Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

On Thursday, April 25th, IPI is hosting a speaker series event featuring H.E. Mr. Pedro Serrano on the topic of the relationship between the European Union and state actors in the Sahel.

Remarks will begin at 10:15am PST / 1:15pm EST

Pedro Serrano is Deputy Secretary General for Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and Crisis Response at the European External Action Service (EEAS) since November 2015.

Previously, Mr. Serrano was principal advisor on external relations to the president of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy. Mr. Serrano was the first head of delegation/ambassador of the EU to the United Nations in New York after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon.

Since 2003, Mr. Serrano has held numerous positions in the CSDP, including as director for civilian crisis management at the General Secretariat of the council. Prior to 2003, Mr. Serrano served as a Spanish diplomat in numerous positions including at the UN headquarters, and in Cuba and Tanzania.

This event will be moderated by Mr. Jake Sherman, Director of the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations at IPI.

L’offensive de l’Armée Nationale Libyenne (ANL) – dirigée par le Maréchal Khalifa Haftar, l’homme fort de l’Est libyen – sur Tripoli, déclenchée le 4 avril, emporte en première analyse deux conséquences : elle marque probablement le début d’une "troisième guerre civile" libyenne ; elle fait apparaître sous un jour cruel les divisions, plus feutrées qu’ailleurs peut-être mais néanmoins essentielles pour comprendre la situation en Libye, entre les puissances…

2,4 millions de Lituaniens, dont 29 796 résidant hors de la République balte, sont appelés aux urnes le 12 mai prochain pour le premier tour de l'élection présidentielle. L'électorat du pays est en recul, la Lituanie a perdu environ 84 000 électeurs depuis 2015, en dépit de l'augmentation de 55% d...

In December 2018, the ruling African National Congress (ANC) and the opposition party, Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), agreed to draft an amendment to the con­stitution in the South African Parliament. Its intention is to give concrete form to existing options to expropriate land without compensation. The narrative of land reform dis­cussions in South Africa often creates the impression that the expropriation of land owned by white farmers without compensation could solve the country’s problem of unequal income distribution. It would, however, take a whole set of politi­cal reforms to create more social justice. Visible successes might help appease those groups that are dis­appointed with South African democracy 25 years after the end of apartheid, but if the reforms fail then this will likely exacerbate the already palpable sense of frustration felt by ordinary South Africans.

After 16 years of Tayyip Erdoğan in power and with almost total control of the bu­reau­cracy and the mainstream media, it has become hard to imagine a Turkey in which he and his party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), would not win an election. Yet, after a long nail-biter of an election night, Turkey woke up on April 1 to results indicating a major shift: Defying expectations, Turkish voters had delivered a challenge to the dominance of the governing coalition. While this came as a sur­prise to some, it points to growing discontent among voters that was able to find expression through institutional means. This was made possible by various parts of the opposition that ran effective alliance strategies and campaigns as well as the elec­tion-night process. This accomplishment of the opposition, however, does not neces­sarily mean an easy shift to a democratic path in Turkey. Much depends on how various actors in the governing coalition respond to this new picture.

Am 30. Juni 2019 endet das Mandat der United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (Minusma). Eine Verlängerung des Mandats durch den VN-Sicherheitsrat gilt als sicher. Dabei ist unklar, welchen Beitrag die Mission zur Stabilisierung Malis zu leisten vermag und wie das Mandat geändert werden könnte, um die Mission effektiver zu gestalten. Angesichts der sich verändernden Rahmen­bedingungen in Mali sollte der Sicherheitsrat ein stärkeres Minusma-Engagement in Zentralmali erwägen. Dafür müssen aber auch Abstriche im Norden gemacht werden.

 

Nach dem Brexit-Referendum im Juni 2016 begann ein windungsreicher Prozess der Loslösung des Vereinigten Königreichs von der Europäischen Union (EU). Das Leave-Votum stürzte die britische Regierung in eine Existenzkrise und bescherte der EU dramatische Sondergipfel. Eine Einordnung in die Geschichte der EU-bezogenen Refe­renden zeigt die Besonderheiten und Fallstricke des britischen Austrittsvotums. Denn der daraus resultierende Auftrag an die Regierung ließ Spielräume, die Ausgangs­situation für Verhandlungen mit Brüssel war zunächst optionenreich. Jedoch vermochte es die Regierung in London nicht, das knappe No-Votum in eine tragfähige Verhand­lungsposition zu überführen. Die EU-Seite beharrte strikt darauf, nur mit der Regierung Ihrer Majestät zu verhandeln. Volksentscheide in Mitgliedstaaten verdeutlichen paradoxerweise die Staatenabhängigkeit des europäischen Mehrebenensystems. Aus dem Umgang der britischen Regierung mit dem Austrittsreferendum lassen sich Lehren für die Mitgliedstaaten und die EU ziehen.

UN peacekeeping missions are facing cash-flow problems and financial strains due to the late payment and withholding of assessed contributions. Since the inception of UN peacekeeping, the financing of missions has been a challenge, with periods of calm followed by periods of crisis. The UN has been particularly vulnerable to withheld and late payments from its biggest financial contributors. This has an impact on missions’ effectiveness and the ability of troop-contributing countries to deploy.

This paper examines how member-state contributions to peacekeeping are calculated, historical and current financing challenges faced by peacekeeping missions, and ideas for placing UN peacekeeping on a firmer financial footing. It recommends reevaluating some of the rules and regulations that govern the management of UN peacekeeping. It specifically recommends:

• Creating a cash reserve for peacekeeping: A new reserve fund or the relaxation of restrictions to use of the existing reserve fund could help manage liquidity problems.
• Consolidating peacekeeping accounts: Consolidating the accounts for missions would significantly improve cash management and operational flexibility by allowing the Secretariat to borrow between the accounts of different missions.
• Streamlining budgeting: Aligning the billing process with the budget period would reduce bureaucracy, reducing the burden on both the Secretariat and member states.
• Incentivizing budgetary discipline: Allowing some flexibility on the crediting of savings to member states could improve liquidity and incentivize missions to be more disciplined in their spending.
• Encouraging prompt payments: To encourage member states to meet the deadline for payments, they could be penalized for making late payments or given positive incentives to pay on time.

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Les 11 et 12 avril derniers, l'Institut Montaigne et le Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS) ont co-organisé, à huis clos, un séminaire de travail franco-allemand sur le thème "promouvoir une politique européenne vis-à-vis de la Chine". Mathieu Duchâtel, directeur du programme Asie de l'Institut Montaigne, et Mikko Huotari, directeur adjoint du MERICS, analysent et comparent les approches française et allemande en la matière. Quels sont les similitudes…

Parmi les grands chantiers de l’exécutif pour l’année 2019 figure la réforme des retraites. Une réforme politiquement complexe, rendue d’autant plus sensible par le contexte social et le mouvement des Gilets jaunes. L’âge de départ à la retraite cristallise ainsi les débats : comment garantir la viabilité du système ? Quelle réforme permettra de restaurer la confiance des citoyens dans leur système de retraites, tout en prenant en compte les impératifs…

La ratification par la Gambie le 2 avril dernier de la Zone de libre-échange continentale africaine (ZLECA) a permis à ce projet phare de l’Agenda 2063 de l’Union africaine (UA) de passer le cap des 22 pays nécessaires pour son entrée en vigueur. La ZLECA sera officiellement adoptée au Sommet de l’UA qui se tiendra à Niamey en juillet prochain. Quelles ambitions porte-t-elle ? Quelles sont les modalités de sa mise en oeuvre ? Michaël Cheylan, contributeur sur…

In 2014, in response to the Ukrainian “Euromaidan”, Russia annexed Cri­mea and provoked a war in eastern Ukraine. The ensuing conflict still claims lives today. For the past five years Germany and its Western partners have been trying to resolve the conflict politically, to date without success. The Minsk ceasefire agreements of 2014 and 2015 have still not been implemented.

All the directly involved actors bear responsibility. The separatist “People’s Republics” in Donetsk and Luhansk have established dictatorial quasi-state structures but remain almost completely dependent on Moscow. Russia refuses to acknowledge its role as a party to the conflict. Ukraine has ful­filled some of its obligations under the Minsk Agreements, but neglected others. The situation is exacerbated by negative dynamics on all levels. Kyiv and the “People’s Republics” are drifting steadily apart, while millions living along the line of contact experience terrible humanitarian suffering. This threatens to establish a state of permanent poverty and underdevelopment in the regions affected by the conflict.

The European Union and its member states pursue a division of labour. Brussels maintains Union-wide sanctions against Russia and forges ahead with implementing the Association Agreement with Ukraine. Germany and France conduct peace talks in the so-called Normandy Format. All conflict parties must be reminded to avoid escalation risks. Much greater attention must be directed to the local level and especially the humanitarian crisis. Action at this level is limited in reach but imperative for progress towards peace.

Die Wählerinnen und Wähler in Nigeria haben mit 55,6 % der Stimmen den amtieren­den Präsidenten Buhari wiedergewählt. Sein größter Konkurrent Abubakar hat es auch im vierten Anlauf nicht geschafft, Präsident zu werden. Letztendlich hat bei der Wahl im bevölkerungsreichsten Land Afrikas der vertrauenswürdigere Kandidat ge­wonnen: Ihm traut die Bevölkerung noch am ehesten zu, die Sicherheitslage in den Griff zu bekommen. Und diese ist zunehmend schwieriger geworden. Neben der nach wie vor angespannten Lage im Nigerdelta, der Piraterie im Seegebiet vor Nigeria, den marodierenden Banden im Nordwesten, dem weiterhin offenen Konflikt zwischen Bauern und Viehhirten (Fulani) im Middle Belt, der separatistischen Bewegung der »Indigenous People of Biafra« (IPOB) im Südosten drängt sich Boko Haram im Nord­osten wieder stärker in den Vordergrund. Seit November 2018 ist die Zahl der Angriffe massiv gestiegen. Sie richten sich nicht mehr wahllos gegen die Zivilbevölkerung, sondern gezielt gegen die Sicherheitskräfte. Möglicherweise gewinnt der »Islamische Staat« (IS) in Westafrika an Gewicht.

Les élections municipales du 31 mars en Turquie sont aussi importantes que ne l'étaient celles qui ont eu lieu il y a 25 ans, en 1994. Cette année-là, les deux villes les plus importantes de Turquie, Ankara et Istanbul, ont élu au pouvoir les maires du précurseur islamiste de l'AKP (Parti de la justice et du développement). Ainsi commença la progression politique du mouvement islamiste, du niveau municipal au niveau national, et la montée en puissance du jeune…

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The international rule-based order has come under threat on multiple fronts. If it continues to deteriorate into an older model based on power politics, small states—by definition vulnerable in a world where only might makes right—are most at risk. This makes them natural defenders of the international order that protects them.

How can small countries serve as effective champions of the rule-based order and international law? This paper explores this question by looking at the role of small states on the UN Security Council. The council, with its five veto-wielding permanent members, is perhaps not an obvious place to look at the role of small states. Nonetheless, it presents critical opportunities, as well as difficult challenges, for small states.

This paper concludes that small states on the Security Council are well-placed to provide an important, credible voice with moral authority to remind all member states of their obligations under international law, reaffirm normative commitments to compliance, and advocate for a recommitment to a multilateral, rule-based international order. Perhaps not since the founding of the United Nations has that voice been more necessary for all to hear.

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Er EU rustet til at beskytte demokratiet?

Les jeunes gens qui manifestent de jour comme de nuit depuis quatre mois dans les rues de Khartoum et dans les grandes villes du Soudan n’ont connu que lui : Omar el-Béchir. Après avoir régné sur son pays pendant 30 années, l’ancien président soudanais, visé depuis une décennie par deux mandats de la Cour pénale internationale (CPI), notamment pour crimes de guerre et génocide, a été défait par ses frères d’armes jeudi 11 avril dernier. Dalila Berritane,…

Den påståede kobling mellem franske højrenationalister og Kreml er overdrevet. Men de fælles interesser er der.

Aujourd’hui, en France, le handicap touche de manière directe ou indirecte 12 millions de citoyens. Dès lors, comment expliquer que la présence des personnes en situation de handicap dans le milieu professionnel, à l’école ou dans les médias soit encore anecdotique ? C’est un paradoxe très français : à vouloir protéger des personnes jugées trop […]

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