Diplomacy & Crisis News

Dans le numéro 3/2020 de Politique étrangère, Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos a proposé une analyse croisée de plusieurs ouvrages consacrés à l’insécurité en Afrique subsaharienne. L’auteur d’un de ces livres, Jacob Zenn, professeur associé à l’université Georgetown et chercheur à la Jamestown Foundation, a demandé à bénéficier d’un droit de réponse.

In Politique étrangère (n°3/2020), Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos reviewed my book, Unmasking Boko Haram: Exploring Global Jihad in Nigeria (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2020), but with much misrepresentation. This article addresses those misrepresentations by quoting Montclos’ review and the book itself.

Montclos claimed Unmasking “utilized no French academic literature on the Sahel.” However, Unmasking cited two French-language Olivier Meunier book chapters. One chapter demonstrated 1990s Nigerian and Nigerien Salafi scholars’ close contacts and the other revealed an “Algerian merchant” constructed Niger-based Islamic school, Moufidah (p. 33). The relevance in Unmasking related to Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) member, Hacene Allane, being a Niger-based Algerian merchant in 1993 before becoming the GIA’s first Nigeria-based operative in 1994 (p. 30). Furthermore, the Salafi preacher hosting Allane in Nigeria ran an Islamic school that supported Moufidah. Although I suspected Allane constructed Moufidah, I withheld making that claim in the book.

French scholar Emmanuel Grégoire’s book chapter was also citedfor noting Niger’s Salafis were called “new jihadists” in 1993 (p. 33). Although Niger’s Salafis rebuffed GIA recruitment attempts, Nigerian intelligence officials observed Allane’s recruiting Nigerians to the GIA and inviting diaspora Nigerian al-Qaeda members back to Nigeria (p. 39). Unmasking contends this represented the Nigerian jihadist movement’s beginnings.

Another French scholar cited was Christian Seignobos, whose research demonstrated when Ansaru faction members reintegrated into Boko Haram in 2013 they would have encountered Cameroon-based zarquina road-robbers (p. 213). Further, Mauritanians Lemine Salem and Zekeria Salem’s French-language works were cited regarding Abu Muhammed al-Yemeni and Muhammad al-Hassan Dedew. Al-Yemeni was Usama Bin Laden’s Nigeria envoy and was hosted by Allane (p. 48); Dedew frequented a Mauritania-based Islamic camp where “Nigerian Taliban” youths studied in 2003 (p. 96).

Lastly, a Montclos French-language report was cited because it argued Boko Haram lacked “diaspora links” and Sahelian jihadist ties. However, Unmasking argues Saudi Arabia-based diaspora Nigerians contributed to Boko Haram’s founding (p. 37) and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) trained, financed, supplied weapons, and advised Boko Haram before it launched jihad in 2010 (p. 152). Given Unmasking’s citing French scholars, including also Gilles Kepel (p. 21), and French-language publications, including Tunisia-based Jeune Afrique, Cameroon-based L’Oeil du Sahel, and Senegal-based Dakaractu, it is remarkable Unmasking was criticized for not citing French scholarship.

Montclos further asserted Unmasking focused only on “international connections” and “a few individuals who tried extending sect networks towards the Sahel.” However, Unmasking’s introduction argues for “understanding how international, national, regional, and local forces produced the Boko Haram phenomenon (p. 9).” Moreover, Chapter 4 examines Nigeria’s domestic Islamic milieu, including oil magnate Muhammad Indimi, who befriended George Bush’s family and selected Salafi Jaafar Mahmud Adam over Sufis to preach at his Maiduguri mosque (p. 81). This mosque is where Adam’s disciple, future Boko Haram leader Muhammed Yusuf, eventually preached.

Chapter 4 also mentions the 1982 Borno government report recommending banning the Salafi Izala movement for promoting takfir against Sufis (p. 67). Further, political calculations compelling Izala’s “godfather” Abubakar Gumi to ally with Sufis to counter northern Nigerian Christian political influence is analyzed (p. 76). Tensions between Gumi, anti-government Salafi radical Ibrahim Datti Ahmed, and Shia revolutionary Ibrahim al-Zakzaky are also assessed (p. 71). However, Gumi’s, Datti Ahmed’s, and al-Zakzaky’s receiving Saudi, Libyan, and Iranian support, respectively, demonstrates Nigeria’s religious marketplace was inseparable from international influences.

Other Nigerian Salafi preachers mentioned in Chapter 4 for post-9/11 pro-al-Qaeda preaching include Aminu Daurawa, Abubakar Gero Argungu, Yahya Farouk Chedi, and Isa Ali Pantami, who collectively impacted Muhammad Yusuf’s followers (p. 86). Nigerian Scholars Muzzamil Hanga, Abdullah Saleh “Pakistan”, and Bashir Aliyu Umar, whose experiences with Pakistani, Iranian, Sudanese, and Saudi scholars shaped their religious worldviews, were also analyzed because they eventually renounced radicalism (pp. 73-76). Furthermore, Chapter 8 described Kogi-based Salafis who joined Boko Haram and Ansaru (p. 201), while Chapter 9 discussed Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP)’s financing around Lake Chad (p. 246). One can imagine my wonderment about allegations that Unmasking focused only on “international connections” and “a few” Boko Haram members with Sahelian ties.

Another Montclos claim is Unmasking “says nothing about Nigerian army failures” or abuses. This is patently false, and is rebutted by Chapter 9, whichstates “revenge for arrested, abused, or slain cofighters must have motivated Boko Haram members” (p. 246). The chapter also mentions Nigerian soldiers’ castrating Boko Haram members and asserts Nigeria’s “military alienated traders when their goods were taxed by ISWAP but then seized and destroyed by the army” (p. 290). Additionally, Nigerian security forces’ extrajudicial killing of Muhammed Yusuf, which inspired Boko Haram’s fighting “under the banner of the global jihad movement” like al-Shabaab, is analyzed in Chapter 6 (p. 142).

Montclos also faults Unmasking for showing “little interest” in Nigeria’s 1999 return to civilian rule, 2001 sharia implementation, and post-2001 Islamist disillusionment, which inspired Islamists’ turn to jihadism. However, Chapter 5 argues influential Saudi-trained Nigerian Salafis easily observed Saudi Salafi scholars’ pre-1999 voting prohibitions because Nigeria had few democratic elections. However, after Nigeria democratized in 1999, Nigerian Salafis gradually softened their sharia demands and promoted voting for Muslim leaders. Therefore, Boko Haram preachers claimed Nigerian Salafis liberalized by embracing democracy to the point of infidelity whereas only Boko Haram retained “pure” Salafism (pp. 82, 100, 115). Montclos clearly overlooked this analysis.

Finally, Montclos finds both my omission of Abubakar Lawan and Muhammed Yusuf’s alleged birthyear of 1970 as “troubling.” However, Lawan is deliberately omitted in Unmasking to avoid speculating on individuals when sources are uncorroborated. The original source regarding Lawan is civil society activist-turned-politician Shehu Sani’s 2011 Vanguard article asserting Lawan was a 1990s-era Boko Haram founder. However, no Boko Haram members’ interviews, primary source documents, or scholarly fieldwork proves Lawan even existed. Contrarily, ample evidence revealed in Unmasking indicates al-Qaeda operative Muhammed Ali cofounded Boko Haram alongside Muhammed Yusuf (p. 87). Likewise, no evidence substantiates Yusuf’s 1970 birthyear. Contrarily, Boko Haram’s Yusuf biography states Yusuf’s birthyear as 1388 hijri, or 1967 (p. 65). Thus, these are hardly “troubling” claims and Montclos’ nitpicking digresses from more important discussions.

A lesson learned from Montclos’ book review is reviewers must perform a close reading or risk being exposed for misinterpretations, inaccuracies, and outright falsehoods.

Jacob Zenn

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Corruption sours healthy economies, always places freedoms at risk and awards the worst of the worst for doing the most damage they can possibly imagine. Much of the slide from corruption into a full totalitarian regime comes from purging those who may limit the powers of elites who wish to dominate their fiefdom. In many cases, corruption gives more power to those at the top of it than possessed legally by King or Queens in those nations where they still exist. Constitutional powers limit the ability for a monarch to become an unelected dictator, with punishments ranging from fines to prison time. A corrupt leader seeks to infect all systems of government with corruption, so that even checks and balances via different branches of government are suppressed or outright eliminated. Different government structures operate in different ways, but when one person at the top can direct justice or jail for those they choose to oppose, the sickness of corruption in a democracy will take hold of it completely.

There are few resolutions to entrenched corruption, except for preventative measures to limit the powers of anyone who is given that degree of control and state wealth. Over 800 years of civilization created modern democratic systems as we see today. For this reason, once a democracy is injured or corrupted, it is extremely difficult to return to balance. Accounting for the most democratic systems currently, the British Parliamentary system, often referred to as Parliamentary Democracies as well as the systems that came out of the French Republic, a system based on a President limited by checks and balances seemed to have produced the most freedoms in modern times. To get to that point, many of those combating tyranny died fighting for it, from the streets of Napoleon’s France to the beaches of Normandy during the Second World War.

A key element of corrupt regimes is for that newly formed government to set upon their political enemies soon after taking power. This includes whistle blowers that seek to promote an openness in society, as an open and transparent society is harder to corrupt. Protests in Belarus are an example of a country that wishes to nip further corruption at the start of government regime taking power. As seen in Venezuela, a state that has fallen to a generation of corruption regularly places opposition leaders in jail or sequesters them using fear. Canada, a country now mired in its second corruption scandal in a two year period had a third major ongoing invisible scandal where a top Admiral was punished for exposing political ties to a shipping contract. The current Prime Minister used his power to go after him personally for being a whistler blower, apparently done in his first meeting of his new government. Corruption is almost impossible to eliminate, and it is why in Brazil, in a remarkable move by those in its judicial branches of government set out to purge the country of as much corruption as possible, even placing some ex-Presidents in jail for crimes against the nation.

Recently actions in Mexico has reflected elements of what has occurred in Brazil and Canada, but mainly due to an ex CEO of PEMEX being targeted by what he claims to be a corrupt system, including three ex-Presidents of Mexico. Emilio Lozoya, the ex-CEO and accused comes from an influential family, and has worked closely with Mexico’s government for many years. His personal crusade to clear his name may activate Mexico’s judiciary against former and current political leaders as evidence leaks out from Lozoya’s time working closely with Mexico’s elite. While there are questions regarding his political loyalties to various factions in government, the exposure of his case may shed some light on how corruption works in Mexico. It is up to Mexican citizens and the Judiciary to withstand pressure from elite leaders, a situation where even Canada was unable to prevent fully. Punishing a powerful individual may help average Mexicans in the process, if that process is able to remain visible.

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Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro d’automne de Politique étrangère 
(n° 3/2020). Pierre Grosser propose une analyse de l’ouvrage dirigé par Jochen von Bernstorff et Philipp Dann, The Battle for International Law: North-South Perspectives on the Decolonization Era (Oxford University Press, 2019, 496 pages).

La TWAIL (Third World Approach in International Law, approche tiers-mondiste du droit international) a le vent en poupe depuis quelques années, déclinée le plus souvent dans des ouvrages collectifs fort onéreux.

La première étape a consisté à revisiter les fondements du droit international du XIe au XIXe siècle, afin de montrer que la plupart de ceux-ci, et notamment la souveraineté, étaient le produit de l’expérience impériale/coloniale, et qu’ils avaient divisé le monde entre « famille des nations civilisées » et « le reste ». Dans un second temps, et avec la participation d’historiens qui ont fouillé les archives, c’est le droit de la guerre (et le droit humanitaire), la création des organisations internationales majeures (Société des Nations unies, Organisation des Nations unies) et le régime international des droits de l’homme qui ont été revisités pour en extraire le substrat impérial/colonial, et pour rappeler les inputs venus de juristes de la « périphérie ». La troisième vague revient sur les combats du Sud dans les années 1960-1970 pour changer les règles du système international. Ces combats semblent avoir été vains, notamment celui du Nouvel ordre économique international, emporté par la vague néolibérale des années 1980.

Cet ouvrage collectif revient en introduction sur la chronologie de ce bras de fer Nord-Sud. Puis sont déclinés quelques-uns de ses thèmes majeurs, comme la question raciale, les droits de l’homme, le rôle des firmes transnationales, la reconnaissance des mouvements de libération nationale, l’héritage commun de l’humanité (avec peu de développements, paradoxalement, consacrés à la souveraineté sur les ressources naturelles). L’échec du Sud à peser sur l’évolution des institutions, notamment la Cour internationale de Justice et la Banque mondiale, est ensuite abordé. Enfin, le livre présente certains acteurs, notamment des juristes (R.P. Anand et Mohammed Bedjaoui notamment), mais aussi l’Union soviétique, qui semble aujourd’hui devoir être presque réhabilitée pour son rôle dans les régimes juridiques d’après-guerre et son soutien aux luttes émancipatrices du Sud. On notera la contribution d’Emmanuelle Tourne Jouannet sur Charles Chaumont, qui rappelle le rôle important que des juristes français et francophones ont tenu dans ces débats, notamment dans les années 1970.

Ce tour d’horizon est indispensable, non seulement pour les juristes, mais pour les historiens et les politistes. On regrettera que trop peu de contributions utilisent vraiment les archives, et surtout l’importante production historique récente sur ces questions. On regrettera aussi que les pays du Sud ne soient pas plus différenciés, avec une approche de leurs stratégies, mais aussi de leurs coalitions et de leurs rivalités, et que les acteurs politiques n’apparaissent pas davantage. Ce n’est là qu’un appel à travailler sur un grain plus fin.

Pierre Grosser

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