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EU and Russia co-operate on dealing with a number of global and bilateral challenges. In 1994, the Parties concluded a Partnership and Co-operation Agreement.

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MOSCOW – US President-elect Donald Trump seems determined to revive a forgotten Hollywood genre: the paranoid melodrama. Perhaps the greatest film in this genre, The Manchurian Candidate, concerns a communist plot to use the brainwashed son of a leading right-wing family to upend the American political system. Given the fondness that Trump and so many of his appointees seem to have for Russian President Vladimir Putin, life may be about to imitate – if not exceed – art.

To be sure, the attraction for Putin that Trump, Secretary of State-designate Rex Tillerson, and National Security Adviser General Michael Flynn share is not the result of brainwashing, unless you consider the love of money (and of the people who can funnel it to you) a form of brainwashing. Nonetheless, such Kremlinophilia is – to resurrect a word redolent of Cold War paranoia – decidedly un-American.

Consider the derision shown by Trump and his posse for CIA reports that Kremlin-directed hackers intervened in last month’s election to benefit Trump. In typical fashion, Trump let loose a barrage of tweets blasting the CIA as somehow under the thumb of his defeated opponent, Hillary Clinton. His nominee for Deputy Secretary of State, John Bolton, went even further, suggesting that the hacking of the Democratic National Committee and Clinton’s campaign chairman, John Podesta, was a “false flag” operation designed to smear an innocent Kremlin.

The idea that a US president-elect would take the word of the Kremlin over that of CIA officials and even the most senior members of his own party is already bizarre and dangerous. But the simultaneous nomination of Tillerson – the long-time CEO of ExxonMobil, America’s most powerful energy company, which has tens of billions of dollars invested in Russia – to be America’s top diplomat takes this love affair with a major adversary to a level unprecedented in US history.

For Tillerson, taking Russia’s side against the US is nothing new. Consider the sanctions that the US and Europe imposed on Russia in response to the country’s annexation of Crimea – a blatantly illegal act – in 2014. Instead of supporting US policy, Tillerson belittled it. Instead of fully honoring President Barack Obama’s call for ExxonMobil not to send a representative to the annual Saint Petersburg International Economic Forum after the annexation, Tillerson cynically sent the head of one of ExxonMobil’s international operations. And instead of returning the Order of Friendship that he received from Putin months before the invasion of Crimea, Tillerson continues to celebrate his status as a “friend of Vladimir.”

Flynn, like Tillerson, has also been feasting at the Kremlin trough. After being fired by Obama for his incompetent management of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Flynn immediately began to cultivate Russian business contacts. And Putin seems to have been more than happy to see that commercial doors were opened to Flynn. There is a now-infamous photograph of Flynn seated next to Putin at a banquet for RT (Russia Today), the Kremlin-backed cable news network that was a prime source of the slanted, and even fake, news that inundated the US during the recent election campaign.

As for Trump, statements made by his sons suggest that, if the American public ever got a look at his tax returns and business loans, they would find that he has also been feathering his nest with Kremlin gold for some time. He has undoubtedly taken money from countless Russian oligarchs. In 2008, he unloaded one of his Palm Beach mansions on Dmitry Rybolovlev, a fertilizer oligarch, for $95 million. Sergei Millian, who heads the Russian-American Chamber of Commerce, is said to have facilitated countless investments from Russians into Trump projects. For Trump, no money is too tainted to pocket.

Trump’s adoration of Russia – or, more accurately, Russian riches – was apparent well before Americans went to the polls, as was his habit of surrounding himself with likeminded advisers. For months, Trump’s presidential campaign was run by Paul Manafort, a political operative who had worked to secure the disgraced President Viktor Yanukovych’s victory in Ukraine’s 2010 presidential election. Trump severed public ties with Manafort only after Ukraine’s current democratic government revealed documents that hinted at the millions of dollars that Yanukovych had paid Manafort, in cash. As Trump’s inauguration draws near, Americans must confront three big questions. One, in a sense, is a take on a question that Trump raised about Clinton during the campaign: what happens if the FBI finds evidence of criminal conduct by the president? Or, perhaps more likely in Trump’s case, what happens if the president tries to shut down FBI investigations into his commercial activities involving Russia, or into the actions of cronies like Manafort?

The second question, which the US Senate should ask before confirming Tillerson as Secretary of State, concerns the extent of his and ExxonMobil’s financial interests in Russia. The Senate should also probe how closely Tillerson has cooperated with Igor Sechin, the chairman of Rosneft and a notorious ex-KGB operative, particularly in renationalizing much of the Russian oil industry and placing it under Sechin’s personal control. (Similar questions should be asked about Flynn, though, because the National Security Adviser doesn’t need to be confirmed by the Senate, little can be done about his appointment.)

The biggest question of all concerns the American people. Are they really willing to accept a president who denounces men and women who risk their lives to defend the US, and equally quick to praise and defend Putin and his cronies when their reckless, even criminal, conduct is exposed?

At the end of The Manchurian Candidate, another brainwashed character – Frank Sinatra’s Marco – escapes his programming to foil the communist plot. But that was Cold War Hollywood: of course the good guys won. Trump the Movie is unlikely to end so well.

© Project Syndicate 1995–2016

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TOKYO – December will be a month of reconciliation for Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, as he meets with leaders from two countries that fought Japan in World War II: the United States and Russia.

It might seem promising that Abe is hosting Russian President Vladimir Putin and then being hosted by US President Barack Obama in such short order. But these events actually presage an uncomfortable, potentially destabilizing time for Japan – and all of East Asia.

On December 26, Abe will shake hands with Obama at Pearl Harbor – weeks after the US marked the 75th anniversary of the Japanese attack there – to reciprocate Obama’s visit to Hiroshima’s atomic bomb sites last May. The mutual demonstration of forgiveness is meant to emphasize the values that Japan and the US now share.

But this gesture will come just ten days after Abe hosts Putin in his Yamaguchi prefecture hometown; and theirs will be a rather different sort of reconciliation. Russia is one of the few countries with which Japan never signed a peace treaty after 1945, because in the war’s final days, the Soviet Union occupied four then-Japanese islands just north of Hokkaido, the country’s northernmost main island.

The four islands sit at the southern tip of the Kuril Islands chain that separates the Sea of Okhotsk from the Pacific Ocean. While they are not of any particular economic value beyond providing some fishing grounds, they do have sentimental significance for Japan – as is often the case with lost territories. And for Russia, which is never keen to cede territory anyway, the islands are strategically valuable; the Kremlin recently decided to install missile-defense systems on two of them.  While the dispute over the islands has prevented Japan and Russia from ever formalizing a peace agreement, both countries now seem to want to cuddle somewhat closer. Putin’s trip will be his first official visit to Japan in a decade; and Abe plans to honor him with personalized treatment; their discussions will take place in the manly environment of an onsen (hot spring), rather than in dull offices.

These overtures reflect Russia and Japan’s respective concerns about China. While Russia has warmed to China in recent years, not least by entering into a big natural gas deal and engaging in joint military exercises, it has largely done so as a gesture of defiance against the US and the European Union. In the long term, Russia does not want to look as though it is dependent on its increasingly powerful southern neighbor. Japan, for its part, fears Chinese domination of East Asia, and is more than happy to be Russia’s new Asian friend.

Previously, it would have been difficult, if not impossible, for Japan to invest in Russia’s Far East, owing to its participation in Western sanctions against Russia, imposed in response to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. But now that Donald Trump has been elected to the US presidency, those sanctions might be eased or eliminated. Indeed, this could explain why Abe broke protocol to become the first foreign leader to meet President-elect Trump in New York, on November 17.

Had Hillary Clinton won the election, Abe would have been forced to downplay expectations for his summit with Putin. Now, Putin and Abe will have more room to negotiate the contested islands’ status, and to develop a future framework for economic cooperation, which will likely include regular bilateral summits.

But this will only be a consolation prize for Abe. Trump’s victory has sounded a death knell for the 12-country Trans-Pacific Partnership, which Obama had made the centerpiece of his Asia strategy. Abe supported the TPP, and saw it as a means to prevent China from becoming the rule-setter in Asian trade. Without the TPP, it is now increasingly likely that China will step into that role.

That will be a big loss for Japan, and the country will lose out even more if Trump follows through on his campaign promise to make allies such as Japan and South Korea pay more for their own defense. And if Trump continues to provoke China by communicating with Taiwan and questioning America’s “One China” policy, regional tensions will escalate. This, in turn, will only increase Japan’s defense needs, especially with respect to the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, which China claims as its own.

So, Abe faces political danger, but he also has an opportunity. Trump’s election and escalating regional tensions have created the perfect pretext for Abe to push for his ultimate political goal: to abolish Article 9 – the pacifist clause in Japan’s post-war, US-imposed constitution, which limits the Japanese military to a “self-defense force,” and has generally kept Japanese defense spending at 1% of GDP.

Abe already has enough parliamentary backing to achieve this, and he could garner more with a snap election for the lower house in early 2017. But, beyond a two-thirds majority in both parliamentary bodies, constitutional reforms also require a simple majority in a national referendum. Achieving that could be harder, because pacifism runs deep in the only country to have been attacked with atomic bombs.

By shaking Obama’s hand in Hawaii, Abe will give a nod to the country’s modern pacifist creed, and signal that, despite his reputation as a nationalist, he also harbors deep feelings about the dangers of war. Such peaceful assurances, against the backdrop of growing tensions in East Asia, may or may not be enough to persuade Japanese voters that it is time to expand their country’s armed forces – 75 years after their great but fateful triumph in Pearl Harbor. This will be one of the central questions in Asian politics over the next few turbulent years.

© Project Syndicate 1995–2016

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WASHINGTON, DC – Planning. It is the key to successful military action – and, in many ways, to success in general – and United States Marines like me pride ourselves on it. But if you’ve spent 30 years in the military, as I have, you know that an effective plan cannot be static; operating environments change, often in surprising or unexpected ways. Donald Trump’s victory in the US presidential election earlier this month constitutes just such a change.

It may be a long time before we fully understand the new operating environment. But we must begin adjusting – and continue adjusting as new facts come to light. Otherwise, we risk becoming vulnerable to serious strategic threats – the gravest of which is likely to be climate change.

The increase in the Earth’s surface temperature represents a fundamental shift in the global operating environment, both economically and militarily. It is not just that some so-called “elites” think that the weather is going to warm up a bit. Climate change is not trivial; nor are its security implications.

Climate change is what we in the military call a “threat multiplier.” Its connection to conflict is not linear. Rather, it intensifies and complicates existing security risks, increasing the frequency, scale, and complexity of future missions.

The urgency of the climate threat is growing quickly. Climate change is already expanding the scope of military operations, with the US Navy and Coast Guard assessing new missions in the Arctic. More intense hurricanes, typhoons, and droughts are increasing the demand for military-assisted humanitarian responses, most notably in the Pacific.

As increasingly extreme weather reshapes migration patterns, the number of displaced people (already at record highs worldwide) will rise, and competition for essential resources (such as water, food, and energy) will increase. These effects will be particularly destabilizing in already-volatile situations, exacerbating challenges like weak governance, economic inequality, and social tensions – and producing truly toxic conflicts. That is why we call climate change “an accelerant of instability.”

Don’t take my word for it. America’s entire national security establishment is clear on this. In fact, the US military has recognized climate change as a major security risk for more than a decade, making it a world leader on this front. Last year’s National Security Strategy reiterated this view, identifying climate change as a top-level strategic risk to US interests, alongside factors like terrorism, economic crisis, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

These are not empty words. The US military has long been integrating climate change into our planning. After all, the worst security failures – for example, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, which dragged the US into World War II, and the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks – tend to arise from inadequate preparation.

Reflecting this lesson, during President George W. Bush’s administration, legislation was enacted to require all US defense agencies to consider the effects of climate change in future strategic policy development. In the last four years, the Department of Defense has released a series of directives that put climate-change preparedness at the center of how we do business.

It is too early to say what the Trump administration will do when it comes to climate change. On the campaign trail, he promised to undo some key climate policies, even threatening to back out of the Paris climate agreement. It is critically important that he and his cabinet recognize that to follow through on his promise would be extremely shortsighted.

The truth is that it is in America’s best interest, in terms of both security and the economy, to remain on the path toward a cleaner future. Already, the clean-energy revolution has brought jobs, money, and industry to rural America. It is a source of untold opportunities. And isn’t identifying opportunity one of America’s great strengths?

The shifting economic operating environment bolsters these opportunities. China, India, and other emerging economies are racing to be the global clean-energy superpower; it would not be in America’s interest to be left behind. If America is to be great, as Trump has promised, it needs to build more future-oriented industries that can compete globally – and that can provide jobs to American workers.

Moreover, Trump’s administration will need to continue the US military’s work and create a more resilient national security strategy. The American Security Project, of which I am CEO, looks forward to providing the Trump administration with relevant advice and solutions. We will also call the administration to account if it fails to protect US interests adequately.

Ignoring  threats might work in politics, but it does not work in security. Denying the reality of climate change will not make it go away; rather, it will erode the economy and expose the US to serious risks. That would amount to a failure by Trump to fulfill one of his most important responsibilities as president: ensuring the security of the American people.

Serious strategic risks cannot be a political plaything. The threat of climate change does not sit neatly on either side of the left-right divide; it is – and must remain – part of US strategic planning. Anyone who has been involved in such planning knows that we cannot prepare only for the wars we want to fight; we must prepare for the wars that will come, whether we like it or not.

© Project Syndicate 1995–2016

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The rise of far-right and populist parties in Europe has alarmed politicians. There are some who believe this is the result of the migration waves that hit EU member states over the past few years. And there are those who think European countries have more Muslims than their populations can tolerate.
Despite the fact that authoritative institutions publish surveys showing the exact opposite, the general belief in Europe is that refugees, migrants and Muslims are to blame for the threat faced by...

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STRASBOURG – The new administration of President-elect Donald Trump should continue cooperating with the European Union and stand up for their common values, Ambassador of the United States to the EU, Anthony Luzzato Gardner, said in a briefing/interview in Strasbourg on December 14.
The ambassador, who was on his seventh and last trip as ambassador to the European Parliament, said he believes in the EU-US relationship. “I hope that the works continue on the foundations that we have laid and I ...

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One year following the coming to power of the Law and Justice administration (PiS), Poland is in a parliamentary crisis.

The trigger

Poles took to the streets for a second day on Saturday, following government plans to restrict journalist’s access to the Parliament (Sejm). Journalists are not normally allowed in the assembly room, but they are allowed to be in the corridors.

The government is proposing to restrict journalists’ access to a building outside the parliament. The government also intends to ban recordings of parliamentary sessions, limiting the right to state television channels alone.

The rules will enter into effect on January 1st.

Parliamentary crisis

On Friday, opposition MPs blocked the state budget vote by surrounding the Speakers podium, obstructing the process. The PiS MPs then moved to another room, where they voted without the opposition. The opposition does not recognize the validity of the vote.

Escalation

The leader of the ruling party, Kaczynski, denounced the obstruction of the 2017 budget vote as “hooliganism” and threatened with consequences, Al Jazeera reports.

The consequences are already visible. The parliamentary Speaker, Marek Kuchciński, moved on Saturday to cancel all press passes for all journalists. Meanwhile, Kaczynski has called for an urgent meeting on Monday to discuss future media measures.

The opposition has been calling people to protest to preserve the transparency of the Parliament. Among the protestors is the former foreign minister, Marek Kuchciński,

The President of Poland, supported by the ruling PiS, appealed for calm and offered to mediate between majority and minority MPs.

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Thirteen soldiers were killed and 56 wounded when a suicide car bomb targeted a public bus in the Kayseri province, Turkey, on Saturday.

The terrorist attack took place early on Saturday morning, outside the local university campus of Erciyas University. The bus was carrying off-duty soldiers.

Seven suspects thought to be linked to the attack have been arrested, Anadolu Agency reports. There is a manhunt for a five more suspects.

Turkey imposed a temporary ban on coverage of the incident, which includes TV footage and images.

Prime Minister Numan Kurtulmus told local media that all signs point towards PKK involvement in the incident. Kurtulmus said that behind these attacks there was support by “several countries.”

Later on Saturday, a mob stormed the Kayseri offices of HDP, a left-leaning pro-Kurdish party the BBC reports. HDP condemned the bombing.

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Following an intense night of press conferences held after the European Council, Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras met with German Chancellor Angela Merkel on December 16.

In the days leading up to the European Council, Merkel had vehemently criticised how Greece was handling the immigration crisis. She criticised Greece before an astonished audience at the European People’s Party pre-summit meeting in Brussels. Together with her Interior Minister Thomas de Maiziere, Merkel scolded Greek officials for not keeping tabs on a 17-year-old convicted Afghan who managed to make his way to Germany where he has since been arrested on suspicion of rape and murder.

Meanwhile, Tsipras arrived in Berlin ready to emphasise Greece’s progress on reforms. He also aimed to make a clear point to Germany about the importance of the second review of the third bailout programme.

It has been a week since Tsipras surprised the EU institutions and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) by announcing he would pass legislation to give pensioners a one-off Christmas bonus and to lower VAT on migration-hit islands.

Tsipras’ announcement triggered a week-long rant that resulted in the EU institutions’ common assessment on Greece’s measurements.

“According to a preliminary assessment by the institutions, which was distributed to the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) members, the proposed measures by the Greek government raise significant concerns on both process and substance as regards MoU commitments, especially regarding pensions,” said the ESM’s spokesperson.

“While those measures reduce the safety margin around the 2016 fiscal target, they are not expected to change significantly the projected fiscal outcomes in 2017 and 2018, although they raise risks regarding the targets, should the measures be extended in the future. Euro area member states will decide how to proceed with the short-term debt measures agreed in the Eurogroup meeting on 5 December,” concludes the joint assessment of the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the ESM.

At the same time, Greece’s Finance Minister Euclid Tsakalotos admitted that the Greek government did not inform the above EU institutions about the measures before these were announced by Tsipras. This was confirmed by several MPs in the German weekly magazine Der Spiegel. Tsakalotos, however, insisted that Greece has the right to decide on pension and tax policies.

During the high-level meeting, Tsipras said: “the projections for the Greek economy are extremely positive for next year”.

“We want it to heal the wounds of the crisis and to alleviate all those who have over these difficult years made huge sacrifices in the name of Europe,” added Tsipras.

Since the European Council, Merkel made clear that she is unwilling to take a position in the dispute over whether Athens’ initiative to hand out Christmas bonuses is compatible with its bailout obligations. Instead, Merkel passed the issue to the Eurozone’s finance ministers and mainly to the three institutions handling negotiations with Greece (European Commission, European Central Bank and the IMF).

“I am not a finance minister,” Merkel said.

“Don’t take initiatives without asking,” Merkel added, explaining that these actions can have negative effects on trust between institutions and the Greek government. Furthermore, Merkel made her discomfort about Germany’s Finance Minister Wolfgang Schauble, more than evident.

According to Berlin sources, the Greek programme will not survive without the presence of the IMF.

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Over a late dinner in Brussels on December 15, the 27 European Union leaders (not including British Prime Minister Theresa May) discussed their plan of action for when the UK activates Brexit.

According to the conclusions adopted by the informal EU Council meeting, the guidelines for Brexit negotiations will initially be agreed by the heads of state and government. These guidelines will aim to define the framework for negotiations and will be dependent on the format that the UK government will use to trigger the Article 50 – the formal mechanism for leaving the EU – in accordance with the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). This will be subjected to all changes needed, within the negotiations process.

The General Affairs Council will then authorise the official opening of the negotiations, adopting the corresponding a recommendation by the European Commission and its chief negotiator, Michel Barnier. Following the EU Council’s endorsement, Barnier will have the first word as negotiations chief on behalf of the EU, after a decision that was strongly criticised by outgoing European Parliament President Martin Schulz during his last European Council press conference.

Schulz warned the EU member states that the European Parliament needs to be fully involved throughout the Brexit negotiation process. “If we are not adequately involved, we may not be able to give our consent. And in this situation the UK would face the hardest Brexit possible,” he said.

A role in the Brexit negotiations will be given to the Council’s forthcoming presidencies, while a representative of the rotating Presidency of the Council will stand alongside the Berlaymont team.

The Council and Coreper (the permanent representatives from each member state, who, in effect, are their country’s ambassadors to the EU) will keep a close eye on Barnier’s team, along with representatives of the 27 member states on a highly technocratic level, via their Sherpas (advisors and technocrats) and Permanent Representatives. Representatives of the

Even though European Parliament will only be actively involved in the European Council’s preparatory meetings, Barnier will keep the European Parliament “closely and regularly informed”. The entire negotiation is expected to remain at an “exchange of views” level.

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On 19 December 2016, the Council prolonged the economic sanctions targeting specific sectors of the Russian economy until 31 July 2017.

These measures were introduced on 31 July 2014 initially for one year in response to Russia's actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine. They were reinforced in September 2014. They target the financial, energy and defence sectors, and the area of dual-use goods.

On 19 March 2015, the European Council agreed to link the duration of the sanctions to the complete implementation of the Minsk agreements, which was foreseen to take place by 31 December 2015.

Since the Minsk agreements were not fully implemented by 31 December 2015, the Council extended the sanctions until 31 July 2016, and on 1 July 2016, until 31 January 2017. Having assessed the implementation of the Minsk agreements at the European Council meeting of 15 December, the EU heads of state and government paved the way to renew the sanctions for a further six months, until 31 July 2017. The Council formalised this decision on 19 December 2016 by written procedure and as it is the rule for all decisions on prolongation of restrictive measures, unanimously.

The economic sanctions prolonged by this decision notably:

• limit access to EU primary and secondary capital markets for 5 major Russian majority state-owned financial institutions and their majority-owned subsidiaries established outside of the EU, as well as three major Russian energy and three defence companies
• impose an export and import ban on trade in arms
• establish an export ban for dual-use goods for military use or military end users in Russia
• curtail Russian access to certain sensitive technologies and services  that can be used for oil production and exploration

In addition to these economic sanctions, several EU measures are also in place in response to the crisis in Ukraine including:

• targeted individual restrictive measures, namely a visa ban and an asset freeze, currently against 152 people and 37 entities until 15 March 2017;
• restrictive measures in response to the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol, limited to the territory of Crimea and Sevastopol, currently in place until 23 June 2017.

On 20 December 2016, the Permanent Representatives Committee (Coreper) confirmed, on behalf of the Council, the agreement reached on 13 December with the European Parliament on visa liberalisation for Georgia.

The agreement provides for visa-free travel for EU citizens when travelling to the territory of Georgia and for citizens of this country when travelling to the EU, for a period of stay of 90 days in any 180-day period.

The institutions take the view that the entry into force of visa liberalisation for Georgia should be at the same time as the entry into force of the new "suspension mechanism".

"The Council has demonstrated its strong commitment to visa-free travel for Georgian citizens, taking into account Georgia's hard work. The Presidency believes that the path of credible reforms is the right one and should be encouraged. It was the recent upgrade of the suspension mechanism that allowed us to inject a new momentum into talks on visa liberalisation with countries fulfilling all criteria. At the same time, this upgrade will help ensure that those criteria will continue to be met."

Robert Kaliňák, Minister for the Interior of Slovakia and President of the Council.Next steps

Now that the agreement has been confirmed by the Permanent Representatives Committee, on behalf of the Council, the regulation will be submitted to the European Parliament for a vote at first reading, and to the Council for adoption.

Background

The proposal for visa liberalisation for Georgia was published by the Commission on 9 March 2016. The Commission concluded that the country had met all the benchmarks for the exemption of the visa requirement.

Once the new visa regime for Georgia is formally adopted, it will  move the country from Annex I of Regulation 539/2001 (countries whose nationals need a visa to enter the Schengen area) to Annex II of the same regulation (visa free countries), thus providing for visa-free travel for EU citizens when travelling to the territory of Georgia and for citizens of this country when travelling to the EU, for a period of stay of 90 days in any 180-day period.

In the context of the current migratory situation in the European Union and taking into account the Commission's proposals for visa liberalisation of Georgia, Ukraine, Turkey and Kosovo and the discussions with member states, the Commission decided on 4 May 2016 to present a proposal to amend Regulation 539/2001 to revise the current suspension mechanism.

The Council and the European Parliament reached an agreement on the new suspension mechanism on 7 December 2016.

Ireland and the United Kingdom will not be subject to the application of these measures, in accordance with the protocols annexed to the EU treaties. The visa regime of these member states remains subject to their national legislation.

On 20 December 2016, the Permanent Representatives Committee (Coreper) confirmed, on behalf of the Council, the agreement reached with the European Parliament on the proposal for a directive on control of the acquisition and possession of weapons, which reviews and completes existing directive 91/477/EEC.

"Current European laws on firearms have been in place since 1991 and in the aftermath of the series of terrorist attacks in Europe, the need to address shortcomings in existing legislation has become ever more urgent " said Robert Kaliňák, Minister for the Interior of Slovakia and President of the Council. "This agreement provides for tighter controls which will help prevent the acquisition of firearms by terrorist and criminal organisations"

 Robert Kaliňák, Minister for the Interior of Slovakia and President of the Council

The amendments which address risks for public safety and security focus on: 

Enhanced traceability of firearms 

The revision strengthens the rules on marking of firearms, by providing, among other things, for a new obligation to also mark all their essential components. This harmonization of the rules for the marking of firearms and establishing the mutual recognition of marks among Member States will improve the traceability of firearms used in criminal activities, including those which have been assembled from components acquired separately. 

In turn, this information also has to be recorded in national data-filing systems. For this to happen, member states will now have to ensure that dealers and brokers register any transaction with firearms by electronic means and without any undue delay. 

Measures on deactivation and reactivation or conversion of firearms 

The rules for deactivation of firearms have been strengthened, especially by providing for the classification of deactivated firearms under the so-called category C, that is, firearms subject to declaration. Until now, deactivated firearms have not been subject to the requirements set by the directive. 

Moreover, the revision includes a new category of salute and acoustic weapons. These are live firearms that have been converted to blank firing ones, for example, for use in theatres or television. These weapons were so far not included in the scope of the directive, and so they posed a serious risk for security: in the absence of more stringent national provisions, such firearms could be purchased freely. Given that their reconversion to live ones was often possible with limited efforts, this posed a risk. For example, such firearms have been used in the Paris terrorist attacks. The new wording of the directive ensures that these weapons remain registered under the same category as the firearm from which they have been converted. 

Banning civilian use of the most dangerous semi-automatic firearms 

Besides strengthening the rules for their acquisition, some dangerous semi-automatic firearms have now been added to category A and thus prohibited for civilian use. This is the case of short semi-automatic firearms with loading devices over 20 rounds and long semi-automatic firearms with loading devices over 10 rounds. Similarly, long firearms that can be easily concealed, for example by means of a folding or telescopic stock, will now also be prohibited. 

Stricter rules for the acquisition and possession of the most dangerous firearms 

The most dangerous firearms of category A can only be acquired and possessed on the basis of an exemption granted by the relevant member state. The rules for granting such exemptions have now been significantly strengthened. Possible grounds, such as national defence or protection of critical infrastructures, are now set out in a limitative list and the exemption may only be granted where this is not contrary to public security or public order. 

When a firearm of category A is required for a sports-shooting discipline, it can only be acquired under strict rules relating among other things to proven practice recognised by an official shooting sport federation. 

Concurrently provision of article 7 para 4a gives the possibility to confirm authorisations for semi-automatic firearms (new point 6, 7 or 8 of category A) legally acquired and registered before this directive will come in force.

Improving the exchange of relevant information between member states

A new provision has been added, according to which the Commission shall provide for a delegated act to set up a common system for Member States for systematic exchange of information by electronic means which strengthening the data collection system and examining the interoperability between information systems created at national level.. This information will concern the authorisations granted for the transfer of firearms to another member state and information with regard to refusals to grant authorisations to acquire and possess firearms. 

The directive sets out minimum rules and does not prevent member states from adopting and applying stricter rules. 

Next steps

Now that the agreement has been confirmed by the Permanent Representatives Committee, on behalf of the Council, the directive will be submitted to the European Parliament for a vote at first reading, and to the Council for adoption. The Council will inform the Parliament formally via the usual letter, with a view to reaching an agreement at first reading.

Background

Council directive 91/477/EEC on control of the acquisition and possession of weapons was originally designed as a measure to balance internal market objectives and security imperatives regarding "civil" firearms. 

The amending proposal was submitted by the European Commission on 18 November 2015 against the backdrop of a series of terrorist acts that took place in Europe and which brought to light gaps in the implementation of the directive.  The current review is a continuation of the 2008 revision and also aligns EU legislation with the provisions on the UN Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms. 

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

Saturday 17 December 2016
Wrocław (Poland)
17.15 Speech at the closing ceremony of the European Capital of Culture Wrocław 2016

Tuesday 20 December 2016
13.00 Meeting with European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker (Berlaymont)

We, the participants of the EU-Western Balkans Ministerial Forum on Justice and Home Affairs in Brdo on 15-16 December 2016, acknowledge the pressing need to counter the illicit trafficking and accumulation of firearms, their parts and essential components and ammunition in the Western Balkans and the EU and reaffirm our strong commitment to work together towards joint solutions, in order to address common security challenges affecting both the EU and the whole of the Western Balkans region. 

Building on the common priorities identified in the Action Plan on Illicit Trafficking of Firearms 2015-2019 we adopted in 2014, and the EU Strategy on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), which identified the Western Balkans as a main priority, we are committed to implement the following actions and pursue the following goals: 

• Systematically associate Western Balkans partners in operational actions related to the Western Balkans in the context of the EU policy cycle priorities on the fight against firearms trafficking
• Set up joint investigative teams, coherently with the initiatives aiming at enhancing operational law enforcement cooperation.
• Carry out at least one joint action per year focused on the illicit trafficking in firearms and explosives with the participation of law enforcement agencies of EU Member States and Western Balkan partners and the involvement of Europol and European Border and Coast Guard.
• Enhance the exchange of  information  at regional level and with EU Member States, involving Europol on the illicit production, stockpiling and trafficking of firearms and ammunition, as well as explosives and precursors, aiming also to develop more effective investigative and intelligence standards.
• Explore voluntary surrender firearms programs throughout the Western Balkans, taking into the account the lessons learned from previous experiences. 
• Welcome the future secondment of liaison officers by Europol in the region.
• Enhancing security and safety of stockpiles, taking into account that unauthorized access to stockpiles of firearms, ammunition, explosives and precursors should be vigorously prevented and all transgressions promptly investigated and sanctioned.
• Support CEPOL dedicated common training programs to strengthen capacity building and awareness about the fight against illicit trafficking in firearms.
• Extend the use of all available tools for tracing firearms, including iTRACE, iARMS and the Europol's databases while ensuring the full use of the Europol Focal Point on weapons and explosives.
• Improve the collection and exchange of statistics concerning illicit production, and trafficking of firearms and ammunition.
• Make full use of the EU supported South-Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC).

Regular assessment of the implementation of the above mentioned actions is necessary so as to allow the EU Member States to leverage this information in the framework of the EU Policy Cycle. Participants of the 2017 EU-Western Balkans Ministerial Forum on Justice and Home Affairs are invited to make an assessment of achievements in the above mentioned areas. 

Done at Brdo on 15-16 December 2016

Holiday recess

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

Delegations

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP