Defence`s Feeds

An intense battle is under way near the city of Maimana, the capital of Faryab. In this northern province, the Taleban gained control over a majority of districts over 2017, including all of those close to the provincial capital, which is practically under siege. They also threaten the national ring road and important provincial roads. Government and international troops are currently trying to push the insurgents away from the city, in order to deny them the propaganda victory of taking it over. Obaid Ali and Thomas Ruttig, looking at the situation on the ground, conclude that a lot of prestige is at stake for both sides on one of the major Afghan fronts.

Government forces and their international allies have started a counter-offensive against the Taleban in Faryab, one of the most contested provinces in the country. For the first time since 2014, those deployed, Janat Gul Karokhel, a spokesman of the local Afghan army corps, told the BBC Persian service included “dozens” of foreign soldiers. Karokhel said the first group already on the ground consisted of 60 soldiers but that their total number could soon reach 300. Those soldiers, he said, would both “take part in combat and advising.” This indicated that both forces under Resolute Support and Operation Freedom’s Sentinel are present. Karokhel also said that ten out of 15 district centres of Faryab were under “serious threat” from insurgents.

The counter-offensive came after alarm calls were sounded, including from the provincial council, which even warned that the provincial capital Maimana, whose population (according to several sources) is between 75,000 and 150,000, could fall to the insurgents. However serious the Taleban threat actually is, the fact that the Afghan government and NATO are rushing extra troops to Faryab is a sign that the general security situation in this Uzbek-majority province is critical and that they worry the capture Maimana – according to the Afghan government’s 2015 “State of the Afghan Cities” report one of the 12 most important urban areas in the country – could hand the Taleban a propaganda victory.

Current fighting

Fighting has been raging in various districts in February and early March, such as Shirin Tagab and Khwaja Sabzposh, both adjacent to Maimana, and along the road linking Maimana with Andkhoi, the second largest city in Faryab. Government forces claimed on 6 March that they had killed the Taleban shadow district governor of Shirin Tagab, to the immediate north of Maimana. At the same time, insurgent activity was reported as stepping up in Khwaja Sabzposh, Daulatabad and Qurgan districts. On 15 February, government forces recaptured several police posts outside of Qaisar district centre that Taleban had overrun earlier that day.

On 7 March, local government security officials and a spokesman for the provincial police claimed that Zabih Ghazi, the Taleban shadow governor for Faryab, had been killed during an operation in Shirin Tagab district. The Taleban quickly denied this statement on the same day.

At least since January 2018, the Afghan Air Force has intensified airstrikes in the province (see media report here). The province had already seen a large number of Afghan forces air strikes with significant numbers of civilian casualties in 2017 (more about this below).

How the Taleban spread in 2017

The Taleban have gained significant ground against the government in almost each of the 15 districts of the province over the past one and a half years. Currently, they control large parts of nine districts, according to local journalists: Shirin Tagab, Khwaja Sabzposh, Dawlatabad, Pashtun Kot, Almar, Qaisar, Belcheragh, Kohistan and Gurziwan. There, according to local journalists, government forces only control the district centres and a few nearby villages in each of these districts. A tenth district, Ghormach, which originally belonged to Badghis province, has been under their full control since August 2017. It has changed hands several times in recent years (see AAN reporting here). The remaining four districts in the province – Andkhoi, Khan Chahr Bagh, Qurghan and Qaramqul – are relatively calm and Taleban activities limited to far-flung areas. The fifteenth district is the contested provincial capital, Maimana. (1)

Shirin Tagab, Khwaja Sabzposh, Pashtun Kot and Belcheragh almost fully encircle the provincial capital Maimana, while to the east, Darzab and Qush Tepa districts in neighbouring Jawzjan province are fully controlled by a former Taleban and now self-declared pro-ISKP commander, Qari Hekmat (see the latest AAN update on him here). Hekmat’s armed group, however, has not shown any sign of planning to expand beyond Jawzjan’s borders.

Around the provincial capital, the Taleban have ousted the Afghan security forces from several strategic locations after intensive attacks from August 2017 onwards, according to local civil society activists. They say the Taleban presence is apparent just three kilometres outside the provincial centre. As a result, a large number of pro-government militia forces and Afghan Local Police (ALP) are under a quasi-siege in Maimana. This situation puts the city under immediate threat.

The largest Taleban presence is in Pashtun Kot, a district to the immediate south of the provincial capital. It is strategically important as it holds a hydro-electric power dam that also provides drinking water to Maimana. The presence of pro-government security forces – including commando forces – is limited to the area of Sar-e Hawz, which they have been besieged for the past two months. Afghan media reported that there were 40 commandos there who were without food and water (here).

The Taleban have also established a strong presence along the crucial northern highway that is part of the national ring road (see AAN report here), which connects Mazar-e Sharif in the north with Herat in the west. There, the insurgents regularly establish mobile check points searching vehicles and seeking out government employees and members of the security forces. In late November 2017, they blocked the highway in Khwaja Sabzposh district for several days, before local elders successfully persuaded them to reopen it. The road between Maimana and Andkhoi has also repeatedly been disturbed (see media report here). Local civil society activists said that the last time a Taleban checkpost was reported there was on 5 March 2018.

Some conflict history

Over the past two years, Faryab has become one of the most active fronts in the countrywide war between the Taleban and the government and its allies. However, the Faryab conflict has been brewing for more than a decade. Ingredients adding to the unstable mix include, initially, factional conflicts between Jamiat and Jombesh, later, conflict between Jombesh and the central government, and a rearming of local commanders; corruption and a lack of coordination among the local security forces; the growing influence of conservative local madrassas fostered by certain factions, particularly among the Uzbek population and; insurgent infiltration from Badghis, with Taleban commanders exploiting local land and water conflicts as leverage to try to persuade elements of the population to join them. As early as 2007, Taleban training camps and assassinations of pro-government figures were reported in Qaisar district.

More recently, according to an article by Deedee Derksen, who is watching irregular armed forces in Afghanistan, the Taleban have also found “willing recruits among Uzbek madrassa students and men that had fought with [the Taleban] in the 1990s.” According to her, the Taleban have been reinforced by commanders who were mobilised by First Vice-President Abdul Rashid Dostum in 2015 and 2016 for anti-Taleban popular uprising groups and whose funding dried up after he fell into dispute with President Ashraf Ghani (background in this AAN analysis). Derksen writes that “in five of Faryab’s districts, former Jombesh commanders reportedly fight in the Taliban’s ranks” and gives examples from Qaysar, Kohistan and Almar.

Civilians have, of course, paid a heavy price for this conflict. In its annual civilian casualties report for 2017, UNAMA ranked Faryab as the province with the fifth-highest civilian casualty rate. The total numbers killed and injured increased in 2017 compared to 2016, bucking a nationwide downward trend. UNAMA also reported that Faryab was among the three provinces that recorded “significant increases in civilian deaths and injuries from ground fighting“ (by 27 per cent, following an increase in 2016, again contrary to the trend nationally). UNAMA also said it was among the five provinces (no other ranking) with the highest total in this category (having been third-highest in 2016). It also suffered “the highest number of aerial operations by the Afghan Air Force causing civilian casualties” in 2017. UNAMA also recorded that “most of the civilian casualties attributed to pro-Government armed groups” occurred in Faryab in both 2016 and 2017.

In 2016, UNAMA had reported that Faryab was also among the three provinces most affected by conflict-related displacement and suffered the highest number of abductions of civilians by irregular pro-government armed groups.

In 2018, the suffering of Faryabi civilians continued. The Kabul-based Pajhwok news agency which compiles monthly statistics on the conflict said that in February it was among the six most badly war-effected provinces of the country and suffered the fourth-highest casualty rate (not specified, but apparently including civilians and fighters from all sides).

Conflict among local pro-government forces

Recently again, the presence of nominally pro-government armed groups in the provincial centre, and outbreaks of violent conflict between them, local journalists told AAN, has further weakened the defence of the province. Rival commanders make mutual accusations of assassination plots and targeted killings. This has increased the fear among locals that the provincial centre might fall into Taleban hands.

The latest of such incidents was reported on 18 February 2018, when around a hundred fighters belonging to Nezamuddin Qaisari, the head of the provincial popular uprising (khezesh-e mardomi) forces and a member of Dostum’s Jombesh party besieged those loyal to a rival commander, MP Fathullah Qaisari, who belongs to Jamiat-e Islami, at Maimana airport and tried to detain him over an alleged assassination plot. Eventually, after local elders and the Faryab governor mediated and the Afghan military stepped in, both sides calmed down (read media report here). The Jombesh-related group also belongs to those forces mobilised to take action against Taleban in 2015 and 2016 by Dostum.

Dispute among the Taleban

At the same time, there have also been tensions within Taleban ranks. Their recruitment policy – since 2009 – has been to allow Uzbek fighters to lead the militancy in this Uzbek-majority province (see AAN’s previous analysis here). This, however, has created tension between Pashtun and non-Pashtun commanders in some parts of Faryab, according to sources close to Taleban, even though the provincial Taleban leadership is mixed. Shadow governor, Mufti Muzafar, is an Uzbek from neighbouring Sar-e Pul province while his deputy Mullah Jawed, is a Pashtun from Qaisar district.

According to an Uzbek Taleban commander in Faryab, “some Pashtun Taleb commanders ignore the Uzbek shadow provincial governor’s instructions.” To prevent further tensions, Mufti Muzafar, the shadow provincial governor, has instructed the fighters under his command to operate only in their own areas and not carry out joint, large-scale offensives against government security forces. This may prevent the Taleban from pulling together large numbers of fighters in any single operation, but also has strategic benefits as it aims at spreading the fight over as much of the province at the same time as possible.

As well as local Taleban, and operating in alliance with them, a small group from the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) also fights in Faryab. IJU regularly releases high quality videos through its official Facebook pages, known as al-Sadeqin.

Conclusion

The province of Faryab continues to feature as one of the most active battlefronts in Afghanistan. It is also the most active one in the northwest of the country. It has an astonishingly widespread Taleban presence, including near the provincial capital Maimana, which is under a quasi-siege. If, as some locals fear, the Taleban managed to capture this important commercial hub, even if only temporarily, it would hand them a new propaganda victory. This would be not much less important than their temporary capture of Kunduz in 2015 (see AAN analysis here).

This threat would explain the latest government forces’ counteroffensive in the province. This offensive has also brought western troops back to this battlefield and is apparently designed to relieve Maimana of the immediate threat. The fighting, that had already been intensifying over 2017, has had a severe impact on the civilian population, including forcing substantial numbers of people to leave their homes. The presence of unruly paramilitary pro-government forces with unreliable loyalty only contributes to the population’s feelings of insecurity, while, at the same time, those groups’ unreliable loyalties contribute to strengthening the insurgency.

Edited by Kate Clark

 

(1) The latest US military assessment for Faryab, published by the US Special Inspector of the Government for Afghanistan’s Reconstrution (see here) and reflecting the situation in October 2017, categorises Almar, Kohistan and Qaisar districts as under “INS influence” (ie Taleban-dominated); Belcheragh, Gurziwan, Khwaja Sabz Posh, Pashtun Kot and Shirin Tagab are called “contested”; and Andkhoi, Dawlatabad, Khn Chahr Bagh, Maimana, Qaramqul, Qurghan, are counted as under “GIRoA influence” (controlled by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan).

Also Ghormach is labeled as under “INS influence” but still listed under Badghis province.

Ukrainian Grom Short-Range Ballistic Missile

North Korean Hwasong 14 Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

The July 2016 EU-NATO Joint Declaration focused on 7 areas of cooperation and set out 42 actions for implementation. In December 2017, the EU and NATO agreed to an additional 34 new actions, with the third Progress Report assessing the implementation of the 76 actions expected in June 2018.  Activities in the area of cyber security and cyber defence are an important element of EU-NATO cooperation, of which a key objective is to ensure coherence and complementarity between EU and NATO efforts and to avoid duplication.

In this context, Antonio Missiroli, Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges at NATO, visited the European Defence Agency on 8 March for first time after his appointment, as part of ongoing high level and staff to staff cooperation, where he met with EDA Chief Executive Jorge Domecq.

The two discussed recent developments on EU and NATO on areas of common interest, and the impact of emerging security challenges on the activities of the two organisations. They focused in particular on ongoing efforts in cyber defence, a key chapter of EU-NATO cooperation, including on training and exercises as well on research & technology. 

“EU-NATO competition is a thing of the past,” said EDA Chief Domecq. “A stronger European Union is a stronger NATO, and I am grateful to ASG Missiroli for an engaging discussion on areas of common interest such cyber, which I am confident will yield concrete results and lead to closer EU-NATO cooperation.” 

Merle Maigre, Director of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, visited the European Defence Agency today for a meeting with EDA Chief Executive Jorge Domecq.
 

Merle Maigre (Director of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence), Jorge Domecq (Chief Executive of the European Defence Agency)

 
Ms Maigre and Mr Domecq discussed cyber defence and the EDA Chief briefed the CCDCOE Director on recent development in EU cyber defence, notably on the launch last month of the Cyber Defence Education, Training, Exercise & Evaluation Platform,  led by the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) and building on the support already provided by the European Defence Agency (EDA), the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the European Commission. EDA played an important role in developing the design proposal of this platform, following the results of a relevant feasibility study which were properly adapted to the actual Member States’ needs.

The EDA Chief Executive declared “Improving our cyber defence is a challenge for the EU, NATO and their Member States. Cooperation between EDA, NATO and the CCDCOE must continue to deliver the best possible training and exercises to our Member States.” 

“In the coming days, CCDCOE and EDA will celebrate five years of formal cooperation. On this occasion I would like to recognize the tangible results we have achieved together in training European cyber defenders, from international law lectures to operational issues, from strategic level cyber defence exercises to the world’s biggest international technical exercises,” said Merle Maigre, Director of NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence.

 

North Korean Assault Rifle with Integrated Grenade Launcher

EDA is committed to equality, one of the fundamental values on which the European Union is built. This includes equality of opportunity and treatment and zero tolerance towards all forms of harassment, including sexual harassment and any form of gender-based violence in the workplace. 

EDA achieves its mission through the contribution of its diverse workforce, men and women, civilian and military, from different national and cultural backgrounds and tolerates no discrimination on the grounds of age, race, political, philosophical or religious conviction, sex or sexual orientation disability, marital status or family situation.

 

A group of influential political parties have called for a change to the electoral system. This emerged out of the ongoing dispute between one of the parties, predominantly Tajik Jamiat-e Islami, and the presidential palace over the contested dismissal of Balkh Governor Atta Muhammad Nur. The group wants political parties to have a greater role in elections. Previous attempts at getting this have failed due to a lack of consensus, and the electoral system remained unchanged. Moreover, this new attempt at changing the electoral system has come very late. AAN’s Ali Yawar Adili takes a close look at the political parties’ demand and its impact on preparations for the upcoming elections (with input from Thomas Ruttig). 

This is part five of a series of dispatches about preparations for the elections. Part one dealt with political aspects and part two dealt with an initial set of technical problems: the date, the budget and the debate regarding the use of biometric technology. Part three dealt with the dilemmas over electoral constituencies. Part four dealt with controversies around the appointment of a new member of the Independent Election Commission, following the president’s dismissal of its chairman.

Leaders and officials of 21 political parties and groups came together at a conference in Kabul on 24 February 2018. They are coalescing around the demand for a change to the electoral system that would give political parties more weight in the upcoming parliamentary ballot. The group includes major parties such as Jamiat-e Islami, which is predominantly Tajik, predominantly Pashtun Hezb-e Islami (both factions of the party) (1), mainly Uzbek Jombesh-e Melli Islami and two major factions of the Hazara-dominated Hezb-e Wahdat. The 21-party group called in particular for parties to be allowed to field party-based candidates list and votes cast for these lists being transferable in each constituency in order to “prevent wastage of people’s votes.”

There are currently 74 registered political parties in Afghanistan, according to the list on the Ministry of Justice’s website. The group of 21 parties (see their full list in footnote 2) includes almost all of the former mujahedin factions, but none of the smaller pro-democratic and formerly left-wing parties.

The group’s 24 February “Statement of Political Parties and Currents about the Parliamentary Elections” (full text here) and under footnote 2) also included a number of other demands, that: parliamentary elections should be held before early Mizan 1397 (late September 2018) at the very latest; measures be taken to allow refugees, IDPs and those who live in insecure areas to use their right to vote; a room to accommodate political party agents be established within the IEC headquarters and provincial offices to allow for effective monitoring of political parties of all ‘elections processes’; and that the polling centres in different provinces that the IEC recently removed due, it said, to security reasons, but without any details beyond that, should be reassessed carefully and the IEC’s report should be shared with political parties.

The demand to strengthen the role of political parties in the electoral system is based on a proposal by the Special Electoral Reform Commission (SERC) that was established by the government in 2015 to come up with proposals for electoral reform. In December 2015, the SERC mainly suggested shifting from SNTV to a multi-dimensional representation (MDR) system (more on this below).

This new motion to introduce an electoral system more conducive to political parties was initiated and driven by Jamiat. On 25 February 2018, Muhammad Nateqi, deputy leader of Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami Mardom Afghanistan (led by Second Deputy Chief Executive Muhammad Mohaqeq), told AAN that the idea stemmed from the negotiations between Jamiat and the Palace over President Ashraf Ghani’s contested dismissal of Balkh governor Atta Muhammad Nur, who is also the head of Jamiat’s executive council (shura-ye ejra’iya). According to Nateqi, Jamiat had already, among other things (see AAN’s previous report about its demand on e-tazkera here), demanded a stronger role for political parties in elections during those negotiations. The Palace told Jamiat that it was not representing political parties in general, whereupon Jamiat reached out to other parties. Nateqi further said that, at first, there were eight political parties which agreed on the proposals reflected in the 24 February statement.

On 26 February 2018, the Independent Election Commission (IEC) released a statement to the media in response to political parties’ demand (see the statement here in English), saying that it “is committed to conducting the Wolesi Jirga and District Council elections in 1397 (2018-19), provided that the required budget for the process is provided within due time, and security of the process is maintained. Changing the electoral system at this sensitive time would seriously affect the preparations for the upcoming elections, and probably may [sic] result in delaying the conduct of these elections in 1397 (2018-19).” (3)

The Free and Fair Election Forum of Afghanistan (FEFA), a major domestic election observer group, also issued a statement on 27 February 2018 calling the SNTV system “old and unresponsive,” and that it results in wastage of “a substantial percentage of votes.” It also said that changing the electoral system “must not be an excuse for postponement of forthcoming parliamentary elections.” In this context, it emphasised that the next parliamentary elections must be held in the Afghan year 1397, ie before March 2019.

The Palace has so far not reacted publicly. Only President Ashraf Ghani’s deputy spokesman, Dawa Khan Minapal, in a conversation with AAN on 5 March 2018, suggested that the political parties could raise their demands with second Vice-President Sarwar Danesh, who is heading the law committee of the government within the framework of the electoral law.

The political parties responded to the IEC’s reaction on 5 March 2018 with another statement, calling it “muhaseba na-shuda” (unconsidered) and threatened to reconsider their cooperation with the IEC if it continued to take “unconsidered stances.” Nur Rahman Akhlaqi, a member of Jamiat’s leadership council, and Nateqi of Wahdat-e Mardom in conversations with AAN argued that the current electoral law had been enforced through a presidential legislative decree without being approved by the parliament. The government had not sent the decree to the parliament, they said, because the government had counted all the years since the expiry of the original five year term of the parliament (ie 2015) as (repeatedly) the ‘last working year’ of its legislative term. According to the constitution, the parliament cannot amend the electoral law in its last working year. According to them, the president could just issue another decree saying that parties could introduce lists and their votes could be transferable.

This exchange of partly unfriendly arguments between the IEC and the 21 political parties, who are among the main stakeholders in the elections, does not augur well as there had already been an absence of trust between them. In October last year, for instance, another political grouping called the Shura-ye Tafahum-e Jeryanha-ye Siyasi Afghanistan (Understanding Council of Political Currents of Afghanistan) demanded the complete replacement of the members of both commissions (see AAN’s previous report about its members and demands here). At that time, some other parties such as Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e Islami faction supported the IEC. This time, however, Hezb is one of the signatories to the parties’ statements and its spokesman Nader Afghan confirmed to AAN on 5 March 2018 that the party was in full concurrence with the statements.

The Jamiat-Arg negotiations

As mentioned above, Jamiat has taken the lead in this initiative by reaching out to other political parties. This came after the conflict between Jamiat and the Palace over President Ghani’s contested dismissal of Governor Atta Muhammad Nur in December 2017. Both Atta (see here, the Jamiat statements here and here) opposed Ghani’s decision to remove Atta. Following this, Jamiat entered into negotiations with a delegation representing the Palace in late December, although Atta himself was not a member of this negotiating team. On the Palace’s side, National Security Advisor Muhammad Hanif Atmar, the head of the National Directorate of Security Masum Stanekzai, Minister of Finance Eklil Hakimi and Salam Rahimi, head of the administrative office of the president, were involved. Jamiat’s demands in those negotiations included the issue of Atta’s dismissal, changes in the electoral law, and the roll-out of the e-tazkera (see more on the controversies about e-tazkera here)

Jamiat’s Akhlaqi confirmed, when talking to AAN on 5 March 2018, that the demand for a stronger role for political parties in parliamentary elections was indeed the second item on Jamiat’s list of demands in the negotiations with the Palace. However, he refused to confirm Nateqi’s account that it was stimulated by Jamiat’s negotiations with the Palace, saying rather that it had originated from SERC’s 2015 proposal and, therefore, reflected an older general demand by all political parties. He insisted that the alleged lead role of Jamiat was “Palace propaganda” and a bid to alienate other political parties.

It also might be the case that Jamiat is trying to distance itself from being the initiator of the motion, because it has already been criticised by electoral allies such as the Hezb-e Islami faction led by former minister of economy Abdul Hadi Arghandiwal and Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami Mardom Afghanistan for allegedly acting on its own behalf in negotiations with the Palace and ignoring other parties’ desire to have a share in government (see media report here).

A flash from the past: discussions about the electoral system

Afghanistan’s electoral system has been a topic of debate since the first parliamentary elections in 2005. Prior to them, the then-50 registered political parties demanded a proportional representation (PR) system (see AAN’s previous reporting here). The United Nations initially also proposed an electoral system based on PR that would be applied in province-wide, multi-member constituencies which would be approved by the cabinet. However, former president Hamed Karzai rejected the system, partly to militate against the emergence of strong parties, and opted for a system based on a single non-transferable vote (SNTV). In SNTV, voters select a candidate rather than a party. (See also this AREU’s report). The debate continued before the 2010 parliamentary elections. In March 2008, dozens of parties with various ideologies demonstrated outside parliament, calling for an amendment to the electoral system. They wanted a ‘parallel system’, ie 60 per cent of the Wolesi Jirga seats to be distributed to party lists on the basis of proportional representation and 40 per cent on the basis of a ‘majority vote’ (SNTV). This system, they argued, would “uphold democratic norms and minimise the number of invalid ballots in elections.” This did not happen. (See AAN’s previous analysis here).

In 2012, the IEC drafted a new electoral law in which it proposed shifting to a mixed electoral system. The IEC did this based on a request from the Ministry of Justice, which had asked the IEC to review the existing electoral law after an initiative by the Wolesi Jirga disappeared following changes to its administrative board. According to the IEC’s proposal, after the ten seats for the kuchis (nomads) were subtracted, one third of the remaining 239 Wolesi Jirga (lower house) seats would be allocated to political parties and the remaining two thirds would continue to be distributed among individual candidates on the basis of SNTV. The provinces would serve as the constituencies for both party and individual seats. (See AAN’s previous analysis here, the draft electoral law in Dari here and the IEC’s statement in English here).

Those proposals, however, were deemed to further complicate the electoral system for a still widely illiterate or semi-literate electorate. Meanwhile, the SNTV system has continued to be widely criticised by various political groups for, among other issues, producing a high number of wasted votes, not encouraging the development of political parties and producing a fragmented parliament (see also AAN’s previous reporting here).

The NUG’s failure to choose a (new) electoral system

The debate about the need for changing the electoral system restarted after the disputed 2014 presidential elections. When the current president, Ashraf Ghani, and chief executive, Abdullah Abdullah, formed the National Unity Government (NUG) in September 2014, they agreed on the need for “fundamental changes” to the electoral laws and institutions with the objective to “implement electoral reform before the 2015 parliamentary elections.” The political agreement (see full text here) also said the president would “issue a decree to form a special commission for the reform of the electoral system.”

Pursuant to this agreement, the Special Electoral Reform Commission (SERC) prepared two batches of recommended reforms. The first batch was submitted on 30 August 2015 and the second on 21 December 2015 (see AAN’s previous reporting here). The SERC members were unanimous in their desire to change the SNTV system, but failed to agree on what should replace it (see AAN’s analysis here). As a result, three proposals came out of their work:

First, in its first batch of reform proposals, the SERC recommended that the SNTV system be changed into a parallel system, that is to say, one third of the seats of the Wolesi Jirga should be allocated to the political parties on the basis of PR, with a country-wide constituency, and the rest would be distributed to independent candidates through SNTV in provincial-level constituencies. (The SERC also introduced a three per cent threshold and open list for political parties’ quotas. In its final batch of recommendations, the threshold was reduced to two per cent and the open list was changed to closed list.) Meanwhile, the SERC also recommended that the current province-wide, multi-member constituencies be divided into smaller one to five-member electoral constituencies for the independent candidates for the Wolesi Jirga which should be “approved with consensus).” The proposal was not unanimous as two SERC members disagreed with it and thus boycotted the meetings. As a result, the president referred the issue of electoral system and constituency back to the SERC for further studies. (4)

Second, as a result of further study, the SERC, with advice from the UN, developed a Multi-Dimensional Representation (MDR) system with multi-member constituencies (mainly provinces, but if necessary, some provinces could be divided in such a way that each constituency should at least have five seats), which it presented to the government in late 2015. Under the MDR system, in theory, there could be four categories of candidates: 1) independent individuals; 2) list of ad hoc alliance of individuals; 3) list of party candidates and; 4) list of a coalition of parties. The list would be open and voters would still vote for individuals, but the determination of the winners would be done in two steps – first counting how many seats the best-performing lists had earned and then awarding seats to the individuals on these lists with the most votes (see here)

Third, the two boycotting SERC members presented their own favoured system to the government, which was the first-past-the-post (FPTP) system, a plurality system applied in single-member districts. According to their proposal, the quota seats reserved for women (65) and Kuchis (10) and the tiny Sikh and Hindu community (1) would be subtracted from the total 250 Wolesi Jirga seats and the rest (174) would be elected in single-member districts.

The debate over the choice of an alternative to the current SNTV has been polarised, as proponents of the different options have weighed how particular changes might impact the balance of power in the parliament. Other considerations have been the future parliament’s ethnic make-up, its factional and geographical representation, whether the changes would and should contribute to strengthening political parties or not, and what they would mean for the women’s quota. In a climate of heightened suspicion, it has been difficult for the government and different sides to unite around an alternative to the SNTV.

The government, therefore, did not incorporate any of these proposed systems into either of legislative decree which amended the electoral laws and which were rejected by the parliament in December 2015 (see AAN’s previous reporting here) and June 2016 (AAN report here).

In preparation for a third legislative decree, the cabinet focussed on only changing the electoral constituencies, without making any mention of the electoral system. It discussed single-member constituencies (which would, by extension, also mean the first-past-the-post system, a system that had been proposed by the two, dissenting SERC members) as an alternative to the current, province-wide, multi-member constituencies and tried to include them in the current electoral law. This law was passed by legislative decree in September 2016 and has not been submitted to the parliament for approval and has since been effective, governing electoral processes and institutions. However, the cabinet did not reach a consensus on electoral constituencies for either parliamentary and provincial council elections and deferred that decision to the IEC. In effect, it made no change to the electoral system: everything stayed as it was. (See AAN’s previous reporting about the discords on the proposed single-member districts here and here and about the status of decision about electoral constituencies here ).

Conclusion: an overdue but late demand and lack of consensus

The demand for a change to the electoral system is not new. SNTV has been criticised from various sides ever since it was introduced, but has proven impossible to remove. What is significant now is that this is the first time that major political parties have called for a specific, list-based electoral system. Their demand also indicates that electoral reform has been incomplete and has not addressed major issues around holding elections in Afghanistan, particularly the disenfranchisement of political parties.

The demand is valid, but has come too late for this electoral cycle. It is valid because, based on the constitution and the Political Parties Law, parties are entitled to a stronger role in elections, while the successive electoral laws, and the electoral system laid down in them –SNTV – prevented political parties from fielding party-based candidates lists. The SNTV favours individual candidates who are only allowed to mention their party affiliation on the ballot paper and election handouts. (In previous elections many did, while others preferred to label themselves as ‘independent’.) The move is late because coming to an agreement on the details of the proposed system could trigger a new round of open-ended debate and prove to be time-consuming. The proposal by some to solve the problem by a presidential decree (at the same time as they criticise the lack of involvement of the parliament on related issues) seems too simplistic. Given all this, the issue has the potential to further disrupt (the already far from smooth) preparations for parliamentary elections, which are still officially planned for this year. (The IEC has cancelled 7 July 2018 as the election date, but not given a new one yet.) At the same time, as suggesting a change to the election system which is bound to cause delays, the same 21 parties also insist that the elections be held on time.

It is also not clear yet how the reported “imminent breakthrough” in the Atta-Palace conflict might affect this initiative. It is possible that Jamiat will continue to pursue it, but also that it will take more of a back seat, and that, if it does, other parties will continue the push for change. A similar all-party initiative sought to promote the role of parties in elections before the 2014 presidential election – the so-called Coordination Council of Political Parties and Coalitions of Afghanistan – forwarded a ‘Democracy Charter’ (more here), but disintegrated in the run-up to that poll, when different member-parties joined opposing camps.

Edited by Thomas Ruttig and Kate Clark

Photo source here.

 

(1) As seen in footnote two, there is only one Hezb-e Islami on the list while, in political reality, there are two Hezb factions that claim to be the one and only Hezb. One led by the party’s historical leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar was in the insurgency until recently, while the other, led by former minister of economy Abdul Hadi Arghandiwal, has operated as a political party in Afghanistan since 2005 (more background in this AAN analysis). Arghandiwal was seen at the parties’ 24 February conference. Nateqi said there were representatives from Hekmatyar’s faction, too.

(2) Full text of 24 February 2018 statement and the names of the political parties and groups that signed it (AAN’s translation):

Statement of political parties and currents about the parliamentary elections

We call for the holding of transparent and fair elections, which result in the establishment of a credible parliament, [which will be] the real representative of the will of all the nation and supported by a majority of the people. We emphasise that the next elections must be held on the announced date without any delay or procrastination. We are determined to turn these elections into an effective instrument for resolving the crisis. Ensuring transparency of elections and [making sure that] no faction opposes their results requires the monitoring and supervision [eshraf] by parties and electoral coalitions of the entire process of the elections, from the beginning to the end, so that [the transparency of the elections] is guaranteed and the shortcomings and violations of previous elections are not be repeated.

Considering these things, we political parties and currents emphasise that:

1. The parliamentary elections should be held at the latest in early Mizan 1397 (late September 2018).
2. In order to prevent the people’s votes for political parties and coalitions being wasted, the votes of lists in each constituency should be transferable.
3. For all residents of Afghanistan including refugees, internally displaced people (IDPs) and those who live in insecure areas, the way for them to use their right to vote should be paved.
4. Every eligible Afghan should be able to run as a candidate independently or from the address of their favourite party and coalition.
5. Through establishing a room for political party monitoring within the IEC headquarters and provincial offices, the way for political parties’ effective monitoring of the entire process of the elections be paved and no decision and action by the Independent Election Commission and Electoral Complaints Commission be taken, away from the party observation.
6. The polling centres which have recently been removed by the Election Commission in different provinces, due to security reasons, should be reassessed carefully and [the Commission’s] report be shared with the political parties.

We, political parties and currents, once again call on the National Unity Government and the International Community to take action as soon as possible to implement these demands [so that] the right of millions of people who are members of political parties are not wasted by depriving political parties of their right to participate in the elections.

We stand firm by our legitimate and reasonable demands and reserve the right to use all of our civil and legal rights to realise these demands.

Kabul – 5 Hut 1396 (24 February 2018)

Names of political parties and currents in alphabetical order [in Dari]

1. [Hezb-e] Eqtedar-e Melli
2. Afghan Mellat
3. [Hezb-e] Paiwand-e Melli
4. Jabha-ye Nawin-e Melli Afghanistan
5. Jabha-ye Nejat-e Melli Afghanistan
6. Jamiat-e Islami Afghanistan
7. Jombesh-e Melli Islami Afghanistan
8. Herasat-e Islami Afghanistan [previously known as Hezb-e Wahdat-e Melli Islami-ye Afghanistan]
9. Harakat-e Islami Afghanistan
10. Harakat-e Islami-ye Mutahed Afghanistan
11. Harakat-e Enqelab-e Islami Mardom-e Afghanistan
12. Hezb-e Islami Afghanistan [both Hekmatyar and Arghanidwal factions]
13. Hezb-e Islami-ye Mutahed Afghanistan
14. Hezb-e Etedal-e Afghanistan
15. [Hezb-e] Haq wa Adalat
16. Rawand-e Hefazat az Arzeshha-ye Jihad wa Muqawamat
17. Hezb-e Qeyam-e Melli Afghanistan
18. Mahaz-e Melli Islami Afghanistan
19. Nahzat-e Hambastagi-ye Melli Afghanistan
20. [Hezb-e] Wahdat-e Islami Afghanistan
21. [Hezb-e] Wahdat-e Islami Mardom-e Afghanistan

(source here)

Both Nateqi of Wahdat-e Mardom and Akhlaqi of Jamiat told AAN that there had been meetings with other political parties which might join the call for change to the electoral system. In the political parties’ second (5 March) statement, the list did include four more parties: Bedari-e Mellat-e Afghanistan; Refah-e Melli Afghanistan; Solh-e Melli Islami Afghanistan; and Mellat-e Mutahed Afghanistan. This increases the number to 25.

(3) The IEC, in its statement, also addressed some of the other demands by the political parties. For instance, on the demand for laying the ground for all residents of Afghanistan including refugees, IDPs and people in insecure areas, the IEC said that based on its legal obligation, it was “committed to providing the opportunity for exercising the right to vote to all persons eligible to vote throughout the country, and that will definitely include IDPs as well.” On the demand for a room for political party agents to be present in the IEC, it said that it had already established the National Election Forum as a continuous consultation mechanism with stakeholders, including political parties and “would [still] welcome their permanent representatives to the Commission.” On the demand for a reassessment of the polling centres, the IEC said that:

The IEC conducted a comprehensive program of the polling centers assessment at the secure areas of the country. The list of the polling centers including the areas, the polling centers of which were not assessed, was approved during the several open sessions of the Commission and was published on the Commission’s website. The PCs list will be finalized after adjudication of complaints received by the Electoral Complaints Commission. It is worth mentioning that in case security of those areas are maintained, where the polling centers were not assessed, the Commission is committed to assess the polling centers in there before the elections. It is also to be mentioned that, the polling centers of those districts where the PCs assessment cannot take place, will remain as per the past.

(4) In response to the concern that changing the electoral system would delay the elections, both Akhlaqi of Jamiat and Nateqi of Wahdat-e Mardom in conversations with AAN argued that the current electoral law has been enforced through a presidential legislative decree without being approved by the parliament, as the government has counted all the years since the expiration of the original five year term of parliament (since 2015) as the last working year of its legislative term, in which, according to the constitution, the parliament cannot amend the electoral law. According to them, the president could just issue another decree saying that parties could introduce lists and their votes could be transferable. However, it seems too simplistic and the agreement on the details of the proposed system (even if it is a consensus one) could prove to be time-consuming.

(4) The first batch of reform recommendations by SERC read:

Taking into account that the existing Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) system in Afghanistan; it does not meet the needs of this country, therefore SNTV is an outdated system and shall be changed. In the SNTV system, majority of the votes of the voters are wasted; as we see that the current members of the Wolesi Jirga have received votes from 38% of the voters.

The electoral system shall change in a way, which shall result in participation and development of the political parties, and which shall provide for an effective role of the political parties in the governance system of Afghanistan.

The SNTV system shall change into the Parallel system in a way, that one third of the seats of Wolesi Jirga shall be allocated to those political parties, which are exactly established and function in accordance to the provisions of the political parties’ law and other legislative documents in this regard. The political parties shall provide open list with preference of candidates for the Wolesi Jirga elections. Electoral constituency for the members of the political parties shall be the whole country. The political parties that receive at least 3% of the overall vote cast, shall be included in the electoral competition.

On electoral constituency for the independent candidates competing under SNTV, the recommendation said:

For the independent candidates of the Wolesi Jirga, the electoral constituencies within the province shall be divided to smaller 1 to 5 member electoral constituencies (approved with consensus).

 

 

North Korean Type 88-2 Assault Rifle

North Korean Hwasong 15 Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

Steven Vandeput, the Defence Minister of the Kingdom of Belgium, visited the European Defence Agency today where he was welcomed by EDA Chief Executive Jorge Domecq.

A wide range of topics related to European defence cooperation were discussed, including the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the European Defence Fund (EDF) as well as the update of the Capability Development Plan (CDP).

Belgium’s role and participation in EDA projects were also discussed during the visit. Minister Vandeput was presented with detailed updates on a range of ongoing projects including on the development of new generation of Maritime Mine Countermeasures as well as on collaborative training for RPAS operators of which one participating training site is in Florennes, Belgium.

Minister Vandeput underlined the important role of the EDA in support of its Member States: “I believe that EDA is actively supporting its Member States in the development of military capabilities that are needed to bolster Europe’s defences. Belgium is happy to cooperate with the EDA where it can.”

EDA Chief Jorge Domecq thanked Minister Vandeput for his visit and Belgium’s involvement in the Agency’s activities. “With Belgium actively participating in a wide range of defence cooperation projects and activities, through the EDA or in other bi- and multinational fora, it demonstrates that it firmly believes that today’s defence and security challenges cannot be tackled in isolation”, said Jorge Domecq.  

Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

Americas

• Boeing received on February 28, a $73.2 million US Navy contract to perform service life modifications on an initial four F/A-18E/F Super Hornet fighter aircraft. The work will extend the fighter’s operational service life from 6,000 to 9,000 flight hours by converting them to Boeing’s Block III configuration which includes an enhanced network capability, longer range with conformal fuel tanks, an advanced cockpit system, signature improvements and an enhanced communication system. Work will take place in St. Louis, Missouri and El Segundo, California, with an expected contract completion time set for April 2020. A Boeing statement said that an additional production line will be established in San Antonio, Texas in 2019 in anticipation of follow-on orders over the next ten years. The F/A-18E and F-model Super Hornets are the single and tandem-seat variants of the Super Hornet respectively, and have been in service since 2002. Approximately 568 Super Hornets are in the US Navy fleet.

• The Pentagon awarded Lockheed Martin two US Navy contracts Wednesday, February 28, for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program. Under the terms of the first agreement—a $148.7 million contract modification—Lockheed will provide additional logistics services for delivered F-35s operated by he Air Force, Marine Corps, Navy, non-Department of Defense (DoD) and foreign military sales (FMS) customers. Services to be provided include ground maintenance activities, action request resolution, depot activation activities, Automatic Logistics Information System operations and maintenance, reliability, maintainability and health management implementation and support, supply chain management, and activities. Work will take place across the US, with some work to take place in the UK, running until April 2018. A second, smaller deal valued at $7.4 million provides funding for sustainment services in support of the F-35 aircraft at Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, Japan and Naval Air Station Lemoore, California. Work will take place in both California and Japan and like the first contract, work is scheduled to wrap up in April 2018.

Middle East & Africa

• Israeli sources have expressed private reservations about Russia’s deployment of its new Su-57 stealth fighter to Syria, Flight Global reports. Satellite images captured by the Israelis confirmed earlier videos of the fighter in the region and is one of dozens of new weapons systems currently being combat tested by the Russians in Syria. While Israel has not reacted officially to the development, a senior source says there is no doubt that Moscow has sent its newest fighter to the region in order to test it against Western technologies. Israeli Air Force F-16s and unmanned assets are active in Syrian airspace, locating and targeting weapons sites that have been used by Lebanon’s Hezbollah, who are friendly to the Syrian regime and use government-held territory to transfer arms and rockets to its own territory in Lebanon. The arrival of the Su-57 comes just two weeks after a border clash during which an Iranian-operated stealth unmanned air vehicle and an IAF F-16 were shot down.

Europe

• Four years after Russia’s annexation of the Crimean peninsula and after multiple calls for arms from the Ukrainian government, the US State Department has cleared its first lethal aid package to the Ukrainian military. A Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) statement released Thursday, March 1, announced the approval of a $47 million package for the delivery of 210 Javelin anti-tank missiles and 37 Javelin Command Launch Units, with the aim that the missiles will help “Ukraine build its long-term defense capacity to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity in order to meet its national defense requirements.” Rather than being the subject of fresh orders from manufacturers Lockheed Martin and Raytheon, the missiles will come from existing US Army stocks while the CLUs will come from on-hand Special Defense Acquisition Fund (SDAF)-purchased stocks. The SDAF is a special State Department fund set up to speed expected requests for military equipment from allies. If State Department officials expect a request will be made, they can pre-purchase the equipment so it is already under production before a deal is made official. Since 2014’s Crimean annexation and the beginning of an insurgency by Russian-backed Separatists in Ukraine’s Donbass region, Kiev has called for lethal military aid to be supplied by the US. While the Obama administration did at one stage consider sending lethal aid to Ukraine, its concerns that injecting such weapons into the already volatile region could make the situation worse resulted in them just supplying training and support equipment. Late last year, the Trump administration said it would send lethal aid to Ukraine with State Department spokesperson Heather Nauert saying “US assistance is entirely defensive in nature, and as we have always said, Ukraine is a sovereign country and has a right to defend itself.”

• BAE Systems has tapped Lockheed Martin to supply its Mk 41 Vertical Launching System (VLS) for the three City-class Type 26 anti-submarine warfare (ASW) frigates on order for the British Royal Navy. The VLS is the only one available that is capable of launching anti-air, anti-submarine, surface-to-surface and strike-length missiles, and initial orders from London calls for the delivery of nine MK 41 VLS modules—enough for the first three ships—the already under construction Glasgow, and the ordered Cardiff and Belfast.

Asia-Pacific

• China’s increase in defense spending has been described as “moderate” by a senior diplomat, Reuters reports. Speaking ahead of Monday’s release of China’s national budget by parliament, parliament spokesperson and Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Yesui said that in recent years, “China has moderately raised defense investment,” adding that a lot of this extra cash had “been to make up for past investment deficiencies, mostly on renewing equipment (and) improving material benefits for soldiers.” Last year military spending was budgeted to increase by just 7 percent, to 1.044 trillion yuan ($164.60 billion) about one-quarter of the proposed US defense spending for the year. “China has always upheld the path of peaceful development, and practices a defensive defense policy. China’s development will not constitute a threat to any country,” said Zhang. While no indication of how much of an increase would be allocated and what areas would be focused on in the budget, reports in the China Daily newspaper said China was looking to build larger aircraft carriers and was aiming to operate a fleet of at least six.

• A senior Philippines Navy official has been quoted by the state-run Philippine News Agency that the service will utilize two frigates on order from South Korea as anti-air platforms. Speaking in front of the Senate during a hearing on the Frigate Acquisition Project (FAP) last week, Rear Admiral Robert Empedrad said: “In the current inventory of the PN, we don’t have capability for aerial denial. Wala pa tayong (We do not have) anti-air missile capability that can hit an incoming aerial object. But except for our frigates supposedly kung ma-deliver (once delivered), ito lang iyong (this will only be the) first time that we will have that capability for aerial denial.” Due to be delivered in 2020, the vessels are being built by Hyundai Heavy Industries under a $346 million contract and are based on the HDF-3000 frigate design used for South Korea’s Incheon-class frigates. The Filipino order will come equipped with weapons capable of combating surface, sub-surface and air threats, as well as electronic warfare.

Today’s Video

• The Royal Navy’s Type 26 Global Combat Ship:

BAE Systems Australia has been selected as the prime contractor to upgrade Australia’s over-the-horizon Jindalee Operational Radar Network (JORN) as part of Project Air 2025 Phase 6. In a joint statement on 5 March, Minister for Defence Marise Payne and Minister for Defence Industry

China intends to build nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, a report published on 28 February in the Global Times newspaper suggests. The state-owned paper quoted an article posted on the website of the China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (CSIC) referring to the country’s need to

Antonov, Taqnia Aeronautics, and Wahaj have signed an agreement to jointly manufacture the An-132D multi-purpose transport aircraft. The modernised version of the An-132 is being co-developed by Ukrainian company Antonov and Saudi Arabia’s King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology

The Myanmar military (Tatmadaw) has pulled back troops from a potential flashpoint on the country’s border with Bangladesh following a sharp spike in tensions and protests from Dhaka. The move by Myanmar’s army-backed, paramilitary Border Guard Police (BGP) took place on 3-4 March

Negotiations behind the planned acquisition of Sparton Corporation by Ultra Electronics have been terminated, Ultra Electronics announced on 5 March. The announcement followed the results of an antitrust review by the US government that has concluded that the sale cannot go ahead. In November

IN A STATEMENT released on March 1, a group identified only as 'Anarchists' claimed responsibility for a number of attacks across Greece - including one on a police station - and threatened further attacks in the capital Athens, The Times reported. The statement referred to the detention of

THREE civilians were killed and two others wounded during a mortar attack by Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen militants near a stadium in Somalia's capital Mogadishu on 1 March, Reuters reported. Al-Shabaab later claimed responsibility for the attack.

Following setbacks to plans to buy two multifunctional modular patrol boats to modernise the Bulgarian Navy, the country's Ministry of Defence (MoD) is now studying options for restarting the project. The shipbuilding project has been in limbo since December 2017, when local shipbuilder MTG