Diplomacy & Crisis News

For many years, the U.S. retained air superiority over its adversaries.

However, as China and Russia expanded their respective fifth-generation airframe programs, America’s aerial arsenal became less menacing. Beijing’s Chengdu J-20 and Moscow’s Su-57 have specifically threatened America’s former monopoly on next-generation platforms.

In order to rectify these tipping scales, the U.S. Air Force is developing its Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program. A new sixth-generation fighter will be the center of the program, which is expected to enter service sometime in the late 2030’s. 

The history of the NGAD program:

The NGAD program was conceptualized nearly one decade ago, when DARPA studies was initiated to explore new technologies for air superiority systems for both the Air Force and Navy.

Over the next few years, the Aerospace Innovation Initiative was launched and the NGAD as we know today was created. Intended to replace the aging F-22 Raptor fighters, the new air dominance program is actually a suite of capabilities and not just a singular airframe. Propulsion, advanced weapons, digital design and stealth are some of the key technologies the NGAD program will feature. 

Last year, manufacturer Lockheed Martin released mock-up images for the next-generation program. These images, and the little information that has been released by the Air Force, sums up what we know about the program. The highly classified program will be developed by either Lockheed Martin or Boeing. Northrop Grumman was also a contender, however, reports suggest that the manufacturer took itself out of the bidding process this summer. The mock-up images released by Lockheed depict a sleek and tailless airframe with refueling drawn from the LMXT tanker concept, which enables greater stealth and lower observability. 

What (little) we know:

Although we don’t know how fast this sixth-generation airframe will be able to cruise, Lockheed’s rendering appeared on the manufacturer’s Instagram handle alongside images of well-known speedy airframes, including the Raptor, the SR-71 Blackbird and the F-117 Nighthawk. The F-22 can fly at speeds nearing Mach 2.0 (times the speed of sound) at altitudes reaching 60,000 feet. Analysts predict that the NGAD fighter will be able to fly with comparable capabilities. 

As a “family of systems,” the NGAD fighter will fly alongside drone “wingmen.” Earlier this year, Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall announced plans to procure at least 1,000 of these sophisticated unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

As explained by Sandboxx News, “At the heart of the Collaborative Combat Aircraft concept is the need for capable artificial intelligence agents that can fly NGAD’s drone wingmen, take cues from local human operators, and even serve as advanced co-pilots inside the crewed fighter itself to help reduce the massive cognitive load pilots must manage while flying their aircraft in combat. The Air Force’s Project VENOM is among the efforts underway to make exactly that happen.” 

Aviation buffs and industry experts alike are anticipating the release of more information surrounding the Air Force’s NGAD program. The new fighter has some tough shoes to fill, however, considering the legacy of the F-22 Raptor platform, NGAD could be amazing. 

Author Expertise 

Maya Carlin is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. 

Late last week, Iranian officials drew headlines with their claims of being able to detect and track American F-35s flying over the Persian Gulf. This prompted a flood of claims on social media about the $1.7 trillion stealth fighter program no longer offering a strategic edge over the aggressive nation.

“Over the past days, several of these planes were flying over the Persian Gulf and were fully monitored by our radars from the moment they took off,” an unnamed Iranian official was quoted as saying by the Beirut-based Al Mayadeen news, an outlet that is frequently criticized for its bias toward authoritarian regimes in Iran, Syria, and the militant group Hezbollah.

Is this claim true? The truth is… it’s pretty likely – but that wouldn’t have the implications many may think it does. Stealth fighters have long been detectable via certain radar frequencies and that’s neither new nor troubling for military planners. This story, like many that have come before it, is leveraging popular misconceptions about stealth, rather than the science associated with this technology, in an attempt to paint modern 5th generation fighters as less capable than they truly are. And make no mistake, the F-35’s detectability is not unique to its airframe – every 5th-generation fighter regardless of origin can be detected under the right circumstances.

It’s targeting those aircraft that can be tough.

The F-35 Claim from Iran

According to several Iranian-bases news outlets, Brigadier General Reza Khajeh, the deputy commander of operations of the Iranian Army Air Defense Force, was the first official to come forward with the claim that Iran has been detecting and potentially even tracking F-35s in the region. This claim follows the deployment of about a dozen F-35s to the U.S. Central Command region following a series of aggressive encounters involving Russian aircraft over Syria and Iranian forces in the Strait of Hormuz.

F-35 stealth fighter. 

According to General Khajeh, all flights in the region have been monitored by Iranian air defense systems, bolstered by what he referred to as “eavesdropping systems,” going on to claim that they have yet to detect a sortie via those listening methods that they weren’t also able to track on radar.

And based on the responses we’ve immediately seen popping up on social media, it’s clear that many are convinced, based on these claims, that Iran has cracked the code to peering through the most advanced fighter on the planet’s stealth capabilities.

Understand Stealth

Stealth aircraft are designed to delay or sometimes even defeat detection via a variety of means, including radar and infrared, but it’s commonly understood that stealth is not invisibility. That is to say that under the right circumstances, these aircraft are often detectable – especially when we’re talking about stealth fighters, in particular.

However, there is a significant difference between being able to detect a stealth fighter and being able to effectively target one, and these claims out of Iran (and subsequent media stories) rely on the average reader’s lack of awareness when it comes to this important distinction.

Modern stealth fighters are designed to delay or prevent detection specifically from high-frequency radar arrays that are capable of providing a “weapons-grade lock” – or radar arrays that can guide a missile to a target. Lower frequency radar arrays are not capable of guiding weapons with this 

Radar Issues

Different radar arrays broadcast in different wavelengths and frequencies for different reasons. The types of design elements that can help delay or prevent detection from one type of radar frequency won’t necessarily help prevent detection from another.

As a result, stealth fighter designs are specifically intended to limit detection from the types of radar arrays that can effectively guide a weapon to its position. While stealth aircraft are still not invisible to radar arrays that work within these bands, the goal is to make their radar returns small enough to delay detection, allowing the stealth fighter to either engage a target or escape without ever being targeted itself.

Radars operate by broadcasting electromagnetic energy (radar waves), usually in the L, S, C, X, or K bands. Each band uses a different wavelength and frequency, with only higher frequency (smaller wavelength) systems providing the image fidelity needed to accurately target an aircraft.

In other words, only certain types of radars can be used to guide a missile toward a target and get it close enough to destroy it. Lower frequency arrays are often capable of spotting stealth fighters in the air, but because of their larger wavelengths, can’t provide accurate enough data to actually lock onto an aircraft with a missile.

Stealth fighter designs only limit detection against higher frequency radar arrays, including parts of the S-band and the C, X, and Ku bands to prevent being targeted. Because these fighters are still visible on lower-frequency radar bands operating on S and C bands, these arrays can be leveraged effectively as early warning systems, notifying defensive forces that stealth fighters are in the area, and allowing for other defensive systems to be oriented in the right direction. But importantly, low-frequency arrays can do little more than point systems toward the area a stealth fighter is in. An effective stealth fighter design remains difficult to target via a high-frequency array even with this head start.

Stealth Fighters Are More Than Just Stealth

It’s not at all uncommon for stealth fighters like the F-35 to fly with radar reflectors on to both render them more detectable and mask their actual radar profiles while operating in regions with enemy air defense systems that are eager to gobble up data about their radar returns. These reflectors, often called Luneburg lenses, aren’t always easy to spot with the naked eye, but they render even the stealthiest aircraft easy to detect on radar.

In other words, it’s entirely possible that American F-35s operating in the Middle East may be flying with these lenses on specifically to make it more difficult for enemy air defense systems to work toward figuring out how to detect these aircraft more readily.

And considering the United States sent these fighters to the region as an intentional message to aggressive Iranian and Russian forces, advertising their presence is an intentional decision. That much was made clear by the Pentagon’s public announcement of their deployment prior to the F-35s even arriving in the region.

“In coordination with our regional allies, partners, and the U.S. Navy, the F-35s will partner with A-10s and F-16s already in theater helping monitor the Strait of Hormuz,” Air Forces Central (AFCENT) spokesman Col. Mike Andrews said in a statement last month.

In other words, there’s a multitude of reasons why Iran might be able to detect F-35s operating over the Persian Gulf, from Luneburg lenses to low-frequency radar arrays. In fact, it would be somewhat damning if they couldn’t. But just as Russia leveraged confusion about the definition of modern hypersonic missiles to claim their Kh47M2 Kinzhal was more than a simple air-launched ballistic missile, Iran is now leveraging confusion around the word stealth in a similar manner.

So, did Iran detect F-35s over the Persian Gulf a few weeks back? It’s pretty likely. But is that anything American military planners are sweating?

Almost certainly not.

Alex Hollings is the editor of the Sandboxx blog (where this first appeared) and is a former U.S. Marine who writes about defense policy and technology. He lives with his wife and daughter in Georgia. 

Last week, China released a new map called the 10-Dash map as a successor to Dash-9. This map represents an escalation by Beijing to further extend its unilateral redrawing of international boundaries. It is an extraordinarily provocative move. It also violates the International Law of the Sea. 

With the 9-dash line, China brazenly claims waters which are thousands of miles away from its territory, but along the coast of smaller nations. The latest map further solidifies those claims and expands upon them with the addition of one more “dash” around Taiwan. The United States must not stand idly by as China tries to redraw the world map.

Beijing's intent is to, first, acquire more territory and resources as some of these areas are rich in hydrocarbons; second, increase pressure on Taiwan by edging closer to its boundaries; and third, flex its muscles with its neighbors while testing U.S. reaction and resolve. 

The publication of the 10-Dash map indicates that China is getting bolder in pursuing its strategic objective to change the regional balance of power and pursue regional hegemony.

The countries of Southeast Asia, who are directly threatened by this Chinese action, are furious and have responded strongly, with some stating that they will take measures necessary to defend their territory. But it is not clear what those measures will be, and their collective failure to respond effectively to 9-Dash has clearly emboldened China to push ahead. 

The latest Chinese action has serious implications for the United States, and it would be a mistake to just dismiss this as bluster. We have treaty commitments to some of the countries threatened, including the Philippines. Our supply chain for several strategic items depends on unfettered access to the region. We simply cannot allow the arbitrary expansion of Chinese power to stand.

Countries in the region are watching for a U.S. response and are more open than previously to the prospect of greater security and military cooperation with the United States. Chinese hegemony in the region will change the global balance of power and directly threaten our vital national interests.

What should we do? Having just returned from a trip to Southeast Asia, I recommend the following measures be taken:

1. Deter Chinese escalation and aggression. For this, we will need to address gaps in our capabilities and those of our allies. Burden-sharing must become a hallmark of our rebalancing of power in the region. We must learn from our mistakes in Europe during the containment of the former Soviet Union. We should not and need not carry a disproportionately heavy amount of that burden.

2. Addressing the chasm in shipbuilding should be a priority. China’s shipyards have a capacity that far exceeds U.S. shipyards, by orders of magnitude—some estimate the gap is 25 million gross tons per year in China vs. 100,000 gross tons per year in the United States. Furthermore, China builds ships for a much lower cost. We must expand our industrial base for manufacturing ships. We should also take advantage of allied capabilities. For example, South Korea has the capacity to produce ship hulls. Some of our laws and policies stand in the way of cooperative production, but there are shelf-ready solutions. The rules should be changed to allow neutral components to be manufactured elsewhere, with the more sensitive capabilities subsequently installed in either the United States or another allied country.

3. Burden sharing and pooling resources should extend to maintenance and repair work on our and allied ships to get them back into commission more quickly. For example, we are in an advantageous position with our nuclear submarines, but many are in maintenance for extensive periods largely because of the legal requirement for only American entities to do the work. This requirement should be appropriately reviewed and adjusted. 

4. Our aircraft and those of our allies are vulnerable to Chinese missiles on airfields without hardened shelters. Our allies should assume a greater portion of this burden by assuming broader responsibility for hardening these facilities across the region. 

5. The United States must assume the role of dispute mediator among the bickering nations affected by China’s Dash-10 provocation. Each nation is clear that the move is a violation of their borders, their sovereignty, and their security. They all have a strong shared interest in meeting this threat. But bilateral disputes among them are impeding their ability to act. This is an important opportunity for the United States to quietly step in as a mediator and work behind the scenes to help resolve these disputes. Such a strategic move would enable the affected countries to pursue joint cooperative policies against Chinese provocations.

These steps are necessary if we are to avoid further aggressive moves by China. The geopolitical risk is outsized. Without taking such bold measures, China may well miscalculate its capacity to continue this encroachment and overreach. There is a distinct potential for this strategic trend to lead them into a major regional conflict. We must take concrete steps like these now in order to preclude such a development.

Zalmay Khalilzad is a former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations.

Image: Shutterstock.

In early May 2011, a CIA-led operation conducted by members of the Navy’s elite SEAL Team 6, also known as DEVGRU, took out the most infamous terrorist leader of the modern era, Osama Bin Laden. The mission, known internally as Operation Neptune Spear, was successful, though not everything went according to plan.

The plan called for the use of two highly classified and heavily modified UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters built specifically for clandestine operations. One of these stealth Black Hawks was meant to hover above Bin Laden’s walled compound for operators to fast rope in, while the other landed nearby to deploy troops, interpreters, and dog handlers to secure the perimeter.

But just as the mission started, things began to go wrong when one of the stealth helicopters crashed inside the compound.

Thanks to the pilot’s quick reaction, none of the operators or crewmembers onboard the helicopter were seriously injured, and the mission was ultimately successful. In order to prevent the stealth technology within the rotorcraft from falling into the wrong hands, the helicopter itself was destroyed prior to the special operations team’s departure.

But the exotic-looking tail section of this highly classified platform remained intact and left behind. It was clearly shown in pictures of the compound shared by media outlets around the world the following day.

Initially, the media didn’t seem to realize what they’d just shown the world… or perhaps the story of Bin Laden’s death simply warranted too much attention to address the uniquely angular and alien-looking tail rotor shown in the photographs. But it wasn’t long before journalists and aviation buffs around the world recognized how unusual the tail section really was, and came to a stark realization: Stealth helicopters are a reality. They’re in service. And none of us in the world at large, or even in the conventional side of the U.S. military, knew about it. At least, not until now.

Stealth is far more than a singular approach to radar evasion.

As detection and targeting capabilities continued to mature, so too did the technologies inherent to what we call “stealth.” Today, stealth designs take great pains to reduce not just radar detection, but also electromagnetic, infrared, acoustic, and even visual detection. It can be extremely difficult to incorporate these stealth design elements into fixed-wing aircraft, but one might argue that it’s even tougher when it comes to adding stealth to helicopters.

As retired U.S. Air Force helicopter pilot and former Air Force Weapons School instructor Mike McKinney put it, helicopters pose a number of unique challenges to the stealth enterprise because “they routinely operate within the heart of the threat envelope and their physical configuration does not allow for the use of many masking techniques.” 

In other words, it isn’t enough to build modern stealth helicopters that can delay radar detection: rather, they also need to minimize the heat produced by the engines, the detectability of their radio transmissions, and importantly, in the case of low-flying rotorcraft, the noise produced by their propellers. Helicopters have large propellers, which are basically narrow wings being spun overhead. These tend to produce a significant radar and acoustic signature, while the helicopters’ powerful engines pump out a ton of heat, all in a platform that’s slower and less agile than modern fixed-wing aircraft.

But it’s also important to understand that stealth isn’t a thing that a platform has or doesn’t have. It might be better to think of stealth as a segment within a spectrum of observability. On the broadly observable side, you have easy-to-spot platforms like the B-52 Stratofortress or the F-15 Eagle, and on the opposite “low observable” side, you have platforms like the F-117 Nighthawk and F-22 Raptor.

The degree of stealth required for a platform to be considered stealth in any given era is based not on clearly defined universal requirements, but rather on how a platform compares to the means of detection used in its day and to similar platforms of its class. Russia’s Sukhoi Su-57, for instance, may boast a worst-in-class stealth profile when it comes to its 5th-generation peers, but it is significantly stealthier than its 4th-generation predecessors. Its radar return may be thousands of times larger than an F-22, but it is dozens of times smaller than an F-15’s, pushing it far enough toward the low-observable side of the spectrum for many to consider it a stealth fighter.

The 90-degree angles inherent to helicopter design, as well as the ways in which these platforms operate, almost preclude them from ever achieving the sort of low observability that’s possible in bomber or fighter designs, but it is possible to design a helicopter that’s far less observable than its in-class peers and precursors, earning that coveted “stealth” designation, even if it will not be nearly as sneaky as its fixed-wing sisters-in-service.

About the Author

Alex Hollings is the editor of the Sandboxx blog (where this first appeared) and is a former U.S. Marine who writes about defense policy and technology. He lives with his wife and daughter in Georgia. 

The 15th annual BRICS summit kicked off on August 22nd in Johannesburg, South Africa, in its most widely observed meeting to date. As the acronym suggests, leaders from Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa convened for a three-day conference with expansion at the top of the agenda. Because Vladimir Putin has an arrest warrant with the International Criminal Court, his attendance came virtually, sparing South Africa the diplomatic headache. Presented as an alternative to the U.S.-led liberal international order and a representative of the Global South, the BRICS group is determined to challenge the “Washington Consensus-driven Bretton Woods Institutions.” This year’s gathering culminated with an invitation to six countries: Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Even before this expansion, the rise of BRICS has prompted doomsday calls in Western media outlets regarding the future of the U.S. Dollar and the structure of international finance. However, if the bloc is to become a counterweight to the Bretton Woods system, it will need to harmonize its members competing interests and geopolitical ambitions.

The story started in 2001 when Goldman Sachs economist Jim O’Neil used the term ‘BRIC’ to describe the fastest-growing economies in the developing world. However, the coalition was only formed in 2009 with its inaugural summit, incorporating South Africa the following year to become BRICS. Fast forward fourteen years: the bloc constitutes 43% of the world’s population, 16% of its trade, and boasts a GDP surpassing the G7. The prevailing sentiment among its members is that current global governance institutions overly centralize power in the U.S. and fellow liberal democracies. At the same time, their dependency on the U.S. dollar creates vulnerabilities and restricts monetary autonomy. Even though the BRICS have made tangible efforts toward what they call a more equitable and multipolar order, such as The New Development Bank and Contingent Reserve Arrangement, the impact has been minute thus far. There is even debate about a potential BRICS currency akin to the Euro, but this is as unrealistic as it would be economically catastrophic.

While these developments are not insignificant, behind the curtain, there is a lack of consensus on purpose and trajectory among BRICS leaders. Aside from using the organization as a vehicle to increase global influence, the bloc comprises countries with differing agendas and motivations. For its part, China sees BRICS as a strategic instrument for counterbalancing America’s international power projection, expanding its economic reach, and supplanting the U.S. dollar’s trade role with the renminbi. During the summit, President Xi Jinping appealed to the resource-rich Global South, arguing for the group’s rapid enlargement while laying veiled criticism toward the West.

On the other hand, India advocates a more cautious approach regarding new members, fearing the bloc’s transformation into a Beijing-run forum dedicated to opposing American interests. Moreover, China and India have unsettled territorial disputes, underscored by recent skirmishes along the Line of Actual Control.

Meanwhile, Putin is eager to demonstrate that, despite Western Sanctions, his country is not diplomatically isolated. In tune with Beijing, he argues for the swift enlargement of BRICS throughout the developing world. However, Putin’s refusal to renew the grain accord with Ukraine and the continued weaponization of the global food supply cast a grim shadow over Russia’s relationship with emerging economies.

Regarding Brazil and South Africa, both countries want to increase their global influence without antagonizing the U.S., which is made more difficult with the addition of Iran. South African President Cyril Ramaphosa even said afterward that the “BRICS is not anti-West.” Looking to spearhead the African Agenda, Ramaphosa has pressed for the swift inclusion of African nations, while Brazil wants a slower expansion for fear of diluting its influence.

When looking at the new members, specifically Iran, it appears China and Russia’s position prevailed. Despite Ramaphosa’s comment, Iran’s inclusion immediately gives the impression that economic initiatives are taking a backseat to Putin and Xi’s efforts to form a coalition against the U.S. Officials in Washington downplayed the developments, with National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan saying that the White House does not perceive BRICS as an emerging “geopolitical rival.”

The competing incentives within the group throw into question the idea of the bloc as anything more than a financial forum. For one, there are significant economic and political disparities among member states. Simultaneously, BRICS contains the world’s largest democracy and autocracy, and now arguably two of the most repressive regimes in Moscow and Tehran. While deviating ideologies can hamper long-term decision-making and cooperation, the fiscal variations exceed those of the political ones. These financial differences do not bode well for any future bloc currency, especially considering how uneven development levels under the Euro exacerbated the fallout from the 2009 eurozone crisis. Sanctions against Russia also complicate matters for the bloc, as the New Development Bank has refrained from investing in the country. Furthermore, if BRICS is not a Chinese-dominated economic tool, then the addition of new members makes agreement ever more elusive.

With that said, the American-led order is far from perfect, with the last successful international response dating back to the Great Financial Crisis. Though it may appear that this order is on its last leg, if not shattered already, hysteric notions of BRICS colluding to outcompete the U.S. and the dollar are premature. While the bloc’s growth is significant, it reflects the shifting tides of multipolarity and strategic competition. For now, BRICs should be regarded for what it is – a grouping of nations with disjointed objectives and separate visions for themselves and the future. Regardless, the U.S. should continue strengthening existing partnerships while forging new ones, while at the same time leveraging its key strengths like soft power and innovation to remain competitive in decades to come. This is not the first time U.S. leadership has been questioned, and as President Biden has mentioned in the past, “it’s never a good bet to bet against America.”

The term “Political Maronitism” entered Lebanon’s political lexicon on the eve of the country’s civil war (1975–1990). Its introduction was due to the leadership of the Druze Jumblatt family, which criticized Maronite hegemony over Lebanon’s confessional system. In essence, however, Political Maronitism reflected the desire of the political and spiritual leadership of the Maronite Catholic community to influence Lebanon’s domestic and foreign policies with the goal of maintaining Maronite influence within the state. Only such influence, these proponents believed, could guarantee the protection of the privileges and safety of the Christian community in general and the Maronite community in particular.

Origins

In this respect, Political Maronitism as a leading political force in Lebanon can be initially traced to the reign of the first Maronite leader, Emir Bashir Shihab II (1789–1840), who ruled Mount Lebanon under Ottoman suzerainty. Regional developments within the Ottoman Empire forced his hand to pursue domestic policies inimical to sectarian coexistence. Dismayed by the Ottoman Porte (central government) for not granting him the province of Syria as compensation for his efforts in crushing the puritanical Wahhabi movement in Arabia, the ruler of Egypt Muhammad Ali invaded the Levant in 1831. Ali asked Emir Bashir for help in subduing the Druze rebellion in Hawran, which extended to Mount Lebanon. Unable to decline Ali’s request, Emir Bashir rallied a Maronite force of 4,000 to subdue the rebels. This marked the first time in the history of Mount Lebanon that a sect sided with a foreign force against another sect, bringing sectarianism to the fore of Mount Lebanon’s politics.

Once British and Ottoman forces forced Egyptian forces from the Levant in 1840, Emir Bashir was forced into exile and died in Istanbul in 1850. As tensions continued to escalate, a sectarian war erupted in which Druze forces massacred thousands of Christians in Mount Lebanon’s mixed towns. In hindsight, the 1860 massacres were instigated no less by sectarian hatred than communal vindictive superiority. Whereas the Maronite clergy described the war as one of religion and the Maronite stronghold of Kesrwan readied 50,000 men to help their brethren, the Druze led a struggle for a lasting ascendency dispensed with a knife at hand. The promised relief never came and the Maronites were butchered. European powers stopped the massacres and in concert with the Porte established a confessional system, Mutasarifiyah, in Mount Lebanon overseen by a Christian Ottoman wali (governor).

Stability in Mount Lebanon was shattered with the advent of World War I (1914–1918). Concerned about Christian collaboration with the French, Ottoman authorities blockaded Mount Lebanon and sought to subdue the Maronites by starving them. One-third of the population of Mount Lebanon and Beirut died from starvation and epidemics. Eventually, the Allies defeated the Ottoman Empire, and the French Army landed in Beirut in 1918, whereupon France had the mandate over Lebanon.

The French established a confessional system favoring the Maronite community, whose clergy played a key role in establishing Greater Lebanon. The National Pact actualized Lebanon’s independence in 1943, but it neither fostered nor forged a national identity. It was based on a compromise guided by the false assumptions that Muslims would “Arabize” the Christians while Christians would “Lebanonize” Muslims. The pact provided that Lebanon’s identity would be characterized by an “Arab face” and manifested by the slogan “No East, No West.” Significantly, deep currents within the Maronite community represented a spectrum of various impulses ranging from the belief of organic affiliation with the West, to opposition to Arabism, to espousing the idea of Phoenician origin. On one end of the spectrum, a Maronite political majority and the clergy supported Greater Lebanon; on the other end, a political minority advocated a smaller Lebanon where Christians would constitute a majority.

Disruption

Ultimately, Maronites wielded power in a confessional system undergirded by a communal balance. But this communal balance has often been disrupted. President Camille Chamoun (1952–1958) felt threatened by Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser’s strident pan-Arabism which intensified anti-Maronitism among the Left, pro-Palestinian activists, and Arab nationalists. Led by the man of the Left Kamal Jumblatt, the National Union Front rallied anti-Maronite groups. Considering Nasserism to be a direct threat to Lebanon’s informal dissociation from the Arab-Israeli conflict, to Maronite hegemony over the Lebanese state, and to his growing relationship with the United States, Chamoun endorsed the Eisenhower Doctrine, under which a country could request U.S. military assistance if it was being threatened by another state.

Once Lebanon’s parliament approved the doctrine, the National Union Front called for the government to resign and a general strike. Meanwhile, Egypt and Syria supplied arms to Chamoun’s opposition. In May 1958, the general strike transformed into civil strife. Chamoun invoked the Eisenhower Doctrine and requested military assistance from President Dwight Eisenhower. A heated debate ensued in the U.S. Congress because some members believed that it was not communism but domestic issues that lay at the heart of Lebanon’s civil strife. Ultimately, the American military intervention took place only after a violent Arab nationalist coup d’état overthrew the pro-British Iraq’s Hashemite monarchy.

The U.S. Marines defused the crisis; yet its causes simmered, eventually leading to the eruption of Lebanon’s long and bloody civil war (1975–1990). Jumblatt led the Muslim camp, whose mainstay was the National Movement, a coalition including Leftists, Marxists, Nasserists, and pro-Syrians. The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) fronted the National Movement. Jumblatt sought to overthrow Maronite hegemony over the state because he perceived them as central players in a U.S. and Zionist conspiracy against Lebanon and the Arabs in general. The Christians rallied around the Lebanese Front, whose mainstay included the Phalange party, National Liberal Party, and the supporters of then-President Suleiman Franjieh.

Maronite entreaty with the Americans to help the Christian camp led to nowhere, at least until the camp was faced with defeat in 1976. Washington saw a win for the pan-Arab-Leftist camp as a win for the Soviet Union, and therefore the Gerald R. Ford administration brokered the unwritten Red Line agreement between Israel and Syria to allow Syrian military intervention in Lebanon to stop the war and prevent the collapse of the Christian camp. Bashir Gemayel, son of the founder of the Phalange party Pierre Gemayel, sought Israel’s help to reinforce the Christian military camp and eventually drive Syrian and PLO forces out of Lebanon. Israel helped him as he became the pivot around which Israel’s policy revolved in Beirut.

Meanwhile, Bashir, under the banner of unifying the “Christian rifle [and cause],” into what became the Lebanese Forces, ordered both the assassination of former President Frangieh’s son Tony and subsequently the crippling of the Phalange’s rival militia, the National Liberal party’s Tigers. The 1978 and 1980 massacres of Ehden and Safra left deep wounds in the Christian community’s collective consciousness, which only deepened by the later assassination in 1990 of former President Chamoun’s son Dany and his family. During this time, Washington’s main concern in the region was stability and preventing an Arab-Israeli war. Washington came to broker a peace agreement between Egypt and Israel in 1979, and entertained the idea of a potential Israel-Syria peace agreement. Henry Kissinger’s slogan “No war without Egypt and No peace without Syria,” reflected Washington’s outlook.

Yet Washington remained diligent in keeping an eye on the fast-paced developments in Lebanon and their repercussions for the region. American intelligence, led by Robert Ames, observed closely the chain of events in war-torn Beirut. Ames, among other American officials, had a paradoxical relationship with the Maronites. Although American officials sought to support the Maronites given their pro-American stance, they also had concerns about them. Ames felt there was enough hatred in Lebanon to fill the whole world. He called Bashir “our brutal warlord.” And he often emphasized that the “Christians want their own state, protected by the U.S., just like Israel. We don’t need another Israel in the area.” His words more or less still ring true in America’s corridors of power. Ames died in the bombing of the American embassy in Beirut in April 1983.

Modern Times

Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982 alarmed Washington, which wanted to resolve the conflict before it spread across the region. Bashir was elected president and the PLO was evicted to Tunisia. Bashir, who had toyed with the idea of creating a Christian state, amplified his resolve to secure Lebanon’s territorial sovereignty. President Ronald Reagan, through his presidential enjoy Philip Habib, underscored to Bashir that he was no longer a sectarian Christian leader but a leader of all Lebanese regardless of sects. Sensing its potential defeat in Lebanon, the Syrian regime then masterminded the murder of the president-elect by a pro-Syrian Lebanese. Bashir’s death was tantamount to the collapse of the house cards upon which Israel had built its policy in Lebanon.

Consequently, as Israel began its withdrawal from Lebanon in 1983–1984, Christian forces were routed in Mount Lebanon’s Shouf area. Christian misfortunes sank to a new low when interim Prime Minister General Michel Aoun declared a “liberation war” against Syria in 1989. At the same time, Aoun opposed the efforts of Lebanese deputies to amend the constitution. He rejected the new version of the constitution, known as the Taif Accords, as a Syrian scheme to whittle away at Maronite power and called on the Lebanese Forces to stand by him in meeting the Syrian challenge. The Lebanese Forces demurred because they considered Aoun’s war against Syria to be political suicide. Consequently, deadly hostilities broke out between Aoun’s forces and the Lebanese Forces, shattering whatever was left of Christian unity. It was against this background that Iraq invaded Kuwait. Washington needed Syria’s help in forming an international and Arab anti-Iraq coalition to extract Iraq from Kuwait.

No sooner, Washington endorsed the implementation of the Taif Accords, and apparently gave the go-ahead to Syria and its allies in Lebanon to oust Aoun as a price for Syria’s participation in the U.S.-led anti-Iraq coalition. Consequently, Syria occupied Lebanon and expedited the implementation of the Taif Accords, which conferred equal powers to the Maronite president, the Sunni prime minister, and the Shia speaker of the house.

Thanks to Syria and Iran, the Shia Islamist party Hezbollah was able to build a state-within-a-state in Lebanon under the pretext of expelling Israeli forces from Southern Lebanon and defending it against Israel’s aggressions. The murder of Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in 2005 by Hezbollah members reportedly with Syrian collusion sparked a mass demonstration, known as the Cedar Revolution, which all but crushed the Syrian order in Lebanon. But corruption remained the hallmark of the confessional system. Ominously, since the end of the civil war in 1990 until the present, Lebanon’s political elite have forged a Faustian deal with Hezbollah grounded in preserving national coexistence, but practically expressed in providing political cover for Hezbollah in return for an extraordinary theft of the state by the political ruling class.

The Present

The steady collapse of the economy, the steep downfall of Lebanon’s currency as pegged to the dollar, and the poaching of the people’s savings have pauperized and starved society. It was against this background that the nuclear-like explosion in Beirut’s port in August 2020 sank the country to a depth of destruction and misery unseen in its history. Demonstrations and calls for reform and holding the culprits behind the port explosion accountable led nowhere thanks to obstruction from Hezbollah and the country’s political elite.

Frustrated, demeaned, and fed up with the chronic failure of the political system, proposals of federalism, partition, or creating a Christian state have once again been expressed by mainly Maronite voices. No doubt, the state and nation are facing an unprecedented crisis and need salvation and help. But Maronite plans have to be taken under careful consideration. As shown here, Political Maronitism since Emir Bashir to the present has been affected by both domestic and regional forces which continuously diminished the very influence Political Maronitism had planned to preserve. Today, the Maronites face challenges and threats within and beyond the community far more dangerous than ever before. The community is divided and has neither allies nor partners among the other sects nor among regional countries supporting its plans. Even Washington has been clear about its priorities in Lebanon: building state capacity and strengthening government institutions such as the Lebanese Armed Forces to impose its authority over the total territory of the country.

Broadly speaking, Washington’s view of Beirut still reflects Ames’ outlook. Saudi Arabia and even Israel have brushed aside Maronite exclusive plans. As happened recently, Israel’s intelligence agency, the Mossad, on the order of Israel’s High Court of Justice, declassified documents, which were cited in Haaretz, pertaining to its plans in Lebanon and its relationship with Bashir Gemayel. The documents reveal that many Israeli officials had more apprehension than consideration about the Maronites, and that the real decisionmaker was not Bashir but his father Pierre, who was critical of Israel. Interestingly, some analysts believe the declassification of the documents at this time was partially meant to nip in the bud any formal or informal renewed contact by some Maronites with Israel.

Political Maronitism metaphorically resembles the myth of Sisyphus who is condemned by the gods to roll a boulder up a hill for eternity only to have it roll down again once he got it to the top. Suicide was not an option for Sisyphus and his struggle against defeat may have gained him definition and identity. Similarly, Political Maronitism today is a struggle against defeat, but the problem is that the boulder Lebanon’s Maronites are carrying to the top of the hill may crush them on the way down, should they not learn the lessons of their history.

Robert G. Rabil is a professor of political science at Florida Atlantic University. He can be reached @robertgrabil and www.robertrabil.com.

Image: Carlos Haidamous / Shutterstock.com

Taipei’s lobbying to include the 24-million democratic island nation of Taiwan in the upcoming UN General Assembly this month in New York will most likely upset China. With the continuing support for Taiwan’s “meaningful participation in the UN system” and other international organizations (IOs), the United States’ engagement in Taiwan Strait relations may also take another turning point in the Sino-American rivalry and the Indo-Pacific defense posture.

With the fresh memory of the infamous slogan of “Ukraine today, Taiwan tomorrow,” the United States and the global community are looking anxiously at the volatile Taiwan issue. China’s relentless military intrusions into the island’s airspace with continuing naval exercises in and around the Taiwan Strait are worrisome for not only the immediate stakeholders but also the whole international community.

President Xi Jinping’s stated mission of “national reunification,” which would culminate in Taiwan’s “return” to the Chinese “motherland,” has always been the undercurrent of these simmering tensions. Beijing’s comprehensive plans for Taiwan encompass not only the threat of a possible armed attack but also a long-term consistent campaign of isolating the democratic island nation in the international space.

Countering the Beijing strategy to block the Taipei government’s meaningful participation in IOs, Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs reiterated its diplomatic campaign for inclusion in the United Nations ahead of the UN General Assembly. Taiwan has been excluded from the UN for more than fifty years.

Is Taiwan a “Renegade Province” of China?

As a result of China’s over two decades of civil war between the Nationalists and the Communists, Mao Zedong’s communist forces seized power over the mainland, announcing the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on October 1, 1949. The nationalist forces of the defeated Republic of China (ROC) led by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek were forced to evacuate to the island of Taiwan.

Since then, both governments—the one in Beijing and the one in Taipei—have considered themselves the sole legitimate authority of all of China. Discrediting Taipei’s democratic ROC government, Beijing calls Taiwan a “renegade province.” It should, however, be noted that the current Taiwanese authorities are a continuation of the government of the ROC, which was established long before the intermittent civil war periods between 1927 and 1949. Indeed in 1911, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the “Father of the Nation” and the founder of the Chinese Nationalist Party (or Kuomintang, known by the acronym KMT), became the first president of the ROC after the collapse of millennia-old China’s dynastic empire. If it were not for the victory of Mao and his comrades, the world would today perceive the Chinese communists merely as rebels.

Despite losing the civil war in 1949, the ROC (Taiwan) kept the “China seat” in the United Nations for the next two decades. It was not until 1971 that the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 2758 in which it dismissed the representatives of the ROC from the seat, inviting the representation of the communist PRC in their place.

China’s Effective Disinformation Campaign

Whenever the issue of the return of the Taiwan representation to the UN is brought up, China triumphantly pulls the 1971 resolution out from its sleeve. According to Beijing, the UN resolution confirmed—once and for all—that “Taiwan is part of the PRC.” In fact, however, the claims of the Chinese authorities are based on manipulation.

UN Resolution 2758 recognizes the PRC as the “only lawful representative of China.” However, it does not resolve the statehood of Taiwan. It neither mentions the “Republic of China” nor “Taiwan.” It only states the removal of “Chiang Kai-shek’s representation” from the United Nations. In other words, the carefully drafted resolution does not authorize Beijing to represent Taiwan in the UN system and it does not state that Taiwan is part of the PRC.

Chiang Kai-shek—the head of the Nationalist government in China (1928–1949) and later in Taiwan (1949–1975)—has long been gone. Since then, Taiwan has become a flourishing democracy in the Indo-Pacific. Today, the presidential, parliamentary, and local elections are held in Taiwan. The thriving Taiwan’s democracy—ranked best in all of Asia—is among the top ten strongest “full democracies” in the world.

Taiwan also has a powerful partner: the United States. Even though Washington ceased its official relations with Taipei in order to establish diplomatic ties with Beijing in 1979, U.S. presidential administrations have maintained unofficial relations with Taiwan and guaranteed its security as confirmed by the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, three U.S.-China joint communiqués of 1972, 1978, and 1982, and the Six Assurances. Nevertheless, with its stated “policy of ambiguity,” the United States deliberately avoids making legally binding declarations as to whether it would come to Taiwan’s aid in the event of a Chinese attack.

In all this, is membership in the UN really necessary for Taiwan? Or, perhaps, are Taiwan’s efforts to return to the UN an unjustified provocation against Beijing in the midst of Sino-American rivalry and increasing military posture in the Indo-Pacific?

Not to Provoke the Chinese Dragon?

The serious consequences of Taiwan’s exclusion from the UN system and other IOs are best evidenced by the events of the coronavirus pandemic. Due to the lack of Taiwan’s presence in the World Health Organization (WHO), for example, Taiwanese experts could not share their experiences from the previous fight against the SARS epidemic in 2003 on the WHO forum. Moreover, because of the continued pressure from China, Taiwan experienced a wide range of problems with the purchase of vaccines.

On the other hand, Taiwan was ranked as one of the countries that performed best in controlling Covid-19 infections. In fact, it was Taiwan that first informed the WHO about the mysterious transmissions of the new virus in the Chinese city of Wuhan in December 2019. Thus, it will not be an exaggeration to claim that Taiwan needs the UN, and the international community needs Taiwan. For the United States and the rest of the world, Taiwan’s participation is “not a political issue, but a pragmatic one.”

For years, Taipei has been trying to obtain membership or at least observer status in the UN family of organizations. However, despite the wide support of the United States, Japan, and the European Union countries, China has kept the door closed for Taiwan in many IOs.

China’s World Order, Replacing the United States

The rising China has been consistently and actively strengthening its position in the UN system and other IOs. Beijing has increasingly been placing Chinese nationals in IOs as well as influencing other member states and supporting their nationals if they were favorably aligned with Beijing’s strategic goals. For example, Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus—the current director general of WHO and former minister of foreign affairs and minister of health of Ethiopia—was suspected of following China’s policy during the coronavirus pandemic.

China’s influence kept growing in IOs as the United States has until recently been neglecting the UN agencies. After five years of absence, for example, the Biden White House rejoined the Paris-based United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in July 2023. Meanwhile, China had space to replace the United States not just with its pressure and influence, but also the financial leverage coming from membership dues. In the absence of the United States, China became the largest contributor to UNESCO’s annual budget.

By taking control of UN funds and modifying the language of international documents as Beijing sees fit, China has slowly been changing the international order from within. The aim of these actions is to impose on the world the vision of the Communist Party of China, which depreciates the importance of universal human rights—e.g., equality among all as well as the freedom of speech and religion.

Everything considered, the global support for Taiwan’s meaningful participation in the UN is far more than just a matter of the international presence of the shining democratic island nation. It is about counterbalancing China’s growing influences in IOs and countervailing threats to democratic values and freedom worldwide.

Dr. Patrick Mendis, a former American diplomat and military professor in the NATO and Indo-Pacific Commands during the Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations, is a distinguished visiting professor of transatlantic relations at the University of Warsaw in Poland.

Dr. Antonina Luszczykiewicz, a former Fulbright senior scholar at Indiana University in Bloomington, is an assistant professor at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow, Poland.

Image: Shutterstock.

Soviet Oppression during the Prague Spring 1968 influenced much of Milan Kundera’s perspective on Czechoslovak society at the time under Communism.

The recent passing of Czech author Milan Kundera was a great loss to the literary world. Exiled to Paris for his anti-Soviet writings, Kundera’s novels explored the inner psychological effects on individuals living under Communist regimes. While focused on Czechoslovakia and the state of affairs around the time of the Prague Spring, Kundera influenced ideals of free speech and liberty in all places that suffered under political oppression. While his work was famous in Europe, much of his following came from places like Latin America, where many of his readers grew up in the shadow of military dictatorships from the 1960s to the 1980s. The inner mind of someone who is trying to survive is an important perspective to understand, as political oppression affects people on many different levels.

While not to the same degree, my own country has recently passed a law where much of my content, the content of FPA.org, along with all local and even international news has been removed from the majority of social media platforms throughout the nation. The effect is so extensive, that even non-media related policy reports and things as simple as the best way to cook with flower honey, is also blocked on major social media platforms in the country. While there are ways of getting around such limitations (as practiced by those who live in China and other censored national grids), free speech and the ability to share ideas, whether they be critical of society or supportive of policy, needs to be given the maximum level of distribution, lest the Government seeks to passively limit such criticism.

Lessons from those like Milan Kundera, or Polish filmmaker Krzysztof Kieslowski, seek to not only highlight the plight of those living under left wing Communist dictatorships and Far Right military dictatorships, but serve as a lesson to never repeat the mistakes of the recent past. The lasting effect on free speech, and missions like Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty effectively used an outside perspective, critical of oppressive Governments, to bring down those same Governments. So effective was leaking information and the truth inside the Iron Curtain, that many regimes more recently created their own counter-narrative Government run media organisations to sow discontent and division in Western countries.

Care must be taken to establish legislation that guarantees not only free speech, but also protect state institutions from being degraded via creating a systemic bulk ward against free speech. Government supported media and fully funded media is easily degraded, and has the effect of becoming a tool for a small elite of Government officials who wish to limit any criticism or opposition. Such institutions should only exist if it can be regularly demonstrated to not only meet the local standards of free speech and liberty, but also meet an international standard as they are the voice of an entire nation. Distributing scripted lines from a Government can easily be labelled as Journalism, even when it clearly supports a small elite group. Labels against elected opposition can be used as well by the same media to limit criticism of the Government of the day, even when operating in an otherwise robust democracy. If your media attacks the opposition while constantly supporting the Government, they lack an understanding of their own role in a democracy.

While political courses often drill in the idea that “Absolute Power, Corrupts Absolutely”, the further reach of such power not only corrupts a country systemically, but is almost impossible to remove from the institutions once it infects the system. Absolutist power in reality is almost never removed, as the cure for such anti-corruption measures are often limited to using systemic tools that have already been corrupted. All Governments would prefer to operate in a system where there are no checks and balances, but such a system without checks, will never achieve any balance. Those with more money, influence and power will gain it increasingly, with the rest of us rapidly become like many of the characters in a Kundera novel, silently and secretly trying to live our lives, hoping that the regime does not decide to activate a tank battalion to crush an elected leader and a Prague Spring, or simply use banned military weapons against its own citizens. Even when an otherwise healthy democracy ignores abuses and creates relations with such regimes, the oppression from the regime seeps into the democratic institutions that are founded on principals banning such treatment of its citizens. The decay of democratic principals is one of the greatest real and persistent threats to existing democracies. Lessons of the Cold War ignored have already lead to some of the largest tank battles since 1945, and not just because its 2023.

After decades of stumbling progress toward democracy, suddenly, in the past few months, eight West African nations have been rocked by coups and civil wars, triggering waves of emigration to the United States and the EU, disrupting the production of oil, gas, and strategic minerals, and spreading shocking amounts of human misery.

What happened? Africa was on track to report the second fastest growth rate in the world this year, projected at 4.1 percent, compared to 3.8 percent in 2022. That puts it much higher than the global average of 2.9 percent. Only Asia’s growth of 4.3 percent will be higher.

Africa is also rich in the minerals needed for electric car batteries and other energy-transition industries. The demand for these minerals is climbing sharply and Africa is best placed to benefit from the mining and refining of these vital resources.

Yet another asset of Africa is the youth of its population. A growing cohort of people under thirty years of age means more workers, more consumers, and more new ideas. By 2050, Africa will be home to 2.4 billion under thirty, while Europe, South America, and North America will see a shrinkage of working-age populations.

Now, given recent developments, these projections may not be realized.

A Troubled Continent

Given these advantages and a potentially bright future ahead, why then is Africa in revolt?

One problem is the lack of investment in water, a necessity for rapidly urbanizing populations. Additionally, war and terror attacks are driving rural people away from land that they had long irrigated. Abandoned land is soon scoured by winds that scatter the topsoil, turning farmland into desert. The Sahara is marching south while other deserts are creeping behind the fleeing populations in the marginal areas of the Sahel and Southern Africa.

Schooling is lacking in too many places and the educated are among the first to emigrate. Once they have learned English and math, they can earn more abroad than at home—a brain drain that keeps the benefits of education from becoming a capital asset for many African lands.

For the enterprising that remain, inflation and currency fluctuations devour their savings. The coronavirus pandemic and a shortage of farm fertilizers from Ukraine only accelerated underlying trends.

At the root of it all is poor governance and state corruption. Bribery is common and placing politically-connected incompetents—a problem in every society—is arguably worse in Africa, where both tribal and political loyalties require jobs for followers lest they become rebels.

It is fashionable to incriminate the former colonizing nations, which once preferred low-priced raw materials over refined products that command higher prices. Yet African nations have been free of colonialists for at least half a century and corrupt elites have generally preferred to siphon their cut from raw-material sales rather than invest in value-adding technology that would produce higher returns over the long run. They have continued colonial economics, not departed from them.

Now, after decades, they own the failures that they once decried from pith-helmet-wearing exploiters. Overall, African elites have never managed to find national consensus in favor of stable and inclusive political systems, preferring tribalism and populism to political struggle around a social goal.

In the handful of cases where societies did unify and reform, economic growth surged, education improved, and poverty fell. Meanwhile, gangrenous states have allowed or encouraged the spread of terror groups across the Sahel for twenty years. This, too, drives away farmers and teachers while perpetuating poverty. All of this produces despair and desperate people imagine a savior, someone strong enough to right all of the wrongs.

Failing to produce a local model of reform, African leaders are seduced by China, which marries the idea of a strongman-savior with that of an alternative to the West. As one leader told former U.S. treasury secretary Larry Summers: “Look, I like your values better than I like China’s. But the truth is, when we’re engaged with the Chinese, we get an airport. And when we’re engaged with you guys, we get a lecture.”

The Scramble for Africa 2.0 and America’s Role

A new “scramble for Africa” is underway—and the West is way behind. China has become the main economic partner in Africa. Turkey has built its first military base abroad (in Somalia). Vladimir Putin’s Russia is “rediscovering” Africa, pushing aside the Wagner Group to manage military affairs directly. Democratic regression in Africa also reflects great power dynamics. It is in this context that the latest coups must be placed.

Anti-French sentiment is linked to Paris’ refusal to change the paradigm. The soldiers are acclaimed by the people because the people are exasperated by the inefficiency of the state and the absence of public services.

The United States is right to refuse foreign military interventions which would only crystallize mistrust and weaken nations. Still, Washington has a leading role to play for several reasons.

First, America has no colonial liabilities, which is a definite advantage in the current context. Moreover, if the United States is faithful to its values, it will develop an accompanying policy for strengthening democracy, fighting corruption, and encouraging investment.

Second, America could offer a framework for investment in mining and energy projects in exchange for transparency. This would mean that ordinary Africans, not the elites, would take the lion’s share of the returns.

Third, America could also work to stabilize African currencies—perhaps through currency boards that would peg those monies to the U.S. dollar—to defeat the scourges of inflation and devaluation.

American leadership, within the framework of international institutions, would allow Africa to emerge from underdevelopment and allow the world economy to benefit from its reservoir of growth. Otherwise, dictatorships will continue to make Africa synonymous with misery.

Ahmed Charai is the Publisher of Jerusalem Strategic Tribune. He is on the board of directors of the Atlantic Council, the International Crisis Group, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Foreign Policy Research Institute, and the Center for the National Interest.

Image: U.S. State Department.

All truths, however long they may take, will find themselves revealed with the passage of time. Unfortunately, in the case of Imam Musa Sadr, that moment has not yet come. August 31 marked the forty-fifth anniversary of Sadr’s disappearance while traveling to Libya to meet the late dictator Muammar Gaddafi. Many observers, including people from his family, hold the former Libyan leader responsible for his disappearance and hope to discover one day what happened to him. 

But what did Sadr do during his life in Lebanon that he merits remembrance today? Born in Iran to Lebanese parents of Shia heritage, Sadr adhered to the teachings of Islam and is universally beloved by Lebanon’s Shia community. If any traveler were to visit the religiously and ethnically diverse Mediterranean country, they will find pictures of the Imam across the Shia-populated areas of Lebanon. However, his impact on Lebanon goes far beyond a single sect. He is remembered and cherished by Lebanese people across different religions, including Lebanon’s Maronite community.

To understand his legacy, one must explore the effect Sadr had on Lebanon and his efforts to support social cohesion during times of political violence and fear.

One resident of the Shia-majority town of Baalbek, Ali Kusai, shared his views on Sadr and how the imam’s teachings brought Lebanese people together at a moment when peace seemed like an illusion for most.

“He was a man of unity, a defender of human rights. Whoever is a person who cherishes unity, he is threatened in Lebanon.”

During the late 1970s, Lebanon was shattered by a fifteen-year civil war. Where before, peoples of all different faiths could visit and enjoy the beauty of all of Lebanon, many were now living in fear of their fellow Lebanese.

Twenty-two kilometers north of Baalbek lies the small town of Deir El Ahmar, whose inhabitants are mostly Maronites Christians. Like everyone else during the war, they too saw their neighbors take up arms and join militias, and felt they were next in line to be targeted.

In a single statement, Sadr called for the safety of Lebanese Christians and declared what they meant to him.

“Whoever shoots a bullet at the people of Deir al-Ahmar is as if he were shooting it in my chest. For me, everyone is to pray in the church as I pray in the mosque. There is no difference between a Muslim and a Christian, between my south and my north.”  

Truly, he was a man who garnered the respect of all Lebanese and worked effortlessly to stop senseless bloodshed. And this was no easy task, for Lebanon’s civil war also possessed a regional element, which succeeded in dragging Lebanon into a conflict that served no sect or community. This was something that Sadr was trying to stop.

In the south of Lebanon, Palestinian commandoes and militia-fighters, including the Palestinian Liberation Organization led by Yasser Arafat, were running what was effectively their own autonomous region.

With this freehand in the south, the Palestinian guerrillas were waging a war against Israel with dire consequences for Lebanon. Although was a supporter of the Palestinian cause, Sadr did not endorse Arafat’s strategy of fighting Israel or any other Palestinian group. He believed it would only cause unnecessary harm to the people living in the south due to Israeli retaliation.

Sadr was prepared to go to great lengths to solve this issue, which included having a dialogue with Libya’s Gaddafi. According to Hassan Chami, a judge and coordinator of Lebanon’s official committee that is investigating the disappearance of Sadr and his two companions, Gaddafi wanted to fight Israel through Lebanon’s territory by supporting Palestinian organizations and militias. Since the other Arab countries had ceasefires with Israel (Egypt, Jordan, and Syria), Lebanon was the only pathway to waging war against the Jewish state. Gaddafi was committed to proving himself to be the Arab World’s next Gamal Abdel Nasser, who died of a heart attack in 1970.

In a discussion with the National Interest, Chami spoke about Gaddafi’s theories on how to solve the Lebanese civil war and the Palestine-Israel conflict.

“From Gaddafi’s point of view, if you want to resolve the Lebanese war, you must clear the Christians from the country to places like Australia or Canada. Imam Musa Sadr did not accept this. This absurd idea from the Gaddafi was the first area of contention between the two men. Sadr rejected all forms of sectarianism, making it clear Lebanon was home to all. Yet, the most crucial and deeper motivation for Gaddafi was his Nasser obsession and desire to fight Israel.”

Chami continued, “Gaddafi dreamed of being the successor and second version of Gamal Abdel Nasser. If anyone wants to be a great Arab leader, he must fight Israel. Gaddafi saw Sadr as an obstacle and needed him out of the picture.”

According to Chami, Sadr was not killed immediately after he arrived at the Libyan capital of Tripoli. Rather, he was put in prison because Gaddafi believed in old “black magic” that says you cannot kill someone on your lands. This was allegedly revealed to Sadr’s family by Libya’s new officials after the fall of Gaddafi’s regime. This old superstitious belief may have prevented Sadr from being killed, but it did not save his life. Further, this terrible ordeal may have indirectly caused the Lebanese civil war to carry on for many years. What would have happened if he lived?

In the end, no one knows for sure. But everyone knows what happened when he was gone. The best way to honor Sadr’s timeless influence is to build the Lebanon that he struggled to see in his lifetime. One of peace, coexistence of all, and support for your fellow citizens who fall on hard times.

Adnan Nasser is an independent foreign policy analyst and journalist with a focus on Middle East affairs. Follow him on Twitter @Adnansoutlook29.

Image: Hiba Al Kallas / Shutterstock.com

Three years ago, Belarusians took to the streets to protest the fraudulent presidential elections that saw dictator Alexander Lukashenko reelected as president for the sixth time. The regime responded with a brutal crackdown, leading to the West breaking off diplomatic relations and imposing sanctions. Since then, Lukashenko has adopted an increasingly belligerent stance against his Western neighbors by orchestrating a migrant crisis, aiding Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, hosting Wagner Group mercenaries, and authorizing the deployment of Russian tactical nuclear weapons on Belarusian soil. While these provocations serve the Kremlin’s interests by destabilizing NATO’s eastern frontier, Lukashenko hopes they will pressure the European Union to normalize relations and lift sanctions as his country grows more isolated and dependent on Russia.

Compared to other post-Soviet countries, Belarus has achieved minimal political and economic reforms. By maintaining a largely state-controlled economy—heavily dependent on Russia—and strengthening the internal security apparatus, Lukashenko has consolidated power since he attained the presidency in 1994. There have been sporadic attempts to improve relations with the West, most notably in 2008 after Russia attacked Georgia, and again in 2015, after the Ukraine crisis and Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Both attempts led to the release of political prisoners and the rise of pragmatic and reform-oriented technocrats seeking to reduce ties with Russia, such as the late Vladimir Makei. Ultimately, efforts to normalize relations were short-lived, and Lukashenko reverted to mass repression and human rights violations after the 2010 and 2020 presidential elections.

The 2020 anti-government protests were the largest in Belarus’s history, with over 200,000 people marching in the streets of Minsk demanding Lukashenko’s resignation. Had the Kremlin not provided political support to the regime and offered to intervene militarily, perhaps Belarus’s story would have taken a different path. Russia’s intelligence apparatus worked closely with their Belarusian counterparts to help suppress protests, and it’s likely they provided intelligence on the whereabouts of opposition activist Roman Protasevich, allowing the regime to hijack Ryanair Flight 4978 in 2021.

The fact that Lukashenko needed Kremlin support to survive undermined his authority and legitimacy within his own government. This allowed Russia to develop closer ties with other key regime figures and infiltrate Belarus’s security apparatus. Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Nikolay Karpenkov, who heads both Belarus’s security forces and the Main Directorate for Combating Organised Crime Corruption (GUBOPiK), played a crucial role in suppressing protests and is a staunch supporter of Russia. He often overshadows his superior, Minister of Internal Affairs Ivan Kubrakov, and is one of Russia’s preferred candidates to replace Lukashenko. Aware of Moscow’s tendrils, Lukashenko has tried to limit its influence by naming Ivan Tertel, who has few ties to Russia, as the head of the State Security Committee (KGB).

Even though some members of the security apparatus are apprehensive of Russia’s encroaching influence, they remain anti-West and have a vested interest in preserving the regime. Furthermore, the Russian Ambassador to Belarus, Boris Gryzlov, is very close to the siloviki (Putin’s inner circle) and helps reassert Russia’s influence while keeping an eye on the internal power dynamics in Minsk. Belarus’ pragmatic technocrats have been sidelined, especially after the sudden and mysterious death of Foreign Minister Vladimir Makei in November 2022, who happened to be one of the few figures openly hostile to Russia.

With Belarus now cut off from Western markets, its economy has become even more dependent on Russia, which is by far its largest trading partner. Minsk’s weakened bargaining position has allowed Moscow to accelerate plans for economic integration and defense cooperation within the Union State of Russia and Belarus. In 2021, both countries signed twenty-eight agreements, including a unified tax system, oil and gas market, and customs union. Ironically, when the Union State was first conceptualized in the late 1990s, Lukashenko pushed for greater integration between the two states, hoping that he would lead the union and take power in the Kremlin after Boris Yeltsin.

Although the opposition, led by Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, is supported by the West and most Belarusians, it is unlikely that they will be able to overthrow the regime. The constitutional amendments, passed in February 2022, allow Lukashenko to secure lifelong immunity from prosecution and retain power post-presidency as President of the All Belarussian People’s Assembly. The amendments also enable the permanent deployment of Russian troops and nuclear weapons in Belarus. Lukashenko may retain an honorific title but gradually lose actual power within his own country, whereas Russia’s influence is likely to stay for the foreseeable future. 

Lukashenko hoped hosting Wagner troops, thanks to his mediation efforts during Yevgeny Prigozhin’s failed mutiny in June 2023, would provide greater security from Russia. The bold assassination of Wagner’s leadership two months after the mutiny served as a message to Russians and allies alike, including Lukashenko, that betrayal is an unforgivable sin. Lukashenko has inadvertently traded his country’s sovereignty to remain in power for a few more years.

Kelly Alkhouli is a political consultant and director of international relations at the Center of Political and Foreign Affairs (CPFA).

Image: Shutterstock.

Amidst the war in Ukraine, Americans shouldn’t be faulted for thinking their closest allies lie across the Atlantic. But unlike many free-riding NATO members, Australia is emerging as the United States’ most willing and capable defense partner. This is good news for America as it enters a “decisive decade” of competition with China. The United States is no longer militarily preeminent and regional states must do more to uphold the status quo by bolstering their defensive capabilities. By this measure, Australia is proving to be a valuable ally.

Australia is reorienting its grand strategy for long-term competition with China after decades of fighting alongside U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. No longer are Australian leaders calling on their Chinese counterparts to assume the mantle of “responsible global citizenship.” The Australian public’s attitude toward China has turned negative too, with nearly 60 percent of Australians classifying Beijing’s foreign policy as a critical threat to their country’s vital interests. These concerns are not unfounded: while the continent itself remains physically secure, China’s long-range precision strike capabilities could threaten key maritime trading routes that are essential for Australia’s economic prosperity.

Canberra is upgrading its defense posture in meaningful ways. For the first time, defense spending will exceed A$50 billion. Divestments in infantry fighting vehicles and self-propelled howitzers, and procurements of littoral maneuver vessels and land-based maritime strike systems align with the review’s aim of implementing an anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy. To that end, the Australian Defence Force is looking to purchase U.S. Tomahawk missiles, air-launched Long-Range Anti-Ship Missiles, Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles, small-diameter bombs, and Norwegian-made Kongsberg Joint Strike Missiles.

Yet, these investments are modest compared to the expenses that will come with implementing the AUKUS agreement. The Australian government estimates that the costs of the submarines could run as high as A$368 billion over the next three decades, though the final price tag is likely to be higher. How Australia will pay this bill—and develop the industrial capacity, infrastructure, and workforce required to maintain nuclear-powered submarines—is an open question. What AUKUS shows however is that Australia is committed to preserving the balance of power in the Pacific and believes acquiring this expensive capability is necessary to secure its interests.

The near-term significance of AUKUS is almost as important as the day when Australian sailors finally take command of their own SSNs in the early 2040s. In March, U.S. president Joe Biden, Australian prime minister Anthony Albanese, and British prime minister Rishi Sunak announced that beginning in 2027, up to four U.S. Virginia-class attack submarines and one British Astute-class attack submarine would begin rotational deployments to HMAS Stirling in Western Australia, known as Submarine Rotational Force-West (SRF-West).

The rotation of these nuclear-powered attack submarines—estimated to reach full strength in 2031—will augment the five already stationed in Guam, allowing U.S. forces to better control key sea lanes like the Malacca Strait during a conflict. Each Virginia-class boat is also equipped with up to forty Tomahawk cruise missiles that can strike targets 1,000 miles away. Taken together, the presence of several highly capable stealthy submarines in the Western Pacific will shore up collective deterrence by frustrating the Chinese navy’s efforts to project power over long distances and operate unmolested in the bastions of the South China Sea.

The creation of SRF-West also underscores why Australia’s greatest asset is its geography. Australia is a continental island—about equal in size to the United States in fact—surrounded by open ocean and friendly neighbors in its littoral waters. More importantly, it lies largely outside of China’s land-based missile umbrella that imperils U.S. bases and assets in Japan, the Philippines, and Guam.

Improving the resiliency of the U.S. force posture will require dispersing U.S. assets widely enough to survive a first strike and muster sufficient combat power to respond effectively. Although Canberra prohibits the establishment of foreign military bases on its soil, provisions allowing for the rotational presence of U.S. forces have seen modest enhancements to the U.S. posture down under, including the planned deployment of six B-52 bombers in northern Australia. With Canberra’s consent, during a crisis, additional U.S. forces could be surged into the Pacific via Australia like they were during World War II.

Along with power projection, Australia’s geography mitigates another problem plaguing U.S. strategy in the region: logistics. Sustaining high-end operations in the Pacific theater will require an accessible logistics and sustainment hub outside of China’s land-based precision strike envelope. At the most recent Australia-U.S. Ministerial Consultation (AUSMIN) in late July, the two sides outlined their desire for “the longer-term establishment of an enduring Logistics Support Area … to enhance interoperability and accelerate the ability to respond to regional crises.” Accordingly, both militaries have prioritized joint logistics support in their regular exercises. The recently concluded Talisman Sabre exercise, for example, saw U.S. sustainers move fuel and water through a three-mile-long pipeline connected to Australian vessels 1,000 meters offshore.

The perennial American complaint that NATO members don’t pay their fair share or take their defense seriously doesn’t apply to Australia. Instead, U.S. policymakers have an ally that is pulling its weight by making meaningful investments in hard power. And by not waiting until a war breaks out to begin the process of rearming, Australia is making such a calamity less likely.

Matthew C. Mai is a research associate at Defense Priorities.

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Since the demise of Chairman Mao Zedong, the Chinese state has embraced drastic changes in its priorities. The Communist Party’s efforts toward market-oriented economic reform represent a change of the party-state’s priority from political to economic leadership. After the Tiananmen Square crackdown of 1989, paramount leader Deng Xiaoping sent an unambiguous message to the Chinese public, denying the possibility of political reform while keeping the doors open for economic growth. This is widely considered the political bargain structuring relations between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Chinese people. In other words, the CCP has premised its political legitimacy on its ability to generate economic growth.

However, this understanding of the party-state’s decision to reform misrepresents the CCP’s fundamental objectives. The party’s ruling legitimacy does not depend on China’s economic advancement. Instead, the fundamental aim of the CCP behind the reforms was to ensure its own security. Logically, should economic reform become an obstacle rather than a solution to the CCP’s political monopoly, the CCP will quickly jettison economic liberalization. In some cases, it already has.

Recovering from the economic catastrophe caused by the Cultural Revolution, Deng Xiaoping struggled to lead China forward. While Deng is widely credited for China’s economic boom, the idea of market reform did not originate with him. In 1978, eighteen peasants from Xiaogang village in China’s Anhui province signed a secret agreement to privatize communally owned land for household farming. Notably, this reform attempt was bottom-up, not top-down. It was not until after observing the success of this ground-breaking private experiment that the Central Committee of the CCP officially approved the Household Responsibility System (HRS) in 1980 and incorporated it into the 1982 Constitution, which effectively reprivatized rural land ownership.

Examining Deng’s words, it is not difficult to notice his confused idea of his policies. When Deng famously described his policies as akin to “Cross[ing] the river by feeling the stones,” he effectively denied the supposedly scientific doctrine of Marxist-Leninism. Further, even after the unprecedented wave of privatization in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the leading principle for China’s reform is illustrated as “grasping the large, letting go of the small.” Privatization may be allowed but only in areas of lesser importance to the national economy. The dominant sectors of the Chinese economy must remain state-owned.

Nonetheless, the private sector has always been the primary contributor to Chinese economic growth. The private sector churns out roughly 60 percent of China's GDP, 70 percent of innovation, 80 percent of urban development, and 90 percent of new jobs. Therefore, if economic advancement is genuinely where the CCP has premised its ruling legitimacy, it has failed to harness its most enduring source of prosperity.

Aside from historical observations, the decisions made by today’s CCP flawlessly display where its actual concerns lie. The party-state’s political prosecutions and judicial interference in Hong Kong triggered a series of protests in Hong Kong throughout 2019–2020. In particular, the city’s residents demonstrated against an extradition bill allowing the city government to extradite criminal suspects directly to mainland China. However, instead of striking a deal with protestors (as it did in 2012 when Hong Kong residents protested the introduction of “Moral and National Education” to school curricula), the CCP feared a knock-on effect in the mainland and decided to intervene with an iron fist, introducing the draconian National Security Law (NSL). Given the deliberately vague, overly broad, and manipulatable nature of the new NSL, its implementation has dramatically affected civil liberties on the island. The legislation’s wide coverage spans all disciplines and professions in Hong Kong, while its extra-territorial application threatens any businesses with ties to Hong Kong around the globe.

As a result, the NSL devastated Hong Kong’s status as an international financial center. According to an American Chamber of Commerce survey, 68 percent of 183 companies polled in Hong Kong are increasingly concerned about sustaining business operations. Moreover, many international companies are reconsidering their investment in Hong Kong, and an increasing number of multinational firms are building offices in Singapore to service the Asian market instead. In addition, the U.S. government also revoked Hong Kong’s special status for trade benefits. Clearly, “national security” is more valuable than mere commerce.

The trade-off of sacrificing Hong Kong’s economic prosperity for the party-state’s regime security was not an isolated incident. One need only examine a series of crackdowns on China’s private sector, especially high-tech and internet companies. In November 2020, regulators halted Ant Group’s $37 billion Initial Public Offering (IPO), considered the largest IPO globally at the time. Since then, the bureaucracy has commenced a series of regulatory crackdowns on Chinese high-tech and internet companies, wiping approximately $1.1 trillion from the market capitalization of Alibaba Group, Tencent, Meituan, Baidu, and JD.com in the Hong Kong stock market. However, as China relies on the United States and Taiwan for most of the advanced technologies, like semiconductors and microchips, there seems to be neither a rationale nor an incentive for the government to crack down on its own high-tech companies. This would inevitably hinder economic growth, restrict military capabilities, and curb technological innovation. While the crackdowns seem aberrant, the reason behind them is clearer when one considers that China’s high-tech industry is private instead of state-owned. While private enterprises in China enjoy limited freedom, they are dangerously autonomous in the eyes of the party-state. Therefore, they must be suppressed.

China’s development indicators also show how the regime has obstructed growth for its own ends. While China’s overall GDP and GDP per capita have been consistently rising over the past decades, it is not difficult to notice the striking inequality in the allocation of resources between Beijing and individual households. Chinese households only retain around 55 percent of the national GDP, compared to industrialized democracies, where household income represents roughly 70 to 80 percent of GDP. As a result, state investment, not private consumption, drives China’s GDP. Had economic prosperity been the determinative ruling legitimacy, Chinese households would retain a significantly larger share of the overall GDP. Moreover, despite the rhetorical goal to elevate extreme poverty, former premier Li Keqiang openly admitted that the monthly income of some 600 million Chinese people is still barely ¥1,000, which is equivalent to roughly $140. Namely, around 600 million Chinese people earn less than $5 per day, lower than the $5.50 benchmark recommended by the World Bank to evaluate extreme poverty.

When sustainable economic growth threatens its survival by creating independent sources of wealth and power, the party-state can no longer tolerate it. This way of thinking is also reflected in President Xi Jinping’s numerous speeches, which he calls “bottom-line thinking.” Here, the bottom line is the unchallenged political authority of the CCP. Therefore, if the requirement for economic advancement would cost the life of the Party itself, economic progress becomes expendable, regardless of its apparent prior role as a hallmark of the CCP’s legitimacy.

Wilson Y. Wen is a Juris Doctor candidate at Osgoode Hall Law School and serves as a senior editor of the Osgoode Hall Law Journal. He is also the research director at HanVoice and serves as an East Asia associate for the Open Foreign Policy Initiative.

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The United Nation’s annual climate change conference, COP28, is set to be hosted by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) this November, succeeding the previous host, Egypt. Amid the discourse surrounding COP28 an important perspective has been absent: that of the Middle East. Though the decision to transition COP hosting responsibilities from Egypt to the UAE was made by the Asia Pacific group of nations, it encapsulates the shift in power dynamics within the Middle East over the past two decades. Egypt, which led the Arab world during the twentieth century, has handed over the reins to a new regional force that seeks to spread its vision: the UAE.

It was Egypt’s leaders who championed Arab unity in the twentieth century, popularised socialist economic ideas, and pioneered peace talks with Israel. The Arab Spring that erupted in 2010 marked the end of the era of Egyptian hegemony and the beginning of a shift in power towards the region’s smaller, wealthier, and more progressive countries like the UAE. Abu Dhabi advocated models for a diversified economy that would not rely solely on natural resources, for leadership that would speak to all actors in the region—including Israel— as well as for a society looking to embrace progress alongside conservatism, prosperity-based nationalism, cultural pride, and most importantly, religious and social tolerance.

Now, the UAE needs to show its strength in leading policy and action on climate change, perhaps the gravest threat facing the world today. Indeed, for the UAE this is not a theoretical discussion. Contrary to popular belief, the Middle East faces a more immediate impact from climate change than the West. Desertification, food scarcity, migration, rising sea levels, and the stark difference in life expectancy between the Middle East (71) and the West (78.9) underline the urgency. The UAE, positioning itself as a regional and global leader, holds significant stakes in ensuring COP28's success.

In recent years, the UAE has demonstrated its commitment to adopting and implementing the highest international standards. It ranked first in the Pandemic Resilience Index’s ranking of governmental responses to coronavirus in 2022. On the economic front, Abu Dhabi worked to effectively streamline its government ministries and stimulate job growth in the private sector, an effort that saw the 29,810 Emiratis working in the private sector in 2021 almost triple to 79,000 in 2023. In 2022, it also shifted to a Saturday-Sunday weekend to align its economy with that of the global market. The UAE’s pragmatic approach is yielding results. Domestically, as part of its effort to ensure its competitiveness and future development it has undergone significant human rights reforms including offering naturalization to foreign workers and introducing civil marriage for non-Muslims. Regionally, it has been investing extensively in Africa, is supporting Egypt economically, and was active in search and rescue efforts following the recent earthquake in Syria and Turkey.

These strategic changes reflect the UAE's dedication to progress, a vision inherited from its founders. The global competition for talent and an innovative economy means that the UAE must adapt quickly, and the upcoming COP28 conference in Dubai, therefore, represents a meaningful opportunity. It is an expression of the country’s effort to adapt to global changes and become a model of a thriving Arab economy that meets the highest international standards. Despite its role in the traditional energy market, the UAE wishes to lead the global climate agenda including emissions reduction. This is reflected in the action plan that the UAE presented in Brussels in July 2023, as well as in its domestic policies including, for example, the efforts of the construction industry—especially in Dubai—in recent years to increase investment in smart construction techniques that focus on reducing energy consumption.

For a global action plan on climate change to succeed, effective cooperation with the regional leaders of today and tomorrow is critical. In the Middle East, pioneers persuading their neighbors to make courageous reforms—from flexibility in interpreting Islamic law to the adoption of international standards on matters of individual rights including the status of women and integration of foreigners – are likely to have substantial influence on climate as well.

The appointment of Dr. Sultan Ahmed Al-Jaber—the CEO of the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) as well as the chairman of the (very active but much less discussed) Abu Dhabi Future Energy Company (Masdar), the UAE’s renewable energy company—as the COP28 president epitomizes the UAE’s result-oriented approach towards effectively diversifying their economy.

Senior Emirati executives are steering the region towards sustainable futures. Their intimate knowledge of the elements shaping the country and the region means that they have a better chance of successfully impacting real change.

The UAE-led COP28 is an important opportunity to shape the Middle East’s perceptions and policies towards climate change, a phenomenon that is already severely impacting lives in the region.

Yossi Mann is head of the Israel and Arab Gulf program at the Abba Eban Institute and head of the Middle East Program at Reichman University in Herzliya, Israel.

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Following last year’s Russian invasion, millions of Ukrainians fled to countries across Europe and beyond. What distinguishes this group from other refugee flows, however, is its unusual gender distribution: most refugee arrivals have been women. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy barred men aged eighteen to sixty from leaving the country so they would be available for military service. As a result, the share of women among adult Ukrainian refugees is close to 70 percent in most host countries.

This is in contrast with other refugee flows; for example, women only made up 30 percent of all asylum applications during the 2015-17 refugee crisis in Europe. Other data provided by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) show that women accounted for slightly less than half of all those protected and/or assisted by the refugee agency in 2022.

We can refer to a “feminization” of refugees in the Ukrainian context. The term feminization of migration was coined to note not so much an increase in the proportion or numbers of female migrants but the emergence of a new form of female migration in the early 1980s: women were migrating independently to seek jobs abroad (rather than joining their husbands) and were becoming the main income providers for their families.

Ukrainian refugee women who fled without their husbands are faced with new responsibilities. They have to manage alone and find employment while taking care of dependent family members who traveled with them (mainly children and elderly people and, in some cases, people with special needs), while also supporting family members who stayed behind. These challenges can become overwhelming; some end up choosing to return, trading safety in a foreign land for the familiarity of home. Ten percent of all Ukrainian refugees who left following the February 2022 Russian attack have returned home from abroad, according to the International Organization for Migration.

Welcoming Ukrainian women refugees in Europe or the United States and giving them access to the labor market does not necessarily ensure their economic integration. Challenges such as the breakdown of the family unit, limited access to adequate and affordable childcare, social isolation, an employment-education mismatch, overqualification or lack of qualifications and skills, lack of recognition of degrees, etc., can hinder the success of these women in their host countries.

Ukrainians who fled their country benefitted from immediate labor market access in Europe and the United States. To avoid overwhelming the standard asylum system and for faster protection rights, the European Commission decided to give a “temporary protection” status to nationals of Ukraine which entails a residence permit, access to employment, housing, social welfare, medical care, education, etc. Across the Atlantic, the U.S. government launched a program called “Uniting for Ukraine” to offer Ukrainians a chance to come to the United States outside the regular refugee resettlement program under “humanitarian parole” for an initial period of two years. Ukrainian parolees in the United States are eligible for employment authorization and Social Security numbers, as well as federal assistance and refugee resettlement benefits. The same benefits are available to those with Temporary Protected Status (TPS), which was recently extended to many more Ukrainians in the United States.

This parallelism is interesting. Both the European Union and the U.S. government offered fast and efficient protection modes to Ukrainian nationals outside the regular refugee system. This is quite telling about how the current refugee system is becoming obsolete. 

Two Oxford professors, Alexander Betts and Paul Collier, have written extensively about the existing broken refugee system and called to transform it and render it fit for the twenty-first century. They explain in their book Refuge: Rethinking Refugee Policy in a Changing World how important it is to provide refugees with opportunities for human flourishing (jobs, training, etc.), rather than seeing them as inevitably dependent upon humanitarian assistance. Those employment opportunities and newly acquired skills can also empower refugees when they return home to rebuild their country—a return very much encouraged by the Ukrainian government, which is providing grants for businesses to stimulate job creation and rebuild the workforce. Zelenskyy recently declared: “Without people coming back, we will not have a strong economy.” His government is betting on attractive job opportunities to act as a pull factor and encourage returns.

While many have done just that, permanent return doesn’t seem to be on the agenda for most Ukrainians. The idea that “all Ukrainians want to return home” is not supported by data on migration intentions. Even prior to last year’s invasion, one in four adults in Ukraine wished to migrate, according to researchers from the Clingendael Institute. The desired destinations were mostly in the EU, but non-EU countries such as the United States and Canada were also on the list. Moreover, research focusing on re-migration patterns teaches us that “it is in fact women and children who have a relatively low probability of returning, especially the longer the war lasts and children put down roots at school.” That is the exact demographic composition of Ukrainian refugees.

As the Ukrainian crisis kept stretching in time and space, a shift from crisis management and short-term measures to long-term policy and support was in order. With this in mind, the U.S. government has set up a new public-private initiative and signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with “Tent Partnership for Refugees” to support employment opportunities and economic integration for refugees generally. “Tent” is a business coalition made up of more than 300 multinational companies committed to supporting refugees through hiring, training, and mentorship. This partnership seeks to mobilize U.S. and international businesses and corporations to connect refugees (including Ukrainians) to employment opportunities in the United States and other hosting countries. It also underlines the importance of shared responsibility, which is one of the main ideas behind the United Nations Global Compact on Refugees.

As time passes, Europe’s integration capacities, including job markets, education, housing, etc., could reach their limits. Aside from those who choose to return home, many Ukrainians will want to migrate onward looking for better opportunities or to join family members scattered farther around the world. We know that diasporas attract onward migration; with hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians on U.S. soil (old and new arrivals), more and more Ukrainians will want to join them. Some 355,000 Ukrainian immigrants were living in the United States as of 2019, and at least 300,000 Ukrainian refugees made it here in the last eighteen months.

It is important to follow up on key measures that are meant to help refugees help themselves. The feminization of Ukrainian refugees means additional initiatives will need to be put in place to ensure the social and economic integration of this particular group. For example, is the MOU initiated by the Biden administration bearing fruit? Is it specifically targeting Ukrainian women who are facing numerous challenges on their own? Is the international community making sure that newly acquired skills developed through vocational training could be reinvested by these women when they return to their country and participate in its reconstruction when the time comes? To attain success in their host countries or back home, these women need more than open borders and job markets.

Nayla Rush is a Senior Researcher at the Center for Immigration Studies.

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Just over one year ago, I asked a simple question in The National Interest: What if machine learning—the most famous research paradigm in artificial intelligence (AI) today—is more limited than it seems? I expressed concern that the United States Department of Defense (DoD) could be unprepared for a slowdown or stagnation in AI development (an AI “winter”).

In the intervening period, state-of-the-art capabilities in subfields of AI, the most prominent among which is natural language processing, have dramatically changed. The rise of generative AI, powering applications such as OpenAI’s ChatGPT, Anthropic’s Claude, and Stability AI’s Stable Diffusion, has led to an endless stream of media coverage on the technology. Generative AI yields seemingly infinite applications; its development has produced a flood of invigorating research and a geopolitical “scramble” of age-defining proportions.

More than this, the U.S. government has seen significant AI-related transformations of its own making. The Chips and Science Act of August 2022 apportioned $280 billion over ten years for research and development in critical technologies, commercialization support, and semiconductor manufacturing on American soil. In October 2022, the U.S. government imposed an extensive array of export controls on Chinese firms, restricting the export of advanced semiconductor equipment and designs. These efforts have since expanded with limited outbound investment controls. The Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office (CDAO) has matured, recently launching a task force meant to study the uses of generative AI by the DoD.

If one were keeping score, my concerns of an AI winter dulling American innovation might look decidedly unfounded in retrospect. But is this picture accurate? How seriously should the DoD take the threat of an AI slowdown or stagnation? These possibilities, save for some defense analysts like Paul Scharre, who acknowledge that AI development could “peter out,” have not been given adequate consideration.

Here, I provide a brief tour of AI’s history to explore these possibilities, examine generative AI’s prospects today, and then offer three recommendations for the DoD to mitigate over-reliance on this technology.

Rise, Fall, and Rise Again

AI is an oddball field. The field swings back and forth between “winters” and “summers,” indicating a rise and drop in funding, perhaps owing to an underappreciation of the difficulties researchers face. The founding research proposal for the field of AI in 1955, indeed, had luminaries like John McCarthy and Marvin Minsky, among others, writing: “We think that a significant advance can be made in one or more of these problems [language use, forming abstractions and concepts, solving problems, and self-improvement] if a carefully selected group of scientists work on it together for a summer.” “Overambitious” does not adequately describe the founding mindset of AI.

Since then, the field has seen cycles characterized by dominant research paradigms. The use of explicit rules hand-coded by human programmers dominated the first wave, Symbolic AI, hoping this approach would eventually capture the dynamism of human intelligence. Others, known as Connectionists, hoped that a system premised upon the structure of mammalian brains—in which artificial neural networks learn from data directly without explicit rules—would lead to human-like intelligence. But by the 1970s, funding dropped, and the field entered its first winter.

“Expert systems” triggered an AI Summer in the early 1980s by hand-coding discipline-specific knowledge into systems for trustworthy commercial deployment. This approach, however, crashed into specialized hardware obstacles and the comparatively more successful deployment of desktop computers, leading to Symbolic AI’s drop from the scene. The computing power that accompanied the rise of desktop computers aided the Connectionists, who used this power to refine artificial neural networks, leading banks to adopt an AI technique premised on this approach that used character recognition to process checks.

Still, the demands for data and computing power required by this emerging form of AI that trains deep neural networks led to its stagnation from the 1990s until the early 2010s, when the big data revolution and increased computing power led to deep learning’s reinvigoration.

The Past Decade as a Race to the Ceiling

The past ten years in AI are commonly described as a victory streak for deep learning, a subset of machine learning. But the abrupt AI “arms race” between American corporate giants, set off earlier this year by OpenAI’s ChatGPT, means that generative AI hype has “spiraled out of control.”

Generative AI hype shields uneven progress within the field and the technical roadblocks to achieving robust deployment of AI systems for sensitive operations. Whereas a typical debate on this matter may center on the opposing positions of generative AI systems being “intelligent” in a meaningful sense or, in contrast, being dead-ends on the road to “artificial general intelligence” or “human-level intelligence,” it need not take this form for defense purposes.

Instead, generative AI may be seen as an acceleration in an ongoing race to the ceiling of machine learning’s utility in emulating human cognitive abilities. It is simultaneously successful in narrow domains and a giant step closer to the limits of this approach, gobbling up the remaining fruits in machine learning’s garden.

U.S. Defense Must Stare Down the Commercial Hype

There is no better time for the U.S. defense establishment to confront the hype, especially given generative AI’s reliance on private-sector AI innovation. Advisory firm Gartner—known for its “hype cycle” of emerging technologies—recently categorized generative AI at the “peak of inflated expectations,” immediately before descending into the “trough of disillusionment” when it becomes critical for providers to deploy the technology in full awareness of its limitations.

There should be no illusions about the potential for existing generative AI systems and major corporate owners to overcome the following (inexhaustive) list of obstacles at a speed suitable for private investment: the tendency to hallucinate (inventing facts with a tone of authoritativeness); the unpredictability of one model version to the next; insufficiently tailored business models that capture the economic value of the generative AI application in question; incompatibilities between AI implementation methods and some companies’ data infrastructures; vulnerability to adversarial attacks that lack robust safeguards; and insufficient consumer interest in AI-integrated search engines.

Generative AI systems do not, as CDAO Craig Martell would have it, offer “five nines…of correctness. I cannot have a hallucination that says: ‘Oh yeah, put widget A connected to widget B’—and it blows up.”

While not all these obstacles are relevant to the DoD’s AI adoption efforts, its reliance on the private sector to act as the primary engine of continuous innovation makes them critical. In addition, while there is sufficient corporate interest in generative AI in the immediate term for the technology to survive, the DoD must nonetheless concern itself with a possible stagnation of the technology’s capabilities or slowdown in mission-applicable breakthroughs.

Consistent with my previous assessment, an AI winter is not guaranteed to occur within a reasonable timeframe. Some argue that the technology will improve over time, making its flaws invisible to consumers. I agree in principle, but this is a major assumption that neglects two critical facts: (1) Time is not unlimited, and the AI bubble could burst before limitations in generative AI are overcome; (2) Generative AI is already receiving a disproportionate share of AI funding across subfields. Generative AI in America exists in a dynamic commercial environment and will survive, thrive, or die primarily in that context.

What should be done by the DoD to mitigate over-reliance on generative AI?

First, the DoD should signal interest in emerging AI research paradigms, like causal and neurosymbolic AI.

Whereas before, I recommended that the DoD send clearer signals about the value of “minority voices in AI pursuing research agendas outside of machine learning,” this should now be firmer and more explicit: emerging AI paradigms, including causal AI and neurosymbolic AI, both identified by Gartner as occupying the “innovation trigger” stage of the hype cycle, ought to be sought out by high-level, agenda-setting organizations like the CDAO. These research paradigms, in part, draw inspiration from the successes of the Symbolic and Connectionist approaches to AI while adding new elements to recognize their shortcomings.

Furthermore, innovative combinations of techniques across subfields in AI (i.e., natural language processing, strategic reasoning, computer vision, etc.) should be prioritized. It is time to break the misleading association bound up in the acronym “AI/ML.”

Second, link AI adoption efforts to the needs of both AI and future warfare.

The operative assumption in much of the DoD’s recent efforts to adopt, field, and integrate AI technologies is that, whatever the flaws of the systems invested in today, they can be improved over time—that autonomous piloting agents will continue to improve in ways suited for the “collaborative combat aircraft” program, that uncrewed drones characteristic of the U.S. Navy’s Task Force 59 will continuously make for better eyes and ears at sea, and so on. Directly connected to this assumption is the DoD’s external-facing organizations like the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) that link the public and private sectors, with concerns about unstable and insufficient funding as well as a difficult-to-navigate defense bureaucracy designed for traditional defense companies abounding.

Given the complexity of the pursuit of AI-enabled autonomy, efforts by organizations like the DIU should be guided by a simple truth: algorithms support applications. It is critical that the DoD not fall into an extrapolation trap, assuming that progress in some areas today means progress will continue indefinitely—at some point, a deliberate hammering out of adoption goals based on the needs of state-of-the-art AI systems themselves may be as important as the funding of such organizations. Echoing the importance of emerging research paradigms in AI above, even the most bespoke AI applications in defense may eventually require a more fundamental innovation that makes them possible.

Third, use academic input to retain intellectual sobriety throughout critical industry dealings.

Over the past year, the U.S. defense bureaucracy has attempted to assert more control over the “technical baseline” in AI-enabled systems. This creates tensions between the DoD and the private sector, where companies like OpenAI closely guard such technical secrets. Pentagon deputy CTO for critical technologies Maynard Holliday thus expressed interest in input from industry, academic, and defense representatives on various issues. This echoes more recent news that the U.S. Army is seeking industry input on an initiative that would have companies “disclose the provenance of their artificial intelligence algorithms.”

Balancing the expertise found in industry and academia—particularly as generative AI’s extraordinary computing power requirements widen the gap between their respective abilities to experiment directly with such systems—can be addressed in the same breath as generative AI’s potential winter. Specifically, individual industry AI leaders must be consciously separated from industry AI research, development, and other defense-relevant trends while recruiting academic expertise for a sorely needed intellectual sobriety on where AI is realistically heading.

Industry leaders have every incentive to inflate the trajectory of state-of-the-art AI systems but frequently employ an extrapolation fallacy. Scale AI CEO Alexandr Wang, for example, uses the successes of the Diplomacy-playing agent “Cicero” along with other gameplaying AI agents as evidence that warfare will be dramatically transformed in “less than ten years.” It is unclear how this conclusion can be drawn. Academic expertise would not be recruited to put down or oppose such claims by default but instead to recontextualize AI developments in a manner that keeps the DoD’s AI adoption efforts grounded.

Vincent J. Carchidi is a Non-Resident Scholar at the Middle East Institute’s Strategic Technologies and Cyber Security Program. His work focuses on the intersection of emerging technologies, defense, and international affairs. His opinions are his own.

Image: Shutterstock.

The quiet burial in St. Petersburg this week of Yevgeny Prigozhin may have laid to rest the mortal remains of the notorious mercenary chief, but the Wagner Group which he founded is still very much alive—at least outside Russia. Until the United States and its allies, including partners among African regional organizations and governments, can provide a credible alternative to what Wagner offers, the outfit will not only survive in one form or another but will continue to wreak havoc through wide swathes of Africa and elsewhere. This is because, reprehensible as it might be, there is a strong demand for what Prigozhin’s network offers.

While much of the focus in the aftermath of the spectacular crash northwest of Moscow of the private jet that killed Prigozhin, two of his top lieutenants, and seven other people on the two-month anniversary of the mercenary band’s abortive mutiny and march on the Russian capital was on either how the Embraer Legacy 600 was brought down and who may have been behind an incident that no one believed was an accident, not much attention was paid to where the Wagner boss was immediately before his untimely demise. In fact, as the Wall Street Journal’s world enterprise team first reported, the Russian street thug-turned-mercenary leader spent what ultimately proved to be his final days visiting outposts in Africa where he had not deployed some 5,000 hardened fighters, but also built a sprawling business empire dealing in everything from natural resources to liquor, much of it illicitly. According to the Journal’s reporting, Prigozhin made stops in the Central African Republic (CAR) and Mali and, while in the former country, also met with commanders of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) from Sudan.

In fact, from the information I received from senior African political and security officials—coincidentally, I was traveling in the Sahel at the same time and discussed the Wagner Group’s activities in neighboring countries with them, even before we knew of Prigozhin’s death—not only was he trying to prevent a Kremlin takeover of his African network, but he was actively trying to expand its operations. One security chief even gave me a detailed briefing of how Wagner was using the territory of a country where it had a presence to recruit opponents of his regime and form them into an armed group that, once trained, could be sent back to try to overthrow the government or at least cause considerable mischief.

Since Prigozhin, Wagner group co-founder and military commander Dmitry V. Utkin, and logistics chief Valery Y. Chekalov were all aboard the jet that went down on August 23, the future of the enterprise they built remains to be determined. The simultaneous elimination of all three certainly facilitates what is said to be the Kremlin’s preferred scenario: the takeover of the group as a whole by the Russian authorities. The call on Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar in Benghazi just one day before by Russian deputy defense minister Yunus-Bek B. Yevkurov, himself a career airborne commando and military intelligence (GRU) officer, was reported to have been for purposes of assuring the Libyans of seamless continued support “under new management.” Another potential scenario, perhaps less likely in the absence of Prigozhin and his deputies, is the emergence of two Wagner successor groups, one directly controlled by the Russian Defense Ministry, possibly via the GRU, and another retaining autonomy. This may have been what Prigozhin was aiming at as he scurried across Africa during his last days. Finally, there is the possibility that the network fragments into multiple discrete units, each acting opportunistically where and when it can. While some Western policymakers and analysts evince a relish for this outcome, as with terrorist groups, the loss of central leadership among organizations can often lead to increased violence and destruction, not its diminution.

Beyond what organizational structure a post-Prigozhin Wagner Group might assume, there is the question of whether or not the successor or successors can maintain the complex web of not just mercenary forces and arms traffickers, but also various commercial enterprises and trade links that enabled its hitherto rapid expansion and, indeed, high profitability. Can any governmental bureaucracy, much less a Russian one, really be run in an entrepreneurial fashion? On the other hand, without the vast profits generated by the businesses—a report by The Sentry in June 2023 documents, for example, the acquisition of a single gold mine with a deposit valued at $2.8 billion—how sustainable are the military operations far from the war in Ukraine?

These questions aside, however, it is important to ask why Wagner has been and continues to be successful in Africa. The answer lies in understanding the demand for what Prigozhin offered regimes, both incumbent and potential. Two things stand out in particular:

Regime survival. Two days before his death, Prigozhin spoke up on camera for the first time since the June mutiny, appearing in a video originally posted to Telegram channels affiliated with Wagner. In his short address, the mercenary chief declared: “Wagner is conducting reconnaissance and search operations, making Russia even greater on every continent—and Africa even more free. Justice and happiness for the African nations.”

Notwithstanding his soaring rhetoric, Wagner’s value proposition to regimes in Africa is very basic: regime survival. With the exceptions of Libya and, much more recently, Sudan, Wagner’s hitherto modus operandi has been to target weak, embattled sovereigns like the CAR’s internationally-recognized government which, at the time the first Russian “civilian instructor” (as the deployed Wagner personnel were euphemistically described then) arrived in early 2018, was barely able to secure the capital of Bangui. Not only did Wagner paramilitaries provide protection for President Faustin-Archange Touadéra, but Russian operatives also soon became critical players in efforts to ensure that he “won” reelection in 2020. More recently, they deployed to arrange the August 5 referendum which supposedly resulted in 95 percent of votes approving constitutional changes that abolished presidential term limits and extended the mandate from five to seven years. No wonder Touadéra hosted Prigozhin in the presidential palace on the banks of the River Ubangi.

The importance of regime survival is not to be underestimated when one contrasts the experience of CAR’s Touadéra, who is looking forward to a prolonged tenure, with the fate of four victims of the rash of military coups in the Sahel since 2020—Presidents Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta of Mali, Roch-Marc Kaboré of Burkina Faso, and, most recently, Mohamed Bazoum of Niger—who, despite being staunch Western allies with especially close ties to France, were overthrown while French troops stationed in their countries did nothing. In the case of the recent coup in Niger, Le Monde has even confirmed an allegation by the putschists that the now-deposed Nigerien government asked it to intervene to rescue the president in the early hours of the coup, but French authorities did not authorize the operation. The coup this week in Gabon only underscores the total dénouement of what was once Françafrique: if a garrison of some 400 French troops cannot prevent the overthrow of a President Ali Bongo Ondimba who, like his late father before him, has been a staunch ally of France, why would any government want to risk incurring the wrath of anti-French populist sentiment by having them around?

And it is not just the historical baggage of Western allies or even the questionable reliability of some of them, but African regional organizations like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have not helped their credibility with not only their failure to prevent or reverse coups but their penchant for ostentatiously making threats they have neither the material capacity nor the political will to carry out.

Elite profit. While its services do not come cheap—the Wall Street Journal investigative team reported that Prigozhin sent a jet last fall to collect a $200 million payment he had earlier demanded from Haftar—Wagner has also taken care to allow local elites in partnership with it access to its globe-spanning network to sell natural resources that would otherwise be difficult for them to market, whether oil from Libya, gold from Mali and Sudan, or diamonds from the CAR. Were it to gain access to Niger—despite overtures from Prigozhin, the junta that took power in the Sahelian country had not opened the door for the Russian mercenaries, a clear red line for the United States as I have previously pointed out—this category might well include uranium.

Having established a quasi-permanent base in the CAR through de facto state capture, Wagner has used the country as a launchpad for entry to neighboring countries, including Sudan (where its non-state partner is the RSF) and Cameroon (where it engages in various rackets and through which it moves contraband to CAR). Earlier this year, it was reported that U.S. officials shared information with their Chadian counterparts of Wagner plots to destabilize their country from its CAR base. Since then, Chadian officials have maintained vigilance on their frontiers as well as focused on exiled dissidents who might fall in with the mercenaries. Similarly, following its initial entry into Mali, Wagner has not only expanded its presence in the country but used it as a bridge to Burkina Faso and other countries in West Africa. All this has bolstered the interests of Russia as well as the profits of Prigozhin and others. Even without the Wagner boss, the Kremlin will want to see the network survive and continue to exploit opportunities as they arise in Africa.

To counter this ongoing challenge, the United States, Europe, and their African partners will not only have to be conscious of the threat, but to craft their response by understanding what makes this malign element, irrespective of whatever form it assumes in the future, attractive to begin with.

Ambassador J. Peter Pham, a Distinguished Fellow at the Atlantic Council and a Senior Advisor at the Krach Institute for Tech Diplomacy, is the former U.S. Special Envoy for the Sahel and Great Lakes Regions of Africa.

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The National Interest recently published an article I wrote entitled, “Getting Smart about Dividing America’s Adversaries.” A critique of my article was subsequently published by Bouthaina Shaaban with the title, “Getting Smart!!!“ in Al Mayadeen—a Beirut-based news outlet that Wikipedia describes as being, “viewed as pro-Hezbollah and pro-Syrian government.” While the bio line on her article about my article demurely describes her just as “an Arab intellectual,” Shaaban is much more than that. She has served as a political and media adviser to Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, and “has been described as the Syrian government’s face to the outside world.” She has been sanctioned both by the U.S. Treasury Department and the European Union.

This being the case, whatever she has to say is probably either reflective of or at least in tune with the Assad regime. Indeed, I witnessed her strenuously expressing the Assad government’s viewpoint in person in Moscow at the February 2018 Valdai Conference on the Middle East. Just after both Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov and Iranian foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif gave speeches expressing sympathy for Turkey because the United States was supporting the Syrian Kurdish forces whom Ankara regarded as enemies, Shaaban harshly denounced Turkish intervention in northwestern Syria and accused Ankara of facilitating the infiltration of mercenaries across the Turkish-Syrian border.

It should not come as a surprise, then, that she disagreed—vehemently—with my article in The National Interest. In it, I argued that while in the past Washington had succeeded at exploiting rivalries between its adversaries (most notably Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger’s exploitation of the Sino-Soviet rift), the United States has not been as successful at this recently. The reasons I cited were opposition from both some of America’s existing allies and politically powerful domestic political forces inside the United States as well as the increased ability of America’s adversaries to exploit differences between Washington and its traditional allies.

According to Shabaan, however, “the US was not using disputes, but creating disputes in order to weaken all parties and stay as the most hegemonic power in the equation.” She further noted that what I “described as ‘taking advantage of disputes’ is seen by the people of these countries as igniting and creating disputes.” But the United States was not able to do this now because “most people all over the world have matured and become truly aware of the objectives of the US in … its endeavors to torment them one way or other.” Further, the “true intentions and purposes’’ of the United States “have become vivid to all in Asia, Africa and Latin America,” and this “is precisely why the US is no longer able to do what it used to do in the past.”

Her logic implies that if the United States cannot take advantage of (or, as Shaaban argues) create differences between its adversaries because “most people all over the world have matured and become truly aware of the objectives of the US,” then this must not have been true in the past when the United States was able to do this successfully. However, the adversaries whose divisions the United States was able to previously exploit were not democracies but authoritarian regimes. American diplomacy succeeded in working with not the people of these countries, but their hitherto anti-American leaders such as those of Communist China and Vietnam as well as of Arab nationalist Egypt, Iraq, and Libya. Even then, it was not any American charm offensive that persuaded previously anti-American leaders such as Mao Zedong, Anwar Sadat, Saddam Hussein (in the 1980s), and Muammar Qaddafi that they had previously been oh so wrong about Washington, and now saw that America was really their true friend. No, these previously anti-American leaders decided that certain other anti-American regimes or movements were more of a threat or problem to them than America, and that they could more readily deal with that threat or problem with America’s help.

If America’s adversaries now have differences with each other but do not turn to the United States for support, it is because they continue to regard the U.S. as more of a threat despite their differences with other anti-American regimes or movements, and so have no desire for any help from America. This is not because the anti-American authoritarian leaders of today, “have matured and become truly aware of the objectives of the US,” while those of the past were not. Instead, what matured in the past was rivalry between anti-American regimes or movements. For example, the Sino-Soviet rift had raged for over a decade (during which Moscow and Beijing competed with each other in supporting Marxist and other anti-Western movements) before each became frightened enough of the other to cooperate with the U.S. government that each had previously reviled. Similarly, Egypt’s Sadat did not turn to the United States out of a newfound love of democracy, but because he understood that the Soviet Union could not or would not help Egypt forcibly retake the Sinai following Israel’s occupation in 1967. Thus, his only realistic hope of getting it back was through an American-backed peace process with Israel—which did indeed succeed.

The truth of the matter is that, just like the present, Washington has never been able to create differences among its adversaries but only take advantage of those differences that had already emerged between them. Even then, it can take years for this process to succeed since long-entrenched aversion both inside anti-American regimes to cooperating with the United States and inside the United States to cooperating with those same regimes must first be overcome. In fact, authoritarian leaders can implement decisions to cooperate with the hitherto reviled Americans relatively quickly after finally making up their minds that this would be in their interests. However, American administrations coming to a similar conclusion about working with adversaries must overcome often vociferous opposition from Congress and politically influential segments of the American public who will denounce any attempt at cooperation with America’s adversaries as “naive,” “weak,” or “woke.”

In other words, there is no guarantee that Washington can even exploit rivalries that have developed between its various adversaries, much less create rivalries between regimes that still regard the United States as a greater threat than each other. But in that Shaaban has reportedly been “the Syrian government’s face to the outside world,” she may not appreciate that American administrations face domestic constraints—such as Congressional and public opinion—on foreign policymaking that authoritarian leaders like Assad can simply suppress.

Mark N. Katz is a professor of government and politics at the George Mason University Schar School of Policy and Government, and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.

Image: Shutterstock.

On July 30, Kuwaiti foreign minister Salem Al-Sabah embarked on a crucial visit to Baghdad and met his Iraqi counterpart Fuad Hussein and later Iraqi prime minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani. The visit aimed to address the bilateral relations between the two nations and urgently tackle the longstanding and contentious maritime border dispute revolving around the Khor Abdullah waterway. This dispute remains a major source of contention between Iraq and Kuwait. The diplomatic visit holds special significance due to its close timing with the twenty-third anniversary of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, which still reverberates in the region’s memory. Moreover, the visit occurs within a context of profound internal power shifts in Iraq, which have favored Shia groups.

The implications of these developments for regional stability are noteworthy, as they could bear on the future geopolitical landscape. In light of these complex dynamics, resolving the maritime border dispute takes on heightened importance, underscoring the urgency for both countries to find a constructive and lasting solution.

Borderline Disorder

The border dispute between Iraq and Kuwait is centuries old. Back-and-forth conflicts, meddling by colonial powers, and great power competition have influenced the current boundaries between the two countries. Even before the discovery of oil, the boundary conflict remained a contentious issue. Despite signing agreements and recognizing Kuwait in the past, various Iraqi governments, whether the Hashemite Kingdom or Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship, have never relinquished their claims to parts of Kuwaiti territory. The Iraqi claim on Kuwait has shifted between complete and partial control, often depending on Baghdad’s political stability. Whenever Baghdad is politically stable, it escalates its demands on Kuwait and refuses to demarcate the border, leading to more problems for Kuwait.

In the past, Iraq has tried various tactics to force Kuwait into a settlement, such as announcing the Sheikh of Kuwait as a deputy governor of one of its provinces, making incursions into Kuwaiti territories, and deploying troops on the islands of Bubiyan. They also pressured Kuwait to cede the islands of Bubiyan, Warbha, and Falaikha on security and commercial pretexts. Kuwait, desiring peace, agreed to some of Iraq’s demands, including allowing Iraqi troops on the islands to counter Iranian aggression. Kuwait also provided substantial financial and political support to Iraq to prevent military actions.

Despite these efforts, on August 2, 1990, Saddam Hussein rolled his army into Kuwait and annexed it as the nineteenth province of Iraq. The invasion triggered a forceful international reaction, uniting Western powers and Arab countries to eject Iraq from Kuwait in 1991. Following the conflict, Kuwait and Iraq signed several agreements, under the supervision of the United Nations, to demarcate their land border. While significant progress has occurred in determining most of the land border, maritime borders remain undrawn. Resolving this dispute was the main goal behind the visit of the Kuwaiti foreign minister to Baghdad last month.

At the core of this disagreement lies the strategically significant Khor Abdullah estuary, a crucial passage for 80 percent of Iraq’s imports and exports. Since 2003, Baghdad and Kuwait have entered into multiple agreements to settle this dispute. The deals encompassed collaborative navigation efforts and security measures to safeguard the area. However, Baghdad’s implementation has often been sluggish, influenced by both commercial considerations and geopolitical factors.

In the foreseeable future, Iraq aims to complete the Al Faw Grand Port by 2028—anticipated to be the largest in the Middle East. This ambitious project could revolutionize Iraq’s economic landscape, providing unimpeded access to the sea and reducing reliance on existing routes and resources. However, it’s improbable that the Grand Al Faw Port will significantly alter the perspective of the Iraqi political elite concerning Khor Abdullah. Consequently, this might prolong the controversy between Iraq and Kuwait for years to come.

Furthermore, territorial disputes often prove too intricate to resolve due to the substantial influence of a state’s status and identity, which can outweigh political and economic considerations. These conflicts often invoke feelings of national pride, victimization, or resentment, complicating the search for common ground and resolution. The emotional and historical dimensions can add complexity to negotiations, necessitating delicate and thoughtful approaches to achieve peaceful outcomes.

Public Outrage

As part of the conflict resolution framework, the Iraqi government took the initiative to establish a high-level committee responsible for overseeing a subcommittee dedicated to seeking mutually agreeable resolutions for border-related matters and other disputes existing between Iraq and Kuwait. Nevertheless, the Iraqi government’s approach to resolving these issues has yet to garner unanimous support. The Kuwaiti foreign minister’s visit, intended to address the border demarcation, swiftly evolved into a heated political and public topic within Iraq.

The relocation of residents and a neighborhood transition became a hot public opinion issue, triggering significant public resistance from the Iraqi side. A portion of this opposition has arisen due to misunderstandings and manipulation by populist politicians aiming to position themselves as ultra-nationalists for political gains, particularly in light of the upcoming Iraqi provincial elections scheduled for November 2023.

These populists have falsely accused the Iraqi government of treachery and ceding Iraqi territory to Kuwait, an assertion far removed from reality. Despite this, the messaging has gained traction within Iraq. Citizens, tribal leaders, and politicians from both Sunni and Shia backgrounds have accused the Sudani government of relinquishing Iraqi territory, gaining significant traction on social media.

The residents of the neighborhood have expressed their rejection of the relocation proposition. Some Iraqis have even reminded Kuwait of its role in Iraq’s devastation, alleging actions such as siphoning oil from Iraqi oilfields and aiding the United States in its occupation after 2003.

Protests have erupted in Basra, with people expressing concerns over concessions related to the Khor Abdullah canal and “Um al-Qasir to Kuwait.” Some individuals fired shots over the Kuwaiti border in defiance of any agreement recognizing Kuwaiti authority over Khor Abdullah. Furthermore, the tribal leaders in Basra have adamantly rejected the border demarcation outlined in the UN-brokered deal between Iraq and Kuwait. They argue that Iraqi territory was seized under extraordinary circumstances, prompting them to call for an amendment to the UN agreement to align with Iraq’s historical territorial boundaries. These tribal leaders have also leveled accusations against Kuwait, alleging land grabbing and the displacement of Iraqis from their land in Um al-Qasir. Such discourse can stir intense emotions on both sides of the border and escalate tensions. These events underscore a critical truth: intense emotions have intertwined with the border matter. Mishandling it could lead to instability.

In reaction, the Iraqi parliament formed a special committee to inquire about the progress of negotiations with Kuwait and assess alleged undue concessions to Iraq’s southern neighbor. Faced with significant public and legislative opposition, the Iraqi government had no choice but to clarify its Kuwaiti border position. Basim Al-Awadi, the spokesperson for the Iraqi government, strongly refuted any notion of territorial concession to Kuwait, characterizing the reaction as a form of “political blackmail.” Al-Awadi asserted that the government’s actions were in accord with the UN-endorsed 1993 agreement between Iraq and Kuwait. He emphasized that previous Iraqi administrations had also remained committed to upholding the terms of the agreement.

Shia militia threats

Latent tensions over the border have resurfaced elsewhere. Shia militia groups have frequently threatened Kuwait with violence and claimed Kuwait to be a historical part of Iraq. The issue over the Khor Abdullah demarcation has added intensity to such claims. Shia militia groups have targeted the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border in the last few years. The situation deteriorated further in 2022 when Kuwaiti border guards allegedly harassed Iraqi fishermen in the disputed territory of Khor Abdullah. Shia MP Ala Al-Haidari, affiliated with the Al-Fateh Alliance and the state-sponsored, mostly Shia paramilitary, the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), accused Kuwait of “assaulting Iraqi fishermen.” He even posted a video on social media, calling the PMF to deploy their forces in Khor Abdullah to protect Iraqi fishermen. This escalation was accompanied by reports in news sites belonging to pro-Iranian militia groups, amplifying the voices of the PMF. This accusation led Kuwait to summon the Iraqi Ambassador to protest the allegations.

No doubt, if the border dispute remains unresolved, the situation could worsen for Kuwait in the coming years. The recent doubling of Iraq’s budget for the PMF and a personnel expansion potentially threaten Kuwait. The underlying tensions surrounding the disputed area are evident, raising concerns about possible escalations in the future. Consequently, it is paramount for both nations to actively pursue a peaceful resolution and prevent further tensions and potential regional instability. Establishing a clear demarcation of both the land and maritime borders is essential to mitigate the risks of future conflicts.

Implications for the United States

Kuwait has played a significant role in assisting American military involvement in the Middle East. In 1991, the United States orchestrated an extensive global military operation to expel the Iraqi Army from Kuwait. The Kuwaiti government also assisted the American invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003. While American and coalition forces withdrew from Iraq in 2011, unresolved historical and border disputes could draw Washington into diplomatic efforts.

Another standoff exists between Kuwait and Iran over offshore gas fields—known as Arash in Iran and Dorra in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Consequently, Tehran could exploit the ongoing Kuwait-Iraq border dispute to further its own interests. Taking advantage of the perceived decline in American influence, Iran has taken a more assertive regional stance. Iranian oil minister Javad Owji’s recent reaffirmation of Tehran’s rights over the gas fields has triggered strong reactions from nations in the Arab Gulf.

Considering Iran’s significant proxy political and military influence in Iraq, substantial security concerns for Kuwait are on the horizon. The potential manipulation of groups like the PMF to destabilize the Kuwaiti border under plausible deniability presents worrying scenarios. This could potentially entangle the United States in yet another Middle Eastern conflict, diverting resources and attention from other critical strategic priorities, including managing rivalries involving China and Russia. Resolving the longstanding border dispute between Baghdad and Kuwait City could undermine Tehran’s influence and proxies while contributing to regional stability, allowing the United States to prioritize.

The Path Ahead

In a region characterized by historical disputes, shifting power dynamics, and evolving political landscapes, resolving the Iraq-Kuwait border issue is a vital pillar of stability. Past experiences emphasize the dangers of leaving territorial conflicts unresolved. Transparent communication and engagement with all stakeholders are imperative in shaping the way forward and reducing jingoism on both sides of the border. The potential for external actors to exploit these tensions highlights the pressing nature of finding a resolution. Hence, it remains paramount for the United States to continue its diplomatic efforts to settle the Iraq-Kuwait border, thus contributing to lasting peace and security in the region.

Dr. Yerevan Saeed is a Visiting Scholar at the Arab Gulf Institute in Washington.

Image: Shutterstock.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has reminded us how little autocracies care about humanitarian atrocities. The war is a gross violation of human rights and the principle of peaceful settlement of international disputes as codified in the United Nations Charter, which has helped maintain the rules-based international order and kept the world in relative peace since the end of the Cold War.

In today’s globalized world, even localized crises may have a global impact. It is therefore imperative to deter similar threats from happening elsewhere. Taiwan—a democracy that is home to over 23 million people and that I proudly represent—continues to confront enormous challenges posed by China.

Despite never having ruled Taiwan, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has for decades vowed to take control of the island and refused to renounce the use of force. The people of Taiwan have remained calm, safeguarding the status quo of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. However, as China’s power has grown, so too has its aggressiveness—threatening our democratic way of life. They have sent warplanes and ships across the Taiwan Strait’s median line, encroached into our air defense identification zones, and intensified gray-zone tactics like disinformation and economic coercion against us in an attempt to wear down our will to fight.

But China’s aggressive behavior goes well beyond Taiwan. Through gray-zone activities in the East and South China Seas, China is attempting to expand its power and solidify its false territorial claims. In addition to signing a security agreement with the Solomon Islands in the South Pacific, the PRC has been securing ports for future military use in the Indian Ocean. All of these maneuvers are causing grave concerns that peace is becoming more difficult to maintain.

It is in the interest of every country in the world to ensure peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. Half of the world’s commercial container traffic passes through the Taiwan Strait every day. Taiwan produces the majority of the world’s semiconductors and plays a key role in global supply chains. Any conflict in the area would have disastrous consequences for the global economy.

The best forum for discussion of these important issues is the United Nations. UN officials often speak of joint solutions, solidarity, and inclusion in tackling the pressing issues of our time. Taiwan is willing and able to take part in these efforts.

However, Taiwan continues to be excluded from the UN due to China’s distortion of UN General Assembly Resolution 2758. This resolution neither states that Taiwan is a part of the PRC nor gives the PRC the right to represent the people of Taiwan in the UN and its specialized agencies. The resolution only determines who represents the member state China, which China itself and the international community recognized following the relevant vote in 1971. The subsequent misrepresentation of Resolution 2758 contradicts the basic principles upheld by the UN Charter and must be rectified.

The 78th session of the UN General Assembly, centering on the theme “rebuilding trust and reigniting global solidarity,” is timely in light of a number of global challenges. For example, the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were designed as a shared blueprint for peace and prosperity. Yet the most recent SDG progress report showed that just 12 percent of SDG targets were on track, while progress on 50 percent has remained insufficient. And on more than 30 percent, we have stalled or even regressed.

As a truly global institution, the UN can serve as a champion of progress. We call on the UN to uphold its principle of leaving no one behind by allowing Taiwan to participate in the UN system, rather than excluding it from discussions on issues requiring global cooperation. A good first step would be to allow Taiwanese individuals and journalists to attend or cover relevant meetings, as well as ensure Taiwan’s meaningful participation in meetings and mechanisms regarding the SDGs.

The bravery and resilience of the Ukrainian people have inspired freedom-loving people of all nations, forging a new sense of democratic solidarity around the world. Unity is crucial to pushing back against Russia’s aggression and to preserving the universal values of human rights and global peace more broadly.

Authoritarian governments need to know that they will be held accountable for their aggression, and the only way to settle differences is through peaceful means. Allowing Taiwan to meaningfully participate in the UN system would benefit the world’s efforts to address pressing global issues and demonstrate the UN’s determination to unite for global peace at a critical juncture when the future of the world is at stake.

We are stronger together. Now is the time to act on this fundamental principle by including Taiwan.

Jaushieh Joseph Wu is the Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Republic of China (Taiwan).

Image: Shutterstock.