Diplomacy & Crisis News

Michael Peck

World War II, Europe

Five lessons from the failed operation.

Here's What You Need to Know: The operation will always be a great "what-if" of history.

(This article first appeared in October 2019.)

On the afternoon of September 17, 1944, the death blow to Hitler’s Germany seemed to blossom in the skies over Holland.

It was 75 years ago when two American and one British airborne division landed in a carpet of parachutes that stretched 60 miles from Eindhoven in southern Holland north to Arnhem on the Rhine River. Instead of the chaos that afflicted the early night airborne landings in Sicily and Normandy, the landings on that warm Sunday went remarkably smoothly, with the troops landing on their drop zones smoothly with light losses.

It was an auspicious beginning to what the Allies hoped would be the beginning of the end of the Third Reich. Just three months ago, the American, British and Canadian armies had been stuck in Normandy, penned in by hedgerows and panzer divisions. But in August, the Germans had broken apart and the Allies had broken out, in an advance that took them 500 miles into Germany itself. The once-invincible Wehrmacht, already being hammered in the East by the Soviet juggernaut, seemed to be falling apart.

But guarding Western Germany like a moat was the mighty Rhine River. Once sheltered behind it, the battered German columns fleeing France could rest and regroup. But what if the Allies could bounce the Rhine in one quick, audacious advance? Once across the waterway, they could race across the North German plain to seize the industrial heartland of the Ruhr – and then on to Berlin. Perhaps the war in Europe would end by Christmas!

The problem was how to quickly cross the numerous rivers and canals that crisscross the Netherlands, This was where the 35,000 paratroopers of the First Allied Airborne Army came in: they would swoop down to seize several bridges across the Netherlands, creating an corridor that would let the tanks race the Dutch polder (land protected from the water by dykes) until they reached the British 1st Airborne Division securing the bridge across the Nederrijn at Arnhem.

Yet just eight days later, the last exhausted survivors of the 1st Airborne Division – that had triumphantly seized the bridge across the Rhine at Arnhem -- paddled back across the river. Instead of a highway to the Reich, the Allies had achieved a 60-mile corridor to nowhere.

Operation Market-Garden will always be a great what-if. Had it succeeded, it would have gone down as one of the most brilliant audacious operations in history. But it didn’t succeed, and the reasons why still matter today.

Here are some lessons of an operation that was “a bridge too far:”

Don’t assume a defeated enemy will stay defeated: 

Buoyed by their sizzling advance across France and Belgium, the Allies were so confident of German collapse in autumn 1944 that they became complacent. Market-Garden was essentially a British operation. And if anyone should have known better, it was the British, who had painfully learned how skillful the Germans were at improving during a crisis. There was no excuse for assuming that the Wehrmacht would not find the resources and willpower to resist a 60-mile thrust into their lines. The same wishful thinking can be seen in U.S. assessments that there was “light at the end of the tunnel” in Vietnam just before Tet Offensive, or the assumption that capturing Baghdad in 2003 would mean the end of the Iraq War.

Details matter:

The same planners who meticulously worked out every detail of D-Day – the largest amphibious invasion in history – failed to consider basic details such as coordinating ground and air operations. British commander disregarded aerial reconnaissance and Dutch Resistance reports that two SS panzer divisions that had sent spotted near Arnhem. The 1st Airborne seized the Arnhem bridge, but couldn’t receive reinforcements, supplies or even air support because their radios had been sent to the wrong frequencies. Then again, the U.S. Army and Marines couldn’t communicate with the Navy and Air Force during the 1982 invasion of Grenada.

What can go wrong, will go wrong:

When the 19th Century German military thinker Carl von Clausewitz spoke of the inevitable “friction of war,” he must have had a clairvoyant vision of Market-Garden. As soon as the operation began, it began to unravel. The paratroopers mostly secured their objectives on the first day, but shortages of transport aircraft and bad weather hindered aerial reinforcement and resupply. The Germans recovered the complete Market-Garden plan from the body of a dead Allied officer. The British armored advance was confined to a single road (“Hell’s Highway”) on a narrow causeway above flooded terrain continually blocked by German counterattacks. Napoleon Bonaparte, who might have won at Waterloo had it not rained, would have sympathized.

Use the right army for the right job:

America and Britain fielded different armies in World War II. The Americans were more willing to take risks. But short of manpower after five years of war, and scarred by the slaughter of an entire generation in the First World War, the British tended to favor methodical offensives designed to minimize casualties. Though Operation Market-Garden relied on a rapid ground advance to relieve the lightly armed paratroopers at Arnhem, the British armored columns were criticized for moving too cautiously. It would be 20 years later, in Vietnam, when it would be the American military’s turn to fight a war it was unsuited for.

Don’t bite off more than you can chew:

“I think we may be going a bridge too far,” one British commander is reported to have said about the plan for Market-Garden. Relying on paratroopers to seize multiple bridges across a 60-mile corridor would have been an ambitious endeavor under the best of conditions. However, Hitler also took too big a bite when he tried to conquer Russia. He paid the price.

Michael Peck is a contributing writer for the National Interest. He can be found on Twitter and Facebook.

This article first appeared in October 2019.

Image: An aerial view of the bridge across the Waal River at Nijmegen, September 1944 / Wikimedia Commons

Andrew Doran

War on Terror, Middle East

The present humiliation should be borne by foreign policy elites, the generals, the best and the brightest, not by the American people—and especially not by those who served, though they doubtless feel it more viscerally than the hawkish elites who counseled war.

War invariably falls hardest on common people, but until recent decades, senior officials were often held to account for failure. Statesmen and generals might pay for disaster with exile or even execution; at a minimum, they were forced to leave office in disgrace. Modern warfare is often harsher for soldiers and civilians alike but is somehow easier for elites. After Vietnam, a disgraced figure such as Defense Secretary Robert McNamara could go on an apology tour and reclaim some measure of respectability. Today, there is no accountability at all.

Foreign policy elites with careers unblemished by success live in comfort far from Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen, and die in their beds while thousands of Marines and soldiers followed such American Bourbons to humiliating defeat, only to end up in humble graves in parts of America as alien to ruling elites as Afghanistan is to troops from Appalachia. Thousands more live with physical and psychological wounds. It is long since time to hold the foreign policy elites and generals who failed America to account.

Historian Charles Norris Cochrane described the Peloponnesian War as, “a terrifying record of human energy and resources dissipated to no profitable end.” Future historians may give a similar assessment of the last two decades of U.S. failure in the Middle East.

Where did the United States go wrong? Much has been written and much more will be written, but a few general trends emerge. First, the enemy, “terror,” was an abstraction, and it’s impossible to wage war on an abstraction. Second, we didn’t understand the nature of Afghanistan—or of Iraq, or Syria, or Libya. America was successful at rebuilding post-tribal, modern societies like Germany and Japan, but not premodern societies. No one thought to ask whether the democratic institutions that emerge in high-trust societies can be replicated in societies with traditions of religious and ideological extremism, literacy rates below one-third, or consanguineous marriage rates of nearly fifty percent—a strong indicator of low social trust. Third, we possessed neither concrete objectives, nor a coherent strategy, nor a definite timeline. Essentially tactical approaches like counterinsurgency and counterterrorism served as substitutes for strategy, and few elites took notice. Then, as is often the case in the region, militaries that cohere around a religious identity proved stronger than those that cohere around a national identity. Perhaps above all, there was a misplaced confidence in the tools of the state and of statecraft. As many have noted, America is itself in need of nation-building and is in no position to lecture others.

The hubris of U.S. foreign policy elites over the past twenty years followed in large part from the misapplication of the lessons of World War II to the Global War on Terror. America was the only real victor of World War II, while the other great powers were devastated. So, we inferred that war could solve more problems than it actually can. Nevertheless, the last two decades of failed policy in the Middle East have produced several victors: China and Russia, Iran, and perhaps also Turkey. And arguably the Taliban, and even Al Qaeda and its outgrowths.

The reckoning for U.S. foreign policy elites—politicians, policymakers, generals, diplomats, think tanks that had access and influence—is long overdue. It’s time for a painstaking inquiry into what went wrong to ensure that it doesn’t happen again in the era of great power competition. One model for accountability could be the Church Committee hearings of 1975, which exposed abuses by the intelligence community and federal law enforcement that so shocked Americans that some agencies were nearly shut down altogether. Americans today would likely be similarly outraged as they learn that senior officials were aware not only of the impossibility of victory but also of rampant bacha bazi (pedophilia), bribery, and corruption, and other scandalous conduct in Afghanistan.

In 1992, U.S. Army General Norman Schwarzkopf wrote, “I am certain that had we taken all of Iraq, we would have been like the dinosaur in the tar pit—we would still be there, and we, not the United Nations, would be bearing the costs of that occupation.” There will be other tar pits to avoid in the decades ahead. Terrorist attacks will occur, terrorists may flourish, but the United States must remain focused on national security priorities, starting with great power competition.

For its part, the Biden administration and its glittering Ivy League elites now stand over the wreckage of the failure in Afghanistan like the French nobles at Agincourt. The present humiliation should be borne by foreign policy elites, the generals, the best and the brightest, not by the American people—and especially not by those who served, though they doubtless feel it more viscerally than the hawkish elites who counseled war.

The Afghanistan failure has a thousand fathers. The hubris, naïve optimism, and overextension that has long been plain to most Americans have yet to be fully grasped by some foreign policy elites. It is these elites, rather than the heroes who served there, who should go cap-in-hand and live the rest of their days as base panders—in shame, and eternal shame.

Andrew Doran is a senior research fellow at the Philos Project. From 2018-21, he served on the Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. Department of State.

Image: Reuters.

Michael Peck

Weapons, Americas

So why buy American weapons?

Here's What You Need to Know: American weapons remain the world's best.

The U.S. government has a message for those nations that would buy Russian and Chinese weapons: buyer beware.

“We have come a long way since the AK-47 became the ubiquitous symbol of Soviet-backed insurgencies from Southeast Asia to Africa,” R. Clarke Cooper, Assistant Secretary of State for Political Military Affairs, said during a speech at the Meridian International Center.  “Today, Russia is working hard to foist variants of its S-400 air defense system around the world, while China is supplying everything from armored personnel carriers to armed drones.  To quote another Latin phrase – caveat emptor! – Buyer, beware.  We have seen countries around the world leap at the chance to obtain high-tech, low cost defensive capabilities, only to see their significant investments crumble and rust in their hands.”

Cooper cited examples where Chinese weapons haven’t lived up their sales pitches. “In Africa, Cameroon procured four Harbin Z-9 attack helicopters in 2015: one crashed shortly after being handed over.  Kenya invested in Norinco VN4 armored personnel carriers – vehicles that China’s own sales representative declined to sit inside during a test firing.”

“And similarly, amongst our partners in the Middle East, we’ve seen instances in which countries that have procured Chinese CH-4 armed drones have found them to be inoperable within months, and are now turning around to get rid of them,” he added. “Caveat emptor!”

Cooper’s sales pitch for U.S. weapons comes as U.S. weapons have taken a bit of a black eye. The recent drone and missile attack on Saudi Arabian oilfields, launched by Iran or its Houthi allies, led to criticisms that Saudi Arabia’s array of American-made Patriot air defense missiles had failed to detect and destroy the hostile munitions. Naturally, Russia hasn’t missed the opportunity to tout its S-400 air defense system as the better option.

Significantly, Cooper mentioned the S-400 twice in his speech.

Curiously, Cooper did not offer specific instances of Russian weapons failures, though there have been no lack of examples in conflicts such as the Arab-Israeli wars. Instead, he accused Russia of aggressive sales tactics. “Through the targeted marketing of systems like the S-400, Russia seeks to exploit the genuine security requirements of partners to create challenges in our ability – legal and technological – to provide them with the most advanced defensive capabilities.  And through a combination of cut-price systems such as unmanned aerial systems, predatory financing mechanisms, and sometimes outright bribery, China is using arms transfers as a means of getting its foot in the door – a door that, once opened, China quickly exploits both to exert influence and to gather intelligence.”

Cooper also took aim at Chinese training of foreign soldiers. “Foreign trainees may be wooed by the offer of unit-scale training in China, but on arrival they are disappointed to find themselves not spread among the elite Chinese training academies, but are lumped together with forces from around the world of significantly varying quality in China’s International Military Education Exchange Center – a facility whose lackadaisical approach to military education is well below the standard China provides to its own officers. Caveat emptor!”

The American view is that Russia and China can make arms sales because they have few scruples about whom they sell weapons to. Yet Cooper acknowledged that there are concerns about the reliability of the U.S. as an arms supplier, for which he blamed the U.S. Congress, which enacted a block on arms sales to Saudi Arabia that was only overturned by a veto by President Trump.

So why buy American weapons? Cooper said there are three reasons: quality, transparency, and accountability.

“The U.S. defense industry produces the best defensive equipment on the planet,” he claimed. In addition, U.S. arms export policy is not hidden. “Unlike the determinations made in Beijing or Moscow, our major foreign military and direct commercial sales are managed via a process whose policies are clear and transparent, and whose approvals are public.”

Ironically, while blasting Russian and Chinese arms sales, Cooper said the U.S. had sweetened its own Foreign Military Sales program. “We made the foreign military sales process faster and cheaper, reducing the time it takes from receipt of a partner’s request to making an offer by nine percent, while reducing the overhead fees captured by the FMS Admin surcharge from 3.5 percent to 3.2 percent and lowering several FMS Transportation rates by between one percent and 7.5 percent, saving foreign partners approximately $180 million in the past year alone.”

“When you buy FMS you obtain the same pricing as the U.S. military services; you participate in a system that is resistant to corruption; and, you get the total package approach: not just a defense article, but a defense capability, from the training required to use, maintain, and integrate it into your doctrine and operations, to the parts and components required for long-term maintenance and support.”

Whether this argument will be persuasive enough to induce other nations to buy American weapons remains to be seen.

Michael Peck is a contributing writer for the National Interest. He can be found on Twitter and Facebook.

This article first appeared in November 2019.

Image: REUTERS/Maxim Shemetov

Peter Suciu

Guns, Americas

This Arms Trade Treaty could require all firearms purchased by Americans to be tracked, and guns registered to ensure compliance with the treaty. 

The United Nations was created to help maintain peace and stability, but in recent years critics of the organization have argued that it often engages in considerable overreach in its efforts. This is especially true in how certain aspects of its efforts to reduce conflict around the globe could violate the rights of American citizens. This is most evident in the Second Amendment and the UN’s attempts to regulate the sale of firearms. 

At the center of the issue is the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), a multilateral treaty that regulates the international trade in conventional weapons. It has been in effect since 2014 and while it was meant to regulate the sales and transfers of tanks, military aircraft and other military hardware, its critics—including the National Rifle Association (NRA) and National Shooting Sports Foundation—have warned that it could impact U.S. gun owners by limiting the availability of commercially-made firearms and parts. 

To date, 110 nations have ratified the treaty, while 32 have signed but not ratified it. Among those latter nations is the United States. In fact, two years ago then President Donald Trump withdrew from the treaty and in a statement at the time said, “We will never surrender America's sovereignty to an unelected, unaccountable, global bureaucracy.”

Biden Reverses Course 

Just as it was expected that the Trump administration would withdraw from the treaty, it has been expected that the Biden administration would seek to rejoin, and even push for ratification.  

“I have come from Washington, D.C., this week to take the floor on the agenda item Treaty Universalization to underscore the continuing commitment of the United States to responsible international trade in conventional arms,” William Malzahn, deputy director for Conventional Arms Threat Reduction in the Department of State, said at the 7th Conference of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty. 

“The United States has long supported strong and effective national controls on the international transfer of conventional arms, and the Arms Trade Treaty is an important tool [for] promoting those controls internationally,” Malzahn added. “The new CAT Policy will better frame the intent and priorities of the Biden/Harris administration and formalize the approach of the administration as adopted on arms transfer decisions that have been in effect since President Biden entered the White House in January.”

Gun Registration Plan? 

The Arms Trade Treaty could go further than reducing conflict, warned critics. The NRA has said that it could require all firearms purchased by Americans to be tracked, and guns registered to ensure compliance with the treaty. 

“ATT has consequences for American gun owners,” the NRA said in a statement via its official social media account on Twitter. “If the UN gets its way, its deliberately undefined & loose terminology will be used to mandate the provision of personal info related to any American that purchases a firearm manufactured overseas to the origin country’s govt.”

“This is the first step towards creating a global firearms registry,” the group added.

Since taking office in January, President Joe Biden has pushed for gun control, including calling for enhanced background checks, banning the sale of parts that can allow individuals to build their own firearms and even calling for a ban on many popular semi-automatic rifles. The president also has sought to overturn a law that would allow firearms companies to be sued when their products are used in illegal activities. 

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He regularly writes about military small arms, and is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com. 

Image: Reuters

En quelques années, un supposé pragmatisme a balayé le plurilinguisme de l'Union au profit de l'anglais obligatoire. Dans la société tout entière, cette mutation amorcée depuis le milieu du XXe siècle connaît une phénoménale accélération sous l'influence d'Internet. / États-Unis, Europe, Russie, Internet, (...) / États-Unis, Europe, Russie, Internet, Langue, Médias, Mutation, Presse, Francophonie - 2016/06

Michael Peck

World War II, Asia

When the United States saw a chance for payback in April 1943, there was no hesitation.

Here's What You Need to Know: Yamamoto’s death was significant on the symbolic level. But in military terms, he was just another casualty of war.

America had broken Tokyo's codes and was able to prepare an ambush.

This time, the target wasn’t a terrorist. It was the Japanese admiral who planned the Pearl Harbor operation. But the motive was the same: payback for a sneak attack on the United States.

In early 1943, Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto, commander in chief of the Japanese Navy, was one of the most hated men in America. He was seen as the Asian Devil in naval dress, the fiend who treacherously struck peaceful, sleeping America. And when the United States saw a chance for payback in April 1943, there was no hesitation. Hence a code name unmistakable in its intent: Operation Vengeance.

As with today’s drone strikes, the operation began with an intercepted message. Except it wasn’t a call from a cell phone, but rather a routine military radio signal. In the spring of 1943, Japan was in trouble: the Americans had captured Guadalcanal despite a terrible sacrifice of Japanese ships and aircraft. Stung by criticism that senior commanders were not visiting the front to ascertain the situation, Yamamoto resolved to visit naval air units on the South Pacific island of Bougainville.

As was customary, a coded signal was sent on April 13, 1943, to the various Japanese commands in the area, listing the admiral’s itinerary as well as the number of transport planes and fighter escorts in his party. But American codebreakers had been reading Japanese diplomatic and military messages for years, including those in the JN-25 code, used in various forms by the Imperial Navy throughout World War II. The Yamamoto signal was sent in the new JN-25D variant, but that didn’t stop American cryptanalysts from deciphering it in less than a day.

Adm. Chester Nimitz, the U.S. commander in the Pacific, authorized an operation to shoot down Yamamoto’s plane. With typical spleen, Pacific Fleet commander William “Bull” Halsey issued his own unambiguous message: “TALLY HO X LET’S GET THE BASTARD.”

Yet getting Yamamoto was easier said than done. Navy and Marine fighters like the F4F Wildcat and F4U Corsair didn’t have the range to intercept Yamamoto’s aircraft over Bougainville, four hundred miles from the nearest American air base on Guadalcanal. The only fighter with long enough legs was the U.S. Army Air Forces’ twin-engined Lockheed P-38G Lightning.

But even the P-38s faced a difficult task. To avoid detection, American planners wanted them to fly “at least 50 miles offshore of these islands, which meant dead-reckoning over 400 miles over water at fifty feet or less, a prodigious feat of navigation,” according to a history of the Thirteenth Fighter Command, the parent organization of the 339th Fighter Squadron that flew the mission.

Even worse, the Lightnings had no AWACS radar aircraft or land-based radar to guide them to the target, or even to tell them where Yamamoto’s plane was. Nor could the U.S. aircraft loiter over Bougainville in the midst of numerous Japanese fighter bases. They would essentially have to intercept Yamamoto where and when he was scheduled to be.

However, by calculating the speed of the Japanese G4M Betty bomber that would carry Yamamoto, probable wind speed, the enemy’s probable flight path, and assuming that Yamamoto would be as punctual as he was reputed to be, American planners estimated the intercept would occur at 9:35 a.m.

The Americans assigned eighteen P-38s for the mission, of which a flight of four would pounce on Yamamoto’s plane, while the remainder would climb above as top cover against Japanese fighters. Two Lightnings aborted on the way to Bougainville, leaving just sixteen to perform the mission.

That the Americans arrived just a minute early, at 9:34, was remarkable. Even more remarkable was that the Japanese appeared on time a minute later. Flying at 4,500 feet were two Betty bombers, one carrying Yamamoto and the other his chief of staff, Vice Admiral Matome Ugaki. They were escorted by six A6M Zero fighters keeping watch 1,500 feet above them.

Still undetected, twelve Lightnings climbed to eighteen thousand feet. The remaining four attacked the Bettys, with the first pair, flown by Capt. Thomas Lanphier Jr. and Lt. Rex Barber, closing in for the kill. As the two bombers dived to evade the interceptors, the American pilots couldn’t even be sure which one carried Yamamoto.

Lanphier engaged the escorts while Barber pursued the two bombers. Barber’s cannon shells and bullets slammed into the first Betty, an aircraft model notorious for being fragile and flammable. With its left engine damaged, it slammed into the jungle. Then the second Betty, attacked by three of the P-38s, crashed into the water. The Americans had lucked out again: the Betty that crashed into the jungle, killing its crew and passengers, had carried Yamamoto. From the Betty that hit the water, Admiral Ugaki survived (hours after Emperor Hirohito announced Japan’s surrender on August 15, 1945, Ugaki took off in a kamikaze and was never heard from again).

A Japanese search party hacked through the jungle until they found Yamamoto’s plane. “Afterward the Admiral’s body and the others were cremated and the ashes put into boxes,” recounts the Thirteenth Fighter Command history. “His cremation pit was filled, and two papaya trees, his favorite fruit, were planted on the mound. A shrine was erected, and Japanese naval personnel cared for the graves until the end of the war.”

Yamamoto’s remains were returned to Japan aboard the super battleship Musashi in May 1943 for a state funeral that drew a million mourners. For the Americans, euphoria and satisfaction were dogged by postwar controversy that lasted for sixty years over who actually shot down Yamamoto’s plane: Barber and Lanphier were credited with a half kill apiece, though many critics said Barber should have received full credit.

The irony was that Yamamoto was not the worst of America’s enemies. He was no pacifist, but nor was he as militaristic as the hard-core Japanese hard-liners. Yamamoto opposed the 1940 alliance with Nazi Germany, which he feared would drag Japan into a ruinous war. While he didn’t oppose war as a means of saving Japan from a crippling U.S. oil embargo in 1941 (his depiction as a peacemonger in the movie Tora! Tora! Tora! is wrong), he did warn Japanese leaders that “in the first six to twelve months of a war with the United States and Great Britain, I will run wild and win victory upon victory. But then, if the war continues after that, I have no expectation of success.”

Did Yamamoto’s death affect the war? His Pearl Harbor operation was audacious and brilliant, but his poor strategy at Midway six months later destroyed Japan’s elite aircraft carrier force (ironically, it was also U.S. codebreaking that set the stage for the Midway disaster). By 1943, he was a sick and exhausted man. Perhaps he might have come up with a better late-war naval strategy than the disastrous battles of the Philippine Sea and Leyte Gulf. Yet not even the architect of Pearl Harbor could save Japan from defeat.

Yamamoto’s assassination is still significant because it has been cited as a precedent for today’s drone strikes. To be clear, there is no doubt that assassinating Yamamoto was legal according to the laws of war. He was an enemy soldier in uniform, flying in an enemy military aircraft that was attacked by uniformed U.S. military personnel in marked military aircraft. This is nothing new. In 1942, British commandos unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate Rommel, and modern militaries devote great efforts to locating enemy headquarters to kill commanders and staffs.

But what’s really interesting is that compared with the controversy over today’s targeted assassinations, there was remarkably little fuss made over the decision to kill Yamamoto. The U.S. military treated it as a purely military matter that didn’t need civilian approval. Admiral Nimitz authorized the interception, and the orders were passed down the military chain of command. There was no presidential decision nor Justice Department review. It’s hard to imagine that the killing of a top Al Qaeda leader, let alone a top Russian, Chinese or North Korean commander, would be treated so routinely.

Yamamoto’s death was significant on the symbolic level. But in military terms, he was just another casualty of war.

Michael Peck is a contributing writer for the National Interest. He can be found on Twitter and Facebook.

This article first appeared in September 2019.

Image: Wikimedia Commons

May 12, 2018 marked NORAD’s 60th anniversary.

Pursuant to last February’s Biden–Trudeau virtual summit, defense heads from the US and Canada reaffirmed on August 14th that NORAD (North American Aerospace Defense Command) modernization is an integral part of North American homeland defense. In coping against the growly complex security threats posed by strategic competitors’ technologically advanced weapons, such as hypersonic glide vehicles, the two neighboring nations put forward stronger “coordinated investments” in upgrading the early warning and surveillance capabilities of the North Warning System (NWS). In particular, the upgrade plan prioritizes the installation of next-generation over-the-horizon radar and an all-domain multi-layered sensor network for enhanced “situational awareness.” These priorities will essentially be accompanied by the installation of efficient data-processing tools and a resilient communication network system, paving the path for “modernized joint command and control systems.” The two neighboring nations’ commitment to NORAD modernization promises a brighter future of “maintaining North America as a secure base for active engagement around the world,” especially in the upcoming era of constructively inevitable great power competition.

Bolstering U.S.–Canada security cooperation through NORAD modernization was one of the cornerstone agendas discussed in the Roadmap for a Renewed U.S.–Canada Partnership, which was the fruitful product of the Biden–Trudeau virtual bilateral summit last February. What lies at the crux of the revitalization of the 63-year-old defense pact in a timely manner is the operational concepts of SHIELD (Strategic Homeland Integrated Ecosystem for Layered Defense). The strategic initiative focuses on cultivating a new generation defense ‘ecosystem’ of continental defense in areas of ‘domain awareness,’ ‘Joint All-Domain Command and Control(JADC2),’ and ‘defeat mechanism.’ Domain awareness proposes to integrate data from both existing NSW/maritime sensors and new sensors into a central repository of a multi-layered sensor network, instead of letting each sensor type gather data in a single platform. The multi-layered aspect of the system allows the augmentation of its detection and surveillance capabilities by adding layers of a globally operating sensor network, such as a space-based radar sensor network. Through ‘JADC2,’ integrated data are then processed with boosted global interconnection and interoperability among all military domain (Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, Navy, Space Force and Cyber Command) in the form of a cloud-connected platform, providing real-time cloud-based/AI-powered data analytics critical to key decision-makers’ optimal decision-making capability, or ‘decision superiority.’ Finally, the defeat mechanism takes a cost-effective approach to prevent the unnecessary field allocation of global forces by focusing on key areas of North American continental defense. Simply put, hardening the SHIELD means strengthening detection, deterrence, and defeat capabilities by equipping key decision-makers with cutting-edge threat/risk assessment capacities through a globally interconnected/interoperable all domain ‘single pane of glass.’ In this way, key decision makers can strategically think of situationally feasible deterrence/de-escalation/defeat options ahead of their adversaries. SHIELD aligns with Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s recent call for the Department of Defense’s renewed concept of deterrence, ‘Integrated Deterrence,’ which aims to enhance the security readiness and resiliency of the Alliance in coping against systematic security challenges posed by strategic competitors. The basic logic of integrated deterrence is to elevate cold-war era ‘deterrence by denial’ to a new level by “denying adversaries the ability to threaten the global connectivity on which we all rely on.”

NORAD Modernization Means a Vast Array of New Opportunities for Canada

Despite its costly price tag, if met with the right, and futuristic, PPP (Public Private Partnership) solutions, NORAD modernization can provide Canada with a vast array of new opportunities. It will not only nourish related defense technologies, notably quantum computing, machine learning, data analytics, and AI, in which Canada is already one of the global leaders. But its side-benefits will also politico-economically leverage Canada’s global engagement practices, especially in the Arctic. Indeed, it was mentioned in the defense head joint agreement that NORAD modernization includes “investments to upgrade and modernize the infrastructure required to support robust NORAD operations, including in our Arctic and northern regions.” When it come to the Arctic in the upcoming era of great power competition, Canada needs stronger North American Arctic leadership to facilitate incrementally sustainable development of the Arctic (which meets the indigenous populations’ and locals’ politico-economic demands). Under the current political climate, it could probably start from rare earth mineral development and accrued Artic fleets to secure the supply chain routes.

Mohammad Javad Mousavizadeh

Afghanistan, Middle East

While Americans are concerned about their military equipment left in Afghanistan after the Taliban takeover, Iran may benefit from the equipment for research purposes or other goals. 

Back when American officials thought Iran would remain an important ally, Iran bought sophisticated arms and defense equipment from the United States for both political and economic reasons. In fact, Iran was the largest single purchaser of U.S. military equipment before the Islamic Revolution in 1979, and U.S. military sales to Iran increased dramatically between 1972 and 1976. But since the Islamic revolution, Iran has been sanctioned by major powers and has not purchased modern equipment from the West.

Some analysts believe that the collapse of the Afghan government, the Taliban takeover, and the U.S. withdrawal have created an opportunity for Iran to pursue its regional goals in Afghanistan.

Recently, some controversial pictures published on social media appear to show a convoy of trailer trucks allegedly transporting U.S. military equipment taken from Afghanistan into Iran.

Based on unofficial reports, Iran purchased Humvees and MRAPs (light armored vehicles) from the Taliban for research and reverse engineering.

President Joe Biden has faced sharp criticism after pictures surfaced showing U.S. defense materials in Taliban hands.

Days before reports of Iran’s alleged purchase emerged, Representative James Comer (R-KY) and Representative Glenn Grothman (R-WI) wrote a letter to Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin requesting information on the Pentagon's plans to recover American weapons left in Afghanistan.

“We are left wondering if the Biden Administration has a plan to prevent the Taliban from using our weapons against the U.S. or its allies, or selling them to foreign adversaries, like China, Russia, Iran, or North Korea,” the lawmakers wrote.

In addition, former President Donald Trump stated that “all equipment should be demanded to be immediately returned to the United States, and that includes every penny of the $85 billion dollars in cost.”

While Iranian and American authorities have not yet commented on the images, it is clear that they amount to a new blow for Biden.

Bismillah Mohammadi, Afghanistan’s defense minister before the Taliban takeover, tweeted one of the images circulating online, calling Iran a “bad neighbor.” “Afghanistan’s bad days won’t last forever,” Mohammadi added in the same tweet.

Some observers believe that the Taliban will need an influx of foreign money to boost the war-torn Afghan economy. Selling off some of their new trophies and assets could provide the Taliban with the funds necessary to run Afghanistan’s public sectors and rebuild the country’s infrastructure.

“Iran probably made deals with the Taliban to buy some of these vehicles and equipment for research and reproduction purposes. So if American helicopter and airplane parts get into the hands of the Iranian government, it will be life-changing for military aircraft development,” wrote Goran Kesic, an intelligence analyst, in a social media post.

Although the commander of U.S. Central Command, General Kenneth Franklin McKenzie, Jr., asserts that U.S. aircraft left in Afghanistan are inoperable and will never fly again, they could still be useful for reverse engineering by Iran or other American adversaries.

Months before the collapse of the Afghanistan government, Iran ramped up its diplomatic outreach to the Taliban. Some reports assert that Iran has provided military support to the Taliban in a bid to accelerate America’s withdrawal from the country. Tehran has denied such claims.

“Iran has provided the Taliban with financial support and training,” said a senior defense intelligence official during a Pentagon news briefing about a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report on Iran.

Some reports suggest that in recent years, Iran and the Taliban have worked together and independently against their common American enemy. If this cooperation continues, it should be expected that some U.S. military equipment, rendered useless or not, will be delivered to Iran for reverse engineering.

According to Taliban officials, 2,000 armored vehicles, including U.S. Humvees, and up to forty aircraft—potentially including Black Hawk helicopters, scout attack helicopters, and military drones—are under the extremist group's control.

However, it remains to be seen if American weapons will fall into the hands of other armed groups such as Al Qaeda—the terrorist nemesis of the United States—and if the Biden administration has a plan to prevent these weapons from being used to harm U.S. national interests.

Mohammad Javad Mousavizadeh is a journalist and analyst in international affairs and foreign policy. He has written many articles for digital publications worldwide, such as The Free Press, Khabar Online News Agency, Foreign Policy News, SNA of Japan, The Levant News, Eastern Herald, Modern Diplomacy, Menafn, MilliChronicle, and South Front. Also, He is an English translator for Iranian newspapers and news agencies. He has translated tens of articles from English to Persian for media in Iran such as Shahrvand Newspaper, Mardom Salarinewspaper, Etemad newspaper, Hamdeli newspaper, etc.

Image: Reuters.

Robert Farley

Israel, Israel

Israel has little indigenous aircraft manufacturing but still outpaces all its geographic peers.

Here's What You Need to Know: Israel’s current aerospace strategy depends on the health of its relationship with the United States. This is true both in terms of the availability of platforms, and in ongoing mutual technological development.

Since the 1960s, the air arm of the Israel Defense Forces (colloquially the IAF) has played a central role in the country’s defense. The ability of the Israeli Air Force to secure the battlefield and the civilian population from enemy air attack has enabled the IDF to fight at a huge advantage. At the same time, the IAF has demonstrated strategic reach, attacking critical targets at considerable distance.

The dominance of the IAF has come about through effective training, the weakness of its foes, and a flexible approach to design and procurement. Over the years, the Israelis have tried various strategies for filling their air force with fighters, including buying from France, buying from the United States and building the planes themselves. They seem to have settled on a combination of the last two, with great effect.

Israel’s Early Technological Base

In its early years, Israel took what weapons it could from what buyers it could find. This meant that the IDF often operated with equipment of a variety of vintages, mostly secured from European producers. By the late 1950s, however, Israel had secured arms transfer relationships with several countries, most notably the United Kingdom and France. The relationship with France eventually blossomed, resulting in the transfer of high-technology military equipment, including Mirage fighters (and also significant technical assistance for Israel’s nuclear program). These Mirage fighters formed the core of the IAF in the 1967 Six-Day War, in which Israel largely destroyed its neighbors’ air forces in the first hours of the conflict.

In 1967, however, France imposed an arms embargo on Israel, which left Tel Aviv in a quandary. The IDF needed more fighters, and also sought capabilities that the Mirage could not provide, including medium-range ground strike. Under these conditions, the Israelis adopted the time-honored strategy of simply stealing what they needed. To complement their existing airframes, the Israelis acquired technical blueprints of the Mirage through espionage (possibly with the tolerance of some French authorities). The project resulted in two fighters, the Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) Nesher and the IAI Kfir. The second employed more powerful American designed engines, and for a time served as the primary fighter of the IDF’s air arm. Both aircraft enjoyed export success, with the Nesher serving in Argentina and the Kfir flying for Colombia, Ecuador and Sri Lanka.

This investment helped drive the development of Israel’s aerospace sector, with big implications for the rest of Israel’s economy. Heavy state investment in military technological development does not always drive broader innovations in civilian technology. In this case, however, state investment provided a key pillar for the early development of Israel’s civilian technology sector. To many, the success of the Kfir suggested that Israel could stand on its own in aerospace technology, eliminating the need to rely on a foreign sponsor.

Nevertheless, Israel continued to invest heavily in foreign aircraft. The IDF began acquiring F-4 Phantoms in the late 1960s, and F-15 Eagles in the mid-1970s. The arrival of the latter in Israel inadvertently sparked a political crisis, as the first four aircraft landed after the beginning of the Sabbath. The ensuing controversy eventually brought down the first premiership of Yitzhak Rabin. But many in Israel, still buoyed by the relative success of the Kfir and hopeful about further developing Israel’s high-tech sector, believed that the country could aspire to develop its own fighter aircraft.

Enter the Lavi. Like its counterparts in both the USSR and the United States, the IDF air arm believed that a high/low mix of fighters best served its needs. This led to the development of the Lavi, a light multirole fighter that could complement the F-15 Eagles that Israel continued to acquire from the United States. The Lavi filled the niche that the F-16 Viper would eventually come to dominate. It included some systems licensed by the United States, and visually resembled an F-16 with a different wing configuration.

But the military-technological environment had changed. Developing the Lavi from scratch (or virtually from scratch) required an enormous state investment for an aircraft that had marginal, if any, advantages over an off-the-shelf F-16. Moreover, the United States took export controls much more seriously than France, and had a much more dangerous toolkit for enforcing compliance. Despite initial optimism about the export prospects of the Lavi, it soon became apparent to Israelis that the United States would not allow the wide export of a fighter that included significant American components. That the Lavi would have competed directly against the F-16 only exacerbated the problem.

In August 1987, the Israeli cabinet killed the Lavi, which caused protests from IAI and the workers associated with the project. Nevertheless, a political effort to revive the plane failed, and Israel eventually acquired a large number of F-16s. In its afterlife, however, the Lavi helped kill the export prospects of the F-22 Raptor; out of concern that Israel had shared Lavi (and thus F-16) technology with the Chinese (leading to the J-10), the U.S. Congress prohibited any export of the F-22. This decision prevented Israel and several other interested buyers from acquiring the Raptor, and undoubtedly cut short its overall production life.

Alternatives

Instead of pursuing its own fighters, Israel has lately preferred to extensively modify the aircraft it buys from the United States. The F-15I “Thunder” and the F-16I “Storm” have both received major upgrades to optimize them for Israeli service. Both planes have increased range and improved avionics, enabling the IDF to fight effectively at great distance from its bases. The F-15I, a variant of the F-15E Strike Eagle, is the IAF’s most important long-range strike platform. The IAF has already undertaken steps to make the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter more suitable for Israeli service, including advanced software modifications.

IAI has continued to see great success, despite the lack of a major fighter project. IAI has thrived on developing and exporting components for domestic as well as export use, including munitions and avionics. IAI has also gone big into the UAV market, with major success both within Israel and abroad. And despite the failure of the Lavi, Israel’s high-tech defense sector has done well, will considerable spillover into the civilian economy. Israeli state industrial policy focuses on exactly this goal: supplying investment for high-tech innovation that facilitates both national defense and economic growth.

Israel’s current aerospace strategy depends on the health of its relationship with the United States. This is true both in terms of the availability of platforms, and in ongoing mutual technological development. Fortunately for Israel, there is little reason to believe that this aspect of the U.S.-Israel alliance will decay anytime soon. Concern over the security of the F-22 stopped export of the Raptor, but didn’t dent the overall relationship. And even if the unimaginable occurred, and Israel needed to look elsewhere from the United States, the proficiency of Israeli industry in developing components and support systems means that it would not lack long for a partner.

Dr. Robert Farley has taught security and diplomacy courses at the Patterson School since 2005.  He received his BS from the University of Oregon in 1997, and his Ph.D. from the University of Washington in 2004.  Dr. Farley is the author of Grounded: The Case for Abolishing the United States Air Force (University Press of Kentucky, 2014), the Battleship Book (Wildside, 2016), and Patents for Power: Intellectual Property Law and the Diffusion of Military Technology (University of Chicago, 2020). He has contributed extensively to a number of journals and magazines, including the National Interest, the Diplomat: APAC, World Politics Review, and the American Prospect.  Dr. Farley is also a founder and senior editor of Lawyers, Guns and Money. 

This article first appeared in 2016.

Image: Reuters.

Michael Peck

Stealth Fighters, Americas

The endless race between stealth technology and the sensors that seek to penetrate its veil continues.

Here's What You Need to Know: Stealth may have hit a brick wall.

Did the Pentagon admit that stealth technology may not work anymore? Or that America must be ready to face a future where its airpower doesn't control the skies?

DARPA, the Pentagon's cutting-edge research agency, has quietly raised these possibilities as it searches for future technology to fight the next war. And stealth technology may not be the answer.

“Platform stealth may be approaching physical limits,” says DARPA.

The agency also admits that “our acquisition system is finding it difficult to respond on relevant timescales to adversary progress, which has made the search for next-generation capabilities at once more urgent and more futile.”

If that’s the case, then the next generation of aircraft—the designs that will eventually replace the F-22, F-35 and B-2 stealth aircraft—may not be any stealthier than their predecessors. Or, in the endless race between stealth technology and the sensors that seek to penetrate its veil, stealth may have hit a brick wall.

Thus, DARPA has to ask a question that America has never really had to contemplate before. “Are there acceptable alternatives to air dominance?” DARPA asks. “Is it possible to achieve Joint Force objectives without clearing the skies of enemy fighters and bombers, and eliminating all surface-based threats? Can this be achieved without placing a high-value, sophisticated platform and crew at risk—reducing leverage potential adversaries currently hold over the U.S.?”

DARPA says it wants to see if it's possible to “go beyond evolutionary advances in stealth technology and disrupt traditional doctrines of air dominance/air supremacy?”

But the traditional U.S. way of war since 1941 has been to seek control of the skies: though there have been rough patches, such as the Pacific War in 1941 and the Bomber Offensive over Germany in 1943–44, America has largely succeeded in clearing the skies of enemy planes and filling them with its own. Few Americans alive today have ever been bombed by aircraft, which is more than America’s enemies can say.

But those days are gone, as Russia and now China are developing stealth aircraft and lethal anti-aircraft missiles.

Now, DARPA is looking for other ways that U.S airpower can accomplish its objectives even without air superiority, such as “lethality through a combination of overwhelming performance (e.g. hypersonics) and overwhelming numbers (e.g. swarming low-cost weapons).”

Indeed, the Pentagon's pet research agency seems to be taking a swipe at the concept of small numbers of expensive aircraft like the F-35 stealth fighter and B-2 stealth bomber when it calls for “reduced reliance on increasingly complex, monolithic platforms.”

Similarly, “how can we reduce reliance on large, expensive, and increasingly vulnerable carrier strike group platforms?” DARPA asks.

It sees one possible solution as “small, inexpensive, massively-networked vessels derived from commercial designs.” That same approach also applies to space, as the United States moves away from “monolithic, high-value space assets and instruments” in favor of smaller, simpler and cheaper satellites and launch vehicles.

On land, DARPA suggests the future of war will be smaller and more lethal ground units operating without the immense infrastructure of forward operating bases and long supply lines. The agency envisions autonomous “terranets” (presumably AI-controlled) that will coordinate the activities of brigade-sized formations of manned and unmanned units, as they battle in the darkness of the emerging domain of subterranean warfare.

Interestingly, the example of future ground combat that DARPA cites is “Starship Troopers,” the legendary sci-fi novel and movies of troops in powered armor. But Robert Heinlein’s novel was really Iwo Jima and Okinawa in space.

Whether DARPA’s vision is prophetic or just premature remains to be seen.

Michael Peck is a contributing writer for the National Interest. He can be found on Twitter and Facebook.

This article first appeared in July 2018.

Image: U.S. Marine Corps photo by Staff Sgt. John Tetrault

Robert Farley

Navy, Europe

The canceled Lions would have had no trouble facing any competing German or Italian designs.

Here's What You Need To Remember: Even after the completion of Anson and Howe, the demands of other ships (including aircraft carriers) took priority over the Lions. Work continued only on HMS Vanguard, which became the final British battleship completed.

The five battleships of the King George V class served the Royal Navy honorably during the war, participating in the destruction of the battleships Bismarck and Scharnhorst along with an array of other missions. HMS Vanguard, the last battleship ever built by the United Kingdom, did not enter service until after the war. Neither of these classes, however, were the apogee of British battleship design. Instead, the Lion class—a group of six ships of advanced design and high capabilities—were initially intended to lead the battlefleet of the Royal Navy in its next war. But the war came too soon, and the Lions never saw service.

Post-Treaty

The Royal Navy entered the mid-1930s with an odd assortment of capital ships, including the two intermediate ships of the Nelson class and a variety of modernized and unmodernized battleships and battlecruisers. Reconstruction of HMS Hood, the Renown class battlecruisers, and the Queen Elizabeth class battleships was hoped to bring these ships up to modern standards, but the Navy still required new vessels. The five ships of the King George V class, while excellent ships, remained creatures of the interwar Treaty system. Bound to 35,000 tons, they carried 14” weapons in part because of a desire to adhere to the Second London Naval Treaty, and in part out of other design requirements. When it became clear that Japan would unbind itself from the terms of the London Naval Treaty, the restrictions on battleship designs eased considerably.

Initial design work for the Lions, the first post-Treaty British battleships, began in 1938 and envisioned a ship of 45,000-ton full load, armed with nine 16” guns in three triple turrets. The secondary armament and armor scheme would have been similar to the King George V class, with dual-purpose 5.25” guns. The ships would have made 28 knots, roughly the same speed at the King George Vs but somewhat slower than extant British aircraft carriers, and considerably slower than the American Iowa class. The Lions also remedied the short range of the King George Vs, which proved an operational as well as a strategic drawback. The ships would have taken on classic Royal Navy capital ship names, including Lion, Temeraire, Conqueror and Thunderer. Two other ships were projected, but never received names. Lion and Temeraire were laid down in 1939, while Conqueror and Thunderer were projected for 1940 and 1941.

Redesign

As was the case in World War I, however, the advent of war delayed the construction of the large battleships. Anticipating the need for smaller vessels (especially in the anti-submarine campaign), the British government decided to abandon the new battleships, proceeding only with the construction of HMS Vanguard, a unique vessel intended for service in the Pacific, and the completion of Anson and Howe, the last two ships of the King George V class. Construction on Lion and Temeraire ceased completely in 1940.

The delay gave the Royal Navy time to reconsider the design and incorporate war-time lessons. A 1942 modification of the design made the Lions a bit beamier in order to remedy concerns over torpedo protection. Horizontal protection against bombs also improved, in part because of the destruction of HMS Prince of Wales off Malaya in December 1941.

However, time did not ease the demands on British shipbuilding. Even after the completion of Anson and Howe, the demands of other ships (including aircraft carriers) took priority over the Lions. Work continued only on HMS Vanguard. This further delay gave the Royal Navy additional time to rethink the design of the Lions, and a variety of proposals for larger and smaller ships (including, at one point, a hybrid battleship-aircraft carrier) were considered and rejected. No further battleships would be laid down during the war.

Postwar Thinking

Even late in the war, the Admiralty had not completely given up on the idea of battleships. The Iowa class seemed to offer a useful template for battleships in a peacetime navy, and even HMS Vanguard served capably in a “showing the flag” role. The Soviets, for whatever reason, also persisted in battleship design, at least as long as Stalin lived. But it became clear that the existing fleet was sufficient for whatever the Royal Navy might need in terms of battleships, and that there was little to be gained from constructing new 16” gunned ships.

Parting Shots

In most configurations, the Lions would have been somewhat smaller, somewhat slower, slightly better protected Iowas, more effective than the U.S. North Carolina and South Dakota classes. Lion likely would have had little trouble with the latest German or Italian battleships, in part because of the latter’s fiscal inability to compete with the Royal Navy, and the former’s habitual inability to competently design battleships. Of course, they would have suffered badly under the guns of the Japanese Yamatos, but then they were far less expensive and in many ways more useful than those behemoths.

That the design process continued as long as it did is a testament both to the longevity of Great Britain imperial pretensions, and to the belief that battleships would remain an important factor in naval warfare. The late 1940s, which combined the increasing lethality of shipborne aircraft with the financial inability of the Royal Navy to maintain its existing fleet, disabused Britain of both these notions.

Dr. Robert Farley has taught security and diplomacy courses at the Patterson School since 2005.  He received his BS from the University of Oregon in 1997, and his Ph.D. from the University of Washington in 2004.  Dr. Farley is the author of Grounded: The Case for Abolishing the United States Air Force (University Press of Kentucky, 2014), the Battleship Book (Wildside, 2016), and Patents for Power: Intellectual Property Law and the Diffusion of Military Technology (University of Chicago, 2020). He has contributed extensively to a number of journals and magazines, including the National Interest, the Diplomat: APAC, World Politics Review, and the American Prospect.  Dr. Farley is also a founder and senior editor of Lawyers, Guns and Money.

This article first appeared in August 2019. It is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: Wikipedia.

Ethen Kim Lieser

economy, Americas

The agency had previously reported that it still has more than thirty-five million individual and business tax returns to process—a massive backlog that is four times bigger compared to the end of the 2019 filing season. 

Over the past several months, the Internal Revenue Service has worked tirelessly to promptly issue tens of millions of $1,400 stimulus checks and the monthly expanded child tax credits—not to mention the traditional tax refunds from federal returns.  

Largely due to the ongoing coronavirus pandemic and staffing shortages, the agency had previously reported that it still has more than thirty-five million individual and business tax returns to process—a massive backlog that is four times bigger compared to the end of the 2019 filing season. Also, due to the stimulus checks sent out over the past year and a half, the IRS has been adding to that backlog by mailing out millions of “math-error” notices to taxpayers saying that they owe more money.  

Delays All-Around 

Against this concerning backdrop, the Taxpayer Advocate Service (TAS) recently pinpointed an array of logistical problems that have caused major delays for its team of advocates, who are tasked with assisting the nation’s taxpayers resolve IRS-related issues.  

“I am painfully aware that taxpayers are experiencing more delays with the IRS this year than usual,” national taxpayer advocate Erin Collins, wrote in a blog post.  

“Our advocates have been handling unusually high levels of inventory for the last year,” she said in the blog post. “The past two filing seasons have been particularly difficult. On top of dealing with personal, medical, and financial challenges brought on by COVID-19, taxpayers have struggled to get advice and answers from the IRS, and millions of refunds are still pending.”

Collins added that taxpayers are being forced to wait an average of eighty minutes when they call the TAS for assistance. Moreover, “courtesy disconnects”—or getting hung up on—have become increasingly common.  

“The IRS’s level of service on its toll-free telephone lines has been at all-time lows, paper correspondence and paper returns have added other complexities and delays throughout the year, and many taxpayers are still waiting for their returns to be processed or their refunds to be paid,” Collins wrote, adding that the office is expecting two hundred fifty-three thousand cases this year, up from a hundred sixty-seven thousand in 2017.  

“Due to the high volume of calls and cases we have been receiving, we have struggled to meet our own deadlines and expectations,” she added. “Our seventy-nine local office telephone lines are receiving over twenty thousand calls each week.”  

Calls for More Funding 

Not surprisingly, Collins is recommending that Congress provide more funding.  

“As Congress focuses on the IRS’s budget, it should continue to allocate appropriate funds to protect taxpayer rights, including the right to quality service,” Collins wrote.  

“As taxpayer challenges continue to increase, I believe it is also critical that Congress and the IRS adequately fund and staff TAS, which serves (or is intended to serve) as the ‘safety net’ for taxpayers who face immediate financial hardship or fall through the cracks of IRS bureaucracy, so we can provide timely assistance,” she continued.  

Ethen Kim Lieser is a Washington state-based Science and Tech Editor who has held posts at Google, The Korea Herald, Lincoln Journal Star, AsianWeek, and Arirang TV. Follow or contact him on LinkedIn.  

Image: Reuters

Michael Peck

Submarines, Asia

The country's most recent efforts have used high-tech methods, such as magnets and lasers, rather than improving traditional sonar.

Here's What You Need to Know: The U.S.-China rivalry is moving underwater.

China is making great efforts to detect U.S. submarines.

Scientists at a Chinese research institute say they developed an airborne laser that might eventually detect hostile subs even at great depths.

Meanwhile, scientists at another institute also claim to have developed a magnetic detection device that might spot subs.

Researchers at the Shanghai Institute of Optics and Fine Mechanics say they have tested lasers that can detect objects more than 160 meters (525 feet) beneath the water, or twice as deep as current equipment.

“The Shanghai team used a beam generated by green and blue lasers,” according to the South China Morning Post. “As light – even laser, a pure, coherent form of light – scatters faster in water than in air, the beam must be very powerful to go deep. Laser devices generate an energized beam of light of a single color, or frequency. Green and blue beams can penetrate water with relative ease.

“Chen’s team also developed a highly sensitive detector that can pick up a single photon reflected from a target, allowing the device to detect bright objects close to the surface as well as targets hidden in the deep.”

A team at the Wuhan Institute of Physics and Mathematics say they have devised a magnetic detection sensor that can fit into a capsule the size of a bean. “The device can pick up signals as weak as 20 femtotesla, or about one-fifth the strength of the magnetic field generated by a human brain,” explained the South China Morning Post.

“Although other devices known as magnetic anomaly detectors are much more sensitive, they are bulkier and can only be mounted on planes or helicopters,” the Post added. “Magnetic anomaly detectors used in anti-submarine warfare must operate at temperatures near absolute zero and require lasers, power supplies and gas chambers to achieve high sensitivity.”

In 2018, Chinese scientists said they were developing a laser-equipped satellite that could detect submarines. The idea is to use laser beams of various colors that can detect disturbances in the water caused by a moving submarine.

The question is what will make these devices successful when previous efforts have fizzled. For example, in 2010, DARPA's Deep Sea Operations program sought to develop blue-light lasers for undersea  communications and hunting subs. The problem is that orbital laser beams can be affected by clouds, murky water and fish, as well as being scattered in the water.

The new blue-green lasers devised by the Shanghai team reportedly have been tested at lower altitudes, from aircraft flying between 1,500 and 3,000 feet. But aircraft-mounted lasers tend to be low-powered, so it remains to be seen whether the new lasers will be successful in locating deep-diving subs.

As for the Wuhan team’s new magnetic detection sensor, a bean-sized device far smaller than the magnetic anomaly detection (MAD) sensors flown by anti-submarine aircraft would seem to face limitations in power and range.  Even some Chinese scientists contacted by the Post were dubious that the magnetic sensor could be useful without further development.

However, such a bite-sized device could be mounted in unmanned aircraft, raising the possibility of swarms of drones hunting subs. Of course, the U.S. is working on its own sub-hunting solutions, including a yacht-sized robot ship that tracks enemy vessels.

Michael Peck is a contributing writer for the National Interest. He can be found on Twitter and Facebook.

This article first appeared in October 2019.

Image: U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class James Kimber

David Axe

Airpower,

There’s a cold logic in the Air Force’s drive to acquire an arsenal plane.

Here's What You Need to Remember: An arsenal plane with stand-off weapons would increase the Air Force's combat power.

The head of the U.S. Air Force’s Global Strike Command wants to develop a new aircraft type that can function as the command’s “arsenal plane.”

The arsenal plane would carry large numbers of long-range munitions into combat, adding firepower to a main force of fighters.

However, the arsenal plane presumably would not possess the same sensors, performance and stealth qualities that other types possess.

“The arsenal plane concept is probably better described as more of a clean-sheet approach to a platform that can affordably and rapidly fill the gap for long-range strike capabilities, and to go down more innovative paths,” Gen. Timothy Ray told reporters in early April 2020.

This apparently is the first time that a top Air Force officer has insinuated that a new, “clean-sheet” design, rather than an existing type, should fill the arsenal-plane role. The Air Force previously had hinted that the B-1 and B-52 bombers and even airlifters could function as arsenal planes.

“If you look at our force going forward, a lot of the programs that we have are turning the bomber force into something else,” Will Roper, the Air Force’s top weapons-buyer, said at a press event in Washington, D.C. in November 2019. “A B-52 with a lot of hypersonic weapons on it is, I will call it a bomber, but it's certainly not dropping things down—quite the opposite, right? It's almost a missileer instead of a bomber.”

Ray around the same time said that cargo planes could be candidates for the arsenal role. “You have to go look at those options, if you believe you’ll have access to airlift assets to go do that in a time of crisis,” Ray said. “I’m not mentally there, I don’t see how that comes together.”

There’s a cold logic in the Air Force’s drive to acquire an arsenal plane. To preserve their clean, radar-dodging lines, the service’s F-22 and F-35 stealth fighters typically carry their weapons in small internal bays.

The F-22’s standard loadout is four air-to-air missiles and two 1,000-pound bombs. The F-35 can haul just two air-to-air missiles and two 2,000-pound bombs internally. By contrast, many Russian and Chinese fighters, while not stealthy, routinely carry 10 or more missiles and bombs under their fuselages and wings.

American fighter squadrons could fly into combat with far fewer weapons than their opponents could carry. An arsenal plane, lobbing potentially hundreds of missiles from well behind the aerial front line, could help to close the weapons-gap.

The idea is for the fighters to spot targets for the more-vulnerable arsenal planes, allowing the latter to remain farther from the battle. For that reason, an arsenal plane could need sophisticated communications systems, whether it’s a new design or a modification of an existing type.

“This is a little unusual and something (almost) entirely new,” Brian Laslie, author of The Air Force Way of War, told The Daily Beast shortly after the Air Force first announced the arsenal-plane concept. “But with too few fighters carrying too few weapons—and rapidly-arming foes—the Pentagon seems willing to risk something unusual and new.”

David Axe is defense editor at The National Interest. He is the author of the graphic novels War Fix, War Is Boring and Machete Squad. This article first appeared earlier this year and is being republished due to reader interest. 

Image: Reuters. 

Michael Peck

Drones, Asia

The country has successfully exported domestic drone models to developing countries over the past decade.

Here's What You Need to Know: China’s arms exports are slowing after a massive surge over the last few years.

For years, drone warfare has been an essentially American pursuit. The new age of armed robots has been symbolized by Predators and Reapers spewing Hellfire missiles.

But guess who’s the biggest exporter of combat drones? China.

“In 2014–18 China became the largest exporter in the niche market of unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs), with states in the Middle East among the main recipients,” according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, which compiles estimates of global military strength and arms spending.

Indeed, combat drones are spreading across the globe. “The number of countries that import and use unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs)—which are remotely controlled armed aircraft often referred to as armed drones—continued to increase in 2014-18,” SIPRI said.

“There is widespread discussion about the impact of UCAV proliferation on peace and security. China has become the primary exporter of UCAVs. Whereas China exported 10 UCAVs to 2 countries in 2009-13, in 2014-18 it exported 153 to 13 countries—5 of which are in the Middle East: Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In contrast, the United States delivered three UCAVs in 2009-13 and five in 2014-18. In both periods all the deliveries were to the United Kingdom. Iran delivered 10 UCAVs to Syria in 2014-18, while the UAE delivered 2 to Algeria.”

This explains why the U.S. Army, which has been lackadaisical about air defense for years, is now suddenly interested. Nations such as Iran are far inferior to the United States in conventional combat weapons such as tanks and jet fighters, but it doesn’t take much money or advanced technology to strap a bomb onto a small drone that’s hard to detect or shoot down.

China’s arms exports are slowing after a massive surge over the last few years. After nearly tripling between 2004 and 2013, they increased by only 2.7 percent over the 2014 to 2018. Interestingly, China’s more aggressive foreign policy in Asia has hampered its arms exports. “China’s arms exports are limited by the fact that many countries—including 4 of the top 10 arms importers in 2014-18 (India, Australia, South Korea and Vietnam)—will not procure Chinese arms for political reasons,” SIPRI noted.

During the Cold War and after, China was notorious as an exporter of cheap knockoffs of old Soviet hardware such as tanks and jet fighters. Yet China’s push to develop Western-style smart weapons, from aircraft carriers to stealth fighters, appears to be paying economic dividends. “Improvements in Chinese military technology have opened up opportunities for arms export growth, including exports to new custom­ers,” said SIPRI.

“The number of countries to which China delivers major arms has grown significantly over the past few years. In 2014-18 China delivered major arms to 53 countries, compared with 41 in 2009-13 and 32 in 2004-2008. Pakistan was the main recipient (37 per cent) in 2014-18, as it has been for all five-year periods since 1991. China supplied relatively small volumes of major arms to a wide variety of countries: 39 of the 53 recipients in 2014-18 each accounted for less than 1 per cent of total Chinese arms exports.”

However, China’s arms exports haven’t totally dampened Beijing’s appetite for imported—mostly Russian—arms. China was the world’s sixth-largest importer of weapons between 2014 and 2018, down 7 percent from the 2009 to 2013 time period. “Russia accounted for 70 per cent of Chinese arms imports in 2014-18,” SIPRI estimated. “China remains reliant on imports for certain arms technologies such as engines for combat aircraft and large ships as well as long-range air and missile defense systems. Its own arms industry has yet to develop the technological capability to match Rus­sian suppliers in these fields.”

Michael Peck is a contributing writer for the National Interest. He can be found on Twitter and Facebook.

This article first appeared in March 2019.

Image: REUTERS/Jason Lee

Robert Farley

Security, Israel

From lone soldiers to massive submarines, Irael has a modern fighting force.

Here's What You Need to Remember: When considering the effectiveness of Israeli weapons, and the expertise of the men and women who wield them, it’s worth noting that for all the tactical and operational success the IDF has enjoyed, Israel remains in a strategically perilous position.

Since 1948, the state of Israel has fielded a frighteningly effective military machine. Built on a foundation of pre-independence militias, supplied with cast-off World War II weapons, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have enjoyed remarkable success in the field. In the 1960s and 1970s, both because of its unique needs and because of international boycotts, Israel began developing its own military technologies, as well as augmenting the best foreign tech. Today, Israel boasts one of the most technologically advanced military stockpiles in the world, and one of the world’s most effective workforces.

Here are five of the most deadly systems that the Israeli Defense Forces currently employ.

Merkava

The Merkava tank joined the IDF in 1979, replacing the modified foreign tanks (most recently of British and American vintage) that the Israelis had used since 1948. Domestic design and construction avoided problems of unsteady foreign supply, while also allowing the Israelis to focus on designs optimized for their environment, rather than for Central Europe.  Around 1,600 Merkavas of various types have entered service, with several hundred more still on the way.

The Merkava entered service after the great tank battles of the Middle East had ended (at least for Israel). Consequently, the Merkavas have often seen combat in different contexts that their designers expected. The United States took major steps forward with the employment of armor in Iraq and Afghanistan (particularly in the former) in a counter-insurgency context, but the Israelis have gone even farther. After mixed results during the Hezbollah war, the IDF, using updated Merkava IVs, has worked hard to integrate the tanks into urban fighting. In both of the recent Gaza wars, the IDF has used Merkavas to penetrate Palestinian positions while active defense systems keep crews safe. Israel has also developed modifications that enhance the Merkavas’ capabilities in urban and low-intensity combat.

Indeed, the Merkavas have proved so useful in this regard that Israel has cancelled plans to stop line production, despite a lack of significant foreign orders.

F-15I Thunder:

The Israeli Air Force has flown variants of the F-15 since the 1970s, and has become the world’s most versatile and effective user of the Eagle. As Tyler Rogoway’s recent story on the IAF fleet makes clear, the Israelis have perfected the F-15 both for air supremacy and for strike purposes. Flown by elite pilots, the F-15Is (nicknamed “thunder”) of the IAF remain the most lethal squadron of aircraft in the Middle East.

The F-15I provides Israel with several core capabilities. It remains an effective air-to-air combat platform, superior to the aircraft available to Israel’s most plausible foes (although the Eurofighter Typhoons and Dassault Rafales entering service in the Gulf, not to mention Saudi Arabia’s own force of F-15SAs, undoubtedly would provide some competition. But as Rogoway suggests, the Israelis have worked long and hard at turning the F-15 into an extraordinarily effective strike platform, one capable of hitting targets with precision at long range. Most analysts expect that the F-15I would play a key role in any Israeli strike against Iran, along with some of its older brethren.

Jericho III:

The earliest Israeli nuclear deterrent came in the form of the F-4 Phantom fighter-bombers that the IAF used to such great effect in conventional missions in the War of Attrition and the Yom Kippur War. Soon, however, Israel determined that it required a more effective and secure deterrent, and began to invest heavily in ballistic missiles. The Jericho I ballistic missile entered service in the early 1970s, to eventually be replaced by the Jericho II and Jericho III.

The Jericho III is the most advanced ballistic missile in the region, presumably (Israel does not offer much data on its operation) capable of striking targets not only in the Middle East, but also across Europe, Asia, and potentially North America. The Jericho III ensures that any nuclear attack against Israel would be met with devastating retaliation, especially as it is unlikely that Israel could be disarmed by a first strike. Of course, given that no potential Israeli foe has nuclear weapons (or will have them in the next decade, at least), the missiles give Jerusalem presumptive nuclear superiority across the region.

Dolphin:

Israel acquired its first submarine, a former British “S” class, in 1958. That submarine and others acquired in the 1960s played several important military roles, including defense of the Israeli coastline, offensive operations against Egyptian and Syrian shipping, and the delivery of commando teams in war and peace. These early boats were superseded by the Gal class, and finally by the German Dolphin class (really two separate classes related to the Type 212) boats, which are state-of-the-art diesel-electric subs.

The role of the Dolphin-class in Israel’s nuclear deterrent has almost certainly been wildly overstated. The ability of a diesel electric submarine to carry out deterrent patrols is starkly limited, no matter what ordnance they carry. However, the Dolphin remains an effective platform for all sorts of other missions required by the IDF. Capable of maritime reconnaissance, of sinking or otherwise interdicting enemy ships, and also of delivering special forces to unfriendly coastlines, the Dolphins represent a major Israeli security investment, and one of the most potentially lethal undersea forces in the region.

The Israeli Soldier:

The technology that binds all of these other systems together is the Israeli soldier. Since 1948 (and even before) Israel has committed the best of its human capital to the armed forces. The creation of fantastic soldiers, sailors, and airmen doesn’t happen by accident, and doesn’t result simply from the enthusiasm and competence of the recruits. The IDF has developed systems of recruitment, training, and retention that allow it to field some of the most competent, capable soldiers in the world. None of the technologies above work unless they have smart, dedicated, well-trained operators to make them function at their fullest potential.

Parting Thoughts: 

When considering the effectiveness of Israeli weapons, and the expertise of the men and women who wield them, it’s worth noting that for all the tactical and operational success the IDF has enjoyed, Israel remains in a strategically perilous position. The inability of Israel to develop long-term, stable, positive relationships with its immediate neighbors, regional powers, and the subject populations of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip means that Jerusalem continues to feel insecure, its dominance on land, air, and sea notwithstanding. Tactics and technologies, however effective and impressive, cannot solve these problems; only politics can.

Dr. Robert Farley has taught security and diplomacy courses at the Patterson School since 2005.  He received his BS from the University of Oregon in 1997, and his Ph.D. from the University of Washington in 2004.  Dr. Farley is the author of Grounded: The Case for Abolishing the United States Air Force (University Press of Kentucky, 2014), the Battleship Book (Wildside, 2016), and Patents for Power: Intellectual Property Law and the Diffusion of Military Technology (University of Chicago, 2020). He has contributed extensively to a number of journals and magazines, including the National Interest, the Diplomat: APAC, World Politics Review, and the American Prospect.  Dr. Farley is also a founder and senior editor of Lawyers, Guns and Money.

This article was first published several years ago and is being reposted due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters.

Robert Farley

Security, Asia

Don't count on the next major war looking like the last one.

Here's What You Need to Remember: It’s worth thinking about how the balance of capabilities between the two countries could shift over time, and how windows of opportunity for either might emerge. With luck and skill, Washington and Beijing will avoid war, even in 2030. But it behooves planners in both countries to take seriously the possibility that conflict might ensue.

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the United States appear ready to plunge off the precipice of a trade war. This war could have far-ranging effects on the economies of both countries, as well as the future of the global economic order. But as of yet, it does not seem likely to involve the flight of actual bombs and missiles. While the U.S. and China have a variety of minor conflicts, none rise to the level of a casus belli.

But things could change over the next decade. Conflicts that now seem remote can take on urgency over time. As China’s relative power increases, the United States may find that small disputes can have big consequences. China, on the other hand, may see windows of opportunity in America’s procurement and modernization cycle that leave the United States vulnerable.

By 2030, the balance of power (and the strategic landscape) may look very different. What would the War of 2030 between China and the United States look like?

How Would War Begin?

The core of the conflict remains the same. China and the United States might well fall into the “Thucydides Trap,” however misunderstood the ancient Greek historian may be. Chinese power seems to grow inexorably, even as the United States continues to set the rules of the global international order. But even if the growth of Athenian power and the concern this provoked in Sparta really was the underlying cause of the Peloponnesian War, it required a spark to set the world aflame. Neither the PRC nor the United States will go to war over a trivial event.

We can imagine a significant threat to a U.S. ally, whether it be Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), India, Taiwan, or perhaps the Philippines. The seeds of conflict between China and all of these countries have already been planted, even if they never bloom. If a militarized conflict developed between the PRC and any of these countries, the United States would almost invariably be drawn in. A war involving India and the PRC would undoubtedly carry the greatest stakes, threatening to bring not only the United States into the fray, but also Pakistan and Russia. But war between China and Japan could also have catastrophic consequences. We should also remain open to the prospect of significant strategic changes, such as rivalry between the ROK and Japan that leads to a militarized dispute that then leads to a confrontation involving China and the United States.

What New Technologies Would the Combatants Employ?

While the field of battle will depend on the cause of conflict, we can expect that the crucial theaters of war will be the East and South China Seas. This will place an emphasis on the air and naval capabilities of each country, granting that the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps have worked hard on developing ways to contribute to the ensuing “multi-domain battle.”

There is every reason to believe that the military balance will shift in China’s favor over the next twelve years. This does not mean that China will have an advantage, but, compared to the status quo, time favors the PRC. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is growing faster than the United States Navy (USN), even if the latter can find its way to 355 ships. In addition, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) is modernizing faster than the United States Air Force (USAF), even as F-35s and B-21s come online.

However, both sides will also field traditional technologies in significant numbers. China could very well have four aircraft carriers by 2030, most likely two Liaoning-type STOBAR carriers and two conventional CATOBAR carriers. Although the United States will still have more (including its fleet of assault carriers), and while the U.S. will enjoy qualitative superiority, China could potentially achieve temporary local superiority at the onset of the conflict. China will also deploy submarines and surface ships in large numbers- without the need to spread naval forces around the world. The USN will still have an advantage, but that advantage will be increasingly marginal.

With respect to aircraft, the United States Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps will all field F-35s in significant numbers. The Air Force will also have access to B-21 Raider stealth bombers, as well as its legacy bomber fleets. China will field more J-10s and J-11s, bringing its fleet up to par with America’s legacy force of F-15s, F-16s, and F/A-18s. The J-20 should be available in numbers, along perhaps with the J-31, if the PLA decides to buy. China’s modernization program won’t be quite enough to bring it up to U.S. standards by 2030, but the PLAAF will close the gap, and will have the advantage of plentiful bases and the support of enormous numbers of ballistic, cruise, and anti-aircraft missile installations.

The most significant difference by 2030 will likely be the explosion of unmanned vehicles that accompany, and often replace, existing manned platforms. Innovation in this area remains high-paced, and so it’s difficult to predict precisely what platforms will take center stage, but it is likely that aerial, naval, and undersea drones will conduct much of the fighting, both against each other and against manned platforms. These drones will depend on access to vast systems of reconnaissance and communication, systems that both sides will attempt to disrupt from the opening hours of the conflict.

No War But Cyber War?

Socially, economically, and militarily, China and the United States are both deeply wired, and deeply dependent upon cyber-connectivity. A significant disruption of that connectivity could have catastrophic effects. But some analysts of cyber-conflict have argued that just as U.S. and China have become more dependent on the internet, the structures that undergird connectivity have become more resilient and less susceptible to disruption. A useful analogy here is with the robustness of the industrial systems of the earlier 20th century; while German industry suffered heavily under Western bombing, it did not collapse like many expected, largely because a sophisticated system has multiple internal redundancies that cannot easily be undermined. By contrast, the less sophisticated Japanese economy suffered much more significant damage from blockade and bombing. Complexity, in other words, does not necessarily imply vulnerability, and we cannot assume that as economies become more digital that they will necessarily become easier to attack.

But this hardly means that the war won’t have a cyber-component; rather, digital combat will likely involve the military side more than the civilian side. Both the U.S. and China will undertake every effort to uncover and disrupt the connections that hold together the reconnaissance-strike complexes of either side, trying to blind their foe on the one hand, while also trying to see through the enemies eyes. The side that best coordinates cyber-attacks with “real-world” military operations may carry the day in the end.

How Will the War End?

Much has been written of late with respect to how a U.S.-China war might end. Without a firm grip on the specific casus belli associated with the War of 2030, it is difficult to assess how far each side might be willing to push. It seems extremely unlikely that China, even by 2030, could possess conventional capabilities that could permanently threaten U.S. industrial and warmaking capacity. On the other hand, it is increasingly hard to imagine a scenario in which the United States could fatally undermine the PRC, granting that defeat might cause a lasting political crisis. Victory will depend on which side can destroy the primary fielded forces of the enemy, either through decisive assault or through attrition.

A blockade probably isn’t the answer, either. While China’s energy consumption will likely increase by 2030, the PRC’s ability to remedy that strategic vulnerability may also increase. The construction of additional pipelines with Russia, in addition to the development of alternative sources of energy, will likely give the PRC enough slack to ride out any conflict with the United States. Unless the trade wars instigated by the Trump administration undermine the entire global economic system, the biggest pain for China will involve a collapse of its foreign trade.

In any case, ending the Sino-American War of 2030 would require careful diplomacy, lest the war become only the first stage of a confrontation that could last for the remainder of the century.

Conclusion

For almost four decades, many analysts suggested that war between the United States and the Soviet Union was inevitable. Despite a few close calls, it never happened. It is entirely possible, perhaps even likely, that China and the United States will not again find themselves in armed conflict. Then again, it’s worth thinking about how the balance of capabilities between the two countries could shift over time, and how windows of opportunity for either might emerge. With luck and skill, Washington and Beijing will avoid war, even in 2030. But it behooves planners in both countries to take seriously the possibility that conflict might ensue.

Dr. Robert Farley has taught security and diplomacy courses at the Patterson School since 2005.  He received his BS from the University of Oregon in 1997, and his Ph.D. from the University of Washington in 2004.  Dr. Farley is the author of Grounded: The Case for Abolishing the United States Air Force (University Press of Kentucky, 2014), the Battleship Book (Wildside, 2016), and Patents for Power: Intellectual Property Law and the Diffusion of Military Technology (University of Chicago, 2020). He has contributed extensively to a number of journals and magazines, including the National Interest, the Diplomat: APAC, World Politics Review, and the American Prospect.  Dr. Farley is also a founder and senior editor of Lawyers, Guns and Money.

This article first appeared several years ago and is being reposted due to reader interest.

Image: Wikipedia

Michael Peck

Korea, Asia

In 2015, a new approach was taken toward the old problem of how to fight a bellicose North Korea.

Here's What You Need to Know: Pyongyang wields a huge arsenal of conventional and unconventional weapons.

North Korea’s unpredictable leader Kim Jong-un has many ways of making war upon his neighbors. He can unleash commandos, or cyberweapons, or threaten to utilize weapons of mass destruction unless the world complies with his wishes.

Whether Kim Jong-un will live to see the results is another matter.

He might be assassinated by U.S. and South Korean special forces, or buried in his bunker by a bunker-buster bomb. Other smart bombs might take out his command posts and nuclear facilities. The authoritarian state of North Korea could become a state without authority, its leadership decapitated by precisely targeted strikes.

Or at least that seems to be America’s plan for fighting the next Korean War. And with North Korea conducting a new wave of ballistic missile tests, and U.S and South Korean forces practicing how to destroy North Korean nuclear sites, that plan is becoming more relevant.

Exactly what U.S. Operations Plan 5015 (OPLAN 5015) entails is classified. Fragments have been reported in the Japanese and South Korean press. But what details have emerged indicate that in 2015, a new approach was taken toward the old problem of how to fight a bellicose North Korea and its huge arsenal of conventional and unconventional weapons.

For years, the expectation had been that a second Korean War would resemble with the first, a big-unit conventional war with U.S. and South Korean forces first stopping the enemy and then counterattacking into North Korea. But OPLAN 5015 reportedly takes a more twenty-first century approach of limited war, special forces and precision weapons. Japan’s Asahi Shimbun newspaper reported in 2015 that the plan resembled guerrilla warfare, with special forces assassinations and targeted attacks on key facilities. The goal was to consolidate several older war plans, minimize casualties in a war and even prepare for the possibility that the North Korean regime might collapse.

Most important, OPLAN 5015 envisaged the possibility of a preemptive strike against North Korea.

“The new plan was said to adapt to changes in the security environment by focusing on making a swifter and more energetic military response than the previous OPLAN 5027, incorporating the concept of a preemptive strike,” according to Globalsecurity.org. With North Korea’s localized provocations becoming more frequent, there was an increasing risk of escalation. OPLAN 5015 articulated ways to respond to these threats with U.S.-ROK combined forces and, in the event of escalation, to respond to the threat of North Korea’s missiles and nuclear weapons.

Echoes of this can be seen in the current U.S.-South Korean exercises, designated Foal Eagle 2017, which will involve more than 300,000 personnel for two months of live and computer-simulated training. Citing Korea’s Yonhap news agency, the Washington Post reported that “the joint forces will also run through their new ‘4D’ operational plan, which details the allies’ preemptive military operations to detect, disrupt, destroy and defend against North Korea’s nuclear and missile arsenal.”

The question is how much stock to put in OPLAN 5015. David Maxwell, a retired U.S. Army Special Forces colonel who now teaches at Georgetown University’s Center for Security Studies, warns against taking OPLAN 5015 too literally. “My recommendation is not to try to read too much into the plans,” he tells the National Interest.

Military planners are by nature worst case planners but they also plan to provide multiple options to national decision makers for responding to crisis based on the mostly likely enemy course of action to the most dangerous enemy course of action. While there is likely Option A, B and C for every contingency, often what gets executed is Option D that is developed from A, B and C and the actual assessment of enemy actions.

As Globalsecurity.org noted,

Although the new plan reportedly focused not on a full-blown war but on limited warfare, a preemptive strike can escalate from a small skirmish into a large-scale war. It is hard to understand how the Korean troops would play a leading role while should a war start, Korea would not have military operational control. If that meant Korean soldiers would mostly engage in ground warfare while the US military provided naval and aerial support as some experts alleged, some South Koreans said the plan needed to be reconsidered.

Then there are the political questions, especially for those nations who will actually the bear the brunt of a North Korean attack. South Korean lawmakers were furious in 2015 when their government balked at telling them details of OPLAN 5015.

“Although the new scheme reportedly focuses not on a full-blown war but on limited warfare, a preemptive strike can escalate—unnecessarily and disastrously—in what could go from being a small skirmish into a large-scale war,” complained an editorial in The Korea Times.

It is also hard to understand how the Korean troops would be able to play a leading role while everyone knows here that should a war start, Korea will not have military operational control. If that possibly means Korean soldiers will mostly engage in ground warfare while the U.S. military provides naval and aerial support as some experts allege, the plan needs to be reconsidered.

Michael Peck is a contributing writer for the National Interest. He can be found on Twitter and Facebook.

This article first appeared in March 2017.

Image: REUTERS

David Axe

military,

Norway has a new strategy for countering Moscow.

Here's What You Need to Remember: Norway’s got a new military strategy. To deter and, in the event of war, defeat Russian forces, Oslo is bolstering its northern garrison and investing in submarines, stealth fighters and surface-to-air missiles.

But the Norwegian government doesn’t plan to replace a navy frigate that ran aground and sank in 2018. That decision alone represents a de facto 20-percent cut to the fleet’s open-ocean surface fleet.

Norwegian prime minister Erna Solberg revealed the new strategy in mid-April 2020. The 123-page defense plan cites Russia, and to a lesser extent China, as a major threat. “These are countries where the authorities do not see the value of neither democracy, rule of law, nor the fact that people have undisputed rights,” Solberg said.

To better prepare for war, the government plans to add nearly $2 billion to the existing, eight-year spending plan. Oslo in recent years has spent around $7 billion annually on its 23,000-person military.

As part of the new strategy, the army’s northern brigade will get an additional battalion with several hundred troops. The army also will receive around a hundred new G5 armored personnel carriers from Germany to replace aging, American-made M-113s.

The Norwegian Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System, which fires a version of the U.S. AIM-120 missile, will get a new sensor. Oslo will buy new long-range and short-range air-defense systems to complement the army and air force’s combined force of around 72 medium-range NASAMS launchers.

The navy is getting four new Type 212 submarines from Germany to replace six older boats. Upgrades will prolong the service lives of the fleet’s four Fridtjof Nansen-class frigates and six Skjold-class corvettes.

But the fleet will not replace a fifth frigate, Helge Ingstad, which ran aground and sank in 2018. Salvagers raised the vessel, but the government determined it was not economical to repair her. Losing Helge Ingstad without a replacement amounts to a one-fifth cut to the fleet’s major surface combatants.

It’s not clear how Oslo plans to compensate for this loss. But it should try, the U.S. think-tank RAND advised. “As a major coastal and maritime nation, Norway is dependent on control of sea lines of communication for allied reinforcements as well as economic function,” RAND noted.

NATO officials recommended Oslo at least consider buying unmanned surface vessels, according to RAND. “Given finite resources and the unexpected loss of a frigate in 2018, allied officials highlighted the need to consider how best for Norway to deliver a mix of naval missions – either through different force mixes or other novel (e.g. unmanned) solutions.”

Norway’s new strategy does not alter the air force’s existing plan to acquire 52 F-35A stealth fighters to replace older F-16s plus five P-8 patrol planes to replace P-3Cs. Norway also is buying into NATO’s new fleet of up to nine A330 aerial tankers.

But RAND urged the Norwegian defense ministry to use the F-35s in new ways. “The F-35A represents a significant development not only for Norwegian air power, but also for how situational awareness, low observability and sensor and data fusion can enable future operations across all domains.”

“Allied officials emphasised the need for Norway to continue to experiment with novel [concepts], including by linking the aircraft with land- and sea-based capabilities, to maximise the [F-35’s] full potential.”

David Axe is defense editor of The National Interest. He is the author of the graphic novels War Fix, War Is Boring and Machete Squad. This article is being republished due to reader interest. 

Image: Reuters. 

Trevor Filseth

Tajikistan, Asia

High-level officials in the previous government, including Vice President Amrullah Saleh and Defense Minister Bismillah Khan, have taken refuge in Panjshir, pledging to continue the fight against the Taliban from its sanctuary.

In southern Tajikistan, hundreds of ethnic Tajiks have volunteered to join the anti-Taliban coalition forming in Afghanistan’s Panjshir Valley.  

A group of more than 1,800 Tajiks in the southern city of Kulob has volunteered to provide support for the United Resistance Front of Afghanistan, colloquially known as the Panjshir resistance, in its fight against the Taliban, according to a report by Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty. The group petitioned the country’s president, Emomali Rahmon, for permission to travel south and join the fight.

The Panjshir resistance has maintained control of the valley, making it the only province which has not been taken over by the Taliban. High-level officials in the previous government, including Vice President Amrullah Saleh and Defense Minister Bismillah Khan, have taken refuge in Panjshir, pledging to continue the fight against the Taliban from its sanctuary. Thousands of soldiers from the defunct Afghan National Army have made the same pledge. The valley’s population is predominantly Tajik, while the Taliban are mostly ethnic Pashtuns from the country’s south. While early fighting has taken place between the Taliban and the Panjshir rebels, including skirmishes over the past week that have resulted in hundreds of fatalities, the Taliban have not yet made a serious attempt to capture the province, and some roads to the rest of the country remain open. 

The Tajikistani volunteers have not yet received a response, per RFERL. They are almost certain not to gain the approval of Rahmon, as traveling abroad to participate in an armed conflict remains highly illegal under Tajikistani law. However, although the volunteers will not be allowed into Afghanistan, the government of Tajikistan is skeptical of relations with the Taliban, declaring that it would not recognize a Taliban-only government in Afghanistan. 

Rahmon made this position clear during a meeting with Pakistani foreign minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi on August 25. In that meeting, Rahmon expressed his disappointment that the Taliban had committed early on to a power-sharing agreement with minority voices in the government, only to ignore it. Rahmon expressed his desire that the Taliban government include more ethnic Tajiks in leadership roles. 

Qureshi visited Dushanbe as part of a tour of nations bordering Afghanistan, attempting to convince them to engage with the Taliban government in Kabul. Pakistan enjoys close links to the Taliban, and has been accused of financing it during its twenty-year insurgency against the Afghan government and its international backers.  

Trevor Filseth is a current and foreign affairs writer for the National Interest.