Defence`s Feeds

Saar 5: INS Hanit
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The 1,227t/ 1,350 ton Sa’ar 5 Eilat Class corvettes were built by Northrop Grumman in the 1990s for about $260 million each. It’s a decent performer in a number of roles, from air defense to anti-submarine work, to coastal patrol and special forces support. In 2006, the Israelis went looking for a next-generation vessel with better high-end capabilities. Six years later, Israel had nothing to show for its search. In the meantime, massive natural gas deposits have been discovered within Israel’s coastal waters, adding considerable urgency to their search.

The USA is Israel’s logical supplier, but given Israel’s size and cost requirements, the only American option was the Littoral Combat Ship. Israel pursued that option for several years, conducting studies and trying to get a better sense of feasibility and costs. Their approach would have been very different from the American Freedom Class LCS, removing the swappable “mission modules” and replacing them with a fixed and fully capable set of air defense, anti-ship, and anti-submarine weapons. In the end, however, the project was deemed to be unaffordable. Instead, Israel began negotiating with Germany, and reports now include discussions involving both South Korea, and a local shipyard.

Ship Systems: What is Israel Looking For? The Strategic Situation

Offshore energy
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Israel’s discovery of massive offshore gas reserves in the Tamar and Leviathan fields has the potential to change Israel diplomatic weight, as well as its economy and energy status. Work is already underway in cooperation with Cyprus, and Greece has shifted from hostile to cooperative over the last decade, but Turkey is making hostile noises, and Syrian hostility is assured.

Potential irregular threats to Israeli drilling installations include UAVs, which have already overflown existing rigs on their way into Israeli airspace, or boat operations with divers or depth charges. Rig owners are working with the IDF to counter the irregular threat, via armed teams on each platform and radars networked to Israel’s coastal defenses. They may need to take further steps with RWS emplacements and missiles, given rules that require enemies to close within 1/2 mile before defenders can open fire.

The higher end is more problematic, and isn’t much discussed, but it exists. Hezbollah has already proven its ability to use long-range surface-launched naval missiles, and drilling platforms are ideal targets if they can be reached. Full state-level threats leave Israel open to the threat of supersonic Russian SS-N-26s in Syria’s possession, and add enemy submarines to this picture. Turkey’s purchase of 6 U214s, Iran’s Kilo Class boats, and a possible Egyptian purchase of 2 U209s fitted with modern systems, are changing the local balance. Turkish saber-rattling and Syrian hostility mean that enemy fighters must also be considered, and the rigs will be placed some distance from Israeli quick-reaction fighter launches.

It’s a complex, multi-dimensional problem, and the solution will have to be multi-layered. Defensive systems and sensors on board the rigs themselves, and naval flotillas of smaller ships that offer presence while providing point defense and surface attack punch, are already in place. Heron UAVs are already operating in maritime patrol mode, which offers Israel a persistent aerial surveillance option, but doesn’t help much with response capability at present. Israel could benefit greatly from maritime patrol aircraft with good on-station time, and offensive capabilities that allow them to intervene. Their aged Westwind 1124N Sea Scan business jets don’t fit that bill.

Meanwhile, their naval flotillas need a boost, and acknowledging higher-end threats becomes very consequential if it means that Israel needs high-end wide-area air defense and anti-submarine capabilities on station.

Israel’s Requirements

LCS-I components
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Whatever that solution may be, Israel’s experience with the LCS concept shows where their needs are leading them. From Israel’s point of view, the keys to their original interest in an LCS-I design were threefold.

Flexibility. The 1st key is an open architecture combat system. Israel produces a lot of its own electronics, and the ability to easily integrate their own products into current and future configurations was seen as a huge plus. Lockheed Martin’s VP of Israel Operations, Joshua Shani, meant it when he said that that “participation by the Israeli defense industry will be the cornerstone of [LCS-I’s] success.” The same will be true of any other ship type that Israel adopts.

Wider View. The 2nd key is better sensors. LCS-I negotiations focused on Lockheed Martin’s SPY-1F S-band radar, which also equips Norway’s Fridjhof Nansen Class AEGIS frigates. Discussions surrounding other ships have focused instead on IAI Elta’s locally-developed EL/M-2248 MF-STAR “Adir” S-band active array radar, which has been exported to India for use on their Kolkata Class destroyers, and is being installed as a Sa’ar 5 upgrade. AESA radars are much easier to resize for smaller ships, and IAI ELta’s designs scale all the way down to the EL/M-2258 ALPHA (Advanced Lightweight Phased Array) radar, which is being installed on Israel’s 500t class Sa’ar 4.5 Fast Attack Craft.

AN LCS-I would also have offered far superior underwater sensors. The ability to embark larger helicopters, including the MH-60 Seahawk family or similar naval helicopters, would dramatically boosting Israel’s anti-submarine capabilities. A modern bow sonar, which is present in other ship designs, would add a lot all by itself, especially if the ship’s combat system could integrate that data with towed and/or variable-depth sonars.

SM-2 (top), SM-3

Weapon Improvements. The 3rd key involves a wider weapon fit, especially when it comes to air defense. Adopting the MK41 Vertical Launch System would give Israel inherent flexibility over time to integrate new missiles of all types, in order to handle Israel’s combat scenarios, and address changes in threats and operational requirements.

LCS-I’s high-end armament would have included torpedo tubes, mounts for Harpoon or Gabriel anti-ship missiles, and the contents of the ship’s 16 strike-length vertical launch cells. Those cells would offer Israel the flexibility to include anti-air missiles like the new Israeli Barak-8, the entire range of Raytheon’s Standard family air and missile defense interceptors, compatible anti-ship and precision strike missiles like Lockheed Martin’s LRASM, or even current anti-submarine missiles like VL-ASROC. Local options like IAI’s ANAM/ Gabriel 5 and IMI’s Delilah-SL will also be of interest to the Israelis.

In Israel’s case, a strike-length MK41 VLS system could take on strategic significance. Raytheon’s SM-3 (area defense), SM-2 Block IV, and SM-6 missiles (point defense) can be used to defend against ballistic missile attacks, if paired with a suitable radar. The AN/SPY-1F has never received the signal processor upgrades given to larger and more powerful SPY-1D radars for ballistic missile defense, nor has it ever been tested in that role. Alternatively, the ship could be networked with long-range ground radars like Israel’s “Green Pine.” In either scenario, the SM-3’s range and Israel’s tiny size would allow just 1 ship on station to cover most of Israel. A situation where 2 ships out of 4 are on station at any given time is very plausible, and could provide overlapping point defense ABM coverage. Either option would supplement Israel’s medium range Arrow and short range Patriot PAC-2 GEM systems on land. At present, this is an option rather than a focus, but even the potential for such a vital national mission is a first for the Israeli Navy.

Onboard vehicles add to an Israeli frigates’ punch in a different way. New ships will be expected to embark a flexible USV/UUV mix, with the ability to store and launch Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats (RHIB), mine or sub-hunting hunting UUVs, or surface USVs. Israel’s leading-edge capabilities in USVs would make that capability an immediate and long-term force multiplier.

Israel’s core problem is that a high-end, full featured frigate is going to cost them $600+ million. They want the capabilities, but don’t have the money to buy 3-4 ships at that price. In response, they can choose to scale back their desires, or they can find some way to make a deal.

What Are You Shipping: Vessels & Systems Current State: Israel’s Sa’ar 5 Corvettes

Sa’ar 5 corvettes
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Some have called the 1,227 tonne Eilat Class a better base model for the USA to adopt, as it seeks an affordable Littoral Combat Ship or flotilla asset. The ships were built by Litton-Ingalls Shipbuilding Corporation of Pascagoula, MS (now HII), based on Israeli designs. All 3 ships of class were launched from 1993 – 1994.

Air Defense. Sa’ar 5 corvettes have moderate anti-air capabilities, thanks to IAI Elta ELM-2218S and ELM-2221 GM STGR radars. Twin 32-cell launchers hold short-range Barak-1 surface-air missiles, and the ship has a Mk15 Phalanx 20mm CIWS gun for last-ditch defense. As of 2013, the ships are preparing to swap their Barak-1 systems for the larger Barak-8 missile, whose 70+ km reach will give the Israeli Navy its first area air defense capability.

ASW. Bow-mounted and towed sonars, plus 6x 324mm torpedo tubes for Mark 46 torpedoes, give these corvettes moderate anti-submarine capability. This was quite adequate until the early 2010s. As Turkey has become progressively more hostile, and unstable neighbors like Egypt buy modern submarines, there is some concern that the Eilat Class’ anti-submarine capabilities may not be enough.

Surface Warfare. Surface warfare is addressed well. Harpoon or Gabriel anti-ship missiles can be used against larger ships or land targets, while the Mk15 Phalanx 20mm gun and Typhoon remotely-operated 7.62-30mm gun/missile systems deal with guerrilla craft. The corvette is also capable of launching small special forces boats, or robotic USVs like RAFAEL’s Protector series.

A 76mm Oto Melara naval gun option could be installed in place of the Phalanx. It would offer slightly less air defense capability, in exchange for a longer reach and more punch against fast boats. That upgrade would be compatible with long-range Vulcano ammunition for naval fire support, but Israel has chosen the Phalanx for now.

The Eilat Class’ helicopter hangar can accommodate AS565 Dauphin/Panther, Kaman SH-2F or Sikorsky S-76N helicopters. Israel’s navy flies the AS565, but they haven’t armed them with substantial naval weapons.

Future Option: Lockheed Martin’s LCS-I

LCS-I missions
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The Israelis have a long-standing relationship with Lockheed Martin, and a 2,500-3,000t LCS design with the USA’s swappable mission modules could significantly improve Israel’s ability to conduct anti-submarine warfare and mine neutralization missions.

Unfortunately, the pitifully weak armament of the USA’s LCS ships is inadequate for the Israelis, who need their ships to be able to engage other naval vessels, and to provide their own air defense. Worse, the American design lacks the flexibility to add meaningful weapons in future. As a result, the Israelis took a different approach, eliminating the ship’s swappable mission modules in favor of a much more heavily-armed vessel.

Initial studies were conducted in conjunction with Lockheed Martin, leading to an RFP and even an official $1.9 billion DSCA request for Lockheed Martin’s LCS-I design. That would have made Israel the first LCS export customer. Construction of the LCS-I ships would have occurred at Marinette Marine and Bollinger Shipyards in the United States and American construction allows Israel to buy the ships with American military aid dollars, rather than using its hard-currency budget. Gary Feldman, Lockheed’s business development director international LCS sales, said that detail design could have begun in 2009, with construction starting in 2010.

In the end, however, expected per-ship costs of $700 million or so led the Israelis to back away and look for another solution.

Future Option: HII’s Sa’ar 5B

Northrop Grumman has proposed an enlarged “Sa’ar 5B” corvette with more advanced systems, and Israel has made that task easier by developing their own advanced ship radars and improved missiles. Indeed, the Israelis are implementing a de facto Sa’ar 5B by upgrading existing Eilat Class ships with fixed-plate MF-STAR “Adir” AESA radars, new medium range Barak-8 missiles, and better anti-ship/ land strike missiles.

Northrop Grumman (now HII) has hinted that Sa’ar 5B ships could be built for less than $450 million, using American aid dollars, but Israel initially rejected that option as well. Discussions are rumored to have resumed, but nailing down a firm price will require money up front for extensive design studies. That left Israel looking beyond the USA for their base ship, even as the equipment they wanted in those ships remained fairly constant.

Future Option: Germany, Overall?

MEKO CSL
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In February 2009, Israel switched its interest to ThyssenKrupp Marine Systsems’ MEKO family, which comes in sizes ranging from A100 corvettes to full-size A200 frigates. MEKOs are customized to their destination country, so a German K130 Braunschweig Class is very different than Malaysia’s Kedah Class, even though both begin with the A100 base. As part of that customization, the radar would have been IAI’s Elta’s EL/M-2248 MF-STAR, and many of the other technologies requested for the LCS-I would have applied as well.

Reports are split between a buy of 4 A100 base corvettes to put more ships on station, vs. a purchase of 2 high-end frigates that would be able to focus on advanced anti-submarine and wide-area anti-air warfare.

There was even some talk of making Israel the launch customer for the MEKO CSL, which would have given Israel some of the modularity found in the USA’s LCS class. The Meko CSL is only slightly smaller than the American LCS Freedom Class, at 108m/ 354 ft. long, with a beam of 21 meters and full-load displacement of 2,750 tonnes. Propulsion is by a combined diesel-and-gas (CODAG) water-jet system that cruises at 15 knots and reaches 40. Cruising speed range at would be about is 3,500 nautical miles, with 21 days endurance. The MEKO CSL variant adds improved stealth shapes and measures refined on Sweden’s Visby Class corvettes, and has several modular sections for faster swap-outs. An Israeli MEKO CSL would contain a lot of local content, including IAI Elta’s MF-STAR, the new Barak-8 medium range air defense missile, and Israeli electronic countermeasures systems, among others. The CSL also has a rear mission bay, and could serve as a hub for Israel’s advanced UAVs and robotic naval USV/UUVs.

German negotiations stalled after Germany agreed to provide subsidies for more Dolphin Class submarines, but not for frigates. 2013 Reports indicate that negotiations have resumed.

Asian Quality: The South Korean Option

FFX launch
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South Korea (ROK) is a global leader in shipbuilding, and their successful naval shipbuilding programs include cruiser-size KDX-III AEGIS destroyers as well as smaller ships like their FFX and FFX II light frigates. The FFX Block II in particular appears to be an advanced small combatant that meets Israel’s size and capability requirements. The 2,500t+ ships will offer electrical power to spare, high-end long range radar capabilities, a 127mm/ 5″ gun with guided shell options and future long-range fire capabilities, a 16-cell vertical launch system, and the ability to embark full-size anti-submarine helicopters.

The South Koreans might be able to produce new frigates at the price and quality level Israel needs, and they’ve become significant buyers of Israeli defense technologies in recent years. Israel wants to keep that relationship going, but KAI’s recent loss of a $1 billion deal for new IAF jet trainers has put a dent in things. South Korea remains interested in other Israeli technologies, including its Iron Dome rocket defense system.

A deal that offset ROK defense purchases with Israeli buys of South Korean FFX Block II ships might make everyone happy, and get the Israeli political support required to move the project ahead. Negotiations are reportedly underway.

Final Option: Don’t Go Big – Go Home

Saar 5 Eilat Class
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Israel’s final option is less ambitious in terms of performance, but more ambitious industrially. It involves a deal with the privatized Israel Shipyards. In exchange for government investment to modernize and expand the shipyard, they would design and build an larger, improved version of existing corvettes. The Sa’ar 5.5 option would be designed to give Israel a locally-built offering that was both exportable and upgradeable, without requiring outside help or approval.

Recent MF-STAR/ Barak-8 upgrades are laying the groundwork for a tested option. The question is whether all of the money required for shipyard modernization, ship design, fabrication in a shipyard stretching its capabilities, and platform testing would make the final product as expensive as higher-end options, while offering comparatively less capability. That could also make the vessels unexportable on price grounds, creating a lose-lose-lose scenario.

Contracts & Key Events 2015 – 2018

 

Barak-8
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August 16/18: Protector of Israeli interests Israel will send its ‘Sons of Sa’ar’ to protect its Mediterranean gas fields and its exclusive economic zone. The Israeli Navy is set to receive four next-generation Sa’ar 6 corvettes between 2019 and 2024. The 300-feet-long warships, which are currently being built in Kiel, Germany, will be packed to the gills with highly sensitive detection equipment — to monitor both the surrounding sea and airspace — as well as offensive weapons and defensive missile interceptors. The ships will be equipped with the ‘Naval Dome’, essentially a navalized version of the Iron Dome, with the Barak-8 missile at its core. The Barak-8, and aims to deliver up to 42 mile of range, thanks to a dual-pulse solid rocket motor whose second “pulse” fires as the missile approaches its target. This ensures that the missile isn’t just coasting in the final stages, giving it more than one chance at a fast, maneuvering target. The missile’s most important feature may be its active seeker. Instead of forcing its ship or land-based radar to “paint”/illuminate its target at all times, the Barak 8 can be left alone once it is close to its target. This is an excellent approach for dealing with saturation attacks using older ship radars, which can track many targets but illuminate just a few. The Barak-8 was developed by IAI in collaboration with Israel’s DDR&D, India’s DRDO (Defense Research and Development Organization), the navies of both countries, Rafael Advanced Defense Systems Ltd., IAI’s ELTA Group and local industries in India.

January 19/18: Upgrades—Testing Israel’s Navy announced that it has successfully tested a new chaff defense system for its Sa’ar 4.5-class missile boats and it is expected that the system will be declared operational in the coming weeks. First to receive the upgrade was the INS Sufa, with testing conducted two months ago off the coast of Haifa. The system includes an algorithm that identifies and classifies any kind of projectile making its way towards the Israeli missile ship, and then programs a unique diversion plan: firing chaff rockets from the front deck and create a “wall” over the water of hundreds of metal wires, which mislead the enemy missile into “thinking” this was the Israeli ship. This helps divert the enemy missile, only a minute or two before it was to hit the Israeli ship.

April 3/17: The Israeli Navy is altering the design of the Sa’ar-6 corvette in order to fit additional Iron Dome interceptors onboard the vessels. By adding a second launcher, each corvette will be able to carry as many as forty Tamir interceptor missiles, allowing vessels to engage an increasing number of disruptive, possibly deadly and inexpensive shore-launched rockets launched by groups such as Lebanon’s Hezbollah. Four Sa’ar-6 ships are currently on order with Germany’s ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS); however, the sale is source of a scandal in Israel and are part of an investigation into potential conflicts of interest among those close to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

November 10/16: Israeli navy officials are evaluating fixed-wing extremely short take-off and landing (ESTOL) UAV ideas to eventually deploy on their four new Saar 6 corvettes and existing SAAR 5 missile vessels. The ESTOL UAV will be based on propulsive lift technology that will enable it to take off from a very small platform on the navy ship. A decision will be made on the platform in 2017.

May 12/15: The Israeli Ministry of Defense announced Monday that it has signed a contract for four Sa’ar-class corvettes, manufactured by Germany’s TKMS. Discussions between the two countries over the supply of Littoral Combat Ships to protect Israel’s offshore gas reserves have been in the works since 2009, with the Germans agreeing to a discount in October last year, with the German government further subsidizing the deal, funding approximately a quarter of the contract’s value. The $480 million deal will see TKMS buying $181 million-worth of Israeli-manufactured equipment as offsets. Whilst the Israeli MoD did not announce the precise type of corvette the Israeli Navy will receive, it is likely to be the Blohm Voss-class 130 corvette, with modification to Israeli specifications.

2014

Israel’s offshore strategic situation; Significant Sa’ar 5 improvements underway; Negotiations with Germany.

Oct 19/14: Germany. Ha’aretz reports that Germany has agreed to a discount, and seems set to secure the Israeli contract for its next-generation ships:

“A crisis between Israel and Germany over missile boats required to protect Israel’s offshore gas fields has ended after Berlin agreed to slash [EUR] 300 million (about $382 million) off the cost, officials on both sides said. They are expected to initial an agreement for the boats within weeks.”

Time will tell which boats Israel orders. If they still want 4 ships, a sum of just over $900 million with subsidies included could get them MEKO derivatives along the lines of Germany’s own 1,840t K130 Braunschweig Class corvettes, but with Israeli technology. If they’re only ordering 2 ships, possibilities expand to include base options like the 2,750t MEKO CSL, or a MEKO A200 derivative that compares to Turkey’s own 3,350t Barbaros Class. Sources: Ha’aretz, “Missile boat crisis ends as Germany gives Israel $382 million discount”.

Sept 28/14: RFP & timelines. State Comptroller Judge (ret.) Joseph Shapira published an audit report in March 2014 that said Israel’s gas facilities in the Mediterranean were only partially protected, but constituted a prime target for attacks by terrorist organizations. That has ratcheted urgency a bit higher, but Israel may have to wait for some time before its ships sail out:

“The Ministry has been preparing for a number of years an international tender for the procurement of ship to operate in Israel’s marine economic area, and has done in-depth staff work in the matter. The government decided to procure the ships only in November 2013, and provided a special budget for them. Procurement was suspended in order to provide enough time for negotiations for a deal with a foreign country. Last July, following the prolonging of these processes, the Defense Ministry decided to issue an international tender for procurement of the ships. The tender is currently taking place; the envelopes will be opened next December, and a preliminary answer will be given. The tender will be completed by the end of 2015.”

Add time for integration of Israeli components, construction, outfitting, testing, and training, and operational acceptance before 2018 would be quite a feat. Globes reports that the contract’s scope involves NIS 2 billion (about $550 million) for 4 ships. That won’t get them very much. Sources: Globes, “Israel Navy to wait years for gas rig defense ships”.

May 15/14: Germany. Ha’aretz reports that the proposed deal discussed in December 2013 (q.v. Dec 8/13) appears to have fallen through for now:

“The German government has decided not to give Israel a massive subsidy for the purchase of German missile boats, due to the breakdown in Israeli-Palestinian peace talks, both Israeli and German officials said on Thursday.”

Sources: Ha’aretz, “Germany nixes gunboat subsidy to Israel, citing breakdown of peace talks”.

May 13/14: Sa’ar 5+. Israeli improvements to their existing ships are underway. This matters, because deploying the systems within the Israeli Navy makes Israel much more likely to demand them as part of any future frigate. Fielding a tested upgrade to the Eilat Class also provides added weight to options like the Sa’ar 5B or Sa’ar 5.5, by creating a proven starting point.

A “senior naval source” tells The Jerusalem Post that Israel is upgrading the anti-ship and strike missiles on board its ships, in order to give their Navy medium-range precision strike capability against land targets. They weren’t specific, but IAI has developed an “Advanced Naval Attack Missile” as a successor to existing naval Gabriel missiles. The other likely option is IMI’s “Delilah-SL”; it’s a ship-launched version of the Air Force’s go-to missile for strikes against targets that are heavily defended, or require a high level of human judgement via its “man in the loop” feature.

The article adds that a Sa’ar 5 Eilat Class corvette has already been outfitted with IAI Elta’s MF-STAR S-Band AESA radar and Barak-8 air defense missiles. Adding better strike weapons to that array changes effectively creates a proven “Sa’ar 5B/ 5.5” option. Sources: The Jerusalem Post, “The Israel Navy is quietly enhancing its capabilities for precision, long-range missiles”.

Jan 18/14: Israel Defence reports that Israel is scaling down its naval platform ambitions. They’re reportedly back to a platform around 1,300t, which is about the same size as their Sa’ar 5s, rather than a 2,000t+ platform. They’ll still insist on its ability to carry MF-STAR and the Barak-8, but success won’t entirely solve their problems:

“Originally, the IDF Navy should have initiated the procurement of the new missile frigates in the context of the previous multi-year plan, and funds had been allocated for this purpose as part of that plan, but owing to the cancellation of the LCS option, the process never materialized…. intention of the IDF is to finance the procurement of the new vessels by a dedicated budget allocated by the government outside the framework of the normal defense budget, in order to secure the offshore gas drilling rigs. The procurement plan notwithstanding, the total number of missile frigates in the IDF Navy is expected to decrease during the next five-year period, owing to the obsolescence of the present vessels, some of which are to be decommissioned.”

Sources: Israel Defence, “The Next Missile Frigate of the IDF Navy”.

Jan 8/14: Strategic. Paul Alster & David Andrew Weinberg discuss the difficulties Israel faces in defending its offshore gas resources, and take a critical look at the exploitable reserves and revenue projections. They say flatly that:

“IDF officials concede that they do not have the resources as of now to properly secure the infrastructure at sea.”

They list threats that include UAVs, which have already overflown existing rigs on their way into Israeli airspace; suicide operations with divers, boats or depth charges; and surface-to-surface missiles like the C-802s that have already been used by Hezbollah. Rig owners are working with the IDF to counter the irregular threat, via armed teams on each platform and radars networked to Israel’s coastal defenses. They may need to take further steps with RWS emplacements and missiles, given rules that require enemies to close within 1/2 mile before defenders can open fire. Higher end threats are even more problematic, and aren’t much discussed here, but they exist. It’s a complex, multi-dimensional problem, and the solution will have to be multi-layered.

One apparent error: the authors refer to “two state-of-the-art German-built MEKO class F221 frigates” as Israel’s choice. The F221 is FGS Hessen, a Sachsen Class advanced air warfare destroyer. First off, it isn’t part of the MEKO family, but a separate and more advanced class built in the context of trilateral cooperation between the Netherlands, Germany and Spain. They are top-end multi-role “frigates,” whose size and growth capacity for ballistic missile defense would make them destroyers if Europeans weren’t so averse to the term. It’s a very capable ship, but an unlikely choice. One ship of that class, with modifications, would eat most of Israel’s reported EUR 1 billion budget for 2. Sources: Forbes, “The Daunting Challenge Of Defending Israel’s Multi-Billion Dollar Gas Fields”.

2012 – 2013

 

Sa’ar 5 & Panther
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Dec 16/13: Strategic. Information Dissemination runs an analysis of Israel’s apparent interest in 2 high-end ships, which is a departure from their traditional focus on larger numbers of smaller vessels. The best that can be said for Jacob Stoil’s analysis is that it’s incomplete. He’s correct to say that this is a departure, and that presence matters, but he never looks at the regional changes underway, and the strategic imperatives created by new enemy capabilities and new Israeli needs. Then there are quotes like this one, which assume premises that turn out not to be true:

“Israel clearly does not intend to use naval power to support land operations or develop independent strategic operations from the sea in a serious way. All of their naval procurement and training decisions over the last more than twenty years have made that impossible.”

Sources: Information Dissemination, “Of Destroyers and Doctrine: An Evaluation of Israel’s Decision to Invest in Larger Hulls”.

Dec 8/13: Germany. The newspaper Ha’aretz reports that Israel’s Defense Ministry is expected to ask the Finance Ministry for a ILS 3 billion budget increase (about $855 million/ EUR 624 million) to purchase 4 “missile boats” as a special buy outside the defense budget, for protection of Israel’s huge offshore natural gas fields. At the same time, the German Bild newspaper is reporting a different deal: 2 ships for EUR 1 billion. The Ha’aretz report does add that Israel continues to negotiate with American and South Korean suppliers, leaving the Navy’s plans characteristically unclear.

What is clear is that there’s a big difference between the implications in the Israeli and German reports. EUR 156 million per ship will struggle to buy a ship like the K130 corvette, a surface warfare patrol ship with limited anti-aircraft capabilities, and no anti-submarine capabilities. They could form interesting flotilla dyads with the proposed Multi-role Super-Dvora, but submarine threats are rising in the Mediterranean. At EUR 500 million per ship, on the other hand, Israel would be looking at high-end MEKO Class frigates will a full range of capabilities, which would become the most advanced ships in their navy. The price would be more limited coverage, with just half the number of ships bought for slightly more money. Sources: Die Presse, “Israel konnte deutsche Kriegsschiffe kaufen” | Ha’aretz, “Defense Ministry seeking $853m to buy German missile boats” | AFP, “”Bild”: Deutschland verkauft Israel zwei raketenbestuckte Zerstorer” | N24, “Israel will Raketenschiffe aus Deutschland” (repeats Ha’aretz figures).

Aug 10/12: South Korea. Israel Defense reports that South Korea is interested in Israel’s Iron Dome rocket defense system, and is negotiating for possible offsetting deals involving frigates for Israel.

April 1/12: South Korea? Israel Defense reports that South Korea is offering to build new surface vessels for the Israeli Navy via Hyundai shipyards. South Korean representatives have reportedly visited Israel and met with the Ministry of Defense, and are said to be continuing discussions. The magazine reports that the offered ships had a displacement of just 1,300 tons, the same size as current Sa’ar 5 Eilat Class corvettes, and significantly smaller than South Korea’s new 2,300t FFX Incheon Class frigates. It didn’t say whether that displacement was measured at full load, after Israel radars, weapons, etc. had all been installed.

Israel hasn’t set aside a budget for such vessels in its current plans, but ongoing discoveries of huge offshore oil and gas are changing its assessment of its security needs.

Meanwhile, Israel Shipyards has reportedly proposed an alternative in which government re-investment would help them add hundreds of employees, invest in a new manufacturing layout, and build 2,100 ton “Saar 5.5” light frigates. They would then become an exporter, with the ability to field upgraded versions for Israel later on. The MoD has approached the Treasury about this plan, but it’s reportedly stuck, even as negotiations have stalled with the USA for a Freedom Class LCS derivative, and with Germany for a MEKO frigate derivative.

2009 – 2011

LCS too expensive; Talks center around German MEKO designs, incl. MEKO CSL; Israel may not have the budget to buy the ships it wants – but huge resource finds mean they may have to.

MEKO 200TN
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November 2010: Leviathan. Israel’s giant “Leviathan” offshore natural gas field is discovered. The gas field is located roughly 130 km/ 81 miles west of Haifa, in 1,500 m/ 4,900 ft. of water. Estimated reserves are a stunning 500+ billion cubic meters, or more than 18 trillion cubic feet.

Israel’s navy just became much more important.

Giant offshore gas find

July 25/10: MEKO. Hopes of German government subsidies to finance Israel’s MEKO buy appear to be fading, amidst the country’s tightening climate of austerity. From The Jerusalem Post:

“The [Israeli] Defense Ministry statement came amid reports that Chancellor Angela Merkel’s government had decided to turn down an Israeli request for financial assistance in purchasing the Dolphin-class submarine and new [MEKO frigates]. In another rare statement, the German government, which rarely talks about defense sales, also denied it was holding talks with Israel on subsidizing new naval vessels… Israel had hoped to receive additional subsidies for two Meko-class ships it was interested in purchasing.”

May 18/10: MEKO CSL? Aviation Week reports that Israel may become the launch customer for ThyssenKrupp’s new MEKO CSL. If true, the American Littoral Combat Ship’s price may end up spawning an international export competitor.

The Meko CSL is only slightly smaller than the American LCS Freedom Class, at 108m/ 354 ft. long, with a beam of 21 meters and full-load displacement of 2,750 tonnes. Propulsion is by a combined diesel-and-gas (CODAG) water-jet system that cruises at 15 knots and reaches 40. Cruising speed range at would be about is 3,500 nautical miles, with 21 days endurance. The MEKO CSL variant adds improved stealth shapes and measures refined on Sweden’s Visby Class corvettes, and has several modular sections for faster swap-outs. An Israeli MEKO CSL would also contain a lot of local content, including IAI Elta’s MF-STAR active-array radar, the new Barak-8 medium range air defense missile, and Israeli electronic countermeasures systems, among others. The CSL does have a rear mission bay, and one of its roles would likely be as a hub for Israel’s advanced set of robotic UAVs and naval USV/UUVs.

Jan 18/10: MEKO. Defense News reports that Germany and Israel are in talks concerning a $1.45 billion naval deal that would add 1 Dolphin Class submarine, and 2 MEKO-derived frigates as the beginning of Israel’s next-generation frigate program. Current reports do not see a January 2010 agreement as likely, and Defense News claims that Israel is asking Germany to pay for 33% of the cost as a German industrial stimulus program, just as it did with Israel’s previous 2-sub order.

The MEKO ships would be Israel’s alternative to a very modified version of Lockheed Martin’s Littoral Combat Ship design, which Israel rejected due to its expected $700+ million cost. Even so, American components in the total naval package could reach up to $200 million. This is important because Israel can use US military aid dollars to buy them, instead of hard currency.

Nov 25/09: German MEKOs? Reuters reports on negotiations between TKMS and Israel to buy up to 8 next-generation MEKO ships.

“Built at ThyssenKrupp’s (TKAG.DE) Blohm+Voss shipyards in Hamburg, the Meko costs around $300 million but Israel wants the German government to underwrite the sale. An official involved in the talks said Israel sought a discount of 20 to 30 percent. That would help the Meko outprice the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)… An Israeli official said despite the fact that U.S. defence grants would significantly defray the estimated $460 to $600 million cost of the LCS, the Meko topped the wish list. “We want to close a deal by the end of the year. Now it comes down to financing issues with the Germans,” he said.”

Previous reports placed the LCS-I cost closer to $650-700 million. As was the case with the LCS-I, Israel is looking to incorporate a range of Israeli technologies and weapons into the frigates.

Oct 15/09: TKMS + UAE. Blohm + Voss parent firm, ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems, sells an 80% share of all Blohm + Voss groups to the United Arab Emirates’ firm Abu Dhabi MAR, and makes future naval construction a 50/50 joint venture. It remains to be seen whether this will affect Israeli negotiations to use Blohm + Voss’ MEKO designs as the base for its future frigate.

June 29-July 6/09: USA Out. Multiple sources report that Israel is abandoning the LCS-I design, owing to its high costs. Israeli estimates reportedly put the price of an LCS-I at over $600 million, a reasonable figure given the $650-700 million cost of the first 2 American ships, and LCS-I’s extensive Israeli equipment upgrades. Arutz Sheva:

“As much as we sought commonality with the U.S. Navy, it became much, much more expensive than planned,” a naval source said. “At the end of the day, we had no choice but to face that fact that, for us, it was unaffordable.”

Surprisingly, Israel also turned down a 2,300 ton Sa’ar 5.5/5B option from original Eilat class builder Northrop Grumman, owing to expected costs of about $450 million. Instead, Israel is reportedly looking at expanding cooperation with ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS), whose HDW subsidiary builds Israel’s Dolphin subs. The idea is to build an advanced, stretched version of Blohm + Voss’ 2,200 ton MEKO A-100 corvette. The ship would add Mk 41 VLS cells, IAI’s Elta’s EL/M-2248 MF-STAR “Adir” active array radar, and other Israeli equipment. The Israelis reportedly believe they would be able to field such a capable ship for around $300 million, and that they can build it locally as a joint military/economic stimulus project. One source told Arutz Sheva (INN) that “We believe a strong case can be made for making this into a national project that fosters self sufficiency and provides all the economic benefits that come with creating a military shipbuilding industry.”

TKMS would be the main design partner, IAI looks set to step into the role of overall systems integrator, and the likely shipbuilder would be Israel Shipyards in Haifa. Israel Shipyards have mostly focused on much smaller fast attack boats, but were also responsible for local integration of the Sa’ar 5 corvettes.

This version of Israel’s next-generation ship project will face 2 main challenges. One is a technical/ engineering challenge. The other is financial.

As one source told the Jerusalem Post: “The challenge will be to make a relatively small ship large enough to carry everything we need, including the radar system.” Given that the systems Israel wants usually equip 4,000+ ton ships, that challenge should not be minimized. TKMS’ Meko 200, in service with the Turkish and South African navies, does offer a 3,850 ton option, and the Israeli Navy is reportedly preparing to issue a design contract to IAI and TKMS subsidiary Blohm+Voss, in order to sort out their technical options.

The financial challenge will be equally formidable. Both LCS-I and a Sa’ar 5.5 design could be purchased with American military aid dollars, which must be spent in America. Those agreements have provisions that allow up to 26% of that aid to be spent in Israel, but those funds are already committed to projects like an extended-range Barak anti-aircraft missile, IAI Elta’s MF-STAR active array radar, and other priority projects. There are 2 possible workarounds for this, and they are not mutually exclusive. One involves financing from other ministries beyond defense, as an industrial project that would provide employment, expand Israeli shipbuilding capabilities, and might even create an exportable platform if the right agreement is struck with TKMS. The second workaround involves using American aid dollars to cover some elements, like steel, American production of the Meko’s MTU1168 diesel engine by General Dynamics, etc., in order to reduce the hard currency price. That would help the project get approved, but it comes with a cost of its own – it would force the Israelis to labor under America’s cumbersome ITAR export approval laws whenever they or TKMS wished to sell the design abroad.

If those conundrums cannot be resolved at an acceptable cost, a 3rd option may exist. Defense News adds that Israel might have driven down the Sa’ar 5.5’s price by $100 million if it had paid for a contract design/detail design process, and that option may return depending on how efforts with ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems progress:

“When Northrop Grumman makes a fixed-price offer, it’s the result of an organized and serious process that allows the company to honor all of its commitments,” a company representative said. “Without conducting a contract design – which eliminates most of the uncertainties that drive up price – NG couldn’t offer the unit costs we all believed we could have delivered to the Israel Navy.”

Sources: Arutz Sheva | Jerusalem Post | Defense News | Jane’s.

LCS-I out; No NGC Sa’ar 5B either

Feb 12/09: Industrial. The director of naval procurement at the Israeli Ministry of Defence’s purchasing mission in New York informs U.S. parties that a change in plans toward a different class of locally-built ships may be in the cards:

“In the event this option turns out to be more suitable both in terms of our operational and budgetary requirements, the [multimission ships] will be built in Israel.”

Source: Defense News June 2009 report.

Feb 1/09: LCS-I. The Jerusalem Post reports that OC Navy Adm. Elazar Marom has dispatched a number of officers to the United States to sail on Lockheed Martin’s Freedom [LCS 1] and test its capabilities. The report adds:

“In addition to reviewing the LCS – whose price has soared over the past year and now reportedly reaches $500 million – the navy is also considering downgrading its procurement plans and purchasing more Sa’ar 5-class missile ships… “There are a number of possibilities and they are under review,” one source said. “There are other possibilities such as more Sa’ar 5s, an upgraded Sa’ar 5 that would be called Sa’ar 5.5, or to wait for the LCS’s price to go down.”

January 2009: Tamar. Noble Energy announces that exploratory drilling has found an offshore gas field about 80 km west of Haifa, in 1,700m / 5,600 ft. of water. The field is called Tamar.

Eventual estimates for the area are a bit of a shock to the traditionally resource-poor Israelis: 200 billion cubic meters / 7.1 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.

Giant offshore gas find

2006 – 2008

From studies to a formal LCS-I request.

(click to view full)

July 15/08: LCS-I. The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency announced [PDF] Israel’s official request for up to 4 Littoral Combat Ships (LCS-I variant), including the hull, and all mechanical and electrical functions. The ships will also include design and integration services, hardware and software, spare and repair parts, test and tool sets, personnel training and equipment, publications, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics personnel services, and other related elements of logistics support. The estimated cost is $1.9 billion.

Each ship will be equipped with:

• 2 MK-41 Vertical Launch Systems, with 8 launch cells for each system. This would allow the ship to hold and fire up to 16 SM-2/3 air defense missiles, or up to 64 RIM-162 Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles.
  
• 1 Enhanced Harpoon Launching System with missile launchers. Harpoon is an anti-ship missile, but the latest versions can also be used to hit land targets.
  
• 1 Phalanx Close-In-Weapon System, Block 1A. This is surprising, as Block 1B adds important capabilities against the small boats that remain a concern for Israel. Israel is likely to bolt on other gun systems like RAFAEL’s Typhoon in order to cover that threat, but Israeli systems do not need to be specified in the DSCA announcement.
  
• 2 MK-32 triple-launcher Surface Vessel Torpedo Tubes, which handle lightweight torpedoes and launch them from on deck using pressurized air.
  
• Communications and Sensors, including Link 16.
  
• The same COMBATSS-21 Combat system used in American LCS designs.
  
• The smaller AN/SPY-1F (V) AEGIS radar, which is also used on Norway’s Nansen Class frigates. SPY-1F radars lack ballistic missile defense capabilities, but could be networked with other radars like Israel’s “Green Pine.”
  
• A MK-99 Fire Control System; or the Ship Self-Defense System (SSDS) now being installed on American Carriers, LHA/LHD ships, San Antonio Class LPDs, etc.

The principal contractors will be:

• Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems and Sensors in Moorestown, NJ and Eagan, MN (LCS-I, SPY-1F radar, COMBATSS-21, Mk-41)
  
• General Dynamics Armament Systems in Burlington, VT (AEGIS illuminator, 20mm gun for Phalanx)
  
• Raytheon Company, Equipment Division in Andover, MA and Integrated Defense Systems in Waltham, MA (Phalanx, SSDS)

The DSCA announcement says that the Israeli Navy will have no difficulty integrating these ships into its Naval forces, adding that this proposed sale will not require the assignment of any U.S. Government or contractor representatives to the Israel.

LCS-I DSCA request

Feb 6/08: LCS-I. The Jerusalem Post:

“Looking to upgrade its sea-based capabilities, the Israel Navy has submitted a Request for Proposal (RFP) to the United States Navy for a new missile ship currently under development by Lockheed Martin Corp. The Defense Ministry said that the navy expects to receive a reply by April.”

The report added a final caveat, but it doesn’t mean as much as it seems when set against a detailed ship design study, and accompanying industrial arrangements for an extensive array of Israeli equipment on board. That prior work and set of partnerships creates a strong pull toward the Team Lockheed design – one that will not be lightly broken:

“While the navy has filed the RFP, defense officials said it was still not certain whether Israel would purchase the LCS from Lockheed Martin. As part of its multi-year plan finalized in September, the IDF decided to purchase two new ships, but did not state from which company.”

September 2007: LCS-I. NAVSEA asks Lockheed Martin to conduct a 9-month, $2.5 million study of combat system integration for an Israeli LCS-I configuration.

Systems that must be compatible with the combat system reportedly include Lockheed’s AEGIS SPY-1F radar and the Israeli Elta EL/M-2248 Adir radar, RAFAEL’s Typhoon remotely-operated gun/missile systems, Raytheon’s Standard SM-2 surface-to-air missile, and Israel Aerospace Industries’ Barak 1 and 8 anti-air missile systems. A Nov 12/07 Lockheed Martin release adds that:

“During the nine-month combat system configuration phase, Lockheed Martin will examine the combat system performance of LCS-I using two different radar options: the advanced radar under development by Israeli Aircraft Industries (IAI) and Lockheed Martin’s SPY-1F radar. The team will examine the performance of these two radar options using the COMBATSS-21 combat management system integrated with the Israeli Navy Command and Control (IC2) system and develop the technical architecture, high level specifications and estimated costs to integrate COMBATSS-21 with IC2 and multiple Israeli and U.S. sensor and weapon systems including the MK 41 Vertical Launch System (VLS)… Lockheed Martin is currently partnered with Rafael Armament Systems, Elbit Systems and Ness on LCS-I.”

Combat system study

April 10/06: LCS-I. Lockheed Martin announces a $5.2 million NAVSEA study studied Team Lockheed’s LCS hull, mechanical, and engineering systems’ ability to accommodate the systems and weapons the Israelis want, while avoiding the need for major redesign of the USA’s basic configuration.

The final answer was that it could, with some obvious modifications to accommodate better radars and vertical launch systems for missiles.

Freedom Class LCS study

Additional Readings & Sources Background: Israeli Sa’ar Vessels

• Israeli Weapons – Eilat Class Saar 5 multi-mission corvettes. Built by what is now Huntington Ingalls in the USA. Currently being refitted with the MF-STAR AESA radar, Barak-8 medium-range air defense missiles, and improved anti-ship/ land strike missiles.

• Naval Technology – Eilat Class Sa’ar 5 Multi-Mission Corvettes, Israel.

• Israeli Shipyards – SAAR Class Fast-Attack Vessel. The Sa’ar 4 and 4.5, which max. out at 500t, plus an abbreviated description of the the 800t SAAR S-72. They didn’t build the Sa’ar 5s, but are an option to build a “Sa’ar 5.5” design if Israel goes that route.

• Defense Update – Israel Shipyards Introduces the SAAR 72 Mini-Corvette Design. The 800t design sits somewhere between the existing Sa’ar 4.5 and Sa’ar 5 corvettes. From May 16/13.

• Israeli Weapons – Sa’ar 4.5. Currently being refitted with improved IAI ELM-2258 APLHA radars.

Background: Other Ships

• DID – The USA’s New Littoral Combat Ships (LCS).

• ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems – Blohm+Voss Class 130 Corvette. Based on the MEKO 100, displacement 1,840t. Mostly surface warfare & point air defense. They carry 2 small heli-UAVs in a small hangar on board, and can accommodate medium helicopters on the deck.

• Naval Technology – K130 Braunschweig Class Corvette, Germany. Germany’s 5th and final ship entered service in March 2013.

• ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems – Blohm+Voss MEKO® A-200 Class Frigate.

• Naval Technology – MEKO A Class Combat Ship Family, Germany.

• ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems – Blohm+Voss Class MEKO® CSL Light Frigate. Modular design with a payload bay.

• DID – Korea’s New Coastal Frigates: the FFX Incheon Class. About 2,300t full displacement. Hyundai and Daewoo can go much bigger, of course, all the way up to their 4,800t KDX-II and 10,000+ tonne KDX-III destroyers that serve with the ROKN. They’ll also be working on an FFX Batch II class that’s expected to be larger, with an upgraded radar and Mk.41 VLS cells.

Background: Ship Systems

• IAI Elta – ELM-2248 MF-STAR : MULTI-FUNCTION Surveillance and Threat Alert Radar. Has up to 4 fixed active array S-band tiles, with multiple digital beamforming capability. Each tile containing 16 Gallium Arsenide transmit/receive modules. A typical 3×3 m array weighs approximately 1,500 kg, and total weight below decks is about 900 kg for onboard equipment in 2 processing and 4 power supply cabinets. Liquid cooling is used.

• Defense Update – EL/M-2248 MF-STAR Naval Multi-Mission Radar. also known as “Adir,” and being fitted to Sa’ar 5 corvettes as part of a current upgrade.

• IAI – ELM-2258 ALPHA: Advanced Lightweight Phased Array Naval Radar. Significantly smaller than MF-STAR, uses a single rotating face. An upgrade for Sa’ar 4.5 FACs.

• Wikipedia – Gabriel (missile). Israel currently fields the Mk.IV (200 km range), and they’ve exported successive versions around the world.

• IAI – Advanced Naval Attack Missile. Effectively, the Gabriel Mk.V, but different enough to merit its own designation.

• IMI – Delilah-SL. The EO-guided Delilah is the IAF’s go-to missile for attacks against heavily defended targets, or targets that demand a high level of human judgement via a “man in the loop” feature. This ship-launched variant offers a 250 km range.

• IAI – Barak-1 Ship Point Defense System.

• DID – India & Israel’s Barak-8 SAM Development Project(s). Barak-8 is already being retrofitted to the Sa’ar 5 Eilat Class, along with an MF-STAR radar.

News and Views

• Forbes (Jan 8/14) – The Daunting Challenge Of Defending Israel’s Multi-Billion Dollar Gas Fields.

• Information Dissemination (Dec 16/13) – Of Destroyers and Doctrine: An Evaluation of Israel’s Decision to Invest in Larger Hulls.

• Defense Update (Oct 14/12) – Israel Navy to Modernize Hetz Class Missile Boats with a New Radar. The Sa’ar 4.5 will get the EL/M-2258 ALPHA S-Band, electronically-steered, software-defined radar. It uses a number of MF-STAR technologies, but is adapted for small ships.

• Ha’aretz (July 9/12) – Israel Navy demands NIS 3 billion for protection of gas rigs.

• Defense Update (January 2010) – Israel Turns to Germany for Naval Stealth Ships. Israel switches gears. Report is focused on the MEKO, incl. the MEKO CSL.

• Defense News (Oct 22/07) – Lockheed Moves Forward With USN’s LCS.

• Jane’s Defence Weekly (Oct 11/07) – Reports that “[The Lockheed Martin LCS-I] design appears to be the most suitable for our needs,” a senior IN source told Jane’s…”

Afghan authorities have solved one of the most long-standing and consequential problems in the country‘s complex election system: the number of districts. It is 387. This is pending a final decision by parliament, as there are some so-called ‘temporary’ districts that could boost the number. If parliament takes this issue up, however, there is a chance that it throws this hard-won unanimity over board again. This is because the number of districts is not just an administrative matter but also one of resources and influence. AAN’s Thomas Ruttig (with input from Ali Yawar Adili) have looked at the figures, what they mean and what questions are still open.

Afghanistan’s more than bumpy road to the next elections has led to at least one positive outcome. Almost unnoticed,the country’s Central Statistics Office (CSO) and the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) have, for now, come up with a joint, consolidated list of how many districts Afghanistan has. It has handed this list over to the Independent Election Commission (IEC) that has used it in preparing the elections. The number is: 387 (see the list here, in Dari).

Now the three major election-related Afghan institutions are using the same numbers. With this, a major technical hurdle has been cleared on the way to holding the country’s first district elections.

Previously, both IDLG and CSO had divergent and inconsistent lists. For instance, in May this year, AAN was given an IDLG print-out titled “The structure of administrative units of the provinces and districts of Afghanistan 1396 [2017-18]” that said Afghanistan had 382 districts. The same number appeared in the CSO’s annual “Estimated Population” review for 2017-18 – but only the total was similar in both lists. They deviated on which districts existed in several provinces. (1) Some international actors in Afghanistan are still using sometimes significantly different figures (more about this below). Even so, it is really good news that the CSO and IDLG have come up with a joint result.

The bad news is, as reported by AAN, that the IEC, facing a severe shortage of candidates for the 20 October 2018 district council elections, felt compelled to suggest a delay until April next year, when the presidential and provincial council polls are being held. That sounds like a tall order. It is possible that the delay could re-open the discussions about district numbers – as will be explained below.

What does the CSO/IDLG list look like?

The new, consolidated district list does still have one small flaw and some major gaps. The flaw is that its serial numbers run up to 389, not to 387. One district – Ghormach – turns up twice. It is listed under both Badghis and Faryab provinces, with the remark – in red – that it had been “temporarily transferred” to Faryab. This means that the authors forgot to give it only one serial number (this looks like an Excel sheet problem). However, even when this is corrected, the list still contains 388, not 387 districts.

The remaining discrepancy can be solved by looking at four large gaps in the list where the districts for four provinces, Daykundi, Nangrahar, Paktia and Uruzgan, are completely missing. The reason, as the IEC’s head of field operations Zmarai Qalamyar told AAN in a phone conversation in late July 2018, is that the CSO had yet to provide the population figures of some newly-established districts in those provinces. (2)  (The authors could have put in the district names anyway, as they seem to be uncontroversial, and just left the population figures open, but chose not to.) How many districts there are in these four provinces can be gauged from the missing serial numbers in the alphabetical order of the provinces: namely, Uruzgan has six, Paktia 14, Daykundi nine and Nangrahar 24 districts. The same numbers also turn up in a – complete – list of all districts given on the CSO website in its latest “Estimated Populatiuon [sic] of Afghanistan 2018-19.”

This CSO list also solves the riddle of the superfluous 288th district: it is Nawmesh (sometimes called Nawamesh) which, similar to Ghormach, is listed under two provinces and counted twice (more background in this AAN dispatch). This district– a Hazara majority area – was split from the Pashtun-majority Baghran district in northern Helmand by a presidential order in March 2016 and the IDLG temporarily transferred the administration of its security, administrative and logistical affairs to Daykundi in June 2017. But the IEC announced that the elections would still be managed from Helmand, which has led to protests among the local population who prefer to be handled by Daykundi – see this photo in an Afghan media report, saying, “We Don’t Accept this Decision”.) (3)

Nawmesh is also a so-called ‘temporary’ (mu’aqati) district – in contrast to ‘official’ districts that are uncontroversial (but not yet officially delineated and recognised by parliament). The IDLG defines a ‘temporary district’ (in an 11 June 2017 official letter to the IEC of which AAN obtained a copy) as those districts that have been approved after entry into force of the 2004 constitution by the president due to security or other considerations, but have not yet been approved by parliament. MPs have the final say on this, according to the constitution.

Other district lists

The most recent quarterly report from the United States government’s Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) (here, on p131) published in July 2018, cites two sets of district numbers when it analyses district control: “There are 407 districts in Resolute Support’s dataset and 399 districts in USAID’s third-party monitor’s dataset.” Both differ from the CSO/IDLG list. It is surprising that even the different institutions of Afghanistan’s largest donor have not reconciled their own data. Resolute Support’s list of 407 districts includes the 34 provincial centres, but taking them out would leave only 373 districts, still different from the USAID and CSO/IDLG lists. (It can be seen in Appendix F of the report, pp 239-49.).

The United Nation’s humanitarian coordination agency, UNOCHA, uses a list – like USAID – of 399 districts when compiling the data on conflict-induced internal displacement. The European Asylum Support Office (EASO), an European Union institution that, among other tasks, provides security-related data about the countries of origin of asylum seekers, including Afghanistan, cites 368 districts in its most recent country report from December 2017. The most recent UN Office of Drugs and Crime’s opium survey (for 2017)  has a list of 413 administrative units which also includes the 34 provincial centres, so that this results in a list of 379 districts.

Districts as perks and the for-ever delay of district council elections

One of the reasons why district council elections have never been held, despite being mandated by the 2004 constitution is that the number of districts is highly controversial. In particular, the delineation of their borders is disputed, ie which areas, villages etc belong to which district and where their inhabitants should vote. This means that an authorised list has never been finally approved by parliament. (4) Despite the consolidated CSO/IDLG list, this still remains to be resolved.

When this author, as a United Nations member of staff, was involved in helping to organise the Emergency Loya Jirga (ELJ) in 2002, the delegates for which were determined through a district-based selection-and-election process (5), the figure of how many districts existed in the country was already a problem. There was no generally accepted list of districts, but after long discussions, the Afghan interim authorities, the Independent ELJ Commission and the UN in an advisory (but driving) role settled on 339 districts. (6) That is almost forty districts or 12 per cent fewer than are counted now.

The additional problem is that there are not only ‘temporary’ districts created after 2004, ie under presidents Hamed Karzai and Ashraf Ghani, but others which are sometimes called “unofficial.” These were created before 2004, by previous governments, often by splitting older, existing districts. This was done under the various regimes of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) (AAN background here), as well a the mujahedin and Taleban regime. Since 2001, under Presidents Hamed Karzai and Ashraf Ghani, new ‘unofficial’ districts have been created in the same way. (New provinces have also been created using this model.) (7)

Sometimes, these rearrangements answered to local demands by certain population groups who felt underrepresented in the larger ‘old’ district or simply in order to create paid administrative jobs for the clientele of a particular powerful politician. Badakhshan, with its record number of 27 districts, might be a point in case (former president Borhanuddin Rabbani was from there), Panjshir with its very small population but now nine districts, or Kandahar, where the Karzai family’s home area, Dand, was made a district.

It looks, as if the list of existing districts has been uncontroversial up to the breakdown of state institutions in the violent transition from the PDPA to the mujahedin government in the early 1980s and then further on to the Taleban regime and after its fall. (8) Now, no one dares ‘dismantle’ districts from those periods, in order to not confront those who created them, as some of those politicians or their followers are still powerful in parliament and elsewhere.

Conclusion: A step forward, but not yet the final one

While administratively, the country’s institutions have solved – at least for the time being – the long-standing issue of the number of officially recognised districts, parliament has still to approve it. It also has to tackle the still pending issue of district delineation. Both are more than just administrative problems, as the creation of districts and the allocation of resources to them (their tashkil of staff and budget) has been used by consecutive governments to the benefit of themselves and their allies. The mash of official, unofficial and temporary districts and the vested interests behind their creation has made the issue extremely difficult to resolve.

In combination with Afghanistan’s still absent population data (there has still been no census), this issue has stood and stands in the way of the legitimacy of any election in Afghanistan. Holding a census is also hampered by severe disputes about whether it should also be used to determine the numbers of the diverse ethnic groups in the country. Holding a census, therefore, throws up similar – actually more serious and dangerous – controversies as the distribution of new ID cards has done (AAN analysis here and here).

But so far, the failure to organise district council elections has allowed everyone to ignore this problem. With the district council elections that are (or were – the decision on whether to delay them is pending) scheduled for 20 October 2018, this was no longer feasible. Without an exact number of districts, it would be simply impossible to hold district elections.

The possibility of a delay of the district elections has mixed blessings. As the IEC and IDLG have argued, the time won by a delay might help them sort out other related issues, such as what exactly the district councils will be responsible for, what their budgets will be and what and whether councillors will be paid. At the same time, parliament – with its opposing interest groups – might take up the issue and open the district list up again.

Edited by Kate Clark

 

(1) In December 2017, AAN received a list from the (now former) IDLG spokeswoman Munera Yusufzada which had 385 districts. These figures were also used as the basis for the polling centre assessment in August and September 2017 (see its AAN analysis here), as Shahla Haque, the (then) acting head of the IEC secretariat, confirmed to AAN on 27 December 2017. Since then, however, two more districts have been created so that Yusufzada’s list was probably already correct and coordinated between CSO, IDLG and the commission.

(2) Afghanistan’s population statistics is another issue. There has never been a full census. The following information is based on data the author received when working for the UN in 2002 and a 2014 article by Najib Manalai published at the Afghan economy-focussed news website Wadsam:

The CSO was founded in 1972 with USAID funding in order to prepare and conduct a comprehensive survey of Afghanistan’s population. The survey was preceded by the collection and aggregation of compiled data from the ministries of interior (conscription and National ID cards distribution) and of agriculture and irrigation (quantity of fertilizer distributed). The results of this survey were published in 1973 as the “Provincial Gazetteer of Afghanistan” (PGA). It counted a total population of about 14 million, which included a presumed number of two million Kuchis. A census had been planned for the summer of 1978, at a time when large parts of the country were already in a state of war. CSO staff claimed that the ‘objectives’ of the census were reached to only about 70 per cent. The results were partially published in 1983 as the “Locality Gazetteer of Afghanistan.” It counted 16 million Afghans. All CSO records published since (under the communists, the mujahedin’s Islamic State of Afghanistan and the Taleban Emirate are based on the 1978 figures with subsequent extrapolations on the basis of an assumed growth rate – initially 1.9 per cent and,since 2007, 2.05 per cent.

In 2004, the United Nations Population Fund conducted a countrywide household survey which is now used as the CSO’s basis to project the total in-country population. For 2017-18, the CSO gave a figure of 29.7 million.

Manalai also quotes other sources and figures, such as figures based on household data collected during the National Immunization Days (estimate of 44.8 million for 2014) and estimates provided by the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development based on the National Solidarity Program (36.3 million in 2014).

(3) The not yet final joint CSO/IDLG list contains the following 16 temporary districts:

Bamian (1): Yakaolang II (Yakaolang having been split into two)

Panjshir (1): Abshar

Kunduz (3): Kalbad, Aqtash, Gortepe (in the list, it is mistakenly called “Gultepe” – perhaps someone deliberated changed the nasty-sounding ‘Tomb Hill’ into ‘Flower Hill’). These districts are all under Taleban control (read more here)

Kandahar (2): Dand (the Karzai’s family’s home place), Takhtapul

Kunar (1): Sheltan (this district is older than 2004; it already appeared on the 2002 district list used by the Emergency Loya Jirga)

Laghman (1): Badpash (background in this AAN dispatch)

Nimruz (1): Delaram

Herat (4): Zerkoh, Zawol, Poshtkoh, Koh-e Zawar (the list contains a fifth district marked as ‘temporary’, Shindand – but that is actually the remainder of the older, larger district from which the four others were divided from)

Helmand (2): Marja (more here), Nawamesh.

The IDLG, however, says there are altogether 23 temporary districts, so seven must be missing from the latest but incomplete CSO/IDLG list.

Four others are, however, included in the IDLG letter sent to the IEC in June 2017:

Uruzgan (1): Chinarto

Paktia (2): Laja Mangal, Mirzaka

Daykundi (1): Pato

This means that since June 2017, three more temporary districts seem to have been created. Where they are, we will only learn when the CSO and IDLG publish their complete list.

(4) The size (number of seats) of the planned district councils is also determined on the basis of the size of the district’s population, as article 60 of the relevant law stipulates:

Each district shall have a council, members of which shall be elected by the voters of the same district for a term of three years. Allocation of Seats to District Council

Article 61:(1) The seats of the district council are allocated in proportion to the population of each district as below: 1 A district with a population of up to forty thousand, 5 seats. 2 A district with a population of more than forty thousand up to seventy thousand, 7 seats. 3 A district with a population of more than seventy thousand up to one hundred thousand, 9 seats. 4 A district with a population of more than one- hundred thousand, 11 seats. (2) A minimum of 25% of the seats of each District Council shall be allocated to female candidates. (3) A nomad may participate in district council elections of any district as a voter and or a candidate.

There are 175 districts with five seats. They are: 1) Badghis: Muqur; 2) Bamyan: Kahmard, 3) Shibar, 4) Saighan, 5) Yakawlang Two; 6) Badakhshan: Jurm 7) Shuhada, 8) Yawan, 9) Taskhan, 10) Baharak, 11) Tagab, 12) Shighnan, 13) Darwaz-e Payin (Mami), 14) Shaki, 15) Yamgan/Girwan, 16) Darwaz-e Bala/Nisi, 17) Kuf Ab, 18) Warduj, 19) Kohistan, 20) Khwahan, 21) Arghanjkhwah, 22) Wakhan, 23) Eshkashem, 24) Karan wa Manjan, 25) Zibak; 26) Baghlan: Deh Salah, 27) Khenjan, 28) Tala wa Barfak, 29) Pul-e Hesar, 30) Andarab, 31) Khwaja Hejran/Jelga, 32) Farang wa Gharu, 33) Guzargah-e Nur; 34) Balkh: Kaldar, 35) Marmal; 36) Parwan: Koh-e Safi, 37) Salang, 38) Shiekh Ali; 39) Paktika: Barmal, 40) Geyan, 41) Zarghun Shahr, 42) Dila wa Khushamand, 43) Mata Khan, 44) Janikhel, 45) Sar Rawza, 46) Wazakhwah, 47) Yahyakhel, 48) Yusufkhel, 49) Sarobi, 50) Nika, 51) Omna, 52) Gomal, 53) Wurmamai, 54) Tarwa; 55) Panjshir: Rokha, 56) Anaba, 57) Paryan, 58) Dara, 59) Shotul, 60) Abshar; 61) Takhar: Kalafgan, 62) Bangi, 63) Dasht-e Qala, 64) Baharak, 65) Chal, 66) Darqad, 67) Khwaja Bahauddin; 68) Hazar Sumuj, 69) Namak Ab; 70) Jawzjan: Khwaja Du Koh, 71) Qarqin, 72) Qushtepa, 73) Khaneqa, 74) Khamyab; 75) Khost: Nader Shah Kot, 76) Gurbuz, 77) Spera, 78) Haji Maidan, 79) Bak, 80) Shemal, 81) Qalandar; 82) Zabul: Arghandab, 83) Shamulzai, 84) Kakar/Khak-e Afghan, 85) Shinkai, 86) Nawbahar, 87) Tarnak aw Jaldak, 88) Mizan, 89) Atghar; 90) Samangan: Feruz Nakhchir; 91) Ghazni: Giro, 92) Jaghatu, 93) Nawa, 94) Ajrestan, 95) Ab Band, 96) Wali Muhammad Shahid/Khugyani, 97) Khwaja Omari, 98) Rashidan, 99) Zana Khan; 100) Ghor: Dolina, 101) Saghar, 102) Dawlatyar, 103) Charsada; 104): Faryab: Khan Chahar Bagh, 105) Qaramqul; 106) Farah: Bakwa, 107) Qala-ye Kah, 108) Khak-e Safid, 109) Lash wa Juwayn, 110) Anar Dara, 111) Shib Koh; 112) Kabul: Chahar Asiab, 113) Istalif, 114) Kalakan, 115) Musahi, 116) Guldara, 117) Farza, 118) Khak-e Jabbar; 119) Kapisa: Alasay, 120) Kohband; 121) Kunduz: Kalbad, 122) Aqtash, 123) Gultepa (Gurtepe); 124) Kandahar: Daman, 125) Arghestan, 126) Maruf, 127) Khakrez, 128) Mianeshin, 129) Nesh, 130) Shurabak, 131) Ghorak, 132) Reg/Shaga, 133) Takhtapul (temporary); 134) Kunar: Sawki, 135) Khas Kunar, 136) Nurgal, 137) Chapadara, 138) Narang wa Badil, 139) Narai, 140) Watapur, 141) Sirkanay, 142) Bar Kunar, 143) Marawara, 144) Ghaziabad, 145) Dangam, 146) Shaigal, 147) Shiltan; 148) Laghman: Dawlat Shah, 149) Badpakh; 150) Logar: Kharwar, 151) Khoshi, 152) Azra; 153) Maidan Wardak: Behsud One, 154) Dai Mirdad; 155) Nuristan: Nurgram, 156) Kamdesh, 157) Manduwal, 158) Waigal, 159) Barg-e Matal, 160) Wama, 161) Du Ab; 162) Nimruz: Chahr Burjak, 163) Khashrud, 164) Asl-e Chakhansur, 165) Kang, 166) Delaram; 167): Herat: Farsi, 168) Chesht-e Sharif, 169) Pusht-e Koh, 170) Koh-e Zur; 171) Helmand: Rig (Khaneshin), 172) Dishu, 173) Washir, 174) Marja, 175) Nawa Mesh.

There are 85 districts with seven seats. They are: 1) Bamyan: Yakaolang One; 2) Badakhshan: Darayem, 3) Yaftal Sufla, 4) Shahr-e Bozorg, 5) Raghistan, 6) Khash; 7) Baghlan: Khost wa Farang, 8) Dahana-ye Ghori, 9) Baraka; 10) Balkh: Kushenda, 11) Nahr-e Shahi, 12) Chaharkent, 13) Zari, 14) Shurtepa; 15) Parwan: Jabal ul-Seraj, 16) Sayyedkhel, 17) Shinwari, 18) Surkh Parsa; 19) Paktika: Urgun; 20) Panjshir: Hesa-ye Awal/Khenj; 21) Takhar: Eshkamesh, 22) Farkhar, 23) Yangi Qala, 24) Warsaj; 25) Jawzjan: Darzab, 26) Mengjak, 27) Faizabad, 28) Mardyan; 29) Khost: Tanai, 30) Manduzai/Ismailkhel, 31) Terezai/Alisher, 32) Musakhel; 33) Zabul: Shajoy, 34) Dai Chopan; 35) Sar-e Pul: Gusfandi, 36) Sayyad, 37) Balkhab, 38) Suzma Qala; 39) Samangan: Dara-ye Suf Bala, 40) Ruy-e Du Ab, 41) Hazrat Sultan, 42) Khuram wa Sarbagh; 43) Ghazni: Gilan, 44) Muqur, 45) Deh Yak, 46) Waghaz; 47) Ghor: Shahrak, 48) Tolak; 49) Faryab: Kohestan, 50) Belcharagh, 51) Khwaja Sabs Posh Wali, 52) Dawlatabad, 53) Qurghan, 54) Andkhoy, 55) Ghormach; 56) Farah: Purchaman, 57) Gulestan, 58) Pusht-e Rud; 59) Kabul: Bagrami, 60) Sarobi, 61) Deh Sabz, 62) Mir Bacha Kot; 63) Kapisa: Kohestan Two; 64) Kunduz: Aliabad; 65) Kandahar: Arghandab, 66) Maiwand, 67) Shah Wali Kot, 68) Dand; 69) Kunar: Dara-ye Pech; 70) Logar: Charkh; 71) Maidan Wardak: Narkh, 72) Jalrez, 73) Jaghatu; 74): Herat: Karkh, 75) Zendajan, 76) Kohsan, 77) Adraskan, 78) Kushk-e Kohna, 79) Zer Koh, 80) Zawal, 81) Shindand; 82) Helmand: Baghran, 83) Sangin, 84) Musa Qala, 85) Nawzad.

There are 45 districts with nine seats. They are: 1) Badghis: Qades, 2) Jund, 3) Ab Kamari; 4) Bamyan: Panjab; 5) Badakhshan: Kashm, 6) Argo; 7) Baghlan: Nahrin, 8) Dushi; 9) Balkh: Chemtal, 10) Chahr Bolak, 11) Khulm, 12) Dehdadi; 13) Takhar: Chah Ab, 14) Khwaja Ghar; 15) Jawzjan: Aqcha;16) Khost: Sabari (Yaqubi); 17) Sar-e Pul: Kohestanat; 18) Samangan: Dara-ye Suf Payin; 19) Nawur, 20 Malestan; 21) Ghor: Taiwara; 22) Faryab: Shirin Tagab, 23) Gurziwan, 24) Almar; 25) Farah: Bala Bulok; 26) Kabul: Shakardara, 27) Qarabagh; 28) Kapisa: Tagab, 29) Kohistan One; 30) Kunduz: Dasht-e Archi, 31) Chahardara, 32) Qala-ye Zal; 33) Kandahar: Panjwayi, 34) Zherai; 35) Laghman: Alishing; 36) Logar: Baraki Barak, 37) Muhammad Agha; 38) Maidan Wardak: Chak-e Wardak; 39) Herat: Gulran, 40 Ghorian, 41) Oba; 42) Helmand: Nawa-ye Barakzai, 43) Nad Ali, 44) Garmsir, 45) Kajaki.

And there are 31 districts with 11 seats which are: 1) Badghis: Bala Murghab; 2) Bamyan: Waras; 3) Baghlan: Baghlan-e Jadid; 4) Balkh: Balkh, 5) Sholgara, 6) Dawlatabad; 7) Parwan: Bagram, 8) Siahgerd/Ghorband; 9) Takhar: Rustaq; 10) Sar-e Pul: Sancharak; 11) Ghazni: Jaghori, 12) Qarabagh, 13) Andar; 14) Ghor: Lal wa Sar Jangal, 15) Pasaband; 16) Faryab: Pashtun Kot, 17) Qaisar; 18) Kabul: Paghman; 19) Kapisa: Nejrab; 20) Kunduz: Hazrat Imam Saheb, 21) Khanabad; 22) Kandahar: Spin Boldak; 23) Laghman: Qarghayi, 24) Alingar; 25) Maidan Wardak: Markaz-e Behsud, 26) Sayyedabad; Herat: 27) Enjil, 28) Guzara (Nezam Shahid), 29) Keshk/Rubat Sangi, 30) Pashtun Zarghun; 32) Helmand: Nahr-e Seraj.

(5) The more than 1000 delegates for the ELJ were chosen in a combined selection/election (entesab/entekhab) process. There were district assembles held in which all ethnic, political and social groups were supposed to be represented and which agreed, by acclamation, who the district’s representatives would be. These were then sent to the provincial centre to decide, in a secret ballot, who the province’s delegates would be. The numbers of representatives and delegates were based on a population-related quota system.

(6) The district list of the ELJ is in the author’s archive. Under today’s circumstances, it would contain only 337 districts, as Panjshir and Daykundi were not yet provinces, and their later provincial capitals would be classed as districts. (Provincial capitals will not have district elections, but, also at some point in the future and again, according to the constitution, municipal elections.)

(7) For example, the following provinces were created:

Paktika latest by 1970s (no exact year available) from eastern parts of Ghazni (called Katawaz) and the southern parts of Paktia

Sarepul, the former southern half of Jawzjan, by the PDPA in 1988

Khost from the eastern of Paktia between 1988 and 1992

Nuristan from the northern halves of Laghman and Kunar, apparently under the mujehedin government of the Islamic State of Afghanistan in the 1990s

Panjshir from the northeastern part of Parwan in 2004 (around 1973, it temporarily belonged to Kapisa)

Daykundi (the northern, Hazara-populated half of Uruzgan) also in 2004.

Particularly unsafe districts have also been shifted, similar to Ghormach, for example Shindand and Farsi from Farah to Herat, Darzab (then still including Qushtepe – the area in which, until recently self-proclaimed Islamic State groups operated, see AAN reporting here) from Faryab to Jawzjan and Kaldar and Kholm from Samangan to Balkh (under the PDPA) and Azra from Paktia to Logar (under Karzai).

There are also longstanding demands to create a ‘Turkmen’ province in northern Jawzjan or another ‘Hazara’ province from Ghazni’s western districts. This is reflected in the current discussions about splitting the provincial constituency of Ghazni for the Wolesi Jirga election into three, to ensure better, ethnically-balanced representation (AAN analysis here).

(8) A reader, Roger Helms, has kindly directed us to a collection of maps that he has compiled and put on the ArcGIS On Line platform and show Afghanistan’s provinces and districts over time (see here) which, among others, includes a 1973 map with then 29 provinces and 325 and one from 1998 with 32 provincesand 329 districts. Separately, he has worked existing CSO district data into a list that shows the current situation (here). It corresponds both with the CSO/IDLJ list and confirms our findings where the list had the gaps described above.

In between the 1973 and the 1998 maps falls an undated district list from the mid-1980s – ie before the creation of Khost and Sarepul by the PDPA regime in 1988 – that is in this author’s archive. It also shows 29 provinces, but a significantly lower number of 230 districts (not counting the provincial capitals). The difference between this list and the two mentioned maps is that it only contains districts (wuluswalis), not also the subdistricts (elaqadaris) which then, however, also still existed. Elaqadaris were dropped as a level of administrative units after 2001; they were either upgraded to districts or merged with or into other administrative units.

 

 

Lockheed Martin has secured a USD480 million, sole source undefinitised contract from the US Air Force Life Cycle Management Center for the rapid prototyping of the Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW). Officially published by the US Department of Defense (DoD) on 13 August, the ARRW contract

Poland’s Armament Inspectorate has launched a tender with revised requirements for the procurement of 4×4 multipurpose vehicles. Poland is seeking to purchase 859 soft-skin vehicles and 41 armoured variants in 2019–22. The contract includes an option for an additional 812

Event Six people were killed in Burkina Faso’s Est province when a police-escorted convoy returning from the Boungou gold mine was ambushed on 11 August. Four gendarmes and a civilian died in the attack; the lead vehicle exploded after driving over an improvised explosive device (IED)

An arms trade agreement signed in October 2010 by Russia and Benin has taken effect, the Interfax-AVN news agency reported on 15 August. The report did not identify the specific equipment that Benin is receiving, but quoted the agreement as saying that, “The Russian side has the right to

The arrival of the remaining 56 of 60 M109A5 155 mm self-propelled artillery systems granted by the US Government to the Brazilian Army as excess defense articles (EDA) in a letter of offer and acceptance (LOA) in January 2018 is expected to take place in December, the service told Jane’s .

The Chilean Navy’s Marine Corps has ordered a Mavic Pro four-engine, rotary-wing unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) from Chinese manufacturer DJI to address a security requirement following an open tender. The UAV, which has no infrared capacity but features good low-light performance, will be

Key Points China announces establishment of ‘key laboratory’ dedicated to developing blockchain technologies Move part of China’s increasing efforts to create a blockchain ecosystem to support sectors including defence China’s Ministry of Industry and Information

AT LEAST two people were killed and six others wounded when an improvised explosive device (IED), emplaced by unidentified militants, detonated in the predominantly Shia Muslim Sadr City district of Iraq's capital Baghdad on 14 August, Reuters reported. No group immediately claimed responsibility

Key Points Mass protests increase the likelihood of government reshuffle, if not the prime minister's resignation. Anti-government protests are likely to continue as long as Liviu Dragnea remains leader of the governing Social Democratic Party (PSD) and the PSD maintains its controversial

Key Points The National Congress Party (NCP)’s nomination of President Omar al-Bashir to stand for re-election in 2020 is most likely designed to entrench his legitimacy and lend early support to his bid for re-election. Should Bashir stand for re-election, as appears likely given his

Uganda revealed its armoured vehicle production facility for the first time on 8 August, when it was officially opened by President Yoweri Museveni. The Ugandan People’s Defence Force (UPDF) said the Nyoka Conversion Project is located at the Magamaga Barracks in the Mayuge district, east of

The US Naval Sea Systems Command awarded General Dynamics National Steel and Shipbuilding Company a USD147.7 million firm-fixed-price contract to overhaul and upgrade the Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser USS Cowpens (CG 63) on 14 August. This long-term availability will include a

Key Points Mattis said he sees future opportunities with Brazil for advanced research, particularly in space Brazil has a healthy appetite for enhanced space partnerships, but regulatory problems loom US Secretary of Defense James Mattis sees future opportunities for advanced research with

Turkey Would Have Operated Both the F-35 and the Russian Engineered S-400 Missile System. On Monday, August 13, 2018, U.S. President Donald Trump signed into law the new John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). Named as a tribute to Arizona Senator John McCain, who is afflicted with brain cancer, the bill includes provisions […]

U.S. Air Force F-22 deployed to Poland. Five jets USAF F-22s have arrived at Powidz Airbase, Poland, this week. On Aug. 15, along with a C-130J that acted as a camera-ship, four stealth aircraft celebrated the 100th Anniversary of Polish Independence and Armed Forces Day by participating in a multi-aircraft flyover in Warsaw (most probably, […]

Americas

The Air Force is quickly moving ahead with its hypersonic missile program. The service is contracting Lockheed Martin’s Missiles and Fire Control division to move ahead with the critical design review and relevant testing of its air-launched rapid response weapon (ARRW). The undefinitized contract has a value of $480 million. The ARRW is one of two current US hypersonic missile research programs. Once completed the ARRW will be able to travel at least five times the speed of sound. Current information suggests that the missile will achieve hypersonic speeds by the use of scramjets, which use an aircraft’s forward motion to shovel air at supersonic speeds into the engine, causing thrust. The hypersonic scramjet will be carried aloft by a large aircraft as a wing-mounted missile. Once the parent aircraft is going fast enough that the scramjet will ignite, it launches the missile. Hypersonic weapons will likely be engineered as “kinetic energy” strike weapons, meaning they will not use explosives but rather rely upon sheer speed and the force of impact to destroy targets. The Air Force is currently investing over one billion dollars to aggressively expedite the ARRW’s and HACSW’s development schedule. Work will be performed at Lockheed’s facility in Orlando, Florida and is expected to be completed by November 30th, 2021.

The Navy’s Blue Angels squadron is set to receive new wings. Boeing is being awarded with a firm-fixed-price delivery order valued at $17 million. The contract provides for necessary work needed to convert nine F/A-18E and two F/A-18F aircraft into a Blue Angel configuration. The Blue Angels were formed in 1946 following WWII as a public relations and recruiting tool to inspire airshow crowds to pursue excellence in all of their endeavors and as a recruiting asset to attract potential candidates to join the US Navy. Work is likely to include removing the jet’s 20mm Vulcan cannon, enhancing the the aircraft’s fuel systems for prolonged inverted flight, adding an oil tank and extra plumbing to the Super Hornet’s exhaust for the smoke system, as well as other smaller changes. Flight controls on the Blue Angels’ F/A-18’s are usually modified to make formation and inverted flight easier. The flight control stick between the pilots’ legs uses a spring to exert 40-pounds of forward bias force meaning the pilot constantly exerts slight rearward pressure compared to a normal Hornet to maintain level flight. Work will be performed at Boeing’s facility in St. Louis, Missouri and is scheduled for completion by December, 2021.

Ceradyne is being tapped to support the US Army’s newly developed lightweight helmet. The $34.6 million contract modification provides for the incorporation of additional systems and components in the Integrated Head Protection System (IHPS). The helmet is capable of providing a larger area of protection for the head and face. The new head protection system is also equipped with accessories, such as mandibles, visors, night vision goggle attachment devices, rails and a modular ballistic appliqué that provides protection against fragmentation, 9mm and rifle fire. The Army intends to field 7,000 units of IHPS to separate brigades during the FY2018 before moving to full-rate production. Work will be performed at the company’s location in Irvine, California.

The US Army is procuring a number of Inflatable Satellite Antenna (ISA) systems. GATR Technologies will provide the service with the systems, kits, spares and associated training under this $522,4 million contract modification. GATR’s ground-mounted antennas look like giant beach balls with tie-downs to point them in the right direction. The inflatable satellite terminal reduces the tactical footprint of large-aperture satellite communications systems and enables portable high-bandwidth communications in remote areas. The ISA is designed for military ground use in remote areas with harsh weather and where the movement and installation of large standard rigid satellite antennas is challenging. The main advantage of the terminal is portability, the company noted. When the ball is deflated, it rolls up (with the dish inside) like a sleeping bag and weighs 18 pounds. The antenna bag, blower, hoses and plates fit in one transportable case. The modification brings the contract’s total face value to more than $960 million. Work locations and funding will be determined with each order. The contract has an estimated completion date of September 26th, 2023.

Middle East & Africa

Iranian media reports that the Islamic Republic has a new anti-ship ballistic missile in its arsenal. Dubbed Fateh Mobin, the new missile is based on the existing Fateh 110 missile design. The Mobin was recently tested by Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The missile flew more than 100 miles on a flight path over the strait to a test range in the Iranian desert. The Fateh 110’s development started in 1995 and was first tested in 2001. According to CSIS the Fateh 110 already comes in two anti-ship variants. In 2014 the IRGC displayed the Hormuz-1 and Hormuz-2 equipped with anti-radiation capabilities for attacking radar systems. Another anti-ship variant of the Fateh is the Khalij Fars, which does have the electro-optical seeker required to improve accuracy enough to potentially hit a moving target. Defense Minister Gen. Hatami recently underlined Iran’s determination to further enhance its defense power in all fields “despite sanctions, pressures and psychological war by enemies”. A message clearly directed towards an US and regional audience.

Turkey may lose a $1.5 billion defense deal as the diplomatic crisis with the US escalates. The contract in question is Pakistan’s planned acquisition of 30 Turkish-made T129 ATAK helicopter gunships. The T129 is produced by Turkish Aerospace Industries but partly uses US-made engine parts for which TAI will need US export licenses. If those licenses are not issued Turkey cannot legally export the gunships to Pakistan. The helicopter is powered by two CTS800-4A turboshaft engines that are manufactured by LHTEC, a joint venture between the American firm Honeywell and the British company Rolls-Royce. Turkey and Pakistan signed a deal July 13th for 30 T129 ATAK helicopter gunships.

Europe

The German Navy plans to equip its K130 corvettes with the Skeldar V-200 rotary-wing unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). The Navy is procuring two V-200s and will start to operate them by the end of 2019. The Skeldar is developed by Saab, is capable of being launched from the deck of any vessel, and delivers real-time intelligence and surveillance. The Skeldar V-200’s major mission capabilities include surveillance, reconnaissance, target attainment and transfer of target data to strike platforms. The typical payload configuration includes EO/IR gimbals, a laser pointer, laser range finder (LRF), synthetic aperture radar (SAR), ground moving target indicator (GMTI), electronic warfare, AIS transponder, searchlight, megaphone and cargo hook. The German Navy has its K130s deployed to a variety of naval missions where an increased reconnaissance capability is direly needed. During combat operations the V-200 will assist in guiding ship-launched RBS15 Mk3 missiles to their target.

Asia-Pacific

Vietnam is exporting three radar systems to Laos. The VRS-2DM radar system is produced by Viettel and provides information to air-defense troops and can perform airspace and flight management tasks. Laos purchased the system as means to boost its combat capability.

The government of Australia is set to receive a new engine for one of its P-8 Poseidon aircraft at a cost of $12.8 million. The Poseidon is powered by a CFM56-7B27AE engine is produced by CFM International belongs to the family of high-bypass turbofan aircraft engines. The CFM56-7 first ran on 21 April 1995 and has a takeoff thrust range of 19,500–27,300lb. It powers commercial Next-Generation 737s and military versions of the airframe including the AWACS and C-40 Clipper. Work will be performed at multiple international locations, including Villaroche, France and Durham, North Carolina. Delivery of the engine is scheduled for September 2019.

Today’s Video

Watch: Iran unveils ‘Mobin’ missile

Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) has been awarded a contract by the Israeli Ministry of Defence (MoD) to supply the Barak-8 weapon system for the Israeli Navy’s four future Magen-class corvettes. Designated Sa’ar 6 in Israeli service, the new corvettes are being acquired under the

Beijing has heavily criticised the US National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2019 (FY 2019) for containing what it referred to as “negative content related to China” along with plans to strengthen Taiwan’s force readiness and military capabilities. Referring to