In early July 2017, the Taleban carried out several simultaneous attacks against the Afghan security forces in Kunduz province, in an attempt to, once again, inch closer to the provincial centre. The attacks were less coordinated and sustained than they had been in the past years (including in 2015 when Kunduz fell and in 2016 when it almost did) and, for now, the fighters have been repelled. AAN’s Obaid Ali (with input from Thomas Ruttig) explains how a series of air strikes and night raids that killed several key commanders has affected the Taleban’s command structure and their ability to threaten Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) positions. The reach and strength of the Afghan security forces, however, also remain limited and dependent on US-supported air strikes.
Taleban attempts to regain territory so far largely repelled
In the beginning of July 2017, the Taleban again launched several attacks against Afghan government positions in Kunduz province, focusing on Dasht-e Archi district and several areas around the provincial centre. According to the UN around 3500 people were displaced by the fighting. The attacks left Kunduz residents worried that the Taleban were encroaching on the city again.
The first attack took place in the early morning of 1 July 2017, when the Taleban conducted a large-scale offensive against Dasht-e Archi from three different directions – north, south and east – in an attempt to overrun its district centre. The clashes continued for several hours until the Afghan air force was called to join the battle. According to Nasruddin Sahdi, the district governor, the Afghan National Army, Afghan National Police, Afghan Local Police and Public Protection Force all came together to jointly protect the district. He also told AAN that the air force played a major role in targeting the Taleban from the air and pushing them back.
Archi is considered a hub for the insurgents and was home to the late Taleban shadow governor, Mullah Abdul Salam Baryal. Over the past two years the ANSF have made several attempts to push the Taleban away from the district centre, which has changed hands between ANSF and Taleban several times (for instance, read a short report here).
The second assault, in the early morning of 2 July 2017, was against the security forces in Talawka, an area only four kilometres north of the provincial capital (read short report here). The attack was an attempt to overrun this strategic area that connects the insurgents’ fronts with Gurtepa in the west and Aqtash (which has recently come under Taleban control) in the east, thus providing a staging ground for the Taleban to control parts of the Kunduz-Imam Saheb highway, to the north of Kunduz city.
Talawka had already fallen into Taleban hands in April 2015. In June 2017, the ANSF, along with American forces, conducted a large-scale clearance operation and pushed the militants back. Mahfuzullah Akbari, spokesman for the northeastern 808 Spinzar police zone, told AAN that on 2 July 2016 an Afghan National Army base had been besieged by the Taleban, that reinforcement had been deployed and that they had defeated the insurgents’ attack. According to security officials more than 40 insurgents were killed in the battle, and more than 50 others were wounded. Tariq shah Bahrami, the acting defence minister, said the “enemy,” along with their foreign fighters, had gathered forces from neighbouring provinces to attack the security forces in Talawka. Further, he said, the Taleban faced serious losses: “Key Taleban commander Qari Hassan was killed and a famous Taleban commander in Talawka, Qari Amir, was wounded.” According to him the attack against Talawka was led by a foreign fighter from Tajikistan, Hekmatullah Tajikistani, who was also killed in the area. Locals from Talawka told AAN that on 7 July serious clashes were still ongoing.
On the same day the Talawka attack started, on 2 July, the Taleban also tried to block two highways. From the east a group of fighters in the Charkhab area of Khanabad district targeted several government security check points on the Kunduz-Takhar highway. The clash continued for a several of hours; eventually the Taleban were repelled.
The other attempt took place on the Baghlan-Kunduz highway, in Aliabad district, southeast of Kunduz city (read short report here). The Taleban established mobile check points in Shanbeh Tepa, an area only three kilometres north of Aliabad district centre, and blocked the highway for several days, until the ANSF conducted a counteroffensive and managed to reopen the highway on Friday (7 July). According to local security officials, the Taleban check points were removed and the militants suffered serious losses (23 militants killed and 13 wounded; read media report here). Omerkhel and Madrasa villages of Shanbeh Tepa area of Aliabad district were, and still are, under Taleban control and they frequently set up mobile check points to search vehicles for ANSF service members or to block the highway for ANSF reinforcements.
Looking at these attacks it seems the insurgents are trying to regain control of areas they lost over the past year. In October 2016, after Kunduz city almost fell to them for the second time, US and Afghan forces conducted several counteroffensives against the Taleban to push back the militants. This campaign, that involved night raids, targeted killings of Taleban commanders and airstrikes, resulted in the weakening of the Taleban’s position and the death of several key commanders. The security situation, however, is still vulnerable and areas around the provincial centre continue to be controlled by the Taleban. The insurgents, moreover, seem to have increased their focus on targeted killings of government security forces (see this report here).
Insurgency dynamics
Over the past few months, particularly after the announcement of the Taleban’s spring offensive, the insurgents have faced challenges to expand their territory in Kunduz. The militants conducted several attacks against security forces in Imam Saheb, Qala-ye Zal and Khanabad districts, but these assaults had limited results. The Taleban have, in particular, been hit hard by the night raids and the airstrikes carried out by Afghan and US forces in the province (read reports here, here and here). In February 2017, a US airstrike targeted and killed Mullah Salam, the then Taleban shadow governor of Kunduz province (read this earlier AAN analysis on Mullah Salam’s background). In May 2017, a US airstrike killed the Taleban’s shadow governor for Qala-ye Zal district, along with seven militants (read short report here). In the same month another Taleban key commander for Dasht-e Archi, Mullah Ismail, was killed in a US airstrike, as was Mawlawi Muhammad Nur (alias Haqqani), reportedly the head of the Taleban military commission for Chahr Dara, who was targeted and killed in a US airstrike in Chahr Dara (read media report here).
The killing of Mullah Salam and other key Taleban commanders negatively affected the insurgency, not only on the battleground but also politically. Apart from being a skillful military commander, Salam was an important political player who managed to handle the Taleban network, as well as relations with other militant groups (including Jundullah and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan) for the last four years. He led the Taleban forces when they overran Kunduz city for two weeks in 2015 and, again, when they seized parts of the city in 2016 (read our previous analysis here and here).
The appointment of Salam’s successor has created serious tension among the militants in the province. According to a source close to the Taleban, the Taleban in Chahr Dara are pushing for the appointment of Mawlawi Rahmatullah (alias Muhammad), the current acting shadow provincial governor and a Pashtun from the Omarkhel sub-tribe of Chahr Dara district. The ‘Kandahari’ (1) Taleban of Dasht-e Archi oppose Rahmatullah, and have instead endorsed someone from their own ranks. This, local sources said, has disrupted the chain of command among Taleban commanders across the province and is affecting their ability to conduct coordinated attacks against the ANSF.
The Taleban’s recent assaults against Kunduz city and Dasht-e Archi district centre, however, indicate that the insurgents still want to probe and assess the capacity of the ANSF, for instance by the kind of simultaneous attacks witnessed earlier this week. Despite the loss of key commanders, the Taleban still control three newly established districts (Gurtepa, Aqtash and Galbad) and have the capacity to target vulnerable district centres like Dasht-e Archi, Qala-ye Zal, Imam Saheb and Chahr Dara, as well as areas around the provincial centre. Additional Taleban presence in areas around the provincial centre (Zakhel, Kanum, Gurtepa and Omarkhel) and along the highway connecting the provincial centre to Baghlan in the south and Takhar in the east, means that they are still well-placed to try to target the provincial centre and to block reinforcement from both directions.
Despite the challenges the Taleban in Kunduz currently face – the internal divisions and the external targeting through air strikes and night raids – the capacity of the ANSF to protect the province’s vulnerable areas and to ensure the safety of the highway remains limited and dependent on US-supported airstrikes. The province, including its centre, thus remains vulnerable.
(For AAN analysis of the Taleban attacks on Kunduz in 2015 and 2016, see our 2016 dossier “Insurgency and governance in Afghanistan’s northeast.”)
(1) ‘Kandahari’ refers to Pashtuns naqelin, or forced resettlers, who were resettled from the south in the past and now form a distinct local population.
https://youtu.be/tGQBMRYRKPQ
The island continent of Australia faces a number of unique security challenges that stem from its geography. The continent may be separated from its neighbors by large expanses of ocean, but it also resides within a potential arc of instability, and has a number of important offshore resource sites to protect. Full awareness of what is going on around them, and the ability to push that awareness well offshore, are critical security requirements.
“Project Wedgetail” had 3 finalists, and the winner was a new variant of Boeing’s 737-700, fitted with an MESA (multirole electronically scanned array) radar from Northrop Grumman. That radar exchanges the traditional AWACS rotating dome for the E-7A’s “top hat” stationary antenna. That design, and the project as a whole, have run into severe turbulence, creating problems for Boeing earnings, the ADF, and other export orders for the type. DID’s FOCUS articles offer in-depth, updated looks at significant military programs of record. This one covers contracts, events, and key milestones within Australia’s E-7A program, from inception to the current day.
In 1997 Australia’s AIR 5077 Project aimed to field a next generation aircraft that could monitor the airspace and even the waters around Australia. They named their AWACS project “Wedgetail,” in honor of their native eagle.
Rather than picking the larger E-767, as the Japanese had done, they wanted to be able to buy a larger number of smaller and less expensive aircraft within their allotted budget. A set of small Initial Design Activity contracts were issued to 3 shortlisted firms in 1997, followed by bid submissions in early 1999 and selection of a preferred bidder.
MESA radarIn 2000, a Boeing/Northrop Grumman team beat 2 competing offers.
Raytheon’s offer involved the Israeli Elta Phalcon stationary active-array radar, mounted on an Airbus A310 widebody airframe. The Phalcon system is currently mounted on Israel and Singapore’s Gulfstream G550 jets, Chilean 707s, and India’s Russian-built IL-76s.
Lockheed Martin’s offer involved C-130J-30s fitted with rotating radomes derived from the E-2C Hawkeye carrier-launched AWACS. The C-130J-30 is used by the ADF as a transport aircraft, and the E-2C is in wide use by the USA, Egypt, France, Mexico, Singapore, and Taiwan.
Boeing’s 737-700 offered Australia a very successful, in-production commercial aircraft that could maintain consistent high-subsonic speeds. That gave it a coverage advantage over the C-130J, but not the A310. Its accompanying Northrop Grumman MESA radar was seen as the newest technology choice, however, which could deliver the best performance if it lived up to its claims. That seems to have given the 737 an edge over Raytheon’s Airbus offer – but it also led to a lot of problems with a developmental radar that wasn’t truly ready.
Program & Industrial Team KC-135 & E-7The initial contract wasn’t signed until December 2000, and the price quoted at the time was A$ 3 billion. DoD releases issued after Australia exercised 2 of its options for additional planes have used a figure of A$ 3.45 billion. ANAO’s 2012-13 report places the figure at A$ 3.83 billion, including factors like monetary inflation and currency exchange.
The real turbulence began in 2006, when a project that was held up as a model of acquisition reform, and reported as on time and on budget, suddenly “found” itself way behind schedule and over cost. This has led to widespread unhappiness in Australia.
The first 2 E-7A aircraft were supposed to be delivered in November 2006, and enter service in 2007. Full Operational Capability was originally scheduled for December 2008. Bottom line? Australia’s E-7As will be about 5 years behind schedule. Initial aircraft were delivered without key electronics, and began limited service and training over Australia at the end of 2009. The 1st aircraft in a ‘final’ configuration, which would still fall short in high-end war fighting scenarios, eventually arrived in May 2012. Initial Operational Capability and final acceptance actually began in November 2012, and Final Operational Capability isn’t expected until June 2015.
Boeing was also unhappy, as the A$ 3.45 billion contracts were structured in a way that shifted risk to the contractor. That has forced the firm to take hundreds of millions of dollars in write-offs. A 1999 Boeing release set out team responsibilities:
Feb 25/15: Real-world results.An RAAF officer spoke to media about the two real-world taskings the Wedgetail pulled: the marshaling of disparate aircraft in the search for Malaysia Airlines MH370 and in recent operations against ISIS. Wing Commander Paul Carpenter said the reliability rate was 90 percent or higher. He also said that since the platform is based on the Boeing 737, when it operated away from Australia, it benefited from high availability of the 737 support chain.
2014Support contract gets 5-year extension.
Flares test
July 7/17: Australia has contracted Boeing to carry out upgrades to the early-warning and control capabilities of its fleet of E-7A Wedgetail aircraft. Valued at $442.4 million, the aircraft will be fitted with new sensors as well as tactical data links, and communication and encryption systems. The project will be completed by mid-2022. Wedgetail aircraft are configured Boeing 737-700, with the addition of advanced Multi-Role Electronically Scanned Array (MESA) radar and 10 mission crew consoles. Australia currently has the aircraft deployed to the Middle East region as part of its contribution to the fight against the Islamic State.
March 17/14: Support. A 5-year, A$ 901 million support contract extension (q.v. July 29/13) to Boeing Defence Australia will help No.2 Sqn in Williamtown with program management, supply-chain management, engineering, and maintenance services until at least 2019. Deeper E-7A aircraft maintenance support and training services will also continue under this deal, but only to 2016. Australia’s DoD intends to open them up to competition after that, and Boeing will have to win again to keep that work.
The extension features 48% Australian content: A$ 433 million is being spent in Australia, including A$ 275 million in Newcastle, A$ 80 million Brisbane and Ipswich and $78 million in Adelaide.
The contract’s scope covers all 6 E-7A Wedgetail aircraft, a full flight simulator, an operational mission simulator, a software development and test laboratory, and maintenance facilities. The contract could be extended via annual extensions based on performance metrics, and Boeing’s key contract partners remain BAE Systems and Northrop Grumman. Sources: DoD, “Minister applauds $901 million Wedgetail sustainment contract” | Boeing Australia, “Boeing Signs Contract to Continue Support for Australia’s Wedgetail Program”.
2011 – 2013All E-7s delivered, planes are flying in exercises; IOC reached, but not Full Operational Capability; Changes in Boeing’s relationship with Australia’s DMO; Boeing Australia takes over support; ANAO report.
COPE NORTH 2012Dec 17/13: ANAO Report. Australia’s National Audit Office releases their 2012-13 Major Projects Report. AIR 5077 Phase 3 Wedgetail is one of the projects whose completion has slipped the most in the last year, adding a 20 month delay to make Final Operational Capability 78 months (6.5 years) late, in June 2015. That helped contribute to an A$ 91.4 million underspend in the past year. The program has spent A$ 3,452.5 million of A$ 3,843.7 budgeted, but it also has been adversely affected by inflation (A$ 1,111.1 million) and exchange variation (A$ 108.8 million) over that period. While Wedgetail was removed from the Projects of Concern list at Materiel Release 3 / Initial Operational Capability in November 2012:
“The performance shortfalls and technical difficulties are adversely affecting the transition into operational service and sustainment…. due to problems with sub?system integration, hardware availability, radar and electronic support measures maturity and aircraft modification.”
Final acceptance of the Mission Support Segment, Operational Mission Simulator, and Airborne Early Warning and Control Support Facility took place in December 2012, but Final Materiel Release has been delayed until December 2014, when Boeing is scheduled to finish remediation work.
Ongoing work with Boeing and Northrop Grumman has helped change minds at Australia’s DMO, and they now believe that they will fix almost all of the performance shortfalls through the settlement with Boeing. Radar performance in the clear has been “substantially remediated,” performance in clutter expected to see “substantial improvement” by December 2013, and a number of shortfalls in Electronic Support Measures (ESM), Electronic Warfare Self Protection (EWSP), communications datalinks/ data forwarding, and residual integrated system performance are getting better. Work also continues on system stability.
July 29/13: Support. Boeing Defence Australia Australian industry receives A$ 140 million to take on the E-7A Wedgetail support contract from Boeing USA (q.v. Jan 19/10). They’ll provide engineering, maintenance, spare parts and training support to Number 2 Squadron at RAAF Williamtown NSW, until the contract ends in 2015. Australian DMO | Australian DoD | Boeing.
Support passes to Boeing Australia
Dec 19/12: ANAO Report. The ANAO releases their 2010-2011 Major Projects Report. With respect to the E-7 program, ANAO says that successive software builds delivered to Australia’s fleet have improved integrated system performance. Unfortunately, other issues remain:
“….a radar remediation program was established. This program includes a radar collaborative research and development program. A contract for the collaborative program was signed on 21 June 2010. The program has been very successful and consequently the period of performance has been extended to the end of 2012. Radar performance in the clear has been recovered to very close to specification and substantial improvement in performance in clutter is anticipated by mid 2013. Further technical challenges in the development of the Communications, ESM, Electronic Warfare Self Protection (EWSP) and ground support systems are still being encountered…”
Dec 12/12: No concern. The Australian government officially removes the Wedgetail program from DoD’s “Projects of Concern” list. Australia DoD.
Off “Projects of Concern” list
Nov 19/12: IOC. Minister for Defence Materiel Jason Clare announces that the Airborne Early Warning & Control (AEW&C) Wedgetail aircraft has achieved Initial Operational Capability (IOC). For Australia, IOC is the minimum standard required to operate the fleet, including the readiness of a platform’s support infrastructure. Since 2011, the E-7A fleet has participated in Exercise Bersama Lima in Malaysia, Exercise Cope North Guam, Exercise Bersama Shield, the Red Flag multinational meet in Alaska, and most recently Exercise Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2012.
The announcement also marks final acceptance. ANAO attributes the delays in aircraft final acceptance to delays in completing the large volume of formal documentation required. Australia’s DoD has no word on when to expect Full Operational Capability. Australia DoD.
May 31/12: Final delivery. The Australian government announces that Boeing has delivered the 6th and final E-7A Wedgetail aircraft, which is now based with the rest of No. 2 Squadron at RAAFB Williamtown.
This is the very 1st E-7 delivered to Australia in ‘final’ configuration. There has, as yet, been no announcement regarding acceptance of the “final” configuration Wedgetail. In response to queries, Australia’s DoD said that Initial Operating Capability is expected by the end of 2012, adding that “Boeing plans to offer all six aircraft for final acceptance in the third quarter of 2012.”
Deliveries end
May 10/12: Exercise. Australia completes Exercise Bersama Shield 2012 with Malaysia, which included RAAF E-7A Wedgetail, AP-3C Orion, B300 King Air and F/A-18 Hornet aircraft, along with the frigate HMAS Ballarat and submarine HMAS Collins.
Feb 14/12: Exercise. Australia deploys 6 of its F/A-18F Super Hornet fighters, and 1 E-7A Wedgetail plane, and 3000 RAAF personnel to Guam for exercise COPE NORTH 2012. They will join the USAF’s B-52 bombers, F-15Cs, F-16s, F-16CJs and KC-135, and Japan’s F-15Js, F-2s and E-2Cs. More than 1,000 military personnel from around the world are expected to participate.
It’s the Wedgetail’s 2nd foreign deployment, but the plane is still operating in the very limited initial configuration.
Dec 20/11: ANAO Major Projects Report. The report lists the aircraft’s current schedule, and adds that:
“The Wedgetail test aircraft participated in the Canadian exercise, Trident Fury, during May 2011. The flights showed varying success, with some radar fixes flown showing excellent results. However, there were still issues with system stability, consistency and repeatability which undermined overall mission system utility. Electronic Support Measures (ESM) remains the most significant concern and schedule risk. Reliability, maintainability and supportability are the key ESM issues that have been highlighted during recent testing. The resolution of these ESM issues will be a primary driver of Final Acceptance.”
ESM systems are used to detect radar and other emitters, and backtrack them to their location. The report also says that “some radar deficiencies will remain at final delivery.”
December 2011: E-7 Increment 2. Upgrades are done on all 4 initial E-7A aircraft, bringing them to the 2nd increment of their initial configuration. Source: ANAO.
Nov 1/11: Exercise. An E-7A Wedgetail participates in the type’s 1st foreign deployment, at the Bersama Lima 2011 exercises with Malaysia. The RAAF shares the RAAFB Butterworth base in Malaysia with the RMAF, as part of a regional defense accord.
An Australian E-7A had participated in RIMPAC 2010, but Australia’s DoD confirms that the Hawaiian exercise was conducted by Boeing crew and maintainers, as part of the development program. Australia DoD.
July 2011: Manage Different. The Australian DMO’s bulletin magazine [PDF] covers the changed relationship between the DMO and Boeing, within the Wedgetail project. In early 2010, DMO/RRAF staff worked separately from Boeing, with security doors preventing access. DMO Flight Lieutenant (FLTLT) Rebecca Sharp:
“It was a real case of us versus them and these attitudes were deep seated,” she said. “The DMO staff felt as if the contractor was just in it for the money while the Boeing staff felt as though they were being used.”
Changes began amidst the program’s difficulties, beginning with co-locating in the same building, followed by joint mapping of business processes and value streams (Engineering, Operations, Maintenance, Supply Chain, HR/Training), and the application of LEAN business principles. The contract itself has reversed to outsource all Systems Project Office functions to Boeing, unless the fixed-fee contract explicitly says that they belong to the DMO or RAAF.
These changes have led to others. A co-located finance team shares project financial data for the 1st time in the DMO’s history. A common AEWCSPO Storyboard displays metrics related to cost, downtime, and capabilities. A Joint Integration Group (JIG) of representatives from Boeing, DMO, and the RAAF, meets on a weekly basis to share problems, ideas and issues. The JIG can also make operational decisions, instead of directing everything up to management level and creating endless delays. Similar groups exist higher up the food chain, but the JIG allows them to focus on strategy and future planning. The DMO says that these measures are saving money as well as time, while creating fundamental changes in the parties’ relationships.
Jan 28/11: Boeing losses. Flight International reports that Boeing’s Q4 and year-end 2010 earnings statement includes a new charge against earnings for its E-7A program, valued at $136 million. It covers “additional software development and testing required for acceptance of the Wedgetail aircraft” as well as “resolution of issues associated with the test program” for the Turkish air force’s similar “Peace Eagle” 737 AEW&C program.
It’s not clear whether these revelations mean more delays in store. Boeing release [PDF] | Conference Call | Flight International.
2009 – 20105-year support contract; FAA certification; Interoperability proven with ScanEagle UAVs; Still lots of issues, and Australia’s initial acceptance of 2 E-7s is conditional.
(click to view full)May 5/10: Acceptance. The first 2 Wedgetail aircraft are formally accepted by Minister for Defence Material and Science Greg Combet, during a ceremony at RAAF Base Williamtown in Newcastle, Australia. The RAAF will now work with Boeing to train personnel in operating the aircraft over the next 12 months. Combet acknowledges that the program will remain on Australia’s “projects of concern” list, noting performance shortcomings in his speech:
“In particular, I look forward to the delivery of the Electronic Support Measures and Electronic Warfare Self Protection Subsystems and improvements in both radar performance and integrated system performance over time… the MESA radar will be subject to a collaborative research and development program to examine potential improvements. This could provide real improvements in the radar and develop the radar expertise of Australian industry. As part of this, the Government is pleased to see the work being done to provide CEA Technologies, an innovative Australian Radar company, with opportunities to play a major role in supporting the Radar Subsystem in service.”
See: Australian DoD | Transcript of acceptance speech | The Australian | Sydney Morning Herald.
Acceptance – with reservations
Feb 2/10: Support. Thales Australia announces a 5-year agreement with Boeing Defence Australia to provide through-life maintenance and engineering support for the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) Wedgetail program’s Operational Flight Trainer (OFT). Price was not disclosed.
Developed by Thales in Australia and the UK, the Wedgetail OFT offers flight performance, air-to-air refuelling, flight deck and pilot tactical training capabilities. It’s customized to reflect unique characteristics of the Wedgetail AEW&C system, including controls for the communication, aerial refueling, and Electronic Warfare Self Protection systems. This OFT will be the sole Wedgetail pilot training device for the RAAF. The OFT was awarded the highest level of Australian flight simulator accreditation in June 2008, and allows the RAAF to graduate Wedgetail pilots with 100% of their type conversion training completed on the simulator. The term is called ‘zero flight time pilot training’, which is actually something of a misnomer because they will have a number of flying hours in other aircraft first.
Jan 19/10: Support. Boeing signs a 5-year, USD $600 million (A$ 800 million) In-Service Support contract from Australia’s Defence Materiel Organisation, for Project Wedgetail’s 6 aircraft. Under the performance-based logistics (PBL) contract, Boeing will provide acquisition, program management, integration and engineering services, with specified rewards for meeting or exceeding contract benchmarks.
Boeing Defence Australia will support the program with engineering, maintenance and training services and supply chain management. Subcontractor Northrop Grumman will support the aircrafts’ Multirole Electronically Scanned Array (MESA) radar. Boeing claims that the contract is expected to create more than 100 jobs in Newcastle, Australia, while providing continued and new employment for more than 100 personnel in Queensland, Australia. Boeing release | Australian DoD ceremony transcript and release.
5-year support contract
Airworthiness testDec 14/09: Testing. As part of planned tests for Australia’s Project Vigilare NC3S (Network Centric Command and Control System) the system completes its first data transmission with an RAAF Wedgetail aircraft. The Vigilare system installed at the RAAF’s Northern Regional Operations Centre in Northern Territory, Australia, successfully sent Link 16 transmissions to an airborne Wedgetail aircraft performing training missions over Australia’s east coast. Other platforms planned for this network include Australia’s F/A-18 Hornets, F/A-18E/F Super Hornets, its future P-8A Poseidon sea control aircraft, and its future Hobart Class Air Warfare Destroyers.
Developed by Boeing Defence Australia, Project Vigilare NC3S will combine data from land, sea, air and space platforms, sensors and data links, in order to help the ADF provide tactical and strategic surveillance across wide geographic regions, and perform battlespace-management operations as needed. Boeing release.
Nov 26/09: Delivery. Delivery of the first 2 Wedgetail aircraft to RAAFB Williamstown, in Australia, follows a commercial settlement with Boeing. As a result of this agreement, Boeing is making these 2 aircraft available to the RAAF for familiarization training, while it continues to work on the program. Australian Aviation writes that:
“The initial delivery denotes that the aircraft have been provided by Boeing to the RAAF for training purposes, but will not be formally handed over to their new owner until March 2010. Despite wearing their ADF serial numbers – A30-001 and A30-004 – the aircraft will remain on Boeing’s books and the US civil register until that time, and Boeing must provide a pilot in command and a flight test engineer on all RAAF training flights until the official handover.”
The aircraft also lack key electronics, but can be used along with the Williamstown AEW&C Support Centre’s Wedgetail Operational Flight Trainer, Operational Mission Simulator, and Mission Support System, in order to allow the RAAF to begin familiarization training for flight, mission and maintenance crews. Australian DoD | Boeing | The Australian | Newcastle Herald | News Australia | Australian Aviation | Seattle Post-Intelligencer.
Nov 9/09: Testing. Boeing confirms that it successfully completed tests of the Counter Measures Dispenser System (CMDS) for Project Wedgetail in September and October 2009. Tests were held off the Washington coast and over Puget Sound, over 19 flights that dispensed more than 500 units of chaff and flares.
Testing of BAE Systems’ CMDS system is just one step toward verification of the Wedgetail AEW&C aircraft’s overall Electronic Warfare Self-Protection (EWSP) capability, which will include LAIRCM defensive systems as well as chaff. See also Aviation Week.
Nov 6/09: Update. Australian Defence Magazine reports that late December 2009, Wedgetail aircraft will begin service over Australia in a training and domestic surveillance role. They will be limited to those uses, because the first 2 E-7As will not have operational electronic counter-measures systems that would allow their use in conflict zones. A total of 5 aircraft have received the basic Wedgetail conversion at this time, and the other 4 fully-equipped aircraft (plus 2 initial deliveries, for 6 total) are expected by the end of 2010. The report adds that:
“One of the final approval tests with the aircraft is expected in Seattle in early November [2009] when ECM tests firing flare and chaff are completed… We understand negotiations about the status and capability of the Wedgetail aircraft, and particularly the performance of their Northrop Grumman MESA radar have been underway for some time between Boeing, Northrop Grumman and the Defence Department.”
July 13/09: Radar issues. The Sydney Morning Herald quotes Air Vice Marshal Chris Deeble, who says that the first 2 Wedgetails are on target for delivery by Nov 30/09, and are now ready to be used for training and initial operations. He also says, however, that ironing out key issues with the plane’s radar could take a couple more years, and the report details those issues:
“The key remaining radar problems relate to its clutter performance – the ability to detect targets such as low-flying aircraft against a ground or water backdrop in certain circumstances – side lobes – extraneous radar signals which could create false images – and stability, where some combinations of operator commands cause mission computers to halt temporarily or even lock up.”
Boeing is scheduled to deliver 4 Wedgetails in full configuration between March and September 2010, after which the first 2 aircraft will also be upgraded to full specification. Depending on how quickly the radar and software issues sort themselves out, further upgrades may become necessary.
May 19/09: Testing. The Australian reports that the Wedgetail project has performed well in a series of tests and technical reviews:
“Senior defence and industry sources say the Wedgetail, a modified Boeing 737-700 aircraft with a specially developed phased array radar, performed well in flight tests over the Northern Territory a fortnight ago.
Ten days ago, a Wedgetail aircraft flying out of Canberra with senior defence officials on board also performed satisfactorily, with its radar detecting RAAF F/A-18 fighters from Williamtown air base, near Newcastle.
The aerial trials of the high-tech airborne air defence system followed a lengthy series of laboratory tests earlier this year on the performance of the Wedgetail’s radar by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Lincoln Laboratory.
The Lincoln Laboratory assessment found there were no fundamental performance problems with the state-of-the art phased array radar that would place the Wedgetail project in jeopardy.”
May 19/09: Certification. The RAAF’s Wedgetail aircraft receive US FAA supplemental type certification. The certification is supplemental because it’s an amendment to the existing civil certification for the 737-700IGW (increased gross weight). International certifications are required in order to fly in civil airspace. The Australian | Aviation Week.
FAA certification
March 16/09: Testing. Boeing’s two-fer. Australia’s Project JP129 failure has created an opening for Boeing’s ScanEagle UAV, but its flagship “Wedgetail” E-7A AWACS faces questions. Boeing responded by linking 2 birds with one datalink: a live demonstration in which a not-yet-delivered Wedgetail aircraft flying over Washington State, USA, controlled and received sensor data from 3 ScanEagle UAVs.
The 3 ScanEagles were launched from Boeing’s Boardman Test Facility in eastern Oregon, approximately 120 miles/ 190 km away from the airborne Wedgetail. Using the company’s UAS battle-management software, airborne operators issued NATO-standard sensor and air-vehicle commands via a UHF satellite communication link and ground-station relay. Operators tasked the UAVs with area search, reconnaissance, point surveillance and targeting, while the UAVs sent back real-time video imagery of ground targets.
Boeing will conduct a follow-on demonstration for the Australian government in early May 2009 at RAAF Base Williamtown in New South Wales. A Wedgetail will take control of ScanEagles operated by Boeing Defence Australia personnel at Woomera Test Facility in South Australia, approximately 1,080 miles/ 1,730 km from Williamtown.
Feb 27/09: Training. Australia’s Project Wedgetail AEW&C program accepts an operational flight trainer (OFT) from Boeing, as the first segment of the Wedgetail program to be delivered to Australia. The simulator was installed at the Wedgetail AEW&C Support Center at RAAF base Williamtown.
The motion-based flight simulator was designed, built and installed by Thales, and managed under a subcontract by Boeing Defence Australia. The OFT is customized to account for the Australian aircrafts’ unique characteristics, including controls for the communication, aerial-refueling and Electronic Warfare Self Protection systems. Prior to delivery, the OFT passed a series of certification tests and was awarded the highest “zero flight time status” accreditation, allowing experienced pilots to train using an accredited simulator instead of an actual aircraft.
RAAF pilots have used the OFT since October 2007, in order to familiarize themselves with the Wedgetail AEW&C flight deck and to develop training scenarios. It will now be used for full pilot training. Boeing.
Feb 25/09: Update. Aviation Week reports comments by that Wedgetail project manager Air Vice Marshal Chris Deeble to an Australian parliamentary committee. While the initial jet is scheduled for delivery in November 2009 with limited performance, Australia expects the other 5 jets to be delivered to the full specification:
“We have made no concessions to Boeing… Neither have they sought any concessions to a reduction in the performance.” But he adds that not all program risks have been mitigated.”
Feb 13/09: Testing. The Australian publishes a follow-on story, which covers the MIT Lincoln Lab’s testing of the E-7A’s MESA radar:
“The Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Lincoln Laboratory is undertaking the review, assisted by a small team from Australia’s Defence Science and Technology Organisation… Senior defence sources say the problems with the radar go beyond simple target identification and software integration issues to the basic performance and geometry of the system, which sits on top of the 737’s fuselage.
The Lincoln Laboratory assessment is due to be completed by the end of March and will be followed by flight testing over northern Australia in May… Subject to further tests later this year, Boeing expects to deliver an initial 737 aircraft to the RAAF for training tasks in November with the first two planes achieving full capability by March next year.”
Jan 21-28/09: Testing. Boeing conducts successful functional airworthiness flights of 2 Project Wedgetail 737-700s from Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) base Amberley.
The flight followed major aircraft modifications performed by Boeing Defence Australia at Amberley, including the installation and checkout of an advanced Multi-role Electronically Scanned Array (MESA) antenna, ventral fins and mission system equipment.
The two aircraft will be painted with RAAF markings over the next few weeks. Boeing will finish installing mission system equipment on both aircraft, and conduct a series of ground checkouts later in 2009. Boeing release.
Jan 7-10/09: Testing. Boeing and the USAF conduct the first aerial refuelings involving a 737-based aircraft, as part of Project Wedgetail. The fights were conducted at Edwards AFB in California, and involved a USAF KC-10 tanker on Dec 7/08 and a USAF KC-135 on Dec 10/08. Boeing release.
2007 – 2008Multiple delays announced, as Boeing begins taking substantial write-offs.
Wedgetai over SydneyNov 20/08: Delays. Announcements are made that the Wedgetail Project will have its delivery date pushed back yet again, with the first aircraft not expected until late 2009, initial operating capability waiting until 2011, and full operating capability waiting until 2012. Even those dates are not firm, however, as they depend on Boeing’s ability to solve major technical issues.
The Australian quotes Australia’s Defence Procurement Secretary Greg Combet, who said the project was on the government’s “Projects of Concern” watchlist but that there were no plans to cancel it:
“Just last week there was a summit held in Canberra where we discussed how we are going to move things forward. I am pleased to say progress was made in those discussions but there is much more work to be done yet. This probably the project that keeps me awake the most at night.”
Meanwhile, Australia’s Courier News reports that:
“Senior military officers have admitted the prime contractor, US giant Boeing, and its sub-contractors have no idea how to fix the main problem – an unworkable radar system… Air Vice-Marshal Deeble qualified his [2011-2012] timetable by saying it depended on solving the technical issues with the MESA radar built by US firm Northrop Grumman… In a desperate bid for answers, the Defence Materiel Organisation has contracted the world-leading independent radar house MIT Lincoln Lab to investigate. “That will be important for us to understand the baseline performance and any path forward for remediation of any shortfall of the radar,” Air Vice-Marshal Deeble told the Senate.”
Sources. The Age: Nov 20 report || The Australian: Nov 21 report | Nov 24 report || Courier-Mail.
Jan 22/08: Testing. The first Wedgetail aircraft modified by Boeing Australia Ltd (aircraft #3 in the program) takes off on a successful functional check flight to verify the airworthiness of the aircraft’s systems and structures. Boeing Australia release | Boeing release with photo.
June 6/07: Testing. Boeing begins flight testing under Project Wedgetail. During an initial 4-hour flight from Boeing Field in Seattle, WA, the crew conducted a series of functional tests as part of a program to measure the mission system’s impact on the aircraft’s power generation capability and environmental controls, such as the liquid and air cooling systems. Boeing release | Gizmag.
March 20/07: Testing. Boeing announces that communications, navigation, mission computing, radar and electronic warfare self protection subsystems has been completed aboard a 737 airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft for Australia’s Project Wedgetail. Functional checkout of the AEW&C system with the aircraft is scheduled for the end of April 2007, and FAA certification and qualification testing are scheduled for summer 2007. Boeing’s release promises delivery of the first 2 Wedgetail aircraft in March 2009, and the remaining 4 aircraft by mid-2009.
Boeing conducted tests aboard the aircraft and at its System Integration Lab in Kent, WA, using a variety of simulations. “The tests demonstrated that the systems worked separately and together, and that they were compatible with the aircraft,” said Ross Dessert, Boeing Wedgetail program manager at the time.
Feb 2/07: Delays. The Australian reports that the Wedgetail early-warning aircraft project has been delayed again, pushing back the expected acceptance date to 2009 and contributing to another $US 274 million fourth quarter write-off by Boeing. Initial operation capability is now expected in 2010. The report adds that:
“Most importantly, it has had problems getting the revolutionary phased array radar — a Northrop Grumman system forming the centrepiece of the new planes — to work properly. The problems have already resulted in a $US496 million write-off in Boeing’s second-quarter results last year and prompted a comprehensive review of the program… But it says it has worked with suppliers to move significant resources to the program and is now confident it can meet its revised timetable as well as the RAAF’s operational requirements.”
2005 – 2006Sudden flip from “everything’s great and on schedule” to “we’re going to be delayed, and we don’t know how badly.”
E-7A WedgetailJune 29/06: Delays. Australia’s Minister for Defence Dr. Brendan Nelson, announces that the Wedgetail project has fallen behind schedule:
“During our talks, Boeing CEO Jim Albaugh confirmed the Wedgetail project has slipped behind schedule. Until recently, Boeing was advising that this project had been running well and achieving significant success for one of such complexity… The extent of the delay will be determined by intense project reviews over the next two months… The contract between the ADF and Boeing does include a provision for liquidated damages. The government is reserving its contractual rights in this regard.”
June 29/06: Boeing tells its investors that it will recognize charges related to delays on the Project Wedgetail and the similar Turkish “Peace Eagle” project, when it announces second-quarter 2006 results July 26.
“Boeing expects to record a charge of between $300 million and $500 million pre-tax due to delays related to its Airborne Early Warning & Control (AEW&C) program for Australia and Turkey… Delivery of the first two Wedgetail aircraft and that effort’s flight test schedule have been delayed up to 18 months because of development and integration issues with certain hardware and software components. Boeing now plans to deliver all six Wedgetail aircraft by the end of 2008 and is developing the Peace Eagle schedule with its Turkish customer.”
March 09/06: Testing. Boeing and Northrop Grumman Electronic Systems have completed ground testing of the Multi-role Electronically Scanned Array (MESA) radar aboard a 737 airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft for Australia’s Project Wedgetail, clearing it for flight testing at full power. Boeing also integrated the radar and Identification Friend or Foe system, allowing for simultaneous operation and more efficient targeting and data collection. Jack Delange, 737 AEW&C integration and test manager:
“The testing demonstrated the radar would not interfere with the aircraft’s avionics and engines and is compatible with the mission system hardware and software.”
Boeing’s release adds that: “Australia has purchased six 737 AEW&C aircraft. The first two will be delivered for initial operational capability in July 2007. The remaining aircraft are scheduled to be delivered by 2008.”
Jan 16/06: Testing. Australia’s DoD announces that a Wedgetail aircraft has successfully conducted a ‘world first’ 360 degree scanning with a fixed airborne phased array radar.
Defence Minister Robert Hill says the airborne test of the radar, carried out by the combined Boeing and Defence Materiel Organisation AEW&C project team based in the USA, lasted more than 3 hours and operated trouble-free.
Jan 16/06: First delivery of a 737-700 aircraft to Boeing Australia for modifications, as it arrives at RAAF Amberley. Australian DoD | Space Mart.
Sept 01/05: Boeing announces the first in-flight test of the Northrop Grumman MESA radar aboard a 737 airborne early warning and control aircraft for Australia’s Project Wedgetail. The 6-hour flight test over Washington state followed 3 weeks of ground testing of the radar in Victorville, CA. The ground testing verified the compatibility of the radar with other aircraft systems while operating and scanning through 360 degrees.
The firm is still promising delivery of the first 2 aircraft in 2006. Jack DeLange, 737 AEW&C integration and test manager:
“The mission was flawless… All of the first radar flight test objectives were achieved.”
July 05/05: Testing. Boeing announces successful completion of the air performance and flight handling test program for Australia’s first Wedgetail 737 aircraft.
March 17/05: Boeing and BAE Systems Australia Limited, today signed a world teaming agreement to capture similar business with their 737 AEW&C platform. Boeing release.
March 15/05: A Boeing 737 Wedgetail aircraft lands in Canberra, Australia, as part of Boeing’s participation in the Australian International Airshow at Avalon in Victoria. In the DoD release, Senator Hill says
“In the four years since project signature, it is still on schedule and on budget.”
2003 – 2004Order for 2 more; Program HQ opened.
E-7A WedgetailNov 23/04: Boeing announces installation of the MESA radar assembly on a 2nd 737-700 for Australia’s Project Wedgetail. The Northrop Grumman-built MESA antenna is 35.5 feet long and weighs more than 3 tons.
June 3/04: Australia formally commits to the purchase of 2 additional Wedgetail Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft in a special signing ceremony at the Royal Australian Air Force Base Amberley. DoD release:
“The $3.4 billion AEW&C project, which is on budget and ahead of schedule, will equip the RAAF with a fleet of six Wedgetail aircraft and provide a state-of-the-art air and maritime surveillance capability. Four of the six aircraft will be modified in Australia. The first of these is scheduled to arrive at RAAF Amberley late next year, with the final Wedgetail due for completion in early 2008.
Australian industry involvement in Project Wedgetail is already worth more than $A 400 million. Completion of the four aircraft in Australia will increase that Australian industry involvement by $80 million. Strategic industry development activity worth an additional $99 million has also been included with the purchase of the extra two aircraft. “The Wedgetail project will create around 170 new jobs in South East Queensland – most based at Amberley,” Senator Hill said.”
May 21/04: Australia’s DoD announces the first flight of the Royal Australian Air Force’s new “Wedgetail” Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft, at Boeing Field in Seattle in the United States.
May 12/04: Boeing announces that Australia has exercised options to purchase 2 of its 3 optional Project Wedgetail aircraft, raising its total order to 6 fully-equipped planes. The options are valued at approximately $180 million, as the original contract had included 6 AEW&C systems. Boeing’s release adds that:
“Delivery of the first two 737 AEW&C aircraft to the Royal Australian Air Force is scheduled for 2006. The other four aircraft will be delivered by 2008.”
1st flight;
2 more E-7As =
6 TL.
March 5/04: Infrastructure. Australia’s DoD:
“Defence Minister Robert Hill today opened the new headquarters for Australia’s $3.27 billion Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) Wedgetail aircraft. The headquarters at Williamtown near Newcastle is also the official new home of Air Force’s re-formed No 2 Squadron, who will fly the AEW&C Wedgetail when it becomes operational.”
The current DoD schedule has the first Wedgetail flight in Seattle in May 2004, and the first 2 aircraft being officially handed over to the RAAF in November 2006. Sen. Hill:
“The headquarters is the first tangible delivery for the project, which has been leading the way for reform in Defence Materiel Organisation projects… In the three years since project signature, it is still ahead of schedule and on budget.
The opening of the headquarters today also marks the beginning of long-term relationship with the Hunter region. It is the first stage of a $149 million redevelopment of the RAAF base, which includes hangars and parking areas for the AEW&C Wedgetail and improvements to the runways and taxiways. The construction program has created about 255 jobs on the base and more indirect jobs related to the prefabrication, supply and distribution of material for the project in the region.”
Nov 03/03: Testing. Australian DoD and Boeing announcements re: successful installation and testing of the power distribution system on the first 737-AEW&C platform, ahead of schedule. The first airworthiness flight of the aircraft is scheduled for spring 2004. Defence Minister Robert Hill:
“Australia’s new AEW&C aircraft remain under budget and on track to entering into service in 2007, providing us with a key air and maritime surveillance capability.”
Oct 21/03: Boeing installs the Multi-role Electronically Scanned Array antenna on the first 737-700 for Project Wedgetail.
May 19/03: Component CDR. The Australian DoD announces a successful critical design review (CDR) for BAE Systems Australia’s Electronic Warfare Self Protection and Electronic Support Measures Subsystems.
2001 – 2002Project reviews for key technologies that are still in development.
Manufacturing lineNov 8/02: “Defence Minister Robert Hill today welcomed the completion of the first Radar and Identification Friend or Foe antenna for Australia’s new Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft.” DoD release.
Oct 31/02: Boeing photo release:
“The first Australian Wedgetail aircraft was rolled out Oct. 31 during a ceremony at the Boeing plant in Renton, Wash. The 737-700 will be transformed into a platform for an Airborne Early Warning & Control System, or AEW&C. Modifications to the aircraft begin in 2003. Project Wedgetail is named after Australia’s native eagle.”
See also the Australian DoD Nov 1/02 release, which adds that:
“Defence Minister Robert Hill today saw the first airframe for Australia’s new [A$] 3.45 billion airborne early warning and control aircraft fleet – fresh off the production line at Boeing’s Military Flight Centre in Seattle, United States… With the first air frame ready for modification we expect our first Wedgetail aircraft to fly before the end of the year – around six months ahead of schedule – with the first two aircraft of the fleet expected to be in service in 2007,” Senator Hill said.”
Rollout
July 12/02: Component PDR. Boeing announces a successful preliminary design review for Project Wedgetail’s airborne mission system. The review was conducted on schedule — one year after the start of the System Acquisition contract. It includes a general review of the airborne mission system design against the requirements established by the Commonwealth of Australia. It shows how the radar, communications, mission computing , electronic warfare self protection, navigation, and aircraft subsystems integrate together.
Group Capt. Lindsay Ward, leader of the Australian Defence Resident Project team:
“The airborne mission segment is the most complex and highly integrated single element in the overall AEW&C System we are buying from Boeing. The review therefore represented the culmination of a huge amount of work… Under our partnering approach with the contractor team headed by Boeing, the program has a solid track record of facing up to and resolving issues so that we can keep forging ahead while still meeting required capability outcomes. This review was no exception.”
Boeing’s release adds that it expects to deliver the first two aircraft to the Commonwealth of Australia in 2006.
April 23/02: Component CDR. Boeing announces a successful critical design review (CDR) for Project Wedgetail’s MESA radar and identification friend or foe subsystems.
“The review was completed on schedule and confirmed that the detailed design developed by Boeing S&C teammate Northrop Grumman Electronic Systems is producible, supportable, maintainable and will yield the required performance characteristics… Boeing and Northrop Grumman also examined the interfaces between the design elements of the radar and between the radar subsystem and the other aircraft and mission system elements to make sure the radar/identification, friend or foe (IFF) subsystem will function properly within the entire airborne mission system.”
Nov 26/01: Component PDR. Boeing announces a successful preliminary design review (PDR) for the mission computing subsystem hardware in Project Wedgetail. It included a review of the hardware elements of the mission computing subsystem against the requirements assigned to that hardware. BAE Systems, New York is the Boeing subcontractor providing the mission computing hardware.
The hardware includes the mission computers, the mission system operator consoles and a tactical display in the cockpit. The mission computing subsystem processes and integrates basic data provided by various mission system sensors; analyzes and presents it to the operators as an integrated situation display of the battlespace environment; and provides them with controls of the sensors and communications suite.
Sept 19/01: Component PDR. Boeing announces a successful preliminary design review (PDR) of the radar and identification friend or foe (IFF) systems for Australia’s Project Wedgetail, on schedule and within budget.
The PDR includes a general review of the radar/IFF design against the Wedgetail radar subsystem requirements established by the Commonwealth of Australia. It is the first major design milestone in the development of this system.
2000 and EarlierFrom approval, to initial competition, to the initial award for 4 Boeing jets.
MESA radar assemblyDec 20/2000: Boeing signs a contract with the Commonwealth of Australia for the development and acquisition of Project Wedgetail. The contract is worth A$ 3 billion according to the DoD release (about $2.04 billion). Defence Minister Moore:
“The AEW&C system is a strategically important capability that will make a major contribution to Australia’s air combat capability, significantly multiplying the combat power of the upgraded F/A-18 fleet. The system will improve command and control, and the capacity for air defence of surface ships. It also will enhance Australia’s strike capability.
“Importantly it will also provide support to Coastwatch activities, as it will be capable of covering four million square kilometres during a single 10 hour mission – that’s the equivalent of Darwin to Perth and back again.”
The contract involves 4 of its 737-700 systems, 6 AEW&C systems, and an option for up to 3 more aircraft at set prices. Initial training and support will also be part of the packagem and the in-service date for the first 2 aircraft is set for 2007. Note that in-service dates usually come some months after the delivery date, due to testing etc. Australian DoD | Boeing release.
Team Boeing wins Wedgetail contract
Aug 21/2000: Delays. Australia’s Minister for Defence John Moore announces that the Federal Government had decided to defer consideration of the Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) project to establish whether it fits into the balance of the ADF’s required capabilities in the context of the forthcoming Defence White Paper.
That White Paper is released on Dec 6/2000. It will be out of date in less than a year.
July 21/99: Boeing picked. Boeing announces that its team has been selected as the preferred tenderer for Australia’s Project Wedgetail.
Jan 27/99: A Boeing-led team, including Northrop Grumman, British Aerospace Australia and Boeing Australia Limited, submits its response to a Request for Tender for Australia’s Project Wedgetail. It details the team’s solution to meet the AEW&C requirements of the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), including 7 of its 737 AEW&C systems, plus ground support segments for flight and mission crew training, mission support and system modification support.
“Source selection is expected by mid-1999… Australia’s AEW&C acquisition strategy that began a year ago with an Initial Design Activity (IDA) contract. During that period, the Boeing team and Australia worked together to develop an approved functional requirements baseline and then developed detailed subsystem design requirements.”
Boeing’s release also sets out team responsibilities:
Dec 3/97: Australia’s DoD awards 3 Initial Design Activity contracts by the Australian Defence Force for the Project Wedgetail airborne early warning & control (AEW&C) system. The contracts are valued at A$ 8.5 million (about $6.5 million) each:
Boeing’s release states that:
“Managing Director of Boeing Australia Limited, David Gray, said that the contract is worth $6.5 million and during the next year, Boeing will work “closely with the ADF on developing a design solution that meet its AEW&C requirements.”… A production contract is expected to be awarded in 1999 and the Royal Australian Air Force plans to enter the AEW&C capability into service in 2002.”
Wedgetail initial design contracts
Dec 2/97: Australian Minister for Defence Ian McLachlan announces government approval for acquisition of an AEW&C capability. The announcement was included in the Minister’s statement on Australia’s new strategic policy.
Australia approves AEW&C program
Feb 19/97: Boeing announces that it is offering its Next-Generation 737-700 aircraft to the Royal Australian Air Force as an Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) system platform. Australia has named the project “Wedgetail” in honor of its native eagle.
Oct 14/96: Australia’s Minister for Defence, Mr. Ian McLachlan announces the short-list of potential prime contractors: Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman and Raytheon E-Systems are selected after evaluation of responses to a world-wide Invitation to Register Interest in the AEW&C Project.
“Although two of the companies, Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman, have recently announced an intention to team for this project, both have asked to be considered separately until their teaming arrangements have been finalised.”
IRI produces shortlist
Additional Readings The AircraftEDA's CapTech Materials & Structures recently organised a workshop on “Smart textiles in defence” at AITIIP Technological Centre in Zaragoza (Spain). It gathered 27 experts from various European Ministries of Defence, industry, SMEs and academia related to this technology domain. The objectives were to raise awareness and better understand the potential of smart textiles and discuss the impact of these technologies on future defence capabilities.
Today, efforts in this field are focused on the development of standards to define terms, definitions, technical specifications and requirements for smart textiles. Future trends include multi-functionalities to make the soldier lighter, safer, and smarter. Specifically the main trends include the monitoring of the well-being, health status and protection of the soldier, including adaptive camouflage and reducing the weight. Given the interest of the smart textiles for different applications, highlighted in the Materials Strategic Research Agenda (SRA), this workshop sought to gather experts in related fields to discuss future research directions within Europe, when applying this kind of materials to defence systems.
The workshop brought forward multiple success stories of smart textiles used in different defence applications with functions such as: thermal control, moisture control, UV protection, functional bactericidal and self-cleaning. Ongoing activities and projects were presented by EDA and organizations from Member States showing the increasing interest and potential of smart textiles for enhancing soldier systems. Among the most targeted research areas were shown to be: durability, thermal comfort, adaptive camouflage, measurement and communication sensors, energy harvesting and recovery, modelling and simulation tools and new materials such as graphene or bio-composites.
The discussion also addressed manufacturing and commercialization of smart textiles, recognizing the growing market and opportunities stemming from the technological developments taking place in the civilian sector. Furthermore, the certification and standardization aspects were highlighted with particular attention paid to ensuring product quality and development of legislation.
The main outcome of the workshop was the identification of the areas for cooperation at EU level, especially in terms of identifying and testing the available systems, and several proposals were put forward for in-depth study and future activities. Another conclusion of the workshop included the need of shaping future priorities and defining stages toward the goal of achieving multifunction soldier uniforms.
The workshop was followed by the 37th meeting of the CapTech Materials & Structures held in the research centre ITAInnova on 31 May and 1 June. The meeting focused on the review of the CapTech’s current activities and on the discussion about future actions and upcoming opportunities. The efforts of the CapTech were further acknowledged with the occasion of the visit to the EDA Additive Manufacturing facility deployed in the Zaragoza Airbase. The successful deployment of a 3D-printing lab for the duration of EAATTC 17-3 represents the main focus of EDA’s ground-breaking project, “Additive Manufacturing Feasibility Study & Technology Demonstration”. The deployment underscored the strong interest and potential of AM technologies across all military branches (pilots, maintenance, technicians and logistic support), who were keen to learn how 3D-printing could benefit their area of expertise. The success of this showcasing has significantly contributed to raising awareness on the operational application of these technologies and on the potential synergistic effects of undertaking European defence R&T activities.
The workshop and the Materials CapTech meeting was co-organized by EDA’s CapTechs Materials & Structures, Land Systems and CBRN & Human Factors, and the Research and Technology Organizations CITEVE, AITEX, ITAInnova and the Spanish MoD.
More information:
The Afghan Local Police (ALP) emerged out of an American special forces’ project to establish ‘community defence forces’ in 2009 and 2010. Despite being viewed by many as ‘militias in uniform’, the ALP has survived and grown to become a significant part of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), present in all but one of Afghanistan’s provinces. AAN’s Kate Clark outlines its current shape and strength, before looking at current reforms aimed at making the ALP accountable on pay, personnel and equipment. The United States, sole funder of the ALP, has said future support is conditional on having a ‘reformed ALP’.
This dispatch is part of a joint three-year project of AAN, the Global Public Policy institute (GPPi), and the American University of Iraq, Sulaimani (AUIS). The project explores the role and impact of militias, local or regional defence forces or other quasi-state forces in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, including their foreign assistance to such actors. Funding is provided by the Netherlands Research Organisation.
From idea to establishment
The idea of a community defence force first emerged in 2009, as the Taleban insurgency grew in intensity and the ANSF was found wanting. US military, especially special operations forces (SOF), were vocal proponents of the idea that the people had to be ‘empowered’ to defend themselves. As part of the counterinsurgency strategy, they proposed that these local forces would be built from the ground-up by small SOF teams:
… living among the people in rural villages (surrounded by the insurgents and the populace), building relationships and assisting the populace to stand up against insurgents, while re-empowering their traditional local governance structures within the village through the shura to establish ALP to enable a local “security bubble” around the village.(1)
This ‘bottom up’ approach to security was a particularly strong theme in the dominating counter-insurgency philosophy of those years. In the initial model, SOF were heavily involved in the recruitment, training, and direct mentoring of the small, village-level, defense forces that would become the ALP. Then Minister of Interior (now National Security Advisor) Hanif Atmar supported the idea, but President Hamed Karzai was reluctant to authorise the programme. Like many Afghans, he associated such forces with the pro-government militias of the PDPA era and the factionalised civil war of the mid-1990s. He also wanted to keep centralised government control over the security apparatus. Nevertheless, on 16 August 2010, he agreed to the establishment of community defence forces, to be known as the Afghan Local Police, so long as they came under Ministry of Interior (MoI) and Afghan National Police (ANP) control, authorising them with Decree 3196.
In part due to these concerns, the ALP was initially capped at 10,000 forces. But that number was expanded to 30,000 by 2012, because of higher demands on the ANSF, some legitimate community desire for local forces and a fair amount of interest by powerbrokers keen to co-opt the new force. In 2012, the ALP was regularised, with training standardised – from then on, it took place at provincial or regional training centres. The various rules and responsibilities governing the ALP, the MoI and its US backers were laid out in a document, ALP Establishment, Organization and Activities Procedures. This was revised in 2014 and 2015, but remains the key document governing the ALP.
The role, rules and casualties of the Afghan ‘community’ police
Today, the ALP is a significant part of the ANSF, with about 29,000 local policemen present in 199 districts in 31 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces (20 new districts were added earlier in 2017, achieved through a redistribution of the tashkil, the authorised force). According to the Procedures, ALP units should only be set up in areas threatened by the insurgency, where ‘the community’ wants to defend itself and the ANP and/or Afghan National Army can support the ALP. The community should be involved in introducing ALP candidates. The candidates should also be vetted by the Afghan intelligence agency, the NDS, and MoI Intelligence. As it is a defensive force, ALP checkpoints should be no more than one kilometre away from the village and local policemen should not be deployed away except under the express orders of the Provincial Police Chief (this happened during the defence of Kunduz in 2015, and Lashkargah in 2016, for example). Training is a four-week course with instruction in the use of weapons, checkpoint defence, human rights, avoiding civilian casualties, dealing with detainees and hygiene.
The ALP’s backers have always insisted that the force is important in holding back the Taleban, and many communities have reportedly asked for ALP. The US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) gives a good description of why, if it works, the ALP should work well.
…[the] key strengths of the ALP include its ability to distinguish local residents from insurgents, a higher level of perceived trustworthiness compared to outside forces, and an intimate knowledge of villages’ vulnerable sites and exit routes. Additionally, a MoI Deputy Minister noted that the effectiveness of the ALP is based, in part, on its ability to garner public support since its personnel are from the immediate area.
However, evidence of ALP being imposed on communities, of abusive behaviour and of the capture of units by strongmen and tanzims (the old armed factions) is evident in much of the research, with political connections between ALP and figures in central government often making control of abusive forces impossible. (See fine-grained analysis of ALP at the district level by AAN (for example on Khas Uruzgan here and here, on Dand-e Shahabuddin in Baghlan on Chahrdara on Khanabad and on Kunduz city; and larger-scale research by Jonathan Goodhand and Aziz Hakimi, Deedee Derksen and Human Rights Watch.) Other studies, including by the International Crisis Group and a US expert group which had top-level access to both the ALP and the US military, have found a more mixed picture. The US expert group found ALP units ranged from “highly effective” – enhancing local security, undermining insurgent influence, and facilitating governance and development – to those “causing more harm than good to the counterinsurgency” – ineffective, predatory, or engaged in collusion with the enemy. (2) It reported the US SOF’s assessment at the time, that one third of ALP units were effective, one third counter-productive and one third somewhere in between. (A working paper by AAN and GPPi reviewing the literature on the ALP and similar militias and quasi-state forces in Afghanistan can be read here).
Perhaps the strongest evidence that the ALP can be a stabilising or protecting force comes in more recent reports by the UNAMA human rights monitoring team into the protection of civilians in conflict. For example, its mid-year 2014 report said, “Most communities continued to welcome the stability and enhanced security provided by the ALP,” and “reported improved security following ALP deployment.” At the same time, UNAMA has continued to attribute incidents of abuse and civilian casualties to the ALP. Its 2016 report (see AAN analysis), for example, reported nine incidents of threat, intimidation and harassment, including severe beatings, extortion, theft, threats and two incidents of sexual abuse, including one involving a child. It did say that the number of civilian casualties compared to 2015 had halved, although many of those civilian deaths (15 out of 20) were deliberate killings.
UNAMA said it had observed increased efforts by the MoI’s ALP Directorate to hold individuals within the ALP to account for criminal acts. There were 108 arrests and referrals of local policemen to the Attorney-General’s Office in 2016, and 99 convictions. According to the head of the ALP Staff Directorate, Colonel Ali Shah Ahmadzai, these were for a variety of allegations, including killing, harassment, illegal taxation, threats and rape, as well as other charges that were far less serious. In June 2016, the Directorate also ordered additional training on rules of engagement, the laws of war and human rights law. UNAMA said these increased efforts may have been one factor contributing to the reduction in civilian casualties in 2016; the other possible contributing factor cited by UNAMA was the removal of about 2000 ALP considered to be under the control of strongmen or tanzims (more on this below).(3) UNAMA said there was still more work to be done, however, and said it was still “concerned at the prevailing lack of accountability for violations of human rights committed by Afghan Local Police.” (The ALP is, of course, not alone in having in its ranks men who commit abuses and violate the laws of war, as UNAMA’s reporting on the protection of civilians also makes clear.)
Both Colonel Ahmadzai and Lt. Gen. Mohammed Salem Ehsas, assistant to the Deputy Minister of Interior for Security and in charge of the ALP, said that most ALP were working well, but some units were highly problematic, especially in the northern provinces of Badakhshan, Takhar, Faryab, Baghlan and Kunduz and in certain districts in Uruzgan, Ghazni and Wardak. Both they and Colonel Charlie Getz, until recently the director of the part of NATO which mentors ALP, the Special Operations Advisory Group, also contended that the ALP was often blamed unfairly for abuses. On further investigation, they all said, many crimes laid at the door of the ALP turned out to have been carried out by other forces, pro-government armed groups, an ‘uprising force’ (government-supported local militias) or even the ANP. The ALP has “a branding problem,” said Getz.
As to their strategic value, it can be said, at a minimum, that the ALP are particularly detested by the Taleban, which suggests that in some places at least, they are a difficult enemy for the insurgents to deal with. As Michael Semple of Queen’s University, Belfast, has written in 2015:
… the Afghan Taliban perceive arbakai (government-backed community militias) as the greatest threat to their influence, which are formed when the Taliban fail to secure consent to their presence. Armed groups know that losing the argument with communities may mean losing the war.
According to AAN colleague Borhan Osman, when the ALP and similar locally-raised forces first emerged, the Taleban took a particularly harsh approach towards them, with campaigns aimed at killing both local policemen and the elders who backed them. (The casualty numbers bear this out, with more ALP killed proportionally than ANA soldiers, at a ratio of 5:7-8, according to an estimate by Ahmadzai. He reported that, each month, 60 to 100 ALP were killed and 400 to 600 wounded.) The Taleban also used propaganda to cast the ALP as wicked, immoral and isolated, hashish smokers (charsi) and the ‘bastard children of Petraeus’. In 2014, according to Osman, the Taleban began to partly change tactics. The propaganda has continued, but they now aim to convince ALP members to leave the force in exchange for ‘amnesties’ or, at least, for no-fight deals. (Osman plans to publish on this subject in the future.)
Lack of accountability and attempts to reform the ALP
The push for greater accountability on issues such as pay, equipment and absentees (‘ghost soldiers’) started about 18 months ago. In October 2015, SIGAR published a scathing report about the force:
The ALP is the first line of defense for many villages across Afghanistan, but supplies ordered for the ALP are often diverted, delayed, of inferior quality, or heavily pilfered. Furthermore, coalition and ALP personnel SIGAR interviewed stated that unreliable logistics and lack of supplies also increase the likelihood of attrition… Additionally, SIGAR found that some ALP personnel have been used inappropriately as bodyguards for Afghan government officials…
SIGAR also found that significant numbers of local policemen were not being paid in full; other people (most likely senior officers in the MoI) were pocketing a proportion of their salaries. The fact that individual ALP were not being paid, armed or supplied properly would obviously affect morale. Moreover, a force where salaries, supplies and equipment can easily go missing is more attractive to anyone wanting to control units in order to make money or steal weapons. SIGAR was critical of the part of the NATO mission which oversees and administers defence funding, the Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, better known as CSTC-A, and recommended that, “[t]o ensure that the ALP program is responsibly managed and sustained, and oversight of U.S. funds is improved,” various reforms should be carried out.
Even though the ALP is firmly under the command of the ANP and MoI, (4) the US has retained significant influence. Since the transition of responsibility for security to the Afghan government at the end of 2014, the Special Operations Advisory Group, which is part of NATO Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (NSOCC-A), maintains a close relationship with the ALP. US SOF forces within the Special Operations Advisory Group continue “training, advising, and assisting” the ALP, albeit only at the level of headquarters and zones. The US is also the ALP’s sole funder (other nations have declined to contribute money because they consider the ALP a militia force). This makes for a very different relationship between donor and force than the ANP has with its donors. The ANP is supported through a multi-donor funding mechanism, the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), which is administered by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Being the only donor has advantages, especially given the relatively small size of the ALP: the US has far more influence over the ALP than the ANP.
Although the impetus behind the accountability reforms came from the US military, the Afghans running the ALP appear to have embraced it. Both the recently retired Colonel Ahmadzai and General Ehsas spoke about “our reforms” and described at length “what we have achieved.” They also described, in practical terms, what they still had to do.
The reforms are set out in the 2016 Bilateral Financial Commitment between CSTC-A and the MoI (seen by AAN) as a set of benchmarks, including on personnel, pay, equipment, training, ghost soldiers and that ALP are not working for “Power Brokers, Government organizations and offices and other similar entities.” Conditions are written into the agreement so that if benchmarks are not met, the US can decide to cut its funding. Most significantly, from 1 January 2017, the US military has only been funding ALP salaries for those who are validated as existing and on the tashkil (who are enrolled on the computerised personnel system, AHRIMS). This led to a drop in US spending to the ALP from 93 million (last quarter of 2016) to 85.4 million US dollars (first quarter of 2017). (Similar conditions were imposed on the ANA by the US and the ANP through LOTFA.)
Getz told AAN that the benchmarks with the most robust conditionality were to do with pay, personnel, equipment and training. Apart from training, he said, these measures are largely to do with “accountability, not performance.” (Other benchmarks to do with ghost soldiers and the co-option of ALP, at this stage, required reporting back information only or for systems of checks to be set up.) That might look to be a mundane place to start, but knowing how many local police there are and making sure they are trained, have weapons and are getting paid is the first step towards having an effective force.
Seventy per cent of the ALP are now enrolled on the computerised personnel system (AHRIMS), which matches each individual to a ‘slot’ in the tashkil (the aim was 95 per cent). Seventy-seven per cent now have biometric IDs (the aim was 100 per cent) and 80 per cent are being paid by electronic bank transfer (the aim was 90 per cent). The shortfalls are all reasonable: some ALP have not been able to get out of their districts to register because it is too dangerous. Indeed, SIGAR reported that 30 were shot and killed while trying to do so last year. Meanwhile, bank transfers rely on having mobile phone coverage and bank branches; this infrastructure does not exist everywhere. In themselves, these three measures have helped to identify whether there were ‘ghost soldiers’ in the system. Once the personnel and payroll systems were tightened, it transpired there had been relatively few ghost police in the ALP.
The push to get all ALP trained is going less well, hovering around the 85 per cent mark. The problem here, said Getz, is attrition, with local policemen killed in action, not re-enlisting or ‘going AWOL’ (absent without leave). This means that recruitment and training are barely exceeding attrition. In some places, for example Uruzgan, it is also difficult to pull ALP out for training because they are needed on the ground.
With accountability for equipment, the aim of 2016 was just to get inventories and put a system of checks in place. Assessments are carried out by provincial police chiefs. This is not ideal, given that the ANP has its own, far bigger problems with corruption, and it appeared that some of the missing ALP equipment had been going to ANP. The situation had got so bad that, in October 2016, CSTC-A ordered a moratorium on procurement. This forced the MoI to go through its own stocks, and it managed to reduce the shortfall in ALP weapons by a half. The moratorium was lifted in April 2017 (new orders will come through in 18-24 months’ time). “Equipment,” said Getz, “will always be a challenge.”
The provincial police chiefs are also charged with reporting back on whether any ALP are working for power holders or government entities. With this benchmark, the conditionality so far is also only about providing information. However, General Ehsas said he had removed about 2,300 local police last year who were working for “strongmen, MPs or tanzims.” The problem was by no means solved, he said. It is important to note that ALP units can be dissolved and have been due to issues with political capture (although this is not a requirement of the benchmarks). Getz gave the example of Khost where the ALP was folded because of political interference and command and control problems. (Jaji Maidan in Khost is, however, one of the new districts selected for ALP.) Ehsas also said Yangi Qala in Takhar had recently lost its tashkil because of problems with ALP involvement in crime and political interference.
(For more detail on the reforms and what has been achieved, see the Annex below).
Conclusion
The US has told the Afghan government that continued funding of the ALP is conditional on reforms being ‘completed’ and that any expansion of the tashkil – and this has been asked for by Kabul – will only be to a ‘reformed ALP’. (5) What has been achieved in the last year on pay, personnel and training is not yet the end of the reform programme, however. The Bilateral Financial Commitment letter for 2017 has not yet been agreed, but more benchmarks are promised. Even so, compared to 2015, there is already a much firmer grasp of who is serving in the ALP and whether they are trained and paid.
The old pressures on the ALP, of powerbrokers trying to control it, have not gone away, though. Describing how decisions were reached earlier in the year over which twenty districts to give new ALP units to, Colonel Getz said pinpointing the greatest security need had been the initial focus of discussion, “but politics quickly kicked in.” The ALP, he noted, is also a “jobs creation programme.” MPs, he said, looking for votes at the next election, are interested in having ALP units in their areas.
In dealing with strongmen and MPs keen to co-opt the force, General Ehsas said that he had backing from President Ghani and that having one committed funder with influence had proved extremely helpful. “US friends put pressure on the government and put pressure on parliamentarians and strongmen. This enables us to lessen the strongman influence on the force. We have very good backing from Resolute Support and Special Operations Forces. So we have had good reforms, and that will continue.” In general, he said the US pressure has been useful for enabling him to tighten accountability. Ehsas believes that, as a result, the force is more disciplined. In terms of morale and the wherewithal to fight, the ALP should now be stronger. The issue of what makes an effective ALP unit will be the subject of future AAN research as we look into what factors lead to units being co-opted and abusive – or defending and protecting the population.
Edited by Erica Gaston, Sari Kouvo and Thomas Ruttig
(1) The quote is from Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police: Bottom-up Counterinsurgency, Headquarters, Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force – Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A) 1 April 2011. See also the highly influential paper One Tribe at a Time: A Strategy For Success In Afghanistan, published in 2009 by former SOF major, Jim Gant: “We must work first and forever with the tribes for they are the most important military, political and cultural unit in that country. The tribes are self-contained fighting units who will fight to the death for their tribal family’s honor and respect. Their intelligence and battlefield assessments are infallible. Their loyalty to family and friends is beyond question.” (Read an AAN guest review of Gant’s paper here).
(2) Mark Moyar, Ronald E Neumann, Vanda Felbab-Brown, William Knarr, Jack Guy, Terry Corner and Carter Malkasian, “The Afghan Local Police Community Self-Defense in Transition,” Center for Special Operations Studies and Research, Joint Special Operations University, August 2013 (copy given to AAN, not available online).
(3) In its mid-year 2016 report, UNAMA said it “welcomes the slight decrease in civilian casualties attributed to ALP during the first half of 2016, noting that such decreases may be attributable to increased accountability for abuses committed by ALP in 2015, continued reduction of the numbers of ALP personnel on the ground in problematic areas, and restructuring efforts of the ALP program that reportedly let to the dismissal of approximately 2,000 ALP linked to power brokers in the first half of 2016. UNAMA reiterates however that the Government must increase accountability for human rights violations committed by ALP throughout Afghanistan.”
(4) The senior ALP officer is the District Team Leader. Under his command are Group Leaders for every 30 men in the tashkil. The ALP District Team leader answers to the ANP District Police Chief. At the MoI, the deputy to the Deputy Minister for Security is in charge of the ALP.
(5) The Special Operations Advisory Group gave AAN a copy of a PowerPoint document, “ALP Orientation Brief”, dated 1 October 2016, which says that “ALP Reform Completion” is “[r]equired for continued… funding” and is a “[c]ondition of COM RS [Commander of Resolute Support] approving uplift”, i.e. an expansion of the tashkil.
Annex: Agreements made in the Bilateral Financial Commitment and achievements so far
Agreements made in the Bilateral Financial Commitment stipulated that, by the end of 2016:
1) 95 per cent of ALP should be enrolled on the Afghan Human Resource Information Management System (AHRIMS) which matches each individual with a ‘slot’ in the tashkil (according to unit, location and duty title) and logs their name, rank, education level and ID number. [AHRIMS contains all the approved positions within the Ministries of Defence and Interior, along with information such as unit, location, and duty title.]
By April 2017, 70 per cent (22,000) had been registered.
This was a sharp rise in registration from October 2016 when only 9000 ALP had been enrolled. The unregistered ALP are mainly living in 32 districts from which it is difficult and dangerous to get out of to register. Indeed, 30 ALP were shot and killed last year, reported SIGAR while trying to get out to enrol in AHRIMS.
From 1 January 2017, the US military has only been paying money to government for salaries for ALP who are on the AHRIMS. This led to US spending on the ALP dropping from $93 million (last quarter of 2016) to $85.4 million (first quarter of 2017).
2) 100% of ALP should have a biometric ID card
By February 2017, 77 per cent of ALP had been biometrically ID-ed, said SIGAR.
3) 90% of ALP should be paid using electronic bank transfer (with only four ‘trusted
agents’ working in the entire country)
By the end of February 2017, 80 per cent of ALP were getting paid by bank transfer, said SIGAR.
General Ehsas compared this to the end of 2015 when only 4000 ALP were paid by bank transfer. Now, he said, only about 4000 were not getting paid, mainly in Zabul, Ghor and Kandahar. The problem now is with infrastructure – the phone company used, AWCC, does not have a signal everywhere in the country, and Kabul Bank does not have branches everywhere. Ehsas said a team, from AWCC, Kabul Bank, the ANP and the Ministry of Finance were working on finding a solution.
Bank transfers are not immune to corruption, but still far better than the ‘trusted agent’ system where an agent selected by the Provincial Chief of Police is charged with personally delivering cash salary payments to ALP personnel. As Provincial Chiefs of Police also certify time and attendance reports, there is says SIGAR “an opportunity for fraud and corruption.” He said as much as 50 per cent of salaries go missing when trusted agents are used.
4) The ANP chief of police will validate through an assessment that there are no payments to Ghost ALPs, defined as “providing salaries to Tashkil authorizations that are not manned.” Districts should be checked, at random, once a year.
This benchmark is about getting information. However, progress on dealing with ghosts is coming anyway through the first three measures: enrolment on AIHRMS, getting biometric IDs and paying by bank transfer. Ehsas told AAN that, because of these measures, they were now confident that, apart from in some remote areas, the ALP was not generally suffering from ghost police. He had already removed some ghosts, Getz said, including 729 from the tashkil in Helmand.
5) 90% of ALP should be trained.
Training continues to hover at only about 85 per cent of ALP, according to Getz.
The problem here is attrition, with local policemen killed in action, not re-enlisting or going AWOL, so that recruitment and training barely exceed attrition. In some places, for example Uruzgan, it was also difficult to get ALP out for training because they were needed on the ground.
6) 100% of equipment should be inventoried (ie Ranger pickups, motorcycles, AK-47s, PKMs (machine guns), RPGs (rocket-propelled grenades), communications equipment, solar chargers, organizational clothing and individual equipment, personal protection equipment, and Counter Improvised Explosive Device) and random checks, according to an agreed schedule, started in October 2016.
As of February 2017, 163 of the 179 old ALP districts had been inventoried and “provincial-level consolidated, manual (non-electronic) inventories” created. A schedule for checks was being created for 1396 (2017/2018).
In SIGAR’s 2015 report, which said described shortages of ALP equipment in the field and supplies being “diverted, delayed, of inferior quality, or heavily pilfered,” gave some concrete examples. In multiple districts in Helmand in August 2014, for example, SIGAR found shortages of weapons, trucks and motorcycles:
…in Marja district, they noted a shortage of 114 AK-47 rifles, and in Nehri-Saraj district, a shortage of 13 ALP Ranger pick-up trucks. These shortages persisted despite an ample amount of such equipment in the supply system. For example, in a July 2014 audit report, we reported that DOD had provided the ANDSF 83,184 more AK-47 rifles than required by current potential and future requirements. DOD noted later that year, however, that although there may be plenty of weapons and ammunition in the supply system, district and provincial requests go unfilled.
Resolute Support ordered a moratorium in October 2016 on giving new vehicles and equipment to the ALP until they could account for what they had already been given. Colonel Getz said that did incentivise the MoI to find suitable weapons from its own stocks for ALP and it had managed to halve the shortfall in ALP weapons. The moratorium on procurement has now been lifted (which means new equipment coming online in 18-24 months’ time). Accountability for equipment relies on the ANP, not the most transparent force for reporting. That raises questions as to the accuracy of the inventories.
7 The ANP will visit each district at random once per year to ensure no ALP are working for “Power Brokers, Government organizations and offices and other similar entities”
At the moment, the conditionality for this benchmark only concerns providing information about co-opted ALP.