Ideas on Europe Blog

This year’s Munich Security Conference took place under the theme ‘Post-Truth, Post-West, Post-Order?’ and hoped to steer the direction of politicians and policy-makers into facing the wave of fake news and fake facts. Originally, the purpose of the Munich Security Conference is for senior politicians, diplomats and military experts to discuss current issues in the field of security and defence. The agenda sounded promising, especially for those interested in the future of the Atlantic Alliance, politics of the West and EU-US relations. If you looked for discussions on pressing and highly important security and defence issues, you were in the wrong place.

Speeches and roundtable discussions by the representatives of the most powerful states reflected the same blah-blah as every year. It was the first performance by the newly formed US administration represented by a delegation around Vice-President Michael Richard Pence, Secretary of Defence James Mattis and Senator John McCain. All three US representatives stressed the importance of NATO, the United States’ commitment to collective defence and to the transatlantic partnership. Mattis criticised the European allies for the lack of commitment terms of defence spending and Pence especially demanded an increased contribution by France, Germany and Italy.

As a reaction, German minister of defence, Ursula von der Leyen, called for a more ‘responsibly minded America’ and demanded that Europe should not always rely on the United States, instead it should be responsible for itself in these times of uncertainty. Newly appointed Sigmar Gabriel – it seems on behalf of the European allies – proclaimed that ‘we must not leave Europe to those who want to destroy it’.

While these speeches and calls sound all too promising and appealing in times of uncertainty, populism and increasing crises in and around Europe, these talks have not changed. And, what are the results? It is the same procedure as every year. It is the same rhetoric and the same lack of concrete measures and actions.

What the main criticism here is that, while the Munich Security Conference is supposed to be a forum to discuss and find solutions of crises and conflicts, the most pressing ones have been neglected and pushed towards the end of the agenda. The main talks circulated around new US administration under Donald Trump – despite his absence – and how ‘obsolete’ NATO might be. More urgent security issues have not been touched upon, such as, above all, how to deal with the increasing authoritarian style of government in Turkey under Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the next crises lurking in South Sudan and the Central African Republic, and how to actually solve still ongoing crises and conflicts in Eastern Europe (Ukraine and Russia), the Middle East (Iraq, Syria) as well as in North and Sub-Saharan Africa (migration, migration, human rights violations).

In addition, there was not much talk about the future of the relations of the West with Russia, which is severely needed to tackle some of these issues. Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov called NATO an institution of the Cold War era and demanded a post-West world order because he sees the West as outdated. It is time for NATO to finally get hands on, and get to grips with the increased aggression by Russia and thus to ‘rethink Russia’.

Almost all speakers called for unity and cohesion, but, as finally vocalised by Anne Applebaum in her article for the Washington Post, what has been forgotten was ‘that one of the gravest dangers facing the Western alliance is the president of the United States’. So, one thing that the Munich Security Conference has shown, however, is how representatives of the current US administration have to carry the can for what their president is not capable of: doing politics.

Then, what to make of all of this? Europe needs to rethink itself. It is slowly realising that the United States as a reliant partner in foreign, security and defence policy is slowly ceasing under the current administration. NATO is not ‘obsolete’, although it is obviously an institution from the Cold War era. Thanks to Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg’s realistic assessment, NATO needs to adopt not only to the external security environment and the current security challenges, but also to the internal changes and (security) challenges. Increased defence spending is one thing, but willingness, ideological commitment to the alliance’s core values and actually taking action to address there threats and challenges is another.

It is about time to go beyond all this rhetoric and to deal with the current security challenges and threats that North America and Europe are facing.

Nele Marianne Ewers-Peters is a PhD Candidate and Teaching Assistant at the University of Kent and a Visiting Scholar at KU Leuven.

The post What lessons learned from the Munich Security Conference? by Nele Marianne Ewers-Peters appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

To whom it may concern

This is to certify that Ms Theresa May successfully passed the admission exam of the ‘Higher Management and Governance’ executive education programme, generally known as ‘HMG’, in July 2013.

At the end of her first semester, during which her performance was evaluated through continuous assessment, she has now submitted her final semester exam, consisting of a research paper on the topic ‘The United Kingdom’s exit from and new partnership with the European Union’. She also has successfully completed her practical assignment of pushing a ‘Notification of Withdrawal‘Notification of withdrawal through parliament in a simulation exercise of democratic procedures. Her second semester is due to start on March 9 with a study trip to Brussels where she is expected to present this notification to a panel of peers.

Please find below her full semester grades and selected comments on her performance. Each grade is an average calculated from the assessment of the professors participating in the jury. Please note that HMG programme only employs renowned experts based in the United Kingdom.

Honi soit qui mal y pense!

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I’ve been looking back at my posts from last summer, when things Brexit-y were in much more obvious flux. this was triggered by last week’s post on the looming Article 50 notification, which reminded me that I’d sketched out some options.

Briefly re-stated, these suggested that the UK would aim for either close or distant relations with the EU in the initial post-membership phase and then in the longer-term relationship: thus, you could have a ‘Norway’ (close, then close), ‘reverse accession’ (close, then distant), ‘abyss’ (distant, then close) and ‘hard’ (distant, then distant) path.

Clearly, debate has moved on since then, but the ‘abyss‘ option is worth revisiting, for reasons that will be fairly obvious.

The basic conceit is that the government would push hard for a distant relationship, only then to row back hard, having seen how perilous that route is in practice. The benign version would be a genuine change of heart – ‘we must think of the national interest’-type rhetoric – while the more cynical might consider it possible that the government always had this in mind, but it was the only way to build public support for what looks like a reversal of policy.

As regular readers will know, I incline in general to cynicism, but the past 8 months as surely the clearest ever example of cock-up over conspiracy. If there is someone in Whitehall or Westminster with a masterplan for all this, then it is the equal of any paperback thriller, and about as likely.

This, sadly, should be no comfort to any of us: there has been a palpable sense of ‘making it up as we go along’ in the corridors of power, strengthened by the repeated failures to demonstrate even the minimal level of intent needed to conduct negotiations with the EU27.

So if the abyss option is to be used, it will be because it looks like the best course of action at the time. This raises two basic questions: why would that happen, and what would be the effect?

Inasmuch as the government does know what it wants from Brexit, the direction is currently set for something between ‘reverse accession’ and ‘hard’ Brexit: no to free movement, but trying to keep as much as possible of the rest. Rhetorically, Theresa May has placed herself firmly in this position, accepting no advice and encouraging no debate beyond her very immediate circle. The unwavering opposition to any amendment of her ‘plan’ is a strong part of this: firm, if futile, resistance to the Millar case; parliamentary manoeuvring to avoid amendments to the EU(NOW) Bill.

The upshot is that May has made it very hard indeed to move away from her position, vague though it might be. As a result, it would need something of very great weight to move her.

Logically, that great weight would be an economic collapse, something at least in the order of 2007-8 and possibly even more. This means a need for dramatic visuals of shuttered factories, sharply rising inflation and unemployment, stark collapses in the exchange rate: moreover, it needs to be clearly linked to Brexit.

Ironically, the dithering caused by David Cameron’s abrupt departure in June makes this all much less likely. The hiatus has not only given economic agents time to start lying plans and make adjustments, it has also changed public opinion. The failure of the Leave vote to result in the economic calamities forecast by Remain campaigners has given many voters the impression that Brexit won’t (maybe even can’t) be so bad, economically speaking. Yes, the UK hasn’t actually changed anything about its status in the EU, but that is to miss the point: many people don’t see it that way. Put differently, ‘Project fear’ only works if people buy the fear: otherwise, it’s all a bit Wizard of Oz.

As a result, even if economic disaster did loom, it might not actually have the effect outlined above. Instead, it might simply encourage a ‘more of the same’ attitude: it’s only hurting because we haven’t yet followed through. Politically, the advantage of taking that view is that it’s unknowable, and that if things do go belly-up, then one can always argue that it was because we didn’t make the right choices earlier on. Unsatisfactory perhaps, but probably more attractive an option than having to eat humble pie as you scramble to rebuild links with the EU.

And this is the second element: the EU would probably be willing to accept a contrite UK, returning to the table to ask for more. Quite aside from the political and personal satisfactions of seeing the EU model be vindicated by the UK’s return, such a development would be a positive one for EU exporters and EU security (both narrowly and broadly). Practically, if this all happened relatively quickly, then the legislative gap would be minimal and things could be put together at some speed.

But to put all of this down on paper/screen simply highlights how much more unlikely the abyss option has become. If it ever had a chance, then that chance looks to have been spent somewhere between May’s election as party leader and the non-amendment of the EU(NOW) Bill in the Commons.

This matters, because it points once again to the central importance of the opening of Article 50 negotiations and the initial ask that will come with that. This will be the central determinant of the path of Brexit, which is why May has held on to control of it so very firmly. The big question now is whether she knows what to do with the power she now holds.

The post What about the abyss? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

For a paper I am writing in the context of my research on EU leaks, I looked at all disciplinary proceedings against leakers in the European Commission from 2006 to 2015, as documented in the annual reports of the IODC, its internal investigation office.

Here’s the data that I extracted from IODC’s annual reports (uploaded here) that I received through a freedom of information request to the Commission:

The types of cases vary and several concern information leaked in the context of tender procedures, so not the typical political leaks that many of you may have in mind when you hear the term.

In fact, the first mention of the term “leaking” in the IDOC reports can be found in  2012. The EU’s staff regulation (Article 17) call the offense “unauthorised disclosure“; in the latest report this is covered under the headline “failure to comply with rules on confidentiality“, even though in the narrative of the report this is called “leaking“.

What does leaking involve? Here some quotes from the different reports:

• 2009: “ Providing information obtained in the line of duty to a national news organisation in exchange for payment” (p. 8)
• 2011: “An official was dismissed and his pension rights reduced to the minimum subsistence level for 20 years […] for having received gifts and other favours of considerable value from various stakeholders in the industrial sector in which he exercised his duties. This same official had regularly provided these entitities, outside of the Commission, with confidential information or information which had not been made public” (p.6)
• 2015: “An official who leaked an internal draft policy document to an external industry stakeholder and incorporated their comments into the document without consulting his line management was temporarily downgraded” (p.8)

It was surprising  how few cases seem to be followed up in disciplinary procedures, given that this an official offense under the staff regulation and given how many there are. I’ve discussed leaks in EU politics in this recent paper and in my doctoral thesis.

The reason could be what Ryan Heath deducted from my thesis:

“ you would need to stop so-called inter-service consultations between departments if you want to stop leaks. That would, if nothing else, have negative effects on policy-making.”

In other words, leaking is in the DNA of the Commission.

I will argue in my paper that leaking it is part of the Commission’s regular bureaucratic politics. Preventing leaks more forcefully would either mean to reduce the number of internal consultations, to undermine relations with the press or stakeholders, or to undermine strategic leaking that those in political position use to influence the outcome of politics in ways that please them.

Past research has shown that leaking often happens from the top, so those on top of the Commission probably have most to fear from a strict anti-leaking policy. But you’ll see the full argument in my final paper once it is published.

In the meantime: Do you have something to tell me about how leaks are prevented in the Commission? Did you observe a change in how leaks are prevented or encouraged inside the Commission in recent years? Get in touch under ronny.patz@gsi.lmu.de for any hints. I will also be in Brussels for some time in mid-March, so I’m happy to meet up for further insights!

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Political science, probably like many other social sciences, seems stuck in an age that many of our students have never lived, and will never live. They live in an age of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and of problems that are far beyond local borders in a world dominated by thinking within borders. In this age, it is time to work together on a global scale and to develop the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) for political science to be able to keep up with the social and technological developments of the coming years.

The political science LHC is one where large-scale collaboration of people of diverse backgrounds,  use of new technologies, and fast and open science come together to understand and provide ideas for a world that is evolving so fast that our local political systems and global institutions cannot follow suit unless political science evolves at the speed of society and technology.

Why the political science LHC?

The World Wide Web is here because academics wanted to collaborate to build humanity’s largest machine – the LHC – to study the universe’s smallest particles. This machine is revolutionizing our understanding of physics, advancing engineering to levels unknown a few decades ago, and showing how seemingly outlandish theoretical physics can be tested when a large group of people collaborates to construct and run an outlandish machine while having another large group of people that can make sense of unprecedented amounts of data.

At the same time, as a ‘by-product’, the LHC led to the creation of the internet that we know today and that is changing societies beyond recognition. Technology-driven solutions are what is shaping today’s political and social reality.

In comparison to the 21st century science around the LHC, my discipline – political science or social science at large – feels stuck in the middle of the 20th century, with little glimpses to 21st century ideas because some of my colleagues have started to leave the borders of narrow ideological institutions, beyond the established working groups in professional associations of political science – national or international – and beyond the boundaries of faculties that still educate students like they used to do when Google, WeChat and the Ethiopian space program did not yet exist.

Faculty today does not mean, in many instance, collaboration at the scale of technological advancement. It mostly means turf war. The same seems true for professional associations.

The established political theorist does not trust the quantitative methods postdoc because she prefers numbers over meaning. The political systems PhD does not want to collaborate with the international relations professor because of some obscure epistemological difference in world view that has been breeding over the last 100 years. And the Canadian ethnographic researcher studying a local community and its politics in The Gambia never meets the IR ethnographer from Vietnam who walks through the halls of UNESCO to study the weird global culture of diplomatic politics.

At the same time, technology developed in the California in a political and social spirit of innovation is copied and perfected in China because of a combination of national policy and local industry development. The radical political shift towards renewable energy paid by German tax payers is partly responsible for revolutionizing the global distribution of solar and wind power allowing for new energy policies and much less costly political decisions.

The historical evolution of nations and borders usually credited to the Peace of Westphalia is still the most powerful idea dominating most politics around the globe while AI-enabled automatic translation and cross-border migration are reframing how many people perceive, shape or resist a world in which cultural differences and the value of nation states are shape-shifting beyond comprehension. This is why the political system of ISIS is influencing security policy across Western political systems. This is why the ‘Panama Leaks‘ story could combine global financial flows, morally corrupt individuals from around the world, international journalistic cooperation and political reactions at national and international scale.

The LHC of political science takes all this together and combines it into a connected research programmes linking the smallest socio-political dynamics with politics on a global scale.

Knowing the complex and conflictuous political history of our planet; knowing the path dependency created by ideas, languages and institutions and the disruptive changes that still happen from time to time; knowing how human beings are both rational and irrational, biologically programmed and socially shaped; and observing the massive technological and related socio-economic changes of the past century, in particular the the advent of AI, one of the questions that we need to answer could be:

Is it possible to advance at the current speed of technological evolution without losing the ability to shape humanity’s destiny through collective human decision-making that we think of in terms of traditional politics?

You may ask: What does AI have to do with all of that?

My answer is simple: We are probably approaching a time when AIs know better about our individual, cultural and political preferences than politicians have ever known in the history of our political systems. Depending on the reach of AI(s), they will be able to analyse and deduct from individual interests and collective dynamics reaching from local, culturally close groups to the aggregated global system of humanity, beyond comparable abilities designed into traditional political institutions.

There are two options coming out of this for future political systems:

There may be those political systems in which traditional politics makes use of this knowledge and policy recommendations generated by AI to shape our collective destiny (or destinies). The others will be systems where the AI(s) take(s) over because we may collectively trust these all-encompassing new technologies more than the bounded rationality and limited knowledge of human representatives.

Knowing this, the question is: Can we even shape where all this is going, for example sending people’s ambassadors to global companies who design AIs like Denmark? Is a culturally divided but technologically interdependent humanity even able to organize meaningful collective action that is successful enough to influence how AIs shape the planet? Or is it even unnecessary to try this because AI-system as the new political systems will represent our collective will anyhow?

Will we give the nuclear launch codes to our AIs and let them decide to start global wars like we give AIs the power to decide on drone strikes? Will we, in the future, elect the best decision-making machine to lead our global institutions, simulating all possible decisions to agree on the best possible option for all humans, all cultures, all technologies?

To answer these questions, we need to build a new type of political/social science research organization, one like CERN for physics, but adapted to the knowledge and social realities of 2017 and the years to come.

We need to be fast and we need to work against the old social system of academic knowledge generation – build up reputation for 20 years, become a professor and then pass on your existing knowledge and decide over what get’s published and what doesn’t until you die.

Instead, we need people with various skills, from theory to practice, from big data to micro-ethnography, from introvert analysts to extrovert talkers, from those who are creative to generate knowledge to those who are creative to communicate it audio-visually, from the experienced researchers who know how to run effective research operations to new researcher who know how to run new technologies.

We need to include people of all cultures, genders and social background,  embedded both in local and in global society, because we need to be as good as the present and future AI(s) – or we need to be able to make intelligent use of AI – in understanding what’s going on in our socieites, helping to shape future technological advancement so that it reflects human and humanity’s interests. To answer these questions, we need a collective exercise and theorise within and beyond existing schools of thought, do empirical research within and beyond existing borders, go for data analysis at the scale of AI far beyond human capabilities and at the scale of intersubjective human understanding.

And we need open science. Knowledge production may remain complex and long-term but the results have to circulate fast. Intermediate findings have to be immediately discussed and  knowledge about arcane developments at one end of the world are made accessible in fast and meaningful ways to researchers at the other end of the world. Only open social science will be able to keep up with the speed of technological evolution.

This all may sound a little over the top, but seeing how slow and how disconnected  from technological advancement most of the social sciences seem to work today, I’m convinced that our generation needs to change this. Either we start building the political science equivalent – or social science equivalent, if you want – to the LHC now or we may miss to jump on a train that is accelerating fast.

This probably needs big money. We don’t need these large sums to pay exorbitant salaries to a few self-declared academic leaders but we will need it because we have to be many and we need to work together in new way. This probably means using both public and private funding, or combining resources from both worlds as borders between the two are anyway disappearing where global-scale corporations compete alongside global-scale public organizations.

We need those funds because we have to invest in technology adapted to the requirements of a social science that works on a global scale, that collaborates beyond disciplinary borders and that can stand up to the AI revolution that is on our doorsteps. This means communication   between well equipped research facilities around the world, combining languages, social science disciplines and local and global knowledge.

We need translation technology that works so that insights from minority languages can be injected into global research questions, and vice versa. We need data analysis facilities that can run calculations at the scale of planetary humanity while we need ethics ombudspersons around the world who can ensure that research respects cultural differences while new knowledge is generated.

We need to pay for new people to join the research endeavour regularly and to make everybody learn and adapt, simply because technology will be advancing faster than ever before. And we need money to ensure that those working with us can still live social lives, take timeout to get children, to care for their parents and friends, to take creative timeouts, to return to their local communities or global societies not to lose touch while working on a big research endeavour, short: being what makes humanity while going with the times.

Thus, it’s time to start constructing the social science CERN and build the political science LHC, turning our current academic system and its social scientists towards those who are already shaping the future of our planet. If we want it or not, those working on technology beyond our imagination, in China, in the USA or wherever else, they are already rushing ahead. Only when social science works with them or at least understands what is going on can we design political systems that keep up with where technology will be in 5, 10, or 50 years.

This essay is a experimental, summarizing ideas that aren’t fully thought through but that have grown over my time inside and outside political science as a profession. Feel free to discuss and to contradict. And if you are already building the social science CERN, I’d be happy to know about it and eventually join.

The post Political Science in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, Cultural Differences, and Global Institutions appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The Malta Declaration, on the external dimension of migration, was adopted by the members of the European Council at an informal EU Summit in Valetta on Friday 3 February 2017. Its adoption represents the continuation of a ‘one-eyed’ security-oriented strategy which impedes a more holistic vision of EU migration law and policy.

A silver bullet?

Daily tragedies in the Mediterranean Sea, the ‘refugee crisis’ and the growing terrorist threat have created a sense of political emergency that has reinforced member states’ focus on border management and return policies. The security-orientated approach to migration issues is not new but has gained increasing traction. The main objective now is to ‘stem the migrant flows’.

In this context, the results of the EU-Turkey deal have been lauded as providing vindication for the methods used to pursue that objective. Thanks to financial support from the EU, as well as certain other inducements such as visa liberalisation, the Turkish authorities have agreed to improve their border management. Together with the closure of the Western Balkan route and the reintroduction of internal border checks in the Schengen area, the EU-Turkey Statement helped to decrease the number of arrivals to the EU via the Eastern Mediterranean.

In a result-driven world that cares little for costs and effects, the EU-Turkey Statement is perceived as being a silver bullet that could be transferred to that other major entrance point of maritime migration: the central Mediterranean route. As Donald Tusk stated after a meeting with the prime minister of Libya: ‘We have discussed the example of our cooperation with Turkey and other countries in this part of the region. Now it is time to close down the route from Libya to Italy’.

Unworkable and difficult

However, replicating the EU-Turkey Statement with Libya is unworkable. Unlike Turkey, the Libyan ‘Government of National Accord’ which the EU is cooperating with, does not have full control over its territory. Unlike Turkey, Libya cannot be offered inducements such as accession talks or visa liberalisation. And finally, as the amount of financial support that Libya could receive is far below that which has been accepted by Turkey, Libya may well decide to increase its asking price.

In addition, the EU may find that solely focusing on migration management issues in its relations with African countries will be difficult. While third countries may need political and financial support, helping the EU with better managing migration flows may not be in their interest. Most African states do not want to keep their young and unemployed generation at home. Locking them into the country would in the end lead to further irregular migration. Hence, more options like legal migration, resettlement solutions, external processing and actions to limit push factors have to be included in the discussions.

Overcoming a hypocritical policy

The declaration does not go that far. It attempts to convince citizens that strong border management and return policies will help to stem migrant flows and will disrupt the business model of smugglers. This is hypocritical and highly questionable. One reliable option to destroy smuggler networks resides in the ability to offer migrants the opportunity to move legally, and therefore safely, to the EU. As long as EU governments refuse to address this policy imbalance, they will contribute to the existence of criminal enterprises.

One complementary way of dealing with the issue would be in external processing. Such a mechanism under an EU perspective is threefold. First, to examine asylum claims in a third country. Second, to resettle people whose right to asylum has been recognised in the EU. Third, to (voluntary) return migrants to their country of origin. An implicit reference to this is made in the declaration where leaders agree to seek ‘to ensure adequate reception capacities and conditions in Libya for migrants, together with the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and International Organization for Migration (IOM)’. While this reference is minimal, it shows that discussions are at least underway. But discussions are not enough if they do not lead to acceptable and fair solutions.

Ahead of the Malta summit, the IOM and the UNHCR have indicated that establishing extra-territorial processing of asylum seekers in Libya and in North Africa is not appropriate at this time. The implementation of such a mechanism requires that a series of conditions have to be met, including a stabilised political situation in Libya and the establishment of adequate reception capacities and conditions for migrants. Whatever the political priorities are, turning external processing facilities into closed and militarised centres will in no way be an acceptable answer. The process must consider the rights of migrants and refugees and be based on the full involvement of the UNHCR and the IOM.

There is no silver bullet solution for the challenges ahead. Instead, the EU must develop policies that look beyond the immediate political climate and produce a concrete set of proposals that are capable of addressing migration with a holistic and all-encompassing approach. The spirit that guided the Union’s founding fathers in 1957, a spirit grounded in hope, tolerance and freedom should inspire modern EU leaders to take bold decisions in order to fully respond to the challenges posed by migration to the EU. The 60th anniversary of the Rome Treaty could be just the occasion where the Union could make a serious effort to reconnect with that founding spirit in the context of migration. Unfortunately, for now, the Malta Declaration provides a stark warning that the EU is in danger of becoming a blind king.

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Bonjour! And warm greetings from the University of Nantes, where the office of “Alliance Europa” is hosted. Alliance Europa is a new and – as we hope: innovative – regional consortium in European Studies. Initiated and supported by the authorities of the Pays-de-la-Loire, it brings together the researchers of 19 laboratories or centres based in higher education institutions between Le Mans, Angers and Nantes, in a common “Institute of European and Global Studies”. The new institute wishes to encourage interdisciplinary projects between its partner institutions, and both streamline and internationalise the rich offer in European Studies programmes and degrees provided by the different institutions of higher education across the region.

But Alliance Europa wants to be more than that. It was created in 2015-16 against the backdrop of a Europe in crisis, facing many political, societal and cultural challenges under the pressure of the globalisation process. More than ever, it is necessary to quit the Ivory Tower, join the debate, and build bridges between academic research and civil society.

Against this backdrop, Alliance Europa has launched “The Factory of European Ideas” (La fabrique des idées européennes), a laboratory of social innovation which has the vocation to be a “project nursery” where academics, civil society and socio-economic actors can join to test new ideas, from one-off events to larger associative initiatives. The first projects are under way – they concern cultural and pedagogical European projects, but also the association “European Migration Law”.

For the time being, Alliance Europa communicates mainly in French, on its website, on Facebook or Twitter. But thanks to “Ideas on Europe”, this is changing today. This blog will allow us to share a selection of articles previously published in French on the Alliance Europa multiblog named “L’Europe en jeu !” The first one is already scheduled for this week.

Stay tuned and feel free to get in touch!

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What if the good old ‘scarecrow’ effect did not work anymore? What if Marine Le Pen managed to break the famous ‘glass ceiling’ of the French electoral system, which has kept her out of governmental responsibility so far? What if voters were no longer willing to rally around a ‘front républicain’ between round 1 and 2 of the elections?

These are questions that would have sounded purely hypothetical some months ago. But are they still?

True, the French electoral system and institutional framework have always been the best allies of those for whom the vision of a triumphant Le Pen family member in the Elysée is nothing short of a Republican nightmare. History seems to be reassuring: at both the 2002 presidential election and successive legislative and regional elections, the time between the two rounds has always proved sufficient to form an ad-hoc coalition behind the remaining opponent. And simple maths also provide comforting evidence. It is difficult to imagine Marine Le Pen double the absolute number of voters between round one and two.

Yes, she does have an extremely stable base of 25% of the electorate, but there is little risk that ‘MLP’, as she is referred to in Twitter initials (while on her posters she prefers to drop the family name altogether), will obtain a surprise score that will put the pollsters to shame. As a matter of fact, now that publicly coming out as an FN sympathiser is no longer taboo, the polls concerning voting intentions are actually more reliable than they used to be. How exactly she could manage to attract the massive and unprecedented transfer of voters from all sides that she needs in order to win the final face-off remains unclear.

So it’s all about keeping calm and carrying on? The traditional politicians from the left and right – a species that has not realised yet it is under the threat of extinction – still want to capitalise on the scarecrow effect. François Fillon, for instance, is now desperate enough to warn his compatriots that in the case of his elimination in round one, the vast majority of his voters would turn towards Le Pen, if only to avoid Macron. And at the PS headquarters in Rue Solférino, Jean-Christophe Cambadélis pretends to see the writing on the walls of Donald Trump’s surprise victory in order to motivate the Socialist troops or what’s left of them. It all sounds like hollow scaremongering because it is too obvious they do not believe what they’re saying. Nothing but a kind of French ‘Project Fear’, and we know how efficient the English one was.

But can the nightmare really be ruled out? In a campaign where nothing is stable except the voting intentions for Marine Le Pen, where every further little scandal (not to mention strange rumours of all kinds) invariably seem to play into her hand, where an entire ‘internet army’ (brilliantly investigated by Nicholas Vinocur) is at MLP’s service, no scenario should be excluded. The very system that has always kept the Front National out of power will continue to work in its interest: with no governmental responsibility despite massive electoral backing the FN has not suffered any loss of credibility in its anti-establishment posture and will continue, all throughout the campaign, to capitalise on its comfortable status of sole untested alternative. That’s a unique selling point, providing a solid basis for an unexpected last-minute swing that could be due to the big unknown variable of these elections, the degree of ‘fed-upism’ of French citizens that may result in a shockwave of irrepressible ‘kick-outism’. With a little bit of imagination, you can already hear the electorate prepare the lamp-posts for the great hanging: ‘Ah, ça ira, ça ira, ça ira! Les aristocrates à la lanterne!’

The international press in shock: Le Pen elected President! (extract from ‘La Présidente’).

François Durpaire, for one, has no trouble at all seeing ‘La Présidente’ behind her desk in the Elysée. A historian and rather well-spoken television pundit on American politics – he’s a co-author of the French edition of ‘The United States for Dummies’ – Durpaire anticipated her victory in 2015, together with the illustrator Farid Boudjellal, in a remarkable graphic novel. In its highly realistic black-and-white aesthetics, and visibly based on thorough documentation, ‘La Présidente’ imagines a post-2017 France in the tradition of Orwellian dystopia. The book displays particular lucidity in depicting how self-referential media loops may create a hysterical sound cloud that eventually erupts in perfectly irrational voting behaviour (rings a bell? or two?). Despite a somewhat disappointing ending that indulged in the same kind of conspiracy theory on which populism itself flourishes, the book and its authors well deserved their success, with 120,000 copies sold.

In 2016, Durpaire and Boudjellal, published a sequel named ‘Totalitaire’ and set in a 2022 France that I would most likely have left in the meantime. While the graphics are just as brilliant, the scenario has some flaws, but overall the authors deserve praise for effectively highlighting the sheer fragility of democracy in an age obsessed with identity and security.

Reading these two graphic novels makes you hastily draw your wish list for 2017:
May the old scarecrow effect have kept at least some of its relevance!
May the ‘glass ceiling’ of the French electoral system prove more resilient than one might fear!
And may the French themselves be collectively smart enough to resist the temptation of hanging their entire political aristocracy at the lamp-posts just to relieve this itchy feeling of disgust.

Albrecht Sonntag
@albrechtsonntag

This is post # 12 on the French 2017 election marathon.
All previous posts can be found here.

The post France 2017: Could she possibly win? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

We find ourselves at the end of the phoney war. Probably.

With only a few weeks left until Theresa May’s self-imposed deadline for Article 50 notification, the most striking thing as one looks around is the almost-complete absence of interest in the issue.

In the UK, this might partly be understood by the wait on the House of Lords to complete their approval of the legislation. However, despite the government’s expectation that this will result in amendments and thus ‘ping pong’ with the House of Commons, which in turn might mean missing the end-March deadline, there is scarcely a whisper of discontent.

In the EU27, there is little more than continuing preparation for the coming negotiations, as the reports pile up (most recently from the French Senate) and the checklists grow.

Indeed, the most notable intervention of recent weeks has come from Tomas Prouza, Czech State Secretary for European Affairs. He spoke at an event I attended last week in Prague, with a speech that was mainly noted in the UK as accusing May of lying about the impact of EU immigrants on the UK. Sitting in the audience, that wasn’t my take-home.

Instead, Prouza seemed more interested in underlining the point that May has still to set out anything like a comprehensive negotiating position for Article 50: in his words, the White Paper did nothing except state that “Theresa May’s speech means Theresa May’s speech” and a broad hope that everyone could get along well in future.

In short, Prouza was making the basic observation that the Czech government – and the EU27 – have paid (and do pay) attention to what is happening in the UK and are factoring it into their calculations: there is no hermetic sealing off of British political debate from the outside world. That such a thing has to be said betrays both the state of the UK’s discussion on Article 50 and the self-image of the country.

The biggest unknown in the process right now is how much May has adequately laid the groundwork for starting negotiations. That includes knowing what the EU7 are likely to ask for and who she can work on to help her achieve her objectives. As the Prague conference noted several times, the UK has traditionally been very good at divide-and-rule in the EU, with a series of partnerships on different issues with other member states. At the same time, Prouza did note that in all the like-minded groups, much work has done into sorting out who will pick up the UK’s role, so much disinvestment in relations with the British has already taken place. And in a context of departure on uncertain terms, what can the UK offer that will be of interest to others?

More crucially, the British government has still to articulate what it wants. Even the concession that it will not seek to break the four freedoms seems to have sunk without much trace, largely because the EU27 have been so adamant that this was never going to be an option: the UK is simply falling into line, not giving anything up. Beyond that, the government is still parroting the line about finding innovative solutions to membership of the customs union, without any idea of how that might work.

All of this does not bode well.

The end-March deadline still looks questionable, both on the British side and for the EU27, who are still deep in a pile of other problems that require their attention. Even if May has decided that notification in or around the EU’s 60th anniversary celebrations, or even participation at that event in Rome, is a bad way to kick things off, March remains a terrible time, between the resumption of the annual refugee traffic across the Mediterranean, an uneasy Russia and a US administration that looks ever-less in control, not to mention the persistent need for Eurozone reform, and a big bunch of important national elections.

The mistake not to be made, however, is to assume that this helps the UK get a better deal. Further delay on an already-much-delayed notification will win no friends and gain no advantage. Likewise, the UK needs to recognise that the time that has already gone has been used by the EU27 to settle many points of difference among them, leaving the latter better-placed to shape both the process and the content of negotiations.

As such, the view from Prague is the same as it is from other capitals: don’t think you can mess us about. as Prouza commented, the Czechs have many links with the UK, but they also have them with other EU states and right now, ‘club membership has more benefits.’

The post Tick follows tock follows tick: Waiting for May in March appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Introduction

The Government of the United Kingdom (UK) has announced that it will trigger the procedure for withdrawal from the European Union (EU or Union) in March this year. As part of this process, the UK is likely to leave the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), reclaim its exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and resume international activity as a single State for the purposes of exercising rights and responsibilities as a flag, coastal, port and market State. Consequently, it will take its own decisions in international fisheries fora and bilateral negotiations, including for the purposes of illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing control. This blog post discusses what the UK’s withdrawal from the EU may mean for the fight against IUU fishing, and related fisheries control policies that have so far been shared between the UK and the other States in the Union.[1]

Background to the Legislation for IUU Fishing Control in the European Union

Council Regulation (EC) 1005/2008 (the IUU Regulation) was adopted by the European Council on 29 Sept 2008, and came into force in January 2010, alongside implementing Commission Regulation 1010/2009.[2] The IUU Regulation and its complementing legislation establish a legal and institutional framework for cooperation in the fight against IUU fishing. They articulated a set of administrative and operational controls across the Member States of the EU, through which non-EU States with regulatory authority over fishing activities are engaged in respect of detected IUU fishing activity.

Axiomatic to the regulatory framework of the IUU Regulation is State compliance with all applicable international fishery conservation laws, and regional conservation and management measures. The IUU Regulation primarily concerns IUU controls on imports of non-excluded seafood products from outside the EU,[3] as well as re-exports. Failure to observe international obligations in respect of flag, coastal or market State responsibilities may prompt warnings,[4] and under certain circumstances also trade suspensions. The IUU Regulation is based on the premise of mutuality in cooperation among Member States as well as third countries, which is underpinned by information exchange and verification processes.[5]

The IUU Regulation and the UK

As a member State of the European Union, the UK responded to the adoption of the IUU Regulation by adapting its domestic legal, operational and administrative framework in support of the shared regulatory objective to control IUU trade. DEFRA contributed to the development of operational systems, regulatory structures, training and the strengthening of communications with the Commission and with the other Member States of the Union. DEFRA and SeaFish published information on the main provisions of the Regulation, and its implementation in the United Kingdom. Regulatory adjustments were made under the powers conferred by section 2(2) of, and paragraph 1A(f) of Schedule 2 to, the European Communities Act 1972, and section 30(2) of the Fisheries Act 1981 for the implementation of the Regulations by way of the Sea Fishing (Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing) Order 2009.[6] UK businesses, particularly importers and retailers, have invested considerable effort in adapting to the requirements of the IUU Regulation, and arguably have an interest in the maintenance of IUU controls as a domestic policy.

UK Withdrawal from the EU and IUU fishing control

Given its full integration in the regulatory arrangements that underpin IUU control in the Union, and the high rate of importations recorded by UK authorities, the withdrawal of the UK from the EU will not be consequence-free. Some of the effects of its withdrawal are likely to be potentially damaging for both parties, and detrimental to the objectives of the IUU Regulation.

Among the regulatory processes that appear less vulnerable to the impact of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU are catch certification arrangements. The flexibility of the regime is evidenced by existing agreements between the EU and non-member States, including New Zealand, the United States and Norway. These arrangements recognise the similarity of domestic regulatory approaches for the purposes of certification, agency interaction, and record keeping.[7] The UK’s integration in the regulatory fabric of the EU in all aspects of IUU fishing control to date suggests that certification arrangements are likely to be perpetuated. There may, however, be loss of coherence between the arrangements if there is no parallel reflection of planned future improvements.

Other cooperative arrangements under the IUU Regulation may be more vulnerable to the negative consequences of the UK’s exit. Among these, the removal of the UK from the internal administrative web of cooperation that supports the operational dimension of the IUU Regulation. This includes intelligence-sharing arrangements concerning IUU risk and verification data under Chapter IV of the IUU Regulation, which establishes the Community Alert System. The sharing of methodologies is essential to avoid misreporting and discourage port-hopping, one of the most important factors in the perpetuation of IUU fishing practices. Inter-agency cooperation and risk assessment systems are key for controls to be effective, and for enabling learning and adaptive growth and resilience against the highly dynamic nature of IUU fishing capture and ensuing transport and processing practices.

Responses to Confirmed IUU Fishing Activity 

The European Commission has adopted a high profile policy of warning third countries that it suspects as being non-cooperating for the purposes of IUU fishing control. The yellow and red carding system follows a formal process of approval that may culminate in the adoption of restrictive measures, including the possibility of trade suspensions, under Article 38 of the IUU Regulation. Once the UK leaves the EU, it will no longer engage in the participatory processes whereby carding decisions are taken, and resulting restrictions will not involve the UK market. This is likely to weaken the reach of some of the measures, as these commonly depend on scale and homogeneity for effectiveness, such as  restrictions in the provision of services to third country IUU listed vessels.[8]  Although there is likely to be loss of coherence in sanctioning approaches, some vessel black lists should persist, insofar as they concern regional fishery organisations of which the UK becomes a party. Lastly, the risk of deregulation in the UK, if ultimately realised, would accentuate discrepancies in market controls.

The IUU Regulation and Shared Stock Management

Upon exit, UK exports to the EU will be subject to the controls and conditions of the IUU Regulation.[9] Regular EU importation processes have been built on a certification strategy that is currently shared by the UK, and should not need major adjustment. International legal obligations exist for both parties in respect of the conservation and cooperative management of shared and straddling stocks under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement, and other applicable global and regional treaties. Potential breaches are in principle relevant for the operationalisation of the IUU Regulation, although only in respect of stock intended for exportation to the EU.

Conclusion

The UK’s departure from the Union has the potential to be detrimental to IUU fishing control policies, given the UK’s prominence as an import market. The overall loss of EU market size, impoverishment of intelligence-sharing mechanisms, and loss of integrity in the articulation of responses to IUU fishing, may erode the efficiency of the system, and cause it to lose global impact in some cases. For the UK, there may be a loss of resilience and opportunity for adaptation to IUU threats, resulting from the withdrawal from EU cooperation, data-sharing and training networks. In order to minimise negative impacts, and given that currently there are no fundamental differences in the IUU control mechanisms in place in the UK and the rest of the Union, the perpetuation of harmonised administrative and operational arrangements should, where possible, be maintained.

There is a risk that the current success of the EU’s approach to IUU fishing control may be unnecessarily damaged, especially if there is loss of good will as a consequence of frictions in shared or straddling stock management negotiations. The IUU Regulation is a flagship tool in the EU’s continuing external fisheries policy, and one of which the UK has been a strong supporter. Maximising the integrity and resilience of the processes it has helped create is essential for the success of IUU fishing control worldwide. The continuing observance of applicable international conservation and cooperation commitments by both parties will be essential to ensure the perpetuation of its success.

Mercedes Rosello, February 2017.

[1] This blog post is a considered opinion by the author only, and has not been written or published for the provision of legal advice.

[2] Later additions include Regulation 86/2010, updating the list of excluded products.

[3] Article 8.2 of the IUU Regulation states: ‘fishery products’ mean any products which fall under Chapter 03 and Tariff headings 1604 and 1605 of the Combined Nomenclature established by Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 of 23 July 1987 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff (1), with the exception of the products listed in Annex I (…).

[4] Article 31.3 of the IUU Regulation.

[5] See Preamble paragraph 38, and Article 12.4 of the IUU Regulation.

[6] http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2009/3391/pdfs/uksi_20093391_en.pdf. The Order implemented sanctions under Regulation 2847/93, later repealed by Regulation 1224/2009 (the Control Regulation). In Scotland, similar arrangements were made through the Sea Fishing (Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing) (Scotland) Order 2013.

[7] Specimen catch certificates and provision for the development of assistance and data exchange processes are set out in Regulation 86/2010.

[8] See Articles 4.2, 5.2 and 6.1(b) of the IUU Regulation.

[9] Article 31.4(a) of the IUU Regulation.

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The government’s new White Paper on Brexit is optimistically described as meant to achieve a new partnership with the European Union. But before that can happen, the terms of divorce must be negotiated, and that is never easy.

The first goal of the government’s Brexit White Paper is to introduce certainty and clarity, subject to the qualification ‘wherever we can’. Insofar as a policy is negotiable, the outcome can hardly be certain at the start of negotiations. Limited clarity and certainty allows both hard Brexiteers and the salvage squad of the remain campaign to project their own hopes onto the government’s plans for Brexit.

To achieve an agreement, the UK government must be prepared to accept compromises. When a new policy is proposed, a member state in good standing can expect to get about two-thirds of what it wants. EU negotiators have made clear that since the UK has chosen to leave the EU it will be given less than any member state gets.

The likelihood of achieving the government’s goals varies from goal to goal. Each can be classified on a simple scale ranging from 0 (impossible); 1 or 2 (achievable with difficulty or only partially); 3, (amenable to bargaining and compromise); and 4 (readily achievable).  They rank as follows:

4 Cooperating in the fight against terrorism. When a terrorist threat erupts, security services are always willing to work together to prevent or apprehend terrorists.

4 Securing rights for UK nationals now resident in Europe and EU nationals now resident in the UK. This is a win-win policy for both the UK and the EU since it will confirm the status quo.

4 Protect and enhance existing workers’ rights. Repatriating EU laws to Britain will leave existing standards in place. Enhancing rights will be disputed in the British Parliament; foreign voices will hardly matter.

4 End the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union over the UK. This can be achieved by unilateral British action, but at a price. It jeopardizes agreement on trade and finance because the EU wants its Court to adjudicate any disputes arising from an agreement.

3 Controlling the number of European nationals coming to the UK. A law or a ministerial statement can set a numerical limit on EU migration but the Home Office has a long record of failing to meet numerical limits. Brexit will free the Mayor of Calais to put refugees there on a train to Britain without any obligation to accept their return from a non-EU state.

2 Protecting historic ties and the common travel area with the Republic of Ireland. Given the negative impact on security of a hard border between Northern Ireland and the Republic, the EU may make concessions to the Republic that the UK could not achieve on its own. The scope for maintaining free trade between England and Ireland is much more limited once the UK becomes a non-member state. Britons flying from London to Dublin or vice versa may have to join long passport queues with foreigners before be crossing the sea border between Ireland and Britain.

2 Securing new trade agreements with non-EU countries. Leaving the EU will give the UK the freedom to negotiate agreements with other countries.  President Trump shows that major countries can have national leaders that are less keen on trading with the UK than the UK is on trading with them and negotiating details of a trade agreement cannot be done in a flying trip or a phone call.

2 Seeking collaboration with European partners in science and technology. Collaboration could be maintained by agreement with the EU – subject to the British government making a cash contribution to the EU research fund and leaving in EU hands the power to decide which British proposals are funded and which are not. People are required to do research and many research workers in Britain are from EU countries. Because of Brexit, some are preparing to return to the continent and immigration controls will make it more difficult to hire replacements.

1 Securing the freest trade possible between the UK and Europe. Not a lot is possible without the British government making a U-turn, because the EU’s requirements for participating in a single European market are unacceptable to the British government’s current position. The UK government’s hopes of “cherry-picking” existing rights of the City of London are also unacceptable to EU leaders.

1 or 0 Strengthening the Union. The Scottish government’s stated goal is to remain an economic and political partner with the EU. Calling and winning another independence referendum is its hoped for means of achieving Scotxit, that is, leaving the Union. If Scottish voters rejected independence, this would preserve the UK as a four-nation Union; whether it would strengthen it is a moot point.

1 or 0 Delivering a smooth, orderly exit with agreement within two years plus a limited transitional period for implementing what Brexit requires. The White Paper recognises the need for an additional period of time to implement a new partnership and avoid a cliff-edge leap from membership to non-membership. To achieve any agreement within a tight deadline will require substantial compromises. Since the impact of Brexit is much greater on the UK than on the 27 states that will remain in the EU after Britain leaves, this increases the risk that the British government will reject the only transition deal on offer as a bad deal and head for the cliff-edge with no deal.

The outcome of negotiations cannot be assigned a numerical mark; it will be graded politically. The Prime Minister can hail whatever is achieved as a great success, whether it is a full loaf, a panini, a few slices of bread or just a biscuit. By contrast, many Conservative MPs will view the results as a curate’s egg, good in some parts and bad in others. They will want the red meat alternative of exiting without any deal.

The White Paper leaves this possibility on the menu. In a European political context, EU negotiators see no settlement as preferable to making concessions that would call into question the authority of the EU in relation to its 450 million citizens and 27 member states.

The post How achievable are the UK’s 12 goals for Brexit? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

This post first appeared at The Academic Research Network on Agencification of EU Executive Governance (TARN)

As a result of the migratory crisis, the transformation of Frontex into a European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG) became a political priority for both the EU and the Member States (MS). Regulation 2016/1624 aims to strengthen the position and independence of the EBCG from the MS, which have not always fully cooperated with Frontex. Frontex was established in 2004 to coordinate and provide operational assistance to the MS in the management of their external borders. The powers initially delegated to Frontex to enhance a uniform and effective implementation of EU border management gradually expanded with the adoption of Regulations 863/2007 and 1168/2011.

Regulation 863/2007 introduced the rapid intervention teams and a Central Record of Available Technical Equipment (CRATE). While this equipment was intended to be used on a bilateral basis between MS, it provided a limited inventory of equipment that could also be used in joint operations. Regulation 1168/2011 reinforced the operational capacity of Frontex and its autonomy. Article 7 ordered that “the Agency may acquire (…) technical equipment for external border control to be deployed during joint operations, pilot projects, rapid interventions, joint return operations or technical assistance project (…)”. Moreover, Regulation 1168/2011 created the European Border Guard Teams. Particularly, article 3b(3) established that Frontex “shall also contribute to the European Border Guard Teams with competent border guards seconded by the Member State as national experts”. For a period of up to six months, Frontex was competent to decide where and for how long the seconded guest officers were going to be deployed (see, Commitments of MS to the European Border Guard Teams and the Technical Equipment Pool).

Despite these developments towards a more independent and effective support to the MS when implementing EU border management rules and policies, the Commission argued that Regulation 2016/1624 would provide the EBCG “the additional competences needed for it to effectively implement integrated border management at Union level (…)”. The Commission stressed that notwithstanding the fact that the EU designed a policy enabling MS to build and maintain sound external borders, the discrepancies in implementation at the national level still remained. However, while the European Commissioner Dimitris Avramopoulos referred to the new agency as “a fully-fledged European Border and Coast Guard system”, Regulation 2016/1624 has not created an agency with exclusive powers in the management and surveillance of the European borders. Rather, it expands the supervisory and operational functions originally delegated to Frontex, which may enhance a uniform and efficient implementation of EU laws and policies.

Source: http://frontex.europa.eu/pressroom/

First, article 3(2) of Regulation 2016/1624 grants the EBCG a supervisory role to ensure a common integrated management of the EU’s external borders. If certain weaknesses were identified at the national external borders, the executive director of the EBCG shall recommend the adoption of specific measures by the concerned MS. Supposing these measures were not implemented in an effective or timely matter, the management board of the agency would adopt a binding decision setting out the necessary measures that the MS must implement (article 13(8)).

Secondly, Regulation 2016/1624 delegates the EBCG greater technical and operational competences (article 18(2)). In order to effectively assist the MS, the EBCG may acquire its own technical equipment (article 38) and it will have at least 1,500 border guards at its disposal to be immediately deployed in joint operations or rapid border interventions (article 20(5)). This new possibility delegated to the EBCG to acquire its own equipment may pose legal and fundamental rights challenges, for instance if the EBCG decides to conduct border surveillance using its own aerostats (blimps), un­manned drones or optionally-piloted aircrafts.

The most contentious competence is what has been referred as the EBCG’s intervention capacity. The new agency is empowered to monitor the effective functioning of the external borders of the MS, carry out vulnerability assessments, verify whether a MS is able to effectively enforce EU law and detect deficiencies in the management of its borders. If a MS either fails to take the measures recommended in its vulnerability assessment or does not request or fails to take the necessary action in the face of disproportionate migratory pressure, the EBCG shall adopt a unified and effective EU approach, since the functioning of the Schengen area might otherwise be jeopardized.

How will this new intervention power delegated to the EBCG work in practice? Article 19(1) of the Regulation 2016/1624 states that “the Council (…) may adopt (…) a decision (…) identifying measures to mitigate those risks to be implemented by the Agency and requiring the Member State concerned to cooperate with the Agency in the implementation of those measures (…)”. Subsequently, the director of the EBCG must, after reaching an agreement with the MS concerned, “determine the actions to be taken for the practical execution of the measures identified in that decision (…)” (article 19(4)). That is, the MS must consent and agree to the operational plan before the EBCG implements it. If the MS neither implements the decision taken by the Council, nor agrees with the director of the EBCG on an operational plan within 30 days, the European Commission may authorize the other MS to reestablish border controls at the Schengen area (article 19(10)). Hence, it is debatable to what extent the new agency will be capable of imposing the execution of certain measures to a MS that completely resists such measures. In this case, the only feasible solution seems to be the exclusion of the non-complying MS from the Schengen area.

Therefore, the implementation powers delegated to the EBCG are still very limited since border management is a distinctive competence related to state-centered matters such as sovereignty, fundamental rights or trade. The EBCG constitutes another necessary and timid step towards an effective and uniform implementation of an integrated management system for external borders. The deliberately ambiguous text of the Regulation 2016/1624 aims to find a balance between the increasing need for an effective and uniform European strategy at the external borders and the resistance of the MS to further delegate sensitive competences closely linked to their national sovereignty. Yet, the emerging shared implementation powers between the EBCG and the MS may lead to important accountability and fundamental rights issues that must be assessed as they arise.

The post The European Border and Coast Guard: Towards the Centralization of the External Border Management appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

About a decade ago in the US, there was a minor scandal about a ‘bridge to nowhere’: substantial federal funds had been appropriated to build a bridge to replace a little-used ferry to an Alaskan island, mainly – it appeared – to serve the pork-barrel politics of Washington.

Theresa May might find herself reflecting on this tale as she returns from the informal meeting of EU heads in Malta on Friday. Alongside the ostensible purpose of the summit – to discuss migration policy and plan for the future of the EU – this was a last opportunity for May to demonstrate her bone fides to colleagues ahead of Article 50 notification next month.

May arrived in Valletta as the only one of the participants to have met Donald Trump since his inauguration, a meeting secured at great speed to bolster her tentative plans for the UK to use Brexit as a springboard to get out into the international system. Taking Trump’s vague enthusiasm for pursuing free trade negotiations as a mandate for this course of action, May’s message to the European Council was two-fold.

Firstly, the UK wishes the EU well in its future development, both because a healthy EU is – politically and economically-speaking – good for the UK, and because May recognises that now is not the time to raise backs, on the verge of a set of negotiations where the UK will be asking much of the EU.

Secondly, May offered the UK a link to the US, an intermediator with a Trump administration that has, by turns, bemused and shocked many in Europe. Playing on both the historic ties that the UK has with the US and the potential close relationship that May talks of for Article 50, May was arguing that the UK still matters.

As far as this went, it represents as coordinated and developed a plan as May has presented to date.

The problem, as so often, is that the UK appears to have made its plans without much reference to what the EU is discussing.

At one level this is very understandable, because the two are heading in different directions: the UK government has to think about what is good for the country’s future path, while the EU has a very different set of concerns. Valletta is a case in point, with the need to regulate migrant flows across the Mediterranean a matter of pressing concern for the EU27 in a way that it certainly isn’t for the UK.

However, at every other level, it represents a failure of British government policy, one that has long characterised the UK’s membership of the EU. The unwillingness – or inability – of successive generations of British politicians and civil servants to conceptualise European integration as anything other than a matter of economic cooperation has led to repeated category errors in policy.

Valletta highlighted this mismatch in a number of ways.

Firstly, the EU’s self-image is that of a substantial and significant part of the international system, with enough depth and scope to be able to fend for itself. May’s offer of a bridge across the Atlantic looked both condescending and irrelevant: the mood music in many European capitals is that Trump will be handled with the longest of spoons or simply ignored as much as possible until a successor arrives in the White House. As Dalia Grybauskaitė, archly noted, “I don’t think there is a necessity for a bridge. We communicate with the Americans on Twitter.”

Secondly, Brexit still looks like an irritant to the EU27. For all of May’s fine words in Valletta, the general impression of the UK is that there is still no clear plan or process for Article 50. Recall that the meeting came after the confusions and vaguenesses of May’s Lancaster House speech, Parliament’s first steps to passing an Article 50 Bill and a White Paper that struggled to offer any substantive policy positions.

For several months after the referendum, Brexit looking like it might be one of the more manageable problems on the EU’s agenda: self-contained, removing a less-than-fulsome partner from the mix, and heading away from the EU rather than heading towards it. More recently, that confidence has been turning into uncertainty about timing and concern that the UK lacks the set of objectives it will need to guide itself through the negotiations. Sympathy looks in very short supply in EU27 capitals, even with a Maltese Presidency than might be expected to be a natural ally.

Once again, May is like the guest who turns up at a party, bearing some inappropriate gift. Worse still, she appears to have little interest in maximising her opportunities: having set up a bilateral with Angela Merkel for Friday afternoon, it was cancelled at short notice, as May felt she had covered the necessary points in an informal chat during a walkabout earlier in the day. Maybe this was discretion – not taking up time with empty rhetoric – but it also speaks to the lack of a detailed plan that May can share with those she will need to convince in the coming months.

And that Alaskan bridge? It never got built in the end. In a time of profound political uncertainty, both domestically and internationally, the UK is going to have to find a better gambit if it is to demonstrate its value to an EU that teeters on the edge of turning in on itself.

This post was originally written for www.ukandeu.ac.uk 

The post A bridge to nowhere? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Today’s White Paper on “The United Kingdom’s exit from and new partnership with the European Union” fulfils a government commitment to provide Parliament with its considered opinion about how to manage the process of Brexit.

Quite aside from the timing issue – coming as it does a day after the second reading of the EU(NOW) Bill - the White Paper is important as its lays down something of a benchmark for the government that it cannot move away from too easily.

However, unlike the vast majority of such documents, this relates to a negotiation, with the EU, its 27 other member states and its own parliament.

Thus matters, because it means that the government is not in a position to deliver whatever it feels like saying, but instead can only offer its hope for that negotiation.

The upshot of this is that the White Paper makes minimal advances on Theresa May’s speech two weeks ago: it’s structured on the same 12 principles, it uses much of the same wording and – most importantly – it offers as few concrete positions as it is possible to imagine.

Beyond reaffirming the desire to stop free movement of people, and accepting that this means the other freedoms must also be halted, there is still no established plan or approach. Indeed, the majority of the White Paper should be read as a list of the points that the UK government believes need to be covered in Article 50 negotiations, rather than as what particular outcome on each individual point should be.

In short, the White Paper is a roadmap, rather than a set of directions. With the latter, you are heading somewhere in particular; while with the former, you’re just aware of what might be here and hereabouts.

Actually, the White Paper doesn’t even really do this. The most glaring omissions relate to the financial aspects: there is passing reference to the budget and liabilities, but nothing at all on how big these might be or how the government wishes to tackle them.

On the generous interpretation, Theresa May is trying to keep her options open as much as possible, rather than making promises she can’t keep in a negotiation in which the UK has only limited power to secure its aims.

However, even in this view one has to wonder whether ‘keeping options open’ is just cover for ‘we still don’t know what we want to achieve’. For the sake of all sides in the coming negotiations, we should hope that this isn’t the case, because there is nothing more difficult than trying to reach an agreement with someone who doesn’t know what they’re aiming for. The clock continues to countdown to March.

The post How to read the Brexit White Paper appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Eppur si muove. A scant 7 months after the referendum, last night Parliament passed the second reading of the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill* by a clear 498 votes to 114. Job done, Parliament no obstacle, what could go wrong?

As usual – in accordance with Usherwood’s law - plenty can go wrong, no matter who one is.

To be clear, the first and second readings are on the principle of a piece of legislation, not its detail. While there might be broad consensus on that principle, there is much less doubt about the operationalisation of it. From the government’s perspective, it will be the committee stage, where amendments are considered, that will be much more consequential and challenging. Seen in that light, the size of last night’s rebellion will be cause for much concern.

Despite a three-line whip, Labour still had almost 50 rebels, including several members of the frontbench and whips (who are supposed to be keeping order in the party). If there is this much indiscipline on the principle of withdrawal, then that indicates a strength of feeling about the issue that might translate into determined amending next week.

Of course, Labour is powerless, unless and and until it works with the other opposition parties in the Commons, as well as Tory rebels. The past two days have not given a clear indication of how many of these latter exist, nor of how far they are prepared to go against Theresa May. Essentially, their power will depend on their ability to find common cause – logically articulated through language of Parliamentary sovereignty – and to use May’s fundamental desire to pursue Brexit to secure their objectives.

At the moment though, the government doesn’t appear to be in the mood to make any concessions at all. As Mark D’Arcy notes, even when amendments might strengthen its hand, the government has resisted them. Everything looks like the thin end of a wedge these days, especially as the full scope of Article 50 negotiations starts to unfurl before a government that still doesn’t have a plan, or the resources to handle the situation.

In short, yesterday doesn’t change much in the scheme of things.

The government is still groping around in the dark, while making bold sounds about how they’re not worried, sounds that convince less and less each time they are made.

The opposition is still in disarray: right now it is as likely that Corbyn suffers a mass revolt on the third reading as it is that amendments can be secured in the second. And there’s the Lords to deal with too.

The legal situation remains unclear: as several have pointed out, the Bill doesn’t actually make a decision about withdrawal, only gives the Prime Minister power to notify under Art.50(1), which means neither the advisory referendum (according to the Supreme Court) nor Parliament have actually made a binding decision. Legal challenges ahoy, if someone’s feeling picky (and surely someone will be). And that’s before we even get to the question of reversibility.

The unavoidable conclusion is that before we get to Article 50 notification – on 9 March, apparently – we will have a lot more fun and games, all of which will feed the sense that the UK is adrift in the Brexit sea, to be battered about in Article 50 negotiations and free trade talks. Time to batten down the hatches.

* Superb trolling BTW by the Bill’s draughtsman: EU (NOW), indeed.

The post We’re on our (Brexit) way! appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

When Martin Schulz resigned as president of the European Parliament to return to German politics, many British saw that as removing an opponent of Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson’s goal of the UK having its cake and eating it too, that is, gaining generous special terms when it leaves the European Union. The bad news is that Schulz is not leaving European politics. On Sunday he was named leader of the German Socialist Party (SPD) and will be the chief challenger of the current Chancellor, Angela Merkel, at the German election in September.

Even if Angela Merkel succeeds in maintaining her Christian Democratic Union (CDU) as the largest group in the German Bundestag, she will need to form a coalition in order to retain office as Chancellor because the country’s proportional representation system prevents any party from gaining an absolute majority.

As the second largest party in the German Bundestag, the SPD is the only coalition partner available to the CDU. Both parties are almost certain to lose seats in the Bundestag to the anti-immigration Alternative for Deutschland, but remain large enough to form another coalition government. In that case Schulz will be in line to receive the post of German Foreign Minister, normally reserved for the second partner in a coalition. This will make him a major voice in Parliament and in discussions with Angela Merkel about how the German government responds to British demands for EU concessions.

If Schulz becomes Germany’s new foreign minister, he will meet his British opposite number at regular meetings of the EU’s foreign secretaries. He can offer Boris Johnson a piece of Black Forest cake and ask BoJo to demonstrate his trick of eating the cake and still having it on the plate. If he can’t work his magic, then Schulz can eat the cake himself and leave BoJo with nothing but an empty plate to show for his too clever by half comment.

Of course, Schulz may not become foreign minister: he may end up as the head of a left wing German coalition government. This could happen if a combination of SPD, Green and Left parties MPs gain a majority of seats. The SPD would then have a choice of remaining a junior partner of Angela Merkel or taking control of government. Choosing to form a left-wing coalition government would satisfy many SPD members who have felt the loss of power and votes as a junior partner in Merkel’s CDU-led government.

If Schulz became Chancellor then BoJo would be saved an embarrassing encounter demonstrating that his magic only applies to words, not real objects. As Chancellor, Schulz would then be Theresa May’s opposite number. Moreover, his presence would be the biggest presence in meetings of the European Council, where 27 heads of EU member states will decide what terms, if any, the EU will offer for Britain’s post-Brexit relations with Europe.

How likely is it that Schulz could replace Angela Merkel?  Opinion polls currently show the total vote of three left parties averaging at the same level as the combined vote of the CDU/CSU plus Free Democrats. The complexities involved in awarding seats in a German electoral system, plus the complexities of arriving at a coalition pact needed to form a government, make it impossible to forecast the outcome. It’s too early to tell. At the moment, Schulz has less of a chance of becoming Chancellor than Merkel has of remaining Chancellor. On the other hand, his chance appears better than that of Donald Trump a year ago.

Downing Street has been working on the assumption that Theresa May will be dealing with Angela Merkel throughout the Brexit process. It is possible that this could produce a ‘pig’ of a Brexit compromise that would satisfy both sides. British negotiators could bring home enough bacon to satisfy meat-eating Tories while leaving lots of Black Forest ham on the table to satisfy hefty German appetites.

It is easy to deal with any Downing Street spokespersons claiming with certainty that Angela Merkel will remain the friendly face backing Britain in EU deliberations next winter. Just ask them: How is Theresa May getting on with President Hilary Clinton?

Bon Appétit.

By Professor Richard Rose, author of Representing Europeans: a Pragmatic Approach and a commissioning fund awardee of The UK in a Changing Europe. It updates a blog he posted on this website on 29 November captioned:  “Another Nail in the Coffin of a Soft Brexit?”

The post German election threatens Bojo’s diet appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

This week’s revelations in the Canard Enchaîné.

Not a good week for French democracy. It started with the communication of false figures from the first round of the Socialist primary, followed by the verdict sending Sarkozy’s former minister Claude Guéant to jail for his ‘automatic cash teller’ practices while in office. It ended up overshadowed by what is now known as #penelopegate, the scandal around the ‘fake jobs’ of François Fillon’s wife Penelope.

A week that looked almost like it was ordered on amazon by Marine Le Pen. Plenty of evidence for the oh, so tempting ‘Tous pourris!’ theory about an establishment that is not only disconnected, but corrupt to the bones. The Front National did not even have to make particular efforts to send the message home: indignation was running high even without them fanning the flames, and they were not too keen on reviving the story of their own MEP assistants paid for working in France for the party…

What is almost touching about the French political class is the stubbornness with which they simply don’t get the point. They seem to live forever in the golden age of the early Fifth Republic, when uninterrupted growth gave them the feeling they were entitled to help themselves to their piece of the cake. Or two. Or three.

Today, especially for candidates who promote strict austerity and collective effort in difficult economic times, all this is no longer acceptable. But like kids caught with both hands in the candy bag, they don’t understand what’s wrong. Listening to the way they defend themselves – from ‘but this is perfectly legal!’ and ‘they mix up gross and net salaries’ (Fillon) to ‘things have always been like this!’ (Guéant) – is a travel back in time. To an epoch when France was entirely impregnated by Catholicism, a place in which sinners were sure to be forgiven and where the accumulation of little benefits and pleasures was considered petty stuff to be dealt with tongue-in-cheek.

This place is no more. Research on consumer behaviour has shown that over the last fifteen years there has been a slow, but continuous change in French consumer’s attitudes which may be linked to an increasing sensitivity to ‘protestant values’ in French society. While it is always risky to stick such labels on movements of social change, there is no doubt that increasing interdependence with a global environment dominated by Anglo-American values has produced some observable shifts.

There was indeed a new sensitivity was not only reflected in increased interest of consumers for environmental issues, organic products, fair trade, but which has also had significant repercussions on the country’s political culture. Traditional cultural auto-stereotypes – a good dose of machismo, disrespect of the law, understanding for petty corruption – were increasingly put into question. There were new laws for gender parity in politics; civil society pressed for tackling the problem of the obscene yearly death toll on the roads; anti-corruption judges adopted a zero-tolerance attitude, including against tax evasion.

True, there is still a large lenience when it comes to extra-marital affairs, but these are rather considered an amusing relic of Versailles court life. François Hollande did not risk an impeachment for having a secret affair with an actor. But he did lose a lot of esteem for spending all this time getting rid of his mistress while buying the breakfast croissants for another, while the middle-class was told to wait patiently for the end of the tunnel.

Those were the days. The Fillon family poses for Paris Match in front of their home near Sablé-sur-Sarthe (2013).

Today, after being told for decades the country was in an economic crisis, the French are fed up with the lack of transparency, accountability, and integrity. The generous self-serving practices of the past – hiring one’s wife with an indecent salary for unclear tasks (Fillon) or taking one’s sons in the government jet to watch a Champions League final in Berlin (Valls) are simply no longer acceptable. As the excellent radio columnist Thomas Legrand pointed out this week, the ‘voracious’ manner in which Mitterrand and Chirac benefitted from the privileges that come with life at the top of the state would today be ‘assimilated to kleptocracy’. Public opinion has moved, while politicians, as if they wanted to provide evidence for just how disconnected they are in their Paris power bubble, have not moved an inch. Many of them even refuse to implement the law prohibiting the age-old practice of serving several mandates concurrently (the famous cumul des mandats’)!

Fillon, and all the others, will have to learn it the hard way. It is difficult to imagine that the strategy mix of self-victimisation and conspiracy theory will work over a three-month campaign. Perhaps with some die-hard party followers. But not with the mainstream French middle class he was courting so desperately with his image of ‘probity’ and ‘rectitude’.

The harm is already done, as two recent polls attest: a SOFRES poll for Le Figaro had Fillon down to only 22% of intentions for the first round of the presidential elections and, worse, credited him with a mere 60-40 win in a potential face-off with Marine Le Pen. And according to an Odoxa poll for France Info, Fillon’s approval rate has gone down from 54% to only 38% since last November. Even in his own party, only 48% consider him ‘honest’…

Not a good week for French democracy. Unless, of course, the events and their consequences finally sound like a wake-up call to the French political class, ideally with tangible effects beyond the election deadlines. In which case, it would have been a good week after all.

Albrecht Sonntag
@albrechtsonntag

This is post # 10 on the French 2017 election marathon.
All previous posts can be found here.

The post France 2017: Protestant protests appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Λαμβάνοντας υπ’ όψιν το προεκτεθέν ισχύον νομικό-θεσμικό αλλά και πολιτικό πλαίσιο του Προγράμματος, η συμμετοχή του ΔΝΤ, όπως έχει ήδη επισημανθεί από τον Μάιο του 2016, φαίνεται αναπόφευκτη. Αυτό που θα πρέπει, όμως, να επιτευχθεί είναι τουλάχιστον η ορθή κρίση από το ΔΝΤ των μέτρων που προτείνουν οι εντός-Ευρώπης δανειστές για το Ελληνικό χρέος, ώστε να διασφαλιστεί η επί της ουσίας η βιωσιμότητα του.

Τις τελευταίες ημέρες υπάρχει έντονη κινητικότητα σχετικά με την ολοκλήρωση της δεύτερης αξιολόγησης του 3ου (2015-2018) Ελληνικού Προγράμματος Οικονομικής Βοήθειας (‘Πρόγραμμα’). Υπήρξαν ελπίδες ότι η ολοκλήρωση θα πραγματοποιούνταν εντός Ιανουαρίου, ήτοι ότι θα υπήρχε συμφωνία στο Eurogroup στις 26.01.2017. Αυτό όμως δεν κατέστει εφικτό, εφόσον το κύριο θέμα που ακόμη εκκρεμεί είναι η συμμετοχή του Διεθνούς Νομισματικού Ταμείου (ΔΝΤ) στο Πρόγραμμα. Για να επιτευχθεί η συμμετοχή αυτή, το ΔΝΤ απαίτησε την προκαταβολική νομοθέτηση επιπλέον μέτρων το 2017 με εφαρμογή τους από το 2019, μετά το τέλος του Προγράμματος (2018). Σημαντικότερα, όμως, το ΔΝΤ εγείρει επίσης σοβαρά θέματα σχετικά με την βιωσιμότητα του Ελληνικού χρέους.

Το ΔΝΤ συμμετέχει έως τώρα στο Πρόγραμμα μόνον ως τεχνικό σύμβουλος (κυρίως συνεισφέρει στην κατάρτιση του σχετικού Μνημονίου). Για την συμμετοχή του και με την παροχή οικονομικής βοήθειας, το ΔΝΤ έθεσε τους παρακάτω δύο όρους: ένα πακέτο δημοσιονομικών μέτρων, με έμφαση στην συνταξιοδοτική μεταρρύθμιση, και σημαντική ελάφρυνση του Ελληνικού χρέους, το οποίο και το ΔΝΤ θεωρεί ότι πλέον έχει καταστεί μη βιώσιμο.

Κατ’ αρχάς, γιατί είναι απαραίτητη η συμμετοχή (είτε τεχνική είτε οικονομική) του ΔΝΤ στο Πρόγραμμα. Όσον αφορά στο νομικό-θεσμικό πλαίσιο, η συμμετοχή του ΔΝΤ σε Πρόγραμμα Οικονομικής Βοήθειας Κράτους-Μέλους της Ευρωζώνης με τεχνική και οικονομική υποστήριξη προβλέπεται στην Συνθήκη για τον Ευρωπαϊκό Μηχανισμό Σταθερότητας (ΕΜΣ – είναι ένας διεθνής οργανισμός με μέλη τα Κράτη-Μέλη της Ευρωζώνης, ο οποίος είναι επίσης ο άμεσος δανειστής της Ελλάδας στο Πρόγραμμα) αλλά και στον Κανονισμό 472/2013 της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης. Όσον αφορά στο πλαίσιο της πολιτικής, η Ελλάδα δεσμεύθηκε να αιτηθεί τεχνική αλλά και οικονομική βοήθεια από το ΔΝΤ στην Σύνοδο των αρχηγών των Κρατών-Μελών της Ευρωζώνης τον Ιούλιο του 2015. Επίσης, και μεγάλο μέρος των υπόλοιπων Κρατών-Μελών της Ευρωζώνης, ήτοι των δανειστών μας, και κυρίως της Γερμανίας, αντιμετωπίζει, ήδη από την αρχή του Προγράμματος αλλά και μέχρι σήμερα, την συμμετοχή του ΔΝΤ στο Πρόγραμμα ως απαραίτητη προϋπόθεση για την συνέχιση παροχής οικονομικής βοήθειας.

Εν ολίγοις, η συμμετοχή του ΔΝΤ φαίνεται αναπόφευκτη, τουλάχιστον από την πλευρά των δανειστών και της Ελλάδας. Δύναται, όμως, το ΔΝΤ να συμμετέχει, δεδομένων των επιφυλάξεων που διατηρεί, και, ιδιαιτέρως, αυτή του μη βιώσιμου χρέους; Εδώ είναι χρήσιμη μια σύντομη ιστορική αναδρομή στο 1ο Πρόγραμμα της Ελλάδας και το 2010. Το ΔΝΤ, κατά την διάρκεια των διαβουλεύσεων για το 1ο Πρόγραμμα, δεν μπορούσε, όπως και τώρα, να επιβεβαιώσει την βιωσιμότητα του Ελληνικού χρέους. Όμως, οι κανονισμοί όριζαν αυτό ήταν απαραίτητη για παροχή τόσο μεγάλου ποσού όσο αυτό που απαιτούνταν για την Ελλάδα. Έτσι, το ΔΝΤ, προς αποφυγή συνεπειών «ντόμινο» (spillover) στην Ευρωζώνη και στην παγκόσμια οικονομία από πιθανή οικονομική κατάρρευση της Ελλάδας, τροποποίησε την συγκεκριμένη προϋπόθεση, καθιστώντας δυνατή την παροχή βοήθειας ακόμη και στην περίπτωση που δεν μπορεί να επιβεβαιωθεί η βιωσιμότητα του χρέους της αιτούσας χώρας, υπό τον όρο ότι κινδυνεύει η παγκόσμια οικονομία από συνέπειες «ντόμινο». Ο συγκεκριμένος κανονισμός τροποποιήθηκε ξανά τον Ιανουάριο του 2016. Το κριτήριο του κινδύνου για «ντόμινο» στην παγκόσμια οικονομία αντικαταστάθηκε με την την απαραίτητη προϋπόθεση παροχής χρηματοδότησης στην αιτούσα χώρα από πηγές εκτός του ΔΝΤ, ώστε να καταστεί το χρέος της βιώσιμο.

Συνεπώς, ακόμη και εάν το ΔΝΤ δεν δύναται να επιβεβαιώσει την βιωσιμότητα του Ελληνικού χρέους, οι κανονισμοί επιτρέπουν την οικονομική συμμετοχή του, δεδομένων των βραχυπρόθεσμων και, των προσεχώς μεσοπρόθεσμων, μέτρων για το Ελληνικό χρέος, τα οποία συμφωνήθηκαν από το Eurogroup. Αυτό, όμως, τελεί υπό την προϋπόθεση ότι το ΔΝΤ θα θεωρήσει τα μέτρα αυτά ως επαρκή προς αποκατάσταση της βιωσιμότητας του Ελληνικού χρέους. Κάτι τέτοιο όμως δεν φαίνεται να ισχύει επί του παρόντος, με το ΔΝΤ να υπογραμμίζει την ανάγκη συμφωνίας περαιτέρω μέτρων ελάφρυνσης του χρέους.

Είναι πρακτικά δυνατή και επιθυμητή η συνέχιση του Προγράμματος μόνον με τον ΕΜΣ; Σαφέστατα, δεδομένης της μορφής και πλέον αυξημένης τεχνογνωσίας του, αλλά και του de facto εξωθεσμικού ρόλου του ΔΝΤ σε σχέση με το Ευρωπαϊκό modus operandi. Παρά ταύτα, αυτό δεν φαίνεται να είναι εφικτό στην παρούσα φάση της διαπραγμάτευσης. Σε κάθε περίπτωση, λαμβάνοντας υπ’ όψιν το προεκτεθέν ισχύον νομικό-θεσμικό αλλά και πολιτικό πλαίσιο του Προγράμματος, η συμμετοχή του ΔΝΤ, όπως έχει ήδη επισημανθεί από τον Μάιο του 2016, φαίνεται αναπόφευκτη. Αυτό που θα πρέπει, όμως, να επιτευχθεί είναι τουλάχιστον η ορθή κρίση από το ΔΝΤ των μέτρων που προτείνουν οι εντός-Ευρώπης δανειστές για το Ελληνικό χρέος, ώστε να διασφαλιστεί η επί της ουσίας η βιωσιμότητα του.

The post Το ΔΝΤ, το Ελληνικό Χρέος, και το 3ο Ελληνικό Πρόγραμμα appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

As one previous post on this blog detailed, the current political turmoil in Northern Ireland was sparked by a subsidy for renewable energy production.  Though it is tempting to blame political carelessness, the ongoing RHI scandal prompts a broader reflection about renewable energy policy instruments. Incentives akin to the RHI are relatively common in renewable energy policies across Europe and it is not the first time that they create difficulties. From the abrupt halt to support to photovoltaics in Spain in 2009 to issues with the territorial planning of incentivised wind power in France and Germany (or near Donald Trump’s golf course…) renewable energy policy can prove hard to manage, even (or especially?) when it relies on apparently simple market-based instruments.

Looking back on the French photovoltaic crisis

The history of solar photovoltaics in France is a good illustration, as I retrace in a recent paper in Environmental Politics. The uptake of photovoltaics in France was driven by a feed-in tariff scheme set up in 2006. These feed-in tariffs offered a fixed payment over 20 years for each unit of electricity generated by photovoltaic appliances and fed to the grid. Their introduction in France was directly inspired by the German FIT-based renewable energy policy. However, while the 2006 feed-in tariff scheme imported its basic template from Germany, it did not copy the features designed to control implementation and uptake. For example, tariffs were not set to decrease every year to follow cost evolutions, as they do in Germany. In addition, the policy did not create institutional or political arrangements to monitor implementation, and very limited manpower was devoted to its management within ministries. Photovoltaics, one of the least mature renewable energy sources, was clearly not intended to contribute significantly to a French electricity mix dominated by nuclear power; the incentive was expected to have only marginal effects, as is explicitly stated in the document planning investment in the electricity sector for 2005-2015 (p. 48).

 Figure 1: Evolution of grid-connected solar photovoltaics in France: installed capacity in megawatt-peak. (data: SOeS)

However, by 2009 the policy began to have significant impacts as sharp decreases in the costs of photovoltaic equipment combined with a surge in political enthusiasm for renewables. With feed-in tariffs guaranteeing record financial returns, the number of photovoltaic installations rocketed and it became very difficult to evaluate the share of serious projects v. speculative ones. Despite alerts in early 2009,  public authorities did not react before January 2010. When they eventually did, the lag between announcement and implementation of tariff cuts only accelerated the rush to register solar projects before cuts were imposed. They also did not have the information channels and the institutional resources to react efficiently. This resulted in high political instability: the policy was reformed again eight months later and no less than twelve regulatory documents about it where published over the year.

The scheme was funded by a levy on electricity use, so this translated in an increase in France’s electricity price for 20 years, the duration of the feed-in contracts. In 2015, feed-in tariffs for photovoltaics represented 35% of the taxes on electricity funding public services, and amounted to € 2,2bn, despite the fact that photovoltaics only accounted for 1% of electricity production in France (Ministry for Ecology, 2016 p. 26).

Unable to contain the policy, the government abruptly froze the scheme in December 2010 – without any warnings. This triggered a violent political crisis which culminated during an extremely tense consultation with stakeholders – though not nearly so tense so as to provoke resignations among the government (this video of a protest before a meeting during the consultation gives an idea of the climate). It ended with a revised version of feed-in tariffs that drastically restricted their ambition and scope to prevent any future crisis, and left the emerging French solar industry decimated. The emerging enthusiasm for photovoltaics plummeted. This is a good example of an ill-managed policy: an instrument was set up in 2006 as a mainly symbolic gesture, with little care for its potential impacts; it turned unexpectedly attractive and the government was unable to monitor its effects and contain its costs. The policy was managed haphazardly for a year, and it ended with an abrupt u-turn that virtually cancelled out the growth of a sector that had just been significantly invested in, when a successful policy should have been able to  both contain and sustain growth.

What can we learn from the French & Northern Irish cases?

What do these two stories tell us about renewable energy policies? First, it is not a matter of policy learning: the risk for such instruments to create windfall effects is well identified and the design and use of safeguard mechanisms is documented. These mechanisms may not always work as well as expected, but they were not even tried in both the French and Northern Irish cases. Careless design and limited resources for policy steering can account for the defects of these instruments, and they are likely to stem from unrealistically low expectations.

This suggests that there might be something specific about renewable energy subsidies, an issue that we are exploring as part of a research project on Energy transitions in-the-making. They aim to accelerate and sustain innovation and the widespread deployment of new technology, and ultimately work towards reconfigurations of the energy landscape. They are thus designed to spark novelty and make the unexpected happen (to an extent at least), but should do so in a controlled way. Precisely because of this objective, their calibration is a delicate business, even when conducted carefully. The subtleties of policy design then take on a major role: minor flaws can have major consequences given the potentially exponential effects of incentives.

This is evidenced by one striking common feature of the French and Northern Irish cases: the dramatic political effects triggered by relatively simple and widespread policy instruments. In both cases, the malfunctioning of instruments did not generate bounded, sectoral difficulties; instead, it degenerated into significant political crises that challenged established legitimacies –  especially so in Northern Ireland. This is a welcome reminder that market-based instruments are not politics-proof, and that the social and technological dynamics behind their workings cannot be eluded.

The post The politics of (bad) policy design: French solar panels and Northern Irish boilers appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The British Supreme Court ruling of January 24 was a mixed result for the Prime Minister Theresa May’s government (PDF).

On the one hand, they saw their earlier defeat in the High Court defeat confirmed, committing them to passing legislation through parliament before they can start the formal process of leaving the European Union under Article 50.

On the other hand, the court unanimously agreed that the Scottish and Northern Irish assemblies did not need to be consulted, closing down what might have been a very awkward development, given the majorities to remain in the EU in both nations.

Perhaps most importantly, the case highlights the extent to which the government has failed to develop a coherent plan of how to manage and pursue Brexit, albeit having decided what substantive outcomes it seeks.

Having made a very strong commitment to starting negotiations by the end of March, May now finds herself having to squeeze a bill through parliament, something that could have been done much more leisurely if there had not been an appeal to the original ruling in November.

What’s next?

To be clear, there is no real chance that parliament will not pass this bill. Despite a majority of MPs and Lords being in favour of remaining in the EU, there is broad acceptance that the June 2016 referendum was legitimate and its result is to be respected. With a Labour Party leadership stating that they will push for support of the bill, there are insufficient rebels on either side of the House to overturn May’s majority.

What is much less clear is the price that parliament will extract for its support. Most obviously, there is very strong support for a White Paper, which would outline the government’s plans in a more formal way, before voting on such a bill, as well as many voices asking that parliament should have oversight and scrutiny of the Article 50 negotiations.

Until now, the government has only grudgingly conceded that parliament will have a vote on the final deal, but without the opportunity to shape that deal this means little.

As such we are about to see a frenzy of activity in parliament once the draft bill is published. The government will be able to avoid the more radical amendments, but is likely to find itself pushed to accept more oversight, especially if Labour can find and keep some discipline on the issue.

Once again, Jeremy Corbyn cuts an ambivalent figure here – torn between a general dislike of the EU and its works and a worry about the erosion of workers’ rights caused by the Brexit. While Tory rebels have started to build links with counterparts across the House, it remains to be seen whether they can outmanoeuvre the government.

What of the other nations in the UK?

There is an added complication to all of this, caused – ironically – by the Supreme Court judgment. The closing-down of any role for Scotland and Northern Ireland in Brexit negotiations might have side-stepped matters now, but it is clear that it hands the Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP) a very strong stick with which to beat the drum for a second independence referendum.

While the SNP had been one of the very few parties to be prepared for a Leave vote in the referendum, they have been hamstrung by opinion polls that suggest the Scottish public are not particularly eager to leave the UK.

First Minister Nicola Sturgeon moved quickly after the Supreme Court ruling to present the decision as a marker of how little control Scotland has over its own future. With a commitment to bring a motion to the Scottish Parliament shortly on the triggering of Article 50, Sturgeon is clearly working on using this as a way of getting voters behind her, as and when she decides to hold another referendum.

Regardless of the result, Theresa May will find that such a referendum will require time and effort that she can ill-spare from Article 50 negotiations.

If Scotland holds the potential for a break-up of the UK, then Northern Ireland holds the potential for the further undermining of the peace process. While the collapse of the Executive last week was not due directly to Brexit, the widespread concerns about the re-imposition of a hard border with the Republic of Ireland and about the disentanglement of the EU from the Good Friday agreements have left many on edge.

The Supreme Court’s marginalisation of the Northern Ireland Assembly is a further blow, albeit one whose effect remains to be seen as new elections get under way.

Discovering the full extent of Brexit

Taken together, the overall effect of the Supreme Court has been to change the manner of Brexit, rather than the destination. The bold political reality of the referendum remains as before, but we are now seeing the emergence of different political takes on how to handle it.

The suspicion that many voters have voiced about “the establishment” trying to overturn the referendum remains unfounded, but the lack of a clearly defined plan makes it easy for politicians and commentators across the spectrum to point to actions that look dubious.

In reality, the British political system is still trying to discover the full extent of what Brexit might involve, as well as what might be done within that. Except a lot more debate about what the options might be in the coming months and years, long after this legal complication has been dealt with.

This piece originally appeared on AlJazeera.com

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