Diplomacy & Crisis News

On the Day of Vesak, which acknowledges the contribution of Buddhism to the spirituality of humanity, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon is paying special tribute to the victims of the devastating earthquake that struck Nepal over a month ago.

The international community must intensify efforts to protect the world’s nuclear facilities from cyberattacks, the head of the United Nations nuclear watchdog declared today as he opened the Organization’s first-ever conference on the issue at the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) headquarters in Vienna.

When young people have decent jobs, political weight, negotiating muscle and real influence in the world, they will create a better future, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said today as he kicked off a Headquarters event on empowering youth through employment.

Photo credit: uwehiksch on Flickr

With all the attention turned to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), currently negotiated by the U.S. with 12 Asian countries, few seem to notice anymore the equally important Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the European Union and the United States. The two deals are similar in essence: They both seek to advance the beacon of free trade by tearing tariff and non-tariff barriers, with the promise of creating jobs and delivering a much-needed economic boost to the nations involved.

However, both trade agreements have been plagued by concerns raised by consumer groups, academics and politicians of all stripes over the so-called Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), an arcane mechanism that allows aggrieved corporations to challenge the validity of government regulations that can impact their bottom line in extrajudicial tribunals. According to critics, the threat of expensive lawsuits from multinationals can leave governments afraid to act in citizens’ favor, a phenomenon known as regulatory chill. Activists are increasingly skeptical of any measure meant to protect the profits of corporations, seen as largely responsible for the near collapse of the financial system and the start of the Great Recession.

Adding insult to injury, the fact that trade negotiations are conducted in secret did not advance the cause for the TPP and the TTIP and an amendment to force the White House to make the texts public was struck down in the Senate. As expected, Capitol Hill has been the scene of some particularly thespian speeches given by opponents and proponents of the ISDS, most recently evidenced on May 22, when the Senate overwhelmingly rejected another anti-ISDS amendment from Senator Elizabeth Warren.

Far from the limelight of the U.S. media, the European Commission has also went into damage control mode over the ISDS, facing off a multipronged crusade mounted by member states, the European Parliament, businesses and the public. Many fear the same fate for the TTIP as that of the shelved copyright infringement treaty, ACTA, rejected after massive popular demonstrations. Indeed, the general mood in Europe is sour to say the least. A petition against the TTIP and the ISDS has gathered almost 2 million signatures in eight months, twice the number needed for the European Commission to take action on the demands of petitioners. Moreover, a public consultation to assess the concerns of businesses on the proposed trade deal received a record 150,000 replies, in which 88 percent of respondents were opposed to the ISDS.

Making matters worse, the governments of France and Germany have voiced strong opposition to the ISDS, threatening not to sign the trade deal in its current form. Paris expressed outrage, with the Secretary of State for Foreign Trade saying that his country would “never allow private tribunals in the pay of multinational companies to dictate the policies of sovereign states, particularly in certain domains like health and the environment.” German Environment Minister, Barbara Hendricks, told the German press she believes that ISDS is “simply not necessary.” Further afield, the European Parliament has echoed such concerns, fully aware that without its vote, scheduled during the week of June 8, the TTIP would be scuttled.

Cobbling together all the elements, it’s clear that the TTIP will survive only after lawmakers on both sides of the Atlantic significantly review the investor-state dispute mechanism. Cecilia Malmström, the European Union’s Trade Commissioner sought to dispel fears when she announced earlier in May a reform plan for the ISDS. Calling the ISDS “not fit for the 21st century,” she put forth a concept paper to revisit it across four areas: the protection of governments’ right to regulate; the creation of an appellate mechanism; the establishment of a clear code of conduct for judges to reduce conflicts of interest and the reassessment of the relationship between ISDS and domestic courts.

But neither the European Parliament nor the United States responded favorably to Malmström’s proposal. European lawmakers insisted that the plan doesn’t go far and deep enough, with one MEP calling it “trying to put lipstick on the ISDS pig,” while the U.S. Undersecretary for International Trade, Stefan Selig, lauded the status quo and rejected the need for any reform to the extrajudicial court system.

However, the European Parliament’s trade committee managed to scrape together enough support and on May 28 backed a resolution in support of the TTIP on the condition that Malmström’s ISDS proposal stays on the table and will be included in the final deal.

“Deplorably, the European Parliament took a very ambiguous stance on the infamous ISDS system. We have yet to see any facts justifying its inclusion in an EU-US trade deal,” said one of the opponents of the trade deal. Even if the non-binding resolution was approved, it will be a long uphill climb in the Parliament once the bill comes to a vote.

Do we really need the ISDS? The answer is far from clear, but so far the “no” camp has the upper hand in the debate. With lawmakers deeply divided on the topic of the ISDS, it’s obvious that the far-reaching deal that would cover 800 million citizens and $35 trillion in GDP, will be the result of fierce political infighting and pork barreling. Nevertheless, the voice of the European Union will carry significant weight across the Atlantic and will certainly impact the equally fierce negotiations on Capitol Hill.

One of Geller’s ads in San Francisco.

The current debate over political advertising in the Washington, D.C.-area transit system moves the issue from “free speech” to “public safety,” and probably toward the Supreme Court.

Charles M. Schultz’s first Peanuts cartoon, 1950

Pamela Geller, the president of American Freedom Defense Initiative (AFDI), sought to bring her message to the nation’s capital using one of the cartoons from her May 2015 “Draw the Prophet” event. The event, which took place in Garland, Texas, was attacked by two gunmen, for which ISIS later claimed responsibility. Geller’s request was denied after the Washington-area transit authority, WMATA, temporarily suspended all advocacy advertisements on May 28.

Debates over advertising on public transportation are not new. Geller has had transit ads run in New York and Washington before. In 2012, New York and Washington posted “Support Israel, Defeat Jihad” ads that referred to war between “the civilized man” and “the savage,” and were widely labeled hate speech. It wasn’t until recently that the New York transit authority voted to ban all political advertising.

On a legal level, these ads have experienced mixed success. In March 2015, a federal court decided Philadelphia‘s transit system could not refuse ads linking Muslims to Hitler.

That same month, however, a federal court held that the transit authority in Seattle could refuse ads from both sides of the Israel-Palestine conflict. Judge Paul Watford cited public safety in the majority decision: “Municipalities faced with the prospect of having to accept virtually all political speech if they accept any — regardless of the level of disruption caused — will simply close the forum to political speech altogether.”

The Boston transit authority has implemented similar measures as well. In May, a federal court found in favor of the city transit authority’s restrictions on ads that “demean or disparage” individuals or groups. The decision allowed the city to permit ads in favor of Palestinians while refusing ads from Geller’s group.

Outside the United States there are competing approaches.  The Supreme Court of Canada, for example, struck down in 2009 an effort by British Columbia Transit to ban all political advertising. Transport for London, on the other hand, prohibits ads on buses and trains that may cause “widespread or serious offence.” Ads that touch on “matters of public controversy and sensitivity” and political causes, as well as ads which undermine the 1999 Greater London Authority Act’s commitment to “promote good relations between persons of different racial groups [or] religious beliefs,” are not permitted.

The U.S. Constitution’s First Amendment protects fundamental freedoms in American society, including the freedom of speech and freedom of religion. The text of the Amendment actually states “Congress shall make no law…abridging the freedom of speech,” but Congress and the states have made many such abridgments, and the Supreme Court has agreed to some of these limits.

One such limit came about through Schenck v. United States (1919). Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. wrote in the unanimous opinion,

“The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic. […] The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger….”

In other words, you can’t falsely shout fire in a theater.  You can’t create a clear and present danger.

In 2008, a Danish cartoonist was targeted for his depictions of the Prophet Muhammad.  A Swedish artist was attacked in 2010, and allegedly the intended target of a murder plot. In January 2015, 12 people were killed in Paris in an attack on the office of a French magazine. In May, two gunmen attacked the cartoonists event near Dallas. The winning cartoon is what Geller sought to bring to Washington.

With her application under review by WMATA, Geller, used inflammatory language to defend her position:

“Drawing Muhammad is not illegal under American law, but only under Islamic law. Violence that arises over the cartoons is solely the responsibility of the Islamic jihadists who perpetrate it. Either America will stand now against attempts to suppress the freedom of speech by violence, or will submit and give the violent the signal that we can be silenced by threats and murder.  We cannot submit to the assassin’s veto.”

But free speech remains an active area of litigation. In a recent Supreme Court decision, Justice Anthony Kennedy defended the marketing of pharmaceuticals, in part by referencing cases which permitted nudity in movies, advertising alcohol prices, and clothing with expletives. In the Court’s current term, it is expected to decide whether Texas can include the option of the Confederate flag on its license plates, and whether towns can restrict the size of church signs more than it restricts the size of other signs.  None of these, though, has the recent record of international terrorism and terrorist targets (public transportation) associated with it. Would depictions of Muhammad on a Washington bus or subway train be akin to shouting fire in a theater – would they create a “clear and present danger,” obvious targets for attack?

Transit authorities seem to think so. In a May 27 statement about an unrelated arrest on of a man for terroristic threats, WMATA’s police chief, Ron Pavlik offered that, “We have no greater responsibility than protecting Metro’s customers and employees. This case demonstrates the seriousness with which we take all threats.” That same mentality supported WMATA’s decision to temporarily suspend all “issue-oriented advertisements.” It also supports Philadelphia’s decision to do the same.

Still, with inconsistent results in different U.S. federal courts, and with some cities deciding to reject all political advertisements, a case rising to the Supreme Court seems inevitable.

Photo: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/6/69/First_Peanuts_comic.png

Serious human rights violations and abuses persist in eastern Ukraine, including shelling, executions, arbitrary and illegal detentions, torture, ill-treatment, human trafficking and the lack of justice and accountability, as well as deprivation of economic and social rights, deeply affecting the 5 million people living in the conflict-affected areas, a new United Nations report said today.

Sunni tribal fighters in 2007 (Photo Credit: U.S. Army)

For several weeks in late 2004, U.S. Marines pushed their way through Fallujah, fighting street-by-street, house-by-house, room-by-room. In that desert city, on the banks of a polluted Euphrates River, they experienced some of the heaviest urban combat the Corps had seen since the Battle of Hue City, Vietnam, in 1968.

The second battle to retake Fallujah, code-named Operation Phantom Fury, eventually secured the longstanding Sunni stronghold, 35 miles west of Baghdad. But a low-intensity warfare campaign against insurgent forces continued, preventing the conditions for Iraqi government control.

In mid-2007, Daniel Green, now a Defense Fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, was sent to Fallujah as a mobilized U.S. Navy reservist to work as a tribal and leadership engagement officer for a Naval Special Warfare unit. He worked alongside then-Lieutenant Colonel William Mullen III, a Marine infantry officer who served as the battalion commander in charge of the city for most of 2007. Together, Green and Mullen were able to successfully build partnerships with local Iraqis, apply a counter-insurgency strategy to the city, and contribute to routing al Qaeda insurgents by bolstering the city’s security, political, and tribal structures.

In January 2014, however, Fallujah fell again to al Qaeda and affiliated militants, including ISIS.

Paul Nash of the Foreign Policy Association spoke with Dr. Green and Brigadier General Mullen about the current situation in Fallujah and their experience in countering the city’s insurgency nearly eight years ago. That experience is recounted in their book FALLUJAH REDUX: The Anbar Awakening and the Struggle with al-Qaeda, published by the U.S. Naval Institute Press.

[Note: All opinions, interpretations, and analyses expressed in this interview are the interviewees’ own and do not reflect those of the U.S. government, the U.S. Marine Corps, the U.S. Navy, or the U.S. Department of Defense.]

Q: When you left Fallujah, did you ever sense that the city might one day fall again to insurgents as it did last year?

Dr. Green: I felt at the time that al Qaeda had so thoroughly brutalized the Iraqi people that the Sunni Arab population would never again embrace them. I also felt that the idea of politically marginalizing the Sunni Arabs had clearly not worked and that the central government would genuinely try to incorporate them into a viable national government. I think none of us anticipated the Arab Spring and how much the chaos in Syria would allow al Qaeda in Iraq to reconstitute itself.

Brig. Gen. Mullen: I think I knew it was always a possibility. There was a good bit of optimism when we left, but it was also clear that the long-term prospects for the city, and Iraq in general, were entirely up to the Iraqis. When asked whether I thought we won in Iraq in the years immediately after 2007, I replied that we would not know for sure for at least 10 years or more. The key, in my mind, was that they needed a Nelson Mandela-type figure to lead the country to a better future. Instead, they got a Shia party hack.

Q: Based on your experience, what do you think is the key to getting local Iraqis off the fence and turned against the insurgents?

Dr. Green: I believe there needs to be an overarching political rationale for the Sunni Arab population to once again turn against al Qaeda and ISIS. A political program of reconciliation between Iraq’s factions must be real, and it must be enshrined in Iraq’s constitution otherwise it will not be enduring. Additionally, Fallujah was pacified in 2007 by having the Iraqi army, Iraqi police, and the Sunni Arab tribes working together, mentored by U.S. military personnel. The strengths of one compensated for the weakness of another. These forces must work in concert and have their actions synchronized.

Brig. Gen. Mullen: You need to instill a sense of personal security and the feeling that when they do climb down off the fence, they are coming down on the winning side because it is a matter of life and death for them. If they can also feel like they are part of making a difference, that helps.

Q: Does the current situation in Fallujah differ from the one you encountered in 2007?

Dr. Green: My sense is that the residents of the Fallujah area only welcomed ISIS as a temporary measure to exert pressure on Iraq’s central government to not mistreat them and their interests. Local residents have also been coerced by ISIS and suppressed by them. I believe that the Sunni Arab population, at its heart, does not truly support ISIS but is only doing so out of short-term political calculations or because it is unable to turn against them due to intimidation. Any strategy going forward needs to factor these conditions into a comprehensive strategy.

Brig. Gen. Mullen: Since I have not stepped foot in Iraq since late October 2007, it is hard to say. News reports can be inaccurate. It seems that ISIS rolled into town and found a very sympathetic population that felt alienated by actions the Maliki government either took or neglected to take. I think I am also seeing some of the “buyer’s remorse” that Dan and I saw in Fallujah because ISIS is actually worse than al Qaeda was – and that is saying something. Al Qaeda learned from its mistakes in Iraq and sought to avoid them elsewhere. ISIS seems to think that al Qaeda in Iraq was too easy on people and has doubled down. That will not end well for ISIS.

Q: Do you feel ISIS can be confronted using the same strategy that worked so well in 2007? Or does the current situation call for something fundamentally different?

Dr. Green: In many respects, ISIS now operates like a conventional army, and so any solution informed by our experiences in 2007 will have to take that into account. Additionally, the Sunni Arab community has been marginalized twice since U.S. forces initially invaded Iraq. Any effort to convince them to turn against ISIS will need to factor that into any political strategy to integrate them into Iraq’s political structures. Finally, we obviously do not have the same numbers of troops there, so our ability to work with, and through our Iraqi partners is paramount and must be constantly improved.

Brig. Gen. Mullen: I believe it can, and it may work even faster due to how harsh ISIS has been. You do not torture and kill Al-Anbari tribe members without some form of retribution coming back at you. The Sunni piled on the bandwagon in the initial ISIS wave of success, and now that the tide is beginning to recede and ISIS is having fiscal difficulties as well as taking substantial losses, I believe we are once again approaching a tipping point. When the situation tips, the weak-willed will scatter like rats from a sinking ship, and the zealots will probably die very hard deaths at the hands of the people they have been abusing since last fall. The Sunni in Iraq neither forgive nor forget. Neither do the Shia, and they now have mass graves being uncovered in Tikrit to add to their desire for revenge.

Q: Do you think the Iraqi government could have done anything to prevent the emergence of a new insurgency? And is it now handling the situation in the most effective manner?

Dr. Green: I think it is very hard for a society emerging out of the shadows of dictatorship, especially one supported by a minority group, to then become magnanimous toward that same group once the formerly oppressed are now in power. In order for Iraq to go forward, a spirit of magnanimity, political tolerance, and inclusion, as well as a focus on decentralization, must be adopted. These efforts must be closely aligned with a security strategy that is highly synchronized and methodical, and one that brings together military, police, and tribal forces. I believe more efforts must be made to reform Iraq’s central government in order for it to be more inclusive of the Sunni Arabs and to empower local government through greater decentralization.

Brig. Gen. Mullen: I absolutely think more could have been done. And I have said before that if we had a list of things not to do in order to avoid a result like we have today, Maliki has not only done every one of them but has even added a few items of his own. He was the last person on earth who the Iraqis needed as their prime minister. Prime Minister Albadi seems to understand all this, and if he can get a truly inclusive government going – he seems to be off to a solid start – then they can beat ISIS and restore Iraq to some semblance of order.

Q: What role, if any, do you think American forces should play in Fallujah today?

Dr. Green: I believe we should serve as behind-the-scenes catalysts, facilitators, and coordinators of Iraqi efforts to address the underlying political problems of the country. And once progress has been made in this respect, we should work to bolster and empower an integrated security plan to secure the rest of the country.

Brig. Gen. Mullen: I think we should do as little as humanly possible. The Iraqis (both Sunni and Shia together) have to do this, to be seen doing it, and to fully understand that THEY did it together. That would be enormous and would go a long way towards the reconciliation that is needed after 30 years of horrendous Sunni rule under Saddam, and then the years since 2003 of sectarian torture and killings that have gone both ways. The reconciliation model used for Rwanda would be a good start.

Cette recension d’ouvrages est issue de Politique étrangère (1/2015). Alain Antil propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Lemine Ould M. Salem , Le Ben Laden du Sahara. Sur les traces du jihadiste Mokthar Belmokthar  (Paris, Éditions de La Martinière, 2014, 208 pages).

Parmi les différents ouvrages parus ces dernières années sur le terrorisme dans la zone saharo-sahélienne, le livre de Lemine Ould M. Salem est particulièrement stimulant. L’auteur, qui couvre cette zone depuis des années pour plusieurs journaux européens, a été l’un des rares journalistes à s’être rendu dans le nord du Mali en 2012, alors que la région échappait à l’autorité de Bamako et que ses principales villes étaient administrées par trois mouvements islamistes : Al-Qaïda au Maghreb islamique (AQMI), le Mouvement pour l’unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest (MUJAO) et Ansar Dine.

Mokthar Belmokthar, alias Khaled Abou Al-Abbas, alias Laouar (« Le borgne ») est un Algérien né à Ghardaïa en 1972 ; il part très jeune combattre en Afghanistan et s’engage, à son retour, comme des centaines d’autres « Afghans », dans l’islamisme violent. Membre du Groupe islamique armé (GIA) puis du Groupe salafiste pour la prédication et le combat (GSPC), il en devient l’un des cadres et participe à son internationalisation vers les pays du Sahel. Il est par la suite fondateur des Signataires par le sang, puis des Mourabitoune. L’ouvrage revient sur la ferveur salafiste de celui qui a souvent été décrit comme un terroriste devenu trafiquant – d’où son surnom de « Mister Marlboro ». Il est d’abord un combattant, avec plusieurs faits d’armes à son actif (attaque de la caserne de Lemgheity en Mauritanie en 2005, ou encore attaque d’In Amenas en janvier 2012), qui lui assurent un grand prestige dans la mouvance salafiste-jihadiste. Le livre confirme également que Belmokthar est l’un des principaux artisans de l’affiliation du GSPC à Al-Qaïda, et donc de la naissance d’AQMI, en janvier 2007.

Si la trame de l’ouvrage repose sur le parcours de Belmokthar, l’auteur dresse des portraits d’autres personnages clés du salafisme-jihadisme saharien, comme Younous Al-Mauritani et Abdelhamid Abou Zeid (AQMI), Hamada Ould Mohamed Kheirou (fondateur du MUJAO), Omar Ould Hamaha (AQMI, MUJAO, puis Mourabitoune) et oncle par alliance de Belmokthar. L’ouvrage comporte d’autres morceaux de bravoure. On signalera pêle-mêle : un récit saisissant de l’opération d’In Amenas, l’auteur étant aux premières loges car en liaison téléphonique avec certains des ravisseurs pendant l’action ; une mise en récit très éclairante de la relation entre la Mauritanie et le GSPC, et notamment de la fin de la moutaraka (pacte de non-agression) en 2005, marquée par l’attaque de Lemgheity ; le rôle des combattants mauritaniens dans AQMI, en particulier celui de Khadim Ould Semane, fondateur d’Ansar Allah Al-Mourabitoune Fi Bilad As-Shinguitt, qui rejoint le GSPC et est impliqué dans les premiers actes violents en Mauritanie.

Ould M. Salem présente un ouvrage basé sur des sources de première main, dont de nombreux entretiens, notamment avec certains salafistes-jihadistes qu’il a pu suivre des mois ou des années, comme le gendre mauritanien de Belmokthar. Le fait que le journaliste ait pu enquêter à Tombouctou et Gao pendant l’occupation de ces deux villes par les islamistes donne évidemment un grand relief à son livre.

On regrettera cependant l’absence de références et d’explications sur la méthode de recoupement et d’arbitrage entre les différents entretiens que l’auteur a eu à traiter : on ne sait ainsi jamais si les faits que rapporte tel protagoniste ont été, ou non, confirmés. Et lorsque des récits n’étaient pas convergents, comment l’auteur a-t-il tranché ? Quand il relaie les affirmations d’un islamiste algérien qui lui explique le soutien actif du Maroc au GIA et lui parle d’une rencontre avec Driss Basri et le roi du Maroc dans une villa de Rabat, on reste dubitatif…

S’abonner à Politique étrangère.

The U.N.-administered camp at Mazrak, northwest Yemen is now stretched beyond capacity after a Saudi military offensive against the Houthis starting early November uprooted a fresh wave of IDP families. (Photo credit: Hugh Macleod/IRIN)

Yemen had drawn little attention in the United States, or in many other parts of the world, until recent events thrust it into the headlines. It has an arguably strategic location on the Bab e-Mandeb, the strait controlling access to the southern end of the Red Sea (and, ultimately, the Suez Canal), and still it managed to remain ignored.

Yemen is the poorest country in the Arab world. Although much smaller geographically, its population is nearly equal to that of neighboring Saudi Arabia. It has a little oil, discovered only in the 1980s, but it is already running out. It has a little water; that is running out as well. Remittances from Yemenis working abroad are a major source of revenue.

For a while, it was two countries: Yemen (sometimes called North Yemen) and South Yemen. North Yemen suffered a civil war in the 1960s, after the army overthrew the monarchy and declared a republic. Nasser’s Egypt intervened to support of the new government’s fight against the traditionalist tribes of the north (northern North Yemen), who remained loyal to the royal family. This came to be known as Egypt’s Vietnam. Egypt cut off its participation after defeat in the Six-Day War (1967) forced it to change its priorities.

South Yemen grew from the British protectorate of Aden, which was granted independence as a separate country in 1967. South Yemen became a Soviet client state and still did not manage to attract much attention. In January 1986, a brief civil war erupted there among rival factions of the ruling party. (It actually began with a shootout at a politburo meeting.) In less than two weeks, the conflict had killed up to 10,000 people, including much of the political elite.

South Yemen never really recovered, and in 1990 it voluntarily merged with North Yemen to form today’s Yemen. While the North’s government considered this a natural outcome, a number of South Yemenis resented it. Yet another civil war, started by southern separatists, erupted in 1994, and separatist sentiments persist in the south to this day.

Thus, the fact that there is fighting in Yemen today is tragic but not really novel. Today’s conflict brings a complex array of old and new actors to the scene. It is often portrayed as a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran and as part of a greater struggle between Sunni and Shiite Muslims, but that is a distortion. Saudi Arabia and Iran do play key roles in the conflict, and their action affect the calculations of internal players, but no one in Yemen is fighting on behalf of either of them and the fight is not about religion. Who are the leading players in today’s drama?

The Houthis

The Houthis are not so much an organization as a clan — or at least a clan-based organization — from the northern province of Sa’dah. Traditional in their ways and highly chary of their independence, they formed the backbone of the 1960s rebellion against the military regime, and they have rebelled against the government of the united Yemen a half dozen times in just the past 15 years.

Religiously, the Houthis are Zaydis, or Fiver Shiites. Fivers were once the predominate branch of Shiism, but then, in the 16th century, the Safavid dynasty made Twelver Shiism the official state religion of Iran. Now the Shiites of Iran, Iraq, Bahrain, and Lebanon are Twelvers. Fivers are prominent only in Yemen, where they constitute at least two-fifths of the population. The original split between the Fivers and the Twelvers was rooted in a dispute over how many of Muhammad’s successors were true Imams. Theologically, the Fivers are probably as close to the Sunnis as they are to the Twelver Shiites of Iran, but today’s conflicts and alliances have little to do with theology. Fivers do, however, say they have a religious obligation to oppose unjust rule.

Although the Houthis have some (frankly, offensive) Iranian-inspired slogans, they are fighting for their own issues, namely against corruption and what they view as an overbearing central government. They do not appear to take direction from Tehran, and they accept Iran’s support because Iran offers it and no one else does. In fact, last September, they seized Yemen’s capital despite Iranian efforts to dissuade them.

Iranian support in the country is a way to annoy and distract Saudi Arabia. In the 1960s, however, when secular-socialist pan-Arab Nasserites were seen as the main threat, it was actually Saudi Arabia that armed and supported the Houthis. The Houthis have offered to cooperate with rival factions a number of times. They did not immediately depose the government when they seized the capital in September 2014, but merely forced themselves into the ongoing debate over a new constitution, from which they had been excluded.

On the other hand, they are not particularly skilled at cooperation. At one point, when they failed to get their way in the constitutional talks, they kidnapped the president’s chief of staff and threatened to hold him hostage until the government conceded the point. Eventually, they did put the president, prime minister and cabinet under house arrest. Once in power, they became more dictatorial, embodying the qualities they claimed to be fighting against. In February, al-Hadi escaped to Aden and proclaimed himself president again, and the current stage of the fight began. The Houthis began advancing to the south, and in March a Saudi-led coalition began their bombing campaign in support of al-Hadi.

Ali Abdullah Saleh

Ali Abdullah Saleh became president of North Yemen in 1978 and was the only president that the united Yemen knew until 2012. Like the Houthis, he is technically a Zaydi, but he is of a more Westernized variety, a secular nationalist at heart. The Houthis rebelled against his rule repeatedly. Although widely viewed as corrupt and a poor administrator, Saleh is highly adept at playing factions off one another.

After the rise of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Saleh permitted the United States to conduct drone attacks against the group. He also enjoyed increased military assistance from the United States, but he focused his own military efforts against the Houthis rather than AQAP. He viewed the Houthis as the greater threat to his own rule — a position vindicated by recent events — and, according to some analysts, he did not want to defeat AQAP outright. The new support that he was receiving from the United States was a direct result of AQAP’s presence in his country, and he understood that the United States would lose interest and turn its attention elsewhere if the group were actually eliminated. The Houthis have been much more vigorously anti-AQAP than Saleh.

In 2011, during the so-called Arab Spring, massive demonstrations formed in the capital, demanding that Saleh leave. A central city square was occupied for months. The demonstrators, mostly students in the beginning, attracted a broader cross section of society. A rival family, al-Ahmar, from Saleh’s tribe split with him. The army divided, with some units remaining loyal to Saleh personally and others to the al-Ahmar family. Houthis launched attacks against the presidential palace. Saleh was seriously injured by a bomb. With the prospect of civil war growing, the Gulf Cooperation Council mediated a solution. Saleh voluntarily stepped down and his vice president, Abd Rabbuh Mansour al-Hadi, a southerner, was “elected” in an election in which he was the only candidate.

Saleh, however, was not finished. Key units of the military remained loyal to him, even out of office. After the Houthis seized the capital in 2014, Saleh made common cause with them against al-Hadi, despite the fact that they had rebelled against him six times. He brought with him the elite divisions of the army and the entire air force. This is what allowed the Houthis to move so swiftly into southern Yemen after al-Hadi fled to Aden.

Today’s Yemen was formed from the merger of the former Yemen (North Yemen)and South Yemen (much of which lies to the east). (Map: CIA)

Saudi Arabia

The Saudis are backing the forces of President al-Hadi with aerial bombardments, but they are not popular on either side of the Yemeni divide. They have depicted the Houthi advances as an Iranian maneuver to encircle the Arab heartland. They are also concerned that a Houthi victory could inspire Saudi Arabia’s own Shiite minority. (Saudi Arabia’s Shiite minority and its oil deposits are both concentrated in its Eastern province.) They have apparently intervened for these reasons.

The new Saudi king, Salman bin Abd al-Aziz, came to the throne in January of this year, upon the death of his brother. He named his son, Muhammad bin Salman, minister of defense and deputy crown prince. Muhammad bin Salman, who is 29 years old and has neither military experience nor a military education, has become the public face of the Yemeni war within Saudi Arabia.

The Pakistanis, who were invited to participate in the Saudi-led coalition but refused, have described Saudi Arabia’s intervention as a panicked reaction to local events. They also say that the Saudis have no plan for victory. Saudi Arabia’s reputation for being cautious and risk-averse is giving way to a new reputation for being impulsive and rash.

The United States has pressed the Saudis to halt their air campaign for fear of triggering a larger regional conflict, but it has also enabled the campaign by providing logistical, material, and intelligence support. The latter probably reflects a perceived need to bolster relations with Saudi Arabia given Saudi suspicions that U.S. negotiations with Iran over the latter’s nuclear program might reflect some sort of pro-Iranian shift in U.S. policy toward the Middle East.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula

AQAP is viewed as the most dangerous member of the network of local al Qaeda affiliates. The group operates primarily in the eastern regions of the former South Yemen. It was formed in January 2009 through the merger of al Qaeda’s Yemeni and Saudi affiliates. The Saudis, having been crushed and pushed out of their own country, merged with and revitalized the Yemeni group. AQAP has focused primarily on local issues and enemies, like other al Qaeda affiliates, but over the years it has expanded into the broader international arena to an unusual degree. It was behind the failed “underwear bomber” over Detroit in 2009, another failed attempt to destroy an airliner in 2010, and the attack on the Charlie Hebdo editorial offices in Paris earlier this year. The group publishes an English-language online magazine for terrorists. Still, its primary focus has remained local.

AQAP has not been a principal player in the fight between the Houthis and the forces of President al-Hadi, but it has benefited from the disruption. It has taken advantage of the chaos to extend its area of control, and it has forged new alliances with Sunni tribes, including some that actively fought it in the past, that object to the expansion of Houthi control.

The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria

The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), sometimes called the Islamic State, is the newest newcomer to the cast. It has announced a presence in Yemen only since the beginning of the current fighting. The group’s suicide bombers have attacked a Zaydi mosque in Yemen as well as a Shiite mosque in Saudi Arabia. This is in an apparent attempt to fuel further sectarian violence in the region. So far, ISIS has thrived only in places already wracked by war and political chaos.

What Future?

More bombing is not what Yemen needs. Unlike ISIS in Iraq, the Houthis are deeply rooted in Yemeni society, or at least in a portion of it. The bombing will most likely escalate the conflict, driving the Houthis closer to Iran, which is the opposite of the outcome that the Saudis want. A preferable approach would be to neutralize the Houthis as a threat. Reconciliation in a broad-based government will be difficult — there is a great deal of mistrust, and U.N.-sponsored efforts have made little headway — but the longer it is delayed, the more difficult it will become.

The game has changed. By sending a military aircraft to take a close-up view of the outposts China is constructing and stating it “will fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows,” the U.S. appears to have drawn a red line for Beijing.

Al asumir la presidencia de Nigeria el 29 de mayo, Muhammadu Buhari toma las riendas de un país en emergencia. La inseguridad supone un problema gravísimo, la economía se encuentra en situación desesperada y la corrupción y la impunidad están extendidas.

As President Muhammadu Buhari assumes office this week, he takes the reins of a country in serious distress. Security poses a towering challenge, the economy is in dire straits, and corruption and impunity are rife.

The United Nations health agency is racing critical medical supplies to fourteen of Nepal&#39s most earthquake-affected districts in an effort to restore health services before the onset of monsoon season.

A United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) chartered ship carrying vital food assistance destined for the Yemeni port of Aden was diverted yesterday to the port of Hudaydah following reports of ongoing fighting and security threats.

The NSA has lost its authority to collect data on U.S. citizens. For now.

(Own report) - Berlin is increasing pressure on Kiev that it enforces the cease-fire in eastern Ukraine. Observers consider the continuation of the civil war to be perilous. On the one hand, they see the risk of loosing even more territory to eastern Ukrainian insurgents, while on the other, it is unclear how the country's total economic collapse can be avoided without ending the hostilities. Therefore, on the weekend, German Foreign Minister Steinmeier traveled not only to Kiev, but also to Dnepropetrovsk, the town of oligarch Ihor Kolomoyskyi. Even though Kolomoyskyi has recently stepped down as governor, he still wields significant influence over the - in some cases - fascist militias, which refuse a cease-fire. To put pressure on the fascists, who had helped execute the February 2014 Kiev coup, but are uncontrollable in the civil war, Berlin must make a deal with Ukrainian oligarchs. These same oligarchs had been the focus of the protests at the Maidan. Several times last year, Foreign Minister Steinmeier held personal consultations with powerful oligarchs - including President Poroshenko - or politicians directly dependent on them. The Ukrainian oligarchy has emerged unscathed from last year's upheavals.

Extrait de Questions Internationales, n°73 - juin 2015




En ce début de millénaire, les questions sur la puissance française sont nombreuses. Hantée par le déclin si l’on en croit la morosité des essais publiés dans l’hexagone, la France (au moins sa composante éditoriale…) remet en cause aussi bien son identité, son modèle social et d’intégration, sa viabilité économique, que sa place dans le monde et sa capacité à y jouer un rôle.[1]Remet-elle également en cause sa puissance militaire, à l’heure où celle-ci est saluée par l’allié américain pour son volontarisme, et remarquée ailleurs pour son savoir-faire ? La réalité de la puissance française en 2015 est en effet ambigüe. la France compte désormais parmi les puissances militaires les plus interventionnistes de la planète, mais l’avenir de ses capacités inquiète à l’heure des restrictions budgétaires. Elle conserve une marge de manœuvre enviable, mais pas nécessairement dans les zones où le besoin s’en fera sentir.
1- Etat des lieux : une puissance interventionniste
La France est une puissance militaire de premier ordre, et toute négation de cet état de fait tient davantage de la spéculation intellectuelle ou de la quête de visibilité médiatique, que du constat objectif. Elle fait d’abord partie du club nucléaire, avec un arsenal que le président de la République a récemment confirmé publiquement (à Istres, le 19 février 2015) : « moins de 300 » têtes nucléaires, 3 lots de 16 missiles pour les sous-marins nucléaires, 54 missiles ASMP-A. Elle dispose ensuite d’un budget classé cinquième mondial en 2013[2] (hors gendarmerie) par le SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), institut qui fait référence en la matière. Les ressources totales pour 2015 sont annoncées à 31,4 milliards d’euros par le ministère de la défense (1.55% du PIB en 2014, toujours hors gendarmerie). Au moment de la rédaction du Livre Blanc de 2013 sur la défense et la sécurité nationales, les effectifs militaires français étaient d’un peu moins de 300.000 personnes dont environ 230.000 militaires, chiffres prévus à la baisse avec une réduction annoncée de 24.000 postes (en plus des 54.000 annoncés en 2008), mais cette réduction fut en partie remise en cause après les attentats parisiens de janvier 2015. Début 2015, 12.000 soldats étaient engagés dans les forces pré-positionnées,[3] et 10.200 en opérations extérieures.[4] La France fait également partie des grandes nations industrielles en matière d’armement, avec un spectre de production large, et une place parmi les tous premiers exportateurs.
Une posture interventionniste
Aligner longuement ici des chiffres qui varient régulièrement, font l’objet de modes calculs variés, et donnent lieu à des classements parfois peu significatifs, n’aurait pas grand sens. Constatons en revanche que cet outil militaire français a été amplement sollicité dans les cinq dernières années, en dépit des prévisions pessimistes dans le débat public, qui annonçaient chaque fois que l’intervention en cours serait la dernière du genre, faute de moyens. Depuis 2011 (outre la contribution du dispositif Licorne à la régularisation de la situation en Côte d’Ivoire, soldée par l’arrestation de Laurent Gbagbo en avril 2011), les forces françaises ont été mobilisées pour plusieurs opérations d’envergure. En Libye d’abord, avec l’opération Harmattan déclenchée le 19 mars de la même année pour empêcher la destruction de la ville de Benghazi par le colonel Kadhafi, finalement destitué et tué dans la guerre civile qui a touché le pays. Les opérations aériennes, menées notamment avec le Royaume-Uni et les Etats-Unis dans le cadre de l’OTAN, ont été sur le moment qualifiées de succès militaire. Elles ont mobilisé, au plus fort de l'intervention, 4.200 militaires, plus de 40 avions, 20 hélicoptères, et des bâtiments de combat dont le porte-avions Charles-de-Gaulle. Au mali ensuite, où l’opération Serval lancée en janvier 2013 (4.500 hommes mobilisés à la fin de l’année) pour repousser une offensive des groupes islamistes qui avaient pris le contrôle du nord du pays, a engagé durablement la France (c’est toujours le cas à l’heure où nous écrivons ces lignes). En décembre 2013, c’est la Centrafrique qui fut le théâtre de l’opération Sangaris, déclenchée pour stabiliser un pays en proie à un risque de génocide dans un contexte de guerre civile. Les effectifs sont montés à 2.000 hommes début 2014. Depuis septembre 2014, la France participe également à la lutte contre l’Etat Islamique en Irak (opération Chammal), qui a nécessité début 2015 l’envoi du porte-avion Charles de Gaulle.
Les fortunes diverses et la pertinence de ces opérations, pour l’essentiel toujours en cours, peuvent sans doute être discutées, notamment dans le cas libyen qui a donné lieu à la situation chaotique que l’on sait. Elles conduisent néanmoins à un constat : ces opérations ont fait de la France, après un retournement de situation remarquable pour qui se souvient de l’opposition chiraquienne à la guerre irakienne en 2003, la puissance de l’alliance atlantique la plus interventionniste. Entamée sous Nicolas Sarkozy avec l’opération libyenne, cette posture s’est perpétuée sous François Hollande. Aux opérations effectivement menées, il convient d’ajouter la posture volontariste  de la France sur la situation syrienne, qui avait conduit Paris, à l’été 2013, à soutenir des frappes contre le régime syrien, avant de devoir y renoncer du fait des réticences britanniques et surtout américaines. Depuis 2014, la dégradation de la situation libyenne a conduit à plusieurs reprises le ministre de la défense Jean-yves Le Drian à envisager une nouvelle intervention dans le sud libyen.
Les conséquences duales de l’activisme militaire français
Incontestablement, ces opérations ont valu à la France un regain de reconnaissance chez ses principaux alliés atlantiques, à commencer par les Etats-Unis. Outre l’appui immédiat de Washington à l’opération malienne dès janvier 2013 (avec un soutien en matière de renseignement, de transport aérien et de ravitaillement en vol), le débat stratégique américain a salué à plusieurs reprises la détermination politique française, son effort militaire à l’heure où la plupart des européens (y compris les britanniques) baissent leurs dépenses de défense, et plus généralement le savoir-faire d’une armée française jugé « incomparable » en afrique. Des louanges du Secrétaire à la défense Leon Panetta en 2013 après l'intervention au Mali, jusqu’à ceux de la Secrétaire d’Etat adjointe pour l’Afrique Linda Thomas-Greenfield, ou de la porte-parole adjointe du département d'État Marie Harf (qui a avoqué « le puissant leadership de la France »), après l'intervention en Centrafrique, les élites politiques américaines ont souligné dans leur grande majorité le rôle central de l’allié français. En septembre 2014, après la décision française de participer en Irak à la lutte contre l’Etat Islamique, c’est le président américain Barack Obama lui-même qui évoquait « l'un de nos alliés les plus anciens et les plus proches », et « un partenaire solide contre le terrorisme ».
Plus généralement, l’opération Sangaris au Mali a suscité des commentaires élogieux sur la précision de l’action, la rapidité de la prise de décision et de sa  mise en œuvre grâce à une chaîne de commandement efficace. Jusqu’à Pékin même, on méditait sur les leçons à tirer de ce savoir-faire français, qui allait encourager la Chine à proposer l’envoi de 500 casques bleus auprès de la Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations Unies, pour l’observer de plus près. Si les responsables militaires des grands pays partenaires (notamment américains) n’étaient pas surpris outre mesure par les qualités de l’armée française à force de travailler avec elle depuis longtemps des Balkans jusqu’en Afghanistan, de nombreuses sphères civiles, comme les think tanks de Washington, découvraient soudain les compétences d’un allié autrefois réputé difficile. De la même manière les cercles d’experts anglo-saxons commentent désormais régulièrement les actions militaires de la France (voir les expertises d’Oxford Analytica en Grande-Bretagne, ou les revues de presse de la pourtant très conservatrice foreign policy Initiative aux Etats-Unis), ainsi que son industrie militaire (voir la lettre régulière de Defense News, qui titrait même en mars 2015 « France Displaces Britain as Key US Military Ally – la France remplace la Grande-Bretagne comme allié clef des Etats-Unis).
Mais cette reconnaissance pose également d’autres questions. En premier lieu, elle place la France en première ligne de la lutte anti-terroriste auprès des Etats-Unis, ce qui change considérablement la donne après une ère chiraquienne qui affichait une posture plus critique, et donc supposément plus appréciée dans les pays du Sud. D’autant que l’interventionnisme militaire de Paris semble accompagner une position plus dure politiquement, par laquelle la France, par exemple, va bien au-delà de Washington dans l’exigence des termes de la négociation sur le nucléaire iranien. Si l’admiration du président Obama pour les actions au Mali ou contre Daech est flatteuse, le « Vive la France ! » du Républicain John McCain qui félicite Paris pour avoir « bloqué » les négociations avec Téhéran en novembre 2013, fut moins célébré. La visite de hauts responsables israéliens en France en mars 2015 pour tenter d’obtenir de Paris, toujours sur le dossier iranien, un soutien que l’on n’attend plus guère de Washington au plus fort de sa brouille avec l'Etat hébreu, n’a pas fait non plus que des heureux. En d’autres termes, le débat public s’est interrogé à plusieurs reprises sur le fait de savoir si les démonstrations militaires françaises récentes étaient l’instrument d’un regain de marge de manœuvre et de souveraineté, ou si elles témoignaient d’une réorientation parfois jugée « néo-conservatrice » de sa politique étrangère.
Ce débat est difficile à trancher tant l'intervention militaire est propice, en règle générale, au déclenchement d’accusations politiques multiples (néo-conservatisme, néo-colonialisme, gesticulation militaire…). Un autre débat, en revanche, est autrement plus concret, qui insiste sur le fossé qui semble se faire jour entre l’ampleur de l’ambition militaire affichée, et la difficulté de déployer les moyens financiers, donc matériels et humains, qui permettraient de la soutenir. 2- interrogations prospectives : situation militaire française et avenir de la guerreLire la suite dans Questions Internationales, n°73 - juin 2015
[1] Voir à cet égard, pêle-mêle, des auteurs aussi divers que Nicolas Baverez, Alain Minc, Laurent Obertone, Eric Zemmour… [2] Après Etats-Unis, Chine, Russie, Arabie Saoudite et devant le Royaume-Uni. [3] Voir la carte de l’état-major des armées : http://www.defense.gouv.fr/ema/rubriques-complementaires/carte-des-forces-prepositionnees [4] Dont plus de 3.000 dans la bande sahélo-saharienne autour de l’opération Barkhane, plus de 2.000 en afrique centrale, presque 3.000 dans l’Océan indien, 900 au Liban, 600 en Irak. Voir http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/rubriques_complementaires/carte-des-operations-exterieures [5] Entretiens de l’auteur avec des responsables chinois.

The United Nations Special Envoy for Syria, Staffan de Mistura, has strongly condemned the death of at least 70 civilians in Syria&#39s northern Aleppo province by barrel bombs dropped from government helicopters.

The elimination of the world&#39s illicit tobacco trade will not only save millions of lives but also generate billions of dollars in windfall for governments, the United Nations World Health Organization (WHO) announced today as it marked the 2015 edition of World No Tobacco Day.

The United Nations human rights chief has urged several States to intensify their efforts to investigate long-standing allegations that soldiers in their forces sent to keep the peace in the Central African Republic (CAR) may have committed very serious violations, including killing of civilians and sexual exploitation of local women.