European Union

Azarov v Council
External relations
The General Court annuls the freezing of the assets of five Ukrainians, including Mykola Yanovych Azarov and Sergej Arbuzov, former Prime Ministers of Ukraine, for the period from 6 March 2014 to 5 March 2015

DRAFT REPORT on Peace Support Operations - EU engagement with the UN and the African Union
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Geoffrey Van Orden

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

Laezza
Freedom of establishment
National rules on betting and gaming may be contrary to the principle of proportionality if they require the licensee to transfer free of charge the equipment used for the collection of bets

Éditions Odile Jacob v Commission
Competition
The Court dismisses Odile Jacob’s appeal in the case concerning Lagardère’s purchase of Vivendi Universal Publishing

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The other shoe has finally dropped. After months of subtle and not subtle warnings, Brussels has taken its first step towards green-lighting border checks across Europe for up to two years – and pushing Greece towards a de facto suspension from Schengen. The European Commission’s report into Greece’s borders found “serious deficiencies” in how Athens manages its external frontier. Those two words – “serious deficiencies” – are key, since they are explicitly used in the code governing the EU’s passport-free Schengen travel zone if Brussels wants to dictate new border measures aimed at restoring “overall functioning” of the bloc. As with all EU rules and regulations, the process of moving from what happened yesterday to border checks is complicated and filled with further rounds of back-and-forth between Brussels and Athens. But the Schengen code also makes clear that such a report is the first step.

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Portugal's new finance minister, Mario Centeno

The complicated procedure and baffling code words that are part of the European Commission’s annual evaluation of eurozone budgets can sometimes make it seem like Brussels is intentionally obfuscating their views on national budgets.

But under the EU’s crisis-era rules, all spending plans must be submitted for approval by the commission’s economics directorate before they can be sent to national parliaments for consideration – one of the most powerful levers Brussels now had in its battle to get debt and deficits in the eurozone back under control.

That’s why the letter sent to the Portuguese finance ministry this week, filled with jargon and confusing benchmarks, is worth taking a look at. We got our hands on the letter and have posted it here.

Under EU rules, eurozone governments are supposed to submit their budget for review by mid-October. But that happened to coincide with last year’s Portuguese parliamentary elections, held October 6, which delayed Lisbon’s submission for months – nearly four months, to be exact. Its 2016 budget was only sent to Brussels last Friday.

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The grandness of the EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy lies in its potential to render the existing conundrum of various EU strategies into a more orderly set of strands with a clear vision regarding their mutually complementary role.

Strategies are in-built in EU’s genome. These policy documents define EU’s aims, approaches in tackling challenges and addressing common issues.  EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy (hereafter – EUGSFSP) is being designed with an aim to “enable the Union to identify a clear set of objectives and priorities for now and the future. On this basis the European Union can align its tools and instruments to ensure that they have the greatest possible impact”. The EUGSFSP refers to other existing initiatives, which should be streamlined according to the needs of this particular strategy. This short overview of several EU’s strategies is aimed at providing a broader context on how the EU Global Strategy of Foreign and Security Policy fits in the existing conundrum of EU strategies. Consequently, it provides few suggestions for consideration in the context of the EUGSFSP drafting and implementation process.

EU strategies are designed, coordinated and their implementation is overseen by Directorates General of the European Commission, as well as European External Action Service. It is a common practice that prior to the drafting process a public consultation takes place. Then, during the drafting process of a strategy states come together to identify areas of mutual interest, where they see the added value of a joint action. It could be termed as the “business as usual” practice.

Broadly speaking, these policy documents are being discussed on two levels. The European level encompasses inter-service consultations and public consultations, as well as the European Council and its working groups. The national level is characterised by working groups which gather all national (and in certain cases subnational) entities involved in the implementation of the relevant strategy.

Overall, EU strategies vary in structure, level of details in terms of implementation process, approach on measuring achievements, as well as vagueness or concreteness of goals. For example, DG MARE coordinates the EU Maritime Security Strategy (hereafter – EUMSS) which excels in its detailed approach towards actions to be pursued. One of DG REGIO’s facilitated strategies is the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (hereafter – EUSBSR), which, as its name suggests, has a regional focus and is characterised by broad descriptions of policy areas, getting closer to implementation once the flagship projects are explained. The European External Action Service is leading the EU Central Asia Strategy, which since 2007 defines a tailored approach to each of the five countries involved. These are just three examples of a much wider pool of EU strategies dedicated to regional matters or a specific policy area.

The reason why EU strategies are described as a conundrum is that they are far from being unique in terms of issues they are addressing and geographic areas they are aiming at covering. Here are few examples of overlapping responsibilities. Both the EUMSS and the EUSBSR aim at strengthening the cross-sectoral cooperation and synergies between information, capabilities and systems of various authorities in domains of maritime surveillance, preparedness for emergency situations and marine pollution. Moreover, the EUMSS has its own external dimension (called “Workstrand 1”), which defines actions to be undertaken in cooperation with the third parties. Similarly, EUSBSR encompass cooperation with non-EU countries. In addition, the Strategic Review “The European Union in a changing global environment: A more connected, contested and complex world” covers regions which have already their specific EU strategies in place, such as the previously mentioned EU Central Asia Strategy.

Why it is worth pointing out these commonalities? The success of EU tools and instruments lies in their complementary nature. When it comes to the EUGSFSP, it would be advisable to go beyond the “business as usual” practice outlined above and render the existing EU strategic conundrum in a more orderly jigsaw. Namely, the EUGSFSP would explain the role of other relevant EU strategies and clarify their unique contribution to attaining the EUGSFSP goals. Such an approach would also help to pool the existing expertise for more coordinated actions and streamline initiatives taken under various EU frameworks, as well as avoid duplication of activities.

However, such an endeavour demands additional coordination of input and effort both from European and national levels. On the European level, it requires brainstorming regarding the future inter-service coordination of various strategies in order to increase the overall awareness on various EU strategies among different divisions of EU institutions. On the national level, it requires extended consultations. These discussions should not be limited to the so-called “usual suspects”, such as authorities dealing with foreign affairs, defence and military matters. It should incorporate inputs from other governmental bodies involved in national steering of different EU strategies. All in all, if the EUGSFSP really is aimed at being grand, these suggestions might help to render the EUGSFSP impressive and overarching not only in words but also enshrine it in its nature and scope.

 

The post EU’s Conundrum of Strategies: Is There an Orderly Jigsaw on the Horizon? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

DRAFT REPORT on Space capabilities for European security and defence
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Bogdan Andrzej Zdrojewski

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

Location : Brussels JAN 2Q2
Further information
Programme
Poster
Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

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Apple's campus in the Irish town of Cork

For the first time since the so-called LuxLeaks scandal broke more than a year ago – where documents leaked showing hundreds of multinationals had received extremely favourable tax treatment in Luxembourg – the issue of corporate tax avoidance has suddenly moved back into the spotlight thanks to actions taken by both London and Brussels to begin clawing back millions in allegedly underpaid taxes.

Tomorrow, Pierre Moscovici, the former French finance minister who now oversees tax issues for the European Commission, is due to unveil the latest in a series of measures aimed at cracking down on “sweetheart” tax deals. Mr Moscovici’s task today will be as much political as financial, since his boss Jean-Claude Juncker was Luxembourg prime minister when the LuxLeaks deals were struck and has suffered some political damage as a result.

Alex Barker, who long covered corporate tax issues for the FT Brussels bureau, has tallied up the windfall for treasuries thus far and asks whether the headline numbers, which seem big, are actually that big at all:

The long suffering European taxman is looking for redress. Over the past three months alone roughly €1.25bn has been clawed back from multinationals across the EU, led by the European Commission’s series of cases brought against companies in Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, which Mr Moscovici will no doubt tout today. It all sounds impressive. But scratch the surface and an enduring truth becomes clear: tax collectors are usually more hampered by European politics than helped.

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"​​​The Global Cybersecurity Index (GCI) measures each nation's level of commitment to the ITU's Global Cybersecurity Agenda, with the aim of highlighting potential areas for improvement and driving cybersecurity to the forefront of national plans. This report presents the 2014 results of the GCI and the Cyberwellness country profiles for Member states. It includes regional rankings, a selected set of good practices and the way forward for the next iteration."

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Aristotle suggested that every political system should be tested as to whether there is any contradiction between its founding principles and the implementation of its governance. The Eurozone crisis seems to have generated precisely such a contradiction between the democratic principles of the European Union and its new modus operandi.

The EU’s democratic principles are fundamental to its purpose, and yet it has long been argued that it suffers from an inherent democratic deficit in its operation, given that its added level of supranational decision-making has always lacked the necessary corresponding citizen input.

Of late, in order to tackle the unprecedented situation created by the Eurozone crisis, a number of institutional modifications have been implemented, including most notably the provision of financial assistance to member-states conditional upon structural adjustment. A core initial problem in terms of democratic process was the fact that the ideological basis of the approach adopted seemed to offer no alternatives. From the side of both creditor and borrower states – a division that in itself has been contended to be democratically problematic in terms of the purported equality of EU member-states – fiscal austerity has been presented as the only way forward. In fact, it has been suggested that Germany’s heavy promotion of ordo-liberalism has reached the point of ideational hegemony. What is more, as revealed by multiple demonstrations across the Eurozone, and especially in member-states receiving conditional financial assistance, the European electorate seems increasingly to oppose this ideological direction.

The institutional framework adopted during this period also gives rise to democratically problematic issues. Many of the measures introduced, such as the permanent financial stability mechanism, further enhanced and specified the concept of policy conditionality, linking it directly with core national policies, such as budget-setting, tax levels and even healthcare policies. Moreover, delegation from the national to the supranational level for such intricate and salient national policy-making arenas has not been restricted to member-states in need of financial assistance. Within the Eurozone, the Eurogroup now has the right to review national member-states’ budgets and to request revisions of them. However, neither the Eurogroup, nor indeed the European Commission, are elected, representative bodies and certainly do not enjoy the benefit of adequate safeguards in terms of accountability to the European electorate. The growing influence of supranational technocratic actors in setting not only budgetary policy but also the overall budgetary framework has become manifest with the Fiscal Compact, which stipulates that Eurozone member-states are obliged to introduce a legally-permanent, and potentially constitutionally-founded, deficit ceiling.

Furthermore, as has been very publicly seen, the so-called Troika – the European Central Bank, the European Commission and the International Monetary Fund – has assumed a strong role within the Eurozone, despite the fact that it is an ad hoc cooperation that lacks a clear institutional framework or set of democratic safeguards of any kind. In fact, as argued by the European Parliament, the roles of the EU institutions within the Troika, and more generally across the crisis, appear to suffer from a conflict of interest with their prescribed institutional mandates, from an expansion of their decision-making authority beyond those mandates, and from questionable democratic standards.

For example, the European Central Bank, which is a solely monetary-policy actor, has appeared to acquire increased influence over fiscal policy measures through its participation in the Troika. In addition, across the Six-pack – secondary legislation aimed at tighter fiscal and macroeconomic surveillance – the European Commission has assumed a strengthened position in the areas of setting fines and conducting in-depth surveillance of EU member-states, especially considering the newly adopted voting system in which the Commission’s decision is immediately enforceable unless a blocking majority of Eurozone member-states is assembled.

Across all of the above measures, citizen input remains almost unchanged and is thus effectively reduced, given the increase in decision-making authority attained by these other EU actors. The European Parliament seems to be minimally, if at all, involved within this new EU-Eurozone decision-making framework, with its role restricted in most cases to an informational or advisory capacity that is unable to influence policy. In sum, the only purely representative body within the EU plays a miniscule role in the EU’s new modus operandi.

So, where do we all stand in terms of democracy in relation to what might be called the ‘new’ EU established during the Eurozone crisis? It has become clear that the rigid, ideological foundations of the measures adopted during the crisis have met strong opposition from the European and, more intensely, the Eurozone electorate. This was amply demonstrated in the outcome of the 2014 EU elections, the first to be conducted since the beginning of the crisis. Approximately 30% of MEPs belonged to either far-right or far-left anti-EU parties, with extreme anti-EU sentiments, across several major EU member-states. Even more remarkably perhaps, in the January 2015 Greek elections a left Party, running on an anti-austerity platform, assumed power or the first time in the country’s modern political history, whilst polls show that a similar result might occur in the upcoming end-2015 Spanish election.

Overall, a contradiction between the founding democratic principles of the EU and its new operational structure during the crisis has left the quality of the EU’s democratic order adversely affected. In the spirit of Aristotle’s criterion, then, the EU’s political system of governance does not any longer seem to adhere to the organisation’s principles. The ramifications of such a divergence are truly far-reaching. In particular, EU democracy has been weakened, damaging at the same time the whole moral stance of the EU and the advocacy and promotion of democracy that is at the heart of its foreign policy.

First published on April 22, 2015 at speri.comment

The post The Eurozone crisis and democracy appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

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Migrants attempt to enter Macedonia from the Greek side of the border on their way north

In many ways, it is a threat that has more bark than bite. Although Greece has been part of Europe’s Schengen bloc since 2000, it has the almost unique status of sharing no land border with another member of the passport-free travel zone (Iceland doesn’t, either). For that reason, suspending Greece from Schengen would probably have no direct effect on the unrelenting influx of refugees from Turkey’s shores into Germany and points north. Although the noise surrounding such a suspension has risen in recent days, only those who fly from Athens into the rest of Europe would find their travel disrupted, and there are not many migrants who have been lining up at the Aegean Airlines ticket desk to book an aisle seat to Munich. (The price of a plane ticket may actually be cheaper, but this video explains why refugees can’t fly commercial.)

That’s why newfound support for EU aid to Macedonia so it can beef up its border defences with Greece has suddenly become the hot topic within many interior ministries and the European Commission. It would achieve what governments up north have long wanted – to keep refugees inside Greece, where they can be processed and, if they qualify, relocated across the EU – while not broaching the politically toxic topic of Schengen expulsion.

In a letter sent yesterday, Jean-Claude Juncker, the European Commission president, gave his full-throated support to the Macedonia plan: “I welcome your suggestion,” Mr Juncker wrote to Miro Cerar, the Slovenian prime minister who has been driving the concept. Although legally, Brussels itself cannot currently send such aid to a non-EU member, Mr Juncker said individual member states should “support controls on the border with Greece through the secondment of police/law enforcement officers, and the provision of equipment.”

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Length of video : 72'
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Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

Length of video : 141'
You may manually download this video in WMV (1.3Gb) format

Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP