Defence`s Feeds

Switchblade out
(c) Aerovironment
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In late June 2011, the US Army gave Aerovironment a contract to begin fielding Switchblade UAV. Aerovironment’s new tube-launched, man-portable UAV will work for surveillance, and transmits live color video. It also functions as a kamikaze missile, however, which can be armed and locked on target by operator control. This makes it extremely useful against dug-in or fortified infantry positions, enemy missile teams, mortars, etc. After a set of 2011 trials, the US Marines added a contract of their own, even as the US Army moved to deploy the system to Afghanistan by summer 2012.

The US military’s interest is understandable. One of the key lessons of Israel’s 2006 war in Lebanon involved infantry use of guided anti-tank weapons as immediately-available precision artillery fire. Iran’s Hezbollah legionnaires frequently used Russia’s 1960s era 9K11/AT-3 missile designs for this purpose, while Israeli forces used the higher-tech Spike. Similar trends have been observed among American and British forces in Afghanistan, who use expensive $75,000 – 100,000 per shot Javelin missiles. With Switchblade, the US military has taken a step toward fielding a lower cost platoon level surveillance/strike weapon. The economics involved, and the clear global trend at work, mean that the US Army won’t be alone.

Switchblade

AeroVironment’s Switchblade is carried and operated by a single soldier. The UAV, launcher and transport bag together weigh about 5.5 pounds / 2.5 kg.

The warhead is made by ATK, and is roughly equal to a 40mm grenade.

It uses the same Ground Control Station as the firm’s RQ-11 Raven, RQ-20 Puma, and Wasp UAVs, and uses its video camera and GPS to find targets.

Switchblade has about 10 minutes of flight time at 55 – 85 knots, with an effective range of up to 10 km/ 6 miles. It can be a loitering munition within those limits, and the operator can halt or resume its attack sequence.

Contracts & Key Events

Unless otherwise noted, all contracts are placed by US Army Contracting Command (Missile) at Redstone Arsenal, AL, to Aerovironment Inc. in Monrovia, CA.

FY 2013-2018

 

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April 25/18: Block 10C upgrade orders The US Army has contracted AeroVironment to provide upgraded hardware and parts for the Switchblade precision strike munition. Valued at $44.6 million, the agreement will task the firm, based out of Simi Valley, California, with providing Block10C inert training vehicles and Block10C all up rounds, multi pack launchers and modular battery payloads to the service, with a scheduled completion date set for September 19, 2019. AeroVironment first rolled out its Block 10C upgrades—which give soldiers more stable and secure encrypted communications—on the Switchblade tactical missile system after the Army awarded the company a $22.8 million contract in September 2016. Capable of being stored and carried in a soldier’s backpack, the system has a strike range of more than six miles with a flight endurance of around 15 minutes, and can strike targets beyond line of sight, meaning the munition can maneuver on targets beyond covered positions or around mountain ridges.

Sept 5/13: US Army. A $29 million firm-fixed-price contract modification for more Switchblade Agile Munitions Systems and support. An AeroVironment release places the recent total at $36.7 million, implying an Aug 20/13 contract size of $1.1 million.

Discussions with Aerovironment confirm that all of these awards are separate from the set announced on Aug 28/13, raising the total to 8 awards worth $52.5 million. AeroVironment is investigating whether or not the 3 recent awards are related to the March 2013 notice of intent, or if those additional orders are still pending.

Work will be performed in Simi Valley, CA. The contract’s importance can be inferred from the fact that the Army is using FY 2013 operations and maintenance funds, rather than procurement funds, to pay for it. This was a sole-source contract, with 1 bid solicited and 1 received (W31P4Q-12-C-0263, PO 0015). Sources: Pentagon | AeroVironment, Sept 10/13 release.

Sept 4/13: US Army. A $6.6 million firm-fixed-price contract modification for more Switchblade Agile Munitions Systems and support.

Work will be performed in Simi Valley, CA. The contract’s importance can be inferred from the fact that the Army is using FY 2013 operations and maintenance funds, rather than procurement funds, to pay for it. This was a sole-source contract, with 1 bid solicited and 1 received (W31P4Q-12-C-0263, PO 0014).

Aug 28/13: US Army option. AeroVironment discusses an August 30/12 Switchblade contract, which hadn’t been announced by the company or the Pentagon until now. It has now grown to $15.8 million under 5 successive orders for Switchblade tactical missile systems, ancillary equipment and support. The release cites a February 2013 news article that quoted the REF’s director as saying, “Theater came in and said, ‘We need dramatically more'” Switchblade systems than the 75 supplied in late 2012. Hence the continued orders.

The US Army’s Close Combat Weapons Systems, PEO Missiles and Space (PEO MS) manages this contract, in support of the Army’s Rapid Equipping Force (REF). Subsequent discussion with AeroVironment confirms that this is the W31P4Q-12-C-0263 contract vehicle.

The firm says that these awards aren’t related to FBO.gov’s March 2013 announcement of intent to award a new sole source contract for Switchblade systems – a date that doesn’t fit the timeline they gave, anyway. Despite their caveat, and despite growing competition from sources like Textron (Battlehawk) and Prioria (Maveric), AeroVironment seems to have a strong position in this niche. Sources: AeroVironment Aug 28/13 release.

New Army REF contracts

FY 2010 – 2012

 

Aug 15/12: LMAMS. An FBO.gov pre-solicitation for the Lethal Miniature Aerial Munition System (LMAMS) is looking for a 5 pound killer UAV with 15-30 minute flight time and 5-6 mile range. The UAV will have day/ night capabilities and image stabilization, with the ability to automatically track a designated target. A secure digital data link will connect the UAV to its soldier, and once the UAV is sent in to kill, the laser height-of-burst sensor will automatically detonate the warhead at the right time. They want to kill troops 4 meters away in the open, but not kill people 10 meters away. The UAV will also be usable against light vehicles, via direct hits. The Army wants TRL 7 or higher by FY 2014-16, which means a prototype that has been tested in an operationally realistic environment.

Interested vendors are being invited to present on Oct 16/12 in Huntsville, AL, and Switchblade is already very close to those specifications. Its range is already at the specification, but it needs 50% more flight time. Day/night stabilized sensors are getting much smaller, too, which means all the pieces of the puzzle could be in place well before 2014.

The real question may be “why gold plate the specifications in the first place?” Simple GPS guidance would allow night use against designated targets, and the growing presence of mini-UAVs in the US Army means that loitering and searching for/ geo-locating targets can easily be done by other assets. Rather than adding cost and development time by trying to make LMAMS a day/night UAV too, why not just field something that’s much cheaper and more portable than a $100,000 Javelin missile, can take a geo-location feed, and relies on standard video + GPS to find and kill targets that are currently taking Javelin shots? Then add new capabilities as they emerge.

The US military rarely does things this way, and budget realities will eat their operational capabilities alive unless they begin changing their mindset. RFIs can indeed help by giving the military a better sense of what’s out there. Having said that, “see-more” specs have a nasty habit of persisting past their point of usefulness. The best place to fight gold-plating is the beginning of the process, via sharp distinctions between mandatory vs. wish-list (“objective”) requirements. Sources: FBO #W31P4Q-12-R-0157 | WIRED Danger Room.

LMAMS RFI

May 23/12: US Army option. AeroVironment, Inc. announces a $5.1 million contract finalization from US Army PEO MS, CCWS, bringing the June 2011 contract’s full value to $10 million. The modification includes engineering services, operational Switchblade systems and operator training. AeroVironment will work with ATK, its munition subcontractor, to produce and deliver the systems.

May 16/12: USMC Buy. The Marines join the Army in buying Switchblade UAVs. Aerovironment’s Steve Gitlin:

“Think about it – pairing switchblade aerial munitions with a Raven, Wasp or Puma [mini-UAV] – a small team with those tools can know what is going on around them within about 15 klicks. Once they identify a threat, Switchblade lets them engage that threat immediately.”

Unless that threat is something like a tank, of course. Gannett’s Marine Corps Times.

USMC buy

May 5/12: Training. The Fort Riley Post reports that training is underway, but suggests that hitting the target is going to take a fair bit of practice:

“As the 4th Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, prepares for deployment later in the spring… 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment; 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry Regiment; and the 2nd Battalion, 16th Infantry Regiment have been training on the new back-pack sized lethal miniature aerial munitions system, or LMAMS, – the Switchblade… Normally used by Special Forces units, the 4th IBCT is one of only two brigades being fielded this weapons system for its deployment this year… “it’s a complicated system on the cutting edge of technology, and it requires a lot of training to get the effects on target,” said Maj. Robert Brown, assistant project manager, LMAMS, PEO Missiles and Space… “We not only are giving the Soldiers simulator time, but also a lot of flying time on the ranges of Fort Riley. They will also receive more training in theater.”

Dec 22/11: Sub launch. Aviation Week reports that Raytheon has received a contract to deploy the Switchblade UAV from a submarine during RIMPAC 2012 exercises, using the launch vehicle it developed under the Submarine Over-The-Horizon Organic Capabilities (SOTHOC) program.

Switchblade’s super-short range and 40mm warhead punch make actual deployment from a $2.5 billion capital asset with limited stowage space sound ridiculous. On the other hand, it makes for an easy concept demonstration. Sources: Aviation Week Ares, “U.S. Navy Subs to Deploy Switchblade UAV”.

Aug 16/11: USMC. The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory has bought 5 Switchblade systems from Aerovironment for testing, and plans to conduct some demonstrations. There’s no official program yet, just initial interest. UK Umanned Vehicles.

June 2011: The US Army’s Close Combat Weapons Systems (CCWS), PEO MS gave Aerovironment a $4.9 million contract to provide engineering support and operational Switchblade UAVs for rapid fielding with the US Army. Sources: AeroVironment Sept 1/11 release.

US Army buy

Fall 2010: The prototype Switchblade system receives Safety Confirmation, and undergoes Military Utility Assessment with the US Army. Source.

Additional Readings

• AeroVironment – UAS Advanced Development: Switchblade

• Prioria – Maveric UAS. Clever tube-launched UAV with bendable wings is used by Canada’s military, and they’re developing a companion Lethal Miniature Aerial Munition System (LMAMS) version with the usual 40mm grenade on board.

• Ars Technica (Aug 15/13) – BattleHawk wants to be your own personal kamikaze robot

• Gannett’s Navy Times (Aug 14/13) – Kamikaze drones: Miniature munitions for dismounted troops. Cites 75 deployed to Afghanistan in late 2012.

• Defense Tech (Sept 19/12) – Textron’s Remote-Controlled Flying Bomb. Their Battlehawk mini-UAV has a camera in the nose, and packs a 40mm grenade cartridge.

Czech Republic’s Aero Vodochody and Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) announced on 24 April that they are to collaborate on the Aero L-159 light combat and trainer aircraft and Aero L-39NG training system. The announcement, made at the ILA air show in Berlin, will see the companies work on

Airbus and Dassault Aviation have launched co-development of a new Future Combat Air System (FCAS) to be ready for fielding in the mid-2030s. Under an agreement announced on 25 April at the ILA Airshow, the two companies will formally begin development of a ‘system of systems’ that was

South Korean shipbuilder Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering (DSME) has handed over the second of three Nagapasa (Type 209/1400)-class diesel-electric submarines (SSKs) ordered by the Indonesian Navy (Tentara Nasional Indonesia-Angkatan Laut: TNI-AL) in 2011. The TNI-AL received the 61.2

Key Points About 500 Boxers will be procured for GDP4.4 billion for the first 10 years, including integration The driver module and all the mission modules will be produced in the United Kingdom UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) and industry officials on 24 April gave the Parliament Defence Committee

The US Air Force (USAF) Research Laboratory (AFRL) and the US Coast Guard’s Research and Development Center (USCG RDC) recently signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to collaborate and are discussing initial areas of interest, including unmanned systems and modeling and simulation. This

MTU Aero Engines has revealed a new future powerplant for combat aircraft to be ready for fielding in the early 2030s. The manufacturer disclosed the Next European Fighter Engine (NEFE) in a product brochure distributed at the ILA Airshow in Berlin in late April. As noted in the brochure, the NEFE

Boeing is pitching its EA-18G Growler electronic attack aircraft to the Luftwaffe as part of a wider drive to replace Germany’s Panavia Tornados with the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet. Speaking to Jane’s at the ILA Airshow in Berlin, Boeing director for global sales for strike, surveillance,

Eurofighter has touted its Typhoon as a technological pathway to the new Future Combat Air System (FCAS) being developed by France and Germany. Speaking at the ILA Airshow in Berlin, consortium representatives said that upgrades planned for the Typhoon over the coming years would better enable

India’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) has recently called upon the armed forces to draw up a list of outdated equipment that can be refurbished and gifted to ‘friendly’ countries in an effort to deepen New Delhi’s regional defence ties. Official sources told Jane’s that

Forty years ago, Afghanistan experienced its second military coup d’état within five years. The authoritarian President Muhammad Daud had seized power in 1973 without much attention abroad and even little notice in Afghanistan – Daud was a sardar (prince) and seen as just another new king, although he proclaimed a republic. It was the second coup, on 27 April 1978, that changed Afghanistan forever. The ‘Saur (April) Revolution’ toppled Daud and killed most of his family. Within 19 months, Soviet troops would invade to save the regime. The invasion, and the reaction of the West and regional powers, internationalised the conflict and turned into the last hot battle of the Cold War. AAN’s co-director Thomas Ruttig looks back at the events and their background.

The following is part 1 of a short series about the events of April 1978. The next part, on the day of the anniversary, 27 April, will present eyewitnesses’ accounts of the events. Another part will look at the relationship between the PDPA and the Soviets after the Soviet military intervention in late 1979.

On 27 April 1978, parts of the Afghan army’s 4th Tank Brigade based in Pul-e Charkhi on the eastern outskirts of Kabul moved towards the former royal palace where President Muhammad Daud was chairing a cabinet meeting. (1) The tanks were ostensibly meant to protect the president — that was what the brigade’s chief of staff, Lieutenant-Colonel Muhammad Rafi, and two battalion commanders, majors Muhammad Aslam Watanjar and Sherjan Mazduryar, told their commander. But actually the tanks were on their way to topple Daud.

What the commander did not know (unless he was complicit) was that the three young officers belonged to a clandestine left-wing network in the military linked to Hezb-e Demokratik-e Khalq-e Afghanistan (People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan, PDPA), a semi-legal party founded in 1965. Their civilian leaders had been arrested the day before, and the cabinet was meeting to decide their fate.

The arrests of the PDPA leaders came after the murder of the party’s main theoretician Mir Akbar Khaibar on 17 April 1978, followed by mass protests at his burial two days later. About 10,000 to 15,000 people poured into Kabul’s streets in what the government saw as a show of force for the PDPA after its reunification less then a year earlier, in July 1977. Since 1967, because of tactical differences and personal feuds among some of its leaders, the PDPA had split into factions. The largest factions were Parcham (banner) led by Babrak Karmal (Khaibar also belonged to it), and Khalq (People), led by Nur Muhammad Tarakay. (2) Both factions maintained networks in the armed forces. Karmal and Tarakay were among the leaders whose arrests provoked the reaction from the young officers. Both of them would also assume ministerial posts and be quickly removed from them again in the tumultuous months that followed.

The PDPA claimed to have 18,000 members in 1978, although independent sources estimated the party’s membership at 4000, up from 1500 a decade earlier. (3) It had gained a following among university and high school students, as well as the small but growing ranks of industrial workers. Starting in 1965, students had been protesting against difficult living conditions, particularly for poorer students from the provinces who lived in dormitories in Kabul where food rations were handed out irregularly. Other issues were corruption in the entry exams and the lack of job opportunities after graduation – problems that sound familiar in Afghanistan today (see AAN analysis here). The workers demanded better working and living conditions, and the right to set up legal trade unions. At the time, the only worker associations permitted were self-help groups that collected money for colleagues falling ill or passing away.

Organised labour activities had increased significantly by 1968. One source listed 21 workers’ strikes between April and June that year alone. This was not confined to Kabul but also spread to towns such as Gulbahar, Jabal us-Seraj, Pul-e Khumri and Kunduz, where decades of government development programmes and private investment had created an industrial base. The workers were supported by students and farm labourers. Andreas Kramer, a German development worker, describes how workers from the the refineries in Shebarghan and the textile mill in Pul-e Khumri marched hundreds of kilometres toward Kabul in 1968, before the police broke up their procession by force. At least one other strike, at Kabul’s largest industrial site, Jangalak, also ended in violence. These strikes were either organised by the PDPA or its Maoist rivals from Shola-ye Jawed (Eternal Flame) (read an AAN paper about this group here). (4)

The PDPA’s small but vocal group of four MPs elected in 1965 – all later Parchamis – brought up these problems in fiery speeches in parliament. (5) A well-known contemporary image shows Karmal at the forefront of a Parchami First of May demonstration in Kabul. It was during this period that Afghan politicians earned the activist bona fides they would later bring into power during the Soviet occupation: Karmal, whose self-chosen second name translates as “friend of labour”, marched alongside his unofficial romantic partner Anahita Ratebzad, a parliamentarian who would later become Minister of Education, and alongside Sultan Ali Keshtmand, who later served as Prime Minister.

In the same year, when the first commoner in the position of prime minister faced a vote of confidence (the position was previously reserved for members of the royal family), Parcham encouraged students to occupy parliament. This resulted in clashes with the West German-trained riot police, the ghund-e zarba, which shot dead three students. The day, 3 Aqrab, (23 October) became a students’ action day for many years.

The clandestine officers’ groups and Parcham

One of the clandestine officers’ groups had been founded in 1964 by Khaibar, whose murder sparked unrest four years later. Olivier Roy, a French scholar, described him as the “only real Marxist” in the PDPA. Various sources refer to the officers’ group as the Revolutionary Army Association or the Communist Union of Army Officers, but it is unclear if the group ever used an official name. There was a parallel Khalqi network within the security forces run by Tarakay’s deputy Hafizullah Amin, a teacher who did some postgraduate studies in the US but was expelled for left-wing political work before graduating—and who also climbed briefly into Afghanistan’s highest office in 1979.

Khaibar, a graduate of Kabul’s military academy, had been imprisoned for political agitation in the armed forces in 1950. In prison he met Karmal, a leading voice of the students’ association at Kabul University. (6) Khaibar was said to have ‘converted’ Karmal, four years his junior, to Marxism during their time in custody. When both of them were released in 1956, Khaibar returned into the ranks of the police as an instructor at the Kabul Police Academy. In 1960, both founded one of the first mahfel, political discussion circles, that preceded the PDPA. Khaibar also became joint editor-in-chief of Parcham’s eponymous party newspaper during its short existence in 1968 and 1969. It can be assumed that Khaibar started his recruitment within the armed forces on the PDPA ticket and, after the party’s split in 1967, merged the clandestine officers’ group with his cellmate’s Parcham faction.

It is not clear whether the leading officers of the 1978 coup — Rafi, Watanjar and Mazduryar — belonged to the same or different networks in the military. Rafi was later known as a Parchami, while Watanjar and Mazduryar were Khalqis. In any case, the difference cannot have been that big as they seem to have cooperated closely during the coup.

The Daud-Parcham alliance and its end

Daud had known the Parchami leader – the son of a general and part of the Afghan elite himself – since Karmal’s student activism days in the late 1940s. Although serving as Minister of War (1946-48) and Interior (1949-51) during that period, Daud had already been plotting to take power then, trying to ally himself with the reform-minded intellectuals and students such as Karmal. (The attempts were not particularly successful and he played a role in suppressing the reformist movement.) Daud’s ambitions then were put on the backburner for a while when the monarch, Muhammad Zahir, appointed him Prime Minister in 1953. He held the post for ten years, until 1963.

But in 1963, Daud was sacked and sidelined as a result of his confrontational policies toward Pakistan, which had led to severe economic problems for landlocked Afghanistan. He also suffered as a result of the king’s political reforms, turning Afghanistan from an absolute into a constitutional monarchy. Ironically, the plan was Daud’s own; he had proposed the changes to the king himself in 1962. But the reforms did not happen the way Daud suggested. The new constitution that came into force in 1964 barred members of the royal family from holding government offices and from becoming members of a political party. Many Afghans, among them the sidelined ex-prime minister himself, saw the constitution mainly as a means to keep Daud away from power. This put Daud back onto a path of confrontation with the king, and he turned to Parcham for support. Daud sought the backing of Parcham’s clandestine officers network starting in 1971, some sources report. This did not remain secret. Embassy cables later revealed that US diplomats were aware of Daud’s preparations to take power latest by 1972 (read the document here).

The alliance with Parcham worked out in 1973, during the overthrow of the king. Half of Daud’s first cabinet was made up of Parchamis, and many of the young officials he dispatched to the provinces to revamp the country’s ineffective, corruption-ridden administration were members or sympathisers of the group. Many of them had studied in the Soviet Union. (7) But, as the historian Amin Saikal wrote, the alliance between Daud and the Parchamis “was not based on ideology” rather solely on Daud’s desire “to wreak vengeance on Zahir Shah and seize power in pursuit of his own vision of Afghanistan.”

The Daud-Parcham alliance was over again soon, as Daud started sidelining Parcham. With one exception, all its ministers were removed from the cabinet by 1975. Karmal, who never had received a cabinet or similar position under Daud, was under de facto house arrest. Daud also dismissed or demoted many Parcham members in the armed forces. Colonel Abdul Qader, one of the leaders of the July 1973 coup who had been made deputy commander of the Air Force, was particularly humiliated: In 1974, after he challenged the president to make good on his promise to legalise political parties, Daud made him the director of the Kabul slaughterhouse.

These moves prompted the PDPA’s Khalq and Parcham factions to re-unite in July 1977, facilitated over more than a year by the Indian Communist Party and Ajmal Khattak, a leftist Pashtun nationalist poet and politician from Pakistan who lived in exile in Kabul. The unification took place in Jalalabad, and Tarakay became party leader with Karmal as his deputy, likely due to the fact that Khalq had more members than Parcham (2500 against 1000 to 1500). Their clandestine military networks were kept separate but cooperated against Daud after the arrest of the party’s leaders in April 1978.

It is still unknown who killed Khaibar, the event that triggered the April 1978 upheavals. Hezb-e Islami (Gulbuddin) claimed the assassination years later, but a more common theory points at Daud’s secret police and at his Khalqi rival Amin. Bruce Flatin, who served as a US Embassy political counsellor in Kabul from 1977 to 1979, later said that a West German police officer, who was then a police adviser to the Afghan Ministry of the Interior, told him that the same weapon used to kill Khaibar had been used earlier to kill another union leader. (8) and “that fact indicated that both killings may have been a government-type assassination” (read interview here). Amin may have wanted to sideline Khaibar and his Parchami military organisation in the re-united PDPA and take over himself by provoking a coup among the remaining left-wing officers who, as with Watanjar and Mazduryar, were closer to Khalq. Cordovez/Harrison’s finding that Qader, a Parchami, was initially hesitant to join the coup indicates that he may have perceived it as Khalqi-led. (9)

… and the PDPA turned the first tank that entered the palace into a memorial for the ‘Saur Revolution’. Source: Afghanistan Today/Afghanistan Hoy, propaganda book, Moscow 1986

The PDPA takes over

Qader endured his assignment at the slaughterhouse and returned to his military duties, reinstated as Air Force chief of staff, but seized the opportunity to seek revenge for his humiliation. On 27 April 1978, fighter jets flown by pilots under his command supported Watanjar’s tanks and started pounding the presidential palace. When commando units also joined the coup, the resistance put up by Daud’s Republican Guard at the palace broke down. After Khaibar’s assassination, Daud might have wrongly assumed that the threat against him emanating from leftist army infiltration was over. Several sources even reported that the army units were still celebrating the PDPA leaders’ arrest when the coup started.

This coup was much more violent than the first one in 1973. The PDPA regime later talked about some 100 people killed on 27 April. Western eyewitnesses quoted in the Washington Post described the fighting:

“I never knew the Afghan army had so many tanks […]. They were everywhere, hundreds and hundreds of them, and many of them had been knocked out in the battles. It was all very fierce stuff.” […]

(Read the full story here.) Louis Dupree, another eyewitness, recounted how, in the weekend traffic, private cars were swerving in and out of tank columns and how traffic police tried to give directions to the tanks.

Daud refused to capitulate and drew a pistol on the officers who came to arrest him. He was executed along with all 18 of his family members in the country at the time, including his wife, his brother, and their children and grand children, five of them underage. (10) They were buried in unmarked graves until 2009, when Daud received a state burial (read here).

It was also Qader who, as the head of a Revolutionary Military Council, announced the success of the coup over national radio on the afternoon of 27 April. (According to one source, Watanjar read out the same text in Pashto.) Two days later, the military council handed power over to a civilian government. On 30 April, the first two decrees of the new government wee published, announcing that PDPA leader Tarakay was appointed head of state and prime minister. Karmal and Amin were made his deputies; Amin also was foreign minister. All of them had been liberated by the military plotters on 28 April who knocked down the mud wall of Sedarat prison in central Kabul with their tanks. Amin was leading operations with a handcuff still around one wrist. Qader became the PDPA’s first defence minister. The country was renamed Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

The new regime allied itself with the Soviet Union, while claiming to be non-communist, and embarked on radical reforms. This alienated the landed elite and the religious establishment, as well as large parts of the population. Growing armed resistance, often spontaneous, was organised by nationalist and even leftist groups, although both were later completely sidelined by the mujahedin parties. This rebellion soon brought the regime to the brink of collapse. It answered with brutal repression against everyone it considered an enemy. While related atrocities in Kabul are relatively well-known (see AAN reporting here and here), similar ones in the provinces are less notorious. For example, the author was told by a tribal elder in Uruzgan province in 2008 how the local PDPA leadership invited all provincial elders for a shura, only to have them arrested: “They were tied together with ropes around their necks and led away. We never saw any of them again.”

In September 1979, Amin assassinated Tarakay and put himself at the helm. Tarakay had established a close personal relationship with then Soviet leader Leonid Breshnev, so the killing cost Amin the backing of Moscow. (Qader, Rafi, Watanjar and Mazduryar had all long been sidelined.) Allegations spread in the party that Amin was a CIA agent. His alleged plans to broker a peace deal with Hezb-e Islami leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who belonged to the same tribe as Amin, finally persuaded the Soviet leadership to intervene militarily. They toppled and killed Amin, replacing him with Karmal, in an alliance with the Khalqi officer group around Watanjar.

The rest is history. The country, a backwater of the Cold War that had preserved its non-aligned status and used it to attract massive foreign aid from both East and West, became the last battleground of the Cold War where the US also took revenge for the Soviet-assisted defeat in Vietnam.

What caused the coups?

The 1973 and 1978 coups did not emerge spontaneously and are closely linked. Lesser-noticed domestic developments had undermined Afghanistan’s relative internal stability of forty years that followed Zaher Shah’s accession to power in 1933 after the assassination of his father Muhammad Nader Shah, and led to the build-up of domestic political tension and finally the first coup in 1973.

This included profound changes in Afghanistan’s social fabric as a long-term result of Amanullah’s modernising reforms in the 1920s and demographic change. These reforms have often been described as a failure. But they were never reversed, only slowed down. Over the following decades, they led to a growth of the educated class that was inadequately absorbed by the stagnating state bureaucracy, dominated until 1964 by the extended royal clan. The educated youth and the growing intellectual class – called roshanfekran (enlightened thinkers) in the country – turned into a breeding ground for the re-emergence of the reformist political current that began with the first constitutional movement (mashrutiat) at the start of the century. This movement continued with the Young Afghans who inspired and pushed forward Amanullah’s reforms and became active again during a political opening in the late 1940s and early 1950s under the name Wesh Zalmian (Awakened Youth). They were the recruitment pool for the new political groups that emerged after the passing of the 1964 constitution.

Secondly, there were tense relations with Pakistan immediately after British India’s partition in 1947. The failure to grant the Pashtun-inhabited areas of the new country the choice of independence or re-accession to Afghanistan led to permanent irredentist politics in Kabul. In 1949, a Loya Jirga in Kabul proclaimed its support for the self-determination of ‘Pashtunistan’ and declared the 1893 Durand Agreement void. Since then, Afghanistan has not given up its claim to these areas and Kabul has supported armed rebellions among the Pashtuns and Baloch in Pakistan. Daud became a prime protagonist of this policy, building his appeal among the reformist and nationalist intelligentsia.

Thirdly, Afghanistan’s rejection by the US drove Daud into the arms of the Soviets. Since 1944, Kabul was repeatedly told by Washington that the country was of no particular interest. The US told Kabul in 1951 that “it would help if the Pashtunistan claim is dropped” and in 1954 that “extending military aid to Afghanistan would create problems not offset by the strength it would create.” In 1955, Afghanistan declined to give in to pressure from Washington to join the anti-communist Baghdad Pact (later CENTO) and remained neutral. The USSR opened its territory when Pakistan blocked the transit trade with land-locked Afghanistan. As a result, Kabul started military cooperation with the Soviet Union that year. An increasing number of Afghan officers and civilians were trained in the Soviet Union. Some of them adopted communist, or at least nationalist anti-Western ideas, and started recruiting followers. The increasing Afghan-Soviet relations and activity of left-leaning political forces also led to a crisis between the Afghan monarchy and the Islamic clergy which traditionally had bestowed religious legitimacy on the leadership.

Fourth, the crackdown by Daud and his Parchami against the Islamist groups gave Pakistan a chance to mirror Afghanistan’s policy of supporting armed insurgents on its territory. Pakistan received the fleeing Islamist survivors with open arms and offered training. The US became part of the game early on, contributing financial aid to the Islamist leaders as early as 1973, according to Pakistani officials involved then (quoted here). After the Soviets invaded, these Islamist groups became the basis for the mujahedin movement fighting them and the major force opposing the PDPA regime.

These social and political tensions were exacerbated by an environmental crisis, resulting in the drought of 1969 to 1972 which led to crop failures, food shortages and food price hikes across the country. Thousands died of starvation, mainly in the northwestern provinces of Herat, Badghis and Ghor, parts of the Hazarajat and Badakhshan (see telegrams from the US Embassy in Afghanistan here; here and here). German magazine Der Spiegel reported in October 1971:

Thousands of Afghans leave their villages in the Southwest of the country. They move to Iran or West Pakistan. Afghans attack Afghans. They fight for food and access to water. (…) The herdsmen and farmers slaughter their animals or sell them at knockdown prices to their neighbours in Iran, the USSR or West Pakistan. [… A]t least 70 per cent of sheep flocks will not survive the winter unless foreign countries urgently help the Afghans.

The inadequate response of the government further undermined the legitimacy of the monarchy. US sources (here and here) reported that foreign aid, including wheat, was left to rot at the Kabul airport. According to the US Embassy, “provincial officials including governors [showed] extraordinarily poor leadership” or often were “ruthlessly exploiting the situation,” selling food aid in the markets. Journalists and foreigners were kept out of most affected areas, and the central government was reluctant to declare an emergency in order to avoid being blamed (read more here). Afghan-German writer Matin Baraki wrote that a large part of the assistance delivered by the UN was misappropriated by a member of the royal family who was the honorary chairman of the Afghan Red Crescent, redirected to the military, hospitals and boarding schools or sold in the bazaar. Donors criticised the lack of a coordinated plan of action and the absence of a relief coordinator at the cabinet level. This behaviour undermined the standing and legitimacy of the monarchy among large parts of the population.

Inter-dynastic problems also played a role. While Daud stood for political reform and saw the Islamists as the major challenge to his aims, a more conservative strand of the royal family – represented by his uncle, Sardar Shah Wali Khan and his son General Abdul Wali, the commander of the central army corps in Kabul – had the King’s ear and was able to slow the pace of reform. There were even tensions over private relationships, indirectly alluded to by the historian Saikal as “the context of an intensified polygamic-based power rivalry.”

In any case, Daud’s coup d’état in 1973 ended a ten-year interlude under Zaher Shah that had been relatively democratic in the context of Afghan history. It also set an example that violent regime change was possible. The PDPA learned this lesson. Daud’s regime was also much less effective than often described. Flatin, the former Kabul-based US diplomat, deflated this posthumous mystification, calling Daud’s post-1973 republican regime “a one-man type of rule“ and Daud as not having “enough energy to found and run this new republic of his properly. There was dissatisfaction everywhere.“

First page of first issue of “Khalq” newspaper, 1966. Source: screen shot

Where did the PDPA come from?

The PDPA was only one of a number of parties-in-waiting that emerged after Zaher Shah started his top-down democratic opening in 1963. They included royalists; Islamists; liberal and social democrats; Pashtun and non-Pashtun ethno-nationalists; as well as Marxists, both pro-Moscow and pro-Beijing. The PDPA was officially founded on 1 January 1965 in Kabul after a series of meetings between a number of mahfel, who had established a PDPA kamita-ye tadaruk (preparatory committee). Finally only five of them participated, those of Tarakay (who became party leader), Karmal (his deputy), Taher Badakhshi (who later founded his own leftist-ethnonationalist group, known as Settam-e Melli), Ghulam Dastagir Panjsheri (a later minister) and Zaher Ufoq. In contrast, some moderate leftists opted out of the party during the preparation process, in particular senior historian Mir Ghulam Muhammad Ghobar who had been a supporter of reformer-king Amanullah and elected parliamentarian in 1949. Karmal and Tarakay, too, had gained political clout as activists during the first democratic period and later suffered prison or exile.

In its documents, the PDPA avoided the term Marxism-Leninism. Instead, it talked about the “scientific world view” – and everyone knew what it meant. “This party did not hide that its aim was the establishment of a socialist society,” one of its co-founders, Karim Misaq, was later quoted as saying. The Soviets were less enthusiastic about the PDPA, particularly because of its notorious factionalism; they did not want to be forced to say whether Parcham or Khalq was the ‘real’ brotherly party in Afghanistan. (As a rule, the USSR only recognised one communist party per country.) Vladimir Plastun, a leading Soviet specialist on Afghanistan, told the author that Moscow did not believe either of the two factions were really communist parties as per the Soviet definition.

While the new constitution contained the right to form political parties, its implementation was predicated on a pending law on political parties. This law had passed parliament and awaited the king’s signature. The king chose not to sign the law, however, fearing that extremist groups might get the upper hand in parliament (read US Embassy cable here). Laws about provincial councils, the right to demonstrate and an independent judiciary were also unsigned (see here). This “royal indecision and caution” proved to be, as Saikal called it, a “fatal mistake.” While the moderates obeyed, either dissolved their groups or decreased their activity, the leftists and the Islamists went underground and started to infiltrate the armed forces, viewing a coup d’état as the only possible way to power. As a result, this only half-hearted democratic opening, almost paradoxically, led to a further destabilisation of the country and to a radicalisation and diversification of the opposition that opened the way for the second, PDPA-led coup in 1978.

Did the Soviets orchestrate the 1978 coup?

There seems to be a growing consensus among those studying Afghanistan that, despite close contacts between PDPA leaders and the Soviet Embassy in Kabul, the Soviets did not engineer the 27 April coup. Much of what was written earlier was coloured by the Cold War. It was clear, though, also to the Soviets, that various groups including the PDPA were working toward a military takeover. On the part of the PDPA, these preparation were well advanced in 1977. Khaibar’s assassination and the remaining party leaders’ arrest likely resulted in the coup plans being accelerated.

A large volume of analysis written after the Cold War seems to show that the Soviets were surprised by the coup. Soviet documents show instructions to their ambassador in Kabul and the chief military advisor, ordering them to have no dealings with the PDPA leaders and leave it to the local KGB. The KGB people, however, told Tarakay and Karmal that the conditions were not ripe for socialism in Afghanistan and that they should instead unite to support Daud. Rodric Braithwaite, a former British ambassador to Moscow who studied all available Soviet sources about Afghanistan for a book published in 2011, comes to the conclusion that “reliable evidence that the Russians were behind the coup is lacking.” At best, KGB advisors were privy to plans for a coup at a later stage, but the coup came, as Braithwaite put it, “like a bolt out of the blue to Soviet officials in Kabul, even the KGB representative.” Former US president Jimmy Carter wrote in his memoirs that even Brezhnev had told him that the Soviets first heard about the coup on the radio.

This does not contradict Rubin’s assumption that the PDPA “probably received financial assistance from the Soviet Union, aided by some Parchamis whose state position gave them access to Soviet aid and trade.” The Swiss editors of a collection of Soviet documents concluded that even though Daud’s relationship with the USSR had become less close in his final years, a change of power in Kabul “was in no way in the interest of the Kremlin in spring 1978.” In other words, they found Daud still much more reliable than the notoriously squabbling PDPA leaders.

That the Soviets were not behind the coup does also not mean that some PDPA leaders were not interlocutors, informants or even agents of Soviet intelligence services. This has been repeatedly claimed, among others by Vassili Mitrokhin, a KGB archivist who defected to the West and claimed the KGB had recruited “long-serving” Karmal in the mid-1950s; Tarakay “possibly” at the same time; and Qader and Ratebzad “informally.” Former PDPA leaders also made such allegations in books published after they fell from power.

The end of the revolution: Soviet military debris at Kunduz airport. Photo: Thomas Ruttig (2007)

Coup or revolution?

The question of whether the events of April 1978 were a coup or a revolution is not a theoretical matter and remains hotly contested in Afghanistan. The answer has been a make-or-break question particularly for leftist, former leftist and pro-democratic groups and has prevented them at various times from joining hands against what they perceive as the overriding problem for their country, the Islamist threat. Many of them are successor organisations of the now defunct PDPA (renamed Hezb-e Watan, or Fatherland Party in 1990; read AAN analysis here) while others stood on the other side of the barricades between 1978 and 1992 and were persecuted by the PDPA. For the next generation of progressive Afghan politicians, it remains a central matter of concern whether the groups that emerged from the PDPA develop a critical look at the regime’s deeds or continue glorifying it.

There is however no question that the takeover of power was achieved by a military coup. Some authors have described the three-day delay before the handover from the military council to the civilian PDPA government as a measure to avoid exposing the PDPA leaders’ involvement in case the coup went wrong. This argument does not carry water: There was no need to conceal any PDPA role. Daud was informed by his intelligence services that there were coup preparations (which he took too lightly, after Khaibar’s death); the links between Khaibar’s officer group and Karmal’s Parcham as well as the close relationship between the two men were equally well known; and the remaining key leaders’ arrest after Khaibar’s funeral showed that they were not unknown entities. The quick handover of power from the military council to the civilian PDPA government, though, was unusual for leftist military revolutionaries in countries without a strong Marxist party (see Mengistu’s Ethiopia). This most likely indicates that there was no plan to establish a military dictatorship.

This could have opened the way for the coup to become a real revolution that overturned Afghanistan’s socio-political relations. The radical reforms envisioned – including land reforms; debt cancellation for landless farmers; implementation of a 42-hour working week; paid maternity leave for working women – could have led in this direction. But the PDPA leadership, overconfident after their easy takeover of power, underestimated the resistance particular their land reforms would create because of the strength of relations between landowners and share croppers, whom the PDPA simplistically viewed as between ‘oppressive feudals’ and ‘oppressed farmers’ waiting for liberation. They also underestimated the influence and staying power of the clergy, and started answering any resistance with brutal force. This cost them most of their initial support. The Soviet invasion in late 1979, meant to stabilise their regime, dealt their project the death blow. Under the conditions of a full-blown guerrilla war, it became nearly impossible to carry out any constructive reform programme.

The authoritarian and bureaucratic model with its one-party state, mostly copied from the Soviet Union, was also incapable of mobilising sufficient support for such a programme. When the Soviet leadership under Gorbachev realised this in its own country and told Karmal in October 1985 to “broaden the base of the regime, forget about Socialism, share power with those who have real influence, including with mujahidin leaders […] and try to act so that the people will see that it is getting benefits from your revolt,” it was too late. Too much blood had already been shed.

Edited by Graeme Smith

 

The above rendering of the fateful events on and around 7 Saur 1357 (27 April 1978) is based on the following literature, as well as the author’s research on the democratic movements of 1947-52 and 1963-73 and political party development in Afghanistan:

• Andeshmand, Muhammad Akram, Hezb-e Demokratik-e Khalq-e Afghanistan – kudeta, hakemiat wa furupashi 1357-1371 [PDPA – coup d’etat, rule and downfall] (Kabul 2009)
• Andrew, Christopher/Mitrochin, Das Schwarzbuch des KGB 2 (German version, 2006)
• Arnold, Anthony, Afghanistan’s Two-Party Communism (1983)
• Bradsher, Henry S., Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention (1999)
• Braithwaite, Rodric, Afgantsy (2011)
• Bucherer-Dietschi, P./Stahel, A.A./Stüssi-Lauterburg, J. (eds), Strategischer Überfall – das Beispiel Afghanistan (1991)
• Emadi, Hafizullah, State, Revolution and Superpowers in Afghanistan (1997)
• Farahi, Abdul Ghaffar, Afghanistan During Democracy & Republic 1963-1978 (2001)
• Halliday, Fred, “Revolution in Afghanistan”, New Left Review (1979),
• Halliday, Fred/Tanin, Zahir, “The Communist regime in Afghanistan 1978-1992, institutions and conflicts”, Europe-Asia Studies (1998)
• Kakar, M. Hassan, Afghanistan (1995)
• Korgun, V.G., Intelligencija v politicheskim zhizni Afganistana (Moscow 1983)
• Majid, Walid, “Prime minister Daoud’s relationship with Washington (1953-1963)”, paper for the Institute for Afghan Studies
• Male, Beverley, Revolutionary Afghanistan (1979)
• Roy, Olivier, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan (French original from 1985)
• Rubin, Barnett, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan (1995)
• Saikal, Amin, Modern Afghanistan (2004)

All possible misinterpretations or mistakes should only be blamed on the author, who also declares his interest to hear from readers if they have more information about the events described (please contact info@afghanistan-analysts.org).

 

(1) Read Barnett Rubin’s 1994 biography of him in Encyclopaedia Iranica here.

(2) In most sources in non-Afghan languages, Tarakay is spelled Taraki. The author chose the lesser used version to reflect that the name is not pronounced as Tarakee but with the diphthong “ai” as in “to buy” or in Khaibar (in English sources often: Khyber).

The author also uses the adjective Khalqi only for the eponymous PDPA faction or its members, not for the entire PDPA – according to its Dari name, Hezb-e Demokratik-e Khalq-e Afghanistan – whose members are often also summarily called “Khalqis.”

(3) See a list of the quote and other literature consulted for this text above, above, at the end of the main text.

(4) Shola-ye Jawed, just as Khalq and Parcham, were not the official names of the groups but of the groups’ often only shortlived newspapers which were much better known publicly than their actual names. Shola-ye Jawed, for example, was called Jamiat-e Demokratik-e Nawin (New Democratic Association), a term borrowed from Mao’s rulebook who had coined it for the system in his own country.

(5) Those four got seats in the 1965 parliamentary election, so far the most open one in Afghanistan’s history. Also Tarakai, Amin and some more Khalqis had run, but with no success. In 1969, when the government’s grip had been tightened again, only Karmal made it again, but also this time Amin, giving the Khalq faction its only ever seat in parliament.

(6) The Kabul University Students Association was the first-ever social organisation in Afghanistan legalised, and initially even encouraged by the government. It existed only from March to November 1950. The association was banned again after it started challenging the monarchy; one student started a public conference without mentioning the king in his opening remarks, a behaviour unthinkable of at that time. In 1951, students held demonstrations in favour of its re-legalisation. One protest, on 21 June 1951, began with a meeting at French-supported Esteqlal Lycée and led to the royal palace where, among others, Karmal gave a speech which led to his arrest. He was released in 1956.

(7) Even Daud’s adopted son Sayed Abdulillahi, who became Vice President in 1977; his chef de cabinet Muhammad Hassan Sharq, another future prime minister under the PDPA; and the first commander of his presidential guard Zia Majid were said to be Parcham sympathisers. (The PDPA’s Khalq faction remained in opposition throughout Daud’s reign.)

See a rendering of the events on the day of the 1973 coup by an accidental witness in the New York Times here.

(8) His name was Enam-ul-Haq Gran, a leader of the pilots’ union at the state carrier Ariana. The pilots went on strike in 1977 and Gran was shot by unknown assailants.

(9) Cordovez/Harrison also have one of the most accurate rendering of 27 April events, from the military side, is their 1995 book Out of Afghanistan (pp 25-8, online here)

(10) Wikipedia lists Daud’s direct family members murdered in April 1978 here.

 

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Today’s MCIS slides installment comes from Lt. General Sergey Kuralenko, the Deputy Commander-in-Chief for Peacekeeping Operations of the Russian Ground Forces. This comes from the breakout session on soft power as a tool to pursue military-political objectives.

Sadly, it seems that the Russian MOD has not posted video or speech texts from the breakout sessions, so I’ll provide a brief summary here, in addition to the slides. Kuralenko’s speech can be summarized in three points:

1. Russia is in Syria to help Syrians.
2. The U.S. is in Syria to pursue its geopolitical ambitions and does not care about collateral damage.
3. People in the military, regardless of country of origin, understand the consequences of conflict and seek to avoid it. More mil-mil contact would help to avert the worst consequences of war.

Kuralenko was followed by Vladimir Padrino Lopez, the Minister of Defense of Venezuela, who made the argument that many countries use soft power as a tool for political domination of weaker countries without having to resort to military force. He contrasted positive soft power, a tool for cooperation as practiced by Hugo Chavez when he led Venezuela, with negative soft power, as practiced by the United States for subjugation and regime change. He also helpfully pointed out that the United States was using the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela to destabilize the country and also noted that there was no humanitarian crisis in Venezuela…

The sole American speaker, Ariel Cohen, highlighted the transition of the concept of soft power from a national branding tool to a weapon. Starting from Joe Nye’s original conceptualization of soft power, he focused on soft power as a tool for expanding national influence through persuasion and attraction, rather than through military or economic pressure. Soft power is the idea that any product of human activity can be weaponized to achieve geopolitical goals.

He was followed by the Russian journalist and television personality Vladimir Soloviev, who gave a typically inflammatory speech. Soloviev opened by saying that he didn’t believe in soft power, since it can only be useful in addition to hard power rather than in and of itself. He argued that the West had rejected all of the norms of international law and had aggressively rejected diplomacy as well. He likened the West (and the United States specifically) to a casino owner telling the players what the rules should be. He accused Boris Johnson of lying about the Skripal case. His larger point was that the West was using soft power together with its technological advantages to solve its military and political issues, with the dollar being the most effective soft power tool. He argued that a new iron curtain was descending over Europe, but this time from the Western side.

Soloviev made the argument that Russia needs  to become more active in defending itself against soft power attacks. Russia, for him, has not been pushing an ideology. Furthermore, since it does not own or operate the platforms, it will always be behind.  It therefore needs to leave the casino altogether and stop playing the game.

Soloviev’s arguments were seconded by Yakov Kedmi, an Israeli expert who has developed a reputation for his pro-Russian positions. In discussing  soft power, he highlighted that power is the key word in that phrase, with the soft modifier being secondary. Soft power is used to pressure opponents or support allies in circumstances when military power can’t be used. He then argued that soft power is as illegitimate as any other use of force and should therefore be prohibited through international law and countered with military power, as that is the most effective tool against it.

After a completely unmemorable presentation by the first deputy defense minister of Argentina, the final (and best) presentation was given by Dan Smith, director of SIPRI. He countered Kedmi’s perspective quite effectively, noting that power is not the same thing as coercion or the use of force. The most effective kind of soft power is silent, intangible and irresistable. It comes from culture, economic strength, and reputation  and offers influence and helps diplomacy. At its most effective, it stops conflicts before they start. It can change the nature of the game. Soft power in the world has declined in general as trust of other countries has declined. No state has as much power today as it used to and none are viewed as models for others.

Here are Kuralenko’s slides… I’ll have one final post on MCIS later this week with overall impressions and takeaways.

will take place on 25 April, 10:00-12:30 (in camera 9:00-10:00), 14:30-18:30 and on 26 April, 8:30-10:00 and 11:00-12:30 in Brussels.

Organisations or interest groups who wish to apply for access to the European Parliament will find the relevant information below.

Further information
watch the meeting live
Access rights for interest group representatives
Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

Americas

• The Trump administration has rolled out a new weapons export policy keeping in mind that “economic security is national security.” While some in the defense industry will be disappointed that the reforms did not go far enough—particularly when it comes to the export of military drones—the new rules “create broad new language emphasizing the need to consider economic benefits when looking at potential weapon exports to partner nations,” Defense News reports. Speaking on the new rules, Peter Navarro, White House National Trade Council head, said this change will allow allies and partners “to more easily obtain” American security goods, which in turn improves the security of the Untied States while “reducing” the need for them to buy Chinese and Russian systems, while Tina Kaidanow, principal deputy assistant secretary for political-military affairs, said the change represents “efforts to do things a little bit more strategically. We need to do, the US government, a better job of strategic advocacy for some of our companies. We need to think about those areas where we can really enable sales oversea.” However, both failed to offer many hard details about what would change for conventional arms transfers, and Navarro declined to say what economic impact could potentially be in terms of jobs or dollar figures.

• Boeing will take care of additional Super Hornet and Growler sensor upgrade work after receiving an $18.7 million award from the US Navy last Thursday. Awarded by the Naval Air Warfare Center Training Systems Division, out of Orlando, Florida, the agreement enables Boeing to integrate advanced software to the Tactical Operational Flight Trainer sensor models on F/A/-18E/F Super Hornet and the EA-18G Growler. Work will take place across the United States with some work to take place in Japan. Contract completion is expected in July 2021.

Middle East & Africa

• Russia’s Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, said Monday that Moscow had not yet decided whether it would deliver advanced S-300 missile systems to Syria, but would not make a secret of the matter if it took such a decision, Reuters reports. Earlier in the day, the daily Kommersant newspaper, citing unnamed military sources, reported that Russia might start supplying the anti-aircraft missile systems to Syria in the near future—a suggestion the Kremlin declined to comment on. However, Lavrov had said on Friday that Western military strikes on Syria this month had removed any moral obligation Russia had to withhold the missile systems from its ally Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. A Russian diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity to Reuters said Israel has asked Moscow not to supply the Syrian military with the S-300s. An Israeli government spokesman declined comment.

Europe

• A report in Germany’s Handelsblatt newspaper on Sunday discusses an upcoming German defense ministry shopping spree with plans for 18 arms contracts totalling 25 million euros to be shortly approved by the budget and defense committees. Aimed at filling growing deficiencies in the armed forces’ equipment and capabilities, other procurements include six C-130J transport aircraft from the United States, Heron TP UAVs from Israel, new rescue helicopters, as well as upgrades to its fleet of Puma armored personnel carriers and the radar found on its Eurofighters. However, Reuters says that the list is “preliminary” and would depend on the 2018 budget. The ministry was not immediately available for comment on the report.

• Serbia has received four additional MiG-29 fighter aircraft from Belarus bringing to 14 the fleet now available to Belgrade. Previous deliveries included six from Russia last October and the transferred aircraft will now undergo a three-stage period of modernization with between 180 million to 230 million euro earmarked for the purpose. According to the Russian news agency TASS,Russia’s assistance in addition to the MiGs will include 30 T-72 tanks and 30 BRDM-2 combat patrol vehicles. Also in discussion are surface-to-air gun and missile systems. Belarus had previously announced its plans to hand over to Serbia in 2018 eight MiG-29 fighter jets and two Buk missile systems on condition that Belgrade pays for their repairs.

• Lithuania wants the regular deployment of both long-range and short-range advanced anti-air and missile assets in its country to allow for more regular training with NATO, Defence Minister Raimundas Karoblis has said. “Yes, of course (we are asking the Americans)”, he told Reuters on Thursday. “We are talking not only about the Patriots but also other capabilities, such as short-range Avengers, and other systems to create a regional architecture of air defence, because we are not able to do that ourselves.” While Karoblis did not expect NATO to increase defences in the Baltics immediately, he does expect the alliance to show greater commitment at a NATO leaders summit in July to deterring any threat in the Baltics. “We would like to have the permanent deployment of ground missile systems and other capabilities, but we understand that a quite significant part of these capabilities were lost by NATO after the Cold War and it’s difficult to rebuild them fast”, he said. “We need to ensure that (air defences) could be deployed (in the Baltics) at any time necessary.” Formerly part of the Soviet Union, Lithuania—along with neighboring Estonia and Latvia—have since 1991 realigned themselves by joining NATO and the European Union. Anxious since Russia’s annexation of the Crimea from Ukraine in 2014, the nations have continued to ask for Western help despite growing defence budgets due to their small economies. Poland was equally alarmed by Moscow’s Crieman seizure, spending more than $5 billion on buying Patriot missiles from Raytheon after a deal in March.

Asia-Pacific

• A Pentagon award last Thursday, April 19, to Northrop Grumman has tasked the firm with supplying identifying friend or foe technology compatible with the E-2C Hawkeye for the government of Japan. Valued at $51.8 million, the US Navy contract is against a previously issued basic ordering agreement and calls for supplies and services required for the delivery, installation, and testing of one Japan E-2C compatible AN/APX-122A Mode 5/S interrogator and transponder unit and will include non-recurring engineering for the developmental laboratory work, integration laboratory testing, software modifications, technical data, training, and post installation ground and flight testing support, kits, and associated hardware for aircraft integration. Work will take place at several locations across the US and in Japan with a scheduled completion time set for December 2020.

Today’s Video

• China’s recent live-fire drills in the Taiwan Strait:

Ukrainian Neptun Anti-Ship Cruise Missile

Americas

• Despite differences over who will pay for the wall along their common border, the Mexican government has been cleared by the Trump administration for the potential purchase of 8 Sikorsky MH-60R Seahwak helicopters. Announced in a Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) press release on Thursday, April 19, the package is estimated to reach $1.2 billion with Lockheed Martin’s Rotary and Mission Systems outfit based out of Owego, New York acting as principal contractor in the sale. Included in sale are engines, radars, radios, naval equipment and spares, alongside deliveries of Hellfire missiles, Captive Air Training missiles, Advanced Precision Kill Weapons System (APKWS) II rockets, and Mk -54 Lightweight Hybrid Torpedoes (LHTs). The Seahawk is the US Navy’s version of the US Army’s UH-60 Black Hawk. According to the DSCA, the potential acquisition of the helicopters is part of a modernization push by Mexico’s armed forces.

• Quality control issues at Boeing has caused the US Army to halt deliveries of AH-64E Apache helicopters to the service. The issue in question involves a strap pack nut on the main rotor that is corroding in coastal environments. According to Brig. Gen. Thomas Todd, program executive officer for Army aviation, the nut in question holds very large bolts that subsequently hold the rotor blades on the helicopter and is therefore determined to be a critical safety item. While Boeing had already commenced redesign efforts of the bolt in the second half of 2017, the Army decided in February to not accept Echo models of the Apache, adding in March that it would stop taking receipt of helicopters permanently until the company began fielding a new and improved, acceptable strap pack nut. Todd added that Boeing had been working at a “very thorough but expeditious pace over the last six months.” “We are in testing as we speak.” In addition to the Army, the Apaches latest model has found customers in the government’s ofIndia, Indonesia, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Korea and Taiwan.

• Raytheon has received a contract to provide services in support of the US Navy’s Air and Missile Defense Radar Program. Valued at more than $136.5 million, the Pentagon contract awarded by Naval Sea Systems Command enables Raytheon to provide low rate initial production work in support of the Air and Missile Defense Radar Program (AMDR) on guided missile destroyer flight III class ships. Also called the AN/SPY-6(V), the next-generation radar will be included on warships like Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers and Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) vessels. They are about 30 times as powerful as their predecessors and will be installed on Flight III variations of the Burke-class, the first of which is the USS Jack H Lucas. Work on the contract will occur in Marlborough, Massachusetts, and is expected to be complete by April 2021.

Middle East & Africa

• Turkey’s participation in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program has been called into question by a senior US diplomat as a measure to exert control over Ankara’s procurement of the Russian-built S-400 Triumf air defense system. Speaking at a congressional hearing on April 18, assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian Affairs Wess Mitchell said: “Ankara claims to have agreed to purchase the Russian S-400 missile system, which could potentially lead to sanctions under section 231 of [countering America’s adversaries through sanctions act] and adversely impact Turkey’s participation in the F-35 program.” While US officials have complained that Turkey’s S-400 systems would not be interoperable with NATO’s networks—with some expressing concerns that possession of the S-400 and the F-35 could be used to compromise the latter, with Russia and its allies gaining invaluable intelligence—the Trump administration’s statements on the issue have been some what vague. Mitchell’s testimony has now made specific threats of potential retaliation if the Turkish government follows through on the acquisition of the S-400 system. While it is not clear how Turkey’s role in the program will be effected, Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) is deeply involved in the F-35A supply chain, supplying composite parts since 2008. It is also is a secondary source to Northrop Grumman for the centre fuselage, with a long-term agreement to supply 400 of the complex assemblies to Lockheed over the life the program. The Turkish Air Force have plans for the procurement of 100 F-35As, with the first batch of 13 already paid for and deliveries scheduled to begin earlier this year.

Europe

• Italy’s Leonardo is looking to boost sales of its BriteCloud missile decoy system, targeting operators of the F-16, F-15, and Eurofighter. In preparation for the push, the firm has starting transforming the cylindrical BriteCloud into a square format so that it can fit on the American ALE-47 chaff and flare dispenser used by both the F-15 and F-16s. The system has already been adopted for use by British Royal Air Force (RAF) Typhoon jets and Jon McCullagh, head of combat air sales for electronic warfare at the Leonardo Airborne and Space Systems Division, disclosed to Defense News that the firm has also approached the Eurofighter consortium for the BriteCloud to completed the jet’s existing towed decoy. Released when a radar-guided missile approaches an aircraft, BriteCloud includes a radar-jamming system and produces a ghost signal that fools radar guidance systems. The US has previously used the Gen-X expendable decoy, but Leonardo claims its new product is the first digital expendable decoy on the market and the most powerful to date.

Asia-Pacific

• Reuters reports that Japan is to be offered a fifth-generation fighter platform by Lockheed Martin that will fuse the export-banned F-22 Raptor and F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. The hybrid platform is the US defense giant’s entry into Japan’s competition to build its own stealth fighter—the F-3. In March, the Japanese government issued a third Request for Information (RFI) for the F-3 to foreign defense companies and sent a separate document outlining its requirements in more detail to the British and United States governments. In addition to Lockheed, Tokyo expects designs from Boeing and BAE Systems. Japan’s last indigenous fighter effort was the F-2, which entered service in 2000, was built jointly by Mitsubishi Heavy and Lockheed Martin. Mitsubishi has also participated as a partner manufacturer for Lockheed Martin’s F-35, controlling airframe assembly of Japanese F-35s at its Final Assembly and Check-Out (FACO) facility in Nagoya.

• In pursuit of what it called the air force’s want for a better fighter, India has pulled out of its partnership with Russia in the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) program. In the works since 2007, the program has seen cooperation between Hindustan Aeronautics (HAL) and Russia’s Sukhoi Design Bureau (Sukhoi) in developing and manufacturing a new fighter dubbed the Perspektivny Aviatsionny Kompleks Frontovoy Aviatsii, or “Prospective Airborne Complex of Frontline Aviation” (PAK-FA). Now called the Su-57, seven prototypes are currently in flight-testing since the first took to the skies in 2010. With $8.63 earmarked for the procurement of 127 PAK-FAs that were stealthy, possessed 360-degree radar and had more powerful engines, the Indian Air Force (IAF) have now claimed that the aircraft being offered was not stealthy enough for a fifth-generation combat aircraft. India’s National Security Advisor Ajit Doval is said to have conveyed the decision to a Russian ministerial delegation in February.

Today’s Video

• DoD warns China & Russia with new weapons development:

Protests in Helmand calling for a ceasefire and talks between insurgents and government are about to enter their second month. The pro-peace demonstrations which began in what are often described as the Taleban’s ‘southern heartlands’, have been spreading: they can now be found in half of Afghanistan’s provinces and for now, at least, they are transcending tribal and ethnic divides. As AAN’s Ali Mohammad Sabawoon reports (with input from Thomas Ruttig), both Taleban and government appear to have been wrong-footed by the protesters, unsure how to respond.

The relatives of victims, activists and other residents from Helmand – both men and women – who began a sit-in for peace following a car bomb suicide attack in the provincial capital of Lashkargah in late March 2018 which left dozens of civilians injured or dead (see a media report here), are now taking their initiative a step further. Spontaneous reactions in other parts of Helmand, where tents were erected and other forms of protest occurred, have spread to neighbouring Kandahar, as well as to other provinces – 16 in all. Sit-ins in support of the Helmand protestors have been organised Herat, Nimruz, Farah, Zabul, Kandahar, Uruzgan, Ghazni, Paktia, Kunduz, Kunar, Nangrahar, Balkh, Parwan, Daykundi, Maidan Wardak and Jawzjan.

A tent was erected in Sheberghan, Jawzjan’s capital, for example, on 20 April, where Tolo News quoted Farzin Fahimi, a female activist there, as saying this was a message to those who choose war: join the peace process. She added that civil society would help them with their legal demands, ensuring they would be accepted. Another tent was erected in Maidan Wardak province on 19 April in support of the movement. One of the protestors, Dr Najiullah Samun, told Pajhwok News Agency that the people were fed up with war. He called on both sides of the conflict to observe a ceasefire as soon as possible in order to pave the way for peace talks.” In Charikar in Parwan province, civil society activists also erected a tent (see media report here), where Pajhwok news agency quoted Khalida, a female participating activist, as saying “This move is in support of the people of Helmand.” Muhammad Sabir Fahim, a civil activist who spoke on behalf of the protestors, called on the Afghan government, armed groups and the United Statesto end the conflict in the country. “The people are tired of war,” he said. Support meetings have also been held in two other provinces, Bamyan and Badakhshan (although only some of these have been reported in the media, see here; and here).

These place names clearly indicate that people from non-Pashtun areas have also joined the protests, potentially making this a countrywide movement for peace.

Another protest tent was also planned for the capital, Kabul. A few days ago, one of the organisers, Eqbal Khaibar (a local journalist and youth activist) and his team met the relatives of victims of attacks in Kabul, as well as other civil society members and youth activists who told him they would support the Helmand initiative. However, officials have not allowed their tents to be erected in Zarnegar Park. They argued it was too close to the high-security Serena hotel, one of the few places where foreigners on official trips can still stay (they made no mention of its use by government officials, although that might also have been on their minds). Until now, the government had not objected to tents being put up in this park, which has been a popular location for similar protests on several earlier occasions. Khaibar told AAN on 16 April that they would choose another place for the tents. Up till now, no protest tent had gone up in the Afghan capital. Khaibar further told AAN he had had meetingsin Kabul with nearly 320 civil society representatives, as well as political groups, government and media.

Khaibar told AAN that a large gathering – a ghunda in Pashto – is planned for today, 23 April, in Lashkargah, in which representatives from all provinces will participate. There, they plan to reach a consensus and declare their decision to go to Musa Qala, the district centre that has served as a ‘capital’ for the Taleban since they took it over in 2015 (read AAN analysis here) to meet insurgent representatives. This was the initial plan when protests began, but it had to be postponed. Khaibar said, “We are very thirsty to go there.” According to Khaibar, the protestors see themselves as intermediaries between both sides and want to bring about talks between the Taleban and the government.

For this, the protestors want to muster additional public support. On 17 April, Khaibar said, a preparatory gathering in Lashkargah was held in order to appeal to the Taleban to allow telecommunication companies to resume their services, phone connections in Helmand have been down since 14 April, which has hindered plans for rallying supporters. However, protestors have announced that teams will go from street to street, to villages, schools and madrassas in order to inform people of the outcome of the ghunda. The Taleban, however, have claimed that closing down mobile phone services had been taken for the protestors’ security (they did not explain further).

In the past, Khaibar explained, the Taleban had been afraid that armed people would join the peace march and therefore refused to let protestors come to Musa Qala. At the same time, he said, there was support from “local Taleban; we are in contact with them every day.” But, he said, “the real problems” were with the ministries of defense and interior and the National Security Council, who, in his opinion, do not have a real plan for peace, while “the president and a limited number of people around him are determined to work for peace. “When we work on the Taleban mindset and make some progress,” he said, “the government forces carry out an attack or airstrike that negatively affects the Taleban mindset”and this, he said, throws their initiative off-track.

 How the initiative began

The sit-in for peace in Lashkargah and the Helmand Peace March initiative began on 26 March 2018 when a protest tent was erected at the Ghazi Ayub Khan Stadium in Lashkargah, two days after after a suicide bomber drove his car into a crowd leaving a wrestling event at the stadium, killing over a dozen civilians and injuring 40 others. Youths tied white banners around their heads with the slogan “Jang bas dai, sola ghwaru,” (Enough war, we want peace). Protestors asked the Taleban to initiate talks with the government.

Youth activists took the street asking Taleban and government for peace. Photos: c/o Helmand Peace March Initiative, 2018.

One of the victims’ relatives and one of the first to join the Helmand protest is Obaidullah, originally from Nawzad district but now living in Helmand. He told AAN that four of his nephews had been killed in the explosion at the in Ghazi Ayub stadium. “Six others of our family members were injured, two of whom are still in the hospital.” He added that he was also at the stadium but had gone to pray just three minutes before the explosion. “Our tears have not dried yet.” He said. “We want the Taleban and the government to stop killing innocent people.”

On the second day of the protest, women’s rights activists as well as those who lost their relatives in the war also joined the sit-in. The protestors declared their intent to march on Musa Qala, 87 kilometres to the north of Lashkargah, conveying their message of peace to the Taleban. They demanded that, in order to facilitate the march, both insurgents and the government must declare a ceasefire for at least two days and that the government delay their planned “Operation Nasrat” (Victory) against the insurgents.

The women would play a very specific role in this. In Afghan tribal tradition, when women perform nenawati (entering a house to demand help or seek forgiveness), the request is rarely rejected, although such traditions have been worn threadbare over the last four decades of war. Female members of the High Peace Council voiced their support for Helmand’s women on 1 April, saying in a statement, “We support the voice of Helmandi women who have lost their sons, brothers, husbands and relatives in the war.”

By then, the protestors had adopted the name ‘Helmand Peace March’ for this initiative – which is also the hashtag for their mobilisation on social media – and De Sole Wulusi Harakat (People’s Peace Movement). An organiser told AAN that their leadership council comprises nearly 20 people, but said he would not disclose all the names. Some of the organisers are known, however, as they have spoken to the media and been active on social media. Apart from Eqbal Khaibar, those who started the sit-in include Muhammad Erfan, a medical doctor, Qais Hashemi, a Helmandi singer famous for his song Sola Ghwaru (We Want Peace), Bacha Khan, another youth activist, as well as Ahmad Jan and Safiullah Sarwan. Khaibar described the group’s members as “people who have a national mindset,” ie not having any affiliations with organisations or militant groups, be they mujahedin or other. As is customary, the participating women’s backgrounds were not provided. It is very rare for women in southern Afghanistan to be allowed to be seen outside of their households, not to mention take on a political role.

The protestors indirectly responded to President Ashraf Ghani’s announcement on 28 February 2018 that his government was ready to talk with the Taleban without any preconditions, in any location (see AAN analysis here). The Taleban have not yet published an official reaction to Ghani’s offer; indeed both sides intensified their military activities in the weeks following the offer of talks.

The demonstration was inspired, in part, by the Pashtun Tahafuz (Protection) Movement, which also uses the name parlat (Pashto for ‘sit-in’) and was launched in Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan, on 1 February 2018. The protestors’ core demand was that the Pakistani security establishment stop the torture and extra-judicial killings of Pashtuns following the high-profile death of a young Pashtun shopkeeper, allegedly at the hands of police in Sindh. That protest lasted until 10 February, when Pakistani authorities promised that it would fulfill the demands within a month. The protestors announced the end of the sit-in but warned of future strikes if their demands were ignored.

The Taleban and the government’s reactions

On the first day of the sit-in, local Taleban reportedly welcomed the demonstration and its demands. Provincial authorities also showed an interest in a dialogue with the protestors and reiterated the government’s position that they were ready for peace talks without preconditions.

But the first official statement by the Taleban was less sympathetic (see here in Pashto). On 28 March they told the protestors they “should go to Shurab and Kandahar airbases of [the] American forces and ask them for peace instead coming to Musa Qala.” The statement warned that protestors should not go to Taleban areas because international forces or intelligence services might take advantage of the situation “and something might happen to you.” The statement added that the Taleban “would be compelled to react” if the march were to be instrumentalised, “and then the responsibility will fall on your shoulders.” The statement noted a widespread desire for peace in Afghanistan and claimed that the Taleban had made sacrifices for the sake of security in the country. “It’s now the duty of the whole nation including you [the protestors] to raise your voice against invaders”, the statement said.

There was also serious wavering on the government’s side. When the protestors went to the provincial government’s office in Lashkargah asking for a ceasefire so they could start their march to meet the Taleban, the government asked for time. Khaibar told AAN that the provincial government had told the activists it had submitted their proposal to the National Security Council in Kabul and would soon respond. But no response came before the deadline set by the protestors.

The response of the protestors

The Taleban’s negative message and the lack of a timely and concrete reply from the government provoked a furious response from the protestors. On 29 March, they announced the march to Musa Qala would be delayed and some of them converted their protest to a hunger strike that same day. A video spread on social media showing one of the organisers weeping and pleading for peace. Hashemi, the singer, expressed his anger at both sides (here on Facebook): “You have destroyed the lives of the people. My tears became dry.” Khaibar told AAN that the march would be delayed “until we receive a response from the government [about] whether or not they accept our proposal of ceasefire, at least to present to Taleban that we have this commitment from the government and now this is your turn.”

As the hunger strikers also refused to drink water, six of them soon had to be hospitalised. Seeing this, Sayed Gul Sarhadi, a local journalist based in Lashkargah and a participant of the sit-in, told AAN a group of religious scholars with a reputation for impartiality intervened and pleaded with the hunger strikers to stop. They also offered to mediate between the government and the strikers. The hunger strike was ended after 48 hours. But the protestors remained in their tents and their protest started to spread throughout the country. They also set out conditions for those to join: government officials could not participate; they would not eat in the tents and only drink water (but not bottled mineral water); and slogans and demands should only be about peace; no other slogans were allowed.

A local scholars’ committee consisting of 15 religious figures was formed on 1 April, headed by Sheikh Habibullah, a famous religious scholar in Helmand who was accepted by the protestors as a trustworthy personality. The scholars decided they would also take part in the sit-in and would continue the struggle until their demands for peace were accepted. At the same time, the scholars warned the protestors that preparing any future peace march on Musa Qala would require time for preparation.

On the same day the protests spread to Nawa and Gereshk, two Helmand districts that have been heavily embattled over the past months, and where demonstrators have also set up tents. On 3 April residents of Washir, a third district in the province, gathered to support the sit-in and planned to set up their own tents the following day. Washir is home to conservative Taleban who control 95 per cent of the district. Protest co-organiser Khaibar said the local Taleban had endorsed the demonstration and that their relatives were among the protestors. But “some outsiders” – referring to Taleban from other districts or provinces – were against it, so they decided against erecting a tent there, for fear that a conflict might occur – “and we stand against conflict.” Khaibar added, “We are working on Garmsir district, too.”

On 9 April Khaibar told AAN “We [also] managed to set up tents in Zabul and Kandahar and we are now in Kabul finding the families of the martyrs of Zanbaq square [the 31 May 2017 tanker truck bomb – see here] and other bomb attacks and talking with them. We would erect the tent in Kabul through them.”

How did other parts of the country react?

The protest first caused reactions in neighbouring Kandahar. On March 28, dozens of elders, including members of the provincial council and religious scholars, gathered in the provincial capital and called on the Taleban to give a positive response to the demands of the people raised in Helmand. One of the religious scholars, Mawlawi Muhammad Haq Khatib, said “now it is time the Taleban give a positive respond to the demands of the people regarding peace.” He also said that this parlat should not be limited to Helmand province but should spread countrywide. Khatib is a leading member of De Wolus Ghag (Voice of the People), a local political movement established recently. (1)

In the meantime, in Kabul, another sit-in was launched in support of the demands of the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement in Pakistan at Chaman-e Hozuri, a popular spot near the national stadium. Its participants also voiced their support for the aims of the Helmand peace sit-in. This sit-in was another example of the significant risks linked to such gatherings and demonstrations in Afghanistan, as on its ninth day, on 4 March, an explosion killed one protestor and injured fourteen others. The incident was attributed to a magnetic bomb (media report here). No insurgent group has claimed responsibility for the attack. Shortly afterwards, protestors held a press conference and told journalists that they would continue their demonstration. (2)

On 1 April, members of the Meshrano Jirga, or upper house of parliament, discussed the sit-ins in Helmand and offered their support. Initiated by a Helmandi senator, the house called on the inhabitants of other provinces of the country to support the Helmandis and raise their voices for peace. On 2 April, the Wolesi Jirga, or lower house, followed suit and unanimously declared its support for the Helmand demonstrations.

On the same day, dozens of civil society activists and youths from northern Balkh province gathered at the Hazrat Ali Shrine in Mazar-e Sharif in support of the Helmand protestors with the slogan: “Dear Helmandis! You are not alone. We are with you.” (media report here). Since then, local residents have erected a permanent tent to show their support to Helmandi protestors there, too (see here).

AAN approached several older civil society groups and political movements for their reactions. Raihana Azad, a member of the leadership council of Jombesh-e Roshanayi and MP for Uruzgan province, told AAN on 8 April,  “Really, they are the voice of those who are the victims of the war. In this peace protest we hear the voices of mothers who have lost their sons, the voices of the widows who have lost their husbands and the voices of those who have lost their relatives.” Aziz Rafiee the member of Transitional Justice Coordination Group (TJCG) and director of the Afghanistan Civil Society Forum (ACSF) also told AAN that he supported the peace sit-in in Helmand and thinks that it is a response to an “urgent need of the people.” He said he had also done so in the media and hoped for “a fruitful outcome.” Ahmad Parwani, a member of Jombesh-e Taghir wa Rastakhez (Uprising for Change Movement) also welcomed the sit-in. He said their leading members were not currently in Kabul. Otherwise they would have also raised their voices in support of the Helmand sit-in. All three more or less cited the alleged lack of interest in peace on the part of the government and regional powers as reasons why an ‘all-Afghan’ peace movement had not arisen until now. Enthusiastic support also has a different chime to it.

Moving beyond Afghan divides

This is the first time – in spite of significant risks – that people in southern Afghanistan have publicly, and over a sustained period of time, raised their voices against Taleban violence and mobilised publicly, and with such energy. Even the initial unfavourable response has not made them give up; it has actually strengthened their resolve. This protest is also remarkable insofar as it is happening in an area often described as the ‘heartland of the Taleban’.

Indeed, the Taleban control more than half of Helmand’s territory while the government’s hold is limited to the administrative centres of six districts – Nawa, Marja, Nadali, Gereshk, Garmsir and Washer – as well as Lashkargah, the provincial capital. The population in the Taleban-controlled areas provides them with refuge, food and money but it is difficult to say how many do so voluntarily and how many by coercion. It is also clear that the never-ending war has inflicted significant costs to many inhabitants in Helmand province and they are getting more and more tired about this. The protest makes clear that there is dissent due to the Taleban’s violent actions among many in this Pashtun-majority province. Moreover, the Taleban’s control over large areas gives the people an address where they can their concerns and complaints to the Taleban.

The Lashkargah stadium bombing has led those who lost their loved ones to raise their voices, take to the streets, protest against the war and ask for peace, put public pressure on the Taleban. The images of Taleban attacks killing innocent civilians that have spread across social media may have contributed to undermining their prestige and raised questions about the legitimacy of their war. These reactions indicate that people are tired of the fighting and cannot endure further atrocities. As Pashto idiom says: “The power of people is the power of God.” If the civilians can bolster the Taleban, they can also undermine them.

It is unsurprising that leaders from both sides of the conflict have demonstrated so little enthusiasm for the Helmandi protestors. The government took so long to react to their request for a ceasefire,  the march on Musa Qala had to be postponed; the official Taleban reaction was even more discouraging. Furthermore, neither side has shown much interest in brokering peace. Since the conclusion of the second peace conference in Kabul, neither party has decreased its military activities. On 2 April, an Afghan airstrike killed and injured at least 150 civilians in Dasht-e Archi district in Kunduz province. This kind of incident drives recruitment for the Taleban and feeds the narrative among insurgents that peace talks are just a money-making project for government officials.

Against this backdrop, the success of the organisers of the Helmand Peace March depends on their ability to keep their initiative up and mobilise more people in their province as well as countrywide. Scores of people have lost relatives in the war and a number of recent, large attacks have generated public outrage as well as protests (see AAN reporting here and here) – this is a large constituency to tap into.

The protest organisers are now systematically reaching out, and, given the number of protest tents that have gone up as well as other support activities, they have achieved much already. Remarkably, the protest has transcended the south-north divide, most notably between Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns. However, the less than enthusiastic reaction from some civil society activists in Kabul that AAN noted indicate that there still seem to be reservations and maybe even scepticism and bias towards what appear to be newcomers on the scene.

The protestors have tried to maintain their impartiality by preserving their distance from the government and by not allowing other interests to take over, hence the ban on slogans on anything other than for peace. They have not heeded, however, the Taleban’s demand that protestors go to US military bases.

It is also striking that ordinary Pashtuns on both sides of the Durand Line who are tired of the insecurity in their particular areas are protesting in large gatherings, rallying young people in mostly peaceful protests. Regardless of whether inspiration is mutual or even whether there are any direct exchanges among those mobilising, organisers on both sides claim they want to build civil movements for obtaining basic rights and have expressed commitment to the peaceful pursuit of democratic aims.

 

Edited by Graeme Smith and Thomas Ruttig

 

 

(1) Some sources from Kandahar told AAN said Khateb was close to the Karzai family and that the head of the provincial council, another Karzai ally, was present at the meeting.

(2) On 23 July 2016, the big TUTAP protest (AAN analysis here) in Kabul organised by the Enlightenment Movement (Jombesh-e Roshnayi) was attacked by suicide bombers causing a large number of casualties (UN report here).

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