Having survived through the Greek saga with the Euro still intact, the banks, for now, still standing, and a new capital markets union in the offing, it could be argued that Europe’s economic union has withstood the slings and arrows of misfortune that have come its way in the last few years. The same, however, cannot be said of its political union.
In his State of the Union address delivered to the European Parliament, Commission President, Jean Claude Juncker, went so far as to call it an “existential crisis”. The day before making this statement, two headlines came out that supported his diagnosis. The first concerned the revelation that the EU admitted Romania and Bulgaria despite warnings from The European Court of Auditors (ECA) that they were not yet ready. The second involved comments made by Juncker’s compatriot, the foreign minister of Luxembourg, Jean Asselborn who said that Hungary should be excluded “temporarily or if need be forever” from the EU on account of the government’s authoritarian lurch and rough handling of the refugee crisis.
Looking more deeply at these interconnected issues we cannot help but agree with Juncker’s gloomy assessment about Europe being in a state of crisis. Since 2008, the main criticism of the EU has been that as a monetary, but not fiscal, union it has been incapable of correcting the imbalances that resulted from the differing economic needs of core and periphery members. Much has been made of this policy mismatch and the deleterious effect it can have, especially on the periphery.
The attention given to this divergence in economic priorities is understandable given that it cuts to the core of the Euro crises; however, while all eyes have been trained on the economic situation, insufficient attention has been paid to a divergence of another, possibly more threatening, kind that has been opening up among member states on the political level.
While the founding members, having set a course for “ever closer union” went into autopilot, expecting to arrive at a state of near perfect union sometime in the medium term, they never imagined that the idea of a perfect union in Berlin might be very different from that in Sofia, Prague or Budapest. That status quo lasted until the onset of the refugee crisis, which revealed the extent of the ideological parting of ways between old and new Europe.
Bulgaria was hard hit by the waves of refugees making their way into Europe, a crisis that translated into violence against asylum seekers committed with impunity by border guards. The country erected a 230-kilometer fence on its border with Turkey and has deployed the army to patrol it, which was accompanied by a spike in the number of reports of excessive force. This happens in a country whose European values are under scrutiny for other reasons, such as its shaky commitment to the rule of law and the nefarious influence the Mafia has over the state.
Across the border, Romania shows the same signs of hostility to refugees despite barely having any asylum seekers crossing its borders. Nevertheless, Bucharest loudly rejected the European Union’s quotas mandatory quotas, arguing that taking in 6,000 would be too much to handle. And indeed, Romania seems to have troubles even keeping its current population within its borders. Millions of Romanians have already left the country over the past decade for economic reasons. The current caretaker government of Dacian Ciolos has been accused of standing idly by as the health care system (understaffed by at least 30,000 physicians) crumbled, and has proved incapable of handling massive strikes and walk-outs. To top it off, Ciolos is accused of leading a witch-hunt against political opponents as part of a wide anti-corruption drive with the help of the Romanian Intelligence Service.
Romania’s case is however typical of the political climate prevalent in Central and Eastern Europe. The Visegrad group (composed of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) has emerged as a stalwart bastion countering western values of liberalism, tolerance and open borders with its own set of values: Christian, nativist, authoritarian.
The most headline grabbing of these countries’ leaders is perhaps Viktor Orbán whose opposition to the EU quota system for distributing refugees throughout the block has become a rallying cry with which to drown out the criticism of corruption and cronyism that plague his administration. Claiming that the admission of Muslim refugees into Europe would undermine its Christian identity, Orbán has successfully fanned the flames of xenophobia in Hungary to a level grossly disproportionate to the vanishingly small number who would actually be settled in the country under the proposed quota system. A forthcoming referendum on migration is expected to swing largely in favor of the government and be used by Orban as a stick against further pressure from Brussels.
Poland, equally concerned with the preservation of its Christian identity, if not its democratic institutions, has come under fire from Brussels for undermining the ability of the supreme court to review legislation, leading to accusations of a power grab on behalf of the government and a roll back towards soviet style centralization. A clash between protesters and the government over the introduction of highly restrictive abortion laws and the influence of the Catholic Church on policy speaks to the growing rift between the country’s urban youth and the staunchly conservative Law and Justice Party.
It is strange how the newest members of the European Union, who have benefited both financially and politically from being members of a powerful political bloc, have been the first to jump ship at the first sign of trouble. Since its creation the EU has been driven by a set of common principles that it was thought would always define the Union. The refugee crisis has woken “old” Europe up to the realization that in a union of 28 countries those principles may not be so common anymore.
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Recently, the case has been made for “preserving” U.S. primacy using primarily military means. With respect to de Gaulle’s “The sword is the axis of the world” thinking, this stance fails to recognize that economic power is the foundation of a state’s influence in the 21st century. Even more fundamentally, it fails to take into account both great and minor powers’ pursuit of self-interest, both historically and in today’s multi-polar world.
Militaristic Romanticism Will Continue to Bankrupt the U.S.Conventional wisdom has it that the U.S. assumed primacy in the post-modern world after defeating the Former Soviet Union. Yes, the U.S. was able to weaken the Former Soviet Union militarily through supporting proxy fighters in Afghanistan, and economically through having it overspend on defense in a futile effort to overcome SDI (“Star Wars”). However, what is not in dispute is that there was no direct military conflict between the two powers. Had that happened, the odds are great that not only would I not be here typing this article, but you also wouldn’t be here reading it.
The conclusion reached during the Cold War that a direct military conflict between the superpowers would have been detrimental to all of humanity seems to have been forgotten by some when discussing current U.S-China hostilities. War with China is just as equally untenable nowadays as military conflict with the Former Soviet Union was during the Cold War. Actually, it’s even more untenable as China is not only a nuclear power, but is increasingly the epicenter of today’s interconnected global economy. The economic fallout from any shooting war with China would not leave any nation on Earth, including, but especially the U.S., unscathed.
Because of all of this, it is critical for the U.S. to draw several conclusions. First, it’s going to need to effectively separate economics from politics in its dealing with states, especially China. While the phrase “Hot Economics, Cold Politics” may have once referred to Sino-Japanese relations, it can be broadened to refer to relations between all states in the 21st century, even if hot is a misnomer in the wake of the global economic crisis.
Pursuit of Self-interest is Man’s Natural StateEven more importantly, the U.S. needs to recognize that the world has returned to the era of great power politics, if it ever truly left it at all. To survive in this world, it will be increasingly critical to recognize, and not deny, the role of self-interest in all nations’ foreign policies, large and small. A first step in this process would be to go even further back in time before the Cold War and revisit certain WWII-era terminology, notably “ally”, “axis”, and “accommodation/appeasement”.
The word “ally” does not mean supplicant. Historically, allies have served one another’s foreign policy objectives because they understood how an alliance served their own self-interest and because they were ready to seal the agreement in blood if necessary, not because they necessarily liked one another. Only through combined U.S. and Soviet power was Nazi Germany eventually defeated. Even on the verge of imminent collapse, the Former Soviet Union contributed to the U.S.’ coalition in the Gulf War. Despite initial hiccups, is Russian cooperation in Syria today any less vital?
The term “axis” has been used rather carelessly recently as well. In the wake of Turkish overtures to Russia, a “Moscow-Ankara axis” has been mentioned. Following Russia’s warmer ties with Beijing and post-sanctions Iran, a “Moscow-Beijing-Tehran axis” has been voiced. Lastly, in the wake of Russian power assertion in Syria and intelligence-sharing efforts with other powers in the region, a possible “Moscow-Tehran-Baghdad(-Damascus?) axis” has been written on. It’s quite moronic to continue to label other countries’ foreign policy goals with lexicon dating back almost three generations, as if a foreign policy that doesn’t clearly support the “rules-based order” is inherently evil.
Related to this are the term’s “accommodation” and “appeasement”. It is equally idiotic to use these terms when describing, for example, German and Japanese outreach efforts to Russia in the wake of U.S.-Russian hostilities. First, a state (ally or not) is always going to follow its own interests, especially where economics is concerned. Secondly, the use of these terms to describe policies of former actual Axis powers reeks of historical amnesia.
Following this logic, is the U.K. an “ally”, part of an “axis”, or “appeasing” other powers? The U.K. recently withdrew from the EU and became a founding member of the AIIB, both despite U.S. protestations. The point is that if the U.S.’ strongest ally in its historically most-important geographic area of interest does this, it’s realistic to assume that this is a harbinger of a larger trend, and not just an outlier.
The issue is not whether it was actually in the U.K.’s interest to make these moves. Rather, the point is that the U.K. perceived that these actions were in its own self-interest and that it, along with all other states, will continue to make decisions based on this criteria, not dictation from other powers. This is also reflected in recent moves by both the Philippines and Vietnam to improve economic relations with China. These maneuvers, combined with global economic interdependency, are simultaneously a harbinger of the future and a reminder of the past and will continue to undermine any attempts to “preserve” U.S. primacy.
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In late August 2016, a Czech entomologist and anti-immigrant nationalist named Martin Konvicka planned and staged a fake ISIS assault in the middle Prague’s Old Town Square. The incident took place near some restaurants, close to the astrological clock and the statue of Catholic priest, reformer, and martyr Jan Hus. While Wenceslas Square is packed with tourists mostly in its shopping district, it is Old Town Square near the Charles Bridge that is marked more by a carnival atmosphere with snake charmers, magicians, restaurants, Thai massage parlors, singers, and men making bubbles that children chase.
Konvicka was clever, taking advantage of that carnival like condition to apply to City Hall for a permit to indulge in a “protest” where his theatrics would blend into a city where theatrics of some sort are common place to note. What Konvicka did in Prague was what any competent terrorist would do when planning an attack—he used legal means and an exploited vulnerability to procure a venue and a method of operation where he and his crew would blend into the environment prior to his strike so well that he could literally walk a camel into his target – Old Town Square.
What was disturbing to me even after only a few weeks after this hoax was the lack of a robust physical police presence in Old Town Square when I visited only a few days later. In Wenceslas Square, there is noticeable police presence, especially as you walk up the hill towards the monument where two Czechoslovakian students, Jan Palach and Jan Zajik killed themselves in 1969 to protest the failed uprising of Secretary Alexander Dubcek and Soviet invasion in August 1968. However, in Old Town Square where all the uproar happened, there was only one small police van with the occasional police car driving by that I could see, with two or three lightly armed police officers helping tourists.
Even with the assumption that heavier weapons were inside that van, the time it would take to retrieve them in the midst of a real attack and for reinforcements to arrive would be critical and probably very costly. Our tour guide did explain that plainclothes police were stationed throughout the area but should an active barricade/hostage or other “sophisticated” terrorist situation unfold, as Kent Layne Oots might call this, police would be at a disadvantage in a reactive situation and possibly facing terrorists with superior firepower at least initially, and armed with grenades, plastic explosives, IEDs and a coherent well thought through plan of action.
Likewise, what appeared to be similar problems were evident in parts of Prague’s Jewish Quarter—all of which are prime targets for Islamic extremists. For example, when we passed the Maisel Synagogue, which is noted for the golden hat that is perched inside its Star of David at its entrance, I did not see any security in front, even though one or two others said they saw guards on the street at or near the synagogue. Security at the Old New Synagogue, located on a fairly large street next to some stairs was conspicuously absent. At the Old Jewish cemetery where tourists flock, our prepaid tickets were scanned but there were no handbag or electronic searches. In fact, the only place I saw where systematic detection was in place and operative was at Prague Castle where detectors and wands were used by police to scan visitors at turnstiles.
As disconcerting as all the foregoing was, it was not as disturbing from a security point of view as the visit my wife and I took to the concentration camp Terezin, also known as Theresienstadt. We visited on a separate tour two days before our tour in Prague began. Terezin is located in a part of the Sudentenland area and, like Prague’s Jewish Quarter and all concentration camp sites, it is a potential target of Islamic extremists because of its inherent Jewish nature and high symbolic value.
From the terrible Dresden barracks, now in disrepair, throughout the town, and up through the prison which is about a quarter of a mile or so away from the center of town, there was no sign of police or military presence. I asked our guide about this and she told us that the only security change she could think of was that buses could no longer pull up in front of the Yizkor (“Remembrance”) museum. Our guide remarked she had never seen Terezin so desolate; usually it was full of tourists and she could only surmise this had something to do with recent terrorist assaults in Western Europe.
That Terezin goes unprotected for those who want to learn more about the Holocaust and that the Jewish Quarter at the very least suffers from gaps in security is shameful given the recent terrorist assault hoax perpetrated that has illuminated security shortfalls and the set of terrorist attacks in the European Union. Czech officials need to embrace anticipatory foresight into their thinking about security and view their place in the EU as part of a dynamic environment that reverberates with change and ripple effects that spread. This ISIS hoax underscores some bureaucratic security problems to be corrected and there appear to be areas for security improvement against the backdrop of very vulnerable targets. Benchmarks for improvement and timetables for implementation are required now before yet another tragedy occurs.
The post Prague’s Terrorist Perils appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.
Le bimestriel Population & Avenir a consacré dans son dernier numéro (sept./oct. 2016) un article au numéro d’été de Politique étrangère (n°2/2016), mettant en avant l’article de Gérard-François Dumont, « Vieillissement de la population et géopolitique ».
« Après deux passionnants dossiers sur le nouveau « Grand Jeu » du Moyen-Orient et deux articles traitant de la question de « l’Europe face aux populismes », cette revue s’interroge notamment sur les interactions entre le vieillissement de la population et la géopolitique. Un article montre combien le vieillissement de la population est, à l’échelle mondiale, inédit. Ce processus se traduit par un accroissement de la proportion des personnes âgées, par l’augmentation de leur nombre absolu, et une augmentation globale de la féminisation, triple processus destine a se poursuivre dans les décennies à venir. Ce vieillissement est inégalement réparti dans le monde, et annonce des effets politiques, en interne, et géopolitiques, sur le système international, eux aussi très diversifiés. »
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