Defence`s Feeds

RSAF F-16C/Ds
(click to view full)

In September 2013, Singapore confirmed its much-anticipated intent to upgrade its F-16C/Ds with improved radars and other changes. By January 2014, that was a published DSCA request. There’s no firm timeline just yet, but the proposal is part of wider-ranging military improvements underway in Singapore. It’s also seen as an early example to many other F-16 operators around the world, who respect Singapore’s as a discerning buyer and may wish to do the same thing.

That decision is expected to launch at least 2 fierce competitions. One will be between Lockheed Martin and BAE Systems. The other will be between Raytheon and Northrop Grumman.

RSAF: The Bigger Picture

F-5S on highway
(click to view full)

After the 2004 sale to Thailand of the RSAF’s initial handful of F-16A/B fighters, the RSAF became an all Block 52 force, built with fighters accepted between 1998 – 2004. Their planes aren’t entirely standard set. The long dorsal spine on many F-16Ds holds extra electronic countermeasures, and the planes reportedly carry a number of Israeli systems within, including DASH-III helmet mounted displays.

Singapore has about 14 F-16C/Ds based in the USA for training, and another 48 F-16C/Ds in Singapore at Changi AB and Tengah AB. Current plans indicate an intent to upgrade up to 60 planes at about $40.5 million per plane.

Basing will also change. In the near future, they plan to expand Changi and Tengah and consolidate around both facilities, while closing Paya Lebar AB. Paya Lebar’s F-15SGs, upgraded F-5S interceptors, and C-130 transports will go elsewhere, though the 40 or so F-5s are due for phase out in the near future.

RSAF F-16D-52
(click to view full)

There is some question as to whether the F-5s will be replaced, though a March 2013 announcement that Singapore would buy more F-15SGs seems to indicate at least partial near-term replacement. The rest of that question hinges on Singapore’s timeline for acquiring F-35s. If they’re bought soon, they’ll grow the fleet, effectively replacing the F-5S with some F-16C/Ds. If Singapore postpones their F-35 buy, they will pay less per plane, and the F-35s will become de facto replacements for the F-16+ fleet as they age out. Upgrading the F-16s might suggest to some that Singapore intends to delay the F-35s, especially since they recently elected to expand their F-15SG fleet instead of making an expected announcement about 12 F-35Bs. In his September 2013 statement, Minister for Defence Dr. Ng Eng Hen would say only that Singapore continues to evaluate the F-35’s suitability “in meeting our long-term security needs to further modernise our fighter fleet and replace our older aircraft.”

Other Changes

Aster-30
(click to view full)

Singapore’s consolidation into just 2 main air bases adds operational risk to their future fleet, but protection is also being improved. Beyond Singapore’s confirmed F-16 upgrades and new F-15SGs, new IAI Gulfstream G550 CAEW jets have improved their advance airborne warning.

On the ground, new mobile Spyder air defense systems from RAFAEL offer a more modern, longer-range complement to the legacy Rapier systems from Britain. At the top tier, MBDA’s long-range Aster-30 missiles will soon replace Raytheon’s MIM-23 I-Hawks on land, offering Singapore the ability to intercept short range ballistic missiles as well as aircraft, cruise missiles, etc. Singapore’s Formidable Class frigates already use a combination of Aster-15 and Aster-30 missiles, so the land-based Aster-30 buy will draw on an existing support network.

None of Singapore’s immediate neighbors can match this array, and Singapore’s qualitative advantage is large enough that it’s very unlikely anyone would test it. The city-state is extremely serious about its defense, with a long history of strong spending in this area. That well-known commitment, and the visibility of its strategic position, ensures that Singapore’s defense choices get attention far beyond their immediate neighborhood.

The Competitions

RACR
click for video

Singapore has a number of options with respect to their F-16s.

Contractor. First of all, Lockheed Martin and BAE can be expected to compete hard for the upgrade work. Lockheed Martin is the manufacturer, but Britain has picked up significant F-16 upgrade wins in the USA and around the world.

AESA. Then there’s the radar question. The new radars will use advanced AESA technology, improving range/ discrimination by 2x – 3x, offering entirely new modes of operation, and sharply reducing maintenance costs.

NGC’s SABR
click for video

Lockheed Martin recently announced that Northrop Grumman’s SABR radar would be the cornerstone of its F-16V offering, which was unveiled at the 2012 Singapore air show. The F-16V can be bought as an upgrade, or as new fighters. Modernized American and Taiwanese F-16s will also use SABR.

On the other hand, South Korea picked Raytheon’s RACR radar for their advanced F-16 upgrade, and Singapore already flies with related Raytheon AN/APG-63v3 AESA radars in its 20 new F-15SGs. If Singapore also picks RACR for its F-16s, in order to take advantage of common software and radar mode development, it will give Raytheon a significant and much-needed boost in the global F-16 refit competition.

There’s also the non-US option of using the Israeli ELM-2052 AESA, but the US reportedly took protectionist measures and threatened to cut off F-16 support if Israel introduced that radar to its own F-16s. Export to Singapore seems unlikely.

Contracts & Key Events

RSAF F-16D-52
(click to view full)

March 21/19: Weapons System Support KT Consulting won an $11.9 million firm-fixed-price task order for F-16 Weapons System support. The contract involves a Foreign Military Sale to Singapore. The F-16 Fighting Falcon is a single-engine, supersonic multirole fighter. Early fighters could be armed with up to six AIM-9 Sidewinder, heat-seeking, short-range air-to-air missiles (AAM), and radar guided AIM-7 Sparrow medium-range AAMs. The recent versions of the aircraft support AIM-120 AMRAAM. The Republic of Singapore Air Force operates 62 F-16 Fighting Falcons, all of which are advanced F-16C/D block 52 aircraft. These aircraft are equipped with state-of the-art armament, including AIM-120 AMRAAM as well as presumably the Israeli Python 4 missile linked to a DASH-3 Helmet Mounted Sight. Work will take place at Luke Air Force Base in Arizona and Holloman Air Force Base in New Mexico and is scheduled to be finished by March 31, 2024. Fiscal 2019 operations and maintenance funds in the amount of $4,435,581 and Singapore National Funds in the amount of $34,969 are being obligated at the time of award.

December 3/15: The US Department of Defense (DoD) has awarded a $914 million contract to Lockheed Martin to upgrade F-16 aircraft for the government of Singapore. The work is to be carried out at Fort Worth, Texas. The number of aircraft to be upgraded is unknown, but the DoD notified Congress that they had approved the sale of upgrades for 60 fighters in 2014. The Singapore Air Force announced earlier this year that it was planning a major overhaul of its current fleet, with enhancements including laser-designated JDAM munitions, air-to-air weapons, datalink capability and helmet mounted displays, in addition to an Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar system.

July 6/15: Singapore’s Ministry of Defense (MINDEF) has released more information on its plans to upgrade the RSAF’s fleet of F-16C/D fighters. The upgrades will take place in phases from 2016 onward, with various capability enhancements planned. These include laser-designated JDAM munitions, air-to-air weapons, datalink capability and helmet mounted displays, as well as an Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar system, as per a previous DSCA request. The AESA system is thought to be the Northrop Grumman AN/APG-83 Scalable Agile Beam Radar (SABR) system. Singapore announced its intention to upgrade its F-16s in 2013, with Lockheed Martin seemingly tipped to win the upgrade contract.

March 19/15: Lockheed tipped to win. Singapore is reportedly close to signing a contract with Lockheed Martin to upgrade its F-16s, after a cancelled deal with BAE in November. The country initially confirmed its intention to upgrade the fleet in September 2013.

Feb 10/14: Boeing? Boeing DSS VP for business development and strategy Chris Raymond says that Boeing would be interested in bidding, if Singapore were to open their F-16 upgrade program to competition. Boeing is an unlikely competitor, given their thin record servicing and enhancing global F-15 fleets. Raymond cites their experience with the QF-16 conversion, and with other fighter and aircraft upgrades. They could also leverage an existing relationship with the RSAF, supporting their F-15SG fighters and AH-64D Apache helicopters.

Lockheed Martin has indicated that NGC’s SABR radar is their preferred choice for upgrades, and for new-build F-16Vs. BAE is tied to Raytheon’s RACR via their South Korean experience. Boeing doesn’t have an official allegiance, but their in-production fighters both carry Raytheon AESA radars, and there’s a RACR variant for F/A-18A-D upgrades. Sources: Aviation Week, “Boeing Could Bid On Singapore F-16s”.

Jan 14/14: DSCA. The US DSCA details Singapore’s official request to upgrade 60 F-16C/D+ Block 52 fighters to something like the F-16V standard, at a cost of up to $2.43 billion ($40.5 million per plane). That’s about 2/3 the cost of buying similar F-16E/F Block 60 aircraft new off of the production line.

Upgrades would include:

• 70 Active Electronically Scanned Array Radars (AESA). Note that no pick is being made here between Raytheon’s RACR (South Korea) or Northrop Grumman’s SABR (Taiwan, US ANG).
  
• 70 Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing Systems (JHMCS)
  
• 70 LN-260 Embedded Global Positioning System/Inertial Navigation Systems (GPS/INS)
  
• 70 APX-125 Advanced Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) Combined Interrogator Transponders
  
• 1 AIS Interface Test Adapters for software updates
  
• 1 Classified Computer Program Identification Numbers (CPINs)
  
• Site surveys and construction. Note that Singapore is busy consolidating its air bases after removing Paya Lebar.
  
• Also included: flight test of the new configuration; aircraft ferry services with aerial refueling support; a Joint Mission Planning System (JMPS); Modular Mission Computers, a software maintenance facility, cockpit multifunction displays, radios, secure communications, video recorders; maintenance, repair and return, aircraft and ground support equipment, spare and repair parts, tool and test equipment; engine support equipment, publications and technical documentation; personnel training and training equipment, and other forms of US Government and contractor support.

They also want a set of test weapons:

• 3 AIM-9X Block II Captive Air Training Missiles. Singapore already fields AIM-9X on its F-15SGs.
  
• 3 TGM-65G Maverick Missiles for testing and integration. GM-65K is the latest standard.
  
• 4 GBU-50 Guided Bomb Units (GBU) for testing and integration (2,000 pound laser-guided bunker-buster)
  
• 5 GBU-38 Joint Direct Attack Munitions for testing and integration (500 pound GPS)
  
• 3 CBU-105 (D-4)/B Sensor Fused Weapons for testing and integration (GPS anti-armor cluster bomb)
  
• 4 GBU-49 Enhanced Paveways for testing and integration (500 pound GPS/laser)
  
• 2 DSU-38 Laser Seekers for testing and integration
  
• 6 GBU-12 Paveway II, Guidance Control Units (used in 500 pound laser-guided)

Contractors aren’t mentioned specifically, implying that they’re still to be chosen by Singapore. In terms of overall priorities, Minister for Defence Dr. Ng Eng Hen said recently that the F-16 fleet’s condition and prospective upgrades meant that they were in “no particular hurry” to make an F-35 decision, though it’s a “serious consideration.” Sources: DSCA #13-67 | Defense News, “US: Singapore To Buy Upgrade For Its F-16 Fighter Jets”.

DSCA request: F-16 upgrades

Sept 16/13: Singapore’s Minister for Defence Dr. Ng Eng Hen’s Parliamentary reply confirms that Singapore has picked MBDA’s Aster-30 as its upper-tier air defense system on land, and will upgrade their F-16s. The planes will be refitted with new electronics and systems, and the RSAF also plans to extend their service lives. Sources: Singapore MINDEF, “Reply by Minister for Defence Dr Ng Eng Hen to Parliamentary Question on Relocation of Paya Lebar Air Base”.

Additional Readings

• YouTube – New Lockheed Martin F-16V Singapore Airshow 2012 HD. By LMCO.

• DID – South Korea Looking to Upgrade its KF-16 Fighters. They picked Raytheon’s RACR AESA radar.

• DID – Import or Die: Taiwan’s (Un?)Stalled Force Modernization. Taiwan’s F-16s will carry Northrop Grumman’s SABR radar, picked for them by the USAF.

• DID – Singapore’s RSAF Decides to Fly Like An Eagle. In April 2013, it became clear that Singapore would grow their F-15SG fleet again, instead of buying 12 F-35Bs.

News & Views

• Fort Worth Star-Telegram (June 11/14) – At Alliance, BAE Systems challenges Lockheed on F-16 upgrades.

• Aviation Week (Feb 3/14) – Fast-Changing Trends In Asia Fighter Market

• DID (Sept 18/13) – Singapore’s Steps: Long-Range Aster-30 Defensive Missiles on Land & Sea.

• Lockheed Martin (Feb 15/12) – Lockheed Martin’s Fighting Falcon Evolves With New F-16V

• Defense News (March 22/10) – [F-5] Retirement or Replacement?

• DTI (Jan-Feb. 2008) – Target Acquisition: MAST Highlights Missile Defense Concepts. Says that the Formidable Class carries both Aster-15s and Aster-30s, along with the Herakles active radar and Sylver A50 launchers.

AAN wishes a happy new year and joyful Nawruz to all its readers. Afghans and many others across the region will be celebrating the first day of 1398, also the first day of spring, with family visits, special food and picnics. In Kabul, some will go to the Sakhi Shrine, while many others will congregate in Mazar-e Sharif at the shrine there. In both places, there is a Jahenda Bala (Raising of the Banner) ceremony on Nawruz when a banner attributed to Hazrat Ali is raised. In Mazar also, there is the special 40-day Mela-ye Gul-e Surkh (Red Flower Feast) celebration of wild tulips. Here, at AAN, we have been thinking about our best and worst experiences of Nawruz. Here, we share some stories from colleagues and friends; mainly, people remembered the good years.

Shopping for new clothes ahead of Nawruz, Kot-e Sangi, Kabul (Photo: Ali Sina Sorush, 19 March 2019)

Shazia

The best Nawruz in my life was the one when I was ten years old. It was the first time my father took me and my brother to the Sakhi Shrine in Kart-e Sakhi, Kabul. I saw many small girls and boys who were riding on wooden horses and a Ferris wheel. My father bought me a tambourine and I was so happy. I played my tambourine from Kart-e Sakhi all the way home. I had a lot of fun. Nawruz Mubarak.

Kate 

It wasn’t my best or my worst Nawruz, but the New Year of 1380 (2001) was revelatory. I had been expelled from Kabul by the Taleban, but was still working as the BBC’s Afghanistan correspondent out of Islamabad. By chance, I encountered a host of Afghan families celebrating Nawruz in one of the public parks. My goodness, I thought, so this is what ‘normal’ Afghan culture can be like without all the Taleban restrictions and bans: families picnicking, enjoying the sun and the flowers, men and women sitting together, children playing, lots of food, all relaxed and, most amazingly for me, having fun. Nawruz Mubarak.

Najib

As far as I know, every Nawruz has been the best for me because it’s one of the times in the year when all family members, my brothers and sisters and their children, come to my home. That’s even though I’m not the oldest child. It’s because my parents live with me. We all sit in one room, having our lunch and dinner together. So Nawruz is a time of getting together, having fun and enjoying life all together. Nawruz Mubarak.

Nahid

I have one experience of Nawruz that was mixed. It was 2002 and I had gone to Sakhi Shrine to celebrate Nawruz. I saw a man selling balloons of all colours and thought that all his wealth was invested in those balloons, which he was hoping to sell. He was standing a little far from me, but to my surprise no one was buying from him. And then suddenly, some of his balloonsjust flew up high into the air and he only had a few left. That man was so sad and looked so disappointed. So, in order to make him a bit happier, I bought the rest of his balloons for my nephews. That year, Nawruz was a very good time for me as security was really good compared to previous years when the Taleban were in power and we could not celebrate the festival. Happy New Year!

Zia 

My best Nawruz was in 2003 (1382) when I’d just come from Iran and wasn’t very aware of the traditions in Afghanistan. A few days before, I was happily receiving good wishes from many people and getting ready for the new year. But every day, I saw propaganda against Nawruz in social media and  heard the same from the loudspeakers in the mosques. They were saying that celebrating Nawruz – haft mewa (seven fruits) and wearing new clothes, as well as visiting family and relatives, was haram (unlawful). It was very painful for me because I’d never encountered or faced such issues before. But now I don’t care. I just celebrate Nawruz with my family, friends and relatives. Nawruz Mubarak!

Reza 

Nawruz in 1393 (2014) was for me initially horrible but turned to joy. I’d left my family in Herat to go to Kabul and then on to Mazar, in both places trying to get a Tajikistan visa. Disappointingly, I didn’t get one in either city! I’d planned to attend a research exchange meeting in Khujand University in Tajikistan, as well as get a feel of Nawruz there. However, I was stuck in Mazar. But that didn’t turn out to be too badly. I soon discovered a huge crowd of relatives and some friends, chatting, having fun and eating, especially haft miwa, and exploring, for the first time, that celebratory city and its impressive mila-ye gul-e surkh when tulip flowers, especially the red ones, grow in the plains and over the hills around the city. Wishing you a happy Nawruz!

Muzhary

We can’t yet say how the new year will start, but I hope 1398 will be recorded as the year of enduring peace in Afghanistan. In my area, there has been less fighting recently – apart from night raids by government and United States forces. I think this shows that peace is coming to Afghanistan after four decades of war. Leaders meeting to discuss peace also gives me hope that we’ll have a happier year in 1398. I hope we see a peaceful Afghanistan that will allow all Afghans to live without war and threats, when we receive no news about attacks to spoil our joy, happiness and brotherhood. 

AAN dispatches about Nawruz from earlier years include our look at the special New Year foods, at poetry, celebrating Nawruz and springtime and the debate among religious conservatives over whether Muslims should celebrate this holiday.

The Italian Air Force F-35 Lightning II aircraft are pretty busy these days. From Mar. 11 to 15, six F-35A stealth aircraft of the 13° Gruppo (Squadron) belonging to the 32° Stormo (Wing) based at [...]

American AR-7 Explorer Survival Rifle

ABSTRACT
The European Union faces an increasingly challenging security environment, with a climate of international instability and a level of tension not seen since the end of the Cold War. Repeated chemical attacks by both State and non-state actors in the context of the Syrian conflict, the Novichok attack in Salisbury and the disruption of two ricine terror plots in Germany and in France in 2018 came all as stark reminders that the threat remains real and that Member States could be affected. In this context, the European Union (EU) continues to strengthen its capacities in the field of CBRN preparedness and response. The use of EU mechanisms and Member States' military assets is one of the possibilities for strengthening prevention capacities that must be explored more thoroughly.
Further information
EU preparedness against CBRN weapons
Source : © European Union, 2019 - EP

Stratofortress bombers are part of a Task Force of 6 “Buffs”: the largest American bomber deployment to RAF Fairford since the Iraq war in 2003. On Mar. 18, 2019, a U.S. Air Force B-52 bomber, [...]

The European Defence Agency (EDA) today (19 March) published the three 2019 calls for proposals for the EU’s Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR).

The work programme includes the following calls/topics:

• Electromagnetic Spectrum Dominance: Combined radar, communications, and electronic warfare functions based on European Active Electronically Scanned Arrays for military applications (PADR-EMS-03-2019);
• Future Disruptive Defence Technologies: 

       o  Emerging Game-changers (PADR-FDDT-EMERGING-03-2019); 
       o  Challenging the future (PADR-FDDT-OPEN-03-2019);

• Unmanned Systems: Interoperability standards for military unmanned systems (PADR-US-03-2019).

Details about the calls and participation conditions can be found here. 

The Preparatory Action on Defence Research is funded by the European Union. The decision on the work programme for 2019 and on the financing of the 'Preparatory action on Defence research, authorising the use of unit costs under the preparatory action was adopted by the European Commission on 19 March 2019.
 

Info & Brokerage Day on 11 April 2019 

Following the publication of the 2019 calls and two successful editions in the previous years, EDA and the European Commission will organise the third Info & Brokerage Day on the PADR. The event will take place on 11 April 2019 in Brussels. 

Registration for the Info & Brokerage Day is now open. 

The Info & Brokerage Day aims at providing industry, research entities and other interested defence stakeholders with first-hand information on the 2019 PADR calls for proposals.

EDA and European Commission experts will provide participants with detailed explanations of the 2019 PADR topics, the rules and conditions for participation in the calls for proposals, as well as with the modalities and access to the Funding & Tender Opportunities Portal. A brokerage session with b2b meetings will allow participants to exchange the views and find potential future consortia partners. 
 

More information:

• Preparatory Action on Defence Research (EDA project page)
• PADR Info & Brokerage Day 2019
• European Commission financial decision on PADR 2019 

On 13-14 March 2019, the first ad hoc meeting of the EDA Renewable Energy Sources and Technologies Working Group was hosted in Vienna by the Austrian Energy Agency, as coordinator of the Concerted Action on Renewable Energy Sources (CA-RES). MOD representatives from Austria, Belgium, France, Ireland, and Slovenia participated in the meeting.

The purpose was to develop further the deliverables on renewable energy as part of the second phase of the Consultation Forum for Sustainable Energy in the Defence and Security Sector (CF SEDSS II) including specific project proposals on hydrogen fuel cells, self-sufficient military bases, technology feasibility assessments, energy performance contracting, and energy storage. 

It was also an opportunity to strengthen civilian-military interactions through the relationship between CF SEDSS II and CA-RES, both of which are funded by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme. CA-RES is a structured and confidential dialogue between national authorities responsible for the implementation of the Renewable Energy Directive and is co-ordinated by the Austrian Energy Agency. 
  

About CF SEDSS II

CF SEDSS is a European Commission initiative managed by the EDA. It aims at bringing together experts from the defence and energy sectors to share information and best practices on improving energy management, energy efficiency, the use of renewable energy as well increasing the protection and resilience of defence energy-related critical infrastructures. On 20 October 2017, the second phase of the Consultation Forum (CF SEDSS II) was launched. This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme, and the agreement is between the EASME executive agency and the EDA. The contract was signed on 16 October 2017 for 22 months, expiring on August 2019. 

Based on the foundations laid during the first phase of the Consultation Forum (2015-2017), the second phase has been further expanded to cover the following interrelated subjects through three main working groups (including sub-working groups): WG 1: Energy Management including Energy Efficiency (Sub-WG1: Energy Management and Sub-WG2: Energy Efficiency; WG 2: Renewable Energy Sources and Technologies; WG 3: Protection of Critical Energy Infrastructure and one cross-cutting theme: Finance.
 

More information:

• CF SEDSS II
• Concerted Action on Renewable Energy Sources

 

The SEDE committee meeting will take place on Tuesday 2nd April, from 14:30 - 18:30 in Brussels (room ASP 3E2).

Organisations or interest groups who wish to apply for access to the European Parliament will find the relevant information below.

Further information
Watch the meeting
Access rights for interest group representatives
Source : © European Union, 2019 - EP

Combat Aircraft Magazine Editor Tracks Down Men Who Shot Now-Famous F-117 Videos. Noted aviation journalist Jamie Hunter recently traveled to the western United States to track down two of the witnesses to last month’s sensational [...]

South African MILKOR MGL Repeating Grenade Launcher

EA-6B 162230/CY-02 will be on display at the Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum, Washington DC. Last week, the last U.S. Marine Corps Prowler squadron, Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron 2 (VMAQ-2), was formally deactivated. [...]

American Hawk Engineering MM-1 Repeating Grenade Launcher

We went to Decimomannu airbase to observe the Italian F-35s at work. Last month, six Italian Air Force F-35As deployed to Decimomannu airbase, in Sardinia, for a 3-week deployment at the local-based RSSTA (Reparto Sperimentale [...]

Item 5 - Security aspects of EU - Asia relations
Item 6 - The role of the EU Military Committee in the current evolution of the CSDP
Item 7 - State of play of the Pilot Project and the Preparatory Action on Defence Research
Item 8 - DSACEUR
Source : © European Union, 2019 - EP

On 9-10 October 2019, the annual EDA Military Airworthiness Conference will be held in Lithuania.

The conference will bring together key stakeholders from national military airworthiness authorities, industry, European agencies and international organisations to discuss the latest developments in the cooperation between National Military Airworthiness Authorities (NMAAs).

Initiated by the Ministers of Defence in 2008, EDA participating Member States started this cooperation with the establishment of the Military Airworthiness Authorities Forum aiming at the harmonization of national regulations on military airworthiness in Europe. Since that moment, under auspices of the MAWA Forum, a comprehensive set of European Military Airworthiness Requirements (EMARs) has been developed and is now being implemented by the participating Member States The MAWA Forum is now focusing on increased cooperation in the area of oversight based on a new Airworthiness Roadmap that was approved last year.

The conference is an INVITE ONLY event. Details regarding the venue, conference agenda, registration and accommodation will be sent out in due time.

Inquiries regarding the event should be directed to: MAC2019@eda.europa.eu

 

Length of video : 94'
You may manually download this video in WMV (708Mb) format

Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2019 - EP

American MGM-31 Pershing Medium-Range Ballistic Missile

With Muhammad Sharif Fayez, another member of the first post-Taleban Afghan cabinet has passed away. In this cabinet, Fayez served as Minister of Higher Education from 2001 to 2004. In 2004, he became the founding president of the American University of Afghanistan (AUAF), which he chaired until 2006. As president emeritus until his passing, he continued trying to influence higher education policies while improving the security and autonomy of the AUAF. Professor emeritus Michael Daxner (*), who worked as an adviser to Minister Fayez, looks back at his life, notably at his efforts to create a new higher education system in Afghanistan.

Muhammad Sharif Fayez, who passed away on 8 February 2019, was a ‘Petersberg Minister’: at the 2001 Afghanistan conference on the Petersberg near Bonn, he was nominated as a member of the first Afghan cabinet following the Taleban’s rule, in then-chairman Hamed Karzai’s Interim Administration. He was subsequently appointed Minister of Higher Education, a post he held until 2004. 

Fayez was also a poet and a professor of literature, focusing on comparative literature. He held a Master’s degree in English Literature from the University of Colorado and a PhD from the University of Arizona in American Literature. But it was Persian poetry that he knew better than almost anyone. Before returning to his country in early 2002, he was a refugee in the United States, where his family still lives. Fayez acquired US citizenship and did not give it up, which led to his dismissal in 2004. Born in Herat in 1946, he was a political intellectual and a public figure. To me, he was a friend. As a Herati, he was as connected as any repatriate from exile could be. Among his friends were many professors from the University of Herat, as well as judges, intellectuals, and also Ismail Khan, then an influential person in the erstwhile unstable system of what would become the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Later on, Fayez became distantly related to Khan by marriage.

I first met Fayez upon my return from a UN assignment in Kosovo, having taken up another international position in higher education in a conflict-torn country. He was leading a delegation of heads of Afghan universities who had come to Germany in 2003 by invitation of the German Academic Exchange Service. They asked me to accompany the group, which led to my next engagement, in Afghanistan. At the time of our encounter, the future of higher education in Afghanistan, as well as the public’s trust in President Karzai and hope in general for the country opening up were still so strong, that he easily convinced me and many of his university colleagues to immediately start collaborating and planning for the reconstruction of Afghan academia. 

 Rebuilding a higher education system

As minister, Fayez had to start everything at the same time. His ministry initially had a ridiculously low budget of 28 million USD, 67 per cent of which was earmarked for maintaining student dormitories. Some universities not deserving of the title were only established in an attempt to build up their region’s reputation. (The faculty of Medicine at Gulbahar University, in Parwan province, for example, consisted of one and a half rooms and only ‘imported’ staff. Twice a week, docents arrived  — mainly from Kabul — to hold lectures.) Each and every decision affecting universities’ internal procedures had to be decided by the ministry, and politics permeated each attempt to change or reform an issue within its authority. A student’s certificate had to get through 27 in-house procedures before being signed by the minister himself (not even by one of his deputies). The kankur, the centralised entry examination, consumed much energy and opened many doors to corruption, parent interventions and the incorrect allocation of students to the various faculties (more on this by AAN here).

It took a few months before I found myself in the room next to Minister Fayez’s office in Kabul. As his international advisor, a period of intense collaboration began. We rarely left the office and there were 25 hours in each day. Each visit to a campus was an event, not only for the students and faculty, but for Fayez himself: during the ‘golden hour’ immediately after the overthrow of the Taleban, almost no other place in Afghanistan longed so much for innovation and opening. When the Afghan delegation led by Fayez visited Germany, no one sensed that this golden hour might one day end, sooner than even experts would have expected. (This short period will still need a thorough historical and political review).

Much of what Fayez initiated was supposed to widen the horizons for education reforms and effective changes in the university system. However, these have sadly never been implemented. They included quick impact rebuilding of academic hardware, such as buildings, campuses, lecture rooms and basic equipment. This was a daily battle for resources: higher education was not a priority for either the US or EU governments. We tried to reduce the social paternalistic impact of supporting students from the upper and upper-middle classes and to oppose interventions by ‘well-meaning’ parents to place their kin in the right campus and to survive the kankur. At the time, the system favoured those students, to Fayez’s dismay.

There was a dire need for legislation and a demand for democracy and autonomy within academia. This included representative participation (particularly by students) within academic bodies, such as the universities’ senate and other committees, transparent hiring procedures for staff and a stronger position for chancellors and academic committees. Meanwhile, the government’s direct influence, especially that of the MoHE, was to be reduced mainly to financial and procedural affairs. There was a need for de-bureaucratisation of the internal procedures at universities and a correction of their public image. Children belonging to former élites, including among refugees, were studying in better universities in Iran or in the West, sometimes in Pakistan and India (and in the Soviet Union before that, although those that did often came from different social backgrounds). After 2001, this needed to change. The idea was that a domestic degree would increase a graduate’s chances of finding work within Afghanistan – although this labour market was also being subjected to heavy restructuring. The notion that a degree in Engineering, Medicine or Law would secure their child a job in the public service ceased to be reliable. Decades of war had also destroyed a homogeneous reproduction of disciplinary professionals – singular exceptions were returnees from academic exile (but they did not have trained, loyal, goodassistants or associated professors).

Another bone of contention was teacher training. The responsibility for this was divided between Fayez’s ministry and the Ministry of Education (MoE), leading to turf wars.School teachers and teacher trainers form one of the most numerous segments of the workforce, with a high share in the national budget and a substantial impact on the power of the minister (Yunus Qanuni at the time). The Ministry of Education also received a lot of funding for new schools at that time. The Ministry of Higher Education tried to secure a stronger hold on this workforce by aiming to give trainers a university training and higher degrees, while the MoE insisted on the establishment of training institutions under its supervision: Teacher Training Centres (dar ul-ma’alemin). Fayez started to develop a plan for an integrated teacher training concept, which would settle the conflict nationwide, but did not succeed. 

Most universities were in very bad shape. Campus buildings and installations were in a terrible state and things did not improve until 2004. Only ‘islands’ in the university landscape that received private investment, such as the economic sciences at Kabul University and its former medical faculty, now independent as the Kabul Medical University under Cheragh Ali Cheragh, were exceptions. Generally, most campus facilities were below standard, except for the offices of higher-ranking professors and administrators (which are non-functional structures and which Ashraf Ghani, as Chancellor of Kabul University, tried in vain to reform). Generally, the old universities that had previously been under Soviet influence, such as Mazar-e Sharif, Kabul’s Polytechnic Institute and Herat University were in relatively better shape. 

While Fayez was minister, he did not support the new private higher education institutions that started competing with the national state universities, mainly because he thought their academic level and performance were lower than those in public universities. There were only two private universities then meeting the requirement set by the MoHE, but many more were accredited through political pressure from interested groups, mainly investors. The deeper reason for him was a rather simple one: private universities host inexpensive disciplines such as Law and MBAs, while expensive subjects like Physics, Biology and Medicine remain with the state. 

Fayez regarded the US system as a model but was more inclined towards the Bologna process in Europe, a transnational restructuring of the basic curricula towards Bachelors and Masters degrees. Later, at AUAF, he ‘Americanised’, focusing on tuition fees-based BA training, although general education was to be attained at classical universities through MAs and doctorates. As for state-run universities, he was against tuition fees in education, as was the majority in the Wolesi Jirga, although there were also a few pro-tuition advocates. Fayez wanted many more students to be recruited from poor families. 

Given resistance from various sides, together we started a number of reforms that would fly under the radar. New legislation and the hope for international recognition required a Rectors’ Conference and a team of experienced advisors. Membership in rectors’ associations and access to their related networks would open doors to regional politics. Fayez advocated for the Afghan Rectors’ Conference, and it was established. The text of the new higher education law – written by a team of Afghan and German advisers – was translated by Fayez himself, only to be turned down by Karzai. The president was afraid it might hamper his electoral campaign. He was also afraid of parliamentary opposition against cuts in the social support of privileged male students, many of whom came from the constituencies of his adversaries in parliament; of the autonomy of the universities and of democratic participation of non-professors in their administration. This, was the fear, would weaken the central government’s authority and might lead to a form of “federalism” that would diversify a ‘united national system.’ 

Fayez was not a man of big gestures. He did not talk much about his ability to act emphatically, about his resilience under duress, about his enemies. But one could read from his posture and his eyes what his concerns were. He saved the faculty from being either dismissed or replaced by those favoured by patronage. His was a permanent battle against two adversaries: those who wanted to retain their corrupt and incompetent academic staff and the pressure from Ghani – then finance minister; and others attempting to radically reduce the personnel in higher education. Fayez was in favour of slow changes rather than creating more unemployment. At the same time, he was adamant about firing staff unable to perform their academic duties, such as English teachers with no English proficiency or biologists with textbooks from the 1960s. 

Forced resignation and change to AUAF

In 2004 the higher education law was still pending, but the pressure on Fayez to step down was mounting, his double citizenship being cited as a political pretext, which he did not want to give up. Fayez was denounced as being too ‘secular’. At this point, he lost confidence in the ability of the Afghan state to reform its higher education system under the prevailing circumstances. After Fayez’s forced resignation, the new minister, Amir Shah Hasanyar, demolished almost everything that Fayez had initiated. The roll-back had begun…

Fayez then became the founding president of the American University of Afghanistan (AUAF). What then had been a barren piece of land near the Darulaman ‘palace’ is today a modern campus, something between a good community college and a prestigious college of applied sciences. It has all the prospects of becoming a full university one day. AUAF initially became a symbol of what you can successfully do in Afghanistan, no matter how many obstacles. It was typical of Fayez’ ambiguity that he was grateful to receive seed money from the US Congress, while increasingly orienting the new university towards Europe and the Bologna-Process. On the other hand, he realized quite early on that he would need far more money, beyond the donations to the AUAF, in order to hire adequate faculty staff and modernise the campus. This could be only done through tuition fees. Thus, he attracted the children of the emerging middle classes and some from the upper classes. In order to fulfil his wish to support less affluent students, AUAF developed a remarkable system of grants and stipends, though they were still too small to meet his aspirations.

Until 2015, I visited Fayez and his campus regularly. I was impressed by the progress his college made, and I understood his impatience regarding the pace of progress and the impediments imposed by the government. And, of course, he was aware of the tensions between wanting to give students from disadvantaged families access to higher education and the need for AUAF’s tuition fees. 

Beyond campus

Back in 2004 and 2005 I got to know another side of Fayez, who was both diligent and shy when it came to his scholarship, his readings, his philosophy and his political ideas. At home, he was not a member of the cabinet. On occasional visits from Maryland in the US, he and his wife were splendid hosts, and his capacity for irony was as remarkable as his taste. When he was alone, as he was most of the time, he was also a good host but then his sense of irony gave way to a sarcastic realism. Once, he said that he had either come too late or too early. When he was no longer in the ministry, he introduced me to the structures and mysteries of Persian poetry, his analyses of the ruling élites, of patronage in power and subtexts of the political discourse, all of which were elements for an advanced primer for understanding this country. His judgment of politicians and prominent protagonists of governance in transition resonates even today. I never met a person who was as close to my professional life in a foreign country and who provided me with such an in-depth understanding of Afghanistan.

Fayez was also well read on the Western reception of Persian literature. When he received his honorary doctorate from Oldenburg University in 2006, he cited the poet and scholar Friedrich Rückert (1788-1866), translator and editor of Farsi poetry and the philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche as an expert on oriental culture, as well as the more contemporary Annemarie Schimmel, in his acceptance speech. He referred to Goethe, Hegel and Hermann Hesse as mystical minds of the West.This demonstrated another side of this political person who, in his heart, was a teacher. Even in this speech he could not contain himself from tutoring the audience – which was well received. 

In the same speech, no longer as a high representative of a state willing to reform its structures, he showed himself still full of structural optimism. But his was a programme for a higher education system in a civilised and developing society that would need an educated class instead of having to create one. 

Had he come too early or too late? Fayez was an ambiguous personality: on the one hand, he was a traditional, if democratic, representative of the humanities in the classical university; on the other, he was a “Western” higher education reformer. As a minister, Sharif Fayez tried to get it all done at once, and he would have succeeded had the ruling élites allowed it. As founder of the AUAF, he created a remarkable institution of higher education. And he succeeded in slowly mixing faculties imported from other countries with Afghan lecturers. As a political peer, he was the strongest advocate for academic freedom and democratic infra-structure of higher education. His plans for community colleges were exceptional, but he had neither sufficient time nor opportunities to establish such institutions. Beyond all other merits, he was a humanist and a person for whom politics were inseparably linked to culture. 

I shall miss him, we will miss him. I know that many well-educated Afghans miss him, among them many former students under his tutelage. The vigor of his tenure has gone. For now.   

Edited by Thomas Ruttig

(*) Michael Daxner is a retired university chancellor and professor of sociology and conflict research in Germany. He worked in Afghanistan from 2003 to 2005 as an International Advisor for Minister Fayez, and afterwards as a conflict researcher and consultant for the development and civil society until 2015. During this time he cooperated with the MoHE and, among others, with UNAMA, UNHCR and UNICEF. He is also a researcher of the Afghan diaspora communities in Western European countries and North America.

One person, involved in the accident, is in stable condition. A weird mishap occurred in Worthington, Massachusetts, where a snowmobile and a U.S. Army Black Hawk MEDEVAC helicopter were involved in an accident in a [...]