Once again, European arms exports are contributing to crisis in the Middle East, and war in the Middle East is creating a crisis of European public policy. In August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait using weapons supplied by all five permanent members of the UN Security Council as well as a host of other weapons producers. Today, European-supplied weapons are playing an important role alongside those of the US and Russia, not only in the Saudi-led war in Yemen, but also in Syria.
One of the outcomes of the 1990 scandal over arms to Iraq was the agreement of the 1998 EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports – a multilateral regime that bound European suppliers, politically at least, to respect regional stability and human rights when assessing their arms exports. Since 2008, those rules have been legally binding in the form of a Common Position. EU arms exports are governed by the national implementation of the Common Position, which requires countries to refuse to authorise arms exports if there is a clear risk they may be used to violate international humanitarian law, for internal repression, or be diverted to unauthorised end-users. Institutional mechanisms to promote information-sharing and circulate notifications of denials of arms exports are meant to prevent a race to the bottom, as seen in the 1990s. But there is now a significant body of thought that sees these commitments as having more rhetorical power than regulatory purchase. EU member states regularly violate the spirit, if not the letter, of their commitments. Nonetheless, common EU rules have created a yardstick by which member states can seek to improve and harmonise their practices, and parliamentarians and activists can attempt to hold states to account.
The EU’s common rules have been thrown into crisis by controversy and disagreement over the supply of weapons to Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern states. Although they lag a considerable way behind the United States as the most ardent supporter of the Saudi regime, Britain and France have increased arms exports exponentially during the war in Yemen, despite widespread allegations of war crimes committed by the Saudi-led coalition. Taking a more restrictive approach are the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Germany and Flanders, which licences its own arms exports from inside Belgium. The strongest position has come from the Netherlands, whose Parliament passed a bill in March calling for the government to halt arms exports to Saudi Arabia, citing violations of international humanitarian law in the war in Yemen. This move gives practical effect to the European Parliament’s call for an embargo, made in February.
“The EU’s common rules have been thrown into crisis by controversy and disagreement over the supply of weapons to Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern states”
Arms exports to Saudi Arabia are playing a role in another Middle Eastern crisis as well, causing a split between EU member states and a problem for common European controls. Arms supplies to
Saudi Arabia – as well as to Jordan, the United Arab Emirates and Turkey – are being “re-transferred” to armed groups fighting in Syria. This not only includes the Free Syrian Army units, whom
Western states support, but groups fighting for the Assad regime and Islamist groups such as Ansar al-Sham and Jabhat al-Nusra. Between May 2011 and May 2013, there was an EU embargo
on arms exports to Syria, including both the regime and rebel groups, but France and the UK pushed to lift it. Their aim was to supply rebels – in line with their support, alongside the US, of
groups fighting both the Assad regime and, more recently, against Daesh. Other EU countries such as Germany, Austria, the Czech Republic, Finland, Sweden and the Netherlands were reluctant to lift the embargo, in part because of the risk of escalation, and in part due to the potential for diversion that arms supplies to rebel groups could cause.
The divisions in the EU have now been exacerbated by revelations of a significant increase in arms exports from Balkan and Central European states – themselves EU members or candidate countries, and thus bound by the EU Common Position. Research by the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network and the Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project has found that weapons worth almost €1.2bn have been licensed by states such as Bulgaria, Croatia and Serbia to the Middle East since winter 2012. Almost 70% of them went to Saudi Arabia. There is considerable evidence that these weapons have been re-transferred to armed groups operating in Syria and Yemen, and are contributing to human rights violations in the course of the wars in those countries. The common European controls, designed to prevent another race to the bottom and human catastrophe, are in disarray.
“The impact of Brexit on European arms export controls will depend on the level and type of British access to the single market”
The impact of Brexit on European arms export controls will depend on the level and type of British access to the single market. Institutionally, some things will be more challenging once the UK
withdraws from the EU and is no longer party to the harmonisation and information-sharing mechanisms that have been painstakingly built. And there are a host of technical regulations at the EU level – such as the Dual-Use Regulation, Firearms Directive, regulation on torture goods, and the Intra-Community Transfer Directive – that will be very difficult to unpick and rework from outside the EU. On the other hand, the UK is already party to the Arms Trade Treaty, a legally-binding treaty that sets common international standards for the regulation of arms exports and contains many similar restrictions to the EU Common Position. In this sense, there is no reason why UK standards should suddenly drop, especially given the UK’s vocal leadership in the negotiation of both the EU regime and the Arms Trade Treaty, and its claim that its national standards exceed them.
But the UK, while a prominent proponent of supposedly progressive standards, is also a violator of said standards. Its sales to Saudi Arabia since the war in Yemen began are the most recent and notable example of the way arms exports repeatedly make cracks in the façade of a European public policy based on values of liberal democracy and human rights. While over-inflated economic arguments about the benefits of arms exports to the UK economy could encourage even greater sales, such a move would need to be accompanied by the abandonment of the rhetoric of restraint or common European policy.
IMAGE CREDIT: Homeros/Bigstock.com
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The last few weeks have seen military and paramilitary operations intensify in the northern Iraqi city of Mosul. But is this liberation or a land-grab?
Daesh – the self-styled ‘Islamic State’ terror group – has kept a tight grip on Iraq’s second city for more than two years now, and it is clear they have been able to entrench themselves and prepare for the current assault.
Fortunately, Iraqi government forces have been able keep the perilous Mosul Dam from the clutches of Daesh. If the dam were to be destroyed, it would unleash devastation throughout Iraq, potentially killing more than a million people in a short space of time.
Since emerging from al-Qaeda and other terror groups around 2012, Daesh has led a campaign of torture, murder and subjugation across Iraq and Syria. It has enslaved thousands, created an unprecedented refugee crisis, and brutally killed anyone who disagrees with its retrograde ideology. They have inspired terror attacks all over the world and pushed policymakers into unprecedented international cooperation and action.
Over the last year Iraqi forces, assisted by international support, have been able to push Daesh back from the gates of Baghdad. Now they are ready to push Daesh out of Mosul.
“This assault should not be called liberation – it is a seizure of land and the imposition of Iranian hegemony”
While these simple facts should be welcome news in Western capitals, it is deeply concerning how these feats have been achieved, and what they mean for Iraq in particular and the region in general.
Iraq weaves together tribes, cultures, ethnicities and religions. Since 2003 the political structure has been based on cementing these differences rather than uniting disparate factions of Iraq under a truly national umbrella. It is this socio-political fact that has allowed Daesh to grow and expand its foothold in Iraq.
Unfortunately, the international community has allowed this problem to get worse in the pursuit of a quick so-called victory against Daesh.
The rejection of political compromise, devolution and power-sharing from Baghdad to Sunni Muslims in particular has left this community isolated, repressed and vulnerable to a Daesh takeover.
On many occasions Sunni leaders and other tribal chiefs pleaded with Baghdad to help them defeat Daesh. They called for military support and weapons, and for work on an inclusive non-sectarian political settlement. These Sunni groups know the area, know the people, and could gain wide support for a complete defeat of Daesh and its ideology.
Baghdad rejected this approach and rejected political inclusion. The Iraqi government, composed of Iranian-backed ethnic parties, instead sent in the heavily artillery of the Iraqi army and summoned airstrikes by the international coalition. More worryingly, they called on paramilitary groups supported by, staffed by and directed by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its leader, Qasem Soleimani.
Over the last year, many human rights groups have reported on and complained about the actions of these paramilitary groups. The Tehran-sponsored groups are causing destruction and starvation; they are displacing and terrorising local communities. News organizations have recently reported that tens of thousands of Iraqi civilians are fleeing Tal Afar, a city on the outskirts of Mosul, as a result of the onslaught of Iranian-backed groups.
“Without concerted efforts to tackle the underlying causes of Daesh, we will only displace the problem – the threat will remain”
Daesh will be pushed out of Iraq, probably at the cost of thousands of ‘human shields’. Iraqi government and Iranian-back forces will take Mosul and the rest of Iraq.
All of this means that this assault should not be called liberation. The Baghdad government will call it that; so will the voices from Tehran. But it is not.
Instead it is a seizure of land and the imposition of Iranian hegemony. Groups like Daesh will be defeated, but their ideology and their inspiration will be displaced and survive. Their threat will go on.
Western cities and interests will not be safe until that ideology and inspiration is defeated and we are able to stop recruitment and eliminate the core threat.
The challenge for all leaders in 2017 will be to understand two key elements about the true nature of the threat and how to work to rid the world of it.
First, we may think that Daesh survives only because it controls and occupies actually territory. In reality, we know groups such as Daesh survive because of ingrained resentment and ideological support.
Second, while many governments and organisations around the world support countering Daesh, their very actions feed and nurture the resentment and ideology of such groups.
Western policymakers face the huge challenge of pushing for and creating political inclusion in both Iraq and Syria. This would greatly help the region economically and support the resettlement of the millions of refugees locally and in Europe. But the West will also have to counter Iranian support of terror and destabilisation.
2017 will see Daesh pushed from Iraq. It will probably also be destroyed in Syria. But without concerted and real efforts to tackle the underlying causes of the growth of such groups, we will only displace the problem – the threat will remain.
IMAGE CREDIT: Homeros/Bigstock.com
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Ministerial meetings between the EU and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
Yesterday’s Labour motion on Brexit marked an important step for the party. For the first time it had managed to push the government on the strategy for the Article 50 negotiations, leaving the government little option but to engage in some Parliamentary wrangling to try and deflect the on-coming threat of backseat rebellion. Keir Starmer looked to be in good control of his brief, after many months of Labour indifference/in-fighting on the subject.
That’s the positive reading, and not one that I totally buy.
The gaps remain glaringly obvious. Most importantly, the commitment to provide Parliament with plans is the vaguest of things: there was no specification of content or length. Moreover, David Davis’ observation that it was ‘inconceivable’ that Parliament wouldn’t get to vote on the outcome rightly left many feeling that this was itself no guarantee:
The last point I want to make to the Secretary of State concerns the question of a vote on the final deal. I heard him say today, “I expect there will be a vote”. Well, I expect that the District line will turn up within five minutes, but today there were longer delays. He said, as I understood it, that it was inconceivable that there would not be a vote. Well, some people would have said it was inconceivable that Donald Trump would be elected President of the United States. It does not fill me with a great deal of confidence. I gently say to him that the simple response to the question, “Will there be a vote when the deal comes before us after the negotiation?”, is to stand up, look the House direct in the eye, and say, “Yes, there will be a vote.
In addition, the government amendment on timing will certainly be used as leverage to push through any notification bill that might result from the Supreme Court case now underway, although given the weakness of the rebellion last night, there is no immediate danger of that bill being defeated.
In short, it was a bit of political theatre that essentially highlights the depths of the UK’s position overall.
Firstly, it demonstrates that Labour remains hamstrung on the EU. Starmer has a plan for Parliamentary scrutiny and oversight, but doesn’t have his party leadership behind him to make that work. Yesterday had the feel of a missed opportunity for both sides of the party: the Richmond Park by-election should underline that the government operates on a very small majority and that only concentrated action by Labour will enable that to succeed. Given the position of the SNP and LibDems, that suggests that common ground lies more to the Starmer end of options that the Corbyn one, but if 2016 has demonstrated anything, then it is that Corbyn holds his beliefs very strongly and will expect others to cleave to him.
Secondly, it also demonstrates that the government still lacks a plan. All the fuss around the motion might have obscured this basic fact, but it has ended up making matters worse. The line that one holds one’s cards close sounds good, but it also gives the impression that a) the UK will be a tricky negotiating partner, always pulling surprises, and b) that it has surprises to pull. that’s just bad negotiating strategy, especially when retaining the good-will of the other parties is a baseline requirement. Ultimately, the costs will fall on the government, as the EU27 take a more cautious approach and as the public realise that there is no secret prize-winning move to be pulled.
Theresa May has learnt much from her predecessor about not over-promising: this has been the bedrock of her strategy to date. But the under-promising also comes with dangers. Canniness quickly turns to looking like cluelessness. The Supreme Court case is a glaring demonstration of this. The government has fought the legal challenge repeatedly, but seems to find itself being backed into a corner where it not only has to pass a bill in Parliament, but potentially also involve the devolved assemblies too. As much as a referral to the CJEU looks unlikely, the outcome is based more on hope than conviction. Ungenerous souls might say that the government wants to be pushed like this, since it will offer more opportunities for delay and time to think about how to deal with this.
However, as the Brexit saga has repeatedly demonstrated, those who do not shape events are doomed to be shaped by them. That has been especially true post-referendum, where plans and strategy are in very short supply. Both Labour and the Tories might reflect on that.
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The 28 EU Commissioners met today to decide the fate of the EU’s Nature Directives (the 1979 Birds Directive and 1992 Habitats Directive). Would these two directives, the cornerstone of EU biodiversity legislation, be deemed ‘fit for purpose’ or would they be revised and potentially weakened? After years of internal debates within the European Commission, and the Nature Alert civil society campaign, the decision was clear: the Commissioners agreed that both directives are fit for purpose, and that the Commission should focus on better implementation and not deregulation.
Thanks all colleagues for full support on Birds & Habitats fitness check – now we focus on implementation- #NatureAlert
— Karmenu Vella (@KarmenuVella) December 7, 2016
This blog post reflects back on this two-year debate, raging since the beginning of the Juncker Commission in 2014, and what it tells us about the prospect for future EU-level environmental policy dismantling, that is, cutting, weakening or removing existing policy.
The Nature Alert Saga
The Nature Alert saga started with the Mission Letter sent by Juncker to his new Environment & Fisheries Commissioner Karmenu Vella in September 2014. In this document, Juncker made it a key priority for the Commission as a whole to “Respect […] the principles of subsidiarity, proportionality and better” and for the Environment Commissioner to focus on:
“Continuing to overhaul the existing environmental legislative framework to make it fit for purpose. In the first part of the mandate, I would ask you to carry out an in-depth evaluation of the Birds and Habitats directives and assess the potential for merging them into a more modern piece of legislation.”
This in-depth ex-post evaluation of directives in place for many decades was to be done through the EU Fitness Check or REFIT process. It had actually been planned before Juncker, with a mandate published in February 2014. But by listing it as Vella’s first priority, Juncker dramatically increased its importance. Additionally, increasing the importance of ‘modernising’ existing legislation over producing new legislation, raised alarm among civil society, afraid that the better regulation/modernisation agenda was in fact a way to pursue policy dismantling.
That Juncker made the ‘modernisation’ of these two directives a priority is, on the one hand, not very surprising. The Nature Directives had often been criticised in the past by key political groups in different member states (such as French hunters seeing shorter hunting seasons in the 1990s, or UK developers having to cope with great crested newts in the 2000s). For a Commission keen to reduce “meddlesome EU rules”, targeting such flagship legislation made sense. But while it made political sense, it was also risky because earlier attempts to expose the potentially high costs of these pieces of legislation had failed. For example, after former UK Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne complained about the “ridiculous costs” of the Habitats directive in 2011, a review commissioned to support his point found the very opposite. This earlier attempt had pushed NGOs to find evidence in support for the two directives, which, together with growing international research on evaluating biodiversity legislation, meant that environmental NGOs were particularly well placed to contest the need for a fitness check.
Source: Alert, by Sam Carlquist, Flickr (Creative Commons)
Armed with this large evidence base, environmental NGOs led by BirdLife Europe, the EEB, Friends of the Earth Europe and the WWF Europe, started their Nature Alert campaign to raise the profile of the on-going REFIT evaluation and to gather as many public responses to the European Commission’s online consultation as possible. At the end of its 12-week consultation in July 2015 the Commission had received 552,472 replies “the largest response [ever] received by the Commission to an on-line consultation”, which overwhelmingly sided with the NGOs.
After the consultation, a group of leading environmental consultancies and think tanks (Milieu, IEEP, ICF International and Ecosystems Ltd) contracted by the European Commission produced the expert review to support the fitness check. Finalised in March 2016, this review largely found, again, that the directives were fit for purpose. But it was not published by the Commission. Indeed, until a previous draft was leaked in June 2016, no public discussions were made of its findings. This is particularly striking as in the meantime both the Council and the Parliament had made the case for the directives – even David Cameron used them as a good example of why the UK needed to remain in the EU. Finally, despite a 500 000+ consultation, a clear expert review and a continuing NGO campaign, it took the European Commission six more months to come to a decision and declare the directives fit for purpose.
What does this case tell us about policy dismantling in the EU?
The Commission’s decision has been heralded by NGOs as a ‘huge victory for nature conservation’, but it also has broader implications for the pursuit of better regulation or modernisation and attempts to dismantle policies at EU level.
First, the long delay in publishing the report and coming to a decision confirms that REFIT, like other ex-post evaluation processes, is a political and not solely technical endeavour. REFIT has been used by this Commission (and its predecessor) to bolster its credentials as an opponent of ‘red tape‘. But the politicisation of better regulation begs a number of questions. Whose support is the Commission trying to attract? The Nature Directives Fitness Check has managed to mobilise EU civil society against the Commission: hardly a PR success. Moreover, this could not have been done at a worse time, as the apparent backtracking of the Commission on environmental leadership was used to undermine an environmental case for ‘Remain’ during the Brexit referendum.
Second, Nature Alert contradicts central assumptions in academic research on the costs of environmental policy dismantling. Social policy is characterised by diffuse costs and concentrated benefits, whereas environmental policy tends to be characterised by diffuse benefits and concentrated costs. Thus while dismantling social policy is expected to be politically costly because policy beneficiaries can organise easily and challenge the government; the same cannot be said for environmental policy. According to Bauer et al. (2012: 8) politicians may even expect to gain “some very powerful votes in retrenching environmental policy”. The (debatable) possibility of gaining support through cutting policies may seem even more alluring when considering EU-level dismantling – there is after all less media coverage, a less active civil society and a consensual political system which makes it relatively easy to avoid blame. But the Nature Alert campaign showed that it was possible to mobilise opposition to suspected policy dismantling (even for environmental policy) and to apportion blame (even at the EU level).
It is uncertain whether the Nature Alert success will be easy to replicate: NGOs were well prepared due to earlier attempts to undermine these policies in the UK, and biodiversity may be an easier policy area to defend (especially in terms of public mobilisation) than, for example, waste or chemicals. Yet it may make this Commission think twice before picking ‘easy’ targets in the environmental acquis, and invites scholars of policy dismantling to rethink what is and what is not possible at EU level.
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Hollande and Sarkozy posing for Paris Match in order to defend the 2005 referendum on the EU constitutional treaty. At that time, they failed together.
After yet another eventful week marked by Hollande’s renouncement television address, French citizens can now be sure that neither of their two last presidents will be on their ballots for the presidential elections next spring. While the media would have loved to play a game of thrones, unfolding the ‘revenge’ narrative and ask Sam to play again his song about ‘hearts full of passion, jealousy and hate’, to many voters this comes as a relief.
Not so much really because of their relative failure with regard to the unrealistic pre-election promises and over-the-top reform announcements they were virtually forced to make by the highly antagonistic nature of French political culture. It is true that once in office, all French presidents since Mitterrand’s election in 1981 were caught in the pitfall of having to live up to the expectations they were obliged to raise with their electorate, while patently knowing that it was impossible to keep them. And none of them would have been re-elected, had it not been for the stupidity of the opposition (Mitterrand in 1988) or the need to fence off the Front National (Chirac in 2002). Which amounts, by the way, to a total of three decades of successive high hopes and disenchantments.
The real reason why Sarkozy and Hollande were considered unfit to run again by a large part of the population is in the concept of ‘embodiment’. Charles de Gaulle had a certain idea of France, and he also had a certain idea of its presidency and how to incarnate it.
For all the pompousness of protocol, the lovely oxymoron of the ‘Republican monarchy’ has become a famous and altogether fitting metaphor over the years. Both Sarkozy and Hollande were happy to use the extent of power granted to the Royal at the head of the French state. But they underestimated to what extent certain expectations with regard to conduct, behaviour and speech were inseparable from the function. Both can be said to have irremediably damaged the Gaullist ideal-type of the president. In fact, they have become the joint undertakers of French presidency.
Oh, they clearly enjoyed some of the privileges that come with the job. Like the incredibly stupid role play during press conferences in the Elysée, where follow-up questions are not permitted, which allows the president to answer totally beside the point or ridicule the defenceless journalist who spoke out an uncomfortable truth. Or the game of condescendingly putting cabinet members (including the Prime minister) in their place who implemented policies decided by the president but turning out to be unpopular or impracticable.
But neither of them understood that living up to the function would have required them to stay out of down-to-earth policy-making, delegate much more to their Prime minister, and make themselves rare. The presidential word is powerful only if it is scarce, solemn, and exceptional (and, ideally, slightly enigmatic). Sarkozy and Hollande were omnipresent, they simply talked too much. Sarkozy’s obsession with being in the limelight and show just how much he was in charge of everything, as well as his strategy of inundating the media with an uninterrupted flow of announcements to make sure they simply would not have the time and resources to follow up on them later, have earned him the nick-name of ‘hyper-president’, with all the connotation of ADHD this term implied. Towards the end of his term, he visibly tried, following the advice of his communication guru Patrick Buisson, to ‘represidentialise’ (believe me, the word exists in French) both his personality and his behaviour. To no avail, the harm was already done.
Hollande was just as effective as an undertaker. The very pre-electoral promise to be a ‘normal’ president was incompatible with the Fifth Republic’s design. A president who is normal, is useless. And a president who needs to juggle simultaneously with the hysterical (though justified) jealousy of his official partner, the presence of his ex-partner and mother of his four children in his own government, and the breakfast croissants he takes on a scooter to his second mistress is no longer an impressive womaniser (even for the permissive French who are rather tolerant in these matters), but comes closer to a clown. Even Sarkozy, who like a teenager before his parents stood before the press saying ‘with Carla, it’s serious’, looked less ridiculous in comparison.
When Hollande recently accepted the publication of the tell-all book written by two Le Monde reporters after hours and hours of interviews with the President, he probably thought that ‘A President Should Not Say That’ was a nice tongue-in-cheek title. As a matter of fact, the phrase turned out to be a 100% accurate summary of his entire misjudgement of expectations and mismanagement of his presidential function, annulling all efforts to react in a statesmanlike manner to the terrorist strikes against France.
What the ten years under Sarkozy and Hollande boil down to is the ‘desacralisation’ of the French presidency. It’s not entirely their fault. De Gaulle and Pompidou did not have to face up with a highly increased demand for transparency in decision-making, with the reactivity of social media, with fact checkers and fake news, and the overall acceleration and hysterically repetitive character of the political debate in the age of on non-stop news channels.
The next president will have to reconcile historically grown expectations, the damage done by his/her predecessors, and contemporary pressure on an office that seems increasingly out of sync with what 21st-century democracy would need. When Harris Interactive asked the French in a representative poll one month ago whether they considered ‘the capacity to embody the presidential function’ an important criterion in their choice next spring, 79% of them agreed. Unsurprisingly, younger voters seemed slightly less sensitive on this issue (still, they are 65% to agree among the 25-34 age-group). At the same time, only Alain Juppé was deemed to possess this capacity by more than half of the respondents. By over two thirds Sarkozy, Hollande and Le Pen were considered ‘poor’ embodiments of the presidency, while Fillon, Macron and Valls scored only slightly better, rated ‘poor embodiments’ for 57-59% of the respondents.
Whoever will be the successor of the two ‘undertakers’ Sarkozy and Hollande, her/she is likely to have a very hard time to live up to the legacy of de Gaulle and the tacit, but persistent expectations of the citizens.
Albrecht Sonntag
@albrechtsonntag
This is post # 6 on the French 2017 election marathon.
Post # 5 here.
Post # 4 here.
Post # 3 here.
Post # 2 here.
Post # 1 here.
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Liberal democracy is in a parlous state. In America, Donald Trump is making his mark even before he enters the Oval Office. In Europe – despite heartening news from Austria – demagogues have the wind in their sails.
Meanwhile, free-thinking, liberal Muslim thought leaders and reformers are struggling to live and work in peace at home. Muslim-majority nations are either ruled by nasty autocrats, military strongmen or flawed and fragile democrats. In many places, to speak up is to find yourself dead or in prison. If you are lucky, you can go into exile – but perhaps not for long.
Escape routes to the West are closing fast. Islam-bashing has become the favourite sport not just of Trump but also of populist parties across Europe. Rants against Islam unite members of the ‘populist international’ on both sides of the Atlantic. As the far right looks set to perform well in elections in many Western countries in the coming months, expect the anti-Islam vitriol to get nastier.
Europe should indeed focus on keeping out Muslim extremists. But it must not ignore the plight of Muslim reformers who are caught between the devil and the deep blue sea. Speak up at home, and they are likely to be branded ‘kafir’ (unbeliever). Head for shelter abroad, and they turn into potential troublemakers or even terrorists.
“Space for freedom of expression has been shrinking in the Muslim world,” says Surin Pitsuwan, Thailand’s former foreign minister and a much-respected former secretary-general of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).
“Speak up at home, and you are branded ‘kafir’. Head for shelter abroad, and you turn into a potential troublemaker or even a terrorist”
“Muslim intellectuals cannot pursue their examination of laws and principles at home… they have to do that outside the Muslim world,” he told a World Forum for Muslim Democrats meeting in Tokyo last month. “Academics have to migrate in order to do their job. Muslim democrats feel the space for exercising their role is being limited… they cannot visualise their future.”
The Muslim world is suffering from a severe democratic deficit. Muslims long for freedom, the rule of law and representative government, said Nurul Izzah Anwar. She is Vice-President of the People’s Justice Party of Malaysia, which was set up by her father, Malaysian opposition politician Anwar Ibrahim (who is still in jail).
“There is confusion about how Muslims relate to democracy and to the challenge of facing extremism,” said Nurul Izzah. Muslims have to deal simultaneously with “fanatic ideologies and kleptocratic regimes”.
For many Muslims also, the struggle centres on efforts to reclaim their religion from the stranglehold of Saudi-based Wahhabist interpretations of Islam.
“It’s a fight that is long and difficult. Wahhabism is a dirty word in Indonesia. It is considered to be primitive,” said Indonesian scholar of Islam Azyumardi Azra. Unlike other countries, Indonesia is not dependent on money from Saudi Arabia, he said. “Our flowery Islam is embedded in our local culture.”
Yet for all its traditional tolerance and openness, Indonesia faces the challenge of protecting its minorities. Indonesian police has opened a criminal investigation into Jakarta Governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, better known as ‘Ahok’, for alleged blasphemy.
Ahok, a Christian, is the first member of Indonesia’s ethnic Chinese community to be elected as the capital’s governor. The investigation shows the authorities are “more worried about hardline religious groups than respecting and protecting human rights for all,” according to Rafendi Djamin, Amnesty International’s Director for Southeast Asia and the Pacific.
“As the extremists gain traction, the welcome for Muslims will wear even thinner in Europe.”
What happens in Indonesia is particularly relevant given the country’s reputation as a role-model for other Muslim countries.
Muslim reformers and intellectuals could once find shelter and asylum in the West. And while many have benefited from such protection and continue to do so, extremists in the United States and Europe are making clear that Islam is their new enemy.
As the extremists gain traction, the welcome for Muslims will wear even thinner in Europe. As former Egyptian member of parliament Abdul Mawgoud Dardery told the conference, “We feel betrayed by the US and Europe”.
Tragically, such betrayals are likely to become the norm. The US President-elect is likely to side with fellow ‘strongmen’ in the Muslim world. Europe’s populists can be expected to be just as indifferent to the plight of Muslim human rights defenders and democrats.
But Europe must keep its doors open to those in the Muslim world who want change, reform and democracy. As Surin underlined, “Muslim democrats have to face a dual challenge: we have to fight extremism in our midst and Islamophobia outside”.
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IMAGE CREDIT: CC / FLICKR – Friends of Europe
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EU Ministers of Justice and Home Affairs meet in Brussels on 8 and 9 December 2016 to assess progress made towards improving the administration of criminal justice in cyberspace. Ministers are discussing the implementation of measures relating to migration and the reform of the common European asylum system as well as addressing the fight against terrorism and organised crime.
EU Ministers of Employment, Social Affairs, Consumer Protection, Health and Equal Opportunities (EPSCO) meet on 8 and 9 December 2016 in Brussels to try to reach a general approach on new regulations for the following agencies: Eurofound, EU-OSHA and Cedefop. They are taking stock of progress on posting of workers, accessibility and the equal treatment directives. Health ministers are discussing the public health related part of the annual growth survey 2017 and getting briefed about the European reference networks that from 2017 will give more patients, in particular those with rare diseases, access to highly specialised quality treatment throughout the EU.