEK seems to have some powers that exceed those of both police and national security agencies, particularly in its ability to avoid judicial warrants. No other agency in the Hungarian government has both police and national security powers, and it is unclear precisely how the agency is accountable – for which functions, under what standards and to whom. What follows is my best guess from reading the law.

With respect to its powers authorized under the police law, it appears that TEK must act like the police and get judicial warrants to search houses, to wiretap and to capture electronic data when these activities are part of a criminal investigation. When TEK was arresting the machete-wielder and making the drug bust, it was probably acting under its police powers.

But TEK only need judicial warrants when it is engaged in criminal investigations. It doesn’t need judicial warrants when it is using its secret surveillance powers in security investigations. When it is acting as a national security agency, TEK only needs the permission of the justice minister to engage in secret and intrusive surveillance. Of course, given that the permissions and constraints are different depending on whether TEK is acting as a police agency or a national security agency, it would matter who decides whether a particular activity is conducted for police or national security purposes and what the criteria are for determining that it is one or the other. The law does not provide the answer to either question.

Suppose someone believes that she has been spied upon illegally by TEK. What can she do to object? First, if TEK is engaged in secret surveillance or data collection, it is unlikely that people will know that they are a target, given the extraordinary secrecy of the whole operation. But even if one finds out that one is being watched, the remedies are not encouraging.

A person aggrieved by TEK’s actions may complain to the interior minister, and the interior minister must answer the complaint within 30 days. But given that the interior minister is the minister who controls TEK in the first place, this is not an independent review. If the complainant does not like the answer of the interior minister, s/he may appeal to the Parliament’s national security committee, which must muster a one-third vote to hear the petition. At the moment, the 12-member national security committee consists of two-thirds governing party members and one-third members of all other parties combined. If the governing party does not want to investigate a complaint, garnering a one-third vote would mean uniting the whole opposition – or, to put it in more blunt terms, getting the Socialists to work with the neo-Nazis. That is unlikely to happen. Even if the national security committee agrees to hear a petition, however, it would take a two-thirds vote of the committee to require the interior minister to reveal the surveillance methods used against the complainant so that the committee can determine whether they were legal. There is no judicial review at any stage of this process.

TEK operates in secret with extraordinary powers and no one reliably independent of the current governing party can review what it is doing when it uses its most potentially abusive powers. This shocking accumulation of power may explain the Hungarian government’s abolition of a separate data protection ombudsman who would have the power to investigate such shocking accumulation of data. Instead, the data protection officer – a post required by European Union law – has been made a political appointee of the government itself. This is why the EU has launched an infringement action against Hungary for failing to guarantee the independence of the office. Now we can see why the EU may be onto something.

As if the powers of TEK are not enough, though, Parliament yesterday authorized another security service with the power to use police measures against citizens and residents of Hungary. The cardinal law on the Parliament itself contains a provision that gives the Parliament its own military, a Parlia-military.

The Parlia-military is an armed police unit outside the chain of command of the regular military or police structures. Its commander in chief is the speaker of the house, László Kövér, who served as minister without portfolio for the Civilian Intelligence Services during the first Orbán government from 1998-2002. The Parlia-military has the power to guard the Parliament and the speaker of the house, as might be expected. But if the Parlia-military is only supposed to guard the Parliament and the speaker, why does it need the powers that the cardinal law gives it?

The law gives the Parlia-military power “to enter and to act in private homes.” That’s literally what the law says. It is unlikely that the Parliament will want to conduct a plenary session in someone’s living room, so one must then wonder just what the Parliament will do if its armed military enters someone’s home to “act.” In addition to this power, the Parlia-military may also make public audio and video recordings of people. It can also search cars, luggage and clothing. It can use handcuffs and chemical substances (which I assume means tear gas and nothing more, but the wording make it sound like the Parlia-military may use chemical weapons!). The draft law seems to imply that the Parlia-military would have to operate under the constraints of the police law, which would mean that it would need judicial warrants to conduct these intrusive measures. But that is not completely clear. What is clear is that Hungary now suffers from a proliferation of police that are under direct political control.

Until this point, I have thought that the Fidesz government was just attempting to lock down power for itself for the foreseeable future, which was bad enough. But now, with the discovery of these new security services, it seems increasingly likely that the Hungarian government is heading toward the creation of a police state. Actually, it may already be there. But shhhh! It’s secret.

Tag: TEKHungarian Counterterrorism Centre

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP