European Union

European Commission head Jean-Claude Juncker called for a common EU defence headquarters in September after the Brexit vote, resurrecting an idea that had circulated in the EU for years. Today, the European Union has approved plans for a military headquarters to coordinate overseas security operation, foreign and defence ministers of the 28 member states (Britain having long opposed it) "unanimously" backed the project.

The new MPCC (Military Planning Conduct and Capability facility) will command the EU's non-executive military missions. The facility will initially run three operations - civil-military training missions in Mali, the Central African Republic and Somalia - which do not involve the use of force, other than in self-defence. The MPCC will initially have a small staff of around 30 and come under the EU's existing military structures.

But top EU officials, including Ms Mogherini, have had to repeatedly issue reassurances that the bloc is not going to undercut NATO as the primary defence for Europe. Besides Britain, many of the former Communist states of eastern Europe such as Poland and Hungary have argued consistently that NATO must come first, given the need for US support in facing a more assertive Russia.

The EU has also mounted Operation Sophia in the central Mediterranean, which can use force to stop migrant smugglers, and Operation Atalanta, part of international antipiracy forces off the Horn of Africa, these executive operations have their own command centres which will remain separate.

Tag: MPCCMogheriniCSDP

Towards a new trade framework between the EU and Turkey and the modernisation of the Customs Union
Report on the 2016 Commission Report on Serbia
Report on the 2016 Commission Report on Montenegro
Report on the 2016 Commission Report on Kosovo
Report on the 2016 Commission Report on the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

On 9 March 2017, Parliament’s lead MEP on the reform of the Dublin system, Swedish liberal Cecilia Wikström, will present her draft report to the Civil Liberties Committee.

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

On 9 March 2017, Parliament’s lead MEP on the reform of the Dublin system, Swedish liberal Cecilia Wikström, will present her draft report to the Civil Liberties Committee.

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

General : For this year's International Women's Day the European Parliament highlights the issue of women’s economic empowerment in a series of events. On Wednesday 8 March Spanish Green MEP Ernest Urtasun, author of a report on equality, answers your questions during a Facebook live session. Women are still often paid less, receive lower pensions and are less represented in top corporate posts and politics. Join our debate on Facebook and follow all Parliament events on International Women's Day.

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

General : For this year's International Women's Day the European Parliament highlights the issue of women’s economic empowerment in a series of events. On Wednesday 8 March Spanish Green MEP Ernest Urtasun, author of a report on equality, answers your questions during a Facebook live session. Women are still often paid less, receive lower pensions and are less represented in top corporate posts and politics. Join our debate on Facebook and follow all Parliament events on International Women's Day.

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

On 9 March, the subcommittee will discuss the topic "CSDP missions and operations: Learning the lessons!?" with Giovanni Cremonini, Chair of the EEAS inter-service CSDP Lessons Working Group. With the EU having established, over recent years, a coherent mechanism for identifying best practices in CSDP missions, primarily through its Annual CSDP Lessons report and the associated processes, the committee will use this opportunity to take stock of the progress achieved and explore the way forward.

Further information
Draft agenda and meeting documents
Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

General : Parliament President Antonio Tajani was in Slovenia on 3 March where he opened the new Europe House in Ljubljana with European Commission President, Jean-Claude Juncker. At the opening Tajani said: "We need to strengthen our European identity and sense of belonging. We need to be united if we want to compete at the European level in a globalised world.”

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

General : Parliament President Antonio Tajani was in Slovenia on 3 March where he opened the new Europe House in Ljubljana with European Commission President, Jean-Claude Juncker. At the opening Tajani said: "We need to strengthen our European identity and sense of belonging. We need to be united if we want to compete at the European level in a globalised world.”

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

https://tvnewsroom.consilium.europa.eu/uploads/council-images/thumbs/uploads/council-images/remote/http_7e18a1c646f5450b9d6d-a75424f262e53e74f9539145894f4378.r8.cf3.rackcdn.com/70adc0e0-6da0-11e5-9347-bc764e083742_245.26_thumb_169_1486654020_1486654020_129_97shar_c1.jpg

EU Foreign Affairs ministers meet on 6 March 2017 in Brussels to have a joint session of defence and foreign ministers on implementation of the EU global strategy in the area of security and defence. Foreign Ministers are also discussing EU-Egypt relations with the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sameh Shoukry. The Council is also discussing migration, the Western Balkans and the Middle East peace process.

Download this video here.

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EU Ministers of Agriculture and Fisheries meet on 6 March 2017 in Brussels to discuss the future of the common agricultural policy, the multi-annual plan for small pelagic species in the Adriatic Sea, dual quality of foodstuffs, and the EU animal welfare platform.

Download this video here.

It seems possible that, if the necessary conditions are created, British voters could decide not to leave the European Union at all.

And Ireland should work to create those conditions. The terms for Brexit set out by Theresa May will do incalculable damage to the island of Ireland – politically, emotionally and economically. We cannot simply wait for this to happen. While seeking to mitigate the effects of ‘hard’ Brexit, we must also do everything we can to ensure that there is no Brexit.

May has outlined the future she wants for Britain: out of the single market, out of the customs union, and ’control‘ over immigration. But she has avoided a few questions that remain open: the financial terms of the divorce; the status of EU citizens living in the United Kingdom, and vice versa; and two aspects of a future EU-UK trade agreement (if there ever is one), namely arbitrating disputes and addressing the issue of third-country imports getting into the EU via the UK.

It is unlikely that the Article 50 letter that May will send to the European Council President this month will tell us much more about the UK’s negotiating position than January’s Lancaster House speech did. So it is time to start thinking how the EU is going to respond.

The European Council is supposed to meet in April to agree on the guidance it will give to EU negotiators for discussions with the UK, which are scheduled to start in June. Every EU head of government needs to accept the orientation. For Ireland this April meeting is potentially the most important European meeting a Taoiseach (Irish prime minister) will ever attend.

The crucial thing for the European Council is to work out is what negotiators call the ‘BATNA’ – the best alternative to a negotiated agreement. It is important to have an alternative ready because there is every possibility that no agreement will be reached within the two-year timeframe.

“Ireland must use its imagination and ingenuity to find out a way out for the UK and the EU”

Mrs May has said that, for her, no deal at all is preferable to a bad deal. Her BATNA is no deal at all.

‘No deal’ would mean that the UK simply crashes out of the EU overnight, sometime before the end of March 2019. This scenario would mean an overnight halt to flights, to trade and to commerce. There would be immediate, massive currency instability.

From the perspective of pure negotiating tactics, May could be simply voicing threats. But to do so without a well-crafted fallback plan is something the UK cannot really afford. It vindicates former prime minister Tony Blair’s description of the UK government as “not driving the (Brexit) bus”, but rather “being driven” by partisan and ideological forces it has not tried to control. Without a real alternative to a hard Brexit, the government is on autopilot, heading towards a cliff.

The EU country worst affected by the UK crashing out of the EU with no deal is, of course, Ireland. So Ireland must use its imagination and ingenuity to find out a way out for the UK and the EU.

However, it is reasonable to ask whether the EU should offer UK voters another option.

If the UK government is unable or unwilling, because of domestic politics, to work out a responsible BATNA, the EU should do it on the government’s behalf. The 27 remaining member states should adopt it alongside their line-by-line response to the UK’s negotiating demands.

Having a BATNA would also strengthen EU’s own negotiating position. It would provide something with which an emerging deal could be compared. It would also provide a basis on which the UK could reconsider its decision of 23 June 2016, if it wants to do that. As Blair said, British voters have a ”right to change their minds”. After all, politicians can change their minds – so why not voters?

If British voters do ever change their minds about Brexit, it will happen slowly and incrementally. Parts of the Brexit scenario, obscured during the referendum campaign, will become clearer during the negotiations. The unavoidable interconnections between the EU’s freedoms and rules will emerge. It will be in the EU’s side of interest to ensure that there is maximum public understanding of the unfolding negotiations. Transparency will benefit the EU.

If the alternative to EU rules is no rules at all, citizens in both the EU countries and the UK may come to see the EU membership in a different light. They may, for the first time, see the EU as something that simplifies – not complicates – their lives.

In my view, the EU’s BATNA is an offer to continue the UK’s EU membership under the same terms as in 2015.

And these terms were generous. They allowed the UK to opt out of the euro, of Schengen, of police and judicial cooperation, of the Stability and Growth Pact, and of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The UK itself had also decided that it would have a referendum on any new EU powers. In that sense the UK was already having its cake while eating it, before even deciding opting for Brexit. These terms should be left on the table by the EU – but without the unjustifiable UK budget rebate.

At this stage the UK would reject such an offer. But, as the inevitable consequences of Brexit become clearer, British public opinion might begin to see merit in it, particularly when the offer is compared with the costs of simply crashing out of the EU overnight.

“Keeping the offer of resumed British membership on the table would be good politics and good economics for the EU”

Resistance to such an offer is more likely to come from some EU member states. Some members will point to the UK’s insatiable demands when it was a member, for opt-outs, rebates and exceptions. They will recall former French president Charles de Gaulle’s original veto of British membership, and his foresight that the UK would never settle in as a member. They may also argue that offering the UK a way back, after it has triggered Article 50, could encourage others to try the same approach.

But if these members sit back and think about it they will, I believe, conclude that an EU with the UK is better than one without, even if a trade deal were to be eventually concluded. Keeping the offer of resumed British membership on the table would be good politics and good economics for the EU.

The terms of the Lisbon Treaty do create some problems for this approach. But they are not insurmountable.

Article 50 (3) says a country that has sought to leave the EU under that article will be automatically excluded from the EU two years after it has triggered Article 50 unless the EU side “unanimously decides to extend the period”.

Article 50 (5) says that if a state that has withdrawn from the EU asks to re-join, it has to do so under Article 49. This means the application would have to be ratified by all existing members.

Others may argue that the UK cannot withdraw its Article 50 letter once it has sent it. This is a matter for the European Court of Justice to decide, but Article 6.8 of the Vienna Convention on treaties explicitly allows revocation of a notice of intention to withdraw from a treaty.

These problems are real but manageable. A political declaration by the European Council in April would create a realistic basis.

The real debate about Brexit – and whether it will really happen – has barely begun.

IMAGE CREDIT: Bigstock – CharliePhoto

The post The best alternative to a ‘hard’ Brexit may be no Brexit at all appeared first on Europe’s World.

General : On the occasion of International Women's Day Parliament calls attention to women's economic situation. Other issues being dealt with this week include the reform of EU asylum rules and the environmental impact of the production of palm oil as well as a debate on the rule of law in Poland. In addition political groups and parliamentary committees prepare for next week's plenary session.

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

General : On the occasion of International Women's Day Parliament calls attention to women's economic situation. Other issues being dealt with this week include the reform of EU asylum rules and the environmental impact of the production of palm oil as well as a debate on the rule of law in Poland. In addition political groups and parliamentary committees prepare for next week's plenary session.

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Place:       Europa building, Brussels
Chair:       Mr Louis Grech, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for European Affairs of Malta

All times are approximate and subject to change

+/- 08.30
Arrivals

+/- 08.45
Doorstep by Deputy Prime Minister Grech

+/- 10.00
Beginning of Council meeting (Roundtable)
Adoption of legislative A items (public session)
Adoption of non-legislative A items

Preparation of the European Council of 9-10 March 2017
European Semester
Implementation of the better law-making agreement

+/- 12.30
Press conference (live streaming)
Main press room, Justus Lipsius building

Introduction 

1.           In accordance with the 15 December 2016 European Council Conclusions and guidance contained therein, the Council has reviewed progress in the implementation of its conclusions of 17 October and 14 November 2016. It welcomes the initial advances made, as set out below, in fulfilling through a comprehensive set of actions the EU's level of ambition derived from the EU Global Strategy in the area of security and defence. It calls for further work and guidance and agrees to revert to these matters in May, ahead of the June European Council. 

2.           The Council recalls that this should contribute to enhancing the Union's ability to act as a security provider and to enhance the Common Security and Defence Policy, as well as its global strategic role and its capacity to act autonomously when and where necessary and with partners wherever possible. 

3.           The Council welcomes the ongoing work on the implementation of the European Defence Action Plan by the Commission, in close cooperation with the Member States. It also welcomes the Commission's intention, included in its Communication dated 30 November 2016, to present further proposals in the first semester of 2017 for the establishment of a European Defence Fund including a window on the joint development of capabilities to be commonly agreed by the Member States, and a research window (whose first step is the launch of the Preparatory Action for defence-related research) to be examined under the next Multiannual Financial Framework. The Council recalls the invitation made by the European Council in December 2016 to the European Investment Bank to examine steps with a view to supporting investments in defence research and development activities.

The Council also reiterates, in line with its Conclusions of 14 November 2016, the need to enhance the effectiveness of CSDP and the development and maintenance of Member States' capabilities, supported by a more integrated, sustainable, innovative and competitive European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), which also contributes to jobs, growth and innovation across the EU and can enhance Europe's strategic autonomy, strengthening its ability to act with partners. The Council recalls that these efforts should be inclusive, with equal opportunities for defence industry in the EU, balanced and in full compliance with EU law. 

4.           The Council furthermore welcomes the swift action in follow-up to the Council conclusions of 6 December 2016 implementing all areas of the Joint Declaration signed in Warsaw by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In this regard, it calls for further work, in full respect of the principles of inclusiveness, reciprocity and the autonomy of the EU's decision-making processes, and to report back on progress in June 2017.  

Improving CSDP crisis management structures 

5.           Today, the Council approves the Concept Note on the operational planning and conduct capabilities for CSDP missions and operations. Further to the December European Council Conclusions and in line with its Conclusions of November 2016, this Note contains measures to improve the EU's capacity to react in a faster, more effective and more seamless manner, building on existing structures and in view of enhancing civilian-military synergies, as part of the EU's Comprehensive Approach. On this basis, the Council agrees in particular: 

• To establish, as a short term objective, a Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) within the EU Military Staff in Brussels which will be responsible at the strategic level for the operational planning and conduct of non-executive military missions, working under the political control and strategic guidance of the Political and Security Committee. The newly created MPCC will work in parallel and in a coordinated way with the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC).
• That the Director General of the EU Military Staff will be the Director of the MPCC and in that capacity will assume the functions of missions' commander for non-executive military missions, including the three EU Training Missions deployed in the Central African Republic, Mali and Somalia, in line with the agreed Terms of Reference.  
• To invite the High Representative to propose consolidated terms of reference of the EU Military Staff, as well as to propose a Council Decision reflecting the above arrangements and amending the Council Decisions of the CSDP missions concerned. 
• To bring together civilian and military expertise in key mission support areas within a Joint Support Coordination Cell at the Brussels level, in order to work on a daily basis to further strengthen and enable effective civilian/military coordination and cooperation in the operational planning and conduct of CSDP civilian and non-executive military missions. This would further contribute to the full implementation of the EU's Comprehensive Approach, while respecting the respective civilian and military chains of command and the distinct sources of financing. 
• To review the establishment of the MPCC and the Joint Support Coordination Cell one year after becoming fully operational, but no later than by the end of 2018, based on a report by the High Representative. This review should be prepared in full consultation with the Member States and would not prejudge any political decisions to be taken.  

The Council also agrees to proposals on strategic foresight and oversight contained in the Concept Note and requests the High Representative, in cooperation with the Commission as appropriate, to proceed with their implementation. 

Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) 

6.           To strengthen Europe's security and defence in today's challenging geopolitical environment, the Council agrees on the need to continue work on an inclusive Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) based on a modular approach. It should be open to all Member States who are willing to make the necessary binding commitments and meet the criteria, based on articles 42.6 and 46 and Protocol 10 of the Treaty. The Council recognises that PESCO could significantly contribute to fulfilling the EU's Level of Ambition including with a view to the most demanding missions and that it could facilitate the development of Member States' defence capabilities and strengthen European defence cooperation, while making full use of the Treaties. It notes that any capabilities developed through PESCO will remain owned and operated by Member States. It recalls that Member States have a single set of forces that they can use in other frameworks. Underlining the responsibility and competence of the Member States in the area of defence, it stresses that PESCO should help generate new collaborative efforts, cooperation and projects. 

7.           To this end, the Council invites the Member States, supported by the EEAS and the European Defence Agency (EDA), to continue working in order to further consider and develop: 

• An agreement on a shared understanding of the common commitments, goals and criteria on the basis of the relevant provisions of the Treaty, as well as the governance model. 
• The possible projects and initiatives that Member States are willing to pursue through PESCO including in a modular way and while making use of ongoing projects and making new commitments in the area of defence investment, with a view to tackling recognised shortfalls and addressing EU and Member States' priorities in the field of capabilities; improving the deployability and operational availability of their armed forces; and increasing their interoperability by pooling and sharing existing capabilities. 

This work would feed into the preparation of the notification to the Council and the High Representative and of the Council Decision establishing PESCO. 

8.           While noting that they are standalone initiatives, the Council underlines the need to reflect on the possible links between PESCO and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD). The Council recognises that more work is needed to explore the potential link to the Commission's proposals to establish a European Defence Fund, including on how PESCO projects and initiatives could benefit from its mechanisms, which will be subject to further decisions to be taken on the setting up and final structure of the fund. 

9.           The Council agrees to revert in May 2017 in order to provide further political guidance on the possible decision-making. 

Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) 

10.        The Council welcomes the work launched to develop the principles and scope of a Member States-driven CARD to deepen cooperation in defence, including by fostering capability development addressing shortfalls, and ensure more optimal use, including coherence, of defence spending plans. It stresses the importance to develop through CARD a more structured way to deliver the key capabilities needed in Europe, based on greater transparency, political visibility and commitment from Member States, while avoiding any unnecessary additional administrative effort by Member States and EU institutions. The Council stresses the need to ensure coherence between the CARD and the NATO Defence Planning Process where requirements overlap while recognising the different nature of the two organisations and their respective responsibilities. The Council stresses that CARD, as an overarching tool, needs to build on and make best use of existing processes and tools and should draw as much as possible on available information generated through them. 

11.        The Council highlights that CARD would be implemented on a voluntary basis and in full respect of Member States' prerogatives and commitments in defence, including, where it applies, in collective defence, and their defence planning processes, and taking into account external threats and security challenges across the EU. 

 The Council stresses the importance of bringing greater transparency and political visibility to the European capability landscape. In this regard, it underlines that CARD should provide an overarching assessment on capability-related issues contributing to political guidance by the Council. The Council therefore underlines that CARD should help Member States deliver on critical capabilities notably on the basis of the capability priorities agreed through the EU's Capability Development Plan. It should also provide Member States with a forum for coordinating and discussing their national defence planning - including in terms of defence spending plans, taking into account the commitments made by the European Council in December 2016 - in a more structured way that builds on the voluntary measures set out in the Policy Framework for Systematic and Long-Term Defence Cooperation. While noting that they are standalone initiatives, the work on CARD should be undertaken in coherence with the implementation of the European Defence Action Plan. 

12.        The Council welcomes the idea of regular and dedicated meetings of Defence Ministers', initially every two years, and more frequently if so decided. The EDA should play a key role in CARD to provide the overarching objective assessment and supporting analysis in the form of a written report to Defence Ministers, while making full use of existing tools and acting also as CARD secretariat. 

13.        The Council agrees to the parameters of CARD set out above and invites the High Representative/Head of the Agency, in close cooperation with Member States, to develop more detailed proposals on the scope, methods and content of CARD by June, notably in terms of interaction with Member States, with a view to preparing the establishment of CARD by the end of 2017. The first full CARD should be implemented based notably on the revised Capability Development Plan priorities as well as other existing processes and tools as of 2018. 

Developing Civilian Capabilities 

14.        The Council underlines the importance of taking work forward swiftly on developing civilian capabilities. It agrees on the need to enhance responsiveness in order to ensure more effective, rapid and flexible deployment of civilian CSDP missions, which play an important role as a pillar of the EU's Comprehensive Approach. In this context, the Council notes ongoing discussions, including on a standing capacity, pre-configured specialised teams of experts and contingents of police and/or other professional categories, and revisiting the Civilian Response Team (CRT) mechanism. It requests the High Representative and, where relevant, the Commission, working together with Member States, to present concrete proposals to enhance responsiveness in view of their approval ahead of the June European Council. It also agrees on the need to further review the Feira priority areas of civilian CSDP missions. The Council underlines the importance of strengthened EU-UN synergies, compatibility and interoperability also in this field. It will revert to these issues in May. 

Implementation in various other areas 

15.        As an important contribution to allow the EU to provide capacity building in an effective, responsible and seamless way, the Council looks forward to the swift finalisation of legislative work on the proposal to amend the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace. The Council recalls its Conclusions of November 2016 about the need to fully cover all requirements to further support partner countries in preventing and managing crises on their own, including those in the context of non-executive CSDP missions. In this context, it calls to continue the ongoing preparatory work to identify the needs in the area of Capacity Building in support of Security and Development (CBSD). The Council reiterates the flexible geographical scope of CBSD and calls to identify and develop new projects. The Council further recalls its proposal to work on a dedicated instrument for providing capacity building. The Council will revert to CBSD in May 2017. 

16.        The Council welcomes the first reflections and looks forward to further work on strengthening the relevance, usability and deployability of the EU's Rapid Response toolbox including the EU Battlegroups - particularly to reinforce their modularity, their preparation and their effective financing. As part of this, further consideration should be given to the particular modalities and common costs and other financial provisions for rapid response operations in general and the EU Battlegroups in particular. 

The Council will revert to the issue in May based on consolidated proposals to be presented by the High Representative in close consultation with the Member States. Regarding their financial aspects, these proposals could contribute to the comprehensive review of the Athena mechanism foreseen by the end of 2017 and to be discussed in the relevant framework. 

17.        The Council reiterates the importance of working with its partners, in particular the UN, NATO, OSCE, African Union, League of Arab States and ASEAN, as well as strategic partners and other partner countries, within our neighbourhood and more globally, with due respect to the institutional framework and decision-making autonomy of the EU, and the principle of inclusiveness. In this regard, the Council recalls the need to take CSDP partnerships forward and invites the High Representative to present options before May 2017 for a more strategic approach to CSDP partners as set out in the November 2016 Council Conclusions. 

18.        The Council welcomes the review and organisational steps taken to promote an increased EU civil-military intelligence-based situational awareness to inform strategic foresight. It supports further steps to be taken in view of a future increase of staff, logistics and infrastructure, if deemed necessary, and will revert to the issue in June. 

19.        The Council, recalling the need for a timely implementation of the review of the Capability Development Plan by spring 2018, welcomes that the EDA is developing proposals on the improvement of the EU Capability Development process. In this regard, it also welcomes the ongoing work on the revision of the Requirements Catalogue. The work being taken forward by Member States within EDA on capability priorities, overarching R&T priorities and Key Strategic Activities will help to guide future investments and inform the implementation of the European Defence Action Plan. The Council further recalls the need for the expeditious implementation of actions taken forward within the EDA related to critical enablers and security of supply based on Member States' political commitments and programme/sector specific agreements. 

On 6 March the Council adopted conclusions setting out the progress achieved in implementing the EU global strategy in the area of security and defence. The conclusions assess what has been done to implement  the various lines of action agreed by the European Council on 15 December 2016. They form the basis of a report for the European Council of 9 and 10 March 2017. 

"EU foreign and defence ministers meeting jointly today all gave a very clear message: we are progressing steadily towards strengthened defence cooperation and we will continue to do more. This is about protecting our citizens. The European Union has unique tools to help Europeans to take more responsibility for their own security, and to do more effectively.  This is what we are doing with our work in security and defence."

 Federica Mogherini, High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

The Council also approved a concept note on the operational planning and conduct capabilities for CSDP missions and operations, which contains measures to improve the EU's capacity to react in a faster, more effective and more seamless manner, building on existing structures and in view of enhancing civilian-military synergies, as part of the EU's comprehensive approach. 

These measures include the establishment of a military planning and conduct capability (MPCC), within the existing EU Military Staff of the European External Action Service, for the planning and conduct of non-executive military missions. The Director General of the EU Military Staff will be the Director of the MPCC and in that capacity will assume command of non-executive military CSDP missions (currently, the EU military training missions in Somalia, in Central Africa and in Mali). This will allow the mission commanders in the field to concentrate on the specific activities of their mission, with better support provided from Brussels. 

The MPCC will work under the political control and strategic guidance of the Political and Security Committee (PSC), which is composed of EU member states' ambassadors and is based in Brussels. The MPCC will work closely with its existing civilian counterpart, the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) through a joint support coordination cell. This cell will be able to share expertise, knowledge and best practices on issues relevant to  both military and civilian missions, as well as capabilities when civilian and military missions are simultaneously deployed in the same area, including  medical support or protective measures. 

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And yet. A few hours later Fillon was back on television, the most relaxed he has looked since the “fake jobs” scandal emerged. Withdraw? No way. He saw the difficulties, he said, but he was sure of one thing: “there is no alternative”. He would go on and on. The crowds were his validation. He had the primary votes, the legitimacy. His conscience was clear. Only he could decide to step aside; the party traitors could not force him out.

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On 6 March 2017, the Council adopted a decision on the signing of an agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Chile on trade in organic products. 

Thanks to the agreement, the EU and Chile will soon recognise the equivalence of their respective rules and control systems as regards organic production. In practice, this means that organic food that is produced in the EU and covered by the agreement will be able to be marketed in Chile without further controls. The same will apply to a number of Chilean organic products in the EU. 

The agreement will also provide for a system of co-operation, exchange of information and dispute settlement in organic trade. 

The organic sector is growing steadily and rapidly and is a great resource for European agriculture and the wider economy. This agreement with Chile will give a boost to EU organic production and exports, and so help generate growth and create jobs. The Council warmly welcomes it.

Roderick Galdes, Parliamentary Secretary for Agriculture, Fisheries, and Animal rights

This agreement with Chile aims at encouraging trade in organic products, thus contributing to the development of the organic sector in the EU. It also aims at improving protection for the respective organic logos, and enhancing regulatory cooperation between the EU and Chile on issues related to organic production. 

It will apply to EU organic products such as: unprocessed plant products, live animals or unprocessed animal products (including honey), aquaculture products and seaweeds, processed agricultural products for use as food (including wine), processed agricultural products for use as feed, vegetative propagating material and seeds for cultivation. 

On the other hand, the EU will recognise as equivalent the following products from Chile: unprocessed plant products, honey, processed agricultural products for use as food (including wine), vegetative propagating material and seeds for cultivation. 

The agreement with Chile is the first of the "new generation" agreements in trade in organic products and the first bilateral recognition with a Latin American country. 

Next steps 

On 6 March 2017 the Council adopted a decision on the signing of the EU-Chile agreement, and approved another decision on its actual conclusion.

The Council will now forward the draft decision on the conclusion of the agreement to the European Parliament for its consent, after which the Council will still have to formally adopt it.

The agreement will enter into force three months following the final notification of the completion of the necessary internal procedures by each contacting party.

The Council adopted EU Guidelines for the promotion and protection of the rights of the child. This 2017 version is a revision of the 2007 EU guidelines.   

The guidelines recall international standards on the rights of the child and provide comprehensive guidance as well as  concrete ways  to promote effectively  and protect the rights of the child. With these guidelines, the EU reaffirms its commitment to the comprehensive protection and promotion of the rights of the child in its external human rights policy.