European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by David De Groot

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered a landmark judgment in case Commission v. Hungary, concerning Hungary’s 2021 law restricting access to LGBTI-related content.

Introduction

The EU has considerable leverage over candidate countries that backslide on the conditions for accession (the Copenhagen Criteria), including respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law. However, once a country has joined the EU, the EU institutions have far fewer tools to respond should Member States backslide on core values. This problem is often referred to as the Copenhagen Dilemma. In Repubblika (Case C-896/19), the CJEU found a connection between Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) (on accession) and Article 2 TEU, which sets out the EU’s founding values.

The CJEU ruled that Member States may not lower the level of protection of EU values following accession, thereby establishing the principle of non-regression.

Building on that case law, on 21 April 2026, the CJEU delivered its judgment in Commission v. Hungary (Case C-769/22). The judgment is a landmark ruling: the Court found, for the first time, both a breach of Article 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) (on human dignity), and a self-standing breach of Article 2 TEU (on values of the EU).

Background

On 15 June 2021, the Hungarian Parliament adopted Act LXXIX of 2021 on ‘tougher action against paedophile offenders and amending certain laws to protect children’ (the ‘Propaganda Law’), which curtailed LGBTI+ content, in particular its availability to minors, by introducing Section 6/A into the Child Protection Act.

On 15 July 2021, the Commission launched an infringement procedure concerning the contested act. One year later, on 15 July 2022, the Commission decided to bring the case before the CJEU; the case was formally lodged on 19  December 2022.

In its action against Hungary, the European Commission alleged violations of the Services, Audiovisual Media Services and e-Commerce Directives, as well as the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Additionally, it alleged a self-standing infringement of Article 2 TEU.

The hearing took place on 19 November 2024, with the CJEU sitting as a full court, reflecting the exceptional importance it assigned to the case.

On 5 June 2025, Advocate General Ćapeta issued her opinion, in which she agreed with the Commission, considering that Article 2 TEU imposes certain ‘red lines’, which are determined by the ‘negation of the values’ laid down in Article 2.

Judgment

In its judgment of 21 April 2026, the CJEU considered that the secondary legislation mentioned in the Commission’s action had been violated, as had Articles 1 (on human dignity), 7 (on private and family life), 11 (on freedom of expression) and 21 (on non-discrimination) of the CFR. Concerning Article 1 CFR – the violation of which marked a first – the Court considered that ‘that association [with paedophilia] and that stigmatisation entail a group of persons forming an integral part of a society in which pluralism prevails being treated as a threat to that society meriting special legal treatment, which results in such persons’ social ”invisibility” being established, maintained, or reinforced, in breach of Article 1 of the Charter’ (para. 489).

Concerning Article 2 TEU, the Court first considered, hinting at the Copenhagen Dilemma, that ‘compliance by a Member State with the values contained in Article 2 TEU is a condition for the enjoyment of all the rights deriving from the application of the Treaties to that Member State. Compliance with those values cannot be reduced to an obligation which a candidate State must meet in order to accede to the European Union and which it may disregard after its accession’ (para. 523).

As to the types of violations capable of giving rise to a breach of Article 2 TEU, the Court held that:

only manifest and particularly serious breaches of one or more values common to the Member States may give rise to a finding, in the context of an action for failure to fulfil obligations, that there has been a failure by a Member State to fulfil legally binding obligations under Article 2 TEU, such breaches being incompatible with the very identity of the Union as a common legal order of a society in which pluralism prevails. (para. 551)

In the case at hand, the Court held that the contested act:

results in the stigmatisation and marginalisation of non-cisgender or non-heterosexual persons, solely on the ground of their gender identity or sexual orientation, with those consequences being intensified by the fact that that law also makes an association between the fact of not being cisgender or not being heterosexual, on the one hand, and being convicted of paedophilia, on the other, suggesting that non-cisgender or non-heterosexual persons constitute a fundamental threat to Hungarian and European society, an association which is capable of encouraging the development of hateful conduct towards those persons. (para. 554)

The Court continued that

Such stigmatisation and marginalisation, which is tantamount to establishing, maintaining or reinforcing the social ”invisibility” of some members of society, runs counter to the values of respect for human dignity, equality, and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities, as referred to in Article 2 TEU. (para. 555)

The Court, therefore, concluded that

it must be held that the [contested Act] is in breach, in a way that is both manifest and particularly serious, of the rights of non-cisgender persons – including transgender persons – or non-heterosexual persons, as well as the values of respect for human dignity, equality and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities, as referred to in Article 2 TEU, with the result that it is contrary to the very identity of the Union as a common legal order in a society in which pluralism prevails. (para. 556)

Outlook

The judgment – while ruling that it is indeed possible to establish a stand-alone infringement of Article 2 TEU without a necessary connection with other Treaty provisions – still leaves many questions as to the circumstances under which such a finding can be made.

In March 2025, Section 6/A of the Child Protection Act, introduced by the contested act, was linked to the Act on the Right of Assembly, which prohibits any public events that portray ‘divergence from self-identity corresponding to sex at birth, sex change or homosexuality’. This was considered a Pride ban. In line with the judgment, such a prohibition would also constitute a breach of Article 2 TEU.

In a joint statement, the Commissioner for Equality, Preparedness and Crisis Management, Hadja Lahbib, and the Commissioner for Democracy, Justice and the Rule of Law, Michael McGrath, stated that discrimination has no place in the EU. They ‘warmly welcome the ruling. Ours is a Union of Equality, where you can be who you are and love who you want’.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Hungary’s anti-LGBTI law and EU values: The CJEU’s landmark Article 2 TEU judgment‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Tim Peters with Elena Bersani.

The European Parliament is fully committed to ensuring an ambitious EU long-term budget that meets the Union’s many challenges in the years to come. On 28 April 2026, Parliament’s plenary adopted an interim report on the 2028‑2034 multiannual financial framework (MFF), with 370 votes in favour, 201 against and 84 abstentions, establishing its mandate for negotiations with the Council. Parliament’s two co-rapporteurs, Siegfried Mureșan (EPP, Romania) and Carla Tavares (S&D, Portugal), steered the report to adoption.

Parliament calls for the MFF to be set at 1.27 % of EU gross national income (GNI), corresponding to €1 789 billion in constant 2025 prices, with an additional 0.11 % of EU GNI (€149.3 billion) for the repayment of debt created by NextGenerationEU (NGEU) above the MFF ceilings. This represents a moderate increase of €175.1 billion in constant 2025 prices (approximately 10 %) compared with the Commission’s July 2025 proposal, to be allocated evenly across the three operational budget headings. The MFF constitutes the EU’s long-term budgetary plan setting a maximum level of spending (‘ceilings’) for each major category of expenditure (‘heading’) in accordance with Article 312 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

In its interim report, Parliament maintains its firm opposition to the merging of different policies in ‘one plan per Member State’, warning that it would weaken EU policies, reduce transparency and create unfair competition between beneficiaries. Under heading 1, Parliament calls for separate, sufficient and clearly ring-fenced funding for the common agricultural policy (€385.12 billion), cohesion policy (€274.34 billion), the common fisheries policy and the European Social Fund.

Parliament welcomes the significant reinforcement of the policies included in heading 2, recognising the need to boost the Union’s capacity to act in key strategic areas, such as competitiveness, defence and security, research and innovation, the twin transition, infrastructure, health and crisis preparedness, education and culture. Parliament stresses that the consolidation of programmes in the European competitiveness fund must not reduce transparency or limit its ability to ensure appropriate funding for specific policy objectives. Parliament proposes a total increase of €62.08 billion, including €26.6 billion in additional resources for the European competitiveness fund. Parliament calls for adequate reinforcement of priority programmes under heading 2 and earmarked funding for EU4Health and LIFE-related actions within the fund.

Under heading 3, Parliament requests €21.24 billion in additional resources, alongside clear and separate budget lines within the Global Europe Fund. Parliament underlines that its proposal represents the minimum amount the EU needs to meet its commitments, respond to citizens’ expectations and address major challenges.

Parliament expresses serious concerns that the Commission’s proposals shift key policy and budgetary decisions to Commission work programmes adopted without co‑legislative involvement, and stresses that simplification must not come at the expense of transparency, democratic accountability or Parliament’s oversight role. Parliament warns that the widespread use of financing not linked to costs could hinder proper auditing.

On the revenue side, Parliament reaffirms its strong commitment to introducing new genuine own resources not only for NextGenerationEU debt repayment but also to finance the Union’s enhanced policy ambitions. It is concerned by the absence of progress on the reform of the system of own resources in the Council since 2020, and calls on the Council to unblock the stalemate on a basket of new genuine own resources generating at least €60 billion per year. Parliament emphasises that the new sources should not harm the competitiveness of small and medium-sized enterprises or of Europe as a whole. Parliament considers that the revenue potential of a digital services levy aimed at major digital platforms, an online gambling and betting services levy, the extension of the carbon border adjustment mechanism, and a levy based on a uniform call rate to the capital gains of crypto assets should all be explored as possible solutions if other proposed own resources fail to gain support among Member States.

The European Commission presented its proposals for the 2028‑2034 MFF on 16 July 2025. The Commission proposed a budget of almost €1.8 trillion in commitments over seven years (in constant 2025 prices), corresponding to 1.26 % of EU GNI, including 0.11 % of EU GNI for the repayment of the debt created by NGEU grants.

Following the adoption of its position, Parliament is now ready to start negotiations with the Council. The MFF regulation requires Parliament’s consent for approval, while the sectoral legislation will be agreed under the ordinary legislative procedure. Negotiations with the Council can begin once Member States agree on a common position. Parliament urges a swift agreement to be reached by the end of 2026 to allow for timely adoption and implementation of spending programmes from 1 January 2028.

OVERVIEW OF EPRS PUBLICATIONS ON THE 2028‑2034 MFF PACKAGE: AT A GLANCE NOTES:

• Karoline Kowald and Marianna Pari, 2028‑2034 EU budget: Parliament’s position
• Marianna Pari, 2028‑2034 EU budget: Comparing Parliament’s position with the Commission proposal

LEGISLATIVE BRIEFINGS:

• David Ashton and Pieter Baert, Single market and customs programme
• Bruno Bilquin and Eric Pichon, Global Europe instrument
• Krisztina Binder and Tarja Laaninen, Erasmus+
• Steven Blaakman, Union support for asylum, migration and integration
• Alessandro D’Alfonso, Karoline Kowald and Marin Mileusnic, National and regional partnership plans, European territorial cooperation and EU facility 2028‑2034
• Alessandro D’Alfonso, Marin Mileusnic and Tim Peters, Budget expenditure tracking and performance framework
• Alina Dobreva, System of own resources: Multiannual financial framework 2028‑2034
• Costica Dumbrava, Union support for the Schengen area, European integrated border management, and EU visa policy
• Clément Evroux, Horizon Europe 2028‑2034: 10th EU research and innovation framework programme
• Clément Evroux, Euratom research and training programme for the period 2028-2032
• Alina Georgescu, AgoraEU 2028‑2034: Funding for culture, media and EU values in the new multiannual financial framework
• Mathias Gullentops, Connecting Europe Facility 2028‑2034: Financing EU infrastructure networks
• Issam Hallak, European competitiveness fund
• Karoline Kowald and Marianna Pari, Next long-term EU budget: 2028‑2034 multiannual financial framework
• Gabija Leclerc, Support for associated overseas countries and territories, including Greenland
• Rafał Mańko, Justice programme 2028‑2034
• Rafał Mańko, Pericles 2028‑2034: Exchange, assistance and training for the protection of the euro against counterfeiting
• Vasilis Margaras, ERDF – Cohesion Fund and conditions for EU support to regional policy
• Marketa Pape, European Social Fund 2028‑2034
• Martina Prpic, Union support for internal security
• Nikolina Šajn, Regulation on the common agricultural policy for the period 2028 to 2034
• Frederik Scholaert, Conditions for EU support to the CFP (2028‑2034 programming period)
• Agnieszka Widuto, Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation and Decommissioning
• Agnieszka Widuto, Nuclear decommissioning assistance programme of the Ignalina nuclear power plant in Lithuania
• Dessislava Yougova, Union Civil Protection Mechanism: 2028 2034 programming period

INITIAL APPRAISALS OF COMMISSION IMPACT ASSESSMENTS:

• Irmgard Anglmayer, Civil protection, preparedness and crisis response
• Irmgard Anglmayer and Esther Kramer, MFF 2028‑2034: Quality analysis of the Commission’s impact assessments
• Josefina Capdevila Penalva, Regulation establishing Global Europe
• Andriana Efthymiadou, Nationally pre-allocated envelopes
• Dieter Frizberg, Reinforcing competitiveness in the EU
• Esther Kramer, Single Market and Customs Programme
• Nikolaos Sarris, Budget expenditure-tracking and performance framework
• Mari Tuominen, The AgoraEU, Erasmus+ and Justice programmes

MONTHLY DIGEST:

• Balazs Hopp and András Schwarcz, Background information on the post-2027 MFF – April 2026
• Balazs Hopp and András Schwarcz, Background information on the post-2027 MFF – March 2026

FURTHER READING:

• Brief up-to-date state-of-play information on all legislative proposals of the 2028‑2034 MFF package: EPRS Legislative Train Spotlight on 2028‑2034 MFF package
• Legislative observatory, Interim report on the proposal for the multiannual financial framework for 2028‑2034 2025/0571R(APP)
• Website on the EU long-term budget by DG COMM of the European Parliament
• European Commission draft legislative proposals: The 2028‑2034 EU budget for a stronger Europe
• Interim report on the proposal for a Council regulation laying down the Multiannual Financial Framework for the years 2028 to 2034 (COM(2025)0571 – C10‑0000/2025 – 2025/0571R(APP)), adopted by the European Parliament on 28 April 2026 (A10‑0105/2026), co-rapporteurs: Siegfried Mureșan, Carla Tavares.

Written by Mar Negreiro with Öykü Dilara Anaç.

Increased time spent online and regulatory pressure.

Social media platforms’ business model relies on keeping users online for as long as possible so they can display more advertising. The platforms are optimised to trigger dopamine, a neurotransmitter the brain releases when it expects a reward, encouraging repeated and prolonged use. Yet excessive social media use – defined as spending more than three hours a day on online platforms – has been linked to poorer mental health, particularly higher levels of depression and anxiety. A 2025 survey conducted by Pew Research Center showed that minors aged between 13 and 17 in the United States (US) are much more likely than they were two years ago to describe their social media use as excessive. Nearly half reported that they spend too much time on these platforms, as they are on the internet ‘almost constantly’.

According to one survey, European teenagers aged 16 and 17 also reported spending more time than they wanted to on online platforms and losing sleep time at night, which might result in displacement from other, healthier activities. For instance, teens who are online late at night are more likely to experience shortened sleep duration and poorer quality of sleep, both risk factors for depression and irritability, a review shows.

Among both children and adults, excessive screen time and social media use have been linked to changes in brain function, including reduced attention and weaker impulse control. The adolescent brain is especially vulnerable. Experts warn that constant exposure to comparison cues, curated content and algorithm-driven engagement loops can create psychological stress that resonates long after the screen is turned off.

Facebook, Instagram, YouTube and TikTok are leading in terms of online monthly users. In the EU, TikTok has more than 200 million active users, making it one of the fastest-growing networks ever. There are over 100 million pieces of content uploaded daily. Users spend an average of 137 minutes on it per day (compared to 27 minutes in 2019) and open it about eight times a day – over 20 % of US teenagers ‘almost constantly’.

At present, TikTok is facing regulatory pressure on both sides of the Atlantic. In Europe, the European Commission started an investigation into TikTok on 19 February 2024 under the DSA, which is ongoing. In the US, TikTok was obliged to restructure its operations under a majority American-owned joint venture, and has settled ahead of trial in a social media addiction lawsuit in California that also involved other platforms, such as Meta and YouTube. They were found negligent for designing addictive online platforms. It is the first time that major social media companies have been found liable by a US jury for this reason. While the damages awarded (US$6 million) are insignificant for two companies worth trillions of dollars, the decision represents a precedent and could impact design choices to avoid further prosecution.

The DSA as a tool to redress online addictive design choices

The Commission has intensified its scrutiny under the DSA of addictive design choices on online platforms. In 2024, it opened an investigation into Meta (ongoing), as it believed both Facebook and Instagram platforms’ designs might stimulate behavioural addictions in minors. Shein is also under scrutiny.

On 6 February 2026, the Commission preliminarily found TikTok in breach of the DSA for its addictive design features, including infinite scroll, autoplay, push notifications and highly personalised recommender systems. Additionally, it found that TikTok disregarded important indicators of compulsive use of the app, such as the time minors spend on TikTok at night, the frequency with which users open the app and other potential indicators. Under the DSA, very large online platforms (VLOPs) such as TikTok have to carry out risk assessments (Article 34) and implement effective measures to mitigate these risks (Article 35). The term ‘addictive design’ does not appear explicitly in the DSA. Instead, the legal link lies in Article 34 (including risks to public health, minors, and users’ physical and mental well-being) and Article 25. The latter prohibits deceptive or manipulative interface design, often associated with ‘dark patterns‘. It introduces a general prohibition applicable to providers of online platforms (not only VLOPs), preventing them from designing or organising their online user interfaces in such a way as to deceive or manipulate users or otherwise materially distort or impair their ability to make free and informed decisions. In addition, Article 28 stipulates general protection of minors online. There are also specific guidelines for all platforms to protect children from addictive behaviours and commercial practices online.

The Commission’s assessment is based on an in-depth investigation (still ongoing) that included an analysis of TikTok’s DSA risk assessment reports, internal data and TikTok’s responses to multiple requests for information, a review of research on this topic and expert interviews. According to the Commission, TikTok’s recommender systems and engagement-maximising interfaces generate systemic risks to the mental well-being of minors and vulnerable adults. Thus, the harm arises from prolonged, compulsive engagement that users struggle to control, stemming from the persuasive design choices made by the platform. The DSA does not provide an explicit definition of a ‘vulnerable adult’. It employs a risk-based approach focusing on protecting users from systemic risks, particularly targeting minors, those with disabilities and vulnerable groups.

TikTok can now exercise its right to defence. It may examine the documents in the Commission’s investigation files and reply in writing to the Commission’s preliminary findings. In parallel, the European Board for Digital Services, an independent advisory group to the Commission, will be consulted. If the Commission’s views are ultimately confirmed, the Commission may issue a non-compliance decision, potentially triggering a fine of up to 6 % of TikTok’s total worldwide annual turnover (estimated at over €30 billion in 2025).

The Commission preliminarily finds that TikTok needs to change the basic design of its service. Specific examples cited by the Commission include disabling key addictive features, such as infinite scroll over time, implementing effective screen time breaks (including during the night) and adapting its recommender system. Incremental adjustments or optional user controls might not be sufficient. Instead, the platform’s core architecture, with features that drive user engagement, might need to be restructured.

Next steps

Safety through design of online platforms for minors is gaining political attention and scrutiny on both sides of the Atlantic. Many argue that age restrictions are not sufficient, as they shift the blame away from platforms’ harmful designs. Likewise, parental control tools are not enough, as they also transfer responsibility from platforms on to children and their parents, and can be difficult to implement depending on parents’ digital literacy. According to the European Consumer Association BEUC, these measures should be complemented with fairness by design components.

If confirmed, these findings will establish the first European precedent for how platforms should mitigate risks from features designed to maximise engagement. The upcoming Digital Fairness Act may introduce even stricter rules, including obligations to switch off manipulative features and greater protections for children. Defining and regulating ‘addictive design’ is complex. Hence, the challenge of this investigation is to assess what constitutes acceptable design. At its core is also whether online platforms’ business models are compatible with children’s safety, and whether platforms’ declarations of intent are enough to mitigate the risks identified in their annual DSA reports. Civil society has criticised the lack of clarity. They argue that DSA risk assessments should be carried out more transparently, as platforms’ methodologies and claims are not always supported by the indicators and data provided.

The European Parliament has been active on this issue. In a December 2023 resolution on addictive design of online services, it called for an end to dark patterns and gaps in consumer protection online. The issue has also been considered more recently in the Internal Market and Consumer Protection Committee (IMCO)’s own initiative report on the protection of minors online and in another report on the impact of social media and the online environment on young people being prepared by the Culture and Education Committee (CULT).

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Addictive design on online platforms‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marketa Pape

While the right to housing is recognised by the European Pillar of Social Rights, the supply of housing in the EU has not kept up with demand. The recent cost-of living crisis has made the lack of adequate, affordable and sustainable housing more palpable. While the responsibility for housing provision lies with EU Member States, regions and cities, the debates around the 2024 European elections showed that citizens expected the EU to step up its action beyond guidance and funding.

In response, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen made housing part of a Commissioner’s portfolio. In parallel, all EU institutions started work to contribute to the new EU policy.

More than a year later, the basis of a coordinated EU approach is in place. European leaders have for the first time discussed the challenge of affordable housing in the European Council. Existing EU rules have been reviewed and EU funding possibilities made more flexible.The European Investment Bank has stepped up its investment support and, together with partner banks, is finalising a pan-European housing investment portal.

The Commission has put forward the European affordable housing plan and accompanying initiatives, which included changes to State aid rules, a housing construction strategy and a proposed recommendation on the New European Bauhaus policy and funding initiative. The Commission also outlined further steps, including legislative ones.

For its part, the European Parliament has put forward a set of recommendations prepared by its Special Committee on the Housing Crisis, ranging from simpler and digital procedures for granting housing permits – within a 60-day deadline – to tax measures to support low- and middle-income households.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Developing a coordinated EU approach to housing‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Alessandro D’Alfonso, Marin Mileusnic and Tim Peters.

CONTEXT

On 16 July 2025, the European Commission adopted a proposal for a regulation establishing a budget expenditure tracking and performance framework and other horizontal rules for the Union programmes and activities (‘performance regulation’), as part of a wide-ranging package on the next EU long-term budget – the 2028-2034 multiannual financial framework (MFF). The proposal aims to simplify and harmonise how EU spending is tracked and its performance measured, moving towards a single system with standardised indicators. It defines horizontal spending principles with a view to streamlining their application across the EU budget: climate and biodiversity, ‘do no significant harm’ to the environment, social policies, and gender equality. Although competitiveness and preparedness play a major role in the next long-term budget, and the European Parliament had requested to include them as horizontal spending principles, the Commission did not include them.

Ahead of the proposal, Parliament had called for further improvements in performance reporting under the EU budget, while underlining that the ‘implementation of horizontal principles should not lead to an excessive administrative burden on beneficiaries’. A stronger performance framework can improve Parliament’s decision-making on EU spending through more transparency. However, increased transparency from a proposed single portal to access EU budgetary data will depend on what information is made available. A briefing requested by Parliament’s Committee on Budgetary Control underlined that improved access to information – such as exchanges between the Commission and Member States, or to information about suspended milestones – was essential for public accountability. According to the European Court of Auditors, the proposal can improve processes for performance reporting and integration of EU horizontal policy priorities, but has design weaknesses to be addressed, including vague indicators, lack of clear results-based linkages, and risks of measuring implementation rather than achievements. The Court estimates that the proposal may achieve simplification between the Commission and the Member States, but that the administrative burden at national, regional and beneficiary levels may remain unchanged or even worsen.

Legislative proposal

2025/0545(COD) – Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a budget expenditure tracking and performance framework and other horizontal rules for the Union programmes and activities – COM(2025) 565,

NEXT STEPS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

For the latest developments in this legislative procedure, see the Legislative Train Schedule: 2025/0545(COD)

Read the complete briefing on ‘Budget expenditure tracking and performance framework‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Anna Flynn.

The EU immediately strongly condemned Russia’s unprovoked attack on Ukraine on 24 February 2022, and has done so repeatedly since. By 31 March 2026, the number of civilian casualties in Ukraine had reached 58 930, according to the United Nations. Since the beginning of the war , the EU has provided €200.6 billion in support for Ukraine, representing the Union’s largest civil protection operation to date.

The European Parliament labelled Russia’s war ‘the most outrageous act of aggression conducted by the political leadership of a given country in Europe since 1945′. The EU’s response has been structured along three axes: political, economic and military support for Ukraine; isolation and containment of Russia; and enhancement of EU and EU neighbours’ resilience.

Parliament’s extraordinary meeting of 1 March 2022, during which it adopted a resolution unequivocally condemning Russia’s aggression and setting the direction for EU action, was one of the first international gatherings to which Ukraine’s President, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, spoke. Parliament’s President, Roberta Metsola, was the first EU leader to visit Kyiv after the Russian invasion, on 1 April 2022. In September 2025, Metsola officially opened a permanent European Parliament liaison office in Kyiv. 

Since the start of the war, Parliament has dealt with multiple legislative files of paramount importance for Ukraine, and adopted numerous non-legislative resolutions on aspects of EU support for the country; including several rounds of macro-financial assistance, the Act in support of ammunition production (ASAP); and the Ukraine Facility, which earmarks €50 billion for Ukraine’s reconstruction from 2024 to 2027.

On 18 December 2025, the European Council agreed a €90 billion Ukraine Support Loan for 2026 and 2027. Without this, Ukraine was expected to run out of funds in early 2026. Instead of using Russian assets, this loan is financed through EU borrowing secured on the ‘headroom’ in the EU’s budget and should cover two thirds of Ukraine’s financing needs for 2026 and 2027.

To implement the European Council’s decision, the Commission presented three legislative proposals on 14 January 2026:

• A regulation implementing the establishment of the Ukraine Support Loan for 2026 and 2027. This loan is based on enhanced cooperation, and therefore implies no financial obligations for Czechia, Hungary and Slovakia ;
• A regulation amending the Ukraine Facility in its current form so that it can be used for the Ukraine Support Loan;
• A regulation amending the EU’s 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF) to allow this to guarantee the loan and finance the interest.

On 20 January 2026, Parliament agreed that these three proposals should be treated under the urgent procedure, meaning that it can vote on the regulations without a parliamentary report. A day later, Parliament gave its consent to use the enhanced cooperation procedure for the Ukraine Support Loan, and Parliament’s plenary adopted its position on the three proposals on 11 February 2026.

However, on 23 February 2026, Hungary blocked the third regulation (amending the MFF) in the Council of the EU, which required a unanimous vote amongst the 27 Member States. The other two proposals were signed by the Council and Parliament on 24 February 2026. On 6 May 2026, Parliament’s Committee on Budgets (BUDG) held a public hearing on financing Ukraine’s reconstruction through the MFF.

Moreover, Parliament has unwaveringly supported Ukraine’s EU membership aspirations, advocating successfully in June 2022 for Ukraine to be granted candidate country status, and in December 2023 for Member States to start accession negotiations. Screening meetings concluded in September 2025, meaning that Ukraine is ready to start negotiations on all policy ‘clusters’. Related to these negotiations, Ukraine has a list of reform targets to meet in 2026. However, accession negotiations have not properly started due to lack of the required unanimity in the Council.

On 12 December 2025, the Council adopted a regulation indefinitely prohibiting the transfer back to Russia of Russian assets (of the Central Bank of Russia) immobilised in the EU. This money has been frozen since the war began. The European Parliament has repeatedly called for the assets (amounting to around €300 billion) to be used to finance Ukraine’s reconstruction. However, it is a divisive issue due to potential economic, legal, and reputational consequences, and for the moment the European Council has not decided to do so.

Parliament also supports the EU’s sanctions against Russia. On 23 April 2026, the EU adopted its 20th package of sanctions against Russia, introducing 120 additional listings. In 2025, Russia represented 1.1 % of EU world trade in goods, shifting from the EU’s fourth largest trading partner in 2007 to 19th place in 2025.

Parliament continues to employ its budgetary, agenda-setting, external action and law-making powers to mobilise solid EU support for Ukraine’s defence against Russia’s aggression, and to ensure that the EU honours its pledges.

Links

• EU Support for Ukraine for 2026-2027
• Ten Issues to Watch in 2026
• Russia under Vladamir Putin
• State of play: EU support to Ukraine
• Financing Ukraine in 2026 and 2027
• Act in support of ammunition production

Other links

• EU solidarity with Ukraine
• Number of civilian casualties in Ukraine during Russia’s invasion verified by OHCHR from February 24, 2022 to March 31, 2026
• EU adopts 20th package of sanctions against Russia
• European Parliament resolution of 1 March 2022 on the Russian aggression against Ukraine 

Written by Clare Fergurson and Katarzyna Sochacka.

Members also debated how to ensure accountability and justice in response to Russia’s continued attacks against the civilian population in Ukraine; and the danger of normalising relations with Russia, including its participation in major cultural and sports events. Members also discussed how to support democratic resilience in Armenia; the situation on the implementation of a ceasefire in Lebanon, peace efforts and humanitarian access; as well as Sudan’s ‘abandoned’ humanitarian crisis. Further debates covered the presentation of the Better Regulation and Enforcement Communication from the European Commission; the need for targeted criminal provisions and platforms’ responsibility to effectively address cyberbullying and online harassment; the need to combat antisemitism and protect Jewish life in Europe, following the recent attacks against the Jewish community in the Netherlands and Belgium; and Roma inclusion, equality and fundamental rights.

2028-2034 EU budget: Parliament’s position

Parliament adopted its negotiating mandate for the EU’s 2028-2034 budget following a debate on the interim report on the multiannual financial framework (MFF). The report of the Committee on Budgets (BUDG) defends a budget set at 1.27 % of the EU’s gross national income (GNI), excluding Next Generation EU (NGEU) repayment. This is a 10 % increase compared with the Commission proposal. BUDG also calls for a budget of €385.12 billion to be ringfenced for the common agricultural policy in the next MFF, with a €274.34 billion budget for cohesion policy. In terms of governance and rule of law, Members are concerned that the proposed budget weakens transparency, and stress that the Commission must apply the necessary legal provisions in cases where the EU’s financial interests are threatened.

Guidelines for the 2027 budget

Members adopted guidelines for the 2027 budget, following the debate held during the March session. The 2027 annual EU budget will be the last one under the current multiannual financial framework (MFF), which covers 2021 to 2027. The European Parliament’s set of guidelines contribute to the preparation of next year’s budget, with the Commission expected to adopt the draft 2027 budget in early summer.

Discharge 2024

Members granted discharge for the 2024 financial year to the various institutions and bodies of the EU, except for the Council and European Council. The Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT) had recommended granting discharge to the Commission and all six executive agencies, but raised concerns about the rule of law and corruption, calling on the Commission to ensure the EU budget is protected. Likewise, CONT recommended granting discharge to seven of the eight other institutions, but yet again recommended postponing discharge for the European Council and the Council of the EU. The Council refuses to acknowledge Parliament’s oversight role, and Parliament has therefore not granted discharge since 2009. The CONT committee also recommended granting discharge for all 33 EU decentralised agencies, but raised concerns about financial risks including rising EU debt and structural weaknesses in financial management, staffing and procurement.

Omnibus VI – chemicals

Rising energy costs and a decline in demand are affecting Europe’s chemicals industry. Parliament supports simplification of certain requirements but prioritises consumer protection and clear labelling. In April 2026, Members of the Committees on Environment, Climate and Food Safety (ENVI) and Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) opposed the Commission’s proposals to extend the time before bans are applied on the use of carcinogenic substances in cosmetic products as well as the removal of certain text requirements to ensure labels remain legible for consumers. Parliament adopted its negotiating mandate for the ‘Omnibus VI proposal’, which aims at simplifying rules for chemicals, cosmetics and fertiliser manufacturing.

Emissions accounting in transport services

Transport is responsible for about a quarter of the EU’s greenhouse gas emissions (GHG). Nevertheless, EU countries have to rely on emissions calculation tools with limited reliability in their efforts to cut emissions. Parliament adopted a proposed common framework to calculate GHG emissions from both freight and passenger transport. This follows a trilogue agreement reached by negotiators from the Committees on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) and Transport and Tourism (TRAN). The agreed text, which Parliament considered at second reading, backs the Commission proposal for a single EU methodology and calls for a free public calculation tool to make data widely available. This universal methodology means a reduction in the administrative burden and allow for greater transparency and fairer comparison between services.

Generalised scheme of preferences

Reform of EU trade with less developed countries is on the horizon, and Members adopted a provisional agreement on revision of the Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) Regulation. Following negotiations between Parliament and the Council in December 2025, the agreed text includes the addition of new human rights and environmental treaties, which participating countries must ratify to benefit from trade preferences, as well as stricter criteria that must be met before GSP countries can see their preferential tariffs withdrawn for non-cooperation in the readmission of migrants illegally present in the EU. As adopted, the legislation would apply from 1 January 2027.

Consent-based definition of rape

As combating sexual violence and violence against women remains an urgent issue globally, Parliament continues to support a strong and survivor-centred legal framework. Members debated and adopted a joint own-initiative report from Parliament’s Committees on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) and on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE), which calls on the Commission to propose EU legislation to define rape based on consent, in line with the Istanbul Convention. The report reiterates Parliament’s previous call to make gender-based violence a specific area of EU crime, stresses that legislation should also apply to virtual acts of sexual assault, and should consider circumstances in which giving consent is precluded. This marks a renewed legislative effort on reform after provisions on a consent-based definition of rape were not included in the EU directive adopted in 2024.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Five decisions to enter into interinstitutional negotiations – one from the Transport and Tourism Committee (TRAN) on registration documents for vehicles and vehicle registration data recorded in national vehicle registers; one from the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) on Directive 2004/37/EC as regards the addition of substances and setting limit values; two from the Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) Committee on economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability, and on alignment with the EU economic governance framework and further simplification of that framework; as well as from Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) and Fisheries (PECH) committees on empowering France to accede to the Inter-American Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles – were approved.

This ‘at a glance’ note is intended to review some of the highlights of the plenary part-session, and notably to follow up on key dossiers identified by EPRS. It does not aim to be exhaustive. For more detailed information on specific files, please see other EPRS products, notably our ‘EU legislation in progress’ briefings, and the plenary minutes.

Read this ‘at a glance note’ on ‘Plenary round-up – April 2026‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Annastiina Papunen and Rebecca Zamponi

The two-day meeting saw discussions on the situation in the Middle East and its geopolitical and economic impact on the EU, EU defence and security, energy, competitiveness, Ukraine, and the EU’s long-term budget for 2028-2034. A notable moment on the sidelines of the meeting was the signing of the ‘One Europe, One Market’ roadmap by the Presidents of the European Parliament, the European Commission and Cyprus (representing the EU Council) – a document which sets clear timelines and deliverables to strengthen EU competitiveness and the EU single market by the end of 2027.

Back to back with the informal meeting, EU leaders were joined for an informal lunch by the leaders of key regional partners in the Middle East (Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Syria, and the Gulf Cooperation Council). The leaders on both sides welcomed the ceasefires between the US and Iran as well as between Israel and Lebanon. European Council President António Costa stressed that ‘the European Union is not a part of the conflict, but we will be a part of the solution’, which reflected the discussions and the general mood of EU leaders. European Parliament President Roberta Metsola underlined that ‘we all want the same thing: a swift and lasting end to the war’.

1. General

EU leaders met in Cyprus for an informal meeting, in Ayia Napa on 23 April over dinner, and in Lefkosia the next day. Security was heightened at the meeting venues, after the drone attack that had targeted the UK military base of Akrotiri in March. Furthermore, Cypriot farmers blocked roads to protest strict governments measures limiting the spread of the highly contagious foot-and-mouth disease. Over 100 farms have been affected and, as per EU rules, the infected animals need to be culled, adding to the plight of farmers harmed by rising costs and adverse climate phenomena.

The President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola, addressed EU leaders, as did Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who attended the meeting in person. This would have been the last European Council meeting for Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán after he lost the April parliamentary elections to Tisza leader Péter Magyar (EPP). However, Orbán, who is currently the longest-serving member of the European Council, with 16 years in post, did not attend.

2. European Council meeting Ukraine

The informal European Council meeting started on the bright side, with President Costa welcoming the final approval of the €90 billion loan to Ukraine and the 20th package of sanctions against Russia on the doorstep. Latvian Prime Minister Evika Siliņa stressed that these two decisions demonstrated that the EU could deliver what it promised, even in turbulent times. EU leaders had agreed on the loan at the December 2025 European Council meeting. However, Hungary and Slovakia blocked the necessary amendment of the financial framework (requiring unanimity) until Russian oil deliveries to the two Member States, via the Druzhba pipeline, had resumed. The High Representative, Kaja Kallas, suggested that the EU should revisit previous sanctions red lines. Zelenskyy, after welcoming the unblocking of the €90 billion loan, raised the issue of the implementation of EU support to Ukraine, the need to pressure Russia towards real diplomacy, and his visit to the Middle East and the new security agreements concluded with partners in the region. He also called for ‘full-fledged EU membership’ for Ukraine, a country which is ‘defending common European values’.
Ahead of the informal meeting, Presidents Costa and Zelenskyy and Commission President Ursula von der Leyen released a joint statement that highlighted the progress Ukraine had made in its reforms and called for the ‘opening of negotiation clusters without delay’. There is, however, no unity on the accession process of Ukraine. While Estonian Prime Minister Kristen Michal said that he favoured ‘accelerating’ Ukraine’s membership, Luxembourg Prime Minister Luc Frieden stated that enlargement should be seen in a geostrategic perspective, but that there could be no short cuts. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz ruled out immediate membership but proposed partial integration to bring the country closer to the EU, for instance by participating in the work of the institutions without voting rights. Merz claimed there was support among his fellow leaders for the proposal, with the main hurdle being Ukraine’s involvement in the internal market.

Middle East

The discussion on the EU’s response to the evolving situation in the Middle East had two main components: 1) contributing to de-escalation and peace; and 2) the core principle of freedom of navigation. Fragile ceasefires between the United States and Iran as well as between Israel and Lebanon formed the background to the discussion. From the outset, the EU has been unified in calling for de-escalation; however, there has not been clear agreement on what the EU and the Member States could do to achieve this.

On Lebanon, President Costa reiterated earlier calls for negotiations to continue in full respect of international law and of Lebanon’s territorial integrity. Lebanese President Joseph Aoun was commended for banning the military activities of Hezbollah and reassured of EU support. In March 2026, the EU announced it was increasing humanitarian aid and financial support to Lebanon. Moreover, at the Foreign Affairs Council on 21 April, Spain, Ireland and Slovenia had put forward a proposal to suspend the EU-Israel Association Agreement over military actions in Lebanon and Palestine. In his doorstep statement, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez said there was disunity between Member States on this possibility. However, if a total suspension, requiring unanimity, seems out of reach, some countries such as Belgium and the Netherlands are suggesting a suspension of the trade-related provisions of the Association Agreement, which only requires a qualified majority.

The US and Iran have been in a stand-off in the Strait of Hormuz, as both sides enact their own blockades, preventing free navigation. President Costa called for the Strait of Hormuz to be re‑opened without restrictions or tolling in full respect of international law and freedom of navigation. Von der Leyen stated that the EU must move past reactive crisis management and suggested expanding the scope of naval missions like ASPIDES.

After the informal meeting, Costa and von der Leyen both expressed the EU leaders’ general agreement that, given the brutality inflicted very recently by the Iranian regime on its people, it was too early to consider removing sanctions against Iran in exchange for lifting the blockade on the Strait of Hormuz. EU leaders consider that a number of milestones would have to be reached before the EU could consider lifting sanctions, notably assurances on the end of Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. The ongoing blockage of the Strait of Hormuz has had a negative impact on the European and global economy (see below).

European security and defence

Faced with this challenging geopolitical and security environment, EU leaders discussed Europe’s readiness to respond and to provide assistance to a Member State victim of armed aggression on its territory. Following a drone attack on the British base of Akrotiri in Cyprus on 1 March, Nikos Christodoulides, President of Cyprus, had put the possible use of the European mutual assistance clause under Article 42(7) TEU on the EU leaders’ agenda, prompting questions on its scope, implementation and the role of the EU institutions. Enshrined in EU primary law in 2009, the clause has only been triggered once, by France following the 13 November 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris. Similar to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the clause envisages ‘an obligation [for EU Member States] of aid and assistance by all the means in their power’, i.e. not necessarily military means. For non-NATO EU Member States (Austria, Cyprus, Ireland and Malta), and amid doubts over the US’s readiness to honour the NATO Article 5 commitment, Article 42(7) appears particularly relevant.

Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk – whose country is NATO’s biggest defence spender proportionate to GDP, and one of Europe’s most pro-transatlantic countries – questioned the US’s ‘loyalty’ to the NATO Article 5 pledge. He stressed that the discussions on the clause were about defining practical ways for EU countries to support each other in the event of an attack. Likewise, Christodoulides called for the clause to be made operational, stating that ‘Europe must be ready to respond swiftly and decisively … . We must put this mechanism firmly in place’. Kallas briefed EU leaders on the ongoing work to provide guidance, which will result in a Commission blueprint, on when and how a country can trigger the mutual assistance clause, and what assets can be mobilised once it is invoked. However, with certain EU countries wary of steps that could be seen as undermining NATO, the Article 42(7) discussion remained part of a wider discussion on geopolitics.

Energy crisis and economic consequences of the war

At their regular March meeting, EU leaders agreed on a set of measures and recommendations to protect EU citizens and the EU economy from the crisis. As stressed at the Eurogroup meeting on 27 March: ‘The rise in oil and gas prices is directly affecting European households and businesses and will put pressure on inflation and dampen growth’. The situation has since grown even more dire; as the Strait of Hormuz is still closed to normal traffic, energy prices have risen further. The EU bill for imported fossil fuels has gone up by €25 billion in 54 days, and Energy Commissioner Dan Jorgensen has warned that the EU should be prepared for ‘a long-lasting energy shock’. Some analysts even consider that a recession may already be unfolding.

In their March 2026 conclusions, EU leaders asked the Commission to present ‘a toolbox of targeted temporary measures to address the recent spikes in the prices of imported fossil fuels arising from the crisis in the Middle East’ without delay. Published ahead of the Cyprus meeting, the toolbox, entitled AccelerateEU, aims in the short and medium term to shield Europeans from the crisis with timely, targeted and temporary measures, and to further accelerate electrification. President Costa stated that ‘coordination is key’ and that EU leaders were ‘ready to step up their response’ if needed. He also noted that, in the long term, there was only one option for the EU – to speed up energy transition and to use clean home-grown energy sources. While acknowledging that the Commission toolbox was a good step forward, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni said ‘it is not enough’. Likewise, Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever criticised it for not being concrete enough; he would have liked to see larger adjustments to the EU emissions trading system (ETS) and an EU-wide tax on windfall profits. According to Christodoulides, EU finance ministers are expected to work on further proposals to address the rising energy prices at the two Ecofin meetings in May.

Competitiveness

On Friday, on the sidelines of the EU leaders’ meeting, Presidents von der Leyen, Metsola and Christodoulides (on behalf of the Cyprus Presidency of the Council) formally signed the joint ‘One Market, One Europe roadmap‘, which is the result of discussions at the Alden Biesen competitiveness retreat in February and at the regular March meeting. Christodoulides called it ‘a strong signal of our collective determination to truly boost European competitiveness’. The Commission had promised the roadmap for the March regular meeting, but it was finally postponed by a month. In the European Parliament, some dissatisfaction with the preparatory process was apparent, since the draft was only circulated one week before the meeting, leaving very little time for reflection and negotiations. Nevertheless, as the Council’s press release underlines: ‘This agreement demonstrates the resolve of the three institutions to move forward together on a clear path. Against the backdrop of sustained geopolitical and economic volatility, this roadmap represents a decisive step to urgently strengthen Europe’s competitiveness, with concrete actions and targets for agreements, at the latest by end 2027.’

Main message of the President of the EP: Roberta Metsola said that the roadmap would allow the EU to deliver ‘what the citizens have asked from us’ in a fast and effective way, adding that ‘we are now at the point where commitments need to turn into delivery’. However, she also underlined that: ‘We also need the space – and the trust – to do our job of democratic oversight and legitimacy properly. 720 MEPs from more than 200 political parties are not, and will never be, a rubber stamp.’

Multiannual financial framework 2028-2034

EU leaders had an exchange of views on the next multiannual financial framework (MFF), notably on the contribution of the new EU long-term budget to the EU’s competitiveness agenda. As von der Leyen pointed out, there are four elements in the budgetary equation: the need to 1) repay Next Generation EU from 2028; 2) invest in new priorities; 3) sustain funding for the EU’s long-standing priorities; and 4) keep national contributions in check. Matching the EU’s resources with its ambitions and needs is challenging and will therefore not be possible without new own resources.

After the meeting, Costa reported that EU leaders had confirmed that new own resources would have to play an important role in funding the budget. The Commission’s new own resources package will constitute the basis for discussions, but EU leaders have also expressed openness to considering the suggestions put forward by the European Parliament, which is proposing to tax digital services, online gambling and crypto-assets. However, own resources are expected to be subject to intense discussions. Irish Prime Minister Micheál Martin, the next holder of the rotating Presidency of the Council of the EU, stated that ‘own resources is a difficult part of the file, in the sense that those [Commission] proposals haven’t garnered too much support across the 27 Member States’. Germany and the Netherlands, for instance, oppose a tax on the turnover of large companies, while revenue collected through the ETS does not seem popular among EU leaders.

As usual in this phase of MFF negotiations, groups of Member States try to influence the discussions by issuing positions or ‘non-papers’ on core aspects of the future MFF, such as the non-paper by Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden on the proposal for a European Competitiveness Fund.

Regarding the timeline, Costa’s objective is to ‘find an agreement by the end of this year’. However, some EU leaders such as Merz questioned ‘whether we’ll actually be able to finalise it this year’. The MFF is due to be addressed at the June meeting, based on a ‘negotiating box’ with figures to be put forward by the Cyprus Presidency, and at the regular meetings in October and December; in addition, there will be a special meeting on 26-27 November.

Main message of the President of the EP: Roberta Metsola pointed out that the European Parliament would adopt its position the following week. She stressed that Parliament supported a stronger focus on competitiveness and defence, while calling on EU leaders ‘to look with fresh eyes on own resources. We need new money to service the debt’. She added that ‘Europe cannot face a new era with an old framework. The current budget has been stretched to its breaking point by crises it was never designed to absorb. We made it work but we see its limits … What we need now is a budget that is fit for purpose – ready to deliver where, and when, it matters most.’

3. Informal meeting with key regional partners in the Middle East

Back to back with the informal meeting, EU leaders held an informal working lunch with leaders from Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria as well as the Secretary-General of the Gulf Cooperation Council to discuss the situation in the region and regional cooperation. This lunch followed Costa’s two days of meetings with the leaders of the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar on 14-15 April. After the informal meeting, Christodoulides emphasised that the security and stability of the Middle East was interlinked with that of Europe. He also stated that the Pact for the Mediterranean was a crucial first step to strategically enhancing cooperation with countries in the region, but that much more needed to be done. Cyprus would put forward specific suggestions to achieve that, such as a step-by-step approach to removing sanctions and boosting cooperation with the Syrian regime. On 20 April, the Commission proposed the full resumption of the EU-Syria Cooperation Agreement (partially suspended since 2011). Von der Leyen emphasised that close relations between Europe and the Middle East was not just for now, but also for the future, outlining a number of upcoming conferences and high-level meetings with partners in the region.

Read this briefing on ‘Outcome of the meetings of EU leaders, 23 – 24 April 2026‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Angelos Delivorias.

Australia is one of the world’s biggest economies, and possesses raw materials reserves that place it at the centre of the green and digital transition. In addition, its geographical position and military capabilities make it a central player in the geostrategic balance of the Indo-Pacific. In the past 70 years, Australia has been mainly governed by the Australian Labor Party and the Coalition (the alliance between the Liberal Party of Australia and the National Party of Australia). In the most recent elections in 2025, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and the Labor Party were re-elected.
The country has had long and strong relations in several sectors with the United States (US). At the same time, the decisions and rhetoric of President Donald Trump’s administration have created tensions in the relationship. Similarly, the country shares strong relations with China, albeit concentrated in fewer areas (mainly trade and migration); nevertheless, these relations have become increasingly strained over the last decade, peaking during the COVID-19 pandemic. The current government has been trying to adopt a firm tone towards the US and diversify its economy and defence, without jeopardising the deep relations between the two countries. It has also adopted a less confrontational tone towards China, while at the same time trying to diminish its reliance on bilateral trade.
In 2026, relations between the EU and Australia reached a new milestone, with the conclusion of a free trade agreement (FTA) and a security and defence partnership (SDP). The FTA eliminates tariffs on almost all Australian goods entering the EU and vice versa. It gives greater access to the respective agricultural markets while protecting several geographical indications. Thanks to the elimination of tariffs on critical minerals, the EU secures greater access to necessary inputs and strengthens the resilience of its supply chain. The SDP – the EU’s 11th (out of 12) since the launch of the Strategic Compass – reflects the bloc’s willingness to play a more active global role, in collaboration with like-minded partners who share converging strategic interests.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Australia: Current landscape and engagement with the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson with Áine Feeney.

Parliament is due to adopt its negotiating mandate for the EU’s 2028-2034 budget, with a debate scheduled on Tuesday morning on an interim report on the MFF. The report adopted by the Committee on Budgets (BUDG) defends a budget set at 1.27 % of the EU’s gross national income (GNI), excluding Next Generation EU (NGEU) repayment. This is a 10 % increase compared with the Commission proposal. BUDG also calls for a budget of €385.12 billion to be ringfenced for the common agricultural policy in the next MFF, with a €274.34 billion budget for cohesion policy. In terms of governance and rule of law, Members are concerned that the proposed budget weakens transparency, and stress that the Commission must apply the necessary legal provisions in cases where EU financial interests are threatened.

Members should also vote on guidelines for the 2027 budget, following the debate at the March session, with the aim of feeding into the draft budget the Commission plans to adopt on 10 June.

On Tuesday afternoon, Members are due to debate granting discharge for the 2024 financial year to the various institutions and bodies of the EU. The Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT) has recommended granting discharge to the Commission and all six executive agencies, but is concerned about the rule of law and corruption, calling on the Commission to ensure the EU budget is protected. Likewise, CONT has recommended granting discharge to seven of the eight other institutions, but yet again recommends postponing discharge for the European Council and the Council of the EU. The Council refuses to acknowledge Parliament’s oversight role, and Parliament has therefore not granted discharge since 2009. The CONT committee also recommends granting discharge for all 33 EU decentralised agencies, but raises concerns about financial risks including rising EU debt and structural weaknesses in financial management, staffing and procurement.

Reform of EU trade with less developed countries is on the horizon, with Members due to consider a provisional agreement on revision of the Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) Regulation on Tuesday lunchtime. Following negotiations between Parliament and the Council in December 2025, the agreed text includes the addition of new human rights and environmental treaties, which participating countries must ratify to benefit from trade preferences, as well as stricter criteria that must be met before GSP countries can see their preferential tariffs withdrawn for non-cooperation in the readmission of migrants illegally present in the EU. Once formally adopted, the legislation would apply from 1 January 2027.

As combating sexual violence and violence against women remains an urgent issue globally, Parliament continues to support a strong and survivor-centred legal framework. On Monday, Members are due to examine a joint own-initiative report from Parliament’s Committees on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) and on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE), which calls on the Commission to propose EU legislation to define rape based on consent, in line with the Istanbul Convention. The report reiterates Parliament’s previous call to make gender-based violence a specific area of EU crime, stresses that legislation should also apply to virtual acts of sexual assault, and should consider circumstances in which giving consent is precluded. This marks a renewed legislative effort on reform after provisions on a consent-based definition of rape were not included in the EU directive adopted in 2024.

Rising energy costs and a decline in demand are affecting Europe’s chemicals industry. Parliament supports simplification of certain requirements but prioritises consumer protection and clear labelling. In April 2026, Members of the Committees on Environment, Climate and Food Safety (ENVI) and Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) jointly rejected the Commission’s proposals to extend the time before bans are applied on the use of carcinogenic substances in cosmetic products and opposed the removal of certain text requirements to ensure labels remain legible for consumers. On Wednesday afternoon, Parliament is due to vote on its negotiating mandate for the ‘Omnibus VI proposal’, which aims at simplifying rules for chemicals, cosmetics and fertiliser manufacturing.

Transport is responsible for about a quarter of the EU’s greenhouse gas emissions (GHG). Nevertheless, EU countries have to rely on emissions calculation tools with limited reliability in their efforts to cut emissions. On Tuesday afternoon, Parliament is set to consider a proposed common framework to calculate GHG emissions from both freight and passenger transport. This follows a trilogue agreement reached by negotiators from the Committees on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) and Transport and Tourism (TRAN). The agreed text, which Parliament will consider at second reading, backs the Commission proposal for a single EU methodology and calls for a free public calculation tool to make data widely available. If adopted, this universal methodology would mean a reduction in the administrative burden and allow for greater transparency and fairer comparison between services.

European Parliament Plenary Session April 2026 – agenda

• 2028-2034 EU budget: Parliament’s position
• Discharge for 2024 budget: Commission including RRF, executive agencies, EDFS
• Discharge for 2024 budget: Other institutions
• Discharge for 2024 budget: EU decentralised agencies and joint undertakings
• A new generalised scheme of preferences
• The need for consent-based definition of rape
• Emissions accounting in transport services
• Omnibus VI – Simplification of requirements and procedures for chemicals

Written by Ulrich Jochheim.

Global imbalances have been a major topic in international economic policymaking since at least the 1970s. Although they decreased after the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2008, they have begun to widen again in recent years. As the 2008 crisis demonstrated, the sudden unwinding of current account surpluses and deficits (‘disorderly adjustment’) can have major consequences not only for the countries directly involved but also for many third countries through spillover effects, particularly in financial markets.

Against this background, developments in the Chinese economy have become particularly important for global economic stability: while China played an important stabilising role in overcoming the GFC, its economic model has largely focused on export promotion and, more recently, import substitution. This has led to substantial current account surpluses, both as a percentage of GDP and in nominal terms, given the size of China’s economy.

International organisations have been trying for some time now to convince China’s authorities that the country’s growth model is shifting the burden of adjustment to its trading partners and risks becoming globally unsustainable. Prior to the adoption of China’s 15th Five-Year Plan by the two houses of Parliament (the ‘Two Sessions’) in March 2026, the IMF, in particular, proposed strategies to render China’s economic expansion more sustainable for its partners while reducing the risk of a disorderly adjustment.

However, a more detailed analysis of the new plan suggests a continuation of the current economic policy trajectory. At the same time, the ongoing crisis in the Middle East/Iran seems to have prompted some within China to reconsider priorities, at least in the short term. It remains to be seen, however, whether recent, more accommodating statements by the Chinese side are merely for external consumption, especially in view of the summit between US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping (currently planned for mid-May 2026).

Read the complete briefing on ‘China’s economic challenge to the world‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson and Sebastian Clapp.

Russia’s attack on Ukraine turned out to be merely the opening salvo in a deteriorating global security scenario. Security has become a top concern for Europeans – and this concern has deepened. More than two thirds of Europeans (68 %) believe their country is under threat, and 52 % trust the EU to strengthen security and defence. The European Parliament has called for the EU to move towards a more unified defence stance, based on credible deterrence, operational readiness, and continued support for Ukraine.

To ensure all EU countries are able to rely on a robust defence against attack, the EU roadmap to defence readiness by 2030 aims at overcoming defence industry fragmentation and a dependence on non-EU suppliers through coordinated investment, collaborative spending and encouraging a robust industrial and technological base. While EU countries increased their defence spending in 2025, Parliament is keen to see EU governments work together more closely to unlock the economies of scale that joint defence procurement could bring. Such coordinated defence spending could benefit the EU’s rapidly-expanding defence industry, with several new financial and legislative initiatives promoting cross-border cooperation in the industry.

Four years into Russia’s war, Parliament still stands firm with Ukraine. Parliament held an extraordinary plenary session in February 2026, marking this sombre anniversary, with President Metsola remarking ‘Ukraine’s security is Europe’s security’. Parliament also voted in favour of a €90 billion support loan package to strengthen Ukraine’s defence and economy. As the loan guarantee requires an amendment to the EU multiannual financial framework, the file requires a unanimous decision in the Council – which to date has been blocked by Hungary.

Presciently, the EU already launched its first approach to boosting defence with the European Defence Fund in 2021. To increase cooperation between EU countries, this €8 billion fund promotes joint defence research and capability development, defence innovation and cross-border industrial cooperation through over 160 collaborative projects. However, the interim evaluation of the European Defence Fund (EDF) highlighted the need for funding to be faster, more flexible, and for better definition of projects for real strategic impact.

The EDF is just one way in which the EU aims to tackle the European defence industry’s high fragmentation, where Member States take national positions that nevertheless undermine overall efficiency, interoperability and competitiveness at the EU level. Today’s goal to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of EU defence spending is to develop a true common market for Europe’s security and defence industry. Less red-tape and greater defence alignment between EU countries could lead to governments enjoying the advantages of economies of scale in both industrial processes and procurement. Companies operating in the European defence technological and industrial base (known as EDTIB) could expand, and less funding would be lost to procurement from non-EU firms. Parliament is a strong supporter of a competitive EU defence market, which would lead to improved deterrence and resilience, and help EU countries better protect their sovereignty in today’s unpredictable geopolitical environment.

In a resolution on its 2025 annual report on the implementation of the EU common foreign and security policy, Parliament reiterated that the EU must defend its interests and called for increased support for Ukraine, an expanded presence in the Middle East, and underlined the need for close coordination with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). As many EU countries are also members of NATO, they are subject to Article 5, the collective defence clause. The armed forces of one or several EU Member States may therefore be called on to defend a border or a NATO Ally and so need to be able to move swiftly across EU territory. However, military mobility today faces considerable barriers – outdated, inadequate or missing infrastructure (such as bridges) and inconsistent legislation. While some improvements have already been seen on customs and transport procedures, tackling the under-investment and regulatory barriers in this area as a collective could lead to benefits almost three times higher than when EU countries do not coordinate their investment.

Returning to the situation in Ukraine, military drones are the main cause of casualties among both civilians and troops. The EU is already using EDF funding to develop drone technology and countermeasures, with EU governments already investing heavily in drone production. Parliament is monitoring the situation carefully to ensure robust ethical guardrails and strong accountability – and is particularly concerned that military drone innovation should not lead to development of lethal autonomous weapons.

Finally, to help Ukraine defend its borders and its people, the question of how to use Russian central bank assets, frozen by Western countries because of Russia’s attack, to sustain Ukraine against its aggressor(s) has not been resolved. While legal opinions on the lawfulness of confiscating Russia’s money diverge, G7 countries have already agreed to use the extraordinary revenues generated by the assets to service and repay a US$50 billion G7 loan to Ukraine. The EU channels its support for Ukraine through the European Peace Facility, and has already allocated €6.1 billion to address military and defence needs (2022-2024). This funding adds to military support directly provided by EU Member States, leading to an estimated €63.2 billion in total support for the Ukrainian armed forces. Fully behind the principle that Russia should pay for the damage it has inflicted, Parliament remains unwavering in its support for Ukraine.

Further reading:

• European defence readiness roadmap
• EU defence funding
• EU joint defence procurement
• European defence industry
• EU support for Ukraine for 2026–2027
• The interim evaluation of the European Defence Fund
• Building a common market for European defence
• Military mobility
• Towards a comprehensive and beneficial approach to military mobility
• Military drone systems in the EU and global context: Types, capabilities and regulatory frameworks
• Confiscation of immobilised Russian sovereign assets: State of play, arguments and scenarios
• European Peace Facility – For Ukraine, but not only

Written by Issam Hallak

Obstacles to businesses’ cross-border operations and expansion constitute a major hurdle to an effective single market. The International Monetary Fund estimates that persistent barriers to the single market represent the equivalent of a 44 % and 110 % tariff on goods and services, respectively. The Letta report emphasised that a single business code would be a ‘game-changer’, making all business procedures – from establishment to end of activity – smoother and more transparent.

To address this issue, the European Commission published a proposal on 18 March 2026 for a regulation establishing the 28th regime corporate legal framework that introduces a new legal entity, EU Inc. Any company would be able to register in any Member State and opt in to the EU Inc. company form. The framework would allow quick, fully digital registration that is automatically valid across the whole EU, thereby benefiting the operations and expansion of EU Inc. businesses. In addition, the proposal provides for a single tax treatment of employee remuneration through stocks and enables employee participation schemes. It also provides for fast-track termination of solvent companies, and a legal framework for winding up insolvent small and young innovative companies, known as start-ups.

Parliament adopted a resolution in January 2026 supporting the approach but remained cautious about its chances of success.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The 28th regime corporate legal framework‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Laurence.Amand-Eeckhout.

CONTEXT

Health biotechnologies are increasingly important for public health, innovation, and the European Union’s competitiveness in global research and healthcare markets. They encompass, for example, gene therapies for rare diseases, cell therapies to treat cancer, immunotherapies, bio-artificial skin for burn treatment, and mRNA vaccines. Biotechnology is among the fastest-growing economic sectors in the EU, yet the EU continues to lag behind the United States and China in translating biotech innovation into commercially viable products and large-scale manufacturing. Structural challenges remain, particularly in clinical development, regulatory processes, and manufacturing capacity.
On 16 December 2025, the European Commission proposed a package of measures intended to improve the health of EU citizens, and ensure the long-term resilience and competitiveness of the EU health sector. The package includes a proposal for a ‘European biotech act’ setting out an EU-level framework to strengthen the competitiveness of the health biotechnology and biomanufacturing sector in the EU, by simplifying regulatory processes, promoting innovation, boosting EU-based biomanufacturing with new incentives and support tools, and facilitating access to finance, while maintaining high safety, ethics and sustainability standards.
Following this health-focused initiative, the Commission is expected to propose a second European Biotech Act later in 2026, centred on industrial biotechnologies and biomanufacturing, to ensure a competitive internal market for all biotechnology areas.

LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL

2025/0406(COD) – Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Union’s biotechnology and biomanufacturing sectors particularly in the area of health and amending Regulations (EC) No 178/2002, (EC) No 1394/2007, (EU) No 536/2014, (EU) 2019/6, (EU) 2024/795 and (EU) 2024/1938 (European Biotech Act) – COM(2025) 1022, 16 December 2025.

NEXT STEPS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

For the latest developments in this legislative procedure, see the Legislative Train Schedule:2025/0406(COD)

Read the complete briefing on ‘European biotech act‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Colin Murphy with Greta Baltika

The virtual, online world is a significant part of everyday life. As a reflection of modern society, it features a range of criminal behaviour. The internet is a complex system of interconnected computer networks allowing applications to communicate with one another. Through this complexity, it has a simplistic structure with a visible top layer, a deeper content layer and finally, a small but significant dark layer.
This dark layer, known as the dark web, is a less explored and understood part of the web. It contains content that is not searchable and is accessed using a process to maintain anonymity. There are legitimate and appropriate reasons for accessing the dark web, such as activists and whistleblowers avoiding identification. However, it has a reputation for illicit content and activity. This notoriety can be justified, as the dark web, while not unlawful in itself, does contain websites providing access to illegal content and services such as drugs, firearms, stolen data and child sexual abuse material. This online space is being progressively scrutinised by law enforcement agencies, who have become increasingly specialised in countering certain aspects of the dark web, with some notable successes in dismantling cybercrime infrastructure and bringing criminals to justice

Read the complete briefing on ‘Understanding the dark web‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Guillaume Ragonnaud with Raphaël Wainstain.

Overview

On 16 December 2025, the European Commission published the automotive omnibus as part of a broader automotive package aimed at supporting the sector in the transition to clean mobility. The automotive omnibus is the ninth set of simplification measures (also known as ‘omnibus packages’) that have been published by the Commission since 2025. Its purpose is to simplify the rules governing the EU automotive industry and improve coherence and consistency between different regulatory requirements. The two legislative proposals included in the package would amend the EU rules concerning tachograph obligations for electric light commercial vehicles (electric vans) and motor caravans, as well as those applying to speed limitation devices for electric vans. Additionally, the package would introduce a definition of a small electric car in motor vehicle legislation and authorise the Commission to adopt delegated acts to lay down the technical requirements for vehicle interoperability with charging infrastructure and grid. Furthermore, the proposals would simplify the rules for EU type-approval of new motor vehicles in terms of their sound level; remove some low-temperature laboratory tests from the Euro 7 Regulation; simplify Euro 7 rules for heavy-duty vehicles; and empower the Commission to adopt implementing acts on car data management.

Procedural information (1) Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EC) No 561/2006, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2019/2144 and (EU) 2024/1257 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the simplification of technical requirements and testing procedures for motor vehicles and repealing Council Directive 70/157/EEC and Regulation No 540/2014

(2) Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 92/6/EEC to exempt certain N2 electric vehicles from the requirement to install and use a speed limitation deviceCommittee responsible:(1) Environment, Climate and Food Safety (ENVI), Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO), and Transport and Tourism (TRAN) (joint committee)

(2) Transport and Tourism (TRAN) (1) COM(2025)993

(2) COM(2025)999Rapporteur:(1) Tbd
(2) Tbd (1) 2025/0422(COD)

(2) 2025/0424(COD)Next steps expected:Publication of draft reports

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU automotive omnibus‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Jakub Przetacznik.

The reintegration of Ukrainian war veterans into civilian life presents both a significant challenge and an opportunity for Ukraine’s economic reconstruction. Veterans are facing various difficulties depending on factors such as their educational background, military role, access to healthcare (including psychological assistance), gender and access to housing, especially for those from territories currently occupied by Russia.

Ukraine recently adopted its veterans policy strategy for 2030, aiming to restore the human capital and wellbeing of veterans and their families. It also seeks to express respect and gratitude towards veterans, commemorate fallen soldiers and define the role of veterans in ensuring Ukraine’s security and defence capabilities.

The European Commission’s Ukraine 2025 enlargement report addresses the situation of veterans in several sections, assessing reforms and providing recommendations for progress on the path to EU membership. These sections concern employment and the rights of people with disabilities.

Implementing the veterans policy for 2030 and various recommendations from the European Commission will require further resources to build a lasting support system for veterans. This issue is expected to be discussed during the Council of the European Union meeting on 21 April 2026.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Ukraine’s veterans policy‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Antonio Vale.

Introduction

The past few years have seen considerable interest in generative AI, particularly large language models (LLMs). This has translated into massive investment amounting to hundreds of billions of euros per year, especially in the US, in AI data centres designed around Graphics Processing Unit (GPU)-based platforms. Such breakneck expansion is increasingly running into constraints, particularly with regard to electricity availability.

Running AI models requires large amounts of power (as well as water, much of which is used to produce the electricity required), with data centres responsible for 1.5 % of global electricity consumption (2 % in the EU) and growing at 12 % annually. Moreover, they are often geographically concentrated, for example in Ireland, where they account for over 20 % of electricity consumption. Future scenarios suggest that this demand could continue to increase rapidly, although this should be taken with the caveat that investment in AI might be a bubble, LLMs may be supplanted by other models with different compute needs, and chip design innovations beyond GPUs may provide energy efficiency gains.

This situation has given rise to the idea of deploying compute in space to take advantage of the free, abundant solar energy. Originally focused on orbital processing of observational data and space mission support, the concept has rapidly evolved into the deployment of AI data centres in orbit to service ground-based needs. Recently, the strongest push has come from the US, with the merger between SpaceX and xAI linked to a request to put a million satellites in orbit, as well as interest from Google with project Suncatcher, and startups such as Starcloud and Axiom. Meanwhile, China has also launched pilot satellites intended to be the first in a future constellation, and in the EU the Horizon Europe-supported ASCEND project has concluded a feasibility study, aiming towards an operational system from 2030.

Potential impacts and developments

Launch costs represent a key constraint for any orbital infrastructure. The introduction of reusable rockets has led to a considerable decrease in recent times, to around several thousand euros per kilo of payload. This reduction is expected to continue thanks to improved heavy rockets and reusable second stages, with the European Space Agency (ESA) aiming for €280/kg with a new super-heavy lift launcher. Most ideas for future space data centres would involve either large constellations or modular construction, allowing build-up to occur over time. Even so, this would require a very high launch cadence, with a complete data centre likely needing upwards of one hundred launches, followed by a significant proportion yearly to replace satellites at end of life; this compares to around 300 space launches overall in 2025.

The main attraction of placing data centres in space is solar power: for objects located above the atmosphere, insolation (incoming solar radiation) can be several times greater than on the ground. The ideal choice would be a terminator sun-synchronous orbit, allowing satellites to keep pace with the dawn/dusk line and ensuring constant solar exposure on one side, while keeping the other dark to assist with cooling. Solar panels would need to be very large – up to a gargantuan 4 km per side, as envisaged by Starcloud for a 5 GW data centre; a small satellite with the equivalent of a server rack might make do with a more manageable 60 m2 and 28 kW, as deployed on the International Space Station (ISS). Newer thin-film solar panel technology may help keep the weight down.

If power is the main advantage, cooling is possibly the major challenge. Although space is cold, it is also a vacuum, meaning cooling can only take place via radiative emission. This can be achieved by coupling a coolant loop (the ISS uses ammonia) with large radiators pointing towards deep space, which would be of comparable size to the solar panels but considerably heavier. The spacecraft’s cooling system is particularly vulnerable: any rupture, for example from a meteoroid strike, can cause coolant loss and damage the electronic systems. Given radiative cooling scales as the fourth power of temperature, further advances may come from lighter radiators running at higher temperatures. The other main concern in orbit is radiation, which can cause random bit flips and whose impact over time can lead to a degradation of performance or malfunction. Recent work from Google and Starcloud, which has deployed a NVIDIA H100 chip in orbit, has given promising indications, but fault tolerance, error correction, redundancy (deliberate duplication of critical components or systems), and shielding are all required.

Any assembly or maintenance would pose a significant challenge. Heavy AI workloads can lead to relatively high chip failure rates, which, added to radiation effects, imply short lifespans of a few years. Depending on the concept, this would require redundancy or satellite replacement, with a weight or cost penalty, or else robotic maintenance in orbit, which still needs further development. Finally, there is the issue of communications. Large amounts of data from the ground, to be used for training, may simply be physically carried by ‘data shuttles‘, while server-side communications, needing high data rates, could use optical communication between satellites, in turn implying close proximity. Google’s plans, for example, envisage satellites hundreds of metres apart. With space debris and collisions being a critical issue, this would represent a major challenge in terms of the coordination of collision avoidance manoeuvres, which may be frequent given the sizes of the constellations being proposed.

Anticipatory policymaking

Deploying data centres in space poses important challenges, but does not appear to face insurmountable technical barriers and might be feasible even with current technology. The main hurdle is rather economic, with a mildly optimistic estimate placing near-future costs around three times those on the ground, although opinions are divided on whether such optimism is justified or not. Further innovation could help, with the evolution of launch costs a key determinant. This may lead to interesting synergies, with further technological and skills development benefiting other potential uses of space such as space-based solar power.

The current legal framework leaves space data centres in a grey zone: the United Nations’ Outer Space Treaty establishes no sovereignty in outer space, with launch states (a concept that presents its own issues) instead bearing responsibility and liability for space activities. Drafted in the 1960s, this treaty lacks explicit provisions regarding data. Article VIII of the treaty refers to jurisdiction over a space ‘object, and over any personnel thereof’, which has prompted some stakeholders to urge regulators to explicitly consider the concept of a ‘digital flag state’. Furthermore, relevant laws and treaties relying on the territorial location of data may require clarification. Examples include the GDPR‘s concept of transfers of personal data to third countries and the recently signed UN Convention against Cybercrime, which includes ships and aircraft but not satellites under its jurisdictional provisions. Likewise, legislation dealing with space activities may need to account for considerable processing of data originating from the ground rather than space. Extending the definition of space-based data and primary providers of space-based data in the Space Act, for example, could offer additional clarity. The overall situation is complex, involving potential multiple layers of overlapping jurisdiction. In the future, in-orbit assembly and AI agents risk further increasing this complexity. These issues highlight that extraterritorial application, as conceived in the GDPR or the Space Act, will be a crucial factor in the future regulation of space data centres.

The potential scale of orbital data centres is also important to consider. A 1 GW data centre, similar in scale to the largest under construction on the ground, could require a total payload upwards of 10 000 tons, or over three times the total payload mass launched in 2025. This risks potential infrastructure bottlenecks, such as the limited availability of launch facilities or liquid oxygen. It also raises sustainability questions, given that lifetime emissions may be larger than on the ground. Furthermore, the pollution of the upper atmosphere that would be caused by de-orbiting large numbers of end-of-life satellites is still poorly understood. Finally, it poses a critical, geopolitically relevant question regarding orbital congestion, as international regulation of slots in low Earth orbit is currently only done indirectly through radio spectrum assignment by the International Telecommunications Union, generally on a first-come, first-served basis.

What ifs are two-page-long publications about new or emerging technologies aiming to accurately summarise the scientific state-of-the art in an accessible and engaging manner. They further consider the impacts such technologies may have – on society, the environment and the economy, among others – and how the European Parliament may react to them. As such, they do not aim to be and cannot be prescriptive, but serve primarily as background material for the Members and staff of the European Parliament to assist them in their parliamentary work.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘What if AI data centres were put in space?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marie Lecerf.

The Roma are Europe’s largest ethnic minority. A significant number of Roma people live in very poor socio-economic conditions. The social exclusion, discrimination and segregation they face are mutually reinforcing. Their restricted access to education and difficulties entering the labour market result in low income and poor health compared with non-Roma people.

Since the mid-1990s, the EU has been stressing the need for better Roma inclusion. In 2011, an EU framework for national Roma integration strategies up to 2020 was launched to tackle their socio-economic exclusion and discrimination. This was followed in October 2020 by the EU Roma strategic framework for equality, inclusion and participation 2020-2030, complemented by the Council’s March 2021 recommendation promoting national strategic frameworks and the October 2023 European Council conclusions on desegregated housing and segregated settlements. The EU continues to support Member States through structural and investment funds with the 2021-2027 Common Provisions Regulation emphasising alignment with European Semester recommendations and the European Pillar of Social Rights.

In parallel, the EU anti-racism action plan 2020-2025, succeeded by the EU anti-racism strategy 2026-2030, strengthened enforcement of anti-discrimination law, while the Fundamental Rights Agency’s Roma survey 2024 confirms modest progress but warns of shortfalls against 2030 targets in poverty, housing, employment, education and discrimination.

Issues relating to the promotion of democratic values and practices, as well as economic, social and cultural rights for Roma people, have received particular attention from civil society organisations. The European Parliament has consistently advocated for Roma inclusion since the 1990s, with recent resolutions and debates targeting implementation gaps, antigypsyism, child segregation, women’s rights and the new anti-racism strategy.

This is a further update of a briefing originally published in May 2021; the previous update was in March 2025.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Understanding EU action on Roma inclusion‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Szczepański.

The world has changed since the European Union adopted its first economic security strategy in 2023. An increasingly confrontational geopolitical environment and the possibility of coercive behaviour from both China and the United States require a longer term strategy to reduce dependencies as well as a short-term ability to react swiftly to threats. On 3 December 2025, the European Commission adopted its new communication on economic security aiming to switch up a gear, from finding ad-hoc responses to crises based on risk identification, to proactive risk anticipation and mitigation. This new approach also focuses on providing clarity on the strategic and coherent use of the many instruments already available in the EU toolbox.

Aiming for a safer and more resilient EU economy, the Commission’s communication proposes ways to protect and develop strategic industries and reduce the EU’s vulnerabilities to coercion and other disruption. To build a solid knowledge base for informed decision-making and common understanding of risks and responses, the approach seeks to strengthen data gathering, analysis and overall economic security policy governance, with increased public and private stakeholder participation. To boost coherence, the Commission wants to adapt existing policy tools to deployment with a clear aim of managing economic security risks, taking possible impacts across policies into account. The Commission will seek to close existing security gaps with new instruments, such as the revised Blocking Statute.

The communication met with mixed reactions from the expert community, with both praise for taking the much needed step in the right direction, as well as criticisism for its insufficient response to the stark challenges facing the EU. The European Parliament is preparing its opinion on the role of trade in strengthening the EU’s economic security, to be adopted in the coming months.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Strengthening EU economic security – From crisis response to proactive anticipation: Joining the dots for a resilient economy‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.