European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Antonio Vale.

Introduction

The past few years have seen considerable interest in generative AI, particularly large language models (LLMs). This has translated into massive investment amounting to hundreds of billions of euros per year, especially in the US, in AI data centres designed around Graphics Processing Unit (GPU)-based platforms. Such breakneck expansion is increasingly running into constraints, particularly with regard to electricity availability.

Running AI models requires large amounts of power (as well as water, much of which is used to produce the electricity required), with data centres responsible for 1.5 % of global electricity consumption (2 % in the EU) and growing at 12 % annually. Moreover, they are often geographically concentrated, for example in Ireland, where they account for over 20 % of electricity consumption. Future scenarios suggest that this demand could continue to increase rapidly, although this should be taken with the caveat that investment in AI might be a bubble, LLMs may be supplanted by other models with different compute needs, and chip design innovations beyond GPUs may provide energy efficiency gains.

This situation has given rise to the idea of deploying compute in space to take advantage of the free, abundant solar energy. Originally focused on orbital processing of observational data and space mission support, the concept has rapidly evolved into the deployment of AI data centres in orbit to service ground-based needs. Recently, the strongest push has come from the US, with the merger between SpaceX and xAI linked to a request to put a million satellites in orbit, as well as interest from Google with project Suncatcher, and startups such as Starcloud and Axiom. Meanwhile, China has also launched pilot satellites intended to be the first in a future constellation, and in the EU the Horizon Europe-supported ASCEND project has concluded a feasibility study, aiming towards an operational system from 2030.

Potential impacts and developments

Launch costs represent a key constraint for any orbital infrastructure. The introduction of reusable rockets has led to a considerable decrease in recent times, to around several thousand euros per kilo of payload. This reduction is expected to continue thanks to improved heavy rockets and reusable second stages, with the European Space Agency (ESA) aiming for €280/kg with a new super-heavy lift launcher. Most ideas for future space data centres would involve either large constellations or modular construction, allowing build-up to occur over time. Even so, this would require a very high launch cadence, with a complete data centre likely needing upwards of one hundred launches, followed by a significant proportion yearly to replace satellites at end of life; this compares to around 300 space launches overall in 2025.

The main attraction of placing data centres in space is solar power: for objects located above the atmosphere, insolation (incoming solar radiation) can be several times greater than on the ground. The ideal choice would be a terminator sun-synchronous orbit, allowing satellites to keep pace with the dawn/dusk line and ensuring constant solar exposure on one side, while keeping the other dark to assist with cooling. Solar panels would need to be very large – up to a gargantuan 4 km per side, as envisaged by Starcloud for a 5 GW data centre; a small satellite with the equivalent of a server rack might make do with a more manageable 60 m2 and 28 kW, as deployed on the International Space Station (ISS). Newer thin-film solar panel technology may help keep the weight down.

If power is the main advantage, cooling is possibly the major challenge. Although space is cold, it is also a vacuum, meaning cooling can only take place via radiative emission. This can be achieved by coupling a coolant loop (the ISS uses ammonia) with large radiators pointing towards deep space, which would be of comparable size to the solar panels but considerably heavier. The spacecraft’s cooling system is particularly vulnerable: any rupture, for example from a meteoroid strike, can cause coolant loss and damage the electronic systems. Given radiative cooling scales as the fourth power of temperature, further advances may come from lighter radiators running at higher temperatures. The other main concern in orbit is radiation, which can cause random bit flips and whose impact over time can lead to a degradation of performance or malfunction. Recent work from Google and Starcloud, which has deployed a NVIDIA H100 chip in orbit, has given promising indications, but fault tolerance, error correction, redundancy (deliberate duplication of critical components or systems), and shielding are all required.

Any assembly or maintenance would pose a significant challenge. Heavy AI workloads can lead to relatively high chip failure rates, which, added to radiation effects, imply short lifespans of a few years. Depending on the concept, this would require redundancy or satellite replacement, with a weight or cost penalty, or else robotic maintenance in orbit, which still needs further development. Finally, there is the issue of communications. Large amounts of data from the ground, to be used for training, may simply be physically carried by ‘data shuttles‘, while server-side communications, needing high data rates, could use optical communication between satellites, in turn implying close proximity. Google’s plans, for example, envisage satellites hundreds of metres apart. With space debris and collisions being a critical issue, this would represent a major challenge in terms of the coordination of collision avoidance manoeuvres, which may be frequent given the sizes of the constellations being proposed.

Anticipatory policymaking

Deploying data centres in space poses important challenges, but does not appear to face insurmountable technical barriers and might be feasible even with current technology. The main hurdle is rather economic, with a mildly optimistic estimate placing near-future costs around three times those on the ground, although opinions are divided on whether such optimism is justified or not. Further innovation could help, with the evolution of launch costs a key determinant. This may lead to interesting synergies, with further technological and skills development benefiting other potential uses of space such as space-based solar power.

The current legal framework leaves space data centres in a grey zone: the United Nations’ Outer Space Treaty establishes no sovereignty in outer space, with launch states (a concept that presents its own issues) instead bearing responsibility and liability for space activities. Drafted in the 1960s, this treaty lacks explicit provisions regarding data. Article VIII of the treaty refers to jurisdiction over a space ‘object, and over any personnel thereof’, which has prompted some stakeholders to urge regulators to explicitly consider the concept of a ‘digital flag state’. Furthermore, relevant laws and treaties relying on the territorial location of data may require clarification. Examples include the GDPR‘s concept of transfers of personal data to third countries and the recently signed UN Convention against Cybercrime, which includes ships and aircraft but not satellites under its jurisdictional provisions. Likewise, legislation dealing with space activities may need to account for considerable processing of data originating from the ground rather than space. Extending the definition of space-based data and primary providers of space-based data in the Space Act, for example, could offer additional clarity. The overall situation is complex, involving potential multiple layers of overlapping jurisdiction. In the future, in-orbit assembly and AI agents risk further increasing this complexity. These issues highlight that extraterritorial application, as conceived in the GDPR or the Space Act, will be a crucial factor in the future regulation of space data centres.

The potential scale of orbital data centres is also important to consider. A 1 GW data centre, similar in scale to the largest under construction on the ground, could require a total payload upwards of 10 000 tons, or over three times the total payload mass launched in 2025. This risks potential infrastructure bottlenecks, such as the limited availability of launch facilities or liquid oxygen. It also raises sustainability questions, given that lifetime emissions may be larger than on the ground. Furthermore, the pollution of the upper atmosphere that would be caused by de-orbiting large numbers of end-of-life satellites is still poorly understood. Finally, it poses a critical, geopolitically relevant question regarding orbital congestion, as international regulation of slots in low Earth orbit is currently only done indirectly through radio spectrum assignment by the International Telecommunications Union, generally on a first-come, first-served basis.

What ifs are two-page-long publications about new or emerging technologies aiming to accurately summarise the scientific state-of-the art in an accessible and engaging manner. They further consider the impacts such technologies may have – on society, the environment and the economy, among others – and how the European Parliament may react to them. As such, they do not aim to be and cannot be prescriptive, but serve primarily as background material for the Members and staff of the European Parliament to assist them in their parliamentary work.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘What if AI data centres were put in space?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marie Lecerf.

The Roma are Europe’s largest ethnic minority. A significant number of Roma people live in very poor socio-economic conditions. The social exclusion, discrimination and segregation they face are mutually reinforcing. Their restricted access to education and difficulties entering the labour market result in low income and poor health compared with non-Roma people.

Since the mid-1990s, the EU has been stressing the need for better Roma inclusion. In 2011, an EU framework for national Roma integration strategies up to 2020 was launched to tackle their socio-economic exclusion and discrimination. This was followed in October 2020 by the EU Roma strategic framework for equality, inclusion and participation 2020-2030, complemented by the Council’s March 2021 recommendation promoting national strategic frameworks and the October 2023 European Council conclusions on desegregated housing and segregated settlements. The EU continues to support Member States through structural and investment funds with the 2021-2027 Common Provisions Regulation emphasising alignment with European Semester recommendations and the European Pillar of Social Rights.

In parallel, the EU anti-racism action plan 2020-2025, succeeded by the EU anti-racism strategy 2026-2030, strengthened enforcement of anti-discrimination law, while the Fundamental Rights Agency’s Roma survey 2024 confirms modest progress but warns of shortfalls against 2030 targets in poverty, housing, employment, education and discrimination.

Issues relating to the promotion of democratic values and practices, as well as economic, social and cultural rights for Roma people, have received particular attention from civil society organisations. The European Parliament has consistently advocated for Roma inclusion since the 1990s, with recent resolutions and debates targeting implementation gaps, antigypsyism, child segregation, women’s rights and the new anti-racism strategy.

This is a further update of a briefing originally published in May 2021; the previous update was in March 2025.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Understanding EU action on Roma inclusion‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Szczepański.

The world has changed since the European Union adopted its first economic security strategy in 2023. An increasingly confrontational geopolitical environment and the possibility of coercive behaviour from both China and the United States require a longer term strategy to reduce dependencies as well as a short-term ability to react swiftly to threats. On 3 December 2025, the European Commission adopted its new communication on economic security aiming to switch up a gear, from finding ad-hoc responses to crises based on risk identification, to proactive risk anticipation and mitigation. This new approach also focuses on providing clarity on the strategic and coherent use of the many instruments already available in the EU toolbox.

Aiming for a safer and more resilient EU economy, the Commission’s communication proposes ways to protect and develop strategic industries and reduce the EU’s vulnerabilities to coercion and other disruption. To build a solid knowledge base for informed decision-making and common understanding of risks and responses, the approach seeks to strengthen data gathering, analysis and overall economic security policy governance, with increased public and private stakeholder participation. To boost coherence, the Commission wants to adapt existing policy tools to deployment with a clear aim of managing economic security risks, taking possible impacts across policies into account. The Commission will seek to close existing security gaps with new instruments, such as the revised Blocking Statute.

The communication met with mixed reactions from the expert community, with both praise for taking the much needed step in the right direction, as well as criticisism for its insufficient response to the stark challenges facing the EU. The European Parliament is preparing its opinion on the role of trade in strengthening the EU’s economic security, to be adopted in the coming months.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Strengthening EU economic security – From crisis response to proactive anticipation: Joining the dots for a resilient economy‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Also known as the Normandy Index, the Peace and Security Index ranks 138 countries and the 27 European Union Member States as a whole, based on specific threats to peace in each. Eleven indicators gather data on the security, economic and social situation. The indicators are identified using the EU global strategy and strategic compass, a tool EU policymakers use to assess countries at risk and in need of EU assistance.

In her foreword to the latest edition of the Index, President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola, said ‘a clear understanding of the threats to peace, security and democracy around the world is crucial. This makes the Normandy Index a valuable tool for navigating today’s world’.

The results of the 2025 exercise suggest the level of threats to peace in the world is the highest in the seven years since the index began, confirming declining trends in global security resulting from the war in Ukraine, multiple crises, conflicts and geopolitical rivalry, including those linked to economic, digital and energy dimensions. Among the top three most peaceful countries are Switzerland, Iceland and Norway.

The most fragile countries are the Central African Republic, Afghanistan and Somalia. Geopolitical crisis in the European neighbourhood resulted in a fall in the EU‑27’s overall global ranking of 3 places in 2024. In 2025, the EU‑27 ranking remains the same as the previous year (10th globally). After a slight improvement from 2019 to 2022, the global peace profile (5.74 average in 2023‑2024) has also declined in the past year to 5.79 – unsurprisingly given current geopolitical tensions (10 is the highest mark).

According to the Index’s lead author, Branislav Stanicek, the 2025 edition also reflects the changed dynamics of today’s international conflicts, which particularly affect energy security and fiscal policies. He stresses: ‘International actions such as restrictive measures against Russian Federation clearly affected governmental revenue and suggests a tightening of the Russian government’s fiscal stance’. In 2025, Russia fell 16 positions down the Index, to 124th globally. However, increased sovereign debt, measured by economic indicator, also demonstrates a certain vulnerability within EU‑27 and Western democracies. Nevertheless, Professor Steve Hanke of Johns Hopkins University argues ‘Public debt is just a deferred tax. It will be paid by future taxpayers, either through an explicit tax increase or by inflation’.

Derived from the Index, 63 individual country case studies provide a picture of the state of peace in the world today. An online, interactive version of the Index allows data comparison across countries, regions and timeline. In 2023, the Index won the Forbes Social Communication Award (in the domain of public communication of peace and security).

The Normandy Index differs from other indices in that it adopts an approach tailored by and to EU action. It also defines conflict and the numerous stages between perfect peace and total war as a product of factors linked to the main threats identified by the EU in its external action strategy. The EU global strategy identifies the following 11 threats as the current main challenges to peace and security.  

Trends towards inflation, trade, energy disruption and weaker economies, underway since 2021, continued in 2025. Global GDP growth slowed in 2022 to 3.2 %, more than 1 percentage point less than expected at the end of 2021, mainly weighed down by Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine. Following 2.6 % growth in 2023 and sub-trend global growth of 2.8 % in 2024, global growth is projected to reach 3.2 % in 2025 and 3.1 % in 2026. At the same time, Kristalina Georgieva, managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), issued a stark warning in October 2025 about the mounting risks facing the global economy: ‘buckle up: uncertainty is the new normal’.

Read the complete study on ‘Mapping threats to peace and democracy worldwide: Normandy Index 2025‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Tristan Marcelin.

Introduction Some history

The concept of a regulatory sandbox already existed before the AI Act. According to Arto Lanamäki et al., it first emerged in 2016 with the United Kingdom’s financial technology (fintech) regulation. Studies suggest that regulatory sandboxes have reduced legal uncertainty and raised fintech venture investment. A 2022 EPRS publication also lists other sectors where regulatory sandboxes have emerged as test beds, including transport, energy, telecommunications and health. It adds that the UK and Norway have already established regulatory sandboxes for AI products. It also notes that the European Parliament has called for introducing regulatory sandboxes in several resolutions since 2019.

Definition

AI regulatory sandboxes were first introduced in the proposal for a regulation on artificial intelligence (AI Act) published by the European Commission in April 2021. The final version of the AI Act, adopted in 2024, defines an AI regulatory sandbox as ‘a controlled framework set up by a competent authority which offers providers or prospective providers of AI systems the possibility to develop, train, validate and test, where appropriate in real-world conditions, an innovative AI system, pursuant to a sandbox plan for a limited time under regulatory supervision’.

Benefits and risks

Regulatory sandboxes offer three main benefits: they can help regulators develop better policies, innovators to develop compliant AI products, and consumers by bringing safer products on to the market. In a 2020 report, the OECD found they may facilitate dialogue between authorities and new players entering the market. Another report from the World Bank confirms these benefits based on its study of the fintech sector. However, the World Bank report also warns of implementation risks, where additional administrative burdens and lack of resources could outweigh the benefits.

AI Act regulatory sandboxes Obligations on Member States

EU Member States are required to ensure their national competent authorities establish, or participate in, at least one AI regulatory sandbox, which should be operational by 2 August 2026. The AI regulatory sandboxes aim to improve legal certainty to achieve regulatory compliance, support sharing of best practices through fostering cooperation, innovation and competitiveness, contribute to evidence-based regulatory learning and speed up access to the single market. They are accessible on a voluntary basis and include specific measures targeted at SMEs and start-ups.

Implementation and coordination

The AI Act established a hybrid enforcement system whereby the Commission and the European AI board assist Member States in setting up their AI regulatory sandboxes. National competent authorities are also obliged to coordinate with and report to EU‑level entities, produce guidance, supervision and support within the sandboxes, and facilitate cross-border cooperation. Meanwhile, the Commission is required to adopt secondary legislation that specifies how the AI Act is to be implemented and gives details of terms and conditions and how to access sandboxes. The European Data Protection Supervisor may also establish an AI regulatory sandbox for EU institutions.

Challenges Design

Claudio Novelli et al. describe three phases of regulatory sandboxes: pre-testing, testing and post-testing. Designing a sandbox involves defining the variables of each phase, such as the eligibility criteria (pre-testing), the level of realism and replication of oversight (testing), and the exit pathway and streamlined conformity assessments (post-testing). They believe the right balance must be struck between each variable to attract innovators and ensure compliance. For instance, eligibility criteria should permit different situations and lead to a tailored track when using the sandbox, since AI systems in early-stage development do not need the same support as those in late-stage development.

Fragmentation

The rules for AI systems are enforced at Member State level through national authorities. While Member States must ensure that authorities have enough resources to set up and run their sandboxes, fragmented enforcement could result in some authorities receiving more resources than others, leading to uneven capacities. AI providers might therefore intentionally choose less stringent sandboxes, risking inconsistencies in the act’s enforcement.

Time

Challenges related to the design and fragmented implementation are compounded by additional time constraints. The AI Act provisions related to regulatory sandboxes will take effect from 2 August 2026. Since the Commission has not yet adopted any implementing acts providing guidance, Member States have to act independently to design their sandboxes, recruit and train staff, and build capacity.

State of play and next steps National implementation

In August 2025, Deirdre Ahern noted that out of the 27 Member States, only one – Spain – has an AI regulatory sandbox which is up and running. Five are actively implementing their sandboxes, four have declared their intention to do so and 16 have not yet communicated their plans. Spain seems to be the most advanced Member State currently, as its sandbox opened in 2025 and began hosting 12 high-risk AI systems. This initial experience enabled the Spanish authority, AESIA, to publish guidelines in December 2025 to support the implementation and compliance of systems with the AI Act. The act further obliges the Commission to develop a single, dedicated interface containing all relevant information on AI regulatory sandboxes to allow stakeholders to interact with them.

Secondary legislation and omnibus

Under the AI Act, the Commission must adopt implementing acts specifying how to establish, develop, implement, operate and supervise the sandboxes. In December 2025, the Commission published a draft version and requested feedback by January 2026. In the recitals of the draft, the Commission insists on the need to ensure consistent implementation of the rules. In addition to the implementing acts, a new regulation known as the digital omnibus on AI has been proposed by the Commission to amend the AI Act. The proposal suggests granting the Commission the right to create an EU‑level AI regulatory sandbox for AI systems under its supervision and strengthen coordination between national sandboxes. As of March 2025, the relevant European Parliament committees are engaged in examining the proposal.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘AI regulatory sandboxes: State of play and implementation challenges‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Kamil Baraník.

European political parties (‘europarties’) emerged in the 1970s, preceding the first direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979. The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 granted them legal recognition; however, it was only in 2004 that EU law defined their status, set establishment criteria, and provided independent funding. The most recent regulatory change in 2025 emphasised protecting EU values, strengthening safeguards against foreign interference, and updating transparency and financing requirements. Europarties’ influence depends on balancing European and national interests. Ongoing deliberations seek to enhance europarties’ resilience, and their independence from national politics, reflecting the broader debate on the balance of power between Member States and EU institutions. This search for equilibrium continues to drive significant academic and political discussion.

Read the complete briefing on ‘European political parties‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Fergurson and Katarzyna Sochacka.

European Union–United States trade deal

Against a background of trade tariff instability, and to pave the way for negotiations with the Council on implementing the 2025 framework agreement between the EU and the United States (the ‘Turnberry deal’), Parliament debated and adopted its first-reading position on Committee on International Trade (INTA) reports on the two regulations proposed. The report on the main proposal covers EU industrial tariff liberalisation/agricultural tariff rate quotas, proposing a ‘sunset’ date of 31 March 2028, defensive measures in case of additional demands, and a safeguard clause. The second report, which deals specifically with trade in lobster, proposes a ‘sunset’ date of 31 December 2028, and includes defensive measures in case of US imposition of additional tariffs, breaches of human rights or threats to EU security interests. Both reports propose to evaluate the situation six months after implementation of the EU-US framework agreement.

Deposit protection and early intervention measures

Members remain determined to protect taxpayers from the consequences of failed banking institutions. A joint debate took place on deposit protection and early intervention measures, followed by a vote on agreed texts on a package of proposals that seek to further harmonise the current EU bank crisis management and deposit insurance framework. The agreements would facilitate access to industry support for failing banks, with resort to national deposit guarantee schemes set as a last resort. They also clarify the criteria for choosing whether to liquidate or rescue a bank and retain the current two-tier system for deposit protection.

Combating corruption

Following lengthy negotiations, Members approved a provisional agreement on the proposed directive to combat corruption. Aimed at developing a more robust legal and policy framework, the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs’ report on the proposal called for an extended definition of a ‘public official’ potentially subject to criminal proceedings in the case of ‘abuse of function’, and to introduce new categories of offence. It also sought enhanced rights for the public to participate in corruption-related proceedings and called for EU countries to adopt anti-corruption strategies. Parliament’s recommendations shaped the compromise text in this latter respect, but with limited extensions to definitions.

Digital omnibus on artificial intelligence

The development and use of artificial intelligence (AI) is changing many aspects of daily life, and at considerable speed. The EU’s flagship Artificial Intelligence Act introduced measures to encourage development whilst also protecting citizens. However, setting up the governance structure to apply the act takes time. To ensure safe AI development can continue in the interim, Members adopted Parliament’s position for trilogue negotiations on proposed measures to simplify application of the AI Act. A report from Parliament’s Committees on Internal Market and Consumer Protection and on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs agrees with the Council position that fixed deadlines should be set for delaying the rules governing high-risk AI systems. The report also introduces a targeted ban on AI generation of non-consensual sexual and intimate content.

Global gateway

The EU’s global gateway strategy seeks to promote clean and secure energy connections by working with international partners worldwide. Members debated and adopted an own-initiative report from the Committees on Foreign Affairs (AFET) and on Development (DEVE), assessing the first four years of the strategy’s implementation. While noting the funding has been successfully spent on promoting sustainable and inclusive growth in non-EU countries, the report nevertheless proposes improvements. These include moving to a more demand-driven strategy, based on partners’ needs and greater private sector involvement. The committees recommend revising the governance structure for greater democratic legitimacy, and advocate simpler and more predictable financing, as well as avoiding global gateway projects exacerbating debt in third countries.

Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive

In the EU, citizens largely enjoy access to clean water. The EU’s urban wastewater legislation was updated in 2024, to bring it into line with the EU’s climate neutrality targets. The new Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive (UWWTD) introduced stricter requirements for urban wastewater treatment, water re-use and sanitation. Members posed an oral question to the Commission on the implementation of this directive, with Members debating how to uphold the ‘polluter pays’ principle without risking production of vital medicines, as the pharmaceutical industry is a major user of water resources. During negotiations on the file, Parliament insisted on measures to avoid unintended consequences for vital products like medicines and to promote the re-use of wastewater and plant modernisation.

European Citizens’ Initiative – ‘Ban on conversion practices in the European Union’

Against the backdrop of several national bans on conversion practices in EU countries, Parliament debated a European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI), with over one million signatures in support, calling for an EU-wide ban on conversion practices targeting LGBTIQ+ individuals. Conversion practices (also known as conversion ‘therapies’) are widely condemned as constituting torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, resulting in severe physical and psychological harm. The European Parliament firmly opposes conversion practices and has long denounced all forms of LGBTIQ+ discrimination.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

One decision to enter into interinstitutional negotiations from the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) on the common system for the return of third-country nationals staying illegally in the Union (Return Regulation), announced on 12 March 2026, was approved by vote.

This ‘at a glance’ note is intended to review some of the highlights of the plenary part-session, and notably to follow up on key dossiers identified by EPRS. It does not aim to be exhaustive. For more detailed information on specific files, please see other EPRS products, notably our ‘EU legislation in progress’ briefings, and the plenary minutes.

Read this ‘at a glance note’ on ‘Plenary round-up – March II 2026‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson with Áine Feeney

Members gather for their second plenary session in March 2026, to progress decisions on a number of important files. Representatives of the European Council and European Commission are expected to make statements on the conclusion of the leaders’ meeting of 19 March 2026, at which the European Union’s competitiveness and the situation in the Middle East, as well as continued support for Ukraine was discussed. The Council and Commission are also due to make statements on energy security, independence and supply in the current fraught geopolitical context, with a view to ensuring market stability and affordable energy for industry and citizens.

Against a background of trade tariff instability, and to pave the way for  negotiations with the Council on implementing the 2025 framework agreement between the EU and the United States (the ‘Turnberry deal’), Parliament is on Thursday set to consider its first-reading position on Committee on International Trade (INTA) reports on the two regulations proposed. The report on the main proposal covers EU industrial tariff liberalisation/agricultural tariff rate quotas, proposing a ‘sunset’ date of 31 March 2028, defensive measures in case of additional demands, and a safeguard clause. The second report, which deals specifically with trade in lobster, proposes a ‘sunset’ date of 31 December 2028, and includes defensive measures in case of US imposition of additional tariffs, breaches of human rights or threats to EU security interests. Both reports propose to evaluate the situation six months following implementation of the EU-US framework agreement.

Harking back to an earlier, financial, crisis, Members remain determined to protect taxpayers from the consequences of failed banking institutions. A debate is therefore scheduled for Wednesday afternoon on deposit protection and early intervention measures, with a vote scheduled on agreed texts on a package of proposals that seek to further harmonise the current EU bank crisis management and deposit insurance framework. The agreements would facilitate access to industry support for failing banks, with resort to national deposit guarantee schemes set as a last resort. They also clarify the criteria for choosing whether to liquidate or rescue a bank and retain the current two-tier system for deposit protection.

The development and use of artificial intelligence (AI) is changing many aspects of daily life, and at considerable speed. The EU’s flagship Artificial Intelligence Act introduced measures to encourage development whilst also protecting citizens. However, setting up the governance structure to apply the act takes time. To ensure safe AI development can continue in the interim, Members are due to vote on Thursday to set Parliament’s position for negotiations on proposed measures to simplify application of the AI Act. A report from Parliament’s Committees on Internal Market and Consumer Protection and on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs agrees with the Council proposal that fixed deadlines should be set for delaying the rules governing high-risk AI systems. The report also introduces a targeted ban on AI generation of non-consensual sexual and intimate content.

Following lengthy negotiations, Members are expected to consider a provisional agreement on the proposed directive to combat corruption on Wednesday. Aimed at developing a more robust legal and policy framework, the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs’ report on the proposal called for an extended definition of a ‘public official’ subject to criminal proceedings in the case of ‘abuse of function’, and to introduce new categories of offence. It also sought enhanced rights for the public to participate in corruption-related proceedings and called for  EU countries to adopt anti-corruption strategies. Parliament’s recommendations shaped the compromise text in this latter respect, but with limited extensions to definitions.

In the EU, citizens largely enjoy access to clean water. The EU’s urban wastewater legislation was updated in 2024, to bring it into line with the EU’s climate neutrality targets. The new Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive (UWWTD) introduced stricter requirements for urban wastewater treatment, water re-use and sanitation. An oral question to the Commission is tabled for Thursday morning on the implementation of this file. The question is likely to raise debate on how to uphold the ‘polluter pays’ principle without risking production of vital medicines, as the pharmaceutical industry is a major user of water resources. During negotiations on the file, Parliament insisted on measures to avoid unintended consequences for vital products like medicines and to promote the re-use of wastewater and plant modernisation.

The EU’s global gateway strategy seeks to promote clean and secure energy connections by working with international partners worldwide. On Thursday morning, Members are due to consider a report from the Committees on Foreign Affairs (AFET) and on Development (DEVE), assessing the first four years of the strategy’s implementation. While noting the funding has been successfully spent on promoting sustainable and inclusive growth in non-EU countries, the report nevertheless proposes improvements. These include moving to a more demand-driven strategy, based on partners’ needs and greater private sector involvement. The committees recommend revising the governance structure for greater democratic legitimacy, and advocate simpler and more predictable financing, as well as avoiding global gateway projects exacerbating debt in third countries.

Against the backdrop of several national bans on conversion practices in EU countries, on Wednesday, Parliament is set to discuss a European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI), with over one million signatures in support, calling for an EU-wide ban on conversion practices targeting LGBTIQ+ individuals. Conversion practices (also known as conversion ‘therapies’) are widely condemned as constituting torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, resulting in severe physical and psychological harm. The European Parliament firmly opposes conversion practices and has long denounced all forms of LGBTIQ+ discrimination.

European Parliament Plenary Session March II 2026 – agenda

• Implementing the EU tariff commitments under the 2025 EU-US Framework Agreement
• Deposit protection and early intervention measures
• Parliament’s emerging position on the Digital Omnibus on AI
• Directive on combating corruption
• Implementation of the Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive
• Global Gateway – Past impacts, future orientation
• European Citizens’ Initiative ‘Ban on conversion practices in the European Union’

Written by Anja Radjenovic.

The safe third country (STC) concept is well established in international asylum policies. According to the concept, certain migrants should not be granted protection in the country where they have applied for it. Instead, they may be returned, or transferred, to a country where they could have found, or can find, international protection. Amid ongoing EU-level discussions on safe third country rules, in 2018 the United Nations Refugee Agency developed legal considerations on safe third countries.

Within the framework of the body of EU law on asylum, the STC concept is based on the assumption that certain third (i.e. non-EU) countries can be designated as safe for applicants seeking international protection, under specific conditions. The concept builds on cooperation with third countries in a bid to reduce irregular arrivals and increase return rates. It seeks to speed up the processing of the claims of asylum applicants arriving from safe third countries, to prevent overburdening national asylum systems.

The recently adopted Asylum Procedure Regulation provides for broader applicability of safe country clauses. This concerns, in particular, four aspects: (i) the safety assessment when applying the STC concept; (ii) the interpretation of the ‘connection requirement’, i.e. the connection between an asylum seeker and a third country when readmitting an applicant to a designated STC; (iii) the option to designate a third country as safe with territorial limitations or to exclude certain vulnerable groups from such a designation; and (iv) the creation of a common EU list of STCs in addition to national lists. The regulation was amended in February 2026, modifying rules on applications from STCs.

The success of any STC scheme relies on third countries’ cooperation, something that can be challenging to obtain. To counter criticisms of burden shifting and to boost the viability of STC schemes, the EU must demonstrate solidarity through burden sharing. Furthermore, many potentially safe third countries lack asylum laws and administrative frameworks. Consequently, they would likely require substantial support from external partners.

This is an update of a 2024 EPRS briefing.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Safe third country concept in the EU pact on migration and asylum‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Sasa Butorac and Agnieszka Widuto.

Europe’s key instrument to achieving energy independence and increasing competitiveness lies in the energy transition and, specifically, in boosting the generation capacity of renewable sources of energy. Following the European Green Deal and ‘fit for 55’ initiatives, the EU legislative framework for achieving this is largely in place. Significant progress has been made, in particular since the launch of the REPowerEU initiative in May 2022 in the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Member States have increased the share of renewables in their energy mix, and the EU is consistently progressing towards its target of a 42.5 % share of renewables in final energy consumption by 2030. The share of renewables in sectors such as electricity (47.5 % of final energy consumption in this sector), heating and cooling (26.7 %) and transport (11.2 %) is also increasing, although progress has been fastest in terms of electricity. The main challenges to an accelerated deployment of renewables can be identified as the cost of capital, timely development of the grids, and the complex and lengthy permitting procedures both at European and national level.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Renewable energy in the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Stefano De Luca.

CONTEXT

Technologies are evolving rapidly, data traffic is growing significantly, and demand for gigabit connectivity is increasing. Modern and sustainable digital infrastructures for connectivity and computing are critical enablers for digitalisation and for both industrial competitiveness and for society. High-quality, secure and resilient connectivity is needed, everywhere and for everybody in the European Union. The EU has set non-binding ‘digital decade’ targets to be reached by 2030. These include providing all EU households with access to a fixed gigabit network (with a capacity of 1 Gigabit per second – Gbps) and ensuring that all populated areas are covered by next-generation, high-speed wireless networks with performance at least equivalent to that of 5G.

On 21 January 2026, the European Commission published a proposal for a digital networks act. The proposed regulation aims to consolidate sector-specific legislation currently set out, inter alia, in the European Electronic Communications Code (EECC), the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC) Regulation, the Open Internet Regulation, the ePrivacy Directive and the radio spectrum policy programme. By replacing directives with a regulation, the Commission aims to ensure uniform application of telecoms rules across all Member States.

LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL

2026/0013(COD) – Proposal for a regulation on digital networks, amending Regulation (EU) 2015/2120, Directive 2002/58/EC and Decision No 676/2002/EC and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1971, Directive (EU) 2018/1972 and Decision No 243/2012/EU (Digital Networks Act) – COM(2026) 0016 final, 21.01.2026.

NEXT STEPS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

For the latest developments in this legislative procedure, see the Legislative Train Schedule.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Digital networks act legislation‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Tristan Marcelin.

AI rules and governance

The AI Act was adopted by the European Parliament and the Council in 2024 to improve the functioning of the internal market, promote the uptake of human-centric and trustworthy AI, ensure a high level of protection against the harmful effects of AI systems and support innovation.

Rules for AI systems and GPAI models

The AI Act regulates AI systems, which are machine-based systems designed to operate with a certain degree of autonomy and generate outputs from the inputs they receive. The regulation applies a risk-based approach to AI systems, differentiating between ‘unacceptable risks’, ‘high risks’, ‘transparency risks’ and ‘minimal risks’. While prohibited AI systems are not allowed in the internal market, providers, deployers, importers and distributors of high-risk AI (HRAI) systems are under certain obligations, including ensuring that systems are compliant and meet particular standards.

The AI Act also regulates general-purpose AI (GPAI) models, which are capable of performing a wide range of tasks and being integrated into a variety of systems or applications. The GPAI definition includes generative AI models, such as OpenAI’s GPT‑5, Google’s Gemini 3 and Mistral Large 3. The AI Act considers that some GPAI models pose systemic risks (such as negative effects on democratic processes or on public and economic security) if they reach a defined level of capability or are designated as such by the European Commission. GPAI models with systemic risks are subject to extra requirements, such as model evaluation and risk assessment.

Governance framework

The AI Act establishes a hybrid enforcement model with a centralised and a decentralised part. The risk-based approach for AI systems is enforced at national level with support and advice from centralised entities, including the European Commission. Conversely, GPAI rules are exclusively supervised and enforced by the Commission. However, researchers note that the decentralised pattern remains dominant in the AI Act, potentially leading to challenges around uneven enforcement in the EU.

This model differs from purely decentralised or other hybrid models. For instance, under the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the data protection rules are in principle subject to decentralised enforcement, but data protection authorities must cooperate in accordance with the ‘one-stop shop mechanism‘ and the new GDPR procedural rules in cross-border cases. Moreover, the European Data Protection Board can issue general guidance and opinions.

Enforcement at national level

The AI Act obliges Member States to designate two types of authority – at least one notifying authority and a market surveillance authority. Both authorities have distinct roles within the enforcement process and its timeline. The national market surveillance authority also functions as the single point of contact at national level. Member States were required to designate their competent authorities and single points of contact by 2 August 2025.

The European Commission maintains a list of single points of contact for all Member States. As of March 2026, the list comprised eight single contact points, out of 27.

Notifying authority, conformity assessment body and notified body

The notifying authority is responsible for setting up and carrying out the necessary ex‑ante procedures for assessing HRAI systems before they enter the EU market. However, the notifying authority does not conduct the assessment itself but instead designates conformity assessment bodies to carry out the task. Notifying authorities must inform the Commission and other Member States once the conformity assessment body has been designated, which then becomes a ‘notified body’. Notified bodies must be independent of the provider and operator of the HRAI system they assess.

Market surveillance authority

The market surveillance authority performs ex‑post checks once AI systems have been placed on the internal market. Its powers include requesting documents, evaluating systems and imposing fines, if needed. However, a separate authority may be in charge of ex‑post checking in certain situations, such as controlling HRAI systems for financial institutions or law enforcement.

Enforcement at EU level

The AI Act has created a number of EU‑level entities to assist, support and advise Member States and the Commission (which runs the AI Office) in their enforcement tasks.

AI Office

The AI Office is defined by the AI Act as the ‘Commission’s function of contributing to the implementation, monitoring and supervision of AI systems and general-purpose AI models, and AI governance’. It has the sole authority to enforce the AI Act provisions on GPAI models. It is also responsible for soft instruments, such as codes of practice, guidelines and communications that shape the regulation’s implementation

Digital omnibus on AI proposal – further centralisation
The digital omnibus on AI, put forward in November 2025 by the Commission, is a set of amendments to the AI Act to further centralise its enforcement. If European co-legislators adopt the proposal in its current state, the AI Office would supervise the compliance of AI systems integrated into very large online platforms (VLOPs) or very large search engines (VLOSEs), as defined under the Digital Services Act, as well as AI systems based on GPAI models where the system and model come from the same provider.

European AI board

The European AI board is composed of one representative per Member State, with the European Data Protection Supervisor and the AI Office as observers. According to researchers, the board’s tasks are limited to advisory and coordinating functions, including ‘facilitating cooperation among national competent authorities, aggregating and disseminating technical and regulatory expertise among Member States, and offering guidance on the AI Act’s implementation’.

Scientific panel of independent experts

The AI Act defines the scientific panel as a panel of experts selected by the Commission on the basis of up-to-date scientific and technical expertise in the field of AI. The panel is aimed at centralising expertise to advise and support the AI Office, as well as national market surveillance authorities at their request.

AI advisory forum

The AI advisory forum comprises stakeholders from industry, start-ups, SMEs, civil society and academia. The AI Act tasks the forum with providing technical expertise, advising the board and the Commission and contributing to their tasks under the regulation.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Enforcement of the AI Act‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ralf Drachenberg, Annastiina Papunen and Astrid Worum.

The main aims will now be to overcome the two-country veto on the Ukraine loan, and to define a common approach to a rapidly evolving situation in the Middle East – notably to prevent escalation, promote a diplomatic path to end the crisis and provide support to partner countries in the region, while addressing the possible impact on global energy security. In that context, the European Council will discuss the Middle East as well as multilateralism with the UN Secretary General, António Guterres. However, despite a probable change of focus, competitiveness will feature prominently in the European Council conclusions and provide a high degree of detail, probably going beyond the EU leaders’ role of setting the general priorities. Other topics on the agenda are the next multiannual financial framework (MFF), European security and defence, and migration, which, due to time constraints, are expected to trigger less discussion. Following the European Council meeting, EU leaders will convene for a Euro Summit focusing on the economic situation in the EU, the international role of the euro and the savings and investment union.

1. General

As usual, European political parties will hold pre-summit meetings with their respective affiliated EU leaders. Additionally, a growing group of ‘like-minded’ countries on migration will meet prior to the start of the meeting. Following a similar pattern, a new group of around 20 EU leaders, which first met ahead of the informal retreat of 12 February 2026, had a videoconference on 10 March to discuss rising energy prices and competitiveness. The European Council itself will start with the address by the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola. This meeting will be the first for the new Dutch Prime Minister, Rob Jetten, and for Andrey Gyurov, the caretaker Prime Minister of Bulgaria.

2. European Council meeting Ukraine

A central topic for discussion at this European Council will be the enactment of the EU’s €90 billion loan to Ukraine, already agreed upon in December 2025, and the adoption of the 20th sanctions package against Russia. Following an exchange of views with the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, EU leaders will attempt to persuade the prime ministers of Hungary, Viktor Orbán and Slovakia, Robert Fico to lift their veto on the EU loan. To enable the urgently needed funding for Ukraine to be disbursed, several pieces of legislation, already signed off in Parliament, need to be adopted: 1) a regulation establishing the loan; 2) an amendment to the Ukraine Facility; and 3) a revision to the MFF, which requires a unanimous decision. In a letter to European Council President António Costa, Orbán indicated that his country would oppose the loan until the Druzhba pipeline, which provides Hungary and Slovakia with Russian crude oil and which was damaged by Russian air strikes, is operational again – a potentially dangerous and lengthy process.

Amid criticism of the two countries’ behaviour, which according to Costa does not comply with the principle of sincere cooperation, temporary alternatives were put forward, such as the Adriatic pipeline, an option rejected by Hungary and Slovakia, who cited high prices. Ahead of the meeting, attempts will be made to find a solution, notably in the context of the Paris Nuclear Energy Summit, while Nordic and Baltic countries are considering bilateral loans (not requiring EU approval) to cover Ukraine’s needs until May. Oil supply was also the justification given for vetoing the 20th sanctions package, which was due to mark the fourth anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Moreover, considering Ukraine’s increased financial needs, now estimated at €135 billion for 2026‑2027, EU leaders are likely to call on non-EU partners to cover an additional €30 billion – beyond the €15 billion secured from Western partners. With some fearing that the war in Iran could distract attention from Ukraine, EU leaders are expected to reiterate their unwavering support to the war-torn country – as did the presidents of the three EU institutions in a joint declaration adopted on the fourth anniversary of Russia’s invasion. They are likely to stress the need to ensure that the country has all the necessary military and financial means to continue fighting the aggressor.

Middle East

The concerning developments in Iran, which threaten the stability of the entire Middle East region, as well as the global implications of the conflict in Iran, are likely to be the focus of EU leaders’ attention. Leaders will probably attempt to develop a unified approach beyond the statement issued on behalf of the EU by the High Representative/Vice President, Kaja Kallas, on 1 March, and reaffirm their commitment to dialogue and to a diplomatic path to end the crisis.

Although in contact with countries in the region from day one, the Union has struggled to find a coordinated EU position since the joint Israeli-US attack on Iran on 28 February. Assessments of the situation have varied widely from one Member State to another. Some have criticised Israel and the US for breaching international law, notably Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, who called the military intervention ‘unjustified and dangerous‘, and French President Emmanuel Macron, who stated that the ‘military operations in Iran were conducted outside international law’. Others have shown reluctance to criticise the US-Israeli strikes on Iran, with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz not wanting ‘to lecture our allies’. Even Costa and Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, who released a joint statement on the day of the joint attack, pointing to the ‘extensive sanctions [adopted by the EU] in response to the actions of Iran’s murderous regime and the Revolutionary Guards’, were, according to some observers, said to be conveying differing messages. In a speech on 6 March, Costa indirectly denounced the joint attacks, stating that, even if Iran ‘bears responsibility for the root causes, … unilateralism can never be the path forward’, while von der Leyen was criticised for stating that a ‘credible transition in Iran is urgently needed’, which hints at regime change and could be understood as approval of the US‑Israeli attacks.

However, the extent of Iran’s response – with strikes on neighbouring countries, ‘an unjustifiable violation of their sovereignty’, drones targeting a military base in Cyprus, an EU Member State, and strikes imperilling critical supply chains and energy infrastructure across the Gulf – has highlighted how closely the EU’s security and interests are linked to the region. According to the Cyprus EU Council Presidency, the only way for the EU to address its ‘long-lasting concerns regarding Iran’, is by: 1) preventing the country from acquiring a nuclear weapon; and 2) ending its destabilising activities in the region. To that end, the European Council will aim to revive the diplomatic path to end the crisis and initiate ‘a collective effort, including through sanctions’, to achieve its objectives.

As Costa and von der Leyen did after a videoconference with Middle East Leaders, the European Council is likely to condemn in the strongest terms the ‘indiscriminate attacks by Iran against the countries of the region’, and convey its ‘full solidarity with the people of the region’. They will most certainly also express their ‘deep concern about the consequences of the regional crisis on Lebanon’, which could have a severe impact on civilians, triggering large-scale displacement as Israel is launching an extended military campaign against Hezbollah and has refused to halt its offensive to hold talks. In that context, von der Leyen announced the mobilisation of ReliefEU stocks to support some 130 000 persons in Lebanon, with a first flight on 10 March.

In the meantime, European countries have initiated elements of response and solidarity, individually or jointly. For instance, the E3 countries (France, Germany, and the UK) adopted a joint statement, in which they pledge to ‘work together with the U.S. and allies’ to ‘take steps to defend our interests and those of our allies in the region, potentially by enabling necessary and proportionate defensive action to destroy Iran’s capability to fire missiles and drones at their source’. EU Member States have also coordinated their action at several levels. First, by cooperating on the repatriation of their citizens stranded in the Middle East. Nineteen Member States have activated the rescEU mechanism under the European Civil Protection Mechanism. Second, by dispatching air and naval resources to protect Cyprus, with France, Greece, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands sending vessels. Third, by coordinating the dispatch of military resources to ensure freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, while France has taken the lead in building a coalition to secure shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. Moreover, the EU has announced a reinforcement of its maritime defensive operations ASPIDES and ATALANTA. Originally launched to protect commercial vessels from attacks by Iran-backed Houthis, the operations will now take on a new scope, as confirmed by Costa and von der Leyen.

Finally, the potential consequences on global energy security will be at the centre of discussions. As oil prices surged over US$119 a barrel, reaching levels not seen since 2022 (even if they have stabilised since), this point could be closely linked to the EU competitiveness agenda point (see below). Despite von der Leyen’s message stating that ‘Today, Europe’s energy system is cleaner, much more diverse – and much more stable than a few years ago’, and EU Member States indicating that they saw no immediate risk to supply from the crisis, there are fears that the Iran war could trigger a new energy crisis, raise energy prices and increase inflation. So much so, that G7 finance ministers held an emergency meeting and the International Energy Agency’s 32 members agreed to release 400 million barrels of emergency oil reserves to avoid shortages. Even if the Commission claims that the storage capacity remains stable, some sources point to gas storage levels standing at only 30 %, noting that the upcoming period is crucial for filling up for next winter.

Competitiveness and the single market

‘We are making 2026 the year of European competitiveness’, Costa stated, ‘just as we made 2025 the year of European defence’. Discussions on ways of delivering on this ambition will build heavily on the outcome of the informal competitiveness retreat in Alden Biesen, Belgium, on 12 February 2026. As the informal retreat did not produce conclusions, the results are expected to be formally turned into concrete decisions in the March conclusions.

One of the key instruments will be the ‘one Europe, one market agenda’, which the European Council is expected to launch to further integrate the single market in all its four freedoms. In order to deliver by the end of 2027, the agenda will be accompanied by a ‘one Europe, one market roadmap and action plan’ to be presented by the Commission, with clear goals and timelines. It was suggested that the roadmap be endorsed by the three institutions to showcase the political momentum and sense of urgency behind the project. The priority areas are expected to be: 1) completion of the single market; 2) simplification and reduction of red tape; 3) affordable energy prices and energy union by 2030; 4) industrial renewal and reduced dependencies; 5) a savings and investment union.

Several notable calls for action can be expected at the meeting. EU leaders are likely to discuss the EU-wide legal framework for companies, the 28th regime, due to be issued by the Commission on 18 March, and to call on the co-legislators to adopt the proposal by the end of 2026. They are expected to ask the Commission to conduct an in-depth review of the EU acquis and withdraw outdated provisions. As a contribution to the effort, Finland has sent a letter to the Commission listing possible ways of simplifying more than 40 pieces of EU legislation. EU leaders are also likely to ask the Commission to identify and map dependencies in strategic sectors. On investment, the European Council could mention the digital euro, and call for the co-legislators to conclude their work by the end of 2026.

With the energy transition and energy affordability very high on the EU leaders’ agenda, especially in the current volatile situation, some countries are pushing for a stronger answer to the crisis. While the European Council is expected to call for the swift implementation of the Energy Union 2030 agenda, it will also discuss ways of immediately alleviating the impact of energy prices on businesses and citizens, as outlined in the new citizens’ energy package. Addressing Parliament, von der Leyen mentioned: 1) the options being explored to reduce the impact of gas prices on electricity prices, such as State aid measures, subsidies or even caps on gas prices; 2) the need to improve the productivity of grids to allow more renewables to access them; 3) the room for action on taxes and levies on energy, which is a national competence; and 4) possible modernisation of the ETS.

Next multiannual financial framework

Following a ‘guiding discussion’ in March 2025 and an MFF ‘stocktaking’ in December 2025, EU leaders will have a brief discussion on the ‘horizontal issues’ of the next MFF to provide guidelines to the Council presidency for the preparation of the negotiating package, with indicative figures due by June 2026. Three aspects are likely to be addressed: 1) the MFF’s contribution to EU competitiveness; 2) the funding of EU ambitions; and 3) the new governance framework. The Leaders’ Agenda envisages an MFF agenda point at all four regular European Council meetings in 2026, with the MFF being the exclusive topic at the 26-27 November special meeting.

European defence and security

The European Council is expected to take stock of progress on the European defence readiness 2030 objectives, and possibly invite the Member States to ensure that concrete capability projects can be launched in the coming months. Moreover, EU leaders could invite the Council to update the 2022 threat assessment, based on a 360° analysis of threats to be prepared by the HR/VP.

Migration

EU leaders will take stock of the implementation of its previous conclusions on migration, with a letter from von der Leyen expected to inform the discussions. Leaders are likely to reiterate their call for Member States and EU institutions to intensify work on all strands of the EU’s approach to migration, notably on the external dimension and on comprehensive partnerships. They could also acknowledge the recent agreement in the Council on the EU-wide list of safe countries, or comment on possible migration waves resulting from the situation in the Middle East.

3. Euro Summit

The first Euro Summit meeting in 2026 is expected to focus on economic developments in the EU, the international role of the euro, and the savings and investment union. Ahead of the meeting, presidents Costa and von der Leyen met the European Central Bank President, Christine Lagarde, and the new Eurogroup President, Kyriakos Pierrakakis, the Greek Minister of Economy and Finance, to prepare discussions. Following the Eurogroup meeting on 9 March, Pierrakakis sent a letter to Costa bringing important points to the attention of the Euro Summit.

Read this briefing on ‘Outlook for the meetings of EU leaders, 19-20 March 2026‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clement Evroux.

Outcome of the association to Horizon Europe

Following the 2021 entry into force of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and the UK, on 1 January 2024 the UK became an associated country to Horizon Europe 2021‑2027. The scope of the association covers the whole programme except for the ‘accelerator’ instrument within the European Innovation Council.

According to the Horizon Europe dashboard, as of 9 January 2026, the number of UK projects participating in Horizon activities was 5 970, corresponding to 3 659 grant agreements, with a net contribution from the EU of €1.32 billion. Most UK participation focuses on pillar I of Horizon Europe (‘excellent science’), with 2 420 project entities, and pillar II (‘global challenges and European industrial competitiveness’), with 3 220 projects. Out of the total 5 970 projects, 907 involve a UK-based small or medium-sized enterprise.

The UK is the associated country with the highest number of Horizon Europe involvements, second only to Norway in terms of net EU contribution received.

Upcoming opportunities for cooperation in research and innovation

Against the backdrop of the multiannual financial framework (MFF) 2028‑2034, the legislative proposals for Horizon Europe and the Euratom training programme both offer relevant opportunities for continuing and strengthening the bilateral cooperation between the Union and the UK on research and innovation. Article 9 of the proposed Horizon Europe 2028‑2034 regulation provides for legal grounds to associate third countries, using a set of rules that largely follow Horizon 2021‑2027’s current guidelines.

However, the unveiling of the proposal on the European competitiveness fund could lead to the UK considering association to this programme under Article 11. This would ensure it remained eligible for the collaborative research activities scheduled under the four policy windows (clean transition and industrial decarbonisation; digital leadership; health, biotech, agriculture and bioeconomy; resilience, security, defence and space). Such activities would be successors to the six clusters that currently make up the second pillar of Horizon Europe. Furthermore, although the UK has chosen not to join the current Euratom training programme, the proposed regulation establishing the Euratom training programme 2028‑2032 includes (in Article 8) a legal ground for association, which would facilitate cooperation on nuclear fission and fusion.

European Parliament’s views on UK association to Horizon Europe

In February 2025, in a resolution on the assessment of the implementation of Horizon Europe, the European Parliament specifically welcomed the association of the UK and Switzerland to Horizon Europe. It recognises that UK and Swiss science and innovation are an integral part of the European science and innovation ecosystem, while also expressing its concern about the automatic rebate for the UK included in the amended protocol in 2023.

Future opportunities in brief

The relevant sectoral proposals in the MFF 2028‑2034 (Horizon Europe, the competitiveness fund and the Euratom training programme) include legal grounds for association tailored to specific countries and relevant joint goals for cooperation.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Research and innovation: State of play of EU-UK cooperation‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Maria Niestadt.

Introduction

Since the United Kingdom’s (UK) withdrawal from the EU in 2020, the parties have continued to cooperate on various digital policy issues. While their regulatory approaches differ in some areas – notably AI – their broader objectives are similar. Both the EU and the UK are pursuing greater digital sovereignty and enhanced global competitiveness, seeking to reduce their strategic dependencies in critical technologies in an increasingly adversarial geopolitical context.

Digital cooperation is evolving alongside efforts to strengthen and formalise the EU-UK partnership. For example, at the first EU-UK summit on 19 May 2025, the parties agreed to establish a new strategic partnership. While digital policy was not explicitly mentioned in the summit’s joint statement, the document outlining the security and defence partnership mentioned further cooperation on cyber issues, countering hybrid threats, strengthening the resilience of critical infrastructure, and addressing FIMI, including through coordination in multilateral fora, such as the G7.

Core framework

The EU-UK relationship is governed by the Withdrawal Agreement, the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), and the Windsor Framework. The TCA explicitly recognises the parties’ ‘right to regulate’ in their respective jurisdictions, while also expressing their wish to cooperate in areas of mutual interest. For example, they have committed to ensuring cross-border data flows, facilitating digital trade and holding regular cyber dialogues. According to Article 776 of the TCA, the parties have to review the implementation of the agreement in 2026, five years after its entry into force. Digital trade issues are discussed in the joint Trade Specialised Committee on Services, Investment and Digital Trade.

In accordance with the TCA, the European Parliament and the UK Parliament established a Parliamentary Partnership Assembly (PPA) in 2021 to enable the exchange of views on the implementation of the TCA. Parliamentarians meet twice a year, with the next EU-UK PPA scheduled to take place in Brussels on 16-17 March 2026.

Since 1 January 2024, the UK has been associated to the Horizon Europe programme.

Artificial intelligence

Although the EU and the UK have different approaches to AI regulation, they share the common goal of promoting the responsible development and uptake of AI. The EU has adopted a comprehensive risk-based regulatory framework through the 2024 AI Act, categorising AI systems by risk and imposing strict obligations on high-risk areas such as critical infrastructure, while banning harmful practices. Minimal-risk AI systems remain largely exempt. In November 2025, the Commission proposed a digital omnibus on AI – amendments to the AI Act – on which the Council and Parliament are currently working.

The UK prefers a lighter-touch approach, regulating AI rather in the context in which it is used. It has established an AI Security Institute and adopted an AI opportunities action plan to boost AI investment, uptake and development. In March 2025, a private member’s bill, the Artificial Intelligence (Regulation) Bill, was introduced in the House of Lords, but, it has not made significant progress. If passed, it would create a central AI authority to oversee AI governance.

Both the EU and the UK are pursuing initiatives to strengthen the AI ecosystem. In April 2025, the European Commission published an AI continent action plan to build large-scale AI data and computing infrastructure across Europe, including AI factories and AI gigafactories. The UK is participating in the AI factories initiative and planning to host an AI factory antenna at the University of Edinburgh. The UK is also establishing its own AI Growth Zones – designated sites for AI-enabled data centres and supporting infrastructure.

At the international level, the EU and the UK collaborate on AI safety and security through their respective bodies – the EU’s AI Office and the UK’s AI Security Institute. The EU and the UK have both signed the Council of Europe Framework Convention on AI, adhered to the OECD AI principles, contributed to international AI safety reports, and worked on shared approaches for measuring and evaluating advanced AI capabilities. They also cooperate on AI standards development through CEN and CENELEC (the European Committee for Standardization and the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization). However, the UK has not signed some AI declarations, such as the Paris AI Action Summit Declaration.

Data flows

Both the EU and the UK are committed to maintaining seamless cross-border data flows. In December 2025, the Commission renewed the two adequacy decisions originally adopted in 2021, confirming that personal data may continue to move freely and safely between the European Economic Area (EEA) and the UK. The Commission concluded that the UK legal framework contains data protection safeguards essentially equivalent to those in the EU. Unless extended, the decisions will expire on 27 December 2031.

Cyber dialogues

The EU and the UK have been holding regular cyber dialogues, as set out in the TCA. Since December 2023, three formal cyber dialogues have taken place: the first in Brussels in December 2023, the second in London in December 2024 and the third in December 2025 in Brussels. These meetings are used to align positions on international cyber norms, exchange views on cyber threats and coordinate responses to malicious cyber activity. Parties provide updates on policy and regulatory developments. The next dialogue will be held in 2026 in London.

Online platforms and search engines

In May 2024, the European Commission’s DG CNECT signed an administrative arrangement with Ofcom – the UK’s regulator for communications services. The arrangement will support the enforcement of the EU’s Digital Services Act (DSA) and the UK’s Online Safety Act, which introduce new obligations for online platforms and search engines, including measures to protect users from illegal and harmful content. The two authorities plan joint training, expert dialogues and studies on issues such as protection of minors, age-appropriate design and platform transparency.

European Parliament

The European Parliament has repeatedly encouraged close cooperation with the UK on digital issues. In its resolution of 27 November 2025 on the implementation of the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement, Parliament welcomed the administrative arrangement signed between the Commission and Ofcom, as well as plans to extend data adequacy decisions. It asked the UK not to go too far from the fundamental principles of the two main EU digital regulations: the Digital Markets Act and the DSA.

Acknowledgements

Any AI-generated content in this text has been reviewed by the author. AI was used to improve the readability of the text.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘EU-UK digital cooperation‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Tarja Laaninen.

Background

The end of free movement between the European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom (UK) following Brexit has resulted in decreased mobility for EU and UK citizens, particularly for young people. For example, EU and UK touring artists and creative professionals face additional costs and administrative requirements since Brexit, not only for their own mobility, but also for the transport of equipment, which must comply with customs and haulage rules.

The first EU‑UK summit took place in London on 19 May 2025, setting out a new strategic partnership. Both parties agreed to enhance cooperation, sign agreements in several areas and hold an annual summit. Three documents were officially adopted: a joint statement, a common understanding on a renewed EU‑UK agenda and a security and defence partnership. The common understanding outlines commitments from both parties to strengthen bilateral cooperation in policy areas, such as youth, mobility, new technologies and sanitary and phytosanitary measures. Further discussions and negotiations are expected to lead to new formal agreements in these areas. The EU will need to adopt negotiating mandates for new agreements, with the European Commission negotiating on behalf of the EU following authorisation from the Council.

Erasmus+, youth mobility and the youth experience scheme (YES)

When the UK formally exited the European Union on 31 January 2020, it chose not to participate in the Erasmus+ programme. EU student applications to UK universities subsequently fell, and data from HESA (the Higher Education Statistics Agency) show that the number of EU students in the UK halved between 2020/2021 and 2023/2024. Reasons include the need for a student visa, a healthcare surcharge and higher tuition fees. UK students coming to the EU also face visa requirements and higher tuition fees. For student exchanges, the UK set up the Turing scheme, which allows UK students to study abroad, including in EU universities.

After the EU‑UK summit, negotiations took place throughout 2025. In December 2025, the Commission and the British government announced the conclusion of negotiations for the UK to rejoin the EU’s Erasmus+ programme in 2027, enabling learners, students, apprentices, teachers and staff in the fields of education, youth and sport from the EU and the UK to once again benefit from opportunities for study, training and work placements. Erasmus+ is one of the best known and most successful EU‑financed programmes and the most popular exchange scheme in Europe. The UK contribution for 2027 will be approximately £570 million and covers the 2027/28 academic year. Any participation in the next multiannual financial framework (2028‑2034) will need to be agreed in the future.

However, EU students who want to study a degree in the UK are still subject to high international tuition fees. The reverse can also be true, depending on where UK‑based students decide to study in the EU.

In the common understanding from the first EU‑UK summit, the UK and EU shared the view that both parties ‘should work towards a balanced youth experience scheme on terms to be mutually agreed’. Such a scheme should facilitate the participation of young people from the EU and the UK in various activities, such as work, study, au-pairing, volunteering or simply travelling, for a limited period. It should provide a dedicated visa path and ensure that the number of participants is acceptable to both sides, possibly including a cap. Negotiations are currently underway between the European Commission and the UK government. The agreement envisaged would benefit both EU and UK citizens aged 18 to 30. Those eligible would, for example, be able to stay in the destination country for up to two to four years. The EU has also tried to negotiate domestic-level tuition fees for European students in the UK; however, the UK government and UK universities have been against the idea. In a recent joint statement, the EU and the UK expressed their willingness to conclude the negotiations by the next EU‑UK summit (expected to take place in Brussels in 2026). The UK already has similar youth schemes with 13 non‑EU countries and territories.

Culture and touring artists

After Brexit, performing artists can no longer tour and work freely across the EU and the UK. UK artists must comply with the immigration and work permit regulations in each EU Member State, including visa costs. Currently, 24 out of the 27 Member States offer time-limited visa and work permit‑free routes for touring, but the requirements and time limits vary significantly. UK artists touring the EU may also need to hire EU‑registered vehicles to comply with road haulage restrictions and need ATA carnets for going through customs with musical instruments, stage equipment and artworks. Making these kinds of arrangements is particularly challenging for young and lesser-known artists.

EU artists, entertainers or musicians touring in the UK may rely on the UK’s permitted paid engagement scheme, allowing visa‑free travel for one month for paid activities, upon invitation by a UK‑based client. In November 2025, more than 200 cultural organisations from both the EU and the UK signed the EU‑UK policy recommendations, highlighting the importance of culture in political, societal and economic relations. Solutions proposed include an EU‑wide visa waiver agreement for creative industries between the EU and the UK, or a ‘cultural exemption’ from the post-Brexit EU‑UK trade and cooperation agreement (TCA) or from carnet requirements for transporting musical equipment. However, the European Commission and UK government position is that there is no prospect of changing the TCA in the near future.

The UK Musicians’ Union has warned that 75 % of musicians who had previously worked in the EU have experienced a decline in bookings, while a 2025 Best for Britain study showed that the number of artists playing at festivals in the EU had declined by more than a quarter since Brexit. Urged by industry representatives, the UK government has clarified immigration and work permit rules with some individual EU Member States and agreed some easements for touring bilaterally, for example with Spain.

The European Parliament

In its resolution of April 2021 on the outcome of the EU‑UK negotiations, Parliament regretted the lack of ambition of the TCA on mobility policies, and welcomed the mechanism in the TCA allowing the EU and the UK to agree additional arrangements on a case-by-case basis and for specific professions.

On 27 November 2025, Parliament adopted an own-initiative report on the TCA implementation, noting that the EU‑UK summit established key steps for filling the gaps of the TCA. In December 2025, Parliament welcomed the EU‑UK agreement on Erasmus+.

From 16 to 18 February 2026, a delegation from the European Parliament’s Committee on Culture and Education met representatives from the UK government, Parliament, universities, cultural institutions and the creative sector in London to discuss the process of bringing the UK back into EU‑funded programmes, such as Erasmus+, for the post‑2027 period. They discussed barriers to cultural collaboration and practical challenges facing touring artists. The MEPs also took stock of negotiations on the EU‑UK reciprocal youth experience scheme.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘EU-UK relations: Mobility and youth opportunities‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Katarzyna Sochacka.

New framework agreement on relations between Parliament and Commission

The revised framework agreement on relations between Parliament and the European Commission aims at strengthening Parliament’s prerogatives as regards the Commission’s duties to inform Parliament of its plans. The Constitutional Affairs (AFCO) Committee report emphasises that the new framework agreement retains the institutional balance intended in the Treaties, while also creating a clearer and more accountable relationship between the institutions working in EU citizens’ interests. Members adopted the revised agreement, which will enter into force following a signing ceremony with Presidents Roberta Metsola and Ursula von der Leyen, planned during the March II plenary session (25‑26 March).

Package travel

The EU rules on package travel date back to 2015 and need to be updated to improve passenger protection. Members considered amendments to the Package Travel Directive, following an agreement reached between the co-legislators in December 2025. Parliament’s negotiators succeeded in improving the complaints procedure and consumer information provided on what is included in the ‘package’ they purchase. Parliament adopted the report concluding its first reading on the legislation to amend the Package Travel Directive.

Establishing EU talent pool

A shortage of qualified workers continues to be an issue in many EU countries. While the EU has already provided a platform to match EU jobseekers with employers, the Commission proposed legislation to create an EU talent pool open to non-EU citizens. Faced with international competition for talent, the proposal would allow EU countries to attract workers, without creating an alternative pathway to legal migration. Parliament is keen to ensure that the system is fair, protects against discrimination and is rolled out in all EU countries. Members adopted the text agreed in interinstitutional negotiations on the proposal to establish an EU talent pool.

Guidelines for the 2027 budget – Section III – European Commission

The 2027 annual EU budget will be the last under the current multiannual financial framework (MFF), and Parliament’s Committee on Budgets (BUDG) is calling for a strong focus on delivery for people, the economy, the planet and providing investment for competitiveness. Members debated the committee’s report, which emphasises the EU budget’s role in strengthening the bloc’s cohesion in the face of a difficult geopolitical landscape. BUDG also calls to uphold a strong external policy and underlines the agreement between EU institutions that expenditure covering the financing costs of Next Generation EU must not reduce funding for EU programmes. The vote on the guidelines for the 2027 EU budget sets Parliament’s position for interinstitutional negotiations ahead of the Commission’s draft budget.

Addressing the housing crisis in the EU

Closer to home, many citizens are personally concerned about the EU’s housing crisis. While housing policy remains a national competence, Parliament’s Special Committee on the Housing Crisis in the EU (HOUS) tabled a report recommending action to improve housing affordability. The committee proposes to help tackle the issue through EU rules on short-term rentals, aiming to strike a balance between promoting urban local communities and tourism income. The HOUS committee also proposes action to improve quality in the construction and energy-efficiency sectors and calls on EU governments to support people trying to get into the housing market through tax breaks. Members held a debate and later adopted the recommendations on solutions for affordable housing.

Copyright and generative AI

When using artificial intelligence (AI) to generate text, images or code, many people are unaware of the legal implications of the AI tool’s use of copyrighted material as training data. This can mean that content creators, artists and other rights-holders are neither acknowledged nor paid for their input. Members adopted an own-initiative report from the Legal Affairs (JURI) Committee calling for clarification of the legal situation as regards copyright and generative AI.

EU enlargement strategy

Members debated and adopted a Foreign Affairs (AFET) Committee report on the European Union’s enlargement strategy. With nine candidate countries and one potential candidate awaiting EU membership, Parliament’s own-initiative report on EU enlargement strategy underlines its support for the process and for reform of the current procedure for admitting new members. The report also emphasises enlargement’s strategic potential to strengthen the wider region in the face of geopolitical uncertainty. Finally, the report underlines the need for a strong merit-based process where alignment with the EU’s core values is an unconditional principle of membership.

2026 World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference

Ahead of the 2026 World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference, taking place in Cameroon at the end of the month, Members debated and voted a resolution setting out Parliament’s position on the multilateral negotiations. Global instability and the retreat from global trade rules mean the need to reform the WTO is urgent, not least to replace the long-broken dispute settlement system, promote a global level playing field and make the rules more flexible. Parliament’s Committee on International Trade (INTA) underscored Parliament’s support for the multilateral trading system and emphasised the need for greater flexibility. A delegation from the INTA committee is due to attend the Parliamentary Conference on the WTO ahead of the 14th WTO Ministerial Conference.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Five decisions to enter into interinstitutional negotiations – from the Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO), on ‘Amending certain Regulations as regards digitalisation and common specifications’ and ‘Amending certain Directives as regards digitalisation and common specifications’; from the Committee on Fisheries (PECH) on ‘Implementation into Union law of measures adopted by several Regional Fisheries Management Organisations’, from the Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON), Environment, Climate and Food Safety (ENVI) and Civil Liberties, Justice, Home Affairs (LIBE) committees on ‘Omnibus IV: Amending certain regulations as regards the extension of certain mitigating measures available for small and medium-sized enterprises to small mid-cap enterprises and further simplification measures’, and from the ECON and LIBE committees on ‘Omnibus IV: Amending Directives 2014/65/EU and (EU) 2022/2557 as regards the extension of certain mitigating measures available for small and medium-sized enterprises to small mid-cap enterprises and further simplifying measures’, were approved without a vote.

Read this ‘at a glance note’ on ‘Plenary round-up – March I 2026‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Linda Tothova and Sebastian Clapp.

Joint procurement of defence equipment by the EU has gained renewed strategic importance in response to the recent deteriorating security environment and persistent fragmentation within the European defence market. Although the European Defence Agency set a 35 % collaborative procurement benchmark back in 2007, cooperation among Member States remains limited. The 2022 coordinated annual review on defence reported that only 18 % of defence investment took place collaboratively, far below agreed targets. While total EU defence expenditure reached €381 billion in 2025, increased spending has not translated into commensurate growth in joint acquisition. EU institutions continue to highlight duplication issues, capability gaps and over-reliance on non‑EU suppliers.

To address these shortcomings, the Union has expanded financial and regulatory instruments. EDIRPA, EDIP and SAFE provide grants and loans to incentivise joint procurement, while the defence readiness roadmap 2030 raises the ambition to 40 % joint procurement by 2027. Targeted adjustments to the Defence Procurement Directive aim to reduce administrative barriers and facilitate multinational contracting.

Joint procurement offers potential economies of scale, stronger bargaining leverage, greater industrial predictability and enhanced interoperability. Studies indicate that meeting collaborative benchmarks could generate annual savings of several billion euros. Yet significant constraints persist, including differing threat perceptions by national governments, industrial competition that often runs counter to consolidation, governance complexity and risks of cost overruns in multinational programmes.

The European Parliament has consistently supported deeper pooling and interoperability, urging collaborative acquisition to be prioritised in EU instruments while cautioning against incentives that may reinforce national disparities. Sustained progress therefore depends on credible demand aggregation, coherent defence planning and effective coordination across EU and NATO frameworks.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU joint defence procurement‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Steven Blaakman

Europe is one of the world’s primary destinations for international migrants. In 2024, the region hosted approximately 94 million migrants, the highest number of any region in the world. The biggest share enter via legal means. The EU is experiencing skills shortages, which is partly because of its ageing population, and migrants could play a role in helping to plug them. The EU shares competence on migration and asylum policies with its Member States; EU legislation plays a significant role in managing legal migration, although its impact varies by type of migration.

Nonetheless, data consistently show that most EU legal migration tools are under-used. Blue Cards, an EU initiative to attract highly skilled workers, account for only a fraction of permits issued for employment reasons and few EU countries make significant use of them, which would suggest more work is needed to make them an attractive option. Similarly, the Single Permit, which is a combined work and residency permit, is mostly used by just a handful of EU countries. In recent years, the EU has also launched new initiatives with non-EU countries such as Talent Partnerships and a Talent Pool, but it is too early to say anything about their impact. There is also a directive for seasonal workers, but again only a few EU countries make much use of it.

The EU plays an important role when it comes to asylum by setting common standards, clarifying which EU country is responsible for processing an application, and encouraging solidarity. The European Commission has proposed a Return Regulation to make it easer and faster to return non-EU citizens who were unsuccessful in their bid to obtain asylum. It includes the possibility to create return hubs in non-EU countries, which many Member States are interested in. Temporary protection was used for the first time to help Ukrainians after the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Legal migration to the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Laurence Amand-Eeckhout.

CONTEXT

On 16 December 2025, the European Commission put forward a proposal for a regulation to simplify the rules governing medical devices in the EU. The proposal forms part of a broader package of measures aimed at improving citizens’ health and strengthening the resilience and competitiveness of the health sector. An evaluation of the current EU regulatory framework for medical devices concluded that it has led to unnecessary costs, administrative bottlenecks, regulatory uncertainty for companies, and delays in patient access to medical devices. The proposed revision seeks to address these challenges while ensuring that patient safety remains the highest priority, with faster access to safe and innovative devices. It also aims to reinforce the EU’s competitiveness in the medical technology sector, by establishing a more coherent framework enabling companies to better respond to evolving market conditions, technological developments and patient needs.

LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL

2025/0404(COD) – Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) 2017/745 and (EU) 2017/746 as regards simplifying and reducing the burden of the rules on medical devices and in vitro diagnostic medical devices, and amending Regulation (EU) 2022/123 as regards the support of the European Medicines Agency for the expert panels on medical devices and Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 as regards the list of Union harmonisation legislation referred to in its Annex I – COM(2025) 1023, 16 December 2025.

NEXT STEPS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

For the latest developments in this legislative procedure, see the Legislative Train Schedule: 2025/0404(COD)

Read the complete briefing on ‘Medical devices: Simplifying the rules‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.