Diplomacy & Crisis News

The recent flare-up in northern Kosovo between NATO peacekeeping troops and ethnic Serbians has reminded the world that while the brutal war in Ukraine may be the greatest threat to European stability at the moment, it is by no means the only one.

On May 29, Serb protestors clashed with NATO troops after the authorities in Kosovo attempted to escort newly elected mayors into government administration buildings in the Serb-dominated northern municipalities. The ethnically Albanian mayors were elected in November 2022 with a meager voter turnout of 3.5 percent, as ethnic Serbians in the region boycotted the elections as part of their ongoing struggle with Kosovo’s government. This came on the heels of the July 2022 decision in Pristina, the country’s capital, to force Serbs in the region to adopt Kosovo license plates rather than Serbian ones.

Although the matter may seem trivial to outside observers, the move was interpreted by many as simply the latest example of Pristina’s overreach. Though Kosovo officially proclaimed its independence in 2008, it was a contentious move that many countries do not recognize. Although the four Serb-majority northern municipalities compose a relatively small portion of the country, with ethnic Serbs composing only 6 percent of the country’s total population, a 2013 EU-brokered deal was meant to allow for a degree of self-rule in the region. The Serbs living in Kosovo have grown increasingly discouraged by Pristina’s failure to implement the terms of the agreement, a fact that both the United States and the EU have acknowledged.

Back in July, protestors set up a number of roadblocks in northern Kosovo following the initial move to alter licensing and registration. Serbian president Aleksandar Vučić described the gravity of the situation by stating that “we [authorities in Belgrade and Serbs in northern Kosovo] have never been in a more difficult situation”—quite a statement considering the region’s notorious volatility.

Nonetheless, Pristina decided to move forward with the mayoral elections despite calls from both Washington and Brussels to delay the vote. There was further cause for consternation when the Kosovar government then went on to ignore Western pressure to have the mayors conduct government operations from a remote location in order to avoid a potential physical clash with demonstrators obstructing access to municipality centers. This is exactly what happened when Pristina decided to use Kosovo law enforcement to forcibly escort the “elected” representatives into official administrative buildings being blocked by Serb protestors. The subsequent attempt by NATO peacekeeping forces to manage the turmoil resulted in dozens of injuries, including eleven Italians and nineteen Hungarians who were a part of the peacekeeping contingent. Over fifty Serb protestors were additionally injured. Belgrade responded to the incident by raising the combat readiness of Serbia’s armed forces to its highest level.

Both the United States and the European Union were swift in their condemnation of the Kosovo government. U.S. ambassador Jeff Hovenier tweeted out his disapproval of Pristina’s actions, stating that “today’s violent measures should be immediately halted.” On June 2, Secretary of State Antony Blinken further laid the blame at the feet of the country’s leadership and its course of “escalating tensions in the north and increasing instability.” An EU-brokered agreement to hold new mayoral elections in the northern municipalities was subsequently reached at a meeting in Moldova attended by Vučić, Kosovo president Vjosa Osmani, and EU high representative for foreign affairs Josep Borrell. French president Emmanuel Macron and German chancellor Olaf Sholz were also present.

It remains to be seen whether the decision to conduct new elections will be enough to lower the tensions in the region. The present situation is a reminder that the United States, for better or worse, remains the ultimate arbiter in guaranteeing Kosovo’s independence and maintaining general stability in the region. This means that the authorities in Pristina must understand the necessity of playing to international audiences, especially those located in the halls of Washington. Prime Minister Albin Kurti has certainly acknowledged as much: the U.S. flag is often seen at his rallies, side by side with Kosovo’s national flag (as well as that of Albania).

Kurti has also attempted to defend his government’s actions by utilizing the current lexicon of U.S. domestic politics. He has continually equated the protestors in northern Kosovo to “right-wing extremist groups,” and took to Twitter to state that “in a democracy there is no place for fascist violence”—language eerily similar to U.S. president Joe Biden’s multiple references to political opposition that still support former president Donald Trump as “semi-fascists.” The protestors, according to Kurti, are “extremists and militias,” and do not represent “the people.” In the past, the prime minister notably feuded with Trump-appointed special envoy for Serbia and Kosovo Richard Grenell, and eagerly endorsed Biden for president in 2020.

For her part, Osmani has also recognized the importance of political narratives and curating the proper international image. She has presented her country as a besieged nation in a similar situation to that of Ukraine and its ongoing war with Russia. Meeting with Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy on June 1 at the EU summit in Moldova, she later tweeted that “No one understands Ukraine’s pain, struggle and resilience better than the people of Kosovo.” She concluded with the statement that “nothing can stand in the way of a people’s will to be free.”

Outside the government administrative buildings in the northern Kosovo municipality of Zvecan, Serb protestors carried signs displaying a similar message: “We are not criminals, we just want freedom,” as well as “You will not drive us out of our homes.” In fact, the political dynamics of the situation in northern Kosovo are in many ways similar to that of eastern Ukraine. Much like Ukraine, Kosovo is a historically disputed territory that’s secession from its former arbiter of political control has not been accepted by a significant portion of the citizens in the country which it seceded from. Ethnic Serbs who found themselves in the newly independent Kosovo (exacerbated after its official independence in 2008) felt displaced from their rightful political home, much like some Russians in the Donbas felt in relation to Moscow, particularly after 2014.

It is no coincidence then that Kurti would claim that the Serb protestors in northern Kosovo are Moscow sympathizers. In an attempt to tie his own struggle to that of Kyiv against the destructive war waged by Vladimir Putin, Kurti also made specific reference to the fact that many protestors displayed the “Z of Russian aggression in Ukraine.” He would go on to state that “the pro-Russian elements in Serbia and the north of Kosovo want to destabilize everything that has been agreed so far.” Many Serbs in the region have been seen displaying their solidarity with Putin and Russia in general, ostensibly as a means for appealing to Moscow for support in the current situation.

Regarding the Kremlin’s stance, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov commented on the situation in Kosovo to Russian state media, saying that “a huge explosion is being prepared in the center of Europe, in the place where, in 1999, NATO attacked Yugoslavia, violating every imaginable (international) principle.”

This is an analysis shared by many ethnic Serbs. The potential for a wider conflagration is certainly a real possibility. However, the relative strength of the United States and the broader transatlantic alliance which it controls is a powerful incentive for Serbia to remain within the bounds of Western-dictated behavior.

The war in Ukraine may very well end up as a type of frozen conflict similar to the situation between Kosovo and Serbia. And much like the latter situation, the United States will almost certainly end up as the ultimate guarantor of the Ukrainian situation as it is for Kosovo. Policymakers should keep this fact in mind as they try to reach a settlement that accounts for the much more significant security implications surrounding a direct military challenge with Russia.

Dominick Sansone is a Ph.D. student at the Hillsdale College Van Andel Graduate School of Statesmanship. Previously a Fulbright recipient to Bulgaria, his writing on politics in the Black Sea region has been published by The National Interest, the Euromaidan Press, The American Conservative, and RealClear Defense, among other publications. He also previously wrote as a contributing columnist focusing on Russia-China relations at The Epoch Times.

Image: Shutterstock.

The post-Western, multipolar international order is coming to pass. As the world grapples with the implications of this shift in power, the foundations of a great reckoning are taking shape. This reckoning will challenge the long-held beliefs and structures that have sustained Western dominance of the world for the past few hundred years, exposing along the way the nature of the West’s perceived entitlement to lead the global pecking order. The end result will be a significant re-evaluation of international relations as we know it.

This great reckoning will be driven by five major trends, which are compelling Western nations to confront and adapt to a future where power must be shared with the rest in a multipolar world. A failure to recognize, or attempting to strongly resist, these trends could pose significant risks not only to the West itself but also to global stability. Yet future conflicts can be avoided if this period of change is viewed as an opportunity to build a more equitable world, rather than as a crisis that threatens preferred and entrenched privileges.

Five Trends to Consider

What future awaits the West—a smooth transition toward multipolarity or a period of instability and potential conflict—will largely depend on how policymakers respond to the following five trends.

First is the unravelling of the hitherto telling of history. The West, across its colonial history, has practiced and perfected the selective interpretation and telling of events, choosing to portray itself as the originator of modern civilization and a benevolent guiding force. This is now changing; information technologies, such as the Internet and social media, have broken the monopoly over information and history once held by Western gatekeeping institutions (media companies, universities, book publishers, and more). As a consequence, people around the world are recognizing that history is no longer confined to Western interpretation—including its projection of benevolence.

A significant component of this has been the West’s frequent failure to acknowledge its own imperfect past. Despite amplifying the perceived wrongdoings of others, it has been silent about its own unsavory moments, such as early American pioneers’ destruction of First Nation cultures, European exploitation of the African continent, or Australia’s treatment of aboriginal peoples. Addressing these historical episodes matters all the more because they affect current behavior; Western nations also have problems admitting to contemporary mistakes and intentions. 

Non-Western nations can now make clear that their own countries and communities have long histories that not only exist despite Western interpretation, but these histories need to be explored, understood, and told. The West must grapple with this trend and its implications, rather than continue to obscure it in denial. Consider the ongoing diplomatic efforts of the Indian government to compel Great Britain to return the treasure stolen from India, including some of the crown jewels.

The second trend is the re-evaluation of the” rules-based” international order. Policymakers in Washington may not like hearing it, but the concept is the subject of much derision around the world and is widely regarded as a tool used by the West to control global affairs and maintain hegemony. There is ample resentment growing against Western nations given the repeated breaching of their own rules, meaning that the legitimacy of this order is being questioned despite its positive aspects.

Coinciding with this growing frustration is the reality that the distribution of power across more nations is transforming the current world order and creating new opportunities and challenges. China has assumed a more prominent position, offering global public goods such as peacemaking and addressing climate change in a manner Western nations are not willing, or able, to do. Similarly, India is beginning to assert itself, as are other smaller nations, like the UAE and Indonesia.

As more countries determine their own trajectories in the twenty-first century, the West must recognize that the international balance of power has shifted. It cannot continue to impose its will on others—the rise of China and other nations is evidence of such. The West must come to terms with this new reality and recognize that a new, more pragmatic, and multipolar approach is needed, where nations pursue foreign policies committed to co-existence, driven by their own best interests rather than aligning themselves with “one side” or the other.

Third is the unmasking of Western “peacekeeping.” Despite portraying itself as the guarantor of global security, much of the world now views the United States‚ and Europe to a lesser extent, as profiting from war rather than being interested in promoting authentic peace. The Western military-industrial complex—particularly the United States’—is so powerful that it is now well-known to drive U.S. foreign policy to the extent that it perpetuates conflicts to thus profit from war.

At present, the United States and its NATO allies are driving the rise in global military spending, with America spending more on defense than the next ten countries combined. It is similarly well known that almost half of the Pentagon’s budget goes to private contractors each year, and the military-industrial complex donates millions of dollars to U.S. Congressional races, resulting in state capture and significant increases in defense budgets.

The rest of the world has realized that the West alone cannot be trusted to lead global peace efforts, especially if a significant portion of their economies are geared to profit from conflict. In light of this, a positive change is occurring, with China brokering ground-breaking peace agreements—between Saudi Arabia and Iran, for example—while world leaders like Indonesia’s Joko Widodo, India’s Narendra Modi, and Brazil’s Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva pitch peaceful resolutions to modern conflicts.

The fourth trend underway is the dethroning of the Western financial superstructure. That the West makes ample use of its financial might for geopolitical advantage and purposes is no great secret—policymakers and experts openly talk about the “weaponization of finance” and applying sanctions on countries that do not comply with Western intentions. Likewise, the ability of the United States and its allies to freeze and even confiscate the reserves of sovereign states—Afghanistan, Venezuela, Russia—sent shock waves across the world.

Because of this and the West’s own track record of financial greed and impropriety—which resulted in devastating crises such as the 2007–2008 financial crisis and the recent collapse of Silicon Valley Bank, which has had global reverberations—distrust in and a rejection of Western financial structures is growing.

Efforts are now underway to dismantle the exorbitant privilege bestowed on the United States via its currency. De-dollarization is very much happening, with the currency’s share of global reserves falling to 47 percent last year, down from 73 percent in 2001. Additionally, countries are seeking alternatives to the SWIFT system, which also has been used in aid of Western-based sanctions and thus alarmed the global majority. As countries with stable currencies gain influence, a more multipolar economic order emerges, reshaping geopolitical alliances, economic diplomacy, and the balance of power within international institutions. This change may grant developing nations greater flexibility in managing their currencies and monetary policies and limit the West’s capacity to unilaterally impose sanctions. Moreover, BRICS nations have recently surpassed the G7 in terms of GDP, signaling a redistribution of economic power and hinting at a future of cooperation in trade, investment, infrastructure, and development assistance.

Fifth and finally, there is the notable collapse of the Western press’ credibility. This comes at a critical juncture, as repeated shortcomings in the last few years have heightened global awareness of Western media’s role in perpetuating the West’s preferred aspects of the current world order—often to the detriment of other countries.

For instance, persistent China-bashing in Western headlines has perpetuated an unproductive and fear-mongering narrative of Beijing as a threat to its own citizens and the world at large. The geopolitical contexts of Hong Kong and Taiwan, though complicated affairs, have been particularly and selectively drummed up to push an “us vs. them” narrative, rather than encouraging understanding between the West and China.

Similarly, overwhelmingly one-sided coverage of the Ukrainian conflict regularly overlooks national and regional geopolitical complexities in the long-standing Russian-Ukrainian relationship and the history of NATO expansion in Europe. A lack of reporting on the Nord Stream bombing, which many believe was perpetrated by a Western nation—with reporting to back this claim up—is a glaring hole that has contributed to the lack of trust in Western media from both non-Western and Western readers alike. Only months later is the Western press quietly admitting potential Western culpability, or at the very least, knowledge.

Moreover, inadequate, and biased coverage of non-Western conflicts, such as those in Yemen, Myanmar, and Palestine, has led to global accusations of neglect, bias, and even racism.

The Writing on the Wall

Western governments operating in an echo chamber of denial need to reach out to their friends across the world and realize what is obvious to everyone except to themselves: that the world is not like what it was in the post-Cold War era. The old ways are finished, and the West simply does not have the political and financial power, not to mention the international legitimacy, it once did. Western nations must adapt to this changing international environment, rather than stubbornly insisting upon business as usual. Failure to do so will make the world a more dangerous place and erode the credibility and influence of the West even further.

Chandran Nair is the founder and CEO of the Global Institute For Tomorrow (GIFT). He is the author of Dismantling Global White Privilege: Equity for a Post-Western World.

Image: Shutterstock.

Russian efforts to manipulate American elections have made headlines in recent years. But China’s attempts at such have achieved more—largely because they have been overwhelmingly conducted via WeChat, an application popular among Chinese-Americans. As the 2024 presidential election heats up, campaigns, voters, and the federal government must be vigilant against CCP efforts to use the platform to influence American elections.

In February 2016, Chinese-Americans erupted in nationwide protests in support of Peter Liang, a Chinese-American cop convicted of manslaughter following the fatal shooting of an unarmed man in a dark stairwell in Brooklyn. The Los Angeles Times noted that the protests were organized through WeChat and reflected “a rare instance of collective political action by Chinese Americans.”

But far from being organic expressions of anger, significant evidence suggests Beijing’s involvement. David Tian Wang, one of the principal protest organizers, is a Chinese green card holder and activist who has long been associated with people and groups affiliated with the Chinese government. In February 2016, Wang used WeChat to help organize protests in dozens of American cities within one week, taking the lead in rallying as many as 100,000 people from, he claimed, forty-eight different states. “This is how powerful WeChat is,” said Wang. The fact that Chinese state-backed media outlets such as the Global Times and the United Front-linked China Qiaowang promoted Wang’s efforts suggests a relationship with Beijing.

Later that year, whether out of concern over the consequences of a Hillary Clinton presidency for China, or a belief that Donald Trump could be bribed or manipulated, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) threw its weight behind Trump’s candidacy. In March, Wang converted the numerous pro-Peter Liang WeChat groups into pro-Donald Trump groups. In the process, he established what would become the largest pro-Trump Chinese-American organization, Chinese Americans for Trump (CAFT). This group, which would eventually grow to over 8,000 registered members, started canvassing for the future president in battleground states such as Pennsylvania, Nevada, and Ohio as early as March 2016, eventually reaching 10,000 to 15,000 households in each of these states. Other groups, similarly organized on WeChat, sprouted up in places such as Missouri, where 300 Chinese-Americans canvassed for Trump. CAFT and these other Chinese-Americans groups also spent significant sums of money on the race.

Meanwhile, WeChat and Chinese internet sites were flooded with pro-Trump (and anti-Hillary) posts praising his wealth, business acumen, and unconventional style. Pro-Clinton material was consistently demoted, and websites such as the Asian American Democratic Club for Hillary were banned from the platform. The context for all this activity is that Beijing does not permit content on WeChat that runs against its interests.

The result of Beijing’s apparent influence seems evident in the Chinese-Americans community’s 2016 voting patterns. Whereas Chinese-Americans have historically leaned Democratic in previous elections, and almost all Asian-American groups increased their support for the Democratic presidential candidate in 2016 compared to 2012, Chinese-Americans moved in the opposite direction. Trump captured 24 percent of the vote, up from Mitt Romney’s 17 percent, meaning that 150,000–200,000 Chinese-Americans, roughly one-tenth of that community’s voting population, switched parties due to CCP efforts to influence American politics through WeChat.

However, the Chinese government badly misjudged Trump. He was a very different president than they had expected, confronting Beijing on many issues. The CCP thus changed course midway through his term and started promoting Democratic candidates. The CCP’s pro-Biden strategy was evident in influential WeChat public accounts, moderated chat rooms, and influential personal accounts, all of which flipped their narratives. For example, College Daily, Global Times, and Weinsight, among the largest public accounts focused on news, changed from pro-Trump to pro-Biden. WeChat promoted organizations such as Chinese Americans for Biden and enabled them to use the app in ways Democratic groups could not in 2016.

Meanwhile, group administrators bullied, ostracized, or banned pro-Trump voices. Sites run by progressives that previously had few viewers, such as Chinese-Americans, gained traction in a way that was previously not possible, with certain sites’ viewership levels growing by a factor of ten or even one hundred within a relatively short time. Groups that continued to support Trump, such as the Chinese American Alliance, Civil Rights, and Rainier Store, were banned. As Sam Ni, administrator of the pro-GOP “This Is the Way” account, told me, “WeChat and the arm behind it are too long. Despite focusing only on American issues, I am still under their crackdown. I don't know how to adapt to this and what rules we should follow. It's like a black hole.”

The result of WeChat’s pro-Biden tilt was evident in the 2020 Chinese-American presidential vote. Trump made significant gains among Asian-Americans, increasing his share of votes dramatically from 18 percent in 2016 to 30 percent in 2020. This increase in support included an especially large boost among Korean-, Vietnamese-, and Indian-American voters (twenty-eight, twenty-five, and thirteen percentage points, respectively). However, his increase in support among Chinese-Americans, which includes Taiwanese, was noticeably smaller: seven percentage points. While some may argue this dampening was due to the Trump administration’s proposed WeChat ban, the 5:1 ratio of petition signatories supporting the ban to those opposing it suggests that a significant part of the Chinese community was sympathetic.

Countering the CCP’s influence tactics in a free society like the United States will always be difficult. By leveraging a wide range of non-state individuals and organizations, the Chinese party-state penetrates society in ways that our democratic culture finds hard to grasp, much less confront. WeChat adds a powerful lever to this mix by enabling the Chinese party-state’s propaganda machine to manage the Chinese-speaking public square in America. Given the difficulties of divesting, fixing, and monitoring the app, Washington should simply ban it.

Dr. Seth Kaplan is a professorial lecturer in the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. He lived in China for seven years.

Image: Shutterstock.

NATO is revamping defense plans that will be a whole lot harder to execute with Sweden on the outside.

A Cold War crouch is inimical to a free, open, and flourishing society.

Those born after the bloc’s founding charter was signed are overwhelmingly committed to its success.

Media saturation, manipulation of the economy, and culture wars helped the longtime leader hold on to his base.

Report after report after report warns of the pending “rematch from hell” that “few Americans want to see” pitting an 80 year old incumbent against a man currently being charged with multiple felonies– in truth, the octogenarian is hardly innocent, and the criminal defendant is hardly an image of youth. 

The reality that two deeply unpopular politicians are the frontrunners for a democratic election feels like a contradiction in terms. Isn’t democracy’s whole “thing” that representatives are elected to office by the people? How, then, is it possible for such a  “nightmare” scenario to materialize in the real world? 

The answer is more obvious than you might expect- that “nightmare” becomes real only if we become content with, or worse resigned to, that obviously undesirable status quo. 

There is no denying that the United States has lost some of its competitive edge since the collapse of the Soviet Union. This absence of a genuine threat has resulted in political decadence- entertainment shows are masquerading as news media, and incidental issues are elevated into the mainstream.

This surface level interaction with politics has simultaneously facilitated increased partisanship and reduced room for serious conversations. In turn, a so-called social war has emerged through which politicians on both sides of the aisle can increase their stature by taking fringe positions on issues with more media bark than policy bite.

As a result, more Americans than ever before are voting against politicians that they despise instead of for politicians that they genuinely support. Voters on the left are horrified by the prospect of migrant children being separated from their families. Voters on the right, meanwhile, cannot stand the idea that their own children may encounter a drag queen at the public library. Policy matters put to the side, you would expect that everyone is disgusted by the alleged amount of criminal behavior on both sides of the aisle.

Looking beyond American shores- Putin’s lashing out into Ukraine could be interpreted as evidence that would-be rivals are willing to test the durability of the Post-WWII rules based order. Additionally, as people on both sides of the Pacific come to the realization that China appears on the verge of reaching the apex of its capacity relative to the United States, efforts to prevent conflict between the two superpowers needs to be taken more seriously.

Despite this grim state of affairs, there are a number of important policies that are both impactful and popular among Americans Left, Right and Center. These issues go beyond bare bones ideas like infrastructure modernization, moderate immigration reform, and apple pie being delicious. In fact, some of these consensus building policies would bring about systemic change.

Policies like implementing term limits, establishing ethics standards for Supreme Court justices, and removing dark money from elections are both popular and transformative. Other good governance policies, even if they are less commonly discussed, also receive the occasional mention on the House floor (in one version or another).

Despite these obvious ways to improve the health of our political eco-system, it does not follow that one of today’s prominent figures is the right person to lead the charge. Frankly, it seems very unlikely that the best person to lead the United States into a new series of challenges is either Joe Bieden or Donald Trump- is it equally unlikely to be one of either man’s closest disciples.

The situation at hand begs for the United States to seek out a more unifying, and better equipped leader. The Constitution, and America’s standing as a Republic gives us the power to bring about the needed change. 

In order to correct course American voters will need to overcome the temptations of performative hopelessness and partisan bickering. The work towards preventing a nightmare scenario in 2024 begins now and it is ours to do. 

Americans have spent the last 30 years eating political sweets, now it’s time to eat our vegetables. 

–

Peter Scaturro is the Director of Studies at the Foreign Policy Association. The views expressed here are not necessarily those of the Foreign Policy Association.

Vieille tradition africaine : se réunir dans l'intimité familiale ou clanique des cases, ou, plus souvent encore, s'asseoir en cercle au pied de l'arbre à palabres, sous les étoiles, pour écouter la voix magique du conteur. Pendant des siècles, la tradition a ainsi transmis les contes et légendes du (...) / Tchad, Afrique centrale, Afrique, Littérature, Fiction, Langue, Autoritarisme - 2018/04

Kyiv needs a binding commitment before NATO membership.

Great-power competition makes it more relevant—not less.

Situated between Iran and Saudi Arabia, who are not threatening one another for the moment, Oman tries hard to remain neutral, walking a fine line, not overtly taking sides. The country’s foreign policy is to be a friend to all, an enemy to none. To that end, Muscat bends over backward to avoid any provocative actions or diplomatic initiatives that can get them into political hot water.

Yet this foreign policy approach has some inconsistencies, to the detriment of not just Oman but others as well. Consider, for example, that last week Oman signed a new “Strategic Document for Enhanced Bilateral Cooperation” with Iran, trying to appease their neighbor while advancing its economic interests. Muscat is particularly keen on maintaining good relations with the Islamic Republic, which is almost in view from its coast in the Persian Gulf. This new agreement, unfortunately, supports Iran’s resistance economy against American sanctions, which also benefits China and Russia, who have filled the American-created vacuum in the Middle East. One could argue that for a nation that doesn’t take sides, this could be interpreted to be such a case.

Such views don’t hold up, however, because Oman also maintains warm relations with the United States and its allies. Most notably, like many of the Arab states before they joined the Abraham Accords, Muscat is (discretely) conducting business with Israel, Washington’s premier partner in the Middle East.

This is where recent developments come into play. Unlike the nations that joined the Accords—the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco, which have all seen dramatic growth in trade with Israel, benefiting their economies and their people—Oman has opted to stay on the sidelines. This is despite the fact that Oman needs the economic investment and joint projects that Israel could offer. More broadly, the Gulf region would benefit from Oman serving as a trusted mediator between both sides. For the sake of such, both Washington and Jerusalem have an interest in facilitating the normalization of relations between Oman and Israel.

Explaining Omani Hesitancy

Ultimately, what truly matters to every Arab nation is what economic benefit they will derive from doing business with Israel. Secretly, Israel has done business with many Arab countries, often having to do with what the latter need most: expertise in water management, agriculture, technology, and security. In the Gulf today, over twelve hundred Israeli companies are doing business. Even the Qataris, whose government supports the anti-Israel Al Jazeera media empire, have an Israeli anti-drone system installed around Doha airport. A Qatari major-general [and] military and security advisor for defense affairs confirmed this to me.

So why did Oman, which would stand to benefit greatly, not join the Abraham Accords in 2020?

One reason was then Sultan Qaboos was dying, and the new sultan had yet to consolidate his power base. Oman under Qaboos was known to be, if not friendly, then politely neutral with Israel. During his reign, the sultan hosted not one but two Israeli prime ministers—Yitzhak Rabin in 1994 and Benjamin Netanyahu in 2018. Having recently been in the country now that the new sultan has established himself, I took the opportunity to meet with various Omani officials and believe they hold no hostility towards Jews or Israel. But given who their neighbor across the Gulf is, they are not in a position to join the Abraham Accords until the Saudis go first.

Another potential reason is that, like the Qataris and Saudis, the Omanis are sensitive to the Palestinian plight. According to Minister of Information Abdulla al Harrasi, who I met in Muscat, “ We hear the suffering of daily Palestinian indignations, but Israel doesn’t show any willingness to show good signs.” He said Oman won’t get involved until Israelis and Palestinians make the first gestures toward each other. Yet he also mentioned that the previous Omani minister of foreign affairs said, “We, the Arab world, must make Israel feel secure.” Unfortunately, he is personally in favor of a one-state solution, which means, in effect, no Israel.

Although Oman is proud to claim it talks to all sides, when I asked how it could not speak to Israel, the other party in the dispute, they danced around the subject, saying the time is not right. The Head of the Omani Ministry of Endowment and Religious Affairs told me, “Knowledge is not enough, we must get to know the other person, but not Israelis yet.” He said this not with animus but with a level of respect for Jewish people, if not the Jewish nation.

Moving Toward Normalization

The path for Omani normalization with Israel, which would greatly benefit them, is one of the small steps to lay the groundwork for further cooperation and diplomatic initiatives. The path to ruffle the least feathers is for Oman to champion trilateral projects between Oman, the Palestinian Authority, and Israel on issues that transcend politics, like water-related issues. Oman has a research center on desalination, while Israel is the world’s desalination expert.

A common complaint of the Palestinians is that they don’t have sufficient water resources for the future. This could be a way to help Palestinians on the ground and allow Oman to host Israelis and Palestinians to talk face-to-face with one another.

An additional option is for Oman to be actively involved in the Negev Forum of Arab nations and Israel, putting forward projects at the conference that would benefit them and could be financed by the United States and the more prosperous Gulf nations. The latter don’t trust the Palestinians as fiduciary stewards of their philanthropy. If Oman is more directly involved in monitoring the money, those nations may feel more confident that their resources don’t end up in the Palestinian kleptocracy.

The Omanis, Israelis, and the rest of the Gulf states know that trust is needed before friendship and normalization begin. This is where Washington’s assistance in shepherding new relationships is required. Unlike other Gulf nations, the Omanis practice a version of Islam that is neither Shiite nor Sunni but Ibadi, a moderate sect that holds freedom of religion dear.

A combined U.S.-Saudi initiative to cover Omani cooperation with Israel is in the interests of all the nations involved, as well as the Palestinian people. But that will take political capital to happen. Perhaps, if America cannot convince Saudi Arabia’s Mohammed bin Salman to normalize relations with Israel at this time, involving the Omanis could be an intermediary step—Washington could provide economic incentives and security guarantees to alleviate Omani worries. This would be in America’s and its Gulf allies’ interests, as anything that stabilizes the region is a benefit for all.

Dr. Eric Mandel is the Director of MEPIN (Middle East Political Information Network). He regularly briefs members of Congress and their foreign policy aides. He is the Senior Security Editor for the Jerusalem Report. He is a regular contributor to The Hill and the Jerusalem Post. He has been published in The National Interest, Must Reads-Foundation for Democracies, RealClearWorld, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, National Cyber Security News, MSN, the Forward, the Messenger, JNS, i24, Rudow (Iraq), The NY Sun, Moment Magazine, The Times of Israel, Jewish Week, Kurdistan24, IsraelNationalNews, JTA, Algemeiner, WorldJewishNews, Israel Hayom, Thinc., Defense News, and other publications.

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While it will take years, if not decades, to sort through the wreckage of the Ukraine War to come to any kind of consensus, it does seem clear that the maximalist claims of alliance networks have an immensely destabilizing role in the international system. The failure to set up buffer states— nations that agree not to join the alliance network of any nearby power blocs—between NATO and Russia might have led to the outbreak of war. Often situated at places where potential contention could arise, these countries keep rival power poles from having direct contact with each other. The reasoning is that if two powers can agree that neither dominates a particular smaller country, they can accept that the lessened risk of a hand-off approach to that particular state is the best way to de-escalate rivalry in that region.

The concept of buffer states has been used many times in history, though with admittedly mixed results. The idea is quite rare in modern international relations discourse, however. When it is mentioned, it is often done so in a disparaging manner. This is not only because the most famous example of a buffer state in the modern mind is the extremely ineffective invasion highway known as Belgium in the early twentieth century, but also because alliance networks have become increasingly burdened with values-laden assumptions that they did not have before. NATO, infused with democratist ideology, cannot accept that a country that wishes to join and become part of its network might be better left outside for reasons of geographic cohesiveness and avoiding more potential flashpoints with Russia. Russia, on the other hand, was ostensibly supportive of a neutral Ukraine but probably expected to dominate it indirectly in some capacity. The inability of these outside parties to stay out of the country resulted in a significant conflict that could have been avoided. Diplomats should learn from this and get more serious about the concept of buffer states.

Despite famous failures, there have in fact been numerous successful buffer states in history; places that for long periods of time (geopolitically speaking) served as effective points of no-contact between otherwise rival powers. Some exploited natural geography to further reinforce the natural borders already in place. Nepal, between the British and Qing empires and now modern China and India, is an example of this. Austria in the Cold War, with the victorious powers of World War II all agreeing to a mutual military withdrawal, is another. Perhaps the longest and most surprising of such states to modern observers is that of late-nineteenth through mid-twentieth-century Afghanistan. Not wanting to rule the unprofitable and warlike territory itself, the British Raj nevertheless was consumed by the specter of a Russian invasion through the territory during the height of Anglo-Russian rivalry in Central Asia, often referred to as “The Great Game.” After a succession of fruitless wars there, it was agreed to draw the boundaries of Afghanistan in such a way that Russian and British imperial interests would not directly collide with each other. The arrangement would bring a surprising amount of stability for the tribalistic nation, and only collapse when a series of coups and internal upheavals opened the way for a Soviet invasion in 1979 and subsequent Pakistani and U.S. intervention.

Lest it be assumed that a long-term successful stint as a buffer nation can only come about from circumstances of comparative stability, the experience of Uruguay offers one of the more remarkable transformations from instability to long-term success. Contested for centuries between the Portuguese and Spanish empires, the early independence of Uruguay was rocked with trouble. Both Argentina and Brazil attempted to dominate the country, and internal factions fought each other on the domestic front, sometimes in open civil war. These contests even helped spark South America’s deadliest war, the War of the Triple Alliance, which further seemed to relegate the region's smaller countries to domination by their larger neighbors. And yet it was the cost of that war, coupled with the desire to maintain some kind of balance in the region, that ensured Uruguay would be able to harness its natural agrarian bounty and access to ports in order to become one of the most developed and, eventually, peaceful Latin American countries. When Brazil and Argentina could both openly admit that they feared the space between them being dominated by the other, it became possible for them to mutually agree that neither would absorb the country into its security arrangements.

In today’s world, there are clearly regions that would benefit from taking a second look at the concept of buffer zones. Improving relations between Tehran and Riyadh could mean a new Saudi-Iranian understanding of Iraq that would have the potential to bring much-needed stability to that war-torn country. Myanmar’s precarious position between India and China already seems to be going for some degree of distance from each. Indonesia’s location as a large country right at the edges of U.S. and Chinese spheres of influence also implies the potential for it to exploit an independent niche between the two superpowers while reducing places where clashes could break out.

The history of buffer states is too complex to be an ultimate solution for every clashing great frontier, but it cannot be dismissed either as it often is in contemporary foreign policy commentary. Political geography can be shaped by policy to reduce conflict points between competing spheres of influence. With even the possibility of such policies creating opportunities for peace, it is worth giving the buffer state at least consideration in many troubled parts of the world.

Christopher Mott (@chrisdmott) is a Research Fellow at the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy and the author of the book The Formless Empire: A Short History of Diplomacy and Warfare in Central Asia.

Image: Shutterstock.

En 1941, Adolf Hitler promulguait le décret « Nacht und Nebel » (« Nuit et brouillard »), exposé minutieux d'une stratégie de la terreur visant à faire disparaître les indésirables sans laisser de trace, de sorte que leurs proches, ne sachant s'ils sont vivants ou morts, n'osent se révolter, de peur (...) / Mexique, Amérique latine, Violence, Société, Matières premières, Pétrole, Narcotrafic - 2018/04

Russian MiG-31 armed with the Kinzhal missile. Kinzhal Hypersonic missiles were once thought to be almost impossible to intercept.

New strategies to attack Ukraine’s military and civilian population has run the gambit of using the most advanced Kalibr cruise missiles, low tech drones imported from outside or Russia, Cold War ballistic missiles, and Hypersonic weapons like the Kinzhal missile. While different older and modern systems are being used to counter the attacks, the theory many had inside and outside of Russia was that the Hypersonic Kinzhal missiles would not be intercepted by any defense system available.

In the earlier stages of the war, it was the case that a Kinzhal missile hit a target in the city of Ivano-Frankivsk while Russia used electronic countermeasures to knock out much of Ukraine’s missile defense tracking capabilities. More recently however, several Kinzhal missiles were intercepted by what was likely a Patriot PAC-3 missile system, a system designed with smaller, more agile missiles specifically meant to intercept ballistic targets.

While many were surprised that the air launched Kinzhal missiles were shot down, it is not an illogical conclusion to assume a Patriot PAC-3 missile system can knock out a Kinzhal. The Kinzhal is heavily based on the ground launched missile system carried by Russia’s Iskander surface-to-surface missile system, also being used in Ukraine by Russia. While the various Iskander types can fire cruise missiles like Kalibr or fast ballistic missiles like a variant of the Kinzhal, NATO designs were created specifically to kill Kinzhal type missiles. The theory that added speed and altitude in launching a Kinzhal from a MiG-31 fighter was certainly sound, and defined the Kinzhal as being Hypersonic. While it can reach Hypersonic speeds using this technique, it does not make the Kinzhal much different than its Iskander based ancestor. In the end, the real life test of Kinzhal lead to several interceptions, with the loss of six of them in one day.

Some peculiar situations have come from the missile war in Ukraine. In a technique not seen since North Korea altered SA-2 missiles to hit ground targets during the early Cold War, Russian S-300 missiles were also adjusted to hit targets on the ground, despite it being designed solely as an air-to-air missile. While this might be a sign that more advanced missiles are running low for Russia, it is the case that NATO supplied advanced missiles are also running low, with a great deal of time needed to replenish their stocks.

Using simple drones may have been a ploy to make Ukraine waste many advanced missiles on $400 drones, and the Kinzhals and other advanced missiles may be being held back for a future attack with a dwindled missile shield. To counter the lack of stock and cost, fairly old Gepard systems were brought in to shoot down simple drones. While effective, there are not enough of them to cover the vastness of Ukraine. If Ukraine can preserve their advanced missile systems to intercept more advanced missile threats only, they can buy more time in keeping their population as safe as possible from attacks from the air.

To cover more regions of Ukraine with Gepard type protection from technically simple threats, three options exist. The first is to try and find more Gepard/Oerlikon based or NATO based systems of a similar type that have cannons linked to a radar and/or tracking system. If this was easy however, it would have likely been done already, which leads to another option. Like many Cold War Soviet equipment being dusted off and used effectively by Ukraine, the ZSU-23-4 was a Cold War system similar to the Gepard, using four 23mm cannons and a tracking system to target low flying threats. If an update of the ZSU-23-4 radar could be implemented, there is likely a tremendous amount of stock and ammo available of the ZSU-23-4 Shilka. Poland had upgraded their systems some time ago, and could act as a blueprint for a quick modernisation. A type of Shilka upgrade or App for the radar could surely save lives by shooting down terror drones purchased by Russia.

The third and last option would be to purchase the PGZ95 system from China. Since 2008, China introduced the PGZ95, but rapidly replaced many of their PGZ95 anti-air vehicles with a similar Oerlikon based system called the PGZ09. While the PGZ09 is very similar to a modern Gepard, the PGZ95s are similar to a modern Shilka, with a modern radar, and have been placed as excess stock by China’s PLA. Sourcing the PGZ95 and placing them at the front would be a simple tactical solution to the drone scourge against innocent Ukrainian civilians. While the politics of such a purchase would be a lot more complicated than the tactical reality, the current image China seeks as a peacemaker abroad, the use of the PGZ95 mainly as a defensive weapon against terror drones, and the perception of impartiality China seeks between Ukraine and Russia may make for a convincing proposal to get modern air defence on the field in Ukraine. If it saves innocent lives, these future approaches are worth a shot.

Marié à la cantatrice carioca Elsie Houston en 1928, le poète Benjamin Péret (1899-1959) n'avait pas 30 ans lorsqu'il a ressenti la morsure brésilienne : débarqué à Rio de Janeiro au cœur de l'été austral 1929, il s'est immédiatement attaché au pays et à ses habitants. C'est en pleine ébullition moderniste (...) / Littérature, Mouvement de contestation, Brésil, Amérique latine, Culture, Peuples autochtones, Personnalités - 2018/04

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At the same time that the U.S. Congress deliberated on legislation to counter China, it remained gridlocked over national debt limits. The current political acrimony adds to persistent American problems of wavering economic growth, bitter partisan feuding, and record levels of gun violence, among other long-standing issues. Meanwhile, Beijing’s demands that the United States “correct” its policies regarding China occurred alongside news that its own economy is faltering amid slowing global demand. China also continues to grapple with a worsening debt problem, a bleak demographic outlook, and high levels of violent crime. Relative political and economic weakness stands out as a striking and disturbing feature of the current U.S.-China rivalry.

The weakened state of the rival powers ill-fits the pattern set not only by the Cold War but also by all great power rivalries over the past two centuries, including the two World Wars and even the conflicts of the Napoleonic era. The state of technologies differed dramatically, of course, but they shared key social, political, and economic features. Those epic contests involved centralized, unitary states with a high degree of internal cohesion and robust patriotic popular support. Governments enjoyed strong legitimacy partly due to expanding opportunities for political participation and economic advancement. Broad popular support for the governments also owed to industrialization, which took off in the late 1700s and yielded dramatic gains in the material standard of living for many people, especially after 1850. Industrial-age warfare typically centered on strategies of mass mobilization that permitted the fielding of vast armies consisting of citizen-soldiers equipped with standardized uniforms and equipment. When these nation-states fought, they demonstrated an impressive ability to mobilize resources, involve the population, and sustain a war footing for years on end. Their militaries frequently engaged in blood-soaked set-piece battles that generated staggering casualties. The wars often wrought immense destruction and typically ended with unconditional surrender by one side or the other.

The current U.S.-China rivalry contrasts sharply with these historical experiences. Unlike their predecessors, the two countries contend amid a complex and overlapping array of threats, labor under severe resource constraints, and manifest distressing signs of domestic weakness. With a diminishing ability to meet the needs of their citizens, the U.S. and Chinese governments have inspired little patriotic enthusiasm. Neither side has mobilized their citizenry against the other, nor do strategies of mass mobilization appear plausible for the foreseeable future. Instead, the principal mode of military recruitment consists of professional volunteers and contractors. China indeed continues to rely on conscription for perhaps a third of its military manpower, but that is because it cannot attract enough qualified volunteers. Far from a minor hindrance, transnational threats and episodes of domestic upheaval appear highly menacing and routinely vie with traditional threats for the attention of policymakers. For example, U.S. military forces have struggled to counter non-state actors in the Middle East and control outbursts of domestic turmoil. Meanwhile, the People’s Liberation Arm has scrambled to protect Chinese citizens abroad from serious harm, and the country’s security forces struggle to ensure domestic control in Hong Kong, Tibet, and Xinjiang.

Grasping that the current situation bears little resemblance to twentieth-century precedents, experts have fiercely debated its meaning. Some have insisted that past patterns will hold and that the two countries are bound for conflict. Others disagree, arguing that war is unlikely and the two countries will carry out a distinct type of competition. Still others question the wisdom of competition at all given the magnitude of domestic problems confronting each rival and urge greater cooperation on shared concerns instead.

Neomedievalism

A starting point for making sense of the U.S.-China rivalry’s unusual features is recognizing that our world is experiencing an epochal transformation. In a recently published RAND Corporation report, I present evidence that the international community entered a new epoch, which I call “neomedievalism,” beginning around 2000. This new period is characterized by the attenuation or regression of the political, social, and economic dimensions of the modern era.

Politically, the centralized nation-state is in steep decline. Although what might succeed it remains intensely disputed. The decline of the nation-state has already spurred severe political crises in many countries, and the problems of a weakened state will persist even following the consolidation of new sources of legitimacy. The relatively high level of social solidarity that predominated in nation-states has atrophied, and competing sets of identities have grown more salient. Economically, neomedieval states are experiencing slowing and imbalanced growth, primarily benefiting a small minority. Neomedieval economies are also experiencing disparate growth rates, the return of entrenched inequalities, and expanding illicit economies. The nature of security threats has undergone significant change as well. Reversing trends that predominated in the past two centuries, non-military dangers such as natural disasters, pandemics, and violent non-state actors rival or outpace traditional state militaries as principal security concerns. While many of these risks are not new, they are especially menacing due to neomedieval states' weakened legitimacy and capacity. Warfare in the neomedieval age has experienced a revival of pre-industrial practices, including the privatization of militaries, the prevalence of siege warfare, the prominence of intrastate war, and the formation of informal coalitions consisting of diverse state and non-state actors.

These trends represent a “meta-history,” in the sense that they extend beyond the experiences of individual countries or leaders. As trends that define the general arc of human experience, they are unlikely to be reversed and can, at best, be delayed or mitigated. Their effects will also likely overshadow the impact of particular technologies and weapons. This is because technologies, no matter how advanced or sophisticated, cannot always solve problems that are fundamentally political, societal, and economic. The limits of advanced technology were well illustrated by the American withdrawal from Afghanistan. American forces possessed the most sophisticated equipment available to any military throughout history. However, this proved inadequate against the realities of a weak Kabul regime, an impoverished and fragmented Afghan society, a tenuous commitment from Washington, and a poorly-equipped yet resolute Taliban-led insurgency.

Why is the world experiencing such attenuation and regression? The most fundamental driver owes to the declining strength of the advanced industrial economies that created the modern industrial era in the first place. Before 1800, no industrial nation-state existed. As Western countries developed into industrial nation-states, their immense concentration of power and wealth excited admiration, resentment, and envy in states worldwide. The appeal and influence of Western nation-states reached their apogee in the 1950s and 1960s when their economies experienced a “golden age” of prosperity that fueled rising incomes across virtually all social classes. However, the situation began to change in the 1970s when the same economies deindustrialized as rising wages rendered manufacturing less competitive. Growth rates slowed, economies experienced stagnation, and inequality grew. Analysts noted a concomitant decay of key social and political institutions dating from this period.

Consequently, U.S. decisionmakers and planners should be wary of resorting to strategies and methods drawn from industrial age wars with which contemporary militaries bear a superficial resemblance. The U.S. military, in particular, will face the temptation to prescribe industrial nation-state solutions for neomedieval problems. Focusing on conventional military challenges both validates the importance of such forces and frames issues in terms that existing interests find comfortable. But policymakers should resist this temptation. The Russian military’s disastrous performance in Ukraine and America’s painful experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq provide examples of what can happen when outdated thinking dominates approaches to warfare. To avoid potentially disastrous misjudgments and miscalculations, U.S. decisionmakers and planners should consider several key points about the neomedieval era.

First, the reality of weakening states will likely be a defining feature of the U.S.-China rivalry. Nation-states are experiencing a decline in political legitimacy and governance capacity. This weakness afflicts both the United States and China, as well as virtually all countries around the world. As economic growth decelerates, the debilitation of modern states will likely worsen over time, and efforts to fully reverse the trends are unlikely to work. This does not mean strengthening state capacity is futile. Finding ways to improve state capacity and rebuild the state’s legitimacy will become central tasks in the contest. But even in the best case, the United States and China will be weaker and less cohesive than they were in the past century. All defense planning should begin with an awareness of this vulnerability and the constraints that it imposes. Weakening state capacity restricts options for building military power and waging conflict. It introduces new vulnerabilities that must be accounted for in defensive preparations as well as opportunities for offensive operations against rival powers.

Second, conventional war between the United States and China is improbable owing to their political, economic, and societal weaknesses. Despite the potential for heightened tensions, neomedieval trends render total war between the United States and China unlikely. The persistent fragility of public support, the inability to carry out a mass mobilization, and the exceeding risks and difficulties of sustaining intensive conflict have made “total war” in the mold of World War II almost impossible to wage. Moreover, war requires the rapid depletion of scarce military resources that will be difficult and costly to replace. This is an especially important consideration given the competing fiscal demands of the welfare state. That said, some sort of conflict cannot be ruled out. Should the U.S.-China rivalry escalate to hostilities, the two sides might instead fight through proxy conflicts or by provoking political unrest in the rival’s homeland. Amid such friction, the two may find their contest frequently interrupted by the imperative to reallocate scarce resources to address various domestic and transnational threats, resulting in a chronic low-intensity conflict. Under such conditions, conventional combat between U.S.-China forces, if it occurs at all, could consist of sporadic clashes between relatively modest-sized formations in different parts of the world. As ambitions of total victory over the adversary prove infeasible, political goals may instead focus on securing minor gains through temporary settlements while leaving broader issues unresolved.

Third, controlling domestic and transnational threats is becoming a higher priority than deterring conventional military attacks. Compared to the modern industrial period, states are more secure from external threats and more vulnerable to internal threats. They are more secure in the sense that weakened rivals generally lack the political will and resource base to subjugate other countries. Thus, most countries continue to face a lower threat of invasion and conquest. However, the perpetually fragile public legitimacy for governments will leave domestic politics volatile. The principal danger to states will come from internal rather than external sources. These include pandemics, terrorism, transnational crime, and political violence. Because failure to ensure domestic security directly implicates the state's legitimacy, controlling such dangers will become an urgent priority. States should allocate resources accordingly.

The great powers who most effectively grasp and adapt to the neomedieval reality may gain a crucial advantage over rivals who continue to exhaust increasingly scarce treasure in futile efforts to recreate the past. Which country is best positioned to do this?  Paradoxically, China’s more limited experience with modernity may prove a valuable asset. Beijing might grasp neomedieval trends more intuitively than Western countries, whose principal point of reference rests in a recent past in which they predominated. Yet there are compelling reasons to believe America can adjust effectively. The most important one is the country’s innate dynamism and innovation. A key reason America has succeeded so well as a nation-state has been its willingness and ability to experiment and adapt. If the United States is to maintain its position, developing strategies to lead as a neomedieval great power will be a critical step in that direction.

Dr. Timothy R. Heath is a senior international defense researcher with the RAND Corporation.

Image: Shutterstock.

It would not be unfair to label the prevailing nature of the U.S.-Sino relationship as one of “mutual distrust and recrimination.” While 2022 ended with both Washington and Beijing reiterating in official meetings—such as Joe Biden and Xi Jinping’s Bali meeting on November 14—their shared desire to keep channels of communication open, there were few practical signs of improvement in relations. In fact, both sides are pursuing policies that will deepen competition and confrontation. Although there has been sporadic talk of new “guardrails” that would establish a form of strategic stability, this aim appears diminishingly small due to each side’s perception of what is driving their competition and how that perception frames foreign policy choices and domestic politics.

For Washington, competition with China is driven by the latter’s challenge to American power and leadership, along and its (perceived) desire to change the international order. For Beijing, competition with the United States is rooted in continued American “hegemonic” pretensions to “contain” China amidst its inevitable “decline.” This fundamental impasse makes both sides increasingly perceive their relationship in zero-sum terms. Moreover, the premium placed on competition is negatively impacting both Chinese and American broader foreign and domestic policy agendas.

In this context, is there any hope for an amelioration of bilateral tensions and competition?

“Competing,” but Not Leading?

A core problem for the Biden administration is that measures taken to ensure the United States can “out-compete” China are likely to undermine the former’s capacity to achieve its objective of revitalizing American global leadership of the current rules-based international order.

For all the administration’s use of orthodox liberal internationalist rhetoric—the 2022 National Security Strategy’s assertion, for instance, of America’s continued commitment to, and reliance on, “fair and open trade” and a liberal “international economic system”—such objectives are increasingly being sacrificed on the altar of strategic competition with Beijing.

The administration’s concrete actions reflect a “security first” approach to bolster and burden-share with existing allies, such as Japan and Australia (including through the Quad and the AUKUS agreement), and attempts to forge deeper ties with like-minded actors like India and Taiwan. Simultaneously, Washington has pursued a decoupling of high-tech trade with China, including implementing overtly protectionist trade and industrial policies (such as the CHIPS Act) intended to boost American competitiveness in the context of bilateral U.S.-Sino relations.

This latter trend was reinforced by National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan’s April 27, 2023 speech at the Brookings Institution. Explicitly billed as focused on the president’s “core commitment … to more deeply integrate domestic policy and foreign policy,” the speech effectively made the case for “national security” concerns to guide economic policy. Sullivan argued that the guiding assumption of post-1945 U.S. policy (“that markets always allocate capital productively and efficiently—no matter what our competitors did”) no longer applies as the integration of a “non-market economy” (China) into the global economy has produced “dependencies” that can be “exploited for economic or geopolitical leverage” as “entire supply chains of strategic goods—along with the industries and jobs that made them—moved overseas” in the “name of oversimplified market efficiency.”.

This constitutes an effort to ensure the United States can guide the invisible hand of the market in directions amenable to geopolitical competition with China. The objective of the administration’s new policy is to identify “specific sectors that are foundational to economic growth, strategic from a national security perspective, and where private industry on its own isn’t poised to make the investments needed to secure our national ambitions,” and to apply “targeted public investments in these areas that unlock the power and ingenuity of private markets, capitalism, and competition to lay a foundation for long-term growth.”

Although this may align with the White House’s domestic political agenda of “renewing” American prosperity, it remains to be seen how this approach will enable the United States to achieve its associated objective of rallying allies and like-minded partners to the cause of combating China. This is especially important in Asia and the Pacific, where many observers have noted the shortcomings of U.S. economic and trade policy for at least the past decade. This has been especially visible around the failure to match the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), as well the lack of U.S. participation in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, or CPTPP. American schemes around investment in the region have also been long on aspiration and short on delivery. That includes both the Trump administration’s Blue Dot Network and Biden’s Build Back Better World.

The irony, as Susan Shirk has noted, is that the Biden administration’s focus on “competition” with China as the organizing principle of its foreign policy is making the United States become more like its adversary: “nationalist, fixated on security, and politicizing the market economy.” Such dynamic risks making the administration’s claims to be reclaiming a liberal internationalist vision of American global leadership based on a “rules-based order” increasingly hollow.

Preparing for “Choppy Waters” and “Dangerous Storms”

China may be more ideologically girded for such zero-sum competition, but overt competition with the United States is exacerbating existing pathologies in both its foreign and domestic policy, resulting in a variety of self-inflicted wounds. It is perhaps no surprise, for instance, that U.S.-Sino strategic competition has coincided with the rabidly jingoistic wolf warrior diplomacy that has damaged China’s standing throughout the world. Such assertive, nationalistic posturing at the very least undermined some of Beijing’s previous gains in posing as an advocate of economic globalization and “interconnectivity” during the Trump era of American foreign policy.

Of greater significance is the impact of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) greater explicit focus under Xi on security both in an international and domestic setting. This has been markedly sharpened in the past two years as U.S.-Sino ties have deteriorated. The party-state’s linkage of increased pressure in China’s external environment and its domestic security was highlighted in Xi’s report to the 20th Party Congress in November 2022, where he warned that the country was entering “a period of development in which strategic opportunities, risks, and challenges are concurrent” and the Party “must therefore be more mindful of potential dangers, be prepared to deal with worst-case scenarios, and be ready to withstand high winds, choppy waters, and even dangerous storms.” To withstand such high winds, the continued application of a “holistic approach to national security” was necessary, in which the party would have “the people's security as our ultimate goal, political security as our fundamental task, economic security as our foundation, military, technological, cultural, and social security as important pillars, and international security as a support.”

While not entirely new, this framing is notable for its explicit connection of the CCP’s “political security,” domestic “stability,” and the achievement of Xi’s great objective of “national rejuvenation.” This fundamental focus on regime security has been felt since the Party Congress in several ways.

First, the sharp about-face on Xi’s signature “zero-Covid” approach to pandemic control responded to two dynamics—increased societal dissatisfaction with draconian lockdowns and concerns of coronavirus-induced economic stagnation—that impinged directly on regime security. The about-face on zero-Covid killed two birds with one stone by removing a policy that had placed Xi “in the firing line of anti-government or anti-party movements” and creating the conditions to kick-start the Chinese economy.

Second, on the international stage, Beijing has adopted more explicit language that points the finger of blame squarely at the United States for China’s current challenges. In a discussion with Chinese commerce and industry representatives on March 3, Xi described China’s international environment as full of “uncertainties and unpredictable factors,” foremost of which is that “the Western countries led by the United States have carried out all-round containment and suppression of China.”

Third, the shift in language points toward the party’s “darker assessment of humanity’s historical trajectory” and the “hidden risks and open dangers’ posed to China’s quest for ‘national rejuvenation.”

Significantly, it has not only been the downward trajectory of U.S.-Sino relations—from U.S. efforts at high-tech “decoupling” from Chinese supply chains to the Chinese spy balloon incident that has driven this pessimistic assessment, but also Chinese perceptions of the global repercussions of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The war in Ukraine, as an analyst from the Centre for Strategy and Security at Tsinghua University argues, has not only “accelerated and intensified” American “strategic deployment” against China, but also “binds China and Russia together.”

This helps explains Beijing’s recent flurry of Ukraine-related diplomatic activities including Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s late February tour through European capitals, the release of China’s twelve-point “road map” for a negotiated peace in Ukraine, Xi’s long-delayed phone call with Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky on April 26, and the May 17 visit of China’s special representative for Eurasian affairs, Li Hui, to Kyiv.

None of these activities have achieved tangible progress toward China’s stated objective of facilitating a negotiated settlement to the conflict. However, they have served Beijing’s goal of portraying itself, in Xi’s words, as a “responsible major country” that—in a less than subtle jibe at Washington—“would not sit idly by, nor would it add oil to the fire, still less exploit the situation” for its own gains.

Despite the recent resumption of high-level contact between Beijing and Washington, including face-to-face discussions between Yi and Sullivan in Vienna on May 10–11, Beijing’s perspective remains unchanged as to who is to blame for the “downward spiral” of bilateral relations.

“The United States,” as a Xinhua commentary on the Wang-Sullivan talks stated, “claims that it is not seeking to decouple from China and has no intention of obstructing China's development” but simultaneously “squeezes” China by “imposing many rounds of chip bans on Chinese firms under the pretext of national security” and “rushing to encircle China in the Asia-Pacific by mustering such Cold-War style groupings as the AUKUS and the Quad alliances.” Ultimately, the commentary concludes, this is driven by the belief of U.S. decisionmakers that “China must be brought down in order to keep America ahead.”

The Messy World of Strategic Competition

Both Washington and Beijing, then, are firmly set on trajectories that lock in rather than ameliorate bilateral tension and competition. This poses challenges and risks for both country’s domestic and foreign policies.

In Washington, competing with China has become a partisan political sport. Amidst tense administration negotiations with Republicans to raise the $31.4 trillion debt ceiling, Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, and Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo all fronted the Senate Appropriations Committee to support the president’s FY2024 budget request. Each argued the case that it was vital for the United States to “out compete” China. The implication, as Democratic Chair of the Appropriations Committee Senator Patty Murray made clear, is that “China isn’t debating whether to pay its debts, or wreck its economy. China isn’t debating whether to invest in its future, or cut and cap the investments that keep it competitive.” While this may be a classic example of wedge politics to paint Republicans as hamstringing U.S. efforts to out-compete China, it remains to be seen whether it produces better policy outcomes.

Xi Jinping, meanwhile, continues to consolidate his revision of the Dengist paradigm of the post-Mao era by privileging security over the economy. This is apparent in China’s recent “counter-espionage” crackdown which has targeted a range of foreign companies and individuals for alleged “leaking” of information related to “national security or interests” to foreign governments or entities. This came even as Premier Li Qiang attempted to reassure foreign companies and investors that Beijing was committed to building a “first class business environment.” However, the fact that the “counter-espionage” crackdown has been tasked to Ministry of State Security head Chen Yixin leaves little doubt that this constitutes a top priority for China’s leader.

In the realm of foreign policy, too, the Sino-American fracture continues apace. At the G7 summit in Hiroshima, Biden succeeded in forging a common, in-principle aspiration amongst the grouping to ensure “economic resilience” through “de-risking and diversifying” as a means of resisting “economic coercion” by Beijing. Meanwhile, Xi’s hosting of the first China-Central Asia summit in Xi’an sought to achieve several objectives that can be seen as necessary to girding China further for competition with the United States: to kick-start the BRI after Covid-19 slowdown; to cement further economic and strategic partnerships with the Central Asian states; and to further embellish China’s posturing as an alternative source of global leadership.

The self-reinforcing logic of great power competition is one of the closest things to an empirical law in international politics, and the increasing divide between China and the United States should not come as a surprise. But the apparent embedding of such competition raises the stakes not only for Beijing and Washington themselves but also for other key actors in the Indo-Pacific—many of whom have deep strategic ties with the United States and economic interdependencies with China.

It is likely that at some stage both Beijing and Washington will have an incentive to establish some guardrails in the relationship: after all, a collision course is costly and difficult to sustain for any length of time. Yet those tend to entail trade-offs and compacts, which tend to have more fundamental impacts on smaller states. Under those circumstances, it is vital that all players in the messy strategic landscape plan for unexpected outcomes, and simultaneously seek to identify what the contours of Indo-Pacific strategic stability might look like.

Dr. Michael Clarke and Dr. Matthew Sussex are Senior Fellows at the Centre for Defence Research at Australian Defence College.

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