Today, in a signing ceremony held as part of the EDA Steering Board, Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the European Defence Agency brought into force an agreement to work together to deliver the European Helicopter Tactics Instructor Course (HTIC). This course is designed to give selected European helicopter crews an enhanced awareness of helicopter tactics, operational employment and multi-national integration.
At the end of the course, which is divided into three phases (ground-school, simulator and live flying), graduates will be qualified to delivering tactical instruction during home-based training; multinational courses and exercises; and on operations. They will also be capable of providing helicopter tactical advice at 1 Star level, as well as leading multi-platform complex Composite Air Operations (COMAOs).
A proven concept
The concept of creating the HTIC was approved by the EDA Steering Board on 9 March 2011. The EDA in partnership with the UK Joint Helicopter Command and the Armed Forces of Sweden developed the concept during 2011/12 and the first course, jointly funded by Sweden and the UK was delivered at RAF Linton-on-Ouse and FMV Test Range, Vidsel in Northern Sweden in April-May 2013. The course consisted of 14 Students from Germany and Sweden and 14 instructors from the UK and received unanimous praise from all participants.
Consequently, a year later, a second course was delivered. Enlarged and with additional financial support from the Multinational Helicopter Initiative, the 2nd course graduated students from Austria, Czech Republic, German, Sweden and the UK. Swedish graduates for the first course became staff instructors on the second – beginning the process of creating a self-sustaining cadre. Nineteen students graduated from six helicopter types: Kiowa, Mi-171, CH-53, UH-1, AS330, and NH90. The course also involved eight fast-jets (Alca 159, Hawk, Gripen) from the Czech Republic, Sweden and the UK. These were used as “red air” both in the academic sorties teaching fighter evasion and also in a free role, trying to prevent the helicopters completing their “mission”.
Upcoming events
The next course, No3 HTIC, will be the first organised under the new arrangements. It will take place in August-September 2015. Once again, the simulator phase will be delivered at the EDA simulator facility at Royal Air Force Linton-on-Ouse and the flying phase will be hosted by Sweden at Vidsel. The graduate instructors will go on to teach on future HTIC and also become mentors on the EDA Helicopter Exercise Programme.
More information
2013 was no exception to the recent years’ trend across EDA Member States to cut defence spending. Despite the fact that EDA increased from 26 to 271 Member States in 2013, the total defence expenditure of its Member States decreased by EUR 1.7 billion or 0.9%, compared to 2012, to EUR 186 billion. In real terms², the total defence expenditure has been declining since 2006, dropping by over EUR 32 billion or about 15% from 2006 to 2013.
Both as a share of GDP and as a share of the total government spending, defence expenditure has decreased for the seventh year in a row to its lowest value since 2006, 1.45% and 2.97%, respectively.
Defence expenditure breakdown (billion EUR and % change on previous year)
Operation and maintenance and R&D/R&T expenditure increase slightlyIn terms of the distribution of defence expenditure, there were some shifts in 2013. Personnel-related expenditure decreased by over 4%, from EUR 95.7 billion in 2012 to EUR 91.8 billion in 2013, and for the first time since 2006, its share in the total defence expenditure dropped below 50%, to 49.3%. Personnel expenditure expressed per person employed in defence (military and civilian) has been increasing since 2006 to reach its highest value of EUR 51,475 in 2011, and started to decrease the year after. It decreased further from 2012 to 2013 (-2.6%), to EUR 49,836.
With a share of 25.1% - the biggest since 2006 - operation and maintenance expenditure remained the second largest component of the total defence spending in 2013, and, despite minor annual fluctuations, it appears to be on an upward trajectory. From 2012 to 2013, it increased by EUR 2 billion or 4.4%, to EUR 46.8 billion, and almost reached its highest level of EUR 46.9 billion recorded in 2007. By contrast, defence investment, comprising equipment procurement and R&D (including R&T) expenditure, following a sharp decrease in 2011 (-10.5%), increased slightly in 2012, but decreased again in 2013 below the level it was in 2006, to EUR 37.5 billion or 20.1% of the total defence expenditure. This resulted from a decrease in one of its components - equipment procurement - which reduced by EUR 1.5 billion or 4.9%, to EUR 30 billion (16.1% of the total expenditure).
The second component - defence R&D expenditure - increased slightly to EUR 7.5 billion (4% of the total expenditure), breaking a downward trend observed since 2006 (with the exception of 2010, when it marginally increased). R&T expenditure - a subset of R&D - followed a similar path. Being on a decline since 2006 (except 2011), it increased by just over 3% from 2012 to 2013, to reach EUR 2.1 billion. In real terms, defence investment decreased by EUR 4.8 billion or 11.3% from 2006 to 2013, whereas its components – equipment procurement and R&D - decreased by EUR 1.7 billion (-5.3%) and EUR 3.1 billion (-29.1%), respectively.
Defence expenditure in current and constant1 prices (billion EUR)
Collaboration3: a sharp decrease in procurement and a marginal increase in R&TSince 2012, it has not been possible to have a comprehensive picture of the total EDA Member States’ expenditure on collaborative (including European collaboration) defence equipment procurement and R&T projects or programmes, as several Member States were not able to provide this data. A glimpse into the partial 2012-2013 data reveals a worrisome trend, particularly for defence equipment procurement. Between 2012 and 2013, reported collaborative equipment procurement expenditure decreased by 20.7% to the lowest level since 2006 of EUR 4.75 billion. In relation to the total defence equipment procurement, collaborative expenditure accounted for 15.9%, suggesting that over 84% was spent nationally. European collaborative equipment procurement experienced an even sharper decrease of 21.6%, and in 2013, amounted to EUR 4.5 billion, accounting for 94.6% of the total collaborative equipment procurement.
The total collaborative defence R&T expenditure of the EDA Member States that provided the data also shrank, though less dramatically (-0.9%), to EUR 203 million. Its share in the total defence R&T was 9.7%, the remaining 90.3% being regarded as national expenditure. Although the reported European collaborative defence R&T expenditure increased by 21.4% between 2012 and 2013, with a total of EUR 168 million, accounting for 82.5% of the total collaborative defence R&T, it nevertheless remained record-low.
Defence expenditure and investment per military decrease despite reduced personnel numbers
2013 saw the seventh consecutive reduction in the number of personnel working in defence (both military and civilian), caused mainly by internal restructuring processes. The total personnel decreased by almost 600,000 or 24% between 2006 and 2013, while the number of military and civilian personnel decreased by over 500,000 (-26%) and almost 80,000 (-16%), respectively, during the same period.
In 2013, there was a total of 1,435,693 military and 407,245 civilian personnel in EDA Member States - a decrease of 0.9% and 3.6%, compared to 2012. A share of military in the total personnel has also been decreasing from the highest of 80.6% in 2008 and 2010 to the lowest of 77.4% in 2012. In 2013, it was 77.9%. For the first time since 2006, defence expenditure expressed per military decreased by 0.05%, from EUR 129,878 in 2012 to EUR 129,814 in 2013.
So did defence investment per military, which has been on an overall increasing trend since 2006 due to declining military personnel, rather than increasing Member States’ investment. In 2013, defence investment per military was EUR 26,122 - a 2.9% reduction on the 2012 figure of EUR 26,906.
Increasing numbers of troops available for deployment and actual deployments
Between 2012 and 2013, the average number of troops deployed outside the EU territory increased for the first time since 2008, both in absolute terms (+17.2%) and as a share of military personnel (from 3.4% to 4%). EDA Member States together deployed on average 58,086 troops on a continuous basis throughout 2013, which constituted 4% of the overall strength of their military personnel. In 2013, there was also an increase in the total number of deployable (land) forces (+7%) and that of sustainable (land) forces (+1.5%). The 27 EDA Member States had in total 481,001 deployable (the highest number since 2006) and 110,433 sustainable (land) forces. The ratio between sustainable and a pool of deployable (land) forces remained stable at 1:4.4.
Meanwhile, after a five-year-long upward trend, the costs related to deployed operations4 decreased for the second time in a row, both in absolute terms - from EUR 9 billion to EUR 7.4 billion (-17.1%) – and as a share of the total expenditure - from 4.8% to 4% - between 2012 and 2013. Operations costs per military deployed decreased by 29.3% and stood at EUR 127,989 in 2013.
Background
The European Defence Agency (EDA) collects defence data on an annual basis. The Ministries of Defence of the Agency’s 27 Member States (MS) provide the data. EDA acts as the custodian of the data and publishes the aggregated figures in a yearly defence data booklet.
Defence investment breakdown (billion EUR and % change on previous year)
More information
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1 Data does not include Denmark which is not an EDA Member State. 2006-2012 data does not include Croatia which became the 27th EDA Member State on 1 July 2013.
2 In order to measure real growth and ensure a “real” comparison between years, inflation needs to be taken into account. Thus, data from 2006 to 2012 has been inflated to 2013 economic conditions (Source of deflator: European Commission ECFIN - based on weight of EU-28).
3 All 2012 and 2013 figures on collaboration are partial, as several Member States were not able to provide data.
4 2013 figure is an estimate, as several Member States were not able to provide accurate data, therefore sound comparisons with the previous years are limited.
Another Oxford Analytica piece, this one from mid-December.
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Russia is the second-largest arms exporter in the world, behind only the United States. In the period 2009-13, Russia accounted for 27% of total world arms sales.
However, Russian arms sales have been highly dependent on a few major customers, with India, China and Algeria accounting for over 60% of Russian purchases in the last five years. Another 15% of Russian exports went to other Asian countries, primarily Vietnam, Indonesia and former Soviet Union states.
Russia is particularly hopeful of expanding its sales to Indonesia and Vietnam — which are both looking towards naval expansion, which have to date included systems ranging from aircraft to combat ships to infantry fighting vehicles.
The main targets of Russian weapon sales are gradually shifting. Sales to China, have been in decline for years as Beijing has pursued a programme of shifting to domestic manufacturing of advanced weaponry.
IndiaIndia has replaced China as Moscow’s main foreign customer. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reported that between 2009 and 2013 Russia supplied 75% of weapons imported by India. However, serious delays such as the transfer of the modernised aircraft carrier — the Vikramaditya — have dented Russia’s reputation as a reliable partner.
Therefore, Delhi seeks a diversity of supply from sources including the United States and several European countries. This is evidenced in India’s preference for French Rafale fighters in the multi-billion dollar Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) fighter tender.
India’s MMRCA tender is for procuring 126 fighters to replace squadrons of MiG-21s. The deal will see France supply a number of aircraft fully built and ready to fly — while the remainder will be built under a technology transfer agreement by Hindustan Aeronautics.
Moreover, India is looking to be 75% self-reliant in defence production by 2020-25. It will also seek to become a weapons exporter and probably promote partnerships with Russia. The BrahMos Aerospace programme has been a particular noteworthy area of close cooperation between Russia and India with the creation of the BrahMos Supersonic Cruise Missile.
PakistanPakistan may also provide a new opening for Russia. On November 20, Russia and Pakistan signed a military cooperation agreement, reportedly involving a deal for Moscow to supply 20 Mi-35 transport helicopters to Islamabad.
Middle EastBesides Asia, Russia has been actively looking for new customers for its arms in the Middle East. Russia has recently concluded significant contracts with Iraq for helicopters and air defence systems worth 4 billion dollars and Egypt for air defence systems worth 2 billion dollars.
Latin AmericaIn Latin America, Russia remains hopeful of selling fighter aircraft to Brazil and Argentina. Russia has sold air defence systems to Brazil and hopes to develop a defence industrial partnership that might parallel its military cooperation with India.
Competitive sectorsThe sectors in which Russian weapons systems are considered equal or superior to Western equivalents include air defence, fighter aircraft, helicopters, submarines and cruise missiles. These are the sectors in which Russia’s defence industry can compete with the most advanced Western suppliers, with weapons such as the S-300 air defence system, the Su-35 fighter jets and the Kilo class submarine being noteworthy. Russia can also be competitive in sectors such as tanks, armored vehicles, small arms, artillery, and small combat ships. These are sectors where Russian weapons are not as good as Western equivalents, but are generally significantly cheaper. This price difference has allowed them to be competitive in many countries despite lower quality and/or inferior characteristics.
Ukraine delaysHowever, Russian arms sales have largely depended on selling late Soviet designs, with new designs proving more difficult to manufacture. The freeze on military cooperation with Ukraine may lead to further delays as many Russian weapon systems depend on Ukrainian components and the transition to Russian domestic substitutes is expected to take two to three years.
So, to re-cap the past week or so: the two-state solution is (almost) dead (again) after Bibi’s victory in the Israeli elections, the Americans came off the sidelines in Iraq with airstrikes in support of an offensive to re-take Tikrit from ISIS, Yemen’s President has reportedly fled the country and Saudi Arabia has now launched airstrikes against the Houthi rebels, Syria has dismantled 3 chemical weapons sites, Syria stands accused of continuing to use Chlorine weapons, Canada announced that it won’t bother to ask the Syrian government before attacking ISIS, oh and nine British citizens have reportedly entered Syria to work as medics in IS hospitals.
Spot the odd one out. That didn’t stop the nine medics making the front pages, though.
What is the British government to do about British citizens that are willing to travel to Syria and support ISIS? The Guardian called this “a test for British policy” and I agree, but it is a general policy problem that any state whose citizens get involved in irregular conflicts will have to face. I had a good debate on Twitter with Shashank Joshi regarding his argument that this constituted “material support” for terrorism, although the question he was asked was slightly different to its presentation. As I see it, the problem here is that two norms are in direct conflict with one another: the idea that the British citizens shouldn’t support ISIS, and the humanitarian impulse to save lives.
The key problem with any assessment is the same as most arguments about foreign fighters: we don’t really know what they’re up to except via scraps of information and rumours spread via twitter/instagram/the internet. As I see it, however, there are three ways that they could be involved (as medics): as a standard fighter with some medical expertise, as a dedicated medic working in a battlefield role, as a medic working in a hospital or similar facility. The first case is the easiest – even under international humanitarian law medical personnel can carry a light weapon for personal protection but lose the protection of their status if they act like standard personnel. The second is perhaps the trickiest issue. A battlefield medic would be providing material support, but at the same time, although medical personnel are integral to the conduct of military operations, they are commonly protected from attack precisely because international humanitarian law seeks to preserve the ability for medical personnel to tend to the sick and wounded while fighting rages. Even though debate rages about what constitutes “direct participation in hostilities” in non-international armed conflicts, this concept doesn’t include medical aid. Fundamentally, in international law there isn’t anything to prevent a person from pulling wounded people from a battlefield or tending to their wounds.
There is little doubt in my mind that the British government could figure out an argument for making it illegal to go to Syria and provide medical support for ISIS, even though this will be fundamentally a British law for British citizens. The question is, do we want to be seen to criminalise the humanitarian impulse? Will nine medical students really make much of a difference? In terms of narrative it seems a needless own-goal. If these students did go to Syria to heal people instead of kill them, the best thing the British government could do is ignore them and focus on something more important. Throw a dart at a map of the middle east, and it’ll probably land on something that should be a priority.
Welcome to this week’s CCLKOW discussion piece. This time, we are looking at the challenges that ex-servicemen and women face in seeking compensation for a disability, illness etc. Over the past few years, Veterans Affairs Canada has been severely criticized for failing to process claims efficiently and the closure of key offices. Legislative changes have also received widespread disapproval. However, these problems are not unique to Canada. Internationally, veterans are in the midst of redefining their relationship with the state. This process will have important implications for both the present generation of veterans and their successors in uniform. Read the piece and join the discussion on Twitter at #CCLKOW.
There is a crisis in veterans’ affairs. Over the past twelve months alone, Veterans Affairs Canada (VAC) has come under fire for everything from failing to process disability claims promptly to the closure of nine out of thirty two offices across the country. Late last year, revelations also emerged that the department has returned nearly $1.13 billion in unspent funds to the treasury since 2006.[i] Moreover, the federal government is currently facing a class action lawsuit in connection to the New Veterans Charter (NVC). Passed in 2005, the NVC replaced existing pensions legislation. Originally praised as, ‘the most sweeping change to Veterans’ services and benefits in the past 60 years,’ it has been extensively criticized since it first came into effect.[ii] Currently in settlement talks with the government, the plaintiffs in the Equitas case claim that the NVC denies veterans access to the same level of compensation as they were entitled to under the old Pensions Act and does not meet the standards set in civil court for, ‘accidents or personal injury.’[iii] In addition, they contend that this is unconstitutional and the NVC should be repealed.
In the wake of continued turmoil, Julian Fantino was dismissed as Minister of Veterans’ Affairs earlier this year. Air force veteran and fellow Conservative MP, Erin O’Toole, replaced him. O’Toole’s appointment has been followed by a series of announcements regarding improvements in compensation for reservists and severely disabled veterans.[iv] Despite these developments, both O’Toole and Prime Minister Stephen Harper face an uphill battle. With a federal election looming, Mr. Harper is under significant pressure to address this issue. Continued problems in veterans’ affairs would reflect poorly on his government and provide his political opponents with ammunition.
Historically, the relationship between government and veterans has often proved problematic. By its very nature, the pension system is ‘adversarial.’[v] Governments have to balance the needs of veterans with the limitations of public spending. Given this consideration, pension/compensation systems have been designed with an ethos of independence and self-sufficiency in mind. Throughout the twentieth century, benefits and allowances have evolved to help rehabilitate ex-servicemen and women and assist them in rejoining the civilian workforce. Millions in Canada, the United States and other countries like the United Kingdom have benefited from legislation that grants veterans access to education, vocational training and financial assistance.[vi] However, officials have also struggled to define who should be considered a veteran in the first place and to what rights they should be entitled as a result of military service. Measuring disability has also proven exceptionally difficult. This is particularly troublesome when it comes to mental health problems, which are not directly or easily quantifiable.[vii] As a result, applying for a pension can be an infuriating process. Generations of veterans have encountered a labyrinthine bureaucracy that can be impossible to successfully navigate without assistance. Individual experiences have varied widely depending upon the nature of the veterans’ disability and the pensions’ officials that he or she encounters.
Since the first deployment of troops to Afghanistan in 2001, the Canadian public has become increasingly cognizant of the role that military personnel play and the health risks that they can run in the execution of their duty. Over the past fifteen years, the federal government has significantly revised pensions legislation and attempted to clarify the relationship between soldier and state. When the New Veterans Charter was first brought before the House of Commons in 2005, it received unanimous cross party support. At the time, Senator Roméo Dallaire described the legislation as, ‘a new social contract between the people of Canada and the new generation of veterans of the Canadian Forces.’[viii] However, the NVC has fallen well short of expectations and the government’s relationship with veterans has been damaged by recent events. There is a clear gap between what legislation is intended to do and the reality of how Veterans Affairs operates on a day-to-day basis. While many civil servants and politicians are undoubtedly well intentioned, waiting times remain excessive and the system is overly complex. Physically and mentally disabled veterans who require medical attention are poorly equipped to negotiate these obstacles.
Canadian veterans are not alone in their struggle. The United States Department of Veterans Affairs is currently facing its own crisis in connection to the deliberate mismanagement and manipulation of hospital wait lists.[ix] In response, President Barack Obama recently announced the formation of an advisory group, ‘made up of public officials and leaders in the private sector,’ to help improve services.[x] Furthermore, media reports in the UK suggest that veterans still face an arduous process when applying for financial compensation.[xi] Veterans’ groups have estimated that it can take an average of over 200 working days in order to process a claim. While the MoD disputes this, officials do admit that there have been delays.[xii] They argue that these problems are largely the result of a rising number of claims and reduced staffing levels. Figures released last year, ‘show there were 36,000 new compensation claims for those injured, disabled or bereaved through service in 2013-14-an increase of around 16% from 2010-11.’[xiii] The government also contends that the 2010 Boyce review of the Armed Forces Compensation Scheme had, ‘diverted resources,’ and caused further delays.[xiv]
There needs to be a renewed commitment on the part of both the Canadian government and its allies to translating principles into action. Moving forward, there also needs to be greater dedication to engaging with veterans’ groups across the political spectrum in an open dialogue. As active partners, veterans can help determine the direction of future policy and revitalize efforts to make VAC a more efficient and transparent organisation. In a 2013 report issued by the Office of the Veterans’ Ombudsman, the authors rightly point out that, ‘those who serve in the Canadian Forces do so willingly, knowing that they may be injured, become ill or die as a result of their service.’[xv] They also highlight that, ‘by putting the needs of Canada and Canadians ahead of their own, they forego some of the rights and freedoms enjoyed by other citizens.’[xvi] While service personnel willingly make such sacrifices, they do so with the expectation that they will be treated fairly upon their return home. Not only is it morally right to meet these expectations, it is also vital for the military as an organisation. Recruitment is a difficult enterprise at the best of times. If the next generation is to consider the armed forces as a viable career option, they must be assured of the state’s commitment to their wellbeing. Investing in veterans is an investment in the future.
Questions for discussion include:
How should the word ‘veteran’ be defined for the purposes of government compensation and care schemes?
A multitude of veterans’ charities and organizations have been established over the past decade. Who should represent veterans in negotiating with the state?
*Poppies pinned to Canadian Military. Photo courtesy of Getty Images.
[i] Mandy Kovacs, ‘Canadian veterans remain critical of government,’ Global News (28 Jan 2015), http://globalnews.ca/news/1798943/canadian-veterans-remain-critical-of-government/; David Pugliese, ‘The battle for veterans’ votes: Conservatives a target for some former military,’ Ottawa Citizen (2 Feb 2015), http://ottawacitizen.com/news/politics/the-battle-for-veterans-votes-conservatives-the-target-for-some-former-military; Murray Brewster, ‘Veterans Affairs handed back $1.1- billion in unspent funds: documents,’ Globe and Mail (20 Nov 2014), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/11-billion-in-unspent-funds-at-veterans-affairs-documents-show/article21665655/
[ii] Office of the Veterans Ombudsman, ‘Improving the New Veterans Charter: The Parliamentary Review,’ Government of Canada (Jan 2013), p. 3.
[iii] Kieron Lang, ‘Feds spend $694K in legal fight against veterans,’ CTVNews (28 Jan 2015), http://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/feds-spent-694k-in-legal-fight-against-veterans-1.2209816; Murray Brewster, ‘Afghan vets lawsuit over benefits on hold as Tories search for settlement,’ CBC News (13 Mar 2015), http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/afghan-vets-lawsuit-over-benefits-on-hold-as-tories-search-for-settlement-1.2993572
[iv] Gloria Galloway, ‘Ottawa to announce better benefits for disabled veterans and their caregivers,’ Globe and Mail (17 Mar 2015), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/ottawa-to-announce-better-benefits-for-disabled-veterans-and-their-caregivers/article23489674/
[v] Stephen Garton, The Cost of War: Australians Return (Melbourne: OUP, 1996), p. 88.
[vi] Notes on War Pension Schemes of UK, Canada, Australia, NZ and South Africa, Sept. 1945, The National Archives at Kew (TNA): PIN 15/3069; World Veterans Federation (WVF), Social Affairs Rehabilitation, Comparative Report: Legislation Affecting Disabled Veterans and Other War Veterans WVF-DOC/830 (Paris, France: WVF, Sept. 1955), Veterans Affairs Canada—Canadian Forces Advisory Council, The Origins and Evolution of Veterans Benefits in Canada (Ottawa: Veterans Affairs Canada, 2004); Alice Aiken and Amy Buitenhuis, Supporting Canadian Veterans with Disabilities (Kingston, ON: Defence Management Studies Program, Queen’s University, 2011).
[vii] Garton, The Cost of War, pp. 167-169.
[viii] Senator Roméo Dallaire, as quoted in, Office of Veterans Ombudsman, ‘Improving the New Veterans Charter: The Parliamentary Review,’ Govt. of Canada (Jan. 2013), p. 3.
[ix] Reuters, ‘Obama administration to start new group to advise on veterans issues,’ Reuters (13 Mar 2015) http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/13/us-usa-veterans-idUSKBN0M919W20150313
[x] Ibid.
[xi] Graeme Strachan, ‘Compensate our veterans faster urges former army captain,’ Courier (16 Mar 2015), http://www.thecourier.co.uk/news/scotland/compensate-our-veterans-faster-urges-former-army-captain-1.851716
[xii] Sima Kotecha, ‘Injured veterans ‘face delays over compensation claims,’ BBC News (6 Aug 2014), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-28656924; Laurence Dodds, ‘Injured veterans facing long compensation delays,’ Telegraph (7 Aug 2014), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/11017500/Injured-veterans-facing-long-compensation-delays.html
[xiii] Kotecha, ‘Injured veterans.’
[xiv] Ministry of Defence, Cm 7798: Review of the Armed Forces Compensation Scheme (Feb 2010).
[xv] Office of Veterans Ombudsman, ‘Improving the New Veterans Charter: The Parliamentary Review,’ Govt. of Canada (Jan. 2013), p. 6.
[xvi] Ibid.