European Union

The EU Commission wants to establish a defence fund into which all members pay, prompting member states to up their defence spending while making Europe less dependent on the US. Some commentators say such a move is long overdue while others see the Commission's plans as unrealistic.

With the takeover of Banco Popular the Spanish bank Santander has saved its former rival from collapse. New Eurozone regulations on bank resolution foreseeing investor participation were used for the first time in the bailout. Taxpayers were spared. Commentators see the move as a success.

King
Freedom of movement for persons
Advocate General Tanchev considers that it is incompatible with EU law to require a worker to take leave first before being able to establish whether he is entitled to be paid for it

Dextro Energy v Commission
Environment and consumers
The Court confirms that a number of health claims relating to glucose cannot be authorised

A.S.
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice
In the exceptional circumstances of the refugee crisis, Advocate General Sharpston considers that the Member States in which applications for international protection were first lodged are responsible for examining those applications

And so the latest disruption to the process of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU draws to a close. Much like the delay in Article 50 notification before it, this General Election has achieved little, except to underline that the British political system still hasn’t got its head around the entire matter.

While there will be countless pieces exploring what the results mean for Brexit, the basic message is going to be that they don’t mean much. If the Tories are returned, then there is no sign of any plan beyond the banalities that litter the White Paper: If Labour pull a surprise victory out of the bag, then they look no more able to fashion a coherent set of objectives. Only in the event of a hung Parliament, where the SNP and LibDems hold the balance of power, might something come of it all, but even then one hesitates at the thought of the media onslaught that would ensue.

Underlining all of this confusion is the passionately held belief that Brexit shouldn’t be the key debating ground for this election. Certainly, May called it on the basis of needing a strong mandate, but the real focus has been on the character of the leaders: if there was a visible policy, there is was social care that has stuck out. There is something of a sense that Brexit is important, but there’s nothing to be gained by talking about, as it’s a giant bear-trap, and one that many voters lack interest in.

Thus we end up where we left off, in April at the start of this election: with confused policies and confused politicians.

And the clock ticks down all the while.

If there is a winner from all this, then it is the EU. It has been able to work on its positions, fleshing out ideas without direct challenge from the UK, building consensus for the Commission team.

Neither side gains from a non-deal, but the onus is much more clearly on the UK to secure a package, so the ability to pull something together as the EU has done can only be to its advantage. As I have suggested before, May is best understood as someone who recognises that a deal on EU terms is coming down the line, so it makes sense to gather as much political capital as possible in anticipation of the storm. Sadly, that approach looks much less viable today.

There is a certain calmness in the EU’s actions. Part of that comes from the necessity of patience in an organisation that often takes a very long time to make any decision. But it also reflects the strong negotiating position that it holds in these talks: there have not been the tensions between the EU27 that many – including myself – anticipated, and all of the likely outcomes are ones that the EU can live with. Either the UK abandons leaving, or it agrees to an EU-designed deal, or it falls out without a deal: the first two axiomatically work for the EU, while the final path at least looks not to contaminate the rest of the EU.

In short, this general election has been a distraction: as we head to 19 June and the start of substantive negotiations, that will become even more apparent.

The post The Brexit non-issue appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Two years ago the European Commission published its Communication on the Energy Union, marking a new approach to the European energy sector.

It was based on an accurate diagnosis of the challenges facing the sector: a high dependency on fossil fuel imports; ageing infrastructure; a major crisis in markets that delivered high retail prices but low wholesale prices, thereby discouraging investment in carbon-free power generation.

The Communication also identified the winning strategy for Europe. Decarbonise the economy to reconcile sustainable development, security of supply and competitiveness. It announced consistent policies and measures regarding the five dimensions of energy and climate policy: security of supply, market integration, energy efficiency, decarbonisation and research and development.

EDF Group, as a leader in low-carbon electricity generation and in R&D, welcomed this initiative and its ambitions for innovative low-carbon growth.

The Communication logically suggested that some sort of governance should be implemented to ensure that national policies would lead to compliance with the European objectives. With the ‘Clean Energy for all Europeans’ package, we now know how this governance could be organised.

But does the proposal accurately address the main issues facing the European Union? As is often the case, the glass is half-full and half-empty.

“We can be confident that the target of 27% of renewable energy sources will be met”

We need an institutionalised dialogue between member states and the European Union, and more transparency regarding national energy policies. To some extent, the Communication achieved this, launching a process of continuous discussion and triggering visits by Maroš Šefčovič, the Commission’s Vice-President for the Energy Union, to the European capitals to discuss the role of member states in the Energy Union.

The future national plans will ensure wider long-term visibility for member states’ projects. If such a dialogue had occurred earlier, we might have developed renewable sources of electricity more efficiently. And we might have prevented stop-and-go policies that induced serious shocks on the renewables sector and tensions that resulted from the impact of variable energy on power trade.

Furthermore, greater consistency has been introduced in energy and climate policy since the Energy Union was created. Before, many initiatives were developed separately and the impact of new draft legislation on existing texts or on legislation in progress was not always taken into account. The Clean Energy Package aims at consistency by launching simultaneously interlinked pieces of legislation based on a common approach. This is a positive move.

But there are downsides. The glass is half-empty in the sense that one very important element of energy and climate policy is not part of the package: the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) Directive.

The ETS Directive was launched before the Communication was released and it will be adopted before the political discussions on several elements of the package are complete. This is extremely concerning since the package’s provisions regarding renewable energy sources and energy efficiency have a major impact on the carbon market. The higher the ambition and the less flexible the governance, the higher the risk of depressed carbon prices – and possibly even a breakdown of the ETS, Europe’s main tool for cost-effective decarbonisation.

This is why the governance aspect of the package must be further enhanced. Some of the key performance indicators should measure the efficiency of energy and climate policies. It is also necessary to identify where policies may overlap and interfere with each other, to prevent any negative consequences.

It is possible, for instance, to neutralise the impact of increased energy efficiency on carbon markets. Some amendments are currently being prepared to this end, and they merit serious discussion.

“We need an institutionalised dialogue between member states and the European Union”

It is also possible to allow for enough flexibility to be able to cope with a potential crisis. The 2008 recession proved that the carbon market was not robust enough to adapt to a shock if the rest of the energy climate framework remained rigid. The ETS is under particular threat in the next five or ten years and we must introduce enough flexibility, in particular by avoiding rigid trajectories, to protect it.

We can be confident that the target of 27% of renewable energy sources will be met; most member states are sufficiently ambitious. Should any doubt arise, the mid-2020s will be the right moment to decide how to deal with any difficulties. Let us not waste time anticipating problems that may not occur.

One more point is worth mentioning: the new target to ensure that every member state reaches an interconnection capacity with networks in other countries that is equivalent to 15% of its installed capacity. This target does not fully take into account that energy policies must necessarily be cost-effective. In this particular case decentralisation is preferable to governance: Europe is better off having interconnectors with a positive cost-benefit ratio rather than sticking to precise targets.

The proposed Governance Regulation appears at first sight more political than other elements of the package. In a sense this is true: we are about to define the respective roles of the member states and the Union and the organisation of their dialogue.

But governance is also about meeting targets at optimum cost and contributing to an efficient functioning of markets. Governance is an essential element of a cost-effective European energy and climate policy, and decision-makers must keep this in mind.

IMAGE CREDIT: CC/Flickr – Håkan Dahlström

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The Council added 14 persons and 4 entities to the lists of those subject to an asset freeze and  travel restrictions, transposing new listings imposed by UN Security Council resolution 2356 (2017). This resolution was adopted on 2 June 2017in response to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)'s ongoing  nuclear-weapon and ballistic missile-development activities, in violation and flagrant disregard of previous UN Security Council resolutions. 

The Council  decision brings the total number of persons under restrictive measures against the DPRK to 53 persons and 46 entities as listed by the UN. In addition, 41 persons and 7 entities are designated by the EU autonomously.  

The EU is implementing all UN Security Council  resolutions adopted in response to the DPRK's nuclear and nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes. In addition, the EU has also imposed autonomous restrictive measures against the DPRK, complementing and reinforcing the UN sanctions regime. 

The legal acts were adopted by written procedure. They will be published in the Official Journal of 9 June. 

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

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EU Ministers of Justice and Home Affairs meet on 8 and 9 June 2017 in Luxembourg to discuss a number of legislative files on the Justice topic (EPPO, supply of digital content, money laundering, etc.) as well as on the Home affairs one. Home affairs ministers are also expected to focus on migration, counter terrorism and improving interoperability of information systems. Both ministers meet to debate on issues related to criminal justice in cyberspace.

Download this video here.

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EU Ministers for Transport, Infrastructure, and Communications meet in Luxembourg on 8 and 9 June 2017. They are expected to agree on a general approach on a draft regulation on cross-border parcel delivery services. Ministers take stock of progress and hold a policy debate on the revision of the EU telecoms rules. They are also looking at progress made on proposed new rules for ePrivacy.

Download this video here.

On 25 May 2017, NATO leaders met in Brussels to celebrate the opening the new headquarters in Boulevard Léopold III. The location of the new headquarters is historically very significant: during construction four unexploded bombs from both the First and Second World Wars were found underneath. This should serve as an excellent reminder for what NATO stands.

While the official opening ceremony was a good occasion for the heads of state and government to come together, one issue – or rather, the presence of one person – surpassed the significance of the meeting: it was the first visit to Brussels by the 45th President of the United States of America, Donald J. Trump. Prior to the NATO meeting, much debate surrounded his visit. The stakes were high, because NATO has to face international disagreements and challenges as well as external threat that require urgent responses. As Sophia Besch, Research Fellow at CER, has outlined the task for the European allies was to contain Trump and to convince him about their efforts and contributions to NATO. On the other hand, Jeremy Shapiro, Research Director at ECFR, gave a more sober outlook for the meeting: ‘Trump will give an ordinary speech, make various extravagant promises, and the meeting will pass with neither incident nor substance.’

 

 

Besides the opening ceremony, the thematic focus centred around the issue of burden-sharing among NATO allies. Already during previous meetings with allies, Trump emphasised that European countries owe his country vast amounts for paying for European security. In one of his Tweet storms, he summarised his claim after the meeting with German Chancellor Angela Merkel in April 2017: ‘Germany owes vast sums of money to NATO & the United States must be paid more for the powerful, and very expensive, defence it provides to Germany’. At the 2014 Wales Summit, NATO allies already agreed on the target of 2 percent of GDP towards NATO defence. However, this target is not only far from realistic and appropriate for some nations. It could also spur new suspicions, especially in Europe. If one imagines that Germany met this target any time soon, as of current, 2 percent of its GDP would amount to $75 billion (€67 billion, £58 billion). Surely, some of its neighbours would become worried.

In addition, this approach to burden sharing does not reflect the actual needs to make the Alliance more flexible, responsive and overall more secure. It is acknowledged that a contribution to collective defence is vital for its survival. But the 2 percent goal does not measure well the actual needs. Instead, it is suggested that a more accurate measure of both burden and risk sharing is required. The more worrying problem is not how to meet this target, but how the money is spent. For a robust and capable Alliance, its members should focus on acquiring capabilities reflecting the current security environment, i.e. one that requires tools and capabilities that respond to cyber threats and hybrid warfare. Further, they should focus on creating deployable militaries that can contribute effectively to NATO’s major operations. Lastly, allies’ contributions to burden sharing should take into account a country’s overall contribution to international and Euro-Atlantic security, i.e. its participation in non-NATO security and defence frameworks.

The outcome of the NATO meeting last month the recommitment of the allies to the 2 percent target as well as the decision to join the counter-terrorism coalition against Daesh. NATO leaders agreed on an action plan enabling states to participate in the fight against terrorism through the coordination of training and capacity building. Yet, as stressed by Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, this would not translate into engagement in combat operations.

Despite the importance of the meeting and the allies’ recommitments, NATO leaders neglected one pressing issue. How will they deal with one of their members – Turkey? Prior to the meeting in May, clashes between Turkey and other allies, most outspokenly with Germany as well as Austria, which is one of NATO’s partners through the Partnership for Peace programme, have troubled internal politics within the Alliance. Since the slash over campaign visits by Turkish officials in the light of Turkey’s referendum, German-Turksih relations have been tense. Then, for the second time within one year, Turkey has denied German officials access to the air base in Incirlik. These internal troubles and scuffles indicate the incoherence and diminished trust among members. Though both Germany and France voiced complaints over Turkey’s recent behaviour during the meeting, these have not received much attention and have been pushed into the shadow of Trump’s limelight appearance.

It has long been argued that NATO is only a defence alliance. Yet, with its transformations in the last three decades, it has become a truly political organisation as well. In this regard, NATO has to step up and improve its internal coherence alongside its defence capabilities. Only in a joint and collective fashion it is able to face its external threats and security challenges. It is therefore at stake and in the hands of NATO leaders as well as the Alliance as a whole to come together and revive common interests and values. This is far more significant and pressing than to denigrating and pointing fingers at each other as well as more important than shining light on those allies whose current policies and statements have been vague, ambiguous and not very trustworthy.

 

 

Nele Marianne Ewers-Peters is a PhD Candidate and Teaching Assistant at the University of Kent and a Visiting Scholar at KU Leuven.

The post NATO, Trump and Turkey: The Alliance needs more coherence appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

On 31 March 2017, the Council adopted Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/621[1]. The Council Decision extends the existing restrictive measures until 2 October 2017. The measures in question are a travel ban, assets freeze and a prohibition from making funds available regarding 3 individuals considered as responsible for obstructing or undermining the successful completion of the political transition in Libya. 

The Candidate Countries the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, Montenegro*, Serbia* and Albania*, the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the EFTA countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, as well as Ukraine,   the Republic of Moldova and Georgia align themselves with this Council Decision. 

They will ensure that their national policies conform to this Council Decision. 

The European Union takes note of this commitment and welcomes it. 

 [1] Published on 01.04.2017 in the Official Journal of the European Union no. L89, p. 10. 
*The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Albania continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.

The European Union and its Member States signed today a strategic blueprint, outlining the future of European development policy. This "New European Consensus on Development" represents a new collective vision and plan of action to eradicate poverty and achieve sustainable development.

The jointly developed strategy, in the form of a Joint Statement, was signed today during the annual two-day European Development Days by the Prime Minister of Malta, Joseph Muscat, on behalf of the Council and Member States, the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, the High Representative/Vice President, Federica Mogherini, and the President of the European Parliament, Antonio Tajani.  

The new European Consensus on Development constitutes a comprehensive common framework for European development cooperation. For the first time, it applies in its entirety to all European Union Institutions and all Member States, which commit to work more closely together.  

The new Consensus strongly reaffirms that poverty eradication remains the primary objective of European development policy. It fully integrates the economic, social and environmental dimensions of sustainable development. In doing so, it aligns European development action with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development which is also a cross-cutting dimension for the EU Global Strategy. 

European leaders committed to three areas: 

1. They recognise the strong interlinkages between the different elements of such action. This includes development and peace and security, humanitarian aid, migration, environment and climate, as well as cross cutting-elements, such as: youth; gender equality; mobility and migration; sustainable energy and climate change; investment and trade; good governance, democracy, the rule of law and human rights; innovative engagement with more advanced developing countries; and mobilising and using domestic resources.
2. The new Consensus furthermore takes a comprehensive approach to means of implementation, combining traditional development aid with other resources, as well as sound policies and a strengthened approach to policy coherence, recalling that EU development cooperation always has to be seen in the context of Europe's partner countries' own efforts. The Consensus provides the basis for the EU and its Member States to engage in more innovative forms of development financing, leveraging private sector investments and mobilising additional domestic resources for development.
3. The EU and its Member States will create better-tailored partnerships with a broader range of stakeholders, including civil society, and partner countries at all stages of development.  They will further improve their implementation on the ground by working better together and taking into account their respective comparative advantages.

Background 

Europe is a global leader in development, being the world's biggest provider of Official Development Assistance. The new European Consensus on Development was agreed jointly by all European Institutions and all EU Member States in an open and transparent manner, also in consultation with other partners. It is the EU's response to today's global trends and challenges, aligning EU external action to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. 

The 2030 Agenda was adopted by the international community in September 2015, and includes at its core the 17 Sustainable Development Goals and associated targets, which run to 2030. Along with the other international summits and conferences held in 2015 in Addis Ababa and in Paris, the international community has an ambitious new frame for all countries to work together on shared challenges. For the first time, the SDGs are universally applicable to all countries and the EU is committed to be a frontrunner in implementing them. 

On 22 November 2016, the European Commission proposed its ideas for a strategic approach for achieving sustainable development in Europe and around the world, including a Commission proposal for a new Consensus. Since then the European Parliament, the Council under the Maltese Presidency, and the Commission have engaged in an intensive series of inter-institutional discussions aimed at agreeing to a new collective vision for development policy which responds to the 2030 Agenda and other global challenges. 

Europe is a frontrunner when it comes to sustainable development and the 2030 Agenda, through external and other policies. 

See also

A Joint Statement by the President of the European Parliament, Antonio Tajani, the President of the Council of the European Union, Joseph Muscat, the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice-President of the European Commission, Federica Mogherini.

Joint statement by the President of the Council of the European Union, Joseph Muscat; the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice-President of the European Commission, Federica Mogherini; the President of the European Parliament, Antonio Tajani and the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker on the adoption of the new European Consensus on Development

With the signature of the new European Consensus on Development, we, the leaders representing the European Union institutions and the Member States, come together to mark a milestone achievement. 

Proud to lead global efforts as the world's largest development actor, we are united in our determination to set ourselves a clear vision and plan of action to eradicate poverty and achieve sustainable development in its economic, social and environmental dimensions by 2030. 

In 2015, the international community adopted at the United Nations the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, including its 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). This Agenda is a politically transformative, ambitious and universal commitment to end poverty and set the world on a sustainable path to prosperity, peace and social justice. The EU and its Member States are strongly committed to its implementation, within Europe and across the world, and this is why we are now translating this new comprehensive blueprint into our own policies including our development policies. Sustainable development is one of the key elements of our external action, as defined in the Lisbon Treaty and further set out in the Global Strategy for the EU's Foreign and Security Policy. 

The new European Consensus on Development is the cornerstone of our revamped development policy and constitutes an important part of the EU's overall response to the 2030 Agenda. For the first time a shared framework applies to all EU Institutions and Member States, providing a common approach to development policies in the next decades. It will guide our cooperation with all developing countries, bearing in mind the need to design tailor-made approaches that reflect the growing diversity of our partner countries.   

Ending poverty in all its forms remains our primary objective. We will work to reduce inequalities, address vulnerabilities and combat discrimination ensuring that no one is left behind aiming to reach the furthest behind first. We will promote gender equality and social inclusion across our policies, foster opportunities for young people and improve people's well-being everywhere. In implementing the Consensus, we will be guided by and promote our common principles, including democracy, the rule of law, human rights, equality and solidarity, as well as our commitment to a rules-based global order, with multilateralism and the United Nations at its core. Recognising the linkages between sustainable development and climate action, we also reaffirm our strong commitment to implement the Paris Agreement fully and effectively. 

Our new approach to development is based on the 'five Ps' of the 2030Agenda: People, Planet, Prosperity, Peace and Partnerships. Recognising the interlinkages between the SDGs, we will pay attention to actions that meet multiple goals in a coherent way. We will work across policies and sectors to boost synergies addressing a range of cross-cutting elements to accelerate transformation. Based on the principle of policy coherence for development, development objectives will be fully taken into account across EU policies that are likely to affect developing countries. Policy coherence will be ensured to contribute to the achievement of the SDGs by partner countries. 

Achieving this ambitious vision for Our World, Our Dignity and Our Future will require  multiplying and unifying our efforts.  We will work better together by improving coordination to maximise the impact of the EU and the Member States' actions, and by applying the development effectiveness principles. We will reinforce innovative partnerships with all countries, involving civil society, the private sector, local authorities, international organisations and all relevant stakeholders. The challenges and opportunities of this era are immense, and none of us alone can successfully address them. Our collective action can make a real difference in addressing our common challenges and advancing mutual benefits. 

In line with the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, a full range of means of implementation will be mobilised in the spirit of partnership. Action will focus on establishing conducive policy environments to achieve the SDGs, mobilising and making effective use of domestic and international public finance, combating illicit financial flows and involving the private sector through investment, trade, innovation and technology. We also reaffirm all individual and collective Official Development Assistance commitments and will take realistic, verifiable actions towards meeting them. 

This Consensus is a pledge and a call for all of us to join forces for a prosperous, fair, sustainable, safe world and a life of dignity for all. It represents our vision that now needs to be translated into reality.

Together, we will be true to our aims, consistent in our new approach and united in our action.

On 8 June, the Council adopted the decision establishing of the military planning and conduct capability (MPCC) within the EU military staff (EUMS). The terms of reference of the EUMS, which is part of the EEAS, have also been amended and approved.

"The establishment of the MPCC is a very important operational decision to strengthen European defence. It will contribute  to make the non-executive European missions more effective and to improve the training of  soldiers of partner countries, to guarantee peace and security. This is important not just for our partners, but also for the European Union's security", said  the High Representative Federica Mogherini.

The MPCC will assume command of EU non-executive military missions, currently: EU Training Mission (EUTM) Somalia, EUTM République Centrale Africaine (RCA) and EUTM Mali. The MPCC will be the static, out-of-area command and control structure at the military strategic level, responsible for the operational planning and conduct of non-executive missions, including the building up, launching, sustaining and recovery of European Union forces. This will allow the mission staff in the field to concentrate on the specific activities of their mission, with better support provided from Brussels.

The MPCC improves the crisis management structures of the EU. It will work under the political control and strategic guidance of the Political and Security Committee (PSC), which is composed of EU member states' ambassadors and is based in Brussels.

The MPCC will be composed initially of up to 25 staff but will also benefit from the support of other departments of the EUMS.  The Director General of the EU Military Staff will also be the director of the MPCC.  He will exercise command and control over the current three training missions and other possible future non-executive military missions. He will also exercise the responsibilities related to deployment and recovery of the missions as well as overall budgeting, auditing and reporting.

The MPCC will work closely with its existing civilian counterpart, the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) through a joint support coordination cell. This cell will be able to share expertise, knowledge and best practices on issues relevant to both military and civilian missions, as well as capabilities when civilian and military missions are simultaneously deployed in the same area, including  medical support or protective measures.

The decision will be published in the Official Journal of 9 June.

BackgroundProcess

On 6 March 2017, the Council adopted conclusions on progress in implementing the EU Global Strategy in the area of security and defence, endorsing a concept note for the operational planning and conduct of CSDP missions and operation. In its conclusions of 18 May 2017, the Council decided to establish the MPCC, pending a formal legal decision. Today this formal legal decision has been adopted by the Council.

On 14 November 2016, the Council adopted conclusions on implementing the EU global strategy in the area of security and defence. These conclusions set out the level of ambition in the form of the main goals the EU and its member states will aim to achieve in the area of security and defence, with three strategic priorities: responding to external conflicts and crises, building the capacities of partners, and protecting the European Union and its citizens. On 15 December 2016, the European Council reaffirmed the need to improve EU's capacity to react in a faster, more effective and more seamless manner, as part of an EU comprehensive approach.

About the three EU Training Missions

EUTM Somalia was launched in 2010 and ever since it has contributed to strengthening the Transitional Federal Government and the institutions of Somalia.

EUTM Mali was launched in 2013 to support the rebuilding of the Malian armed forces and to meet their operational needs.

EUTM RCA was launched in 2016 and it supports the Central African Republic government in the implementation of security sector reform in the country.