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Haizam Amirah Fernández. Comentario Elcano 28/2020 - 24/7/2020

¿Qué ha impedido a la Unión Europea tener más éxito a la hora de transformar el Mediterráneo?

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On July 23rd, IPI held an information-sharing discussion on the United Nations Security Council, the most powerful body in the UN system, among 15 ambassadors of countries who are current or recent members of the Council or primed­­ to join it next year, and a select group of experts.

The event was prompted by the English language release of the book With an Orange Tie: A Year on the Security Council by Karel van Oosterom, Permanent Representative of the Netherlands to the UN. Ambassador van Oosterom served on the Council in 2018, as part of an historic compromise under which the Netherlands shared the 2017-2018 term with Italy.

The moderator of the event was IPI Vice President Adam Lupel, who began the discussion with a tantalizing preview of the book: “It mixes political insight about relations between the elected members and the veto-wielding P5, accessible explanations of procedural arcana, and chronicles of debates about top issues like Syria and Yemen with personal anecdotes and intimate insider details such as which are the most comfortable seats around the Security Council table or when you are allowed -or not-a snack during deliberations.” Pointing out that elections to the Council had now been advanced from October to June, affording new members more preparation time, Dr. Lupel noted that the book “shares useful knowledge and experience for incoming members, to be better prepared and make the Council more effective, which is in everybody’s interest.”

Ambassador van Oosterom said his book was particularly focused on enhancing the experience of the ten elected members of the 15-member council, known as the E10, who serve two-year terms alongside the five veto-bearing permanent members, known as the P5. “The purpose of this English translation is to make the E10 stronger,” he said. “P5 members have their own archives of experiences, but for the E10, a term on the Council is a once in a lifetime event. We can all benefit from each other’s stories. Incoming members should look to current members for guidance.”

He said the E10 were too often intimidated by the P5 and shouldn’t be. “There are around 30 subsidiary organs, and in recent years, the permanent members have largely been the ones to take up the pen, and the heaviest workload of chairing the subsidiary organs has fallen to the E10. We tried to change that, but didn’t succeed.” In a comment aimed at incoming members of the Council, he counseled, “Make sure the P5 get some of this workload as they have the time to do it, and deputies are allowed to do it. This is an unfair division of labor, which leaves less time for your priorities. Don’t accept being framed as non- permanent by the P5. You’re the elected ones. Say, ‘If I’m non-permanent, then you’re non-elected.’”

Ambassador van Oosterom warned that “if a P5 member is close to an issue on the agenda, the chances of reaching an agreement are slim. There is a big difference between what they talk about and what our products are. In 2018, the Council spoke the most about Syria, but Syria figures very little in press statements. Results on the Palestine question are similarly absent.” In that connection, he added, “My biggest frustration was not being able to refer the killing of more than 500,000 people in Syria to the ICC [International Criminal Court] or a special tribunal.”

Accompanied by a slide whimsically entitled “The Hamster Syndrome,” he said the workload for Council members had tripled from 1990 to 2018, with many more meetings, resolutions, presidential and press statements, formal visits, peacekeeping operations, and subsidiary organs. “Delegations need to be sufficiently staffed; claim enough diplomats from your capitals. The agenda is overloaded—formally 69 items.” Consequently, “if you don’t have established priorities, you get lost.”

With demands this great, he said, even personal fitness becomes an issue. “Stories of working day and night and on the weekends intimidate colleagues. Be aware, plan ahead for the health and well-being of your colleagues and team.” He recalled that the Council had been traumatized by the death in April 2018 of a Council colleague, Bernard Tanoh–Boutchoue, the Permanent Representative of Côte d’Ivoire.

Ambassador van Oosterom emphasized the importance of learning the ropes ahead of time. “Procedural challenges are one of the most difficult parts of the Council, and make sure your team knows them inside and out.” If one arises and you have any doubts about it, he advised, suspend the meeting, move to a consultation room and solve it there with the assistance of an expert.

He talked light-heartedly about some of the “bizarre” unwritten rules of the Council chamber and several instances in 2018 when they had been broken. The entry of Nikki Haley, the American Permanent Representative, was blocked when she tried to enter with a cup of coffee, and a meeting was stopped because Peter Wilson, the Deputy Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom, was eating a breakfast sandwich. Other rules of the consultation rooms, like keeping the curtains closed or not shedding your jacket on warm days are moments to declare independence, he said. “You have to break these rules to own the room and let the P5 know that you are truly part of the Council. It gets very hot; take off your jacket!”

Inga Rhonda King, Permanent Representative of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines said she wanted to “debunk the many criticisms that the Council has been unable to do its work, that we have been slow to get started [during the pandemic].” She countered that in June the Council had 50 virtual meetings compared to 44 meetings the year before, that it had held 170 virtual meetings since March 24th and that the number of resolutions adopted was almost identical for the same period of time.

Kairat Umarov, Permanent Representative of Kazakhstan, conceded that the work of the Council had suffered from “polarization. The Security Council is very divided. We need to improve and overcome this through dialogue and trust. And it’s not only about building trust between the E10 and the P5, but also between the P5 themselves.”

Olof Skoog, Head of the European Union delegation to the UN and former Permanent Representative of Sweden to the UN, acknowledged the divisions on the Council and the damage they cause and said the solution should come from the E10. “That’s where building alliances is important. We are the elected members, we have a completely different view of the need to deliver during our short terms on the Council. That makes us think differently than the big countries, who can afford to have a show or use their veto to block something whereas we should always try to find solutions. The E10 need to stick together. You need to come together especially when the P5 aren’t able to deliver because they are lost in blockages. “

Geraldine Byrne Nason, Permanent Representative of Ireland to the UN, expressed appreciation for the book as her country prepares to join the Council. “It’s 20 years since Ireland was on the Council. There isn’t much of a folk memory for the procedural arcana or what works and what doesn’t. We’re thinking about the relationship between the E10 and the P5. We’re asked whether we can hope to do anything, given the P5 veto. My answer is always, ‘Yes. We’re an elected member with the legitimacy of the General Assembly behind us.’”

Odd Inge Kvalheim, Deputy Permanent Representative of Norway, another incoming country, said, “ This sharing of experiences is extremely important for us as an incoming member. We are all ears to the experiences of others. In terms of carrying the torch, there’s been a development over time in how elected members can make a difference.”

Juan Ramon de la Fuente Ramirez, Permanent Representative of Mexico, another incoming country, said he too was concerned about the “increased polarization” on the Council. ”We have the impression that existing differences seem to be more evident. The fact that it took almost 4 months to agree to the Secretary-General’s resolution to call for a global ceasefire is testimony of this.”

India is also coming onto the Council, and its Permanent Representative, T.S. Tirumurti, commented, “I got an excellent picture of the increase in the workload and how the discussions don’t correlate to the outcomes.”

Francisco Duarte Lopes, Permanent Representative of Portugal, said he wondered to what extent interventions and advice from civil society were listened to and taken into account.

Karin Landgren, Executive Director of Security Council Report, said she hoped there could be a way to cultivate stronger links between the Council and other principal UN organs like the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

Loraine Sievers, co-author of The Procedure of the UN Security Council said, “One thing that becomes clear is how long it takes for the Council to evolve. There are few revolutions. Change is incremental. Sometimes elected members don’t see the seed that they planted bear fruit until long after they’ve left.”

Mansour Ayyad Sh. Al-Otaibi, Permanent Representative of Kuwait, said he had noticed “great movement” in recent years towards empowering the E10. “The E10 should be united, not against the P5, but to carry on the mandate of the Council and to make the Council more efficient and transparent.”

Richard Gowan, UN Director at the International Crisis Group, wondered if there were times when Ambassador van Oosterom had felt tensions between his EU identity and his E10 identity.

Ameirah Alhefeitii, Deputy Permanent Representative of the United Arab Emirates, asked if the role of the E10 could be “enhanced” given the diversity of the group.

Taye Atske Selassie Amde, the Permanent Representative of Ethiopia, said it was important that “New York and your capital should be on the same page and speak with one voice. Otherwise, you will be a Spanish piñata, especially for the P5.”

Both Besiana Kadare, the Permanent Representative of Albania, and Vanessa Frazier, the Permanent Representative of Malta, asked Ambassador van Oosterom if, despite all his preparation, he had been caught by surprise by anything, and he said, “I did not realize that the seats rotate after one month.”

The event concluded with reflections by Ambassador van Oosterom, who stated that the conversation had proven it was useful to share experiences that help incoming members prepare, and to do so publicly to show the world how the Council works in practice.

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In September 2017, UN Secretary-General António Guterres proposed a new management paradigm to enable the UN to confront global challenges and remain relevant in a fast-changing world. The new management paradigm would bring decision making closer to the point of delivery, empower managers, increase accountability and transparency, reduce duplicative structures and overlapping mandates, increase support for the field, and reform the planning and budgeting processes.

Eighteen months after the management reform came into effect, this paper examines the implementation of the reform and its impact on peace operations from the perspective of both UN headquarters and the field. The paper highlights the current state of the reform, identifies good practices, flags areas for possible improvement or attention, and offers forward-looking recommendations for UN headquarters, mission leaders and managers in the field, global or regional support offices, member states, and staff at large.

While the reform is still a work in progress, it has continued to gain momentum, and implementation has become more systematic. Nonetheless, the paper concludes that greater effort must be made to get input from personnel in peace operations to ensure that the reform responds to their needs and constraints. More work is also needed to fully realize the potential of the management reform and ensure that it aligns with parallel reforms underway in the UN peace and security architecture and development system.

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La monarchie parlementaire, clef de voûte de la transition démocratique espagnole, est sur la sellette. Déjà en retrait et contesté pour une affaire financière, sur laquelle enquêtent les justices espagnole et suisse, le Roi émérite, Juan Carlos Ier, va-t-il être assigné à résidence ? Le gouvernement a déclaré, le 17 juillet 2020, s’en remettre au souverain en exercice, depuis le 18 juin 2014, Philippe VI. Pedro Sanchez, président de l’exécutif, avait suggéré, le 9 juillet, une modification de la Constitution permettant, après suppression de l’inviolabilité du monarque, d’ouvrir d’éventuelles procédures judiciaires concernant des actes liés à sa vie privée.

Philippe VI avait pourtant, le 15 mars dernier, suspendu le versement de l’indemnité annuelle versée à son prédécesseur. Il avait par ailleurs renoncé à ses droits d’héritier des biens de son père. Manifestement, les circonstances poussent à aller au-delà. Juan Carlos Ier serait disposé, selon des informations recueillies par la presse, à renoncer au titre de Roi émérite qui lui a été reconnu par décret le 13 juillet 2014. Cette crise dynastique et institutionnelle vient à point mal nommé. Le 11 juin 2015, Christine sœur du Roi, et son époux, actuellement emprisonné pour fraude fiscale, avaient été écartés de leur titre et de leur appartenance à la famille royale. La crise catalane est toujours béante. Et en ce premier mois d’été, propice aux souvenirs du soulèvement militaire du 18 juillet 1936, ces évènements mettent du sel sur les sept plaies héritées d’un passé dictatorial lointain, mais mal digéré.

La monarchie, chère aux forces du passé franquiste, avait été acceptée en 1976 par les partis de l’opposition démocratiques, démocrates-chrétiens, gauches, formations nationalistes catalanes, en échange d’un régime de libertés – citoyennes, individuelles et territoriales – fondé sur le suffrage universel. Ce compromis validait, par ailleurs, une loi du silence, non écrite. La transition démocratique allait être – devait être – une transition indifférente au passé, aux injustices et aux crimes commis pendant les années de dictature.

Les générations actuelles, nées bien après la mort du général Franco, peu ou mal informées du passé de leurs pays, remettent en question ces équilibres. Beaucoup sont républicains en Catalogne et indépendantistes. Les alliés du PSOE, Podemos, ont depuis la fondation de leur parti mouvement, considéré que la monarchie était une institution d’un autre âge. La droite, le Parti populaire, et désormais l’extrême droite, Vox, défendent la perpétuation de la royauté, et avec elle l’oubli d’un passé que quelques-uns d’entre eux revendiquent.

Il y a déjà quelques années, les descendants des vaincus, des républicains, exigeaient une reconnaissance minimale de leurs souffrances. Ils souhaitaient que les dizaines de milliers de leurs grands-parents, exécutés et jetés dans des fosses communes puissent bénéficier d’une sépulture. Et aussi que l’héritage physique du franquisme, noms de rues, statues, mausolée du dictateur, dans le « Valle de los caidos », soient sinon effacés du moins réévalués avec les critères démocratiques correspondant à l’Espagne d’aujourd’hui.

Un juge, Baltazar Garzon avait essayé en 2008 de forcer l’État à reconnaître les crimes commis et à identifier les disparus. Après une phase de dénombrement ayant permis de comptabiliser plus de 120 000 victimes, Baltazar Garzon a été écarté en 2012 de la fonction judiciaire. Il était en effet passé outre à la loi d’amnistie, ligotant le passé. La victoire du socialiste Zapatero en 2004 avait pourtant fait bouger les lignes. Une loi de mémoire avait été adoptée le 31 octobre 2007. L’État encourageait, sans les prendre à sa charge, la recherche des disparus de la guerre civile. Il obligeait les institutions publiques à ôter toute référence au passé franquiste.

La crise de la monarchie, ouverte depuis 2011, paralyse une institution qui aurait pu avoir un rôle actif de médiateur, au moment où les polarisations politiques s’accentuent : entre Catalans indépendantistes, Catalans autonomistes et centralistes, forces de droite et d’extrême droite « jacobines », entre autorités de Madrid et de Barcelone, entre gauche et droite espagnoles.

La monarchie non seulement s’est mise hors de tout jeu politique, en raison de sa perte de légitimité morale, mais elle est devenue un élément de crise additionnel, renvoyant à ses origines. Celle d’une monarchie, remise en selle par le général Franco, en 1969, validée le 22 novembre 1975, et acceptée contre mauvaise fortune bon cœur par le camp démocratique en 1976. Pedro Sanchez a réussi à délocaliser en 2019 le corps du dictateur. Le Valle de los Caidos devrait devenir un centre de mémoire démocratique. La vice-présidente, Carmen Calvo, a annoncé le 20 juillet 2020 que l’État allait participer financièrement et matériellement aux opérations de reconnaissance des victimes de la dictature. La répression franquiste devrait être désormais enseignée dans les écoles. Avec quelle garantie de pouvoir sauver la monarchie, calmer Podemos, et reprendre un dialogue « républicain » avec les nationalistes catalans… ?

Pascal Boniface, co-auteur du manuel d’histoire/géographie/géopolitique de Hachette pour les élèves de Première, décrypte en vidéo la rivalité entre l’Inde et le Pakistan.

José Moisés Martín Carretero. ARI 98/2020 - 23/7/2020

España debe saber aprovechar el acuerdo alcanzado en el marco del Consejo Europeo de julio de 2020.

Die Europäische Union hat Handlungsfähigkeit bewiesen – nach episch langen, harten und zum Teil quälenden Verhandlungen haben die Staats- und Regierungschefs der 27 Mitgliedstaaten am 21. Juli 2020 einen Kompromiss gefunden. Mit seiner Verständigung auf einen neuen mehrjährigen Finanzrahmen (MFR) für die nächsten sieben Jahre und einen auf vier Jahre befristeten europäischen Konjunkturhaushalt unter der Überschrift »Next Generation EU« (NGEU) hat der Europäische Rat ein immenses Finanzpaket mit einem Umfang von insgesamt 1,8 Billionen Euro geschnürt.

Diese Einigung beinhaltet einige fundamentale Neuerungen: die Möglichkeit der EU, zur Finanzierung des Konjunkturhaushalts nun selbst Kredite in bisher nicht gekanntem Umfang an den Finanzmärkten aufzunehmen, und die Einführung neuer Finanzierungsquellen für den EU-Haushalt. Weitgehende Maßnahmen also, die vor der Pandemie-Krise undenkbar erschienen und kaum durchsetzbar waren. Ob sie aber als großer Schritte hin zu einer vertieften Integration zu werten sind, wird sich erst noch erweisen müssen. Denn der erzielte Kompromiss ist nur ein Auftakt, dem bis Ende des Jahres eine Reihe weitere Schritte folgen muss, damit er zu einem wirklichen europäischen Erfolg werden kann.

Zunächst muss der politische Konsens des Europäischen Rates in konkrete Gesetzestexte gegossen werden. Auch hier sind harte Verhandlungen zwischen den beiden europäischen Gesetzgebern, dem Ministerrat der Mitgliedstaaten und dem Europäischen Parlament, zu erwarten. Dann müssen alle nationalen Parlamente den weitreichenden Neuerungen bei der Finanzierung des europäischen Budgets zustimmen. Schließlich müssen die neuen Regelungen in angewandte Politik umgesetzt und mit Leben gefüllt werden. Dies ist eine gewaltige Aufgabe für den deutschen Vorsitz im Ministerrat, denn alle Elemente des Pakets sollen bis zum 1. Januar 2021 in Kraft treten. Zudem ist jeder Schritt mit einem hohen Risiko des Scheiterns oder der Blockade verbunden.

Nationale Parlamente müssen die Integrationsschritte legitimieren

Die Zustimmung der nationalen Parlamente zu der erstmaligen Verschuldung der EU in Höhe von 750 Mrd. Euro und den neuen Finanzierungsquellen ist nicht nur ein zeitliches Problem, sondern auch ein politisches, denn die Größe des Schritts zu einer enger zusammenwachsenden Union ist unübersehbar; seine Legitimation erfordert breite parlamentarische Debatten. Doch für eine sorgfältige Abwägung der Integrationsschritte und ihrer Folgen bleibt unter dem Druck der Covid-19-Krise und der unbedingt erforderlichen schnellen europäischen Reaktion kaum ausreichend Zeit.

Nicht leichter dürfte es werden, die gefundenen Kompromisse des Gipfels in konkrete Programme umzusetzen. So müssen die Mitgliedstaaten sogenannte Aufbau- und Resilienzpläne mit ihren Reform- und Investitionsvorhaben erarbeiten, um europäische Fördermittel aus dem neuen Aufbaufonds abrufen zu können. Diese Pläne müssen sie der Europäischen Kommission zur Prüfung und Billigung vorlegen. Dabei sollen sie die sogenannten länderspezifischen wirtschaftspolitischen Reformempfehlungen sowie die Klimaschutz- und die Digitalisierungsziele der EU beachten. Sowohl die Mitgliedstaaten als auch die Europäische Kommission müssen also sehr schnell konkrete Ideen entwickeln, wofür das Geld sinnvoll verwendet werden soll. Denn die Fördergelder sollen erst fließen, wenn die Mitgliedstaaten die zugesagten Reformanstrengungen wirklich aufgenommen und die vereinbarten Etappenziele tatsächlich erreicht haben. Dies macht die genaue Prüfung und ein kontinuierliches Monitoring der nationalen Umsetzung erforderlich. Dass es den Mitgliedstaaten ernst damit ist, dass das Geld nur im Gegenzug für nachhaltige Strukturreformen und Investitionen fließt, haben die sehr harten Debatten im Europäischen Rat gezeigt.

Zeitdruck gefährdet Zielgenauigkeit der Förderung

Es ist eine kaum zu lösende Aufgabe, die nationalen Pläne in der Kürze der Zeit zu erstellen und zu bewerten sowie neue Formen des Monitorings aufzubauen. Wissenschaftliche Gutachten oder die Begleitung weitreichender nationaler Strukturreformen durch Kommissionen, wie sie zum Beispiel in Deutschland zum Braunkohleausstieg erfolgte, sind in wenigen Monaten kaum vorstellbar. Trotz des hohen Drucks, schnell und wirkungsvoll auf die Folgen der Pandemie zu reagieren, müssen Nachhaltigkeit und Zielgenauigkeit der Maßnahmen mit einer sorgfältigen Bewertung der Programme und der einzelnen Maßnahmen verbunden werden. Nur so kann das in den Verhandlungen des Europäischen Rats sichtbar gewordene Misstrauen zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten überwunden werden.

Ein hohes Tempo bei der Umsetzung der vom Europäischen Rat vorgezeichneten Schritte ist zweifelsohne nötig. Für diese Dynamik bei den Verhandlungen über die konkreten Rechtsgrundlagen kann die deutsche Ratspräsidentschaft sorgen. Um jedoch den Kompromiss des Europäischen Rats zu einem wirklichen und langfristigen Integrationserfolg zu machen, müssen das gegenseitige Vertrauen zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten wieder wachsen und die Unionsbürgerinnen und -bürger diesen Integrationsschritten zustimmen. Das sind große Aufgaben, die gegenseitiges Verständnis, Toleranz und auch Zeit erfordern. Ob die Quadratur des Kreises gelingen kann, bleibt abzuwarten. Immerhin hat der EU-Gipfel die Diskussion über die Weiterentwicklung der EU angestoßen.

Das Eis im Nordpolarmeer schmilzt, wodurch die arktischen Seewege zunehmend schiffbar werden. Die Nordostpassage ist schon heute für längere Zeiträume im Sommer befahrbar, während die Nordwestpassage wohl in den 2030er Jahren, die Transpolare Route wiederum frühestens ab den 2040er Jahren für die Schifffahrt häufiger – und damit kommerziell – nutzbar, da »eisfrei« sein wird.

Neben den Klimaveränderungen wirken auch Ressourcennutzung und Großmachtkonkurrenz – jeweils unterschiedlich in Art, Ausmaß und Folgen – als Treiber für einen Wandel in der Arktis.

Die Erwärmung der Arktis ermöglicht es, bislang unzugängliche Lagerstätten von Rohstoffen zu nutzen, und eisfreie Seewege erleichtern deren Transport. Doch geht es dabei um kostenträchtige, riskante und lang­wierige Projekte, zumal bei der Öl- und Gasförderung auf See (offshore).

Die USA haben die Arktis als geopolitische »Arena« im Kampf um Macht und Einfluss identifiziert. Russland will über die Nördliche See­route maßgeblich seine Rolle als Energiegroßmacht bewahren.

Als neuer Akteur kann China in der Arktis an sein Seidenstraßen-Projekt anknüpfen, Transportwege diversifizieren und die eigene Versorgungs­sicherheit erhöhen. Im Konfliktfall lassen sich Versorgungsrouten militärisch nutzen, weshalb das Nordpolarmeer auch für Peking strategisch zunehmend wichtig ist.

Neben den negativen Auswirkungen des Klimawandels ist eine Verschlechterung der sicherheitspolitischen Lage im Norden festzustellen. Die widerstreitenden Ambitionen Chinas, Russlands und der USA machen einen Dialog über militärische Sicherheitsfragen nötig.

Directeur des études à l’Institut Montaigne, Nicolas Bauquet a publié en juin dernier une note intitulée L’action publique face à la crise du Covid-19. À l’heure où les Français et les pouvoirs publics craignent une seconde vague, voire un reconfinement sous des modalités différentes, il revient sur ce qui a changé, ou pas, dans le dispositif…

La situation économique et sociale libanaise est alarmante. Les contestations populaires ne faiblissent pas, mais elles font face à une répression de plus en plus importante. L’hyperinflation à laquelle le pays fait face se conjugue à la corruption, mais aussi aux tensions géopolitiques régionales. Entretien avec Karim Émile Bitar, chercheur associé à l’IRIS.

En proie à une crise socio-économique sans précédent, le Liban connaît une contestation populaire inédite. Or de plus en plus de voix s’élèvent pour dénoncer un climat d’intimidation et de répression. Qu’en est-il ? La situation sécuritaire est-elle en train de largement se dégrader ?

À ce jour, la situation sécuritaire reste globalement sous contrôle, même si on aperçoit de nombreux nuages à l’horizon. La période qui s’ouvre et qui nous sépare des prochaines élections américaines, est une période qui s’annonce particulièrement dangereuse. Au niveau local, le climat d’intimidation est bien réel. Incapables de résoudre les problèmes économiques et sociaux colossaux, les autorités s’efforcent de faire taire les nombreuses voix qui protestent contre les conditions de vie. Depuis près de deux ans, les libertés publiques se sont réduites comme peau de chagrin. Une dizaine d’ONG ont fait front commun cette semaine pour protester contre les atteintes aux libertés.

Le Liban est un pays qui, historiquement, se distinguait des autres pays de la région par de larges marges de liberté laissées aux citoyens, aux activistes, aux artistes et aux journalistes. Or, aujourd’hui, il suffit d’ironiser quelque peu sur les réseaux sociaux, d’exprimer des critiques un peu vives à l’encontre d’un dirigeant, pour se faire convoquer par un supposé bureau de répression de la cybercriminalité – dont la définition du « cyber-crime » est particulièrement cocasse et étendue. Un certain nombre de journalistes et de militants ont ainsi été convoqués et parfois même violentés. On assiste à un climat de répression, cependant sans commune mesure avec celle extrêmement brutale à laquelle on assiste dans un pays comme l’Égypte, qui compte près de 60 000 prisonniers politiques. Le Liban demeure un pays où l’on peut s’exprimer assez librement. Mais, s’installe l’impression que les autorités souhaitent envoyer un signal à la population pour éviter des débordements, en réprimant quelques blogueurs, journalistes ou des personnes qui se seraient un peu trop lâchées sur les réseaux sociaux, et ainsi se protéger d’un effet boule de neige, en évitant que beaucoup d’autres ne laissent libre cours à leur grande colère.

 

Avec une dette de plus de 170 % de son PIB et une inflation record, le Liban fait face à une situation économique qualifiée de « hors de contrôle » par Michelle Bachelet. Les solutions pour sortir de cette crise peuvent-elles être trouvées en interne, ou la situation économique du Liban devra-t-elle nécessairement être mise sous tutelle du Fonds monétaire international (FMI) ?

Le grand paradoxe est que dans la plupart des pays du monde, l’arrivée du FMI est perçue très négativement. Cela signifie une mise sous tutelle, accompagnée de politiques d’austérité impliquant que la population devra se serrer la ceinture pendant de nombreuses années.

Or, le Liban – comme souvent – fait exception. Sa population n’est pas aussi hostile qu’ailleurs à l’arrivée du FMI. Le pays a atteint un tel degré de corruption et d’incompétence des équipes au pouvoir que le FMI apparaît, paradoxalement, comme beaucoup plus progressiste que la plupart des forces politiques présentes sur l’échiquier libanais, et cela est souligné même par les partis les plus radicaux.

La situation est inédite, car c’est le FMI et les organismes internationaux qui proposent aujourd’hui des mesures de justice sociale un tant soit peu protectrices des Libanais les plus vulnérables face à la crise sociale et économique. A contrario, ceux qui s’efforcent de maintenir le statu quo sont ceux qui ont le plus profité ces vingt dernières années, notamment l’oligarchie politico-financière.

La situation économique du Liban est dramatique. Le pays fait face à une hyperinflation, les principales banques sont en grande difficulté – voire même pour certaines en situation de faillite non déclarée. La Banque Centrale du Liban a, selon le Financial Times, usé de méthodes comptables très douteuses pour maquiller ses pertes. Le pays a une dette record allant de 85 à près de 100 milliards de dollars. Le FMI a confirmé ces chiffres, avancés dans le cadre du plan de sauvetage économique du gouvernement libanais. Ce plan proposait que les actionnaires des banques, les détenteurs de comptes supérieurs à 10 millions de dollars (environ 900 comptes en banque au Liban disposent de près de 10 millions de dollars), et ceux qui ont beaucoup profité des « ingénieries financières » mises en place pendant ces cinq dernières années, soient raisonnablement mis à contribution pour que les populations les plus vulnérables ne soient pas les plus touchées. Le FMI cautionne cette approche, dite de « bail-in ». Or, ce sont souvent des hommes politiques proches des milieux d’affaires, des banques et de cette oligarchie politico-financière qui s’efforcent de mettre en avant des arguments fallacieux afin de ne pas reconnaître l’ampleur des pertes économiques. Ils la sous-évaluent pour tenter de mettre en échec les négociations avec le FMI, qui patinent aujourd’hui.

Ce sont les plus vulnérables qui en payent le prix, le Liban étant soumis à une hyperinflation et à une pauvreté galopante. La Banque mondiale estime que plus de 50 % de la population libanaise se trouve sous le seuil de pauvreté, et plus de 30 %, va tomber sous le seuil d’extrême pauvreté.

 

Le pays est par ailleurs dans une région où les tensions géopolitiques sont nombreuses (loi César, conflit syrien, embargo sur l’Iran, etc.). Dans quelle mesure impactent-elles le Liban ? Quid également de l’impact de la crise sanitaire liée au Covid-19 ?

L’ampleur des crises internes au Liban se trouve, comme toujours, accentuée par les crises géopolitiques régionales. Le Covid-19 a considérablement fait ralentir l’économie libanaise de la même manière qu’il a ralenti l’ensemble des économies moyen-orientales et mondiales. Il a également accentué le taux de chômage, déjà très élevé.

Par ailleurs, les politiques de pression maximale, mises en place par Donald Trump contre Téhéran, sont venues accentuer le goulot d’étranglement. Quant à la loi César à l’encontre de la Syrie, elle est venue renforcer un peu plus l’isolement du Liban. Les pays du Golfe, à l’image de l’Arabie saoudite, ne souhaitent plus offrir au pays d’assistance financière, estimant que le Hezbollah joue un rôle trop important dans la vie politique libanaise. De concert avec les États-Unis, ils ont décidé que cette aide ne serait plus possible tant que ce parti jouera un rôle aussi déterminant. Coupé de ses relais traditionnels, le pays se retrouve donc soumis à un blocus qui ne dit pas son nom.

Le Liban doit ainsi traverser cette passe extrêmement difficile sans avoir le moindre allié régional ou international. Certains ont laissé entrevoir une ouverture vers l’Est, c’est-à-dire vers Pékin, en espérant que des investissements chinois permettent au Liban de rééquilibrer son économie. Mais cette promesse semble illusoire. Le Liban a besoin d’une injection massive et immédiate de devises étrangères, de dollars américains. Une ouverture économique sur la Chine pourrait éventuellement permettre de diversifier l’économie libanaise, mais cela ne porterait ses fruits que dans cinq à dix ans. Cela ne résout absolument pas le problème immédiat du manque de devises, produisant cette inflation, accompagnée de la mise sous pression de la livre libanaise, conjuguée à cette explosion de la pauvreté. Cet appauvrissement généralisé risque de conduire à des vagues d’émigration, et le Liban risque de perdre ce qu’il a de plus précieux : ses ressources humaines. C’est ce qu’il y a de plus triste dans la situation actuelle.

 

Propos recueillis par Agathe Lacour-Veyranne

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On July 22nd, IPI, with co-hosts Ethiopia, Indonesia, Japan, and the Republic of Korea, held a virtual discussion on Impact-Driven Peacekeeping Partnerships for Capacity Building and Training, guided in part by a new IPI white paper on the subject. The event and the paper served as input to the next United Nations peacekeeping ministerial-level meeting in April 2021 in Seoul and to a preparatory meeting on the subject co-chaired by Ethiopia, Indonesia, and Japan due to take place sometime beforehand in Addis Ababa.

“In peacekeeping, training and capacity building are the cornerstones for ensuring the efficient performance and the safety and security of all peacekeepers,” said Cho Hyun, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea to the UN.

He chose to highlight three aspects of the white paper—expanding the participation of women in peacekeeping operations; broadening and standardizing missions’ use of digital technology; and strengthening the medical capacity of peacekeeping operations, particularly in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. While noting new awareness of the need to include women in peacekeeping, Ambassador Cho stressed that “barriers and challenges remain for uniformed women in the field, and we need to discuss how to overcome these challenges. We may need to explore new ideas, such as creating female platoons, instead of just a few women peacekeepers in a platoon mainly made up of men. Such female platoons may be better placed for engaging with local communities.”

Dian Triansyah Djani, Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the UN, said his country had been increasing the number of women assigned to peacekeeping, with notably positive results. “We have found when handling cases of child or sexual abuse in a community, local women were more inclined to talk to women peacekeepers. As such, they have to have training in psychology, health, and other social issues. Community engagement, cultural awareness, language skills, and addressing sexual exploitation and violence against women and children are all important in the role of women peacekeepers.” At the same time, Ambassador Djani said, women peacekeepers’ needs were not properly accommodated, gender was not sufficiently “mainstreamed” in peacekeeping decision-making. “The need to increase spaces for women peacekeepers, including their living quarters, is ignored. The questions of leave for mothers and other such issues that affect women disproportionately require a different approach.”

Ambassador Djani said that Indonesia had advocated for more emphasis on community engagement in peacekeeping training. “With COVID-19, it is more important than ever to win the hearts and minds of the community,” he said. “Peacekeeping operations are not effective without the support of the local population. Most importantly, community engagement is necessary to better protect and serve the needs of the people. With that in mind, in our training centers in Indonesia, we equip our peacekeepers with language skills, soft skills, and understanding and respect for local cultures.”

The author of the white paper, IPI Senior Non-resident Adviser Arthur Boutellis, singling out one of the report’s 13 recommendations, emphasized the need to build sustainable, systemic, and institutional capabilities within troop- and police-contributing countries (TCC/PCCs). “Training and capacity building starts at home, and countries need to integrate and value peacekeeping in their own national curriculum and develop their own national support system,” he said. Elaborating on another recommendation, Mr. Boutellis also stressed the importance of joint initiatives and partnerships, saying “Capacity providers interested in improving peacekeeping, but lacking the resources to do so alone, should join existing training partnerships programs such as the Triangular Partnerships Project (TPP), which has expanded in scope and region, or join a joint capacity building partnership.”

On another point, he cited the “proliferation” of in-mission trainings but warned they should be limited to addressing capability gaps that had been identified by the UN as “critically hampering” the security of TCC/PCCs or the implementation of the mandate of the mission, “notably when it comes to the protection of civilians.” On evaluation, he said, “Member states and the UN should work closely together to better link performance evaluation to training and capacity building efforts and create feedback loops.”

Mark Pedersen, Director, Integrated Training Service, UN Department of Peace Operations, highlighted the importance of building self-sustaining national capacity, which he said led to an improvement in peacekeepers’ self-employment, their pre-deployment preparations, their training, and rotations. “Much capacity building focuses on skills, but unless these skills are built on a solid professional basis of military and police skills, the result is a house built on sand.” He said this was particularly true in the case of women peacekeepers. “Focusing on core skills is important to help member states deploy more female peacekeepers, who must be deployed into operational roles in battalions, police components and headquarters. To succeed, they need the same military and police skills and experience opportunities as their male counterparts. One way to do this is to work with the TCC/PCCs to strengthen the female components of their forces, especially at the junior commissioned officer level, so these women become examples for others.”

A survey conducted by his office last year identified the priority areas for training and capacity-building, in descending order, as they relate to pre-deployment training, lessons learned, deployment, sustainment, force generation, and rotation. “Addressing systemic capacities will make a massive difference,” he said. “There are cost-light opportunities, where a small amount of niche experience will make a big difference.”

Kristina Zetterlund, Counsellor, Civilian Adviser of the Permanent Mission of Sweden to the UN, said that increasing the number of women peacekeepers should be prioritized.  “Peacekeeping operations must have a gender lens. Training on this means ensuring there is an understanding of the different needs, interests, and opportunities of girls and women and boys and men on planning and implementing tasks in the field.” Asserting that “more inclusive processes make for more sustainable results,” Ms. Zetterlund said that missions should work on “gender mainstreaming with a long-term view, making sure efforts are sustainable, even after missions transition.”

Michael L. Smith, Director, Office of Global Programs and Initiatives, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, US Department of State, outlined the US Global Peace Operations (GPO) initiative and the direct link between its provisions for capacity building and UN force generation efforts. “Our process for assessing and prioritizing training, equipping or other assistance requests has evolved with the establishment of the UN Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS) groups. We require all new assistance be linked to a capability pledge in PCRS. Formally registering a pledge requires demonstrating political commitment, which helps ensure that our assistance packages are supporting a viable, deployable capability.” Mr. Smith said the GPO promotes ongoing “full training capability,” and he stressed that “pre-deployment training alone will not produce an effective peacekeeping unit without an upstream military education system to develop core staff and soldier skills. This needs to exist within a broader structure of human resources, financial resources, and logistics.” He detailed a three-tiered monitoring and evaluation framework, based on “outputs, outcomes, and impacts. It’s more of an art than a science because it relies on anecdotal analysis, mission reporting by the UN, external organizations, and our own mission visits.”

Fumio Yamazaki, Director, International Peace and Security Cooperation Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, discussed progress made under the Triangular Partnership Project (TPP), which was an outcome of the 2014 UN peacekeeping summit. Under TPP, supporting member states provide trainers, equipment and funds required for the training of TCC/PCCs’ uniformed personnel while the UN coordinates and manages the overall program. Mr. Yamazaki said that 40 percent of the TCC/PCCs now participated in the program. “It’s important for the TCC/PCCs to build their own capacity, and the key to success is the political decision by a TCC/PCC to use and train its forces for UN peacekeeping.”

Dawit Yirga, Director, International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, said that improving training and capacity building was very important to his country, which is a leading contributor of troops to UN peacekeeping.  “We have in Ethiopia an international peacekeeping training center which fills crucial gaps in training and capacity building in Ethiopia and other African countries. We work with bilateral, regional, and international partners in this regard, particularly Japan and Indonesia, and we hope to develop the center as having a niche in organizing integrated training programs that enable us to deploy able personnel.”

Namie Di Razza, IPI Senior Fellow and Head of Protection of Civilians, moderated the discussion.

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Le Liban traverse actuellement la pire crise économique de son histoire, aggravée par la pandémie de Covid-19, dans un contexte politique et social dégradé, alors que le pays a connu d’importantes manifestations à l’automne 2019. Anne Gadel, spécialiste du Moyen-Orient, fait le point sur la situation, qui "…

Monitoring and evaluation have gained importance in recent decades in development cooperation to increase evidence, and thereby aid effectiveness. However, the focus on measuring results needs to be coordinated with other strategically important aspects of the aid and development effectiveness agenda, such as adapting to local needs and harmonisation among development actors. Combining these different goals remains a challenge in the development community. Studies show that most donors have similar problems when measuring results. The quality of the collected data can oftentimes be questioned because data collection methods lack methodological rigor. The data collected and used is often of limited relevance for the project. Reporting by implementing agencies to BMZ focusses more on accountability than on using the results for learning. This discussion paper offers an in-depth analysis of the efforts undertaken by German bilateral development cooperation actors to measure results and in how far the reported data can contribute to increase the effectiveness of development cooperation. Thirteen projects by German implementing agencies GIZ and KfW were selected and analysed by means of project documents and interviews with staff. In addition, general monitoring and evaluation guidelines of German development cooperation were consulted. The results show that BMZ does not have a comprehensive results-based management system in place for planning, monitoring and evaluation in German development cooperation, which leads to quality challenges with regard to the collected data. Many projects do not have a comprehensive theory of change, use methodologically contestable indicators and are not able to demonstrate causality between their activities and the results measured. Indicators are often selected with only the limited involvement of partner countries, and there are challenges with using partner countries’ secondary data. BMZ has recently started a reform process with the aim of establishing a more comprehensive RBM system and providing additional guidance to projects on how to define indicators and measure results. The findings of this paper offer important lessons learnt and recommendations for the reform process.

Monitoring and evaluation have gained importance in recent decades in development cooperation to increase evidence, and thereby aid effectiveness. However, the focus on measuring results needs to be coordinated with other strategically important aspects of the aid and development effectiveness agenda, such as adapting to local needs and harmonisation among development actors. Combining these different goals remains a challenge in the development community. Studies show that most donors have similar problems when measuring results. The quality of the collected data can oftentimes be questioned because data collection methods lack methodological rigor. The data collected and used is often of limited relevance for the project. Reporting by implementing agencies to BMZ focusses more on accountability than on using the results for learning. This discussion paper offers an in-depth analysis of the efforts undertaken by German bilateral development cooperation actors to measure results and in how far the reported data can contribute to increase the effectiveness of development cooperation. Thirteen projects by German implementing agencies GIZ and KfW were selected and analysed by means of project documents and interviews with staff. In addition, general monitoring and evaluation guidelines of German development cooperation were consulted. The results show that BMZ does not have a comprehensive results-based management system in place for planning, monitoring and evaluation in German development cooperation, which leads to quality challenges with regard to the collected data. Many projects do not have a comprehensive theory of change, use methodologically contestable indicators and are not able to demonstrate causality between their activities and the results measured. Indicators are often selected with only the limited involvement of partner countries, and there are challenges with using partner countries’ secondary data. BMZ has recently started a reform process with the aim of establishing a more comprehensive RBM system and providing additional guidance to projects on how to define indicators and measure results. The findings of this paper offer important lessons learnt and recommendations for the reform process.

Monitoring and evaluation have gained importance in recent decades in development cooperation to increase evidence, and thereby aid effectiveness. However, the focus on measuring results needs to be coordinated with other strategically important aspects of the aid and development effectiveness agenda, such as adapting to local needs and harmonisation among development actors. Combining these different goals remains a challenge in the development community. Studies show that most donors have similar problems when measuring results. The quality of the collected data can oftentimes be questioned because data collection methods lack methodological rigor. The data collected and used is often of limited relevance for the project. Reporting by implementing agencies to BMZ focusses more on accountability than on using the results for learning. This discussion paper offers an in-depth analysis of the efforts undertaken by German bilateral development cooperation actors to measure results and in how far the reported data can contribute to increase the effectiveness of development cooperation. Thirteen projects by German implementing agencies GIZ and KfW were selected and analysed by means of project documents and interviews with staff. In addition, general monitoring and evaluation guidelines of German development cooperation were consulted. The results show that BMZ does not have a comprehensive results-based management system in place for planning, monitoring and evaluation in German development cooperation, which leads to quality challenges with regard to the collected data. Many projects do not have a comprehensive theory of change, use methodologically contestable indicators and are not able to demonstrate causality between their activities and the results measured. Indicators are often selected with only the limited involvement of partner countries, and there are challenges with using partner countries’ secondary data. BMZ has recently started a reform process with the aim of establishing a more comprehensive RBM system and providing additional guidance to projects on how to define indicators and measure results. The findings of this paper offer important lessons learnt and recommendations for the reform process.

Iliana Olivié y Manuel Gracia. Elcano Policy Paper 4/2020 (versión en español) - 22/7/2020

Haciendo uso del Índice Elcano de Presencia Global, este policy paper describe el perfil internacional de la UE. Se observa hasta qué punto los contenidos de la estrategia global de la UE están alineados con el volumen, naturaleza y distribución geográfica de la proyección exterior de la Unión.

With the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its guiding principle “Leave no one behind”, the international community has set itself the goal of improving the living conditions of poor and marginalised groups. In many cases, these groups include migrants and refugees. A sophisticated review process has been set up to monitor the implementation of the 2030 Agenda. Here, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) play a decisive role. Migrants and refugees were explicitly included from the outset. However, this creates additional data requirements: Data disaggregated by migratory status is necessary to capture changes in the living conditions of migrant population groups within the structured review and follow up process of the SDGs. This disaggregation allows to draw conclusions about the well-being of migrants and refugees. SDG 17.18 explicitly calls for the differentiated consideration of this population group in the SDGs, where relevant, and the necessary building up of capacities for data collection and analysis.
Census data, data from national administrative registers and sample surveys are possible data sources to achieve this objective. These data sets, however, differ in their scope and extent to which they capture different types of information. Hence, each represents only a partial reality.
Five years after the adoption of the SDGs, the balance sheet is sobering: Data disaggregated by migratory status are still lacking in most countries. As a result, there is a growing danger that existing disadvantages will become more permanent or more pronounced. In line with its overarching commitment to the implementation of the SDGs, the German government should work to ensure that migrants and refugees are systematically taken into account in the follow-up and review of the 2030 Agenda. For the remaining period until 2030 – touted as the Decade of Action and Delivery - the following recommendations are derived:
•    Harmonise migration definitions: Data collections should apply definitions and methods recommended by the UN Statistical Commission.
•    Support data collection: The personnel and financial capacities of the national statistical authorities in partner countries should be systematically strengthened.
•    Strengthen synergies: Bridges should be built between migration-specific data initiatives and thematically broader data initiatives that are closely linked to the SDG process.
•    Expand migration expertise in the SDG review process: Migration expertise should be more systematically integrated into the SDG review process than has been the case to date in order to take greater account of changes in the living conditions of migrants and refugees.