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Kyrgyzstan’s Eastward Slide

Foreign Policy Blogs - lun, 10/08/2015 - 18:17

Photo Credit: Kremlin Press and Information Office

Kyrgyzstan has canceled a two decades-old agreement governing U.S. economic aid in response to the State Department’s decision to recognize a jailed human rights campaigner with a prestigious commendation. The dispute concerns Azimjon Askarov, who was arrested in 2010 for “inciting ethnic hatred.” Askarov, a member of Kyrgyzstan’s Uzbek minority, filmed rioting by Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in June 2010 that claimed that lives of 400 people. The Kyrgyz-led government in Bishkek accused Askarov of encouraging the violence and handed him a life sentence. Since then, international NGOs and human rights groups have called for Askarov’s release, alleging he is the victim of political and ethnic persecution.

The State Department’s recent decision to bestow the Human Rights Defender Award on Askarov follows years of work to obtain his exoneration. In response to the award, Kyrghyz President Almazbek Atambayev accused the U.S. of “trying to stir up ethnic hatred,” and canceled the 1993 Bilateral Agreement governing American aid to the former Soviet republic. Atambayev suggested that Washington is deliberately destabilizing the country, darkly referencing unspecified “attempts to sow division [and] chaos.”

The move is part of a general trend in Central Asia that has seen U.S. influence decline and official commitment to human rights weaken, with Russia eagerly stepping into the vacuum.

Since 1993, Kyrgyzstan has received $2 billion in aid from the United States, mainly through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Under the terms of the 1993 Bilateral Agreement, USAID and other U.S. aid organizations are exempt from taxation and auditing requirements and their personnel are granted the same immunity from prosecution as diplomats.

Atambayev’s dark hints that the U.S. is trying to “sow division” may sound paranoid, but one needs only look to recent events in Ukraine to see their underlying logic. USAID provided unaccountable millions in funding to various organizations and news outlets opposed to former President Viktor Yanukovych prior to his overthrow in February 2014. There’s no doubt that the work these organizations played some role in the Euromaidan protests that ousted Yanukovych last year. Atambayev has taken the lesson to heart: seemingly innocuous aid organizations can act as catalysts for unwanted political change.

But Ukraine is just the tip of the iceberg. Russia and the United States are involved in a Cold War-esque struggle for influence across Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Kyrgyzstan is a political football that has been tossed between the two superpowers for more than a decade.

Kyrgyzstan is one of the most politically volatile states in the world today. The so-called Tulip Revolution in 2005 overthrew the country’s pro-Russian president, Askar Akayev, with support from the United States. Five years later, Russia allegedly supported yet another revolution to overthrow Akayev’s successor, Kurmanbek Bakiyev. After two revolutions in the last decade, Atambayev is seeking security by decisively entering the Russian camp.

For more than a decade, the country was the only in the world to host both a US air base and a Russian one.  The Manas Transit Center proved instrumental in supporting the troops fighting in Afghanistan – hundreds of thousands of passengers passed through Kyrgyzstan on their way to the frontlines. However, the base was closed in June 2014, coinciding with a $2 billion Russian loan for Kyrgyzstan.

Then, on Aug. 6, Kyrgyzstan officially joined the Eurasian Economic Union, becoming the fifth member of Russia’s response to the European Union. The EAEU now includes Russia and three other former Soviet republics: Armenia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Kyrgyzstan’s entry into the EAEU marks a further step into Russia’s economic and political domain, away from the U.S. and the West.

In the realm of domestic policy, as well, Kyrgyzstan is increasingly modeling itself after Russia. On June 4, Kyrgyzstan’s parliament passed a “foreign agents” law modeled after Russia’s through the first stage of the legislative process. If successful, the law would require all NGOs that receive funding from foreign donors to register as “foreign agents” and submit to intrusive auditing by the state.

Russia’s own “foreign agents” law — passed in 2012 — has targeted NGOs and human rights groups including the GOLOS Association (Russia’s only independent election monitoring organizations), the Levada Center (the country’s only independent polling agency), and the Committee Against Torture, an investigative body that researches allegations of torture by Russian police and military forces. Since 2012, many Russian NGOs have been forced to close their doors or curtail important work to avoid scrutiny, fines and imprisonment by the state.

Kyrgyzstan looks to be following in Russia’s footsteps: the repeal of the 1993 Bilateral Agreement, the passage of its own “foreign agents” law, and its entry into the Eurasian Economic Union point to a decisive shift towards Russia and a further attenuation of U.S. influence in the former Soviet periphery. NGOs, aid workers and human rights groups will be the first to feel the wrath of Krygyzstan’s eastward slide.

Obama’s Foreign Policy “Bully Pulpit”

Foreign Policy Blogs - lun, 10/08/2015 - 17:28

President Barack Obama has shown a recent willingness to engage forcefully on tough issues in a manner some found lacking earlier in his presidency. With re-election behind him, he discovered the value of the bully pulpit. His recent discussion of prison reform may be the initial steps of the long walk other social issues — like marriage equality — had to take before they were addressed fully. Presidents cannot resolve issues like these alone — no president can move gun control through an obstructive Congress, for example — but they can set down markers for action on an issue so that successors can approach it with the ball moved a little further down the field. In short, while it’s not an endgame, the bully pulpit adds value.

Since Obama uses the bully pulpit domestically, can he take it abroad? In a sense, he has. His trip to Africa last month aimed to clarify U.S. policy towards the continent’s major nations. His openness toward Cuba showed a willingness to take action to “unfreeze” American policy toward the country that was mired in Cold War thinking. Even in the waning months of his presidency, there is still more that he could accomplish abroad. In the remaining months before the 2016 presidential campaign kicks into high gear and soaks up all available media, here are three areas where Obama’s “foreign policy bully pulpit” could be useful.

NATO. Obama’s administration coined the term “leading from behind” in reference to U.S. participation in the ouster of Moammar Gadhafi from power in Libya, and the amount of responsibility it could shoulder for the results. “Leading from behind” positioned U.S. forces as facilitators of collective actions, but not as the spearhead they were for the Iraq War.

Such actions not only honor alliances they diffuse burdens to a U.S. military that is still looked to first as the global policeman. NATO now encompasses Central and Eastern Europe; its members are best positioned to counter Russian influence in the region. NATO’s rounds of enlargement and efforts to partner with Russia have not matched the level of strategic reassessment NATO undertook with the 1967 Harmel Report. That document outlined the alliance’s guiding principles during the Cold War. Some analysts have called for a repeat of the Harmel process to clarify NATO’s post-Cold War principles and mission. Obama’s motive to share alliance responsibilities more equally with European powers still applies.

Moreover, well into their second decade of NATO membership, rising Central European economies like Poland have increasing resources and strategic need for a revitalized alliance. Obama could call for a second Harmel process, led in part by NATO’s most recent Central and Eastern European members, to determine how the alliance will continue to ensure European security. A a second Harmel process could clarify circumstances under which NATO would take out-of-area action, such as the criteria for an equivalent of the Libya intervention.

Japan. Central to Obama’s foreign policy has been a “pivot” toward Asia. China commands a separate level of attention from U.S. policymakers; but the most important U.S. ally in Asia is Japan. It is the world’s largest economy behind the U.S. and China. Its financial contribution to the United Nations (close to $294 million in 2015) are second only to the U.S. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s new security legislation passed Japan’s lower house last month and is headed to its upper chamber.

The new security measures have been controversial in Japan and the U.S. for proposing to alter Article 9 of Japan’s post-World War II constitution to allow Japan to project military force. But they offer Obama an opportunity to move U.S.-Japan relations forward from its World War II-era posture in the way he pushed the U.S.-Cuba relations out of their Cold War stasis. Japan’s economic might, like Germany’s was long seen as a potential security threat; it is time that its economic power carry with it responsibilities to global security.

A reformed Article 9 could open options for Japanese contribution to security actions without encouraging unilateral action by Japan. Abe’s domestic critics pose the greater challenge, but Obama can make further steps towards getting Japan to shoulder more of Asia’s security burdens while incorporating Japan into global security leadership more directly (by endorsing its addition as a UN Security Council Permanent Member, for example.) A full course correction in policy will not be accomplished in the next year, but Obama can move it forward while he has time.

Germany. To paraphrase Henry Kissinger’s famous comment, when Obama has to “call Europe,” he has to call Germany. Chancellor Angela Merkel has directed Europe’s response to the Greek crisis, cementing Germany’s position as the guiding voice of the euro.

Germany, like Japan, has been run deliberately as a militarily rudderless economic engine. Any path to a common EU security policy, however, will go through Germany. Likewise, the EU’s response to Russian aggression has centered on Germany’s energy and economic relations with that country.

In short, if President Obama wants to be on good terms with Europe, he needs to leave office on good terms with Germany. The Obama administration has made efforts to clean up the mess of the NSA’s alleged tapping of Merkel’s cell phone, but it still stands that the U.S.’ standing in Germany has been dinged during Obama’s tenure. An effort on his part to cement good relations with Berlin would pay dividends for his successor and America’s ongoing ties with the EU.

It is hard to underestimate the power of the media in today’s politics. Obama is a master communicator, and his rhetorical gifts have played a key role in moving America forward on some key domestic issues. As he aims to cement his legacy, why not take his talents abroad?

Peacekeeping and geopolitics in the 21st century

Crisisgroup - lun, 10/08/2015 - 14:37
On Friday, May 15, the Project on International Order and Strategy hosted a discussion about the current state of geopolitics and international peacekeeping. The conversation, a part of the Foreign Policy program’s Order from Chaos project, featured Jean-Marie Guéhenno, former United Nations’ undersecretary-general for peacekeeping operations. Guéhenno discussed his new memoir "The Fog of Peace: How International Engagement Can Stop the Conflicts of the 21st Century" (Brookings Institution Press, 2015). In his role as the U.N.’s lead peacekeeper, Guéhenno oversaw the largest expansion of peacekeeping missions in U.N. history. His insights into peacekeeping, international diplomacy, and great-power relations illuminated some of the challenges we face today, including the crisis in Syria, Russian aggression in Ukraine, and the accommodation of rising powers in a new world order.

Burundi: Godefroid Niyombaré avait mis en garde Nkurunziza

Crisisgroup - lun, 10/08/2015 - 14:05
Alors qu’une tentative de coup d’Etat contre Pierre Nkurunziza, émanant de l’ex-chef d’état-major, Godefroid Niyombaré, est en cours au Burundi, Thierry Vircoulon chercheur à l'International Crisis Group, explique qui est le général putschiste et analyse, plus généralement, l'appareil sécuritaire du Burundi.

“This is as important as the Berlin Wall”: A former leader of UN Peacekeeping operations remembers 9/11

Crisisgroup - lun, 10/08/2015 - 13:56
September 11, 2001, started in New York as a particularly beautiful September day: there was not a single cloud, the air was transparent, and the light was crisp. I was less than three weeks away from the first anniversary of my joining the United Nations and had no sense of the momentous global changes that would be set in motion by the tragic events of the day. In his acceptance speech for the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo three months later, Kofi Annan would say of September 11, with some flourish: “We have entered the third millennium through a gate of fire.” The historic importance of events is not always immediately perceived, but September 11 was almost immediately understood as the beginning of a new era.

The U.N. at 70: The Past and Future of U.N. Peacekeeping

Crisisgroup - lun, 10/08/2015 - 11:51
When the Cold War ended in 1991, there was hope the U.N. Security Council would be able to take decisive action to create a more peaceful world. Early blue helmet successes in Cambodia, Namibia, Mozambique, and El Salvador seemed to vindicate that assessment. This optimism was tripped up by the tragedies that followed in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Rwanda. U.N. peacekeepers were bystanders to horrible atrocities. Peacekeeping shrank rapidly.

From fragile to final: how to ensure the Iran deal stays on track

Crisisgroup - lun, 10/08/2015 - 11:32
The nuclear agreement reached in Vienna on 14 July 2015 between Iran and the P5+1/E3+3 (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany) is a significant diplomatic achievement and a testament to the possibilities that principled and patient diplomacy hold for resolving even the most intractable international conundrums. Negotiated outcomes by nature are imperfect. But both sides have protected their core interests and rightfully can claim victory – a precondition for any sustainable solution.

Imagining the Impossible, One Step at a Time

Crisisgroup - lun, 10/08/2015 - 11:13
Some may say John Lennon was a dreamer. But he wasn't the only one. Such was the sentiment of Lennon's 1971 hit song, "Imagine", which dreams of a world without hunger and wars. Although the song resonated with millions of people, I doubt there were many people, including myself, that believed such a dream was even remotely possible. Unfortunately, our world is made up of too many people with varying histories and agendas. I think most will agree, that Peace on earth and good will to man, just ain't gonna happen. At least not in absolute terms.

"No" to Iran Means No Forever

Crisisgroup - dim, 09/08/2015 - 17:42
There is a notion cultivated by opponents of the Iran nuclear agreement, attractive to members of Congress under intense pressure to vote no, that congressional rejection of the agreement will enable U.S. negotiators to reach a better deal. The expectation is, that with a further turn of the screws, we can pressure the Iranians to give more and/or we give less. But it can’t happen.

An Unofficial Plebiscite

German Foreign Policy (DE/FR/EN) - ven, 07/08/2015 - 00:00
(Own report) - The German establishment is sending mixed signals in reaction to the announcement of an unofficial plebiscite on Catalonia's secession from Spain. Catalan Prime Minister Artur Mas has declared the September 27 regional elections a de facto plebiscite on the region's secession. Should his alliance secure the absolute majority, he will proclaim independence from Spain within 8 months. In the past, Germany had repeatedly supported Catalan secession. Influential German think tanks are demanding that secession not be obstructed. However, there is opposition rising from within business circles. Catalonia is a central site for German companies in Spain. Engaged in trade throughout Spain, they do not want to see their business possibilities limited to one region and Barcelona's secession from Madrid could possibly prove an obstacle. According to German government advisors, on the other hand, these problems could be solved. Some economists contend that the EU's currency, the Euro, can, in the long run, only be maintained within a uniform economic area. This would exclude Spain, but include a seceded Catalonia, the strongest economic zone on the Iberian Peninsular.

The FPA’s must reads (July 31-August 7)

Foreign Policy Blogs - jeu, 06/08/2015 - 23:03

The Point of No Return: Climate Change Nightmares Are Already Here
By Eric Holthaus
Rolling Stone

From acidification and warming waters to the disappearance of entire species, climate change has already begun to take its toll on the earth. Some of these changes may be irreversible, and what’s particularly frightening is a lot of them are coming sooner than expected.

Hiroshima
By John Hersey
The New Yorker

Pulled from the archives in remembrance of the 70th anniversary of Hiroshima, this extraordinary article provides an in-depth look into the lives lost and those who somehow managed to survive.

The harrowing story of the Nagasaki bombing mission
By Ellen Bradbury and Sandra Blakeslee
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

Although the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were touted as clear and decisive victories by U.S. leadership, the Nagasaki mission in particularly was riddled with screw-ups and errors that could have plunged the plane into the Pacific Ocean. This comprehensive account of the bombing on August 9, 1945, looks at what went wrong and how it changed the course of history.

The Bureaucrats Who Singled Out Hiroshima for Destruction
By Paul Ham
The Atlantic

At first glance, Hiroshima may have seemed like an odd target for the 1945 bombing. It wasn’t Japan’s biggest city, nor was it as obvious of a military target as, say, Kokura. In this excerpt from Hiroshima Nagasaki: The Real Story of the Atomic Bombings and Their Aftermath, Paul Ham tells the story of the reasons military strategists chose their targets and the process that led to dropping the two atomic bombs a few months later.

When Canada Learned It Had Spies
By Graham Templeton
Vice

Canada’s intelligence gathering efforts remained largely a secret until 1972, when a senior analyst at the U.S. National Security Agency divulged the name of its intelligence branch in an interview with the leftist magazine Ramparts. Dubbed the Communications Branch of the National Research Council, or CBNRC, the 1970s marked the death of anonymity for Canada’s SIGINT program. Templeton explores how this information came to light.

Blogs:

Rebuilding Afghanistan: The Way Forward by Elly Rostoum
Russia and the World are not on Good Terms by Hannah Gais
Netanyahu’s Problematic Remarks on the Iran Deal by Josh Klemons
GailForce: Aspen Security Forum Part II – Terrorism by Gail Harris
Beijing Attempts to Stifle South China Sea Discussion at ASEAN by Gary Sands

Rebuilding Afghanistan: The Way Forward

Foreign Policy Blogs - jeu, 06/08/2015 - 17:40

The turbulent modern history of Afghanistan provides a sketch of a nation either battling or recovering from a series of wars, political unrest and corruption scandals — the confluence of which has left the country facing poverty and an uncertain future.

Afghanistan’s economy is largely reliant on an international community that provides billions of dollars a year to prevent the country from falling into complete chaos. Despite these efforts, international influx of money in Afghanistan has done little to build a sustainable economy that could eventually stand independent of international support.

The perennial challenge for international reconstruction efforts lies with the lack of fiscal and economic sustainability, and in the absence of proper political governance at the governmental level.

Earlier this month, the Center for Rebuilding Sustainable Communities After Disasters (CRSCAD) at the University of Massachusetts Boston, hosted an international conference on “Rebuilding Sustainable Communities in Afghanistan: The Way Forward.” I had a chance to catch up with the center’s founding director and a professor of Urban Planning and Community Studies, Dr. Adenrele Awotona, who explained,

In March 1948, just after the end of World War II, the United States Congress passed the Economic Cooperation Act and approved funding of over $12 billion for the rebuilding of war-ravaged Western Europe. That comprehensive European Recovery Program was nicknamed the “Marshall Plan.” In 2014, after over a decade of war in Afghanistan, records show that more United States and NATO money had been invested in the “reconstruction” of that country than was spent on the Marshall Plan.

For once, money doesn’t seem to be the problem. Corruption and the lack of regulatory, fiscal and constitutional structures have lead to an uneven distribution of wealth in the country — mostly concentrated with the top 15 to 20 percent of the population. The economic disparity is a bit of deja vu, and had previously been an contributing factor the original Communist takeover in the 1978. Today, competing political ideologies remain a problem. They are mostly sectarian and Islamic in flavor and continue to divide the country, eliminating any semblance of good governance.

The challenge for Afghan reconstruction is ensuring sustainability. The international community’s reconstruction strategy in Afghanistan has not stressed the need for sustainability. The majority of the hundreds of billions already poured into reconstruction has gone to building roads, dams, hospitals and schools – but the Afghans are not able to sustain much of that infrastructure without the continued financial support. In other words, when the money stops flowing, the structures won’t last long.

Perhaps a better strategy to rebuilding Afghanistan lies in focusing efforts on 1.) formulating a strong constitution that is embedded and reflective of the country’s history, culture, faith and one that is deeply committed to a modern understanding of human and civic rights; 2) strengthening law enforcement — not through militarization, but in the ability to enforce laws, keep the peace, and prosecute those who break the law — this point is particularly important in helping curb corruption — which remains rampant given the inability to prosecute those who break the laws; 3) providing  a strong regulatory and fiscal framework to facilitate and protect investment. A viable solution for Afghanistan’s economic woes and development lies with the private sector. Private international investment can help develop profitable business enterprises that can spur and generate greater economic development in the country, and produce needed revenues for the government to aid in rebuilding Afghanistan.

The caveat lies with the substantial above-ground security risks of doing business in Afghanistan. Providing the conditions for private sector growth requires proper political governance at both the national and local levels. It also requires that the international community focus its efforts on paving the way and providing the right conditions for private sector growth both in terms of infrastructure, but perhaps most importantly in building a robust, enforceable regulatory structure to secure and protect investments.

You can follow Elly on Twitter @EllyRostoum

Fishing For Ways To De-escalate South China Sea Tensions

Crisisgroup - jeu, 06/08/2015 - 16:18
While the increasing militarization of the South China Sea strains Asia-Pacific’s stability and security for the long term, the region’s humble fishing fleets pose more immediate, frequent, and less managed risks. If properly organized, however, those same fleets could offer one way to develop a culture of compromise and cooperation.

Forced to Flee (III)

German Foreign Policy (DE/FR/EN) - jeu, 06/08/2015 - 00:00
(Own report) - The German government has contributed to the causes of people fleeing in three of the world's five countries generating the largest number of refugees. This was exposed by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). By the end of 2014, Syria, according to the UNHCR, was the country that generated most refugees, with Afghanistan second. Since mid 2011, the West had massively exacerbated the civil war in that country, causing a steadily growing number of refugees. Back in the 1980s, the West began supporting the complete destruction of Afghanistan's social structures, which has been driving countless numbers to seek safety abroad. Pursuing geopolitical objectives, the West pressured South Sudan - number five in the UNHCR's statistics - to declare its independence in 2011, disregarding warnings by observers that secession could inevitably re-enflame tensions inside the territory, possibly even leading to a new round of civil war. The civil war is now reality with millions fleeing. To ward off refugees ("border management") from Europe, Berlin and the EU are seeking an even closer cooperation with the Juba government - whose militias have carried out horrible massacres.

Russia and the World are not on Good Terms

Foreign Policy Blogs - mer, 05/08/2015 - 22:08

Putin at a BRICS summit in 2014. Photo Credit: Presidential Press and Information Office

Is Russia’s aggressive foreign policy finally catching up to it?

A recent poll of 26 countries, which was conducted by the Pew Research Center, found that views of Russia and its president, Vladimir Putin, are largely unfavorable, and in some countries, still on the decline.

Anti-Russian sentiment was highest in Jordan and Poland, where 80 percent of participants expressed a negative view toward the country. Some notable runner-ups included Israel (74 percent), Japan (73 percent) and Ukraine (72 percent). In Western Europe, Germany and France followed shortly behind, with 70 percent of participants expressing unfavorable opinions toward the country.

For the most part, public perception of Putin was lower in all of these countries, even if only marginally, than perception of Russia. Here, Spain took the lead, with 92 percent of participants expressing no confidence in Putin’s ability to do the right thing in world affairs. Poland (87 percent), France (85 percent) and Ukraine (84 percent) followed closely behind.

To some extent, these numbers are not tremendously surprising. Even before the conflict in Ukraine kicked off in early 2014, relations between Germany and Russia had begun to sour. In 2010, 50 percent of Germans expressed favorable views toward Russia; by 2014, that number had dropped to a staggering 19 percent. Meanwhile, in Russia, positive feelings toward Germany dropped from 78 percent in 2011 to 35 percent in 2015.

Distrust runs rampant — and for good reason. Eastern European and Baltic states, even those that are NATO members, view Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as a stepping stone. “Little green men,” the title given to the unmarked, unacknowledged forces that entered Ukraine in 2014, are just a hop, skip and a jump away. In preparation, Baltic and Eastern European states have girded themselves up in a defensive position. Some, like Poland, have witnessed a dramatic rise in membership to paramilitary associations. There’s even been a proposal to scoop up some of the members of these associations to establish a Territorial Defense Force, somewhat akin to the U.S. National Guard.

Of course, pissing off — or at the very least, freaking out — the EU is undoubtedly on Putin’s agenda. The question is how Russia’s relationship with those countries with a positive opinion, or even no opinion at all, will change in the years to come.

Pro-Russian sentiment was highest in Vietnam (75 percent), Ghana (56 percent) and China (51 percent). All three were mostly supportive of Putin’s conduct in world affairs as well. That makes sense: Russia’s own so-called pivot to Asia has emphasized both Vietnam and China.

Where things get murky for Russia is in Africa. Although Russian influence in Africa was extensive during the Cold War, it pulled back dramatically after the fall of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, Russia continues to engage in arms and resources trade with a number of Africa nations, albeit under different ideological pretexts. This time it’s more about business, not exporting a revolution.

Although Russia has actively pushed for more economic engagement in both Africa and Asia, more trade doesn’t necessarily lead to an empathetic public. In South Africa, a member of the BRICS partnership, of which Russia is an integral part, only about 25 percent of people viewed Russia in a positive light. As a leader, Putin was viewed slightly more favorably — 28 percent were confident he would do the right thing in world affairs. Meanwhile, over half of South Africans held negative opinions of Russia.

But there were also a number of countries where participants claimed to have no opinion of Putin. In Ethiopia, for example, only 10 percent expressed an unfavorable view of Russia, but that’s because a little less than 50 percent of those polled expressed any opinion at all. So as Russia pushes to build its ties with Africa and Asia, a little charm offensive may be in order.

Le cas de la Libye : 3 questions à Archibald Gallet

Politique étrangère (IFRI) - mer, 05/08/2015 - 17:36

Auteur de l’article « Les enjeux du chaos libyen » paru dans le numéro été 2015 de Politique étrangère (2/2015), Archibald Gallet a accepté de répondre à trois questions en exclusivité pour politique-etrangere.com.

Quels sont les principaux acteurs du conflit libyen ?

Depuis juillet 2014, deux gouvernements, l’un à Tobrouk, l’autre à Tripoli, s’affrontent pour le contrôle des institutions et des richesses libyennes. Chaque gouvernement exerce une souveraineté théorique sur une mosaïque de territoires contrôlée par les différentes milices qui la soutiennent. Après près d’un an de guerre civile, l’enlisement du conflit a mis chacune des coalitions à l’épreuve. La montée en puissance de l’organisation État islamique (EI), puis plus récemment la signature d’un accord de paix sous les auspices de l’Organisation des Nations unies mettent à jour les divisions internes à chaque camp. Beaucoup de groupes armés ne rendent de compte à personne, et le Sud saharien jouit d’une autonomie de fait. Les milices des ethnies locales Toubou et Touareg s’y affrontent pour les routes de commerce transsahariennes et des revenus de protection des installations pétrolières du Sud-Est.

L’organisation État islamique peut-elle durablement s’implanter en Libye ?

L’EI a jusque-là fait preuve d’une résilience remarquable sur les théâtres ou elle s’est implantée, et la Libye d’aujourd’hui lui offre des conditions particulièrement favorables : une économie à l’arrêt, une situation sécuritaire fortement dégradée, un discours islamiste dominant le champ politique, et une immense quantité d’armes aux mains de milices. En 2014, l’organisation s’est progressivement implantée dans l’Est du pays, puis à l’Ouest de Tripoli, se livrant notamment à des activités de soutien des djihadistes internationaux. Son recrutement au sein des autres milices, ainsi que son agenda régional ont rapidement été facteur de tension avec les autres groupes armés, souvent pourtant de la même obédience islamiste radicale. L’EI est désormais en difficulté dans le port de Derna face à Ansar Al-Sharia, et autour des infrastructures pétrolières de Syrte contre les milices de la ville de Misrata. Comme en Irak, l’EI cherche à s’implanter là où sont les richesses naturelles. À cet égard, la mort probable de Belmokhtar, le leader des Mourabitounes qui gardait la haute main sur le djihadisme saharien, ouvre des opportunités autour des champs pétroliers du Sud-Est. Une consolidation de la présence d’EI dans le Sahara libyen pourrait aussi permettre une jonction avec Boko Haram à travers le Niger et le Tchad.

Comment peut-on contenir les effets du chaos libyen (contagion djihadiste en Tunisie, afflux de réfugiés en Europe, etc.) ?

La menace djihadiste et l’augmentation du trafic de migrants demeurent deux problèmes distincts. Les réseaux de passeurs libyens ont pignon sur rue et entretiennent des complicités avec des responsables des deux gouvernements, utilisant souvent des infrastructures publiques pour détenir et transporter les migrants. Les groupes terroristes préfèrent, pour leur part conserver une certaine clandestinité, et n’ont pour l’heure nul besoin d’avoir recours à une traversée hasardeuse de la Méditerranée pour s’infiltrer en Europe. La Libye s’est constituée comme le principal pays de transit en provenance de l’Afrique subsaharienne à cause de la corruption généralisée et de l’absence totale d’état de droit. Seul le rétablissement d’un contrôle effectif du territoire par un gouvernement légitime pourra avoir un effet significatif dans ce domaine. La solution du périmètre de sécurité maritime en Méditerranée est à cet égard un aveu d’impuissance de l’Union européenne, tandis que les partenaires européens se méfient, à juste titre, de l’idée d’une intervention militaire sur le sol libyen. Au-delà, le problème des migrants appelle une politique régionale ambitieuse. La création d’opportunités économiques tant pour les candidats au départ que pour ceux qui les transportent aura certainement plus d’effets sur les flux migratoires qu’une politique simplement axée sur le renforcement des capacités sécuritaires des pays concernés.

  S’abonner à Politique étrangère.

Netanyahu’s Problematic Remarks on the Iran Deal

Foreign Policy Blogs - mer, 05/08/2015 - 17:33

NEW YORK, NY – SEPTEMBER 27: Benjamin Netanyahu, Prime Minister of Israel, points to a red line he drew on a graphic of a bomb while addressing the United Nations General Assembly.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu just addressed the American Jewish community via live webcast. He spoke for 10 minutes, followed up with a 10 minute question and answer.

All of his standard arguments against the deal were there; he didn’t cover too much new ground. But there were some interesting tidbits.

For one, he re-stated the idea that giving Iran 24-days notice of inspection was like giving several weeks notice to a drug dealer that you’ll be raiding their labs. It’s a great talking point, and he’s used it before. The problem is that the response is stronger than the accusation.

FACT: The half-life of uranium is 700 million years. That’s 10 billion 24-day periods. It will be detected, thanks to the #IranDeal.

— The Iran Deal (@TheIranDeal) July 23, 2015

Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz, one of the architects of the Iran deal — and an MIT trained nuclear scientist — prefers to refute this line with an example of Iran from 2003.

“In February 2003, the IAEA requested access to a suspicious facility in Tehran, and negotiations dragged on as Iran tried to remove evidence. But even after six months, tests revealed nuclear activity despite Iran’s attempt to cover it up.”

Netanyahu commented that after receiving notice, Iran would flush their “nuclear meth” in order to hide it from inspectors. It’s powerful language that conjures criminal mastermind Walter White, the main character in the award-winning show “Breaking Bad,” outsmarting the authorities, season after season. But it’s not in line with the facts, and Netanyahu surely knows that. It undermines his position to use talking points that are so blatantly without merit. He clearly believes deep in his heart than this deal is bad — for Israel, the U.S. and the world. But he won’t win his argument through manipulation.

Netanyahu argues that he is not against all deals, only this deal. The glaring problem here is that he is been vocally, vehemently and vociferously against this deal since well before this deal even existed. He says he believes a better deal could have been reached. The Obama administration is just as vehement in their rejections. But it doesn’t matter. Bibi has been talking about a better deal for years! He is the face of all global opposition to this deal, he seems to see himself the leader of a movement, bent on preventing the actualization of this deal. He has thus made himself irrelevant as a force for change. He’s been arguing, since 1993, that Iran is just years away from a nuclear weapon. How can anyone take seriously the Bibi who cried bomb?

The most glaring issue with his remarks, however, revolved around Israel’s neighbor’s reactions to the agreement. When Bibi first came out against the deal, he pointed out that both Israel and the Arab states were against it. He posed the question: How often do Israel and our Arab neighbors see eye-to-eye on anything?

It’s a powerful argument. Israel was against the deal, so too Saudi Arabia and their Arab allies.

But the day before this speech, the Washington Post reported that during a visit from Secretary of State Kerry, the Persian Gulf Arab states had publicly endorsed the Iran nuclear deal. They continued:

“The GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) support leaves Israel as the only country in the Middle East to vehemently oppose the agreement.”

This is extremely problematic for Netanyahu since he is supposed to be the learned teacher, patiently explaining why this deal is so bad for the entire world. Ignoring such developments make him look either dishonest or uninformed. Neither are great traits for the leader of a movement, especially not one as serious as this.

Follow me on Twitter @jlemonsk.

Août 2015 en perspective

Le Monde Diplomatique - mer, 05/08/2015 - 14:27
Un récit de la crise grecque par Yanis Varoufakis, l'ex-ministre des finances ; combattre à l'étranger, les similitudes des parcours des brigadistes et des djihadistes ; un voyage sous bonne garde en Corée du Nord ; l'illusion des fast-foods nouvelle génération : voici une sélection d'archives en (...) - La valise diplomatique

Venezuela, al borde del colapso

Crisisgroup - mer, 05/08/2015 - 11:22
Venezuela está al borde del colapso, tanto en materia de salud, como económica y alimentaria. La comunidad internacional, especialmente la UNASUR, todavía está a tiempo de resolver una crisis que va camino de desbordar una débil Venezuela que necesita desesperadamente consenso político, crecimiento sostenible y bienestar social. Así lo describe el director para Latinoamérica de Crisis Group Javier Ciurlizza en esta entrevista a El Venezolano TV.

Corruption in Greece (II)

German Foreign Policy (DE/FR/EN) - mer, 05/08/2015 - 00:00
(Own report) - The German judiciary has initiated new criminal proceedings against German arms companies because of their multi-millions in bribes payments in Greece. Last month, the states attorney's office in Munich brought charges against a former manager of the Krauss-Maffei Wegmann (KMW) tank producing company. He is charged with having personally pocketed up to €1.5 million of a much larger bribe without paying the adequate taxes. Other managers, for example of the Rheinmetall arms manufacturer, are also being threatened with criminal charges. In late last December, a German court sentenced the Düsseldorf-based Rheinmetall company to pay the unprecedentedly inflated profit of nearly €37 million into the budget of the Federal State of Bremen. These €37 million were paid by the Greek government for bribery-induced arms deliveries. In answer to its compensation demands, the Greek government is being told that Rheinmetall cannot be punished twice for the same offense. Greek lawsuits against German managers usually remain without consequences, because the German government refuses extradition to Greece after German courts gave more lenient sentences, than they could have expected from a court in Athens. The Greek government estimates its damages alone from the bribes in arms deals at €100 million.

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