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On April 22, 2015, IPI’s Middle East and North Africa (MENA) office hosted Ambassador Mokhtar Lamani, a  former UN representative in Syria, former Arab League official, and the former permanent observer of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation at the UN, who discussed the origins and evolution of extremist organizations across the Middle East.

At the event—attended by government officials, diplomats, religious leaders, and representatives from think tanks and civil society—Mr. Lamani delved into the complex origins of religious political organizations and their metamorphoses into groups like al-Qaeda and its offshoots, including ISIS.

“Although ISIS is the same organization in both countries, there are similarities and differences between Syria and Iraq,” he said. “In Iraq, ISIS Iraqi fighters amount to two thirds [of the group, while] in Syria, national fighters constitute less than one third. The rest comprises operatives from different parts of the world.“

During the debate moderated by IPI MENA Director Nejib Friji, Mr. Lamani underlined the troubled situation in the six provinces of Iraq that have turned into key incubators for ISIS operatives.  Mr. Lamani said sectarian policies are the main culprit behind the emergence of these incubators in the country.

Mr. Lamani said that when the group began its campaign in the summer of 2014 managing to gain control of a territory as large as Jordan, it took the entire international community by surprise. This pushed the international community to “a reactive attitude instead of a proactive approach,“ he said. In that regard, the group now seems to have the edge over the international community, he continued.

Mr. Lamani also discussed possible solutions to the group’s advance, highlighting the need for a multifaceted response. “A military approach will not lead to a solution unless a multidisciplinary strategy covering the political, social, cultural, and educational needs is implemented,” he said.

The discussion also noted that in order to preserve, reinforce, and protect human rights in the region, international legal standards need to be supported by constitutional guarantees at the national level.

The event was also attended by the ambassadors of Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon, who called for immediate action to tackle the acute humanitarian and refugee crises created by ISIS. The refugee crisis, they said, has had a strong impact on their countries‘ economic and social equilibrium.

Migrants arrive in the Sicilian port of Messina after a rescue operation at sea earlier this week

When EU leaders meet in Brussels on Thursday for a hastily-called summit to address the rash of migrant drownings in the Mediterranean, the most concrete “deliverable” is likely to be a pledge to “at least” double resources to the bloc’s two maritime operations along Europe’s southern coast.

According to a draft communiqué sent to national capitals late Wednesday, which Brussels Blog got its hands on and has posted here, the commitment to double the financial resources will go through 2016. But the text is a bit more unclear on what exactly the Triton and Poseidon missions’ mandate will be.

The draft says the new cash would allow the patrols to “increase the search and rescue possibilities within the mandate” of Frontex, the EU’s border guard agency. But diplomats say the issue of whether to grant Frontex an explicit search-and-rescue mission, like the now-disbanded Mare Nostrum patrols, remains off the table. A senior EU official said Frontex remains a border-control agency, and that will not be changed.

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Jorge Domecq, EDA Chief Executive, met today with the Greek Minister of National Defence, Panos Kammenos to exchange views about the preparation of the European Council in June 2015 and the participation of Greece in EDA projects. 

“Member States benefit significantly through their cooperation within the framework of EDA, in areas such as capability development, training, procurement, standardisation, achieving on one hand economies of scale, while on the other enhancing European security”, Hellenic Minister of Defence Panos Kammenos said in Wednesday’s meeting with EDA Chief Executive Jorge Domecq.

“Greece will actively support your work in order to foster the improvement of European capabilities and cooperation in the area of defence, consequently promoting European integration and strengthening European security”, the Minister added.

“Greece is a strong supporter of the European Defence Agency. Its proactive approach in EDA initiatives relating to the European defence industry as well as to our maritime or energy and environment activities, have certainly contributed to their overall success. 

One of the Agency’s key functions is to serve as an interface between the Member States and the European Commission. We facilitate access to information on EU policies which have or might have an impact on the military such as the modernisation of the European air traffic system. In the same spirit we also support national defence industries and especially small and medium sized enterprises, for instance in the application processes for EU funding for dual-use research. This can be of benefit for the Greek and the European defence and technological industrial base as a whole”, said Jorge Domecq during his visit in Athens. 

The visit in Greece also allowed for meetings with other high-ranking officials of the Ministry of Defence, including Alternate Minister of National Defence Mr. Kostas Isichos, the Greek Chief of Defence and representatives of the national defence industry. It is part of a series of visits by Mr. Domecq to all EDA Member States following his appointment as EDA Chief Executive and ahead of the Ministerial Steering Board on 18 May 2015. So far, Mr. Domecq visited Spain, Lithuania, Latvia, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Germany, Portugal, the Netherlands, Ireland, France, Romania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Croatia, Estonia, Poland and Hungary. Tomorrow he will head to Cyprus.

More information

• News "Jorge Domecq in Poland for defence discussions"(20 April 2015)
• News "Jorge Domecq meets Estonian Minister of Defence" (20 April 2015)
• News "Meeting with Croatian Defence Minister in Zagreb" (17 April 2015)
• News "Slovenia welcomes Jorge Domecq" (15 April 2015)
• News "EDA Chief Executive visits Czech Republic" (13 April 2015)
• News "Jorge Domecq in Bulgaria to discuss defence cooperation" (8 April 2015)
• News "EDA Chief Executive travels to Romania" (8 April 2015)
• News "EDA Chief Executive meets French Minister of Defence" (30 March 2015)
• News "Jorge Domecq exchanges views with Irish Minister of Defence Simon Coveney T.D." (25 March 2015)
• News "EDA Chief Executive visits The Netherlands" (23 March 2015)
• News "Discussions on European defence in Portugal" (19 March 2015)
• News "Jorge Domecq meets German Secretary of State" (19 March 2015)
• News "Belgium and EDA discuss future defence cooperation" (18 March 2015)
• News "Jorge Domecq in the UK for cooperation talks" (25 Feb 2015)
• News "Latvia and EDA discuss cooperation opportunities" (19 Feb 2015)
• News "EDA Chief Executive visits Lithuania" (17 Feb 2015) 

Az Egyesült Államoknak újabb nagy fegyverüzletet sikerült összehoznia az orosz veszélyre hivatkozva; Lengyelország épp az imént jelentette be, hogy megveszi a Raytheon Patriot rakétarendszerét.

Polish Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defence Tomasz Siemoniak and EDA Chief Executive Jorge Domecq met on 20 April to exchange views about the preparation of the European Council in June 2015. They also discussed Poland’s participation in EDA projects and ways to support the Polish defence industry with an emphasis on small and medium sized enterprises.

“Poland is a driving force of defence cooperation within the European Defence Agency. It participates in all of our key capability programmes: air-to-air refuelling, cyber defence, governmental satellite communications and remotely piloted aircraft systems. Additionally, Poland is heavily involved in many of our research and technology initiatives.

The focus of all our activities is to improve national defence capabilities as well as to support the European defence industry. Security of supply and support to the European defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB) are key aspects of our strategic autonomy. We are therefore keen on understanding the needs and working with the Central and Eastern European defence industries”, said Jorge Domecq during his stay in Warsaw.

The visit in Poland also provided the opportunity to meet with the Secretary of State Czesław Mroczek and representatives of the Military Institute of Armament Technology. It is part of a series of visits by Mr. Domecq to all EDA Member States following his appointment as EDA Chief Executive and ahead of the Ministerial Steering Board on 18 May 2015. So far, Mr. Domecq visited Spain, Lithuania, Latvia, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Germany, Portugal, the Netherlands, Ireland, France, Romania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Croatia and Estonia. 

Copyright picture: Polish Ministry of National Defence, mjr Robert Siemaszko

More information

• News "Jorge Domecq meets Estonian Minister of Defence" (20 April 2015)
• News "Meeting with Croatian Defence Minister in Zagreb" (17 April 2015)
• News "Slovenia welcomes Jorge Domecq" (15 April 2015)
• News "EDA Chief Executive visits Czech Republic" (13 April 2015)
• News "Jorge Domecq in Bulgaria to discuss defence cooperation" (8 April 2015)
• News "EDA Chief Executive travels to Romania" (8 April 2015)
• News "EDA Chief Executive meets French Minister of Defence" (30 March 2015)
• News "Jorge Domecq exchanges views with Irish Minister of Defence Simon Coveney T.D." (25 March 2015)
• News "EDA Chief Executive visits The Netherlands" (23 March 2015)
• News "Discussions on European defence in Portugal" (19 March 2015)
• News "Jorge Domecq meets German Secretary of State" (19 March 2015)
• News "Belgium and EDA discuss future defence cooperation" (18 March 2015)
• News "Jorge Domecq in the UK for cooperation talks" (25 Feb 2015)
• News "Latvia and EDA discuss cooperation opportunities" (19 Feb 2015)
• News "EDA Chief Executive visits Lithuania" (17 Feb 2015) 

On 18-19 February 2015, Switzerland in cooperation with the Kingdom of the Netherlands and with the support of the GCSP hosted the workshop “  Mechanisms for Confidence-Building and Cooperation in Cyberspace  " in Geneva.

On 11-12 March 2015, the GCSP organised in Glion (near Montreux), Switzerland, a retreat in preparation of the  2015 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference  , jointly with the Canberra-based   Centre for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament  (CNND, Australian National University).

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

Barack Obama reakciója az orosz légvédelmi rendszer Iránnak eladásáról: "nem gond, át tudunk ütni rajta".

The suicide attack on the Kabul Bank in Jalalabad on 18 April 2015, which killed more than 30 people and injured at least 100 others, was condemned by the Taleban and claimed by the Islamic State (IS), or at least by a Facebook site purporting to represent IS, also known as Daesh. President Ashraf Ghani also appeared to endorse the Daesh claim. As Kate Clark and Borhan Osman report, despite the ‘Daesh attack’ making news headlines around the world, both claim and denial have to be carefully scrutinised.

Jalalabad endured a bloody day on Saturday, 18 April 2015. A suicide bomber blew himself up among crowds of people outside the city’s branch of the Kabul Bank, killing and injuring scores of those queuing up to get their monthly salaries from the government. Members of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) (not in uniform) were hit, along with government workers and other civilians. Children were among the casualties. The scenes of carnage captured on film showed dazed and bloody survivors among the wounded and dead.

At about the same time in Jalalabad, a saint’s shrine called Dolakai Baba was blown up, wounding two civilians and, also on the same day, a magnetic bomb exploded in the nearby Behsud district killing one person and injuring two others. A fourth bomb was safely detonated by Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) outside the Jalalabad branch of Afghanistan’s central bank which is not far away from the Kabul Bank.

Claim and denial

Both denial and claim of responsibility for the attacks came swiftly. Two hours after the bank attack, the Taleban spokesman, Zabihullah Mujahed, tweeted: “2 blasts hit civilians this morning at a shrine & front of Bank in ‪#Jalalabad, we condemn/deny involvement in both.” He told Reuters, it was “an evil act.”

All four attacks were claimed on a recently activated Facebook account  purportedly belonging to Shahidullah Shahid, the former spokesman for the Pakistan Taleban and now spokesman for Islamic State’s ‘Khorasan province’ (an old Islamic name for the wider Afghanistan region, so incorporating supporters in Afghanistan and Pakistan) appointed by IS central after a lot of urging from his side (for more detail on Shahid and his success, on the fifth attempt, at getting IS central to recognise the Khorasan chapter, see here). About 20 minutes after the shrine attack (at 8:38 am), this account said IS had blown up “a centre of idolatry” (shirk). ‘Shahid’ also claimed the Kabul Bank attack on “government people” soon after (8:52). A claim for the attempted attack on the Central Bank was posted at 9:50 and the attack in Behsud on the vehicle of a district chief from Kunar at 11:49. The same claims were also posted around the same timings by another account named in Arabic as ‘Khorasan Province, Nangarhar.’ Local journalists in Jalalabad said a man introducing himself as Shahidullah Shahid and claiming to speak for IS telephoned within half an hour of the attacks to say IS was responsible.

Hours later, President Ghani appeared to endorse the IS line – telling journalists, “In the horrific incident in Nangarhar, who took responsibility? The Taliban didn’t claim responsibility. Daesh claimed responsibility for it.” It is not clear if the president had special information to back up his comments or whether this was another attempt to claim that Daesh is in Afghanistan and the international powers should be worried and continue to back his government.

The president’s words helped harden the Daesh claim. Many journalists, particularly those from outside Afghanistan, who contacted AAN for background or interviews on the bombing, assumed Daesh had been behind the attack. “Why were they killing Sunnis?” the presenter of a domestic British news programme asked, as he struggled to make sense of attack and claim. “These are disgruntled Taleban who have rebranded as IS?” he asked. By the time the attacks hit the news stands, for some it had become fact: “First-ever IS suicide attack in Afghanistan kills 35″ was the headline for The News, in Pakistan, while the Mumbai Mirror reported: “33 die in first ISIS attack in Afghanistan.”

Assessing the Taleban denial

Generally, claims and denials in Afghanistan have to be taken with a dose of scepticism. The Taleban’s denial could be genuine, although they do have a record of distancing themselves from attacks which ‘go wrong,’ for example those that cause high numbers of civilian casualties, particularly in areas considered to be their heartland (and because their official line is – based on their code of conduct to avoid harming ‘the common people’ and their property). (1) In the face of a denial, it can be difficult and it takes time to verify whether an attack has been launched by the Taleban (which includes the Haqqani network, sometimes described as a separate organisation). However, in AAN’s report into the Taleban Code of Conduct, we traced several examples of false denials of attacks where commanders had subsequently been investigated.

Recent attacks where the denial looked suspicious would include the attack on Afghan Local Police who were watching a volleyball match on 23 November 2014 in Yahyakhel district, Paktika province. The bomber killed ten ALP members, including two commanders, along 53 civilians, including 21 children (a further 85 civilians, including 26 children, were injured; figures are from UNAMA’s 2014 report on the Protection of Civilians).

On the face of it, the attacks in Jalalabad, with the exception of the attack on the shrine, fit the Afghan Taleban’s pattern of operations. If it had not been for the Daesh claim, no-one would have noticed anything extraordinary about them. The Taleban spokesman called the attack on the Kabul Bank “evil,” but it resembled other Taleban attacks on ANSF personnel drawing their salaries from banks. UNAMA detailed these two in the second half of last year:

Suicide attack at Kabul Bank, Lashkargah City, Helmand – On 17 December, two men wearing [body-born IEDs]  entered the Kabul Bank in Lashkargah city, Helmand. One [body-born IED] detonated causing 16 civilian casualties (three killed and 13 injured). Three [Afghan National Policemen] ANP were also killed and four injured. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack.

On 1 October, a magnetic IED detonated near a bank in Kunduz city, Kunduz province, targeting the ANP, which caused 16 civilian casualties (one death and 15 injured including one woman and two children). The Taliban claimed responsibility and stated having killed five ANP.

Saturday’s attack was the second time the Kabul Bank in Jalalabad has been targeted in very similar fashion. In February 2011, the Taleban sent several armed men into the bank, dressed in police uniform, who killed 38 people and wounded 70; the movement claimed to have targeted “policemen, intelligence agents and other government employees” who were drawing their wages from the bank. An estimated half of the casualties in the bank were non-policemen.

The attack was captured on the bank’s CCTV and the footage shown on television. It horrified and sickened Afghans and led to a backlash against the Taleban. As AAN reported, the popular revulsion at this and similar attacks which targeted civilians or civilian places (2) and the political damage caused lead to some re-thinking by the movement as to its tactics or at least its media strategy. Its thinking on ‘civilian casualties’ has moved on; in early 2015, for example, its definition of civilian broadened somewhat (3), and the group has become more proactive on cataloguing its own lists of civilians by which it accuses the ANSF and international military of killing or wounding. UNAMA has been investigating these claims and adding them (where appropriate) to its figures and reports. In some periods, the Taleban appear to take greater care, for example reducing their use of pressure plate IEDs, which are inherently indiscriminate (and therefore also illegal under International Humanitarian Law) and kill large numbers of civilians, and trying to minimise collateral damage in suicide or complex attacks. However, such efforts are not consistent.

Civilian casualties may now be on the Taleban radar as potentially politically damaging and they have appeared to make some mitigation efforts. However, the group still has a high tolerance of collateral damage, for the Taleban this would mean ‘ordinary Afghans’ incidentally killed in an attack. (4) An analysis by UNAMA of the 382 attacks claimed by the Taleban in 2014 found that most of them – 236 – had military targets (international or Afghan armed forces or pro-government armed groups), but caused 1682 civilian casualties. (5) To take a recent example, on 10 April 2015, the Taleban claimed an attack on an ISAF convoy outside Jalalabad which wounded two international soldiers. killed eight civilians and injured 15 others.

All this means that, even though the Saturday attacks, with the exception of the one on the shrine, fit the Taleban’s normal modus operandi, the movement may still have wanted to deny the attacks, particularly the Kabul Bank attack because of the feared bad publicity. This was a ‘messy’ operation. The number of ordinary people killed and injured compared to the ‘military’ target may have seemed too high, the video already showing on television too appalling, to claim the attack. Or, of course, the denial may have been genuine.

The Daesh claim

‘Shahid’s’ claim could also be authentic or merely opportunistic. The most plausible aspect of the claim is the IED against the saint’s shrine, given that shrines are not normal Taleban targets, but do offend Daesh’s Salafist ideology. Moreover, an IED is easy to place, and that claim came quickly, within minutes of the explosion.

The Facebook account is new and cannot be verified as belonging to Shahid. (6) IS Khorasan’s ‘official’ Twitter and Facebook accounts have been suspended several times, so it would be no surprise if a personal account had been used. However, Shahid normally contacts the media by phone and speaks in Arabic. This is the first time we know of him posting a claim or using Pashto. Even if this new account does belong to Shahid, operating in his capacity as IS Khorasan spokesman, the claim might still not be genuine.

Further muddying the water, a report was published on 22 April of a denial from IS-Khorasan which in itself is unverifiable and, anyway, of questionable authority. (7)

The attack has not yet been claimed on any ‘official account’ from ‘IS central’ in Iraq/Syria.

The posting claiming the Kabul Bank attack included a generic photograph of ‘the bomber,’ whom the account names as ‘Abu Muhammad Khorasani.’ Sitting on a prayer mat, with his face masked by a scarf, the man has a Kalashnikov rifle by his side and Daesh’s black flag in the background. The IS flag looks to be of crude, home-made design rather than having the standard IS calligraphy used by the group’s authorised branches. The picture is not especially convincing.

Local journalists who received calls from ‘Shahid’ claiming the Jalalabad attacks for IS-Khorasan told AAN the voice sounded ‘younger’ than normal and had a Nangrahari accent (Shahid is from Orakzai Agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas).

A step change for Daesh or a grab for publicity? 

So far, Daesh has been prominent in Afghanistan largely on social media and in reports by the media and Afghan officials. Such ‘sightings’, as AAN discovered, usually turn out to be baseless. Where a Daesh presence on the ground has been confirmed (see AAN reporting here) was in the ‘Khorasan chapter’ being announced on 26 January 2015 with known Taleban commander Rauf Khadem at the helm for Afghanistan and a former Pakistani Taleban commander, Hafez Saeed Khan, as the overall ‘governor’ of Khorasan. Khadem’s group was active in Helmand province. However, he was killed two weeks later on 9 February in a drone attack. The handful of others who have proclaimed themselves IS tend, like Khadem, to be disgruntled former Taleban. Several had been kicked out for criminality. For the group to now pull off three attacks in a day, with a fourth thwarted, would be a step change in its operations.

That having been said, if one wanted to start IS in Afghanistan, the east would be the obvious place to start. The insurgency there is much more fractured than in the south, making it potentially easier for new groups to emerge and recruit members. The east also has a stronger history of Salafism, the ultra-orthodox school of Islam followed by Daesh, than other parts of Afghanistan. However, unlike Daesh’s internationally-minded, jihadist Salafism, the main Salafist strand in the east, and across Afghanistan for that matter, has generally been quietist. It has also had Salafi fighting groups since the days of the anti-Soviet jihad of the 1980s. In recent years, such groups have fought alongside the Taleban after failing to operate independently (see AAN’s 2010 piece on the joining of Kunar’s Salafis with the Taleban). Anecdotal observation suggests increased sympathy with global jihadism among the youth in the east (as opposed to other regions), particularly among those fighting with Salafi groups and among ‘cyber-jihadists.’ This trend appears to have gained momentum since the emergence of IS in the Middle East, especially after the announcement of its Khorasan province. (8)

As to the Jalalabad attacks, no other group disputed the ‘IS claim’ for any of the four incidents, including the Behsud attack, which did not cause the kind of collateral damage that might have prompted a denial by the Taleban. This lends some weight to the argument of those speculating that all four attacks, which happened within four hours, were planned for a dramatic launch of Daesh operations in Afghanistan.

It is also quite possible that local fighters, who used to fight alongside Taleban or in semi-independent Salafi groups and are now self-identifying with IS, carried out these attacks. They might have no operational or actual connection to IS, but have adopted its ideology and have enough military experience to plan a series of attacks on one day. However, that could still mean that Shahid’s claim was opportunistic (and the Taleban’s denial genuine). It is difficult to imagine IS’s Khorasan chapter’s ‘media operations’ being that organised or hooked up to self-identifying IS armed men on the ground.

It is also completely plausible that the attacks had nothing to do with IS, or with groups who have rebranded themselves as IS, and was purely opportunistic on the part of Shahid or someone else claiming to be Shahid. The IS claim is reminiscent of ‘Fedai Mahaz’s’ statement that it murdered the Swedish journalist, Nils Horner, in Kabul in March 2014, a claim which AAN looked into) and found to be unverifiable – possible, but highly questionable. That claim did, however, generate enormous amounts of publicity for Fedai Mahaz – as Saturday’s did for Daesh in Afghanistan.

Impact of claim and attack

It is impossible at this stage to say for certain whether these attacks were carried out by the Taleban or by IS or IS sympathisers. UNAMA seems correct in its call for the presence of Islamic State in Afghanistan to be meticulously evaluated to ascertain if militants are committing violence under a different name. More investigation is needed as to who the Kabul Bank bomber was and what his networks were, where he spent the night before the bombing and so on. More should be known generally about how the Taleban run their suicide (fedayi) operations; who endorses suicide attacks, who carries out surveillance, who trains, how is command and control ensured. As to IS, unlike the Taleban’s media operation, which is familiar to journalists – they know who they are talking to and their trustworthiness –, reporters are still in the dark about IS or indeed whether there is an IS to speak to. This makes it more difficult to verify claims.

What is certain is that Daesh’s name made this particular attack international news, something which the Taleban now struggle to do. The Daesh name also caused uneasiness among the Afghan public. Already, there was disquiet that certain savage tactics had been (re-) introduced into the war, following the release of a video of an Afghan soldier being beheaded by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) earlier this month and the kidnapping of more than 30 Hazaras allegedly by the same group in Zabul in late February (AAN will be publishing a piece on this soon). There is fear that the emergence of IS in the Middle East and the announcement of its Khorasan chapter may embolden the more radical of the militant networks in Afghanistan – and particularly in the east – who have worked under the supervision of the Taleban. The cooperation emerged not because they share the Taleban’s doctrine and vision, but because they could not operate independently. IS may be an attractive alternative for such radical jihadists operating in Afghanistan, giving them an opportunity to align themselves with the new brand. There is also the possibility that ‘good publicity’ for IS in the wake of the Jalalabad attack may encourage others to switch groups, including those with long, military experience. Of course, more savage attacks would be unlikely to help Daesh find favour with Afghans generally, and, as the Taleban found, very brutal tactics tend to result in popular backlash (again, see AAN’s paper on the Taleban Code of Conduct); they are not a sustainable way to build support.

Afghanistan had already been preparing for a bloody year after 2014 saw an intensification of the conflict, with the highest number of civilian casualties in any year since 2001 and a war which failed to fall into its normal winter lull. Whether genuine or not, the Taleban denial, the Daesh claim and the president’s apparent endorsement of both gave weight to fears that this year could see more savagery and fewer red lines in the Afghan war.

 

(1) Injunctions include: suicide attackers must “avoid casualties among the common people” (art. 57); Taleban must “with all their power…be careful with regard to the lives of the common people and their property’ (art. 65); “anyone who harms people in the name of the mujahedin shall be punished (arts. 65, 66) and; “Taking care of public property and the lives and property of the people is considered one of the main responsibilities of a mujahed” (back cover).

(2) Other attacks included one on a Finest Supermarket in Kabul in January 2011, supposedly targeting the head and workers of the private security company, Blackwater, but killing nine Afghan civilians, including the mother, father and four children of one family, and another attack, in February 2011, in Kunduz, on men supposedly registering for the Afghan local police; of the several dozen killed, many had simply been trying to renew their IDs and were clearly far too young or too old to have been conceivably trying to join the ALP.

(3) UNAMA wrote:

 A Taliban statement released on 4 January 2015 reported a revised definition of “civilian” to include “any person who is not engaged in activities against the Taliban: “those people who do not stand shoulder to shoulder with the enemy forces and are not carrying out actions against Jihad are to be considered as civilians.” The 2013 statements reported a definition of “civilian” which included women, children, elderly persons and those who “live an ordinary life” under the category of civilians who must be protected from attacks.

(4) Collateral damage normally refers to civilians killed or injured ‘incidentally’ in an attack on a military target. The Taleban consider many people classed under International Humanitarian Law as civilian (because they are not in the armed forces or participating in hostilities) as legitimate targets. So, with the Taleban, it is more accurate to talk about their high tolerance for collateral damage among the common people, rather than civilians.

(5) From a war crimes perspective, targeting civilians per se is illegal – the International Criminal Court’s preliminary examination into war crimes in Afghanistan includes an assessment of the Taleban’s deliberate targeting of civilians. Also illegal are indiscriminate attacks, where no discrimination is made between military and civilian, as well as attacks on military targets where it could be foreseen that the loss of civilian life would be disproportionate to the military gain. UNAMA gives the following examples of disproportionate harm done:

On 28 December, an IED detonated in front of a shop in Alingar district, Laghman province. The shop was located near an ALP check-point and was owned by a tribal elder who was a member of the district Afghan Social Outreach Program (ASOP). The detonation caused five civilian casualties (two killed, including the shop owner, and three injured including a 13-year-old boy). The Taliban claimed responsibility on their website.

On 13 December, a 17-year-old a suicide attacker detonated his suicide vest against an [Afghan National Army] ANA shuttle bus in Kabul city, killing and injuring 14 ANA combatants. The detonation also seriously injured 14 civilians, including a woman and two children. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack on Twitter.

On 1 November, a [vehicle-born] IED attacker targeted a joint check post of ANA and ALP in Azra district, Logar province. The explosion caused 29 civilian casualties (five killed, including a pregnant woman and a child, and 24 injured, including four women and three children). The blast damaged five civilian houses and a mosque. The attack also killed and injured 21 combatants (ANA and ALP members). The Taliban’s claim of responsibility indicated that the attack killed 28 ANA, ANP and ALP members and injured 19 other members of Afghan national security forces. The statement said that five civilians, including two children had been slightly injured.

(6) The same account had, on Friday, posted pictures supposedly of an IS training camp in Logar under the leadership of Saad Emarati, the former Taleban commander in Azra district who has defected to IS.

(7) The Daily Beast reported a denial by Muslim Dost whom they name as a spokesman for IS. However, this Afghan, based in Pakistan, is a Salafi scholar who pledged allegiance to IS. For more detail about him, see AAN’s first report on Daesh.

(8) In Nangrahar, locals in Chaparhar district, about 20 kilometres from Jalalabad, have told AAN that insurgents there who were already mostly Salafi have been tilting towards IS in recent months, as evidenced by more IS flags and more talk about IS. AAN has verified accounts of men from Chaparhar going to fight in Syria/Iraq and some being killed there in September as already being reported. Some of these Chaparharis who have ‘migrated’ to the IS heartland (and married there) are actively in touch with local supporters on social media.

Uniós eljárás indul a Gazprom ellen, amiért többek között Magyarországon is visszaél az erőfölényével.

Une nouvelle inconnue s’est ajoutée à une équation grecque déjà passablement complexe : les deux partis les plus opposés à l’aide à la Grèce (le parti du Centre et les « Vrais Finlandais ») ont remporté les élections de dimanche en Finlande. Il va devenir difficile pour le gouvernement d’Alexis Tsipras d’invoquer en permanence se toute fraiche légitimité démocratique pour continuer à refuser d’établir la liste des réformes précises que ses créanciers lui réclament en échange d’un nouveau prêt de 7,2 milliards d’euros, le camp des « durs » au sein de l’Eurogroupe (les 19 ministres des Finances de la zone euro) se renforçant. Car, depuis deux mois, la Grèce « joue la montre », selon un diplomate européen, « espérant qu’on ne pourra pas faire autrement que de l’aider de peur de voir la zone euro se déliter : ont-ils raison ? Ou sommes-nous prêts à prendre le risque d’un Grexit ? C’est impossible à dire ». Quoi qu’il en soit, chaque jour qui passe rapproche dangereusement le pays d’un défaut de paiement, d’autant que l’incertitude politique grève dangereusement les espoirs de reprise économique.

Pourtant, la Grèce a pu mesurer son isolement au cours des dernières semaines : non seulement elle n’a trouvé aucun allié au sein de la zone euro, mais elle a indisposé par ses provocations (les réparations de guerre demandées à Berlin, les clins d’œil à Moscou et Pékin) et ses erreurs de manœuvre ses partenaires les mieux disposés à son égard. La zone euro « n’a jamais été aussi unie », a ainsi expliqué hier à Libération Pierre Moscovici, le commissaire chargé des affaires économiques et monétaires. Pis : elle n’a trouvé aucun allié extérieur : ni Moscou ni Pékin ne se sont montrés disposés à suppléer les Européens. Wolfgang Schäuble, le ministre allemand des Finances, n’a pas hésité à se moquer de Syriza, le parti de gauche radicale qui dirige la Grèce avec la droite radicale souverainiste d’ANEL, jeudi, à Washington : « si vous trouvez quelqu’un à Moscou ou à Pékin qui est prêt à vous prêter de l’argent, nous sommes d’accord ».

Les États-Unis, qui souhaitent pour des raisons stratégiques que la Grèce reste dans l’Union européenne et dans l’euro, se sont eux-mêmes lassés des tergiversations grecques : « aidez-vous vous-mêmes, faites des réformes difficiles : collectez l’impôt, réduisez votre bureaucratie, rendez de la flexibilité au marché du travail », a lancé le président américain Barack Obama, vendredi, lors d’une conférence de presse avec le Premier ministre italien Matteo Renzi. « Nous soutiendrons un degré de flexibilité sur la façon dont vous avancerez », a-t-il poursuivi, « mais vous devez montrer à vos créanciers et à ceux qui soutiennent votre système financier que vous essayez de vous aider vous-mêmes, et cela requiert le genre de décisions difficiles que Matteo commence à prendre ».

« Si le verre est à moitié vide, on pourra considérer qu’il est à moitié plein », espère un haut fonctionnaire européen : « tout le monde veut les aider. Mais pour l’instant, le verre est totalement vide et ça, c’est inacceptable ». Ce que confirme Pierre Moscovici : « les négociations avec la Grèce avancent très lentement. Ca n’a commencé à bouger que samedi, lors de la réunion du Club de Bruxelles –Commission, Banque centrale européenne, FMI- samedi à Paris ». « Ca coince sur tout : le gouvernement grec ne propose aucune réforme articulée et n’a aucune vue d’ensemble de ce qu’il faut faire », poursuit l’ancien ministre des finances français : « les Européens leur ont pourtant donné du temps et ont fait preuve de flexibilité. Le climat actuel est très très préoccupant ».

De fait, selon nos informations, ce n’est pas seulement sur la réforme des retraites, la flexibilisation du marché du travail ou l’augmentation de la TVA, c’est-à-dire les mesures d’austérité budgétaires, que les négociations bloquent : tout se passe comme si Syriza ne s’attendait pas à accéder au pouvoir et n’avait pas préparé une feuille de route précise d’une réforme d’un État qu’il juge lui-même dysfonctionnel. Ainsi, la lutte contre l’évasion et la fraude fiscale n’est pour l’instant qu’une proclamation et n’a pas été accompagnée de mesures concrètes n’a été prise, comme, par exemple, le rattachement du SDOE (l’élite des agents du fisc) au secrétaire général chargé des recettes publiques (un poste indépendant). Or, la capacité de l’État grec de lever enfin l’impôt est sans doute l’un des plus gros abcès de fixation des créanciers de la Grèce qui veulent éviter que le pays ne replonge dans ses vieux travers (la fraude fiscale est estimée entre 20 et 40 milliards d’euros par an selon les sources). « Non seulement il ne se passe rien entre la Grèce et la zone euro, mais il ne se passe rien à l’intérieur du pays », affirme un diplomate européen : « on ne sait vraiment pas ce qu’ils veulent ». Or, sans réformes précises, pas d’aide, mais aussi pas de négociation sur un allègement de la dette ou du surplus primaire budgétaire (avant charge de la dette).

Le problème est que le temps presse : selon le FMI, il faudra non seulement boucler rapidement le plan d’aide actuel, mais mettre sur les rails d’ici fin juin un troisième plan qui pourrait être compris entre 30 et 50 milliards afin de mettre le pays à l’abri des marchés jusqu’en 2030. Ce qui s’annonce difficile, car, là aussi, il faudra qu’Athènes s’engage sur des réformes structurelles précises. Si la Grèce continue à trainer des pieds, le nouveau gouvernement finlandais ne manquera pas de s’opposer à un troisième plan d’aide. Le Grexit est-il devenu inéluctable ? « Tous les scénarios sont sur la table », soupire le diplomate européen déjà cité.

N.B.: article paru dans Libération du 21 avril 2015

Nyolcszáz ember halála kellett ahhoz, hogy a Földközi-tengeren átkelő bevándorlókkal a legmagasabb szinten foglalkozzon az EU.

Armateurs de France se félicite de la signature, le 17 avril 2015, d’un accord de branche sur la formation professionnelle des personnels navigants et sédentaires. Faisant suite au vote de la loi n° 2014-288 du 5 mars 2014 relative à la formation professionnelle, le nouvel accord met en place le compte personnel de formation (CPF) pour les marins et les personnels à terre, en remplacement du droit individuel à la formation (DIF). Il est accompagnée d’une liste de formations maritimes ciblées par la branche et éligibles pour le salarié au titre du CPF.

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