Defence`s Feeds

The US Navy (USN) will re-establish the 2nd Fleet to better handle adversaries in the Atlantic, Admiral John Richardson, the chief of naval operations, said. “Our National Defence Strategy makes clear that we’re back in an era of great power competition as the security environment

The US Army’s Robotic Wingman Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD) programme will advance from an armed, unmanned Humvee truck to a tracked M113 armoured personnel carrier. Army Tank Automotive Research, Development and Engineering Center (TARDEC) “is co-ordinating the whole

The role of political parties in Afghanistan’s highly centralised presidential system, with only limited parliamentary checks and balances, is an important yardstick by which to measure how the country has fared in its attempts to democratise in the post-Taleban era. This new AAN thematic report, in cooperation with the German Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAS), looks at the complex issue of political party development over the period of 2001 to 2016, following up on a first paper published in 2006 and the parties’ impact on the nominally democratic system. AAN co-director Thomas Ruttig, who has been researching Afghan political party history for over 35 years, concludes that the parties have remained peripheral to the political system and that this is one key reason why the system is not progressing toward a more democratic political practice. In this introductory dispatch, which also serves as a short overview over developments not covered in the paper, he adds that this has not changed in the run-up to the upcoming parliamentary elections where parties, once again, will not play a major role.

The paper draws on and provides an update of the author’s 2006 paper on the same subject, published by Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS). It is based on research conducted during extensive fieldwork in Afghanistan between 2006 and 2016. It draws on a large number of interviews with political party leaders, activists and analysts, the many Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN) publications on the Afghan political party scene since 2009 and other available literature. (You can find the list of AAN publications as an annex to the paper and as a separate dossier, here: add link).

The years since 2001 constitute the longest period in Afghanistan’s history during which political parties have been able to operate openly. For the first time parties are fully legal. Despite many shortcomings, they have become a reality within the polity of present-day Afghanistan. In reference to the democratic periods of 1947-52 and 1963-73, the post-2001 periofd could be dubbed Afghanistan’s “third democratic period.” But much of the democratic potential, particularly embodied in the political parties as a reflection of the country’s political diversity, has remained unused or even blocked. This is another similarity with both the 1947-52 and 1963-73 periods.

Notably, the three ideologically different historical political currents (Islamists, leftists and ethno-nationalists) have proven relatively stable since 2006, although to differing degrees. This cannot be said (yet) for the two new currents, the new democratic parties that openly emerged immediately after 2001 and the neo-Islamist groups that later became more prominent – and not for most existing political parties. The void in the centre of the political spectrum – ie the lack of a moderate, pro-government or pro-reform party – remains glaringly unoccupied.

A high degree of fragmentation and a personality-oriented character complicates the landscape for Afghanistan’s political parties.

Afghanistan’s laws regarding political parties and their participation in elections are highly ambivalent. As a result, while Afghanistan’s political parties are a political and legal reality today (as well as historically, with the first parties having emerged in the late 1940s) and while this system is constitutionally designed as a multi-party democracy, the parties cannot openly compete for power.

This is particularly the case in the parliamentary elections, where candidates are free to identify themselves as members of a certain party (although many do not), parties as such are unable to play an official role. Most significantly, in the current electoral system, which is individual-based, parties cannot field lists of their candidates, there are no parliamentary seats reserved for political parties, as in other countries, and parties are not allowed to establish factions in parliament. The latter provisions, even more paradoxically, have never been laid down in any legislation, yet they are still adhered to.

This situation also limits the necessity for inter-party competition and for the individual parties to tie members, sympathisers and potential voters closer to them. The level of political maturity, organisational stability and the internal democratic nature of Afghanistan’s political parties, remains low.

Legally, the parties are inherent to the political system, but in practice they remain outside it, or at least relegated to the sidelines. Their strength has never been measured by full and unhindered participation in elections. This has prevented any ‘natural selection’ based on voter mobilisation or the number of votes received, that usually curbs the number of political parties – which is seen as excessive by many in Afghanistan. This is what the author calls a “paradoxical system.”

More paradoxically, while parties as such have no place in the system as a result of an election, some of their leaders hold a very prominent place, as individuals, in the parallel political system built during the Karzai years. (This might by less so the case under the current government.) This has relegated the parties – ie their members and sympathisers – to a position where they mainly serve as voter mobilisation machines during times of election, while, in between elections, they drift back into insignificance and hold no influence on their leaders’ politics. Additionally, this has led to the emergence of a two-class party system, with some parties (or rather their leaders) within this parallel system and all other parties outside of it.

Optimistically put, Afghanistan’s political party system is still a system in the making.

Thomas Ruttig, AAN co-director and senior analyst, at KAS Kabul on 6 May 2018, presenting his new AAN paper about political parties development in Afghanistan (2001-16). Photo: AAN

Some post-2016 developments

The upcoming parliamentary elections, scheduled now for 20 October 2018 (AAN analysis here), are already casting a shadow. Political parties’ positioning, alliance building and re-aligning has already started (see for example AAN’s analysis here, here and here).

Electoral reform, however, including the envisioned strengthening of the role of political parties, has not happened (AAN analysis here). A last ditch effort by a broad coalition of parties, including some usually close to President Ashraf Ghani (see AAN’s analysis here) has apparently been warded off. This was not too difficult, as the proposal came late and was contradictory, as it would have required a lengthy legislative procedure which, in turn, would have jeopardised the 20 October election date – that parties simultaneously insisted must be respected at all costs.

After the 2016 peace deal with the government, Hezb-e Islami and its leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar returned to the country. Various wings and factions reunited, although one of them – that of former minister Abdul Hadi Arghandiwal – challenged that Hekmatyar could claim the party’s official registration (AAN analysis here) that was done under his name, leading to Arghandiwal’s expulsion by Hekmatyar (media reporting here).

After internal power struggles in the government, Jamiat-e Islami and Jombesh-e Melli Islami set up an opposition coalition, dubbed the ‘Ankara coalition’ by the public – while many of their leading figures still occupied government positions (AAN analysis here). Jombesh itself has been challenged by the launch of a New Jombesh (AAN analysis here). In Jamiat, a struggle is underway about who should be the permanent replacement for its assassinated leader Ustad Borhanuddin Rabbani (AAN analysis here).

Supporters of former President Hamed Karzai, who continues to harbour ambitions of a political comeback, formed a new political grouping but then distanced themselves somewhat from him again, following a series of controversial political statements (AAN analysis here). Afghan Mellat, one of the country’s oldest parties, split (media report here). Its long-term leader, former minister Anwar-ul-Haq Ahadi, joined hands with the former mujahedin party of Harakat-e Enqilab-e Eslami-e Afghanistan (Islamic Revolution Movement of Afghanistan) (AAN analysis here), in a New National Front (media report here). This alliance has come out as the most vocal group demanding an end to the NUG and a political system re-launch by a Loya Jirga.

On the left side of the spectrum, some politicians re-launched the Hezb-e Watan (Fatherland Party) (AAN analysis here). A party under the same name wasthe successorof the Soviet-backed Hezb-e Dimukratik-e Khalq-e Afghanistan (People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan, PDPA), which ruled the country following a coup in 1978 and during the Soviet occupation (1979-89) and was revamped by President Najibullah in 1990 when he tried to shed its communist past (an AAN dossier here).

The on-going rift within the National Unity Government, embodied by the opposing positions of the president and Chief Executive Abdullah, over the implementation of the roll-out of an electronic ID card (AAN analysis here) that would double as a voter card has pushed Abdullah’s party, Jamiat, deeper into opposition.

Finally, President Ghani offered the Taleban a chance to participate in the upcoming elections as a political party (AAN analysis here) – which was promptly declined by the insurgents.

The Ministry of Justice (MoJ), unlike in 2009 and 2013/14, has refrained from unleashing another ‘re-registration’ exercise again, although there were hints it might do so in 2015 (media report here). But pressure on the parties has been kept up, particularly on the political party law’s stipulation that each party must have a clearly visible, separate office in at least 24 provinces (and not only a rented backroom). This keeps a Sword of Damocles hanging over them, as almost none of them – not even the more affluent ones – has the financial or organisational capacity to adhere to this stipulation.

Afghanistan’s political parties will once again remain peripheral to the upcoming parliamentary elections. Although their number, ie those registered with the MoJ, has risen again to 74 (from 57 in mid-2016), there will be no seats reserved for parties in the lower house of parliament, the Wolesi Jirga, no political party lists of candidates and no party-based parliamentary groups or factions.

 

Publication date: 06 May 2018

The full report can be downloaded here.

This report is simultaneously published in German at the KAS’s Kabul office website, here.

There also will be an AAN dossier on Afghanistan’s political parties up here soon.

 

Opening of the presentation by Matthias Riesenhuber, head of the KAS country office in Kabul, and project manager Khalid Gharanai. Photo: KAS Kabul.

 

 

The European Defence Agency’s (EDA) ministerial Steering Board met this Saturday morning in Sofia under the chairmanship of HR/VP Federica Mogherini in her capacity as Head of the Agency. Defence ministers among other things welcomed the Agency’s progress on taking forward the new European defence initiatives and encouraged EDA to further develop initiatives in areas such as military mobility and the Main Battle Tank capability.

EDA plays a central role in many of the initiatives implementing the security and defence aspects of the EU Global Strategy presented by HR/VP Federica Mogherini in 2016. Federica Mogherini highlighted the Agency’s aim to support coherence between the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund (EDF) – using the Capability Development Plan (CDP) as baseline for developing the European capability landscape.

The currently ongoing revision of the CDP will be finalised by June 2018 and Defence Ministers highlighted the importance of ensuring coherence of output and timelines between EU and NATO defence planning processes. At the same time, an Overarching Strategic Research Agenda (OSRA) is being developed with a view to guiding future investments in collaborative European defence research. Ministers of Defence welcomed the progress achieved so far in the trial run of the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence implemented by EDA in its capacity as CARD Secretariat. The first CARD report will be presented in November 2018. EDA also supports Member States as part of the PESCO Secretariat. On 2 May, the PESCO Secretariat (EDA together with EEAS/EUMS) issued the second call for project proposals to PESCO participating Member States to be submitted by 31 July 2018.

 

Military Mobility

Regarding Military Mobility, and in line with the scope and timelines mentioned in the European Union Action Plan, the Agency is currently preparing two ambitious programmes on the harmonisation of military requirements related to customs and on cross border movement permission.

Both programmes aim at facilitating military mobility activities. The Agency together with the participating Member States will look at harmonising the military requirements related to customs. The programme on cross border movement permission builds on the successful Diplomatic Clearances arrangement which foresees annually issued clearance numbers for air transport aircraft. The arrangement has proven its value by reducing administrative burden and time. The new programme will build on this good practice by looking at surface movement to enhance military mobility for road, rail and inland waterways, also including air assets such as helicopters and air-to-air refuelling aircraft. The Agency’s work in this area is coordinated with the PESCO project on military mobility and conducted in close cooperation with the EEAS, EUMS, the Commission and other stakeholders. It is also coherent with respective NATO initiatives.

  Main Battle Tank

Defence Ministers invited the Agency to pursue the development of the Pooling and Sharing initiative on Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) based on identified MBT surplus capacities in a number of Member States (Providers) and a demand for the acquisition of such assets in others (Receivers). The Agency together with national experts and industry investigated to what extent Providers could pool & share their surplus assets with interested Receivers and upgrade the MBTs to the latest configuration available. In addition, some Member States have voiced interest in upgrading their national fleets and keep them under full national control (Upgraders). The project will provide economies of scale throughout the entire life cycle while enhancing interoperability among Member States.  

  Cooperative Financial Mechanism & other topics

The Steering Board was informed about the progress achieved in the negotiation of the Programme Arrangement of the Cooperative Financial Mechanism. It is intended that the CFM will be structured around two pillars, one intergovernmental, and one involving the European Investment Bank as the sole lender for defence-related projects and programmes in line with its lending policy. Following calls from the European Council to support investments in defence research and development activities, the European Investment Bank and the European Defence Agency concluded a cooperation agreement on 28 February 2018.

Ministers welcomed closer interaction between EDA and NATO. They were also presented with lessons learnt on the successful implementation of the Pilot Project and the first work programme of the Preparatory Action on Defence Research by the Agency under delegation of the European Commission. Finally, the Steering Board welcomed the progress made with regard to the implementation of the dual-use strategy on RPAS regulation, based on close coordination with the European Commission, the SESAR Joint Undertaking and EASA.

 

 

American TOW 2 Anti-Tank Guided Missile

Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

Dutch Bulldog Beach Recovery Vehicle

Americas

• Northrop Grumman Systems Corp. has been awarded a firm-fixed-price delivery order in support of the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye aircraft. The order provides for the procurement of four aerial refueling retrofit kits and related support equipment in support of the aircraft. The contract is valued at $11,4 million. Northrop Grumman’s E-2C Hawkeye is a carrier-capable “mini-AWACS” aircraft, designed to give long-range warning of incoming aerial threats. Secondary roles include strike command and control, land and maritime surveillance, search and rescue, communications relay, and even civil air traffic control during emergencies.Work will be performed at various locations within the continental US, including St. Augustine Florida; Ronkonkoma, New York and Melbourne, Florida and is scheduled for completion by April 2019.

• The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has awarded a cost-reimbursement modification to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The contract provides for exercising the second option to the 36-month contract for Phase 3 of DARPA’s Living Foundries: 1000 Molecules program. Current and emerging Department of Defense (DoD) capabilities rely on upon access to a number of critical, high-value molecules that are often prohibitively expensive. The Living Foundries program aims to enable adaptable, scalable, and on-demand production of such molecules by programming the fundamental metabolic processes of biological systems to generate a vast number of complex molecules that are not otherwise accessible, essentially transforming synthetic biomanufacturing into a predictable engineering practice supportive of a broad range of national security objectives. The program has three challenge areas: rapid, improved prototyping of known molecules; prototyping of known, but currently inaccessible, molecules; and prototyping of novel molecules.The modification brings the total cumulative face value of the contract to $32 million. Work will be mainly performed in Cambridge, Massachusetts and is scheduled for completion by April 2020.

• Lockheed Martin Corp. Missiles and Fire Control, Dallas, Texas has been awarded to separate contract modifications related to the THAAD interceptor program. The first contract modification provides for the production of additional THAAD Lot 10 interceptors and associated product support and is valued at $145.3 million. The second modification sees for the production of additional Missile Round Pallets-Transportable and is valued at $17.9 million. The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system is a long-range, land-based theater defense weapon that acts as the upper tier of a basic 2-tiered defense against ballistic missiles. It’s designed to intercept missiles during late mid-course or final stage flight, flying at high altitudes within and even outside the atmosphere.Combined those modifications bring the total cumulative face value of the contract to $2.4 billion. Work will be performed at various locations including Dallas, Texas; Sunnyvale, California and Anniston, Alabama and is scheduled for completion by August and December 2021 respectively. The Missile Defense Agency is the contracting activity.

Middle East & Africa

• Turkey’s program for the design, development and production of the country’s first indigenous fighter jet is gaining pace. Late last month Turkey’s largest defense contractor Aselsan and Turkish Aerospace Industries signed a memorandum of understanding to share work on the TF-X program. Both companies will work to develop critical systems for the TF-X, including a national radar, electro-optical systems, mission-control systems and integration of these systems into the future aircraft. Earlier this year the Turkish government earmarked an initial investment of $1.2 billion. The next critical stage will be Ankara’s decision on the procurement of an engine for the fighter plane. Up to this date Turkey wanted to build the TF-X with know-how from BAE Systems. In January 2017, Britain and Turkey signed a deal worth more than $137 million to develop the Turkish fighter jet. However, in a surprise move the Russian defense conglomerate Rostec has voiced its interest in supplying those engines. This development may well cause further concern for other NATO members who view the increasing defense cooperation between Turkey and Russia in a critical manner. Turkey’s ambitious TF-X program currently awaits a critical presidential endorsement.

Europe

• The magazine Der Spiegel reports that the German Luftwaffe is currently facing problems keeping the ground readiness of its Eurofighter Typhoon fleet. According to the magazine the majority of the Luftwaffe’s 128 fighter planes is currently not cleared for conducting missions. Engineers are concerned about faulty wing-pods that could seriously impede the functionality of the plane’s self-protection system. Without this system the planes are not ready for conducting missions as part of its NATO obligations. The technicians managed to fix some issues with the pods but are unable to fix an issue with leaking cooling-fluid. The component issue, centers on a so-called “grease nipple” that is part of the system that cools the wingtip pods that house elements of the self-protection system, which was designed by BAE Systems. Supplies of the component have been restricted while the primary supplier, a U.S.-based company, is recertified after a change in its ownership. “We hope to get this problem under control in several weeks or months,” the Defense Ministry spokesman Colonel Holger Neumann told a regular German government news conference. He declined to give any details about how many of Germany’s Eurofighters were affected by the spare parts logjam.

Asia-Pacific

• The Japanese government is currently debating the size of its P-1 maritime patrol aircraft fleet. The P-1 is developed by Kawasaki Heavy Industries as an indigenous replacement for the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force’s Lockheed Martin P-3C Orion’s. Japan’s Navy has so far taken delivery of 15 P-1s. Tokyo has yet to define its long-term spending plans, currently there are no follow up contracts in place, however it is possible that the government will acquire up to 58 additional planes, to fully replace its aged P-3C inventory. Japan sent two P-1s to Germany in late April for a debut appearance at the ILA Berlin air show, with one participating in the flying display and the other parked in the static area. “We have brought the aircraft here to promote Japan’s very high level of technology to the world,” the P-1 program managed Capt Ryota Ishida said during a press conference.

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