It was only because of the passionate resolve of past Conservative Prime Ministers that Britain joined the European Community in the first place.
Now, Mrs May is Britain’s only Prime Minister ever to go against membership of the European Union and the cherished Single Market of Europe. She will be taking Britain out, whereas all previous Prime Ministers (both Tory and Labour) wanted Britain to be in.
WINSTON CHURCHILL: It was one of the Tory party’s greatest leaders, Winston Churchill, who passionately promoted the ‘Union of Europe as a whole’ and is recognised as a founder of the European Union.
When the European Economic Community (now called the European Union) was created in 1957, Churchill welcomed the formation of a “common market” by the six founding countries, provided that “the whole of free Europe will have access”.
Churchill added, “We genuinely wish to join..”
But Churchill also warned:
“If, on the other hand, the European trade community were to be permanently restricted to the six nations, the results might be worse than if nothing were done at all – worse for them as well as for us. It would tend not to unite Europe but to divide it – and not only in the economic field.”
In 1961 Conservative Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, applied for Britain to join the European Community.
Churchill wrote, “I think that the Government are right to apply to join the European Economic Community..”
He added, “We might well play a great part in these developments to the profit of not only ourselves, but of our European friends also.”
HAROLD MACMILLAN: In a pamphlet explaining to the nation why Britain had applied to join the European Community in 1961, Prime Minister Macmillan wrote:
“By negotiating for British membership of the European Economic Community and its Common Market, the present Conservative Government has taken what is perhaps the most fateful and forward looking policy decision in our peacetime history.
“We did not do so lightly. It was only after a searching study of all the facts that we came to accept this as the right and proper course.”
Mr Macmillan continued:
“By joining this vigorous and expanding community and becoming one of its leading members, as I am convinced we would, this country would not only gain a new stature in Europe, but also increase its standing and influence in the councils of the world.”
SIR ALEC DOUGLAS-HOME: Mr Macmillan’s successor, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, was briefly prime minister for one year from 1964. He supported Britain’s application to join the European Community. Sir Alec said:
“I have never made it a secret that I cannot see an alternative which would offer as good a prospect for this country as joining the E.E.C. [European Community].”
And he also stated:
“I am acutely conscious that there are two questions which have to be asked: not only whether we should go in, but what is the prospect for Britain if we stay out. Those two questions have to be asked because, whether we are in or out, the Community goes on.”
EDWARD HEATH: It was Conservative Prime Minister, Edward Heath, who joined Britain to the European Community following the backing of Parliament after 300 hours of debate (contrast that with the scant time given to Parliament by the current Conservative government to debate the triggering of Article 50 and the European Withdrawal Bill.)
On the evening of 28 October 1971, Mr Heath addressed the House of Commons during the momentous debate on Britain joining the European Community. He said:
“Surely we must consider the consequences of staying out. We cannot delude ourselves that an early chance would be given us to take the decision again.
“We should be denying ourselves and succeeding generations the opportunities which are available to us in so many spheres; opportunities which we ourselves in this country have to seize.
“We should be leaving so many aspects of matters affecting our daily lives to be settled outside our own influence. That surely cannot be acceptable to us.
“We should be denying to Europe, also – let us look outside these shores for a moment – its full potential, its opportunities of developing economically and politically, maintaining its security, and securing for all its people a higher standard of prosperity.”
Mr Heath added:
“..tonight when this House endorses this Motion many millions of people right across the world will rejoice that we have taken our rightful place in a truly United Europe.”
Parliament did endorse the Motion, and Britain subsequently joined the European Economic Community on 1 January 1973.
MARGARET THATCHER: Two years later the Labour government offered the British people a referendum on whether the country should stay in the European Community. Tory leader and future Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, strongly campaigned for the country to remain in the Community.
In a keynote speech at the time she said:
“It is not surprising that I, as Leader of the Conservative Party, should wish to give my wholehearted support to this campaign, for the Conservative Party has been pursuing the European vision almost as long as we have existed as a Party.”
Mrs Thatcher also pushed for, and made possible, the Single Market of Europe.
In September 1988 in Bruges, Prime Minister Mrs Thatcher gave a major speech about the future of Europe. She said:
“Britain does not dream of some cosy, isolated existence on the fringes of the European Community. Our destiny is in Europe, as part of the Community.”
Mrs Thatcher added:
“Let Europe be a family of nations, understanding each other better, appreciating each other more, doing more together but relishing our national identity no less than our common European endeavour.”
Crucially she said in support of the Single Market:
“By getting rid of barriers, by making it possible for companies to operate on a European scale, we can best compete with the United States, Japan and other new economic powers emerging in Asia and elsewhere.”
JOHN MAJOR: And it was former Conservative Prime Minister, John Major, who negotiated and won Parliament’s backing to sign the Maastricht Treaty, that among other benefits gave us EU Citizenship rights allowing us to reside, work, study or retire across a huge expanse of our continent.
At the Tory Party Conference of 1992, just six months after John Major won a surprise victory in the General Election, he said to the party faithful:
“I speak as one who believes Britain’s future lies with Europe.”
And Mr Major warned about Britain walking away from Europe:
“We would be breaking Britain’s future influence in Europe. We would be ending for ever our hopes of building the kind of Europe that we want. And we would be doing that, just when across Europe the argument is coming our way. We would be leaving European policy to the French and the Germans.
“That is not a policy for Great Britain. It would be an historic mistake. And not one your Government is going to make.”
And Mr Major crucially added:
“Let us not forget why we joined the Community. It has given us jobs. New markets. New horizons. Nearly 60 per cent of our trade is now with our partners. It is the single most important factor in attracting a tide of Japanese and American investment to our shores, providing jobs for our people..
“But the most far-reaching, the most profound reason for working together in Europe I leave till last. It is peace. The peace and stability of a continent, ravaged by total war twice in this century.”
DAVID CAMERON: Previous Conservative Prime Minister, David Cameron, also strongly supported Britain’s continued membership of the EU, and his government’s official advice to the electorate during the Referendum was to vote for Remain.
Of course, Theresa May also shared these sentiments during the Referendum, when she campaigned for Remain and declared:
“I believe it is clearly in our national interest to remain a member of the European Union.”
And she added then:
“If we do vote to leave the European Union, we risk bringing the development of the Single Market to a halt, we risk a loss of investors and businesses to remaining EU member states driven by discriminatory EU policies, and we risk going backwards when it comes to international trade.”
But now, Mrs May has volunteered to go against her own wise words prior to 23 June 2016, and as our Conservative Prime Minister, seems determined to wreck the legacy of all the past Tory Prime Ministers – indeed of all UK Prime Ministers – of the last 60 years. Why?________________________________________________________
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The post Destroying the legacy of past Tory Prime Ministers appeared first on Ideas on Europe.
Relations between Hong Kong and the EU are based on a high-level annual meeting called the Structured Dialogue between the EU and the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSARG). The tenth Structured Dialogue took place in November 2016 in Brussels.
Srsly???
Following the Common’s debates on and around the Withdrawal Bill alongside my Twitter feed has been instructive at a number of levels, not least the volume of comment that can be generated around a man standing up.
But one of the more striking moments was the comments surrounding the continuing lack of knowledge that many in the chamber appear to display. The on-going conflation of the customs union and freedom of movement, or the assumption that the Irish border is only a matter of customs checks, are taken as emblematic of ‘The Mess We’re All In’.
To that I want to advance a somewhat different proposition, namely that since not everyone is as engaged in the ins-and-outs of Brexit as the kind of people who read blogs about it, they use short-cuts and heuristics to guide their way, and those are sometimes insufficient.
In the two examples I gave just now, the customs arrangements are a common element, because right now that what a lot of the British debate is about, even if – as Ken Clarke noted – no-one ever talked about it during the referendum.
Customs arrangements matter, but not to this degree, so why the focus?
Simply put, it’s because it’s a more manageable hook on which to hang a number of other big questions without getting too lost. Solutions to customs carry with them implications for those other questions, including free movement and regulatory alignment: win the narrow battle and you carry a big advantage through to the rest.
Hence the max-fac/customs partnership tussle: the former accepts hard borders, while the latter doesn’t.
Partly this is about the nature of political debate: fix on something that people feel they can understand and build out, rather than trying to convey a broad and detailed platform. That’s why ‘Brexit means Brexit’ lasted so long: it made enough sense to show that May was serious about, well, Brexit, without getting bogged down in the fine print.
Obviously, that doesn’t meant you don’t need the fine print. Or even some of the larger print, for that matter.
But partly, it’s also about Brexit. It’s a genuinely massive undertaking, well beyond the scope of any other matter of public policy. And that means there is no one master key, no one slogan that can capture that.
I’m hesitant about this, since I’m generally of the opinion that the worst way to engage people in a subject is to tell them it’s complicated. So my ju-jitsu move is to say that the shape of the problem is simple, even if the substance isn’t.
The problem is that in the face of such complexity, simple heuristics don’t work. They obscure more than they reveal and they suggest extrapolations that aren’t appropriate.
To return to the case in point, sorting out customs does offer a way into issues such as freedom of movement or regulatory alignment, but they don’t deal with the full range of those issues. Indeed, customs barely touches the sides of freedom of movement of goods, tell alone anything else.
Moreover, there are plenty of areas that can’t be addressed at all by the customs issue: the security relationship is an obvious example.
This prompts the observation that there’s a lot of stuff we’re not really giving enough attention. And a prime exhibit here is the Withdrawal Bill itself.
Recall that the purpose of the Bill is to cover the uncertainty around the status of the EU’s acquis once the UK leaves: it’s an essential counterpart to the Withdrawal Agreement. And the solution it offers, of rolling over all that acquis for the government to decide what to keep and what to chuck, matters hugely for the balance of executive and legislature in the UK, given the scale and scope of what it deals with.
And yet, we had scant discussion of that – despite numerous outstanding critiques of its model – and a focus on an (admittedly meaningful) amendment relating to the role of Parliament in the event of a failure to reach a deal with the EU by November.
The issue is essentially one of bandwidth: there’s only so much that can be a priority issue at any one time, so something’s got to give. That’s true in normal times, and these are not normal by any stretch of the imagination.
The risk is that important decisions are made by accident, or without due consideration, or even by default.
That’s a problem for everyone, both those who don’t get what they want – i.e. the large majority – and those that do – because the other lot will feel rightly aggrieved. Even the cry that “you should said something at the time” is weakened by the scale of the problem, even before we get to contemporary values about the instantaneous satisfying of one’s needs. In short, it’s a recipe for future instability.
The process of Brexit will matter as much as the outcome for the future development of the British polity. Consider how already the dissatisfactions carried by remainers shape political debate, much as the disconnect between elites and publics contributed to the referendum in the first place.
Participation is the life-blood of democracy, not only because of the need for some transmission from people to government, but also because inclusion through political channels is a means of building and maintaining a community. If we fail to heed that point, then we risk dealing with even greater problems than those posed by Brexit.
The post The heuristic gap appeared first on Ideas on Europe.
Based on her prize-winning article in JCER on the Sino-European Solar Panel Dispute, Astrid Pepermans examines how the European Union (EU) risks losing a trade war which China and the US initiated. She argues that the EU must respond by remaining united and sticking to its values of quality and rule-based trade.
Container ship in the port of Rotterdam, Holland © rob3rt82 / Adobe Stock
Lately, free traders all over the world must be having a hard time when opening their newspapers. Donald Trump is unleashing a trade war with Xi Jinping. Meanwhile, the EU is also increasingly agitated about its imbalanced trade relationship with China. And, while having similar worries about China’s mercantilist economic strategy, the US and the EU find themselves dragged into a tit-for-tat trade conflict which is not so different from the Trans-Pacific trade quarrels.
Nothing new under the sun, you may think. Trade conflicts have existed since the birth of human economic interaction. However, this is the first time that the ‘strategic triangle’ of China, the EU and the US has been so close to reaching deadlock. The EU may well get squeezed between the two superpowers, which know exactly how to play on the EU’s internal divisions. The EU risks losing a trade war which China and the US initiated.
One could argue – and some experts do – for a Sino-European alliance against President Trump’s foolhardy catalogue of requirements for every country with whom the US has a trade deficit. However, as my recent article on the Sino-European solar panel dispute illustrates, existing worries about Chinese overcapacities, dumping practices, mercantilist policies and technological transfers are far from ill-founded.
In fact, these unfair trade practices have been, and are, harmful to the EU. While the European Commission has some trade defence instruments to tackle them, the same case demonstrates how China can bypass the Union with ease by playing member states against each other. In short, while fighting the eagle by joining the panda sounds like a good idea, history has shown that the latter has claws too and that it will use them whenever it feels its interests are endangered.
Others argue for the opposite: a western front forcing China to deliver on all the promises it made when it entered the WTO in 2001. These promises include opening up the Chinese market to foreign goods and investment; transforming the economy from state-directed to market-orientated; making consumption rather than investment the main driver of Chinese growth; and liberalising its monetary system etc. Nevertheless, it is clear that Trump is planning on playing cavalier seul on this one. Even if the US and the EU worked together to press for Chinese concessions, it is highly unlikely (and equally unconducive) that all the EU member states would join the US’s extremely hard stance in the debate.
Whether by means of hard protectionism or offensive mercantilism, both the US and China are laying claim to the top spot of the global economy. The only way for the EU to cope with its position between the hammer and the anvil is to remain united and to set its own course. Such a course does not include closing off its market, nor does it mean that it should make an enemy of China or the US.
It means sticking to what is at the core of the Union: rule-based trade. Trump is wrong on many points, but not on his argument that China should follow trade rules. The prospect of tapping into the huge Chinese consumer market has blinded the 28 EU member states to China’s economic nationalism, which has stood in the way of a level economic playing field since China’s entry into the WTO.
Having arrived at a point where Chinese strategic investments have made clear the enormous competitive pressure unleashed by the ‘opening up’ of the Chinese economy, it is only now dawning on countries like France and Germany that their position in global trade is being challenged. However, their efforts to establish a decent screening mechanism at European level to scrutinise Chinese investments in sensitive industries have been hampered by the desire among many other member states to attract Chinese capital.
Creating a European policy and tackling the challenge mean that the member states must refrain from short-term thinking, which implies not giving in on every financial carrot China dangles before them. As a unified whole, the EU28 still carries serious economic weight and the member states should be less afraid of using it to press for fair competition. In the same vein, quality should remain Europe’s central yardstick. Competition is important for innovation and economic progress, but not when it causes international price wars and a global race to the bottom. Whether for European, Chinese or American goods, quality standards should be agreed upon and upheld.
Fair international competition and a consistent focus on quality will in turn create room for manoeuvre for Europe to increase its productivity and prosper economically. The threefold approach of regaining Europe’s economic competitiveness, sticking to European values such as quality and rule-based trade, and conveying them in a forceful and unanimous way is the only option for Europe to tackle both the China and Trump challenges.
This article is based on the author’s article in the Journal of Contemporary European Studies (JCER) Vol 13 No 4, which won the 2018 Luke Foster Prize for Best JCER Article.
Please note that this article represents the views of the author(s) and not those of the UACES Graduate Forum, JCER or UACES.
Shortlink for this article: http://bit.ly/2sT5FNE
Astrid Pepermans
Free University of Brussels / Vrije Universiteit Brussel
Astrid Pepermans obtained a Masters degree in Political Sciences and started working as a teaching assistant at the Free University of Brussels in 2015. She is currently preparing a PhD thesis on the Sino-European political/economic relationship.
The post Unless the EU Gets Its Act Together, It Will Lose a Trade War Against Both China and the US appeared first on Ideas on Europe.
The further development of the Common Position 2008/944/CFSP on arms exports control
Tuesday 19/06/2018 - 9:30-10:30