Ideas on Europe Blog

Unity is strength. These were the words of the German Chancellor Scholz as he met with President Macron and Prime Minister Tusk in Berlin. Similarly, in his Sorbonne speech, President Macron appealed to more unity in face of constant geopolitical changes, calling for a strong bloc who is capable of leaving its footprint in the international setting. Unity has then become a hot debate topic in everyday politics, as leaders often proclaim that a united EU is able to better assert itself in the international arena.

 

This link between unity and external action is reflected in the approval of EU sanctions against Russia in February 2022, as these passed with an unprecedent speed. Thus, as the EU displayed a united front, it emanated strength and influence. On the flip side of the coin, the EU might struggle to display a united front in certain geopolitical issues, as EU Member States (MS) demonstrate divergent domestic interests. In the Middle East, for instance, the EU has been facing difficulties in conveying a united message. Consequently, if the EU is not able to speak in a single voice, its credibility may be undermined vis-à-vis third parties.

 

So, could a lack of European unity lead to an undermined role for Europe? Though the answer to this question would entail delving into the various complexities of EU policy, it is possible to take a positive outlook to external action. In fact, despite being internally divided, the EU nonetheless concludes international agreements. Take trade policy as an example. Within the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) and the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) MS displayed polarised views, but the EU still reached an internal position and effectively concluded the negotiations. Therefore, the key question should not be whether there is a correlation between internal cohesiveness and effectiveness, but instead, how EU unity can be forged. Indeed, in the article I presented at the UACES Conference in Amsterdam, I argued that there is no strict correlation between EU internal cohesiveness and external effectiveness, as a disunited EU is capable of achieving its goals by forging unity during the negotiation process.

 

The contribution of the UACES Conference

 

Attending the UACES Conference in June was utterly beneficial for the development of valuable skills and new connections, as I had the opportunity to get to know interesting colleagues who work in a similar field. As a result, I enriched my perspective of EU studies, gaining new insights into the role of feminist and LGBTQ+ theories on the understanding of complex phenomena. Moreover, the establishment of these links, allowed me to reflect on different forms of evolving my research. Here, I highlight the perspective of international law – an area I am very captivated by.

 

In addition, the conference was marked by its welcoming atmosphere where great feedback was provided – though I focus on trade policy in my research, I had the opportunity to reflect on the importance of analyzing the link between cohesiveness and effectiveness in security negotiations. In fact, obtaining results in this field would be of remarkable societal relevance, as it could lead to a thorough understating of current geopolitical issues (e.g. military support for Ukraine), therefore paving the way for the understanding of collectively beneficial outcomes.

 

I would therefore like to thank UACES for the opportunity to present my research in such a dynamic and thought-provoking event.

The post A Reflection on EU Internal Unity through the UACES Conference appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

In recent years, Europe has witnessed a notable surge in the popularity and influence of populist radical right parties. This trend has been particularly evident in the 2024 elections for the European Parliament, where this party-family has secured significant victories, reflecting a broader shift in the political landscape across the continent.

One of the most prominent figures in this phenomenon is Giorgia Meloni, leader of Italy’s Fratelli d’Italia (FdI). Meloni is the first female Prime Minister of the country and managed, in only a decade, to take FdI from being a smaller political to the first party in Italy. In Meloni’s agenda emerge many of the populist radical right ideological traits, particularly the return to conservative social values, such as, the traditional family, women appointed to their roles of mothers, as well as stances against immigration and the LGBTQ+ community. The success of FdI is mirrored in other European countries, suggesting a growing resonance with populist radical right ideologies.

For instance, Germany’s Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) represents the complex dynamics of the populist radical right on the EU level. Although the AfD did not perform particularly well in the 2021 federal elections, losing parts of the votes obtained in the previous 2017 elections, it has consistently achieved stronger results in the recent European Parliament elections. This apparent discrepancy highlights the different dynamics at play in national versus European elections, suggesting that the AfD’s message resonates more with voters when framed within the broader context of European governance and identity politics.

In France, the Rassemblement National (RN), led by Marine Le Pen, further underscores the persistence of the populist radical right in Europe. The RN has made significant inroads in French politics, despite challenges in securing Le Pen’s presidency in 2022 and the majority in the July 2024 legislative elections. The party has, nonetheless, been able to secure substantial representation over the years, highlighting its growing influence in the French political scene. This success reflects the RN’s dédiabolisation (de-demonisation) – the strategic rebranding to shed its extremist image and appeal to a broader – and possibly younger – electorate. This process, initiated by Marine Le Pen, involved softening the party’s rhetoric and distancing it from its more controversial and radical past.

Other parties in Europe have seen its share of influence, such as in the Netherlands with the Party for Freedom (PVV), led by Geert Wilders. Known for his outspoken stance against Islam and the European Union, Wilders has managed to maintain a significant following despite facing legal and political challenges. Similarly, under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, Hungary has also become a stronghold of populist radical right politics, through the implementation of policies that emphasise national identity, and against the European Union, immigration and the LGBTQ+ community.

In this light, the success of these parties in various European countries points to a larger phenomenon that is unlikely to disappear anytime soon. The populist radical right’s ability to tap into the public’s fears and frustrations about immigration, cultural change, and globalisation has proven to be a powerful political strategy. This trend should not be overlooked and considered as just a passing phase, but it reflects deep-seated concerns among significant portions of the European electorate.

Moreover, the rise of the populist radical right has had profound implications for the European Union. These parties often challenge the very foundations of the EU, advocating for policies that prioritise national interests over collective European goals. This has led to increased tensions within the EU, as member states navigate the complex dynamics of sovereignty and integration.

The persistence of populist radical right parties in European politics indicates a fundamental shift in the political landscape. As long as issues like immigration, economic inequality, and cultural identity remain contentious, these parties will continue to find fertile ground for their messages. The challenge for Europe will be to address the underlying causes of this political shift while maintaining the principles of democracy and unity that have long defined the continent.

The post The Success of the Populist Radical Right – What does it mean for the European Union? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Let’s cut to the chase: What ARE the strongest arguments for the UK to rejoin the EU?

I asked Chat GPT 4.0 for the answer, which it gave in precisely 2 seconds.

Clearly, I’m now redundant. But the case to rejoin the EU certainly is not. If only we could rejoin the EU as fast as AI gave its reasons to do so.

Read the rational arguments configured by Artificial Intelligence.

• THE ANSWER BY ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

Rejoining the European Union (EU) is a complex and multifaceted issue, but there are several strong arguments that proponents put forward:

1. ECONOMIC BENEFITS

Trade and Market Access

• Single Market Access: Rejoining the EU would grant the UK seamless access to the Single Market, facilitating trade by eliminating tariffs, reducing non-tariff barriers, and simplifying regulations.
• Customs Union: Membership in the customs union would eliminate customs checks and tariffs on goods moving between the UK and EU, reducing costs and delays for businesses.

Investment and Growth

• Foreign Direct Investment (FDI): The UK could attract more FDI, as EU membership makes it a more attractive location for multinational companies seeking access to the European market.
• Economic Stability: Being part of a larger economic bloc can provide more stability and resilience against global economic fluctuations.

2. POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC INFLUENCE

International Influence

• Global Power: EU membership amplifies the UK’s voice on the global stage, allowing it to participate in shaping EU policies and decisions that have international implications.
• Collective Security: Collaboration on security, defense, and foreign policy within the EU can enhance the UK’s strategic capabilities and influence.

3. SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ADVANTAGES

Freedom of Movement

• Work and Travel: Rejoining the EU would restore the right of UK citizens to live, work, and travel freely across EU member states, benefiting individuals and businesses alike.
• Cultural Exchange: Enhanced opportunities for cultural and educational exchanges can enrich the lives of UK citizens and foster greater understanding and cooperation.

Rights and Protections

• Worker and Consumer Rights: EU regulations often provide robust protections for workers and consumers, ensuring higher standards and benefits.

4. SCIENTIFIC AND EDUCATIONAL COLLABORATION

Research Funding and Collaboration

• EU Research Programs: Rejoining would provide access to EU research funding and collaborative projects, which are crucial for advancing scientific and technological innovation.
• Educational Opportunities: Participation in programs like Erasmus+ enhances educational opportunities and cross-border academic collaboration.

5. REGIONAL STABILITY AND COHESION

Northern Ireland Peace Process

• Good Friday Agreement: Rejoining the EU could help stabilize the situation in Northern Ireland by addressing issues related to the border with the Republic of Ireland, thus supporting the peace process.
• Regional Development: EU funding and policies aimed at regional development could benefit disadvantaged areas in the UK.

6. ENVIRONMENTAL AND REGULATORY STANDARDS

Climate Change and Environmental Policies

• Sustainability Goals: Collaborating with the EU on climate change initiatives can enhance the UK’s ability to meet its environmental targets and commitments.
• High Standards: EU environmental regulations ensure high standards for pollution control, biodiversity, and sustainable development.

7. PUBLIC OPINION AND POLITICAL UNITY

Changing Sentiments

• Public Support: If public opinion shifts significantly in favor of rejoining, it would provide a democratic mandate to reconsider EU membership.
• National Unity: Rejoining the EU could help address divisions within the UK, particularly if Brexit has led to political and social fragmentation.

These arguments collectively present a strong case for the UK to consider rejoining the EU, emphasising economic prosperity, political influence, social benefits, scientific collaboration, regional stability, environmental sustainability, and the potential for enhanced national unity.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

• Watch this 9-minute video on why the UK joined the EU, and why we might join again for the same reasons

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The post Strongest arguments to rejoin the EU appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

This blog post summarises the contribution I submitted for the UACES 2024 Graduate Forum held this June in Amsterdam. I want to thank UACES for having organised and provided funds for attending this event!

 

Human rights constitute the core values of the European Union, enforceable both internally and externally. Through the Amsterdam Treaty-consolidated acquis communautaire, they have become a cornerstone of the EU law. Yet, the EU’s journey towards human rights inclusion in the treaties has been lengthy. It has been largely shaped by significant case law, notably from the German Constitutional Court, which standardized human rights based on common constitutional traditions. Equally important is the role of the European Convention and Court on Human Rights as a source for EU human rights, despite the EU Court of Justice denying the possibility of an EU membership in the convention. Finally, the third source of human rights can be found in international human rights law, especially its constituent treaties. All relevant sources were subsequently enshrined in treaty provisions, thereby enriching the construction of EU legal instruments, and ultimately fostering an EU principled approach.

Recently, this principled approach has been further concretised in EU regulatory efforts, encompassing a growing array of policies, and spanning from environmental protection to supply chains.

 

Environmental Protection and Human Rights

The EU Green Deal (EGD) has been a central policy of the 2019-2024 Commission. At its core are the commitments to achieve a carbon-neutral EU by 2050, first outlined and subsequently consolidated in the 2021 Regulation amending the broader EU climate law. While the instrument itself does not explicitly mention human rights, many associated policies include provisions that address human rights considerations. This is particularly evident in due diligence-based instruments and other regulatory frameworks such as the EU Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA), which includes provisions addressing human rights considerations in international partnerships. Other instruments related to the EGD also include human rights provisions. The EU Battery Regulation mandates risk assessments and necessary actions linked to due diligence in cases where human rights abuses are at risk. The EU auditing regime has also been expanded to include assessments of sustainability and human rights impacts. Notably, the 2022 Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) extends human rights and sustainability requirements, previously established in non-financial reporting, to sustainability reporting, merging these concepts under a broader umbrella of sustainability.

These amendments underscore the EU’s commitment to a principled approach to human rights and its expanding influence in the business sector. Moreover, they demonstrate the inseparable nature of human rights and sustainability. Legislative developments, including recent case law from the European Court of Human Rights, support the integration of environmental rights within the realm of human rights. However, the intersection of environmental and human rights represents just one aspect of the broader EU human rights efforts. The imminent introduction of the due diligence directive presents an additional dimension to this unfolding debate.

 

Human Rights Through Supply Chains

The development of the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CS3D) was some years ago but has only recently concluded. Developing a human rights due diligence policy for supply chains was not just an independent EU initiative; it followed existing instruments in several member states. Notably, three EU member states had already developed instruments covering supply chains. The French Loi de Vigilance (Law of Vigilance – 2017) and the German LkSG (Supply Chain Act – 2021) are broad-spectrum due diligence instruments, while the Dutch Child Labour Due Diligence Law (2019) is subject-specific. The CS3D aims to complement these national actions by establishing a unified EU framework for environmental and human rights due diligence applicable to large companies. The CS3D mandates the application of EU human rights standards through due diligence within the EU. It also extends these requirements to supply chains and large companies from third countries operating within the EU internal market. It also provides mechanisms for member states to enforce penalties in cases of non-compliance. The overarching goal is to hold businesses accountable for upholding human rights, prevent gross violations within and outside of the EU borders, and establish penalty regimes for violations.

The CS3D stands out as a pivotal instrument demonstrating the EU’s principled approach, not only for its intrinsic value but also for its establishment of a unified EU-wide system to enforce human rights standards in the business sector. This framework complements existing international frameworks established by the UN, OECD, and the ILO. The CS3D represents the next phase of EU human rights policy and aligns with a global trend toward holding large corporations accountable. This aspect reinforces the EU’s role as a prominent global advocate for human rights, showcasing its commitment to external enforcement beyond traditional conditionality measures. This instrument encapsulates the evolution of the EU’s principled approach, building on past efforts and paving the way for future developments in human rights protection.

The post Advancing a Principled Approach: Human Rights and Environmental Integration in the EU Business Sector appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

This article is based on research presented at the UACES Graduate Forum Conference 2024 and is anticipated to be published in a journal article currently undergoing evaluation.

The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine has reignited interest in EU enlargement, presenting new opportunities for (pre-)accession candidates. While much attention is often given to the Council and the European Commission, the European Parliament’s role is frequently overlooked. Moreover, scholars mainly focused on the Parliament (EP’s) broader role in the domain of foreign policy, specifically its tools to potentially exert influence and the extent to which it does within CFSP/CSDP. In contrast, despite its clearly distinctive position within the institutional power balance of the Union, the capabilities of Parliament when it comes to enlargement policy are yet to be appropriately addressed in the literature.

This blog post explores how the EP can leverage both formal and informal sources of power to potentially influence EU enlargement policy, thereby identifying five key tools that stand out as most prominent in the literature: agenda-setting, the consent procedure, standing parliamentary delegations, budgetary authority, and parliamentary oversight. The findings reveal a notable disparity between the European Parliament’s formal powers and informal powers, thereby confirming its ‘self-empowerment’ strategy and simultaneously underscoring the consent procedure and the budget as the most powerful tools available for the Parliament.

By combining a document analysis (Treaties, Inter-Institutional Agreements and the EP’s Rules of Procedure) and an extensive literature review (using the iterative snowballing technique), the study provides a comprehensive understanding of the EP’s capabilities to potentially influence enlargement policy.

 

Unpacking the EP’s (Hidden) Powers

The findings highlight a significant disparity between the Parliament’s formal and informal capacities regarding enlargement. While the former are often sparse in this area (except its consent and budgetary powers), the Commission and the Council anticipate the EP’s position when making choices. Besides these politics of anticipation, the Parliament empowers itself through a maximalist interpretation of the Treaties and its engagement in IIAs and its own RoP. Among the five avenues of power, the consent procedure and the power of the purse stand out as the most prominent.

 

1.  Agenda-Setting

Although the EP’s formal role in setting the EU’s enlargement agenda is limited, it can informally shape the agenda through the adoption of reports and resolutions, debates about EU enlargement and speeches by its President, thereby raising the salience of an issue and foster public and/or elite support for EU enlargement.

 

2.  The Consent Procedure

The most clearcut avenue through which the Parliament can weigh on enlargement policy is the consent procedure. Art. 49 TEU grants the EP such veto power in the case of accession through the right to accept or block any application, since Council must consult the Commission and gain EP consent before taking action. In this way Parliament “de facto decides on enlargements”. However, when it comes to enlargement the power given to the EP through the consent procedure is a blunt tool as offers no room to bargain, let alone amend the final text.

Nevertheless, the EP’s threat of veto as well as increased awareness that the views of Parliament are directly legitimized by EU citizens has allowed it to also influence the specific contents of the agreements. By adopting resolutions that set so-called ‘conditions’ for consent and (threatening to) delay the approval of Association or Accession Agreements, the EP pressures the Commission and Council to consider its positions. This has allowed the EP to push for greater attention to political issues such as democracy and human rights in the candidate countries. A unified parliament (i.e., acting with a majority among the main political groups) is, however, essential for making this avenue of power an effective one.

 

3.  Standing Parliamentary Delegations

Parliament can also weigh on enlargement policy with its nine formal standing parliamentary delegations to the (potential) EU candidate countries, through which it can partake in ‘inter- parliamentary diplomacy.’ As such, the standing delegations tend to take on two main functions. Firstly, due to its (mostly) continuous nature, they could also act as ‘preparatory agents’ that offer foundational work for the eventual decisions by the executive as they have more space to maneuver as opposed to traditional diplomacy. Secondly, delegations also allow for potentially influencing the views of parliamentarians from candidate countries as ambassadors of the EU’s constitutional values, able to emphasize matters such as human rights and democracy. However, two caveats need to be made. First, their effectiveness relies on internal coherence between committees and delegations, which often have overlapping competences. And secondly, the unregulated appointment of delegation members can lead to biased representations, potentially undermining fair debate and transforming them into dialogues among the deaf.

 

4.  Budgetary Authority

The EP’s involvement in the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) and the Annual Budget allows it to link funding to specific conditions related to enlargement. Concerning the MFF, the Treaties require

the EP to give consent by absolute majority before the Council can adopt the MFF. Additionally, sectoral regulations, which provide the basis for the funding of almost 40 EU spending programs over a seven- year period, are agreed upon under OLP, putting the EP on equal footing with the Council. This effectively makes the EP a co-legislator on the main external financing instruments regarding enlargement (i.e. IPA and NDICI) as the ceilings and overall amounts of these instruments are decided by the MFF, but not exactly how they are organized, i.e., their general and specific objectives and the size, form and rules of the funding.

Turning to the Annual Budget then, it is within the seven-year ceilings of the MFF that the Parliament’s power is most prominent, as it needs to agree with the Council following a special legislative procedure. The Annual Budget is often identified as a very important power-maximization tool that offers indirect leverage in the area of foreign policy and enlargement and allows for Parliament to steer the political direction of these policy domains. The EP often acts to defend the policies that the Council has under- funded, intervening to amend the sums that are being assigned to specific programs and projects. At the same time, shared concerns are also often promoted by acting together with the Council, as is the case with, for instance, pre-accession assistance. However, this power remains at all times constrained by the limited room for maneuver left by the MFF. Several authors therefore emphasize that one of the best strategy for the EP to still maximize its (potential for) influence, is aiming at a limited number of priorities in successive annual budgets (see f.e. 1999-2004 stabilisation programs in the Western Balkans). However, this strategy is once again dependent on internal cohesion, as conflict seems almost inevitable on a sensitive subject such as the budget, which basically covers all policy areas.

 

5.  Parliamentary Oversight

The European Parliament oversees the executive, primarily the Commission, and other EU institutions through several key functions. It consents to the appointment of the Commissioner for Enlargement, allowing it to influence portfolio allocation and even compel the withdrawal of a designated candidate. The EP also requires the Commissioner to participate in debates and respond to questions. Additionally, the EP must be fully informed at all stages of association and accession agreements, although the implementation of this requirement looks often different with the provisions unevenly implemented. Firstly, the provision of information relies on the quality of the relationship between the respective Commissioner or DG NEAR, and the AFET Committee (or its secretariat). Moreover, it seems that there exists currently no harmonized approach by the Commission’s services to provide information (concerning negotiations of international agreements) to Parliament in a coordinated manner. Finally, that the flow of information remains piecemeal and incomplete which in turn could have negative consequences for the Parliament’s consent and therefore increase the risk of tenuous relations between both institutions. Finally, apart from its role in establishing the budget, the European Parliament can also play a crucial role in assessing its implementation through the discharge procedure which is as much a power as a procedure.

 

Conclusion

The study identifies a significant disparity between the European Parliament’s formal and informal powers in the context of enlargement. While the former are often sparse in this area (except its consent and budgetary powers), the Commission and the Council anticipate the EP’s position when making choices. Besides these politics of anticipation, the Parliament empowers itself through a maximalist interpretation of the Treaties its engagement in IIAs and its own RoP. Among the five avenues of power, the consent procedure and the power of the purse stand out as the most prominent.

However, three caveats need to be made. Internal divisions and conflicting interests within the hemicycle can undermine its bargaining power, particularly during consent and budget procedures. Additionally, overlapping responsibilities among different committees and standing parliamentary delegations, along with voluntary delegation appointments, can hinder its strength. Streamlining roles and ensuring committed participation are necessary to enhance Parliament’s impact on enlargement policies. And finally, timely and complete access to information from the Commission and the Council is often challenging, hindering the EP’s ability to conduct thorough scrutiny and make informed decisions. Enhanced transparency and information-sharing are therefore vital for effective parliamentary oversight of enlargement policies.

The post The (hidden) powers of the European Parliament in EU enlargement policies appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

by Monika Brusenbauch Meislová (Masaryk University)

My article, recently published in JCMS, looks into how ongoing policy processes are discursively legitimated. It argues that that in order to satisfy complex demands on their legitimacy, policy makers tend to legitimate them not only by referring to the status quo (the current – new – state of affairs), but also by legitimating the status ad que (the future state) and delegitimating the status quo ante (the previous state). The article applies this original typology to the empirical case of Brexit, not least because the question of how Brexit is being legitimized is of immense European-wide relevance. Indeed, Brexit acts as a benchmark for citizens’ evaluations of EU membership in other member states, with the literature showing that positive information about the Brexit outcome leads to substantial increases in optimism about leaving the EU.

I specifically focused on the official communications of the UK Conservative government under Boris Johnson published on its website. The findings demonstrate that the government did seek legitimacy of Brexit through its current performance but also legitimated Brexit heavily through an anticipatory future promise and delegitimation of its previous EU membership and the EU as a result. While doing so, it (re)produced particular pasts, presents and futures (and the relations between them) and constructed a distinct sense of place and (non)belonging between self and the EU as the ex-community. Let’s now have a look at how exactly the Johnson’s government did that.

Legitimating the presence

The UK government strongly claimed the output legitimacy of Brexit through its current performance, framing it as a highly effective policy that had achieved all its goals.

There were two dominant narratives within this temporal regime: the narrative of success and the narrative of emancipation. The narrative of success functioned to construct the image of Brexit as a sheer triumph. The main topic here was that of gain. Appealing to people’s collective feelings of national pride, this narrative conveniently served the function of highlighting the great many advantages that Brexit had already brought to the UK and that ‘everyone’ in the country could now reap. With Brexit having already proved a ‘great success’, arguments here were built on a very simple cause and effect logic: the end of EU membership was the direct cause of the UK’s current successes.

The narrative of emancipation served to cast Brexit as having empowered the UK, almost in all every way imaginable, with the topic of control restoration being central to this construction. The main discursive thrust here was the representation of the control which the government had now managed to take back from Brussels (on a plethora of issues, including democracy, borders, waters, money, the economy etc.). Brexit was explicitly marketed as a tool by means of which the UK had restored its national pride. It was only now, with the country ‘finally out of the EU single market and customs union’, that the UK had become a ‘sovereign country’, able to make ‘sovereign choices across a range of different areas of national life’.

Legitimating the future

Despite having become a reality, Brexit (still) functioned heavily as a future imaginary. Representing it as a future benefit, the government foregrounded various aspects of its numerous upcoming (solely positive) implications.

Two dominant narratives here were those of a bright future and that of opportunity. The narrative of a bright future served to convey the vision of UK’s post-Brexit amazing future. A prominent topic was that of better prospects. Replete with pledges for a better future and a bold new future Britain, this promissory discursive construction was characterized by offering up a vision of the expected future of the UK, unhampered by EU membership, which was full of possibilities. Relying on the symbolism of hopeful future-oriented performance and values, the Johnson’s government routinely exploited this topic to send the message that Brexit would increase prosperity in all parts of the UK, across all levels of society.

The narrative of opportunity, built around the topic of potential, functioned to depict Brexit as a source of huge opportunities. The government was eager to cast the end of EU membership as a key precondition for creating a forward-looking, entrepreneurial, and globally ambitious country. Constantly evaluating Brexit’s potential as ‘enormous’, it was only due to Brexit that the UK would ‘thrive as a modern, dynamic and independent country’ and ‘seize new opportunities available to a fully independent global trading United Kingdom’.

Delegitimating the past

Even though the government highlighted its efforts to create a ‘new relationship’ with the EU ‘as friendly trading partners and sovereign equals’, it very much deplored the country’s former EU membership (and the EU as such) in its pursuit of Brexit legitimation.

Two central narratives were those of the oppressive EU and freedom (re)gain, both driven by the exclusionary rhetoric of othering. The former narrative, built around the topic of subjugation, functioned to delegitimate the EU as an outside force which used to prevent the UK from seizing the worldwide economic (and other) opportunities that it was rightfully entitled to. EU membership was invariably construed as a constraint, restricting member states’ actions and unacceptably interfering in domestic affairs.  The government repeatedly refereed to the need of rebuilding the country from the ‘distortions created by EU membership’ and ‘EU restrictions.’ Accordingly, the delegitimation acts are dotted with targeted allusions to the previous EU-imposed burdens, realized mainly via the ‘burdensome’ and ‘excessive red tape’ expressions.

Intimately related to the previous narrative was the narrative of freedom (re)gain. The main topic here was that of independence, conjuring up the idea that the UK was imprisoned and unsovereign as an EU member. The metaphor of imprisonment played a key role here. Typically, Brexit was characterized by the UK government as ‘freeing’ Britain from the EU, its policies, and various EU restrictions. The ‘newfound freedoms’ were inseparably connected to Brexit, as they were called ‘Brexit freedoms’. As such, Brexit was habitually presented as the sine qua non of the country’s ability to control its own domestic affairs. It is only now, after leaving the EU, that the UK had become ‘an independent nation’.

Problematic practical implications

Johnson’s government’s legitimation discourse of Brexit was problematic for many reasons, but two in particular. Firstly, according to the UK government’s discursive logic, Brexit had produced only winners and no losers. Obvious here was the strategic silence on adverse effects of the EU withdrawal. The government deliberately deployed a discursive strategy of omitting the inconvenient costs that are inherent in (any) disentanglement from the 47-year-old relationship. In doing so, it did not pass on the information necessary to facilitate the (British but also wider European) public’s understanding of the implications of the EU withdrawal.

The second problem pertains to the highly contradictory nature of the official legitimation discourse, with the UK government willingly demonizing the very actor with whom it proclaimed the desire to build a new friendly relationship. The official governmental communication was exceedingly radical in its explicitly exclusionary construction of the EU, promulgating anti-EU sentiment and countenancing mutual polarization. Such discursive handling of relations undermined the trust between the two actors and hampered the advancement of mutual talks.

Dr Monika Brusenbauch Meislová is an Associate Professor at the Department of International Relations and European Studies, Masaryk University, Czech Republic. She is also a Visiting Professor at Aston University in Birmingham, United Kingdom, and one of the coordinators of the UACES research network ‘The limits of EUrope’. Her research work covers issues of British EU policy, Brexit and political discourse. Her most recent research has been published in various journals, including The Journal of Common Market Studies, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, European Security, British Politics, Europe-Asia Studies, and The Political Quarterly. She can be followed on X here.

The post Spinning Brexit as a success story: Three temporal regimes of Brexit legitimation by Boris Johnson’s government appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Every Monday, a member of the international academic association ‘UACES’ will address a current topic linked to their research on euradio.

 

Listen to the podcast on eu!radio.

 

 

Mechthild Roos, you are Lecturer in Comparative Politics at the University of Augsburg, in Germany. As an expert on the European Parliament, what are your expectations towards the forthcoming elections?

Well, the forecasts largely point to two major trends. First, a relatively high voter turnout, in comparison to previous European elections. And, second, a shift of votes and seats to the right. For me, as someone who looks at longer trends in the European Parliament’s institutional development, the perhaps most intriguing question is: will these shifts affect the Parliament’s established working routines and, maybe even more importantly, its self-understanding?

 

Can you explain in more detail?

Until now, the European Parliament has always understood itself as the voice of the people, as the main provider of democratic legitimacy in EU politics, but also as driver of ever-closer integration.

This is the main point I wonder about: will the shifting of seats and perhaps majorities to the right change this self-understanding? Will the Parliament adopt more of a member-state centred course – which, in effect, would imply a weakening of the Parliament itself, but which corresponds to the political aims declared by the bulk of the parties in the most right-wing groups? Or will these new MEPs – or at least some of them – be socialized into the institution’s raison d’être and find themselves defending a stronger European Parliament and the need for parliamentary involvement in EU politics at the EU (rather than national) level?

 

Do you think this is likely?

It is far from impossible! It is actually a typical pattern within the Parliament. Over its history, and throughout many changes of composition, the Parliament has seen MEPs entering with a rather Eurosceptic view, and then gradually coming to appreciate the Parliament’s strengthened involvement in EU politics, not least of course because that gives the MEPs themselves more political power.

In addition, those who are generally sceptical about European integration tend not to be very active in the Parliament. Those who are active, on the other hand, those who lead debates and negotiations with other EU institutions, who draft reports and carry the bulk of parliamentary work – are largely in favour of closer integration, and of a strong mandate for the Parliament.

 

And in what shape, if you look back at the last five years, do you think the European Parliament is going into its next term? Which of the numerous crises it had to handle, from Brexit to Ukraine and beyond, had the biggest impact on the institution itself?

In my point of view, the most influential crisis of all clearly was the COVID-19 pandemic. Because regardless of all the other crises’ broader implications, COVID-19 had by far the most profound impact on the Parliament’s own work. The combination of a dramatic urgency to act, a complete inexperience with a pandemic of this scale, and the institutional consequences of the lockdown, all of this put into question the established policy-making procedures at the EU level, and also within the European Parliament itself. The situation was further aggravated by the fact that the 2019 elections had brought a significant turnover among MEPs: 58% of them were new to the job, and consequently had hardly any networks or knowledge of formal, but also informal working routines, which are particularly important in the European Parliament as an institution that has always been fighting for more power than it formally holds.

In the pandemic, Parliament managed to uphold a remarkable level of legislative activity. It has also pushed intensely for better and more democratically legitimised crisis governance mechanisms. Nevertheless, this period of extraordinary strain has left its marks on the European Parliament and its role in EU politics.

 

Do you think the pandemic has weakened the Parliament’s position?

Time will tell. We will most likely not exit this period of polycrisis anytime soon, so for me, the question is whether Parliament will manage to formalize its involvement in EU crisis governance, which we may safely expect to become something of a new normal, or whether it will have to fight continuously to keep its foot in the door.

Overall, I choose to be optimistic: if crises are indeed the new normal, then we will get normalized crisis governance routines sooner rather than later, if only for the sake of efficiency. And I hope that these new routines will include a strong dimension of parliamentary involvement and democratic oversight.

 

Thank you very much, Mechthild Roos, for sharing your expectations with us! I recall you are Lecturer in Comparative Politics at the University of Augsburg, in Germany.

The post The Post-Pandemic Parliament appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

© Sam Forson sur Pexels

Every Monday, a member of the international academic association ‘UACES’ will address a current topic linked to their research on euradio.

 

Listen to the podcast on eu!radio.

 

 

Jannik Jansen, you are Policy Fellow at the Jacques Delors Centre in Berlin, and together with your colleagues, you express serious doubts about the famous anti-green backlash among European voters. Tell us where this narrative comes from in the first place.

When Commission President Ursula von der Leyen took office in 2019, the European Parliament had just been elected amidst a wave of climate strikes, led by young people demanding more ambitious climate policies to secure their future. Five years and an ambitious European Green Deal later, climate policy debates are again central in the run-up to the European elections in June. However, the tone has shifted: instead of young people, it is farmers taking to the streets with their tractors to voice their frustration about environmental regulations.

Far-right parties have been quick in capitalizing on these protests, portraying climate policies as unfair and overly burdensome for citizens and farmers. Their narrative of a widespread backlash against green policies has gained traction. As a result, liberal and centre-right politicians have become increasingly hesitant to endorse Green Deal initiatives, calling for a pause or even a rollback of climate legislation.

 

But does this political U-turn truly reflect a general shift in public sentiment?

Good question. To explore this, we conducted a survey with 15,000 citizens in Germany, France, and Poland at the end of last year. Our findings challenge the notion of general climate fatigue.

Citizens in all three countries remain concerned about the negative effects of climate change on themselves and their families. For instance, 4 out of 5 respondents in France indicated that they were already negatively impacted by climate change or expect to be so in the next five to ten years.

These concerns translate into continued support for more ambitious climate action, with a majority of citizens in each country expressing this sentiment. Notably, this support spans beyond green and left-leaning party supporters, among liberal and conservative voters as well.

 

How much climate scepticism did you find in your survey?

There is a sizeable minority skeptical of more ambitious climate policies: roughly 30% of the population in Germany and Poland, slightly less in France. But despite the politicized debate, this group has not grown significantly compared to previous studies. Moreover, this group of “climate sceptics” is largely dominated by supporters of far-right parties, which increasingly treat climate debates as an ideological battleground.

Therefore, democratic parties should refrain from rushing into a “race to the bottom” in scaling back their climate ambitions. The tale of a broad anti-green backlash appears largely overstated; however, mainstream voters do have clear preferences for how the EU’s climate-policy mix should be shaped going forward.

 

What are these mainstream preferences?

Green industrial policies and public investments into infrastructure, such as electricity grids and railways, are amongst the most popular policies. Similarly, targeted regulatory measures such as green standards for the industry and the power sector enjoy broad support. In contrast, broad bans and CO2 pricing mechanisms are relatively unpopular, especially in areas such as transport and heating, where households would be directly affected by higher prices. This is particularly relevant, as the European Emissions Trading System is set to be extended to these areas in 2027.

Our findings underscore that to garner voter support for these necessary but unpopular policies, it will be essential to combine them with a more substantial redistribution of carbon-price revenues, providing some sort of compensation to all citizens while privileging those who are hit hardest. In general, it should be a key priority to reassure citizens that the costs and benefits of the green transition are equitably distributed.

 

What are your recommendations to the political parties?

It is clear that ideology and partisanship have a significant impact on people’s climate policy positions. If parties compete over the best recipes on how to fight climate change, explain trade-offs, and try to convince voters of necessary but unpopular steps, voters will take notice. However, if parties outbid each other over who scales back climate ambitions the most, they would not only misread where most voters stand on the issue but could inadvertently create the very climate fatigue they aim to address.

 

Thank you very much, Jannik Jansen, Policy Fellow at the Jacques Delors Centre in Berlin, for sharing your research on the perception of green policies by European voters.

The post Is there an anti-green backlash? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

by Dr Moritz Rehm, Prof. Dr. Martin Schröder, and Prof. Dr. Georg Wenzelburger (Saarland University)

The enduring romanticized notion that border regions serve as the quintessential embodiment of European identity has long captured our collective imagination. However, recent scholarly inquiry challenges this assumption, suggesting that the emotional attachment to Europe among individuals residing in border regions is not significantly different from those living inland.

Led by Professor Georg Wenzelburger, Martin Schröder, and post-doctoral researcher Moritz Rehm, our study recently published in JCMS delves into the prevalent belief that proximity to borders inherently fosters a stronger sense of European belonging. Contrary to popular belief and political claims, our findings, drawn from comprehensive data collected from over 25,000 individuals via Germany’s Socio-Economic Panel, reveal a surprising lack of disparity in attachment to Europe between residents of border and inland regions.

In scrutinizing potential explanations for this unexpected revelation, we explored various factors including education, income, duration of residency in border regions, and actual cross-border experiences such as commuting. While our study confirms the commonly held view that individuals with higher education, income levels, and international experience tend to exhibit greater attachment to Europe, it also shows that neither the educated nor the affluent, nor those with cross-border experiences, display heightened European attachment simply by residing in border regions compared to their counterparts in inland areas.

Rather than perpetuating an overly optimistic portrayal of border regions as natural hubs of European identity, our study urges a reevaluation of prevailing assumptions. While we do not outright dismiss the potential influence of border regions on European attachment, we propose a nuanced understanding. Border regions may indeed serve as focal points for European integration, intensifying the “experience of Europe” compared to inland regions. However, they may also be arenas of heightened conflict where national differences manifest more acutely, potentially leading to detachment from Europe among residents who directly witness the challenges of cross-national connections. Thus, border regions may simultaneously foster cooperation and conflict across borders, resulting in a net neutral effect on European attachment overall.

As policymakers continue to invest substantial resources in promoting cross-border cooperation, our study underscores the importance of adopting evidence-based approaches. Our data unequivocally indicates that border regions are not inherently foster greater European attachment. This insight is crucial for shaping informed policies that accurately reflect the dynamics of European identity formation.

Dr. Moritz Rehm is a postdoc at the Department of European Social Research at Saarland University. His research is focused on the political economy of European integration as well as on financial assistance in the European Union. He studied at the College of Europe in Bruges and holds a doctorate in political science from the University of Luxembourg.

 

Prof. Dr. Martin Schröder is professor of sociology at Saarland University, Germany. He did his doctorate at the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies in Cologne and studied at Sciences Po Paris. He was a postdoc at Harvard University and a Visiting Professor at Sciences Po Paris. He is currently in what explains a European identity.

 

Stt

Georg Wenzelburger is a political scientist and holds the Chair of Comparative European Politics at Saarland University. His research is centred on the comparative study of public policies with a focus on Western Europe. Recent work has focussed on the politics of law and order, welfare state reforms, digital politics and insecurity and has been published in academic journals such as the British Journal of Political Science, the European Journal of Political Research, the Journal of European Public Policy or West European Politics.

The post Debunking the Myth: Exploring the Role of Border Regions in European Identity Formation appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Many people, including politicians and journalists, don’t understand the difference between ‘free trade’ and ‘frictionless trade’. This has caused a huge misunderstanding across the country, leading to the mess we are now in.

In summary, ‘free trade’ means that goods (sometimes only some goods) can be exported and imported between countries without tariffs – hence the phrase, ‘free trade’ or ‘tariff free’.

But those goods, even though tariff free, must still go through customs and are subject to checks, often causing many delays.

And even though it’s called ‘free trade’ there are other barriers as well as customs – such as regulations, restrictions, strict compliances and complicated documentation, which hold things up. (See the graphic for some examples).

‘Frictionless trade’ means that goods, as well as being tariff free, go through customs without any checks. In fact, it means that for trade between those countries, there aren’t any customs or borders.

Furthermore, with ‘frictionless trade’ there is a ‘level playing field’ between countries for the movement of goods – removing many of the barriers that exist with ‘free trade’ only.

That makes exports and imports between those countries super-efficient, leading to streamlined delivery of products, and of course, increased profits and more successful national economies.

But frictionless trade, although making international trade simpler and easier, is more difficult to establish than just free trade.

Frictionless trade can’t just be based on trust. If countries agree to flatten their borders, then those countries need to agree rules, terms and conditions. And they need to agree on a mutually acceptable court to intervene if those rules are breached.

That’s so the process of sending goods between each other is not abused, for example, to export substandard or dangerous goods, or exporting goods that are banned, to another country within the customs union.

Agreeing those rules is fiendishly complicated. But there’s more.

For frictionless trade to function most fully and most successfully, it needs what are called the ‘four freedoms’ – free movement of goods, services, capital and people.

These ‘four freedoms’ represent the cornerstones of the EU’s Single Market, helping the EU to become the world’s largest and most successful frictionless trading bloc.

Studies show that the EU’s gross domestic product (GDP) has grown by several percentage points thanks to the Single Market and its four freedoms. This is hardly surprising, when one considers that two-thirds of all goods produced in the EU are exported to another EU country.

To try and understand how the EU couldn’t fully function without all four freedoms, imagine how our own union of the United Kingdom also couldn’t fully function without these four freedoms.

Free movement of people, goods, services and capital between the three nations of England, Scotland, Wales and the province of Northern Ireland form the basis of our union of the United Kingdom.

It’s our single market. Just like the EU’s Single Market, it’s the glue that keeps us together.

Free movement of people, goods, services and capital work together. They cannot be separated without causing discord and disorder across our nation.

It’s the same with the EU. The EU functions as a cohesive single market of 27 countries – 31 if you include non-EU members Norway, Switzerland, Iceland and Liechtenstein that are also in the Single Market – just as the UK functions as a cohesive single market of four ‘nations’.

The EU Single Market is the glue that keeps European nations together. It has helped to maintain Europe as one of the world’s richest and most successful continents, with common standards, values and history.

The UK’s Single Market, and the EU’s Single Market, both represent significant achievements. They work.

But here’s one vital difference.

Frictionless trade between the four members of the UK is vital to our smooth functioning as a nation. But doing business with each other doesn’t make the UK significantly richer.

To do that, we need the UK to export our goods and services (and we export far more services than goods).

Doing frictionless trade with other EU countries made Britain richer. Easy exports and imports with the EU brought us prosperity.

Losing borderless, lowest-cost trade with our most important customers and suppliers right on our doorstop, makes Britain – and Britons – poorer.

Our frictionless exports to the rest of Europe brought us wealth. Yes, exports to countries outside the EU also bring us wealth. But we need BOTH. And ONLY in the EU did we have both.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

• Watch this 1-minute video – What the UK has lost:

• Watch 1-minute video: Rishi Sunak supports the Single Market – but only for Northern Ireland

• Watch this 3-minute video: 1988 When Britain LOVED the Single Market

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The post Frictionless trade is different to free trade appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Inga Ulnicane

Behind the Artificial Intelligence (AI) hype about its numerous benefits, uncomfortable questions concerning the problematic social impacts of AI on issues such as justice, fairness and equality are intensifying. While it has been argued that AI has a potential to eliminate human bias, growing evidence suggests quite the opposite – that AI is amplifying and exacerbating gender, racial, ethnic and other stereotypes. Some widely discussed biased AI applications include hiring algorithms that discriminate against female candidates, facial recognition that performs poorly on black and female faces as well as obedient and subservient digital female voice assistants. At the same time, it is very difficult to find examples where AI has helped to detect, reduce or eliminate human bias.

In two recent articles (Ulnicane 2024; Ulnicane and Aden 2023), I analyse how AI documents frame concerns about bias and inequality in AI and recommendations for tackling it. For this analysis, I use an intersectional lens to highlight the interaction between multiple identities – gender, race, class and others – leading to the marginalization, exclusion and discrimination of certain social groups.

 

Social vs technical framing of bias in AI

Bias is one of the key concerns in policy, media and public discussions about AI. While bias in AI can be presented as a technical issue, it is a multifaceted phenomenon that includes social, technical, political, cultural and historical dimensions. To make sense of discussions about bias in AI, in our recent article (Ulnicane & Aden 2023) we distinguish two competing frames: technical framing and social (socio-technical) one.

According to a technical frame, AI is objective and neutral and can help to detect and eliminate bias. If bias in AI occurs, then it is just a glitch that can be addressed with technical measures. AI is offered as a technical fix to solve human bias. While this technical frame has been quite popular, it has been challenged by an alternative social framing. According to the social frame, AI amplifies and exacerbates human biases and reflects deep rooted historical and systemic inequalities and power asymmetries. It cannot be just fixed with AI but requires a systemic and holistic approach. We suggest approaching bias in AI as a complex and uncertain ‘wicked problem’. To tackle such a problem, a broader strategy is needed that combines technical and social actions based on wide-ranging collaborations including affected communities.

 

Intersectionality and AI: concerns and agenda for tackling them

In my recent article on intersectionality and AI (Ulnicane 2024), I examine four high profile reports on AI and gender focusing on how they frame concerns and recommendations for action. The reports highlight the systemic nature of equality issues in AI, where the diversity crisis among AI developers and founders leads to the building of biased AI systems creating a negative feedback loop and vicious cycle. Concerns that AI might offset progress made towards equality during previous decades are growing.

Lack of women and minorities in computing is not a new problem. There have been a lot of diversity initiatives in computing during the past decades, but they have not led to positive changes. Sometimes these initiatives have even resulted in decline of diversity because they have not sufficiently addressed underlining culture and structural issues in the tech sector that includes harassment, discrimination, stereotypes, unfair pay and lack of promotion opportunities. Despite the acceptance of diversity rhetoric by tech companies, it is often poorly understood and has even experienced pushback.

The reports highlight the urgency of diversity problem in AI. They argue for a broad approach that goes beyond just increasing numbers of women and minorities. Instead, focus should be on shaping culture, power and opportunities to exert influence. Furthermore, it is necessary to involve perspectives from multiple disciplines, sectors and groups. At the same time, it is important to avoid ‘participation washing’ when the participation of a minority representative is supposed to legitimize the project.

While intersectionality provides an illuminating perspective on some of the key concerns in AI, in the existing AI landscape dominated by economic issues it can be perceived as a niche perspective mainly concerning women and minorities. It could be enriching to use intersectionality to reimagine AI in more inclusive and participatory ways.

 

References:

Ulnicane, I. (2024) Intersectionality in Artificial Intelligence: Framing Concerns and Recommendations for Action. Social Inclusion, 12: 7543 https://doi.org/10.17645/si.7543

Ulnicane, I. & Aden, A. (2023) Power and politics in framing bias in artificial intelligence policy. Review of Policy Research, 40(5): 665–687 https://doi.org/10.1111/ropr.12567

The post Artificial Intelligence and Intersectionality appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

by Christian Achrainer & Michelle Pace, Roskilde University (RUC)

The EU has aimed to support democratization in Arab countries for decades, yet the region is still one of the most authoritarian in the world. What is most striking is that the EU has apparently not learnt from its past ineffective democracy support (DS) attempts but continuously reproduces DS malpractices. To help us understand non-learning in that context, and in policy-making more generally, in our recent JCMS article, we conceptualize EU DS as practices performed by a community of insiders who act within a complex constellation on communities of practice (CoPs). The article provides an explanation for why the EU is not able to improve its DS practices, and it allows us to critically reflect on the way how the industry works and constantly (re)produces malpractices. This can help us rethink EU DS and identify ways to overcome this gridlock, and it brings practice-theoretical debates on (non)learning forward.

Learning and the CoP Approach

The article primarily draws from the CoP approach and is thus situated within the practice turn in International Relations (IR). The CoP approach offers a practice-theoretical perspective on learning and non-learning in groups, assuming that learning is rather a communal social endeavour instead of an individual mental process. CoPs are learning communities, which, as Adler defines them, consist of “like-minded groups of practitioners who are informally as well as contextually bound by a shared interest in learning and applying a common practice.”

We argue that only a very restricted form of learning takes place within CoPs: members learn the CoP’s (non-reflexive) background knowledge and learn how to perform practices accordingly. They do not, however, critically reflect on background knowledge, and once this knowledge becomes internalized, CoP members perform practices as a matter of routine and largely unconsciously. Thus, they do not learn reflexivity nor introspection: that is, how to be open to reconsider and revise background knowledge and how to improve the practices they perform. Instead, they constantly reproduce the same practices, no matter whether these are suitable to reach a desired goal or not.

EU DS and the Constellation of CoPs

In our article, we build on this theoretical approach and conceptualize EU DS as practices performed by a community of insiders within a complex and multi-layered constellation of CoPs.

As shown in Figure 1 above, the insiders (CoP 1) stand at the centre of this constellation, and they comprise three sub-CoPs: deciders (CoP 1.1), supporters in the EU (CoP 1.2), and local supporters (CoP 1.3). All individuals who have ultimate decision-making power regarding EU DS within EU institutions are members of CoP 1.1, deciding on the overall strategy, budgetary issues, instruments and measures, and so on. The deciders closely work together with supporters in Europe (CoP 1.2) and in Arab states (CoP 1.3), such as large and well-connected implementation agencies and NGOs, or influential Think Tanks and other experts. These supporters provide the deciders with information, and they implement DS projects financed by the deciders. Members of CoP 1 constantly engage with each other, and the background knowledge on which they base their practices largely converges. They are entangled and co-dependent, because they can only jointly run the industry of DS, from which they all benefit.

Yet, the insiders do not perform their practices in a vacuum but within a complex environment. At least three groupings of outsiders perform practices which also impact democratization in the Arab World as well as (non-)learning amongst the insiders and the subsequent reproduction of their malpractices. Outsiders contesting DS malpractices (grouping 2) are all those actors in Europe (CoP 2.1) or in Arab states (CoP 2.2) who call for an alternative, more inclusive, bottom-up EU DS approach which empowers local democratization practitioners. They could help to turn malpractices into good practices by bringing in fresh ideas and insights, and by contesting the dominant background knowledge and established practices of CoP 1. Yet, they lack influence and are kept out of CoP 1 by powerful gatekeepers.

Outsiders contesting EU DS as such (grouping 3) are all those actors who are, in general, against democratization in the Arab World and contest EU DS practices on this basis. The grouping comprises actors in Europe, such as right-wing populists or anti-feminist movements (CoP 3.1), at the local level, such as the military, the monarchy, fundamentalist religious actors, or a corrupt business elite (CoP 3.2), and international actors, such as leaders of other autocratic states (CoP 3.3). These CoPs can, for example, produce counter-narratives or support non-democratic forces, contest the legitimacy of EU DS practices, and they complicate good practices and learning.

Finally, grouping (4) comprises actors involved in cooperation between the EU and Arab countries in fields such as energy (CoP 4.1), migration (CoP 4.2), security (CoP 4.3), and trade (CoP 4.4). While EU practices in these fields often significantly influence DS, the EU largely treats them as disentangled policy areas. CoPs of grouping 4 and CoP 1 hardly coordinate their practices, which they each perform based on different background knowledge. In consequence, CoPs of grouping 4 frequently perform practices contradicting EU DS efforts, and the EU’s cooperation with Arab countries often rather entrenches authoritarian structures by propping up repressive regimes.

Application of the Constellation Model and the Way Forward

In our JCMS article, we illustrate this – admittedly complex – constellation model by explaining non-learning in the context of EU DS in Egypt in the period 2011 until 2017. This is an interesting case, because EU deciders had enthusiastically declared to critically reflect on their cooperation practices with Egypt after the 2011 Revolution, but have then, after the military coup in 2013, gradually returned to the pre-2011 practices, indicating the incapability to truly reflect on the insiders’ background knowledge to improve practices.

The case study provided in the article also exemplifies that the constellation model can serve as a general conceptual framework for empirical research, including categories of actors conceptualized as CoPs and groupings of CoPs, and, importantly, that it must be regarded as a flexible framework. Which CoPs exist in the EU’s DS in a specific country is an empirical question, and the framework can be adjusted to study particular aspects of EU DS. When studying EU DS and EU practices performed in other policy areas, especially CoP 1 and the CoPs of grouping 4 will be relevant. To investigate the impact of actors who prefer maintaining authoritarian structures, a focus on CoP 1 and grouping 3 seems more appropriate. And so on. Empirical studies will not necessarily have to apply the entire constellation, but it can and should be adjusted.

Therefore, we hope that our article inspires others to apply the model in in-depth empirical case studies (which do not need to be restricted to the Arab world!), developing it further. Moreover, we hope to kick-start increased conceptual thinking on how to use practice approaches and especially the CoP approach when studying EU DS and (non-)learning in policy-making groups, because this in essence is our main objective: to provide a sound conceptual framework to better understand (non-)learning in EU DS.

Christian Achrainer is a PostDoc researcher at Roskilde University, where he is involved in the Horizon Europe project SHAPEDEM-EU. His research focuses on democracy, authoritarianism and human rights in the Arab world (esp. in Egypt) as well as on German and EU foreign affairs.

 

 

Michelle Pace is Professor in Global Studies at Roskilde University, Denmark. A political scientist by training, her research focuses on the intersection between European/Middle East/Critical Migration/Democratization and Conflict Studies.

The post Why does the EU not learn how to improve its democracy support practices? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

I am thrilled to have been awarded the UACES scholarship to support my research trip to Slovenia. As a PhD candidate in war studies, I focus on reconciliation in Slovenia following post-Second World War mass killings. Reconciliation remains a contentious, disputed and polarised topic, experiencing revisionism, contestation and political manipulation. My research aims at developing an understanding of this historical case that still continues to impact the country and its politics today. It was a great privilege to conduct my research trip with the support of the UACES scholarship.

 

The UACES scholarship supported five weeks of fieldwork in Slovenia by contributing to my expenses for the trip, including travel, accommodation, and food expenses. I was in Ljubljana between 14 April and 17 May. The trip has provided me with the opportunity to spend time in Ljubljana to conduct interviews, which are an integral part of my research, as well as archives and the National and University Library of Ljubljana, to collect data and access books that are not available in London.

 

Interviews, networking and access to resources

The interviews were an invaluable source of information which the UACES scholarship enabled me to collect. I was able to get insights on my research topic from key experts working on the post-war atrocities and Slovene reconciliation, including historians, politicians and government actors, journalists, investigators, novelists, and philosophers. They provided me with fascinating insights into my research on reconciliation in Slovenia, the narratives explaining the post-Second World War mass atrocities, political polarisation and the interpretation of history. The discussions were informative and engaging, providing me with significant knowledge to develop my arguments. They contribute to fulfilling my research objectives, which are to understand what reconciliation in Slovenia means, what the obstacles for reconciliation are, the role of historical re-interpretation and revisionism in reconciliation, and finally, what solutions have been attempted to address the obstacles.

 

In addition, the interviews provided me with the opportunity to network and receive guidance from the experts I had the privilege of meeting and interviewing. This has been an exceptional opportunity for professional development alongside the development of my research.

 

Besides the interviews, visits to the National and University Library of Ljubljana provided me access to books and sources such as newspapers and archival material that are not available in London. These resources offer a wealth of information to support my research. Additionally, I visited the government archives, which gave an insight into the gaps in the archives since many documents are missing. However, it was fascinating to access certain documents, and it was exciting to delve into a country’s past through governmental archives. Archives, and the lack thereof, are an integral aspect of my research, looking at a country that has been independent since the early 1990s but was previously part of communist Yugoslavia. During the decades under Yugoslavia, the post-war atrocities were silenced, and their knowledge was hidden. Therefore, the silence in archives and the few documents available are an interesting insight into the role of silence in reconciliation and establishing the facts about the past.

 

Therefore, the UACES scholarship allowed me to focus on my research and develop my professional skills and network.

 

The importance of understanding the context behind the research

Finally, the UACES scholarship enabled me to spend a longer time in Slovenia and visit the museums, including the Museum of Contemporary History and the City Museum of Ljubljana. Museums provide insights into how history is presented to the public and remembered in collective memory. Since my research focuses on a polarised topic, visiting museums and being confronted with how history is publicly explained is insightful to understand my research’s social and political context. Understanding the context is central to this research topic. Indeed, since the focus is on contemporary reconciliation, revisionism and polarisation, context is key to understanding how the problem developed and why events that took place over 70 years ago continue to divide. This context explains how people think and why they argue certain positions, the impact of decades of silence, and the deeply rooted re-interpretations of history.

 

Concluding remarks

The trip supported by UACES was also an opportunity to spend more time in my native country, where I have lived for only a very limited time. I was able to reconnect with the language and culture and delve into a dark chapter of history. Spending these five weeks in Ljubljana allowed me to immerse myself in my research topic and better grasp the context of my research.

 

I am grateful for the recognition provided by the awarded UACES scholarship to conduct my fieldwork because it supported my research and data collection, which I hope will contribute to the academic field of reconciliation and mass atrocities but also to a practical understanding of obstacles to reconciliation, and solutions addressing these obstacles.

The post A UACES-supported research trip delving into Slovenia’s history appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

© European Union 2024- Source EP – Alain ROLLAND

Every Monday, a member of the international academic association ‘UACES’ will address a current topic linked to their research on euradio.

 

Listen to the podcast on eu!radio.

 

 

Very pleased to have you back with us, Nick. You have studied the European far right parties over decades now and you shared your findings several times in our programme, most recently on how these parties respond to the climate crisis. With the European elections less than one month away, let me ask you what you think of all the media speculation about the rise in support for Radical Right Parties.

Before turning to next month, the first thing I would flag up is that the Radical Right already did very well in the 2019 European elections. A leading scholar in the field, Cas Mudde, estimated back then that ‘Right-wing Euroskeptics took between a quarter and a third of the seats in the European Parliament, with populist radical-right parties making the biggest gains’.

That said there is little doubt that the number of Radical Right MEPs looks set to increase further at the elections next month, although not uniformly across the member states.

In a Policy Brief conducted for the European Council on Foreign Relations in January, Kevin Cunnigham and his co-authors predicted that ‘anti-European populists’ are likely to come first in nine member states and that the two transnational groups where Radical Right parties currently sit are likely to win a quarter of the European Parliament’s 720 seats.

 

Is that confirmed in the current opinion polls?

If we look at the three largest Western European states, France, Italy and Germany (all three founding members!), the Radical Right, as represented by the Rassemblement National, the Fratelli D’Italia and the Alternative für Deutschland, could obtain up to 75 seats.

This would represent over 10% of the seats in the Strasbourg Parliament. And that’s before you add the 12 seats predicted for the rival radical right parties in Italy and France, Matteo Salvini’s Lega (with a prediction of 7 seats) and Éric Zemmour’s Reconquête (possibly 5 seats). On the face of it, this is a very significant rump of like-minded Radical Right MEPs emanating from the three big founding member states!

 

Why do you say “on the face of it”?

Because historically, the Radical Right has struggled to work together in the European Parliament, and this has limited its overall influence and impact. Back in 2007 Michael Minkenberg and Pascal Perrineau stated that ‘there is nothing more difficult to establish than an international group of nationalists.’

Since then, we have witnessed more cooperation among radical right parties, but even today, despite the strategic and financial advantages of transnational group cooperation, the Radical Right remains fractured across two groups: the ‘soft eurosceptic’ European Conservative and Reformists group (ECR), and the ‘hard’ Eurosceptic Identity and Democracy group (ID). To illustrate the point, if we go back to our discussion about France, Italy and Germany, currently the Fratelli d’Italia are in the ECR group and the Rassemblement National are in the ID group.

And even within the groups there are tensions between certain parties; for instance, most recently within the ID group between the RN and the AfD over the latter’s controversial meeting on ‘remigration’.

In other words, as Cas Mudde extrapolates, ‘a far-right “super group” remains an unlikely scenario – at least for the next legislature.’

 

So, what will be the significance of their potential increase over the next 5 years?

The significance in the broader sense is that it appears to confirm the ongoing mainstreaming of the Radical Right, which is much debated by political scientists.

What this means in terms of its impact on EU policy is that flagship policies such as the European Green deal may be up for further discussion and potentially watered down. There will also be moves to prioritize a stricter immigration policy, with pressure on the Schengen Agreement and the principle of open internal borders.

In short, the next President of the European Commission, whoever that is, will face significant challenges emanating from the Radical Right in terms of the future trajectory of the European Union.

 

Many thanks, Nick Startin, for sharing your observations and expectations with us. 
I recall you are Associate Professor of international relations at John Cabot University, in Rome.

The post The Radical Right and the European Elections appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Photo de Luka E sur Unsplash

Every Monday, a member of the international academic association ‘UACES’ will address a current topic linked to their research on euradio.

 

Listen to the podcast on eu!radio.

 

 

Ana Bojinović Fenko, you are professor of international relations at the University of Ljubljana. Tell us what you were doing when Slovenia joined the European Union on the 1st of May 2004?

I was already at the University of Ljubljana, 23 years old and just graduated in Political Science with a major in International Relations at the Faculty of Social Sciences. Only fourteen days before the 1st of May 2004 I defended my Bachelor Thesis with the title: “Western Balkans as an opportunity for Slovenia as a member of the EU”. I was quite enthusiastic to be finishing my studies in this field, which was much focused on the EU accession process of Slovenia at this time when it was successfully finalised and when the accession Treaty came into force.

 

So what were your expectations for the future at that moment in your life?

My expectations as a future Master student were mostly focused on how to seize the new opportunities offered by the EU market and other EU integration instruments. I remember I applied for a master’s in European integration in Nice, in a programme ran by the Centre International de Formation Européenne, and I almost moved to France!

But finally, despite being accepted to the programme, I decided to stay in Ljubljana, where I was offered an employment in scientific research. In October 2004 I started a job as a Junior Researcher, which led directly from the Master to PhD studies in International Relations.

And I could feel the expected opportunities brought by EU membership very quickly, as the Centre of International Relations where I was employed got engaged in concrete international projects, especially those funded by the European Union. We were mostly analysing economic and political effects of EU enlargement for the EU but also for small states such as Slovenia. One specific feature, for example, was the effect of transition periods that were negotiated by some of the new Member States – for Slovenia this was a period imposed by Austria and Germany for opening their job market. In these research projects, the most important feature for Slovenian foreign policy was focusing on the future EU enlargement towards the Western Balkan countries.

 

So you were seizing the opportunities right from the beginning.
How do you look back today at these two decades?

Both personally and professionally I am very satisfied with Slovenian membership. It should be noted though that Slovenia as a society, economy and state did not only profit from EU membership. There were also hard times, for instance the specific period of the economic and financial crisis, when the state was on the very verge of bailout, but then the government managed to avoid international intervention into domestic finance.

Still, I consider the EU political community brings much more positive effects to Slovenia compared to if the state had not become an EU member. In my assessment, the ultimate positive effect for Slovenia – a former communist state – is the internalisation of European values into Slovenian society. This effect was very visible in 2020–2022 period, a moment when the government started several political manoeuvres of de-democratisation, disrespect of human rights and rule of law. Not only political opposition and organized civil society but also the Slovenian people in general opposed en masse such a move away from EU values and in the election managed to change the leading party and the government.

 

So there’s definitely more than economic benefits to EU membership.

Yes, I think so. All of the challenges Slovenia is facing – economic, political, security, social or cultural effects of globalisation – would of course have been present regardless of its EU membership. But for a small state of only 2 million people in the centre of Europe, at the crossroads of four different cultures, I assess that these challenges are met much more effectively in a multilateral setting within the European institutions.

As the biggest opportunity for Slovenia, I see the possibility for our country to contribute to EU policies that respond to specific interests and expertise of Slovenian companies, civil society and state: a fair green transition on a global scale, safeguarding international peace and security, protection of human rights and application of humanitarian law in armed conflicts, and more particularly the integration of Western Balkan countries into the European Union.

 

The last issue may be one of the most pressing ones today. Thank you very much, Ana Bojinović Fenko, for your personal testimony. I recall you are professor of international relations at the University of Ljubljana. All the best for the next twenty years!

The post 20 years of Slovenia in the EU – Ana Bojinović Fenko appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

©European Union

Every Monday, a member of the international academic association ‘UACES’ will address a current topic linked to their research on euradio.

 

Listen to the podcast on eu!radio.

 

 

Petr Kaniok, you are professor of political science at the Masaryk University of Brno, beautiful city in the South-East of the Czech Republic. And you recall the moment when your country became a member of the European Union, twenty years ago, on the 1st of May 2004.

May 2004 – that is a long time ago! Twenty years is a small step for mankind, but it is a remarkable period for one person. Anyway, I still remember what I did and what the atmosphere was in the society. Why? Because this time was very special, vibrant and unique.

 

What were you doing at that time?

I was about to complete my first year of doctoral studies in the political science programme at Masaryk University. The exact location is important – the faculty was new, established in the late 1990s – there were no real “social sciences” in Czechia before the 1989 Velvet Revolution. Everything had to be built up from scratch – political science and subsequently European studies. So, I remember that even that being admitted to the political science branch, already during the first year I moved – surprise, surprise! – to the newly founded Department of International Relations and European Studies. And started my first research and PhD project there.

 

Had you always been interested in the European Union?

Yes, my move was not an accident. Even though I graduated from political science, I was interested in the EU politics already there. My master thesis had been about the EU Council presidency – a detail no one cared about at that time – apart from me!

To be honest – there was no great knowledge on the EU prior to accession. Both the people and the politicians perceived membership as a goal, a potential gate to heaven. Once I read the biblical metaphor of the “EU as the land of milk and honey” – and this is, I think, a very accurate description of the atmosphere in Czech society at the time. The EU was first and foremost perceived as a way to modernize the country. Particularly in economic terms – the EU was seen as a river of quick and easy money that would change everything and would make people richer. There was a dream of having the same salaries as people in Germany, the same living standards. But no one talked about or even mentioned the duties, possible problems or challenges that such a membership inevitably is associated with. Because no one knew, or no one believed this was important.

 

So how was the awakening?

The years after the accession was a kind of adapting to normality. Seeking for membership in a club is a different thing than being a member. This transformation happened both to Czech society and me personally.

People, as well as the politicians, had to absorb the first shocks. In particular, responsibility and activity – for example, the famous 2009 Czech EU Council Presidency, which the Czech government framed as “giving lectures and lessons to the EU”, but ended with the domestic collapse of the government and the change of prime minister in the middle of the presidency.

Or the famous EU funds which, as they were used in Czechia, quite quickly transformed into “toxic money” associated with corruption, scandals, and frauds. Both the people and the politicians started to realize – very slowly, sometimes without success – that the EU will not etake care of us”. We have to take care of the EU, as we are, more or less, the EU.

For me personally, the process was less dramatic but sometimes painful as well. Being a student and subsequently a young researcher operating mostly in a domestic context is something different than facing the EU context, EU-wide cooperation and EU-wide competition.

 

What conclusion do you draw at the end of these twenty years?

In a nutshell: “no pain, no gain!” I think that despite the bumpy road during the 20 years of the Czech EU membership, we are on today on a good track and the country – and I personally – benefit from the membership. It is not just about the new highways or hospitals built across the country. What I see is more cooperation, more communication, more openness and more willingness to take our own responsibilities.

 

Thank you very much, Petr Kaniok, for sharing both your personal testimony and your analysis as professor of political science at Masaryk University, in the beautiful city of Brno.

The post 20 years of Czechia in the EU appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

by Ana E. Juncos, Bristol University and Sophie Vanhoonacker, Maastricht University

EU Strategic autonomy: different trajectories in security and external economic relations

Global shifts in power distribution and successive international crises have challenged key ideas and policies underpinning European Union (EU) external action and led to the formulation of a new narrative in which geopolitical considerations have come back to centre stage. One of the main ideas put forward to deal with the increasingly unstable international environment is strategic autonomy (SA), understood as the capacity of the EU to act independently in realizing its strategic objectives and defending its interests and values. Although the SA concept was born in the security domain, it has gathered pace in the field of EU external economic relations. Puzzled by these different trajectories, our recent JCMS contribution  seeks to get a better understanding of why an idea originally born in the area of security and defence has become more embedded in the field of trade and external economic relations. We aim to solve this puzzle by researching the role and power of ideas and how they enable actors to push for policy change in a context of geopolitical uncertainty.

Using the analytical lenses of discursive institutionalism, we examine how policy entrepreneurs took advantage of international developments such as the Presidency of Donald Trump, the Covid-19 pandemic or the war in Ukraine to transform both the cognitive and normative beliefs of actors, and to what extent they have been translated into new EU policies. In a comparative analysis in the domains of EU security and external economic relations, we focus on three dimensions of ideational power: power in, power through and power over to understand the different trajectories of SA in these two policy areas. We argue that the ability of ideational entrepreneurs such as the Commission to push for this idea, supported by the coercive power derived from its exclusive trade competences, facilitated the adoption of this concept in the form of ‘open strategic autonomy’. By contrast, French President Emmanuel Macron was unable to persuade others to move towards a more sovereigntist conception of SA in the area of security and defence. Only in the case of defence capability development, where the Commission enjoys budgetary power and competences in industrial policy, has SA been able to take hold.

Hegemonic discourses – Power in Ideas

As a first step, we look into how the SA concept relates to prevalent hegemonic ideas at the EU level. While our analysis of EU strategic documents shows that the SA discourse indeed has challenged the predominant philosophies on how to best guarantee the Union’s prosperity in a rapidly changing geopolitical and geoeconomic context, it is still too early to speak of a paradigmatic change. The deeply ingrained neoliberal paradigm and the continuing controversies between Atlanticists and Europeanists have proven to be quite resilient. For instance, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been perceived by Atlanticists as clear example of the continued need to rely on NATO for defence and to maintain the close political and security ties with the US. By contrasts, the Europeanist camp has argued that the war in Ukraine has drawn attention to the weaknesses and dependencies of EU member states in matters of defence and the need to address those by strengthening SA. Hence, the ambiguity surrounding the concept remains.

Discursive Entrepreneurs – Power through ideas
The launching of new ideas is always accompanied with discursive interactions and struggles about the definition of problems and their possible solutions. In security and defence, we argue that the French President Macron, who has been the key discursive entrepreneur, did not manage to persuade others to follow a more sovereigntist understanding of SA. In line with French strategic thinking, President Macron has repeatedly emphasized the need for the EU to strengthen its capacity to defend itself and to act independently from others. Yet, other member states, particularly Central and Eastern European countries, have rejected this notion. This is well illustrated in the 2022 Strategic Compass with its emphasis on partnerships, but also explicitly noting that NATO ‘remains the foundation of collective defence for its members’. By contrast, in the area of trade, the European Commission has been more successful. Although the member states were also divided in the field of external economic relations, DG Trade cleverly coined the term Open Strategic Autonomy (OSA). This helped to build a bridge between those favouring a more protective EU approach and the so-called ‘friends of the internal market’.

Authority and Competences – Power over Ideas

As a third step, we examine the coercive capacity of policy entrepreneurs, i.e. the resources and/or competences that those actors have within a particular institutional context. Here our comparative analysis shows that in security and defence, where supranational institutions are relatively weak and every member state is a potential veto player, it has been more difficult to impose new ideas than in external economic relations, where national capitals have delegated competences to the EU. Despite several discussions at the highest political level, the member states did not manage to reach consensus on what to understand under SA in the security field. In the area of external economic relations on the contrary, a well-resourced  DG Trade did not only develop a new Trade Policy Review (2021) but also managed to move ahead with developing a whole range of new trade instruments aimed at promoting sustainable value chains, supporting the EU’s regulatory impact, enforcing trade agreements and ensuring a level playing field.

What have we learned?
Our comparative analysis shows that to understand the different success rates of the SA concept in the area of security and external economic relations, it does not suffice to merely study the external drivers of the EU’s geopolitical turn. We demonstrate that it is also important to pay attention to internal factors, such as the role of ideas. The study of discursive struggles about dominant paradigms, the role of policy entrepreneurs and their authority and competences is indispensable to better understand the EU response to the rapidly changing international context.

We conclude that although the debate about the reformulation of security and external economic policies took place in parallel, over time we have seen a ‘security logic’ being transposed to the EU’s external economic policies. Whilst the convergence of the two debates could positively impact coherence, it also brings risks. If one of the biggest defenders of free trade and multilateralism is increasingly reverting to a sovereigntist discourse and a policy of relative gains, this may negatively impact the openness of the global trade system and the EU’s international influence.

Ana E. Juncos is Professor European Politics at the School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies at the University of Bristol. Her primary research interest lies in European foreign and security policy, with a particular focus on EU conflict prevention and peacebuiding.

 

 

Sophie Vanhoonacker is Professor in Administrative Governance at the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at Maastricht University. Her research focuses on the institutional aspects of EU External Relations and administrative governance in the area of foreign and security policy.

The post The ideational power of strategic autonomy in EU security and external economic policies appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

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Every Monday, a member of the international academic association ‘UACES’ will address a current topic linked to their research on euradio.

 

Listen to the podcast on eu!radio.

 

 

You are postdoctoral research fellow and lecturer at the University of Surrey, in Britain, and you would like to draw our attention to the fact that Ukraine is not only defending itself against the Russian aggression, but also fighting a second battle, against corruption.

That’s right, and this second battle is a serious test for the promotion of democracy, not least in the post-war context.

However, measuring corruption’s impact and the success of reforms is notoriously difficult. What does, for instance, the revelation of corruption cases mean? Does it mean that corruption has become more widespread? Or does it mean that anti-corruption institutions have started to work more efficiently? There is a crucial need to distinguish facts from perception.

 

Tell us how the fight against corruption actually works.

It begins with the realization that policy makers in systems that are characterized by large-scale corruption have rarely an incentive to conduct reforms on their own. The EU’s mission to promote such reforms revealed a certain divergence within its own ranks: there are Realists and Idealists, and each group has its own definition of success and method of evaluation.

The Realists, emphasizing geopolitical stability, caution against vocal criticism of reform failures, fearing it might bolster counter-narratives. For them, the sole existence of anti-corruption institutions is sufficient to speak of a success of their “reform advice”.

Idealists, on the other hand, view institutional reforms as the bedrock of geopolitical strength and the most potent weapon in the ongoing conflict with Russia. As a result, they call for openly addressing shortcomings of local anti-corruption institutions and see only the processing and conviction rate of corruption cases as a sufficient measure to speak of success.

This antagonism reveals the complexity of internal assessments. The dominance of the realist camp in the EU explains the way in which the EU approached reforms in Ukraine and the corresponding language of official documents, which lacked consistency and clear yardsticks over the years.

 

How strong is resistance to reform?

The multifaceted nature of resistance to reform was visible in 2020, with the Constitutional Court ruling on asset declaration transparency, no doubt the most important backsliding event during President Zelensky’s tenure.

Traditional views see backsliding as a phenomenon driven by the executive. But this case unveils a whole network of opposition spanning the judiciary and the legislature, which the executive later used for its own benefit. That’s when coalitions between Western actors and the Ukrainian civil society become essential. The battle against corruption demands a decentralized, collective front, which can bring about actual results by incentivising policy makers to become active.

 

So what does this say about the reconstruction of Ukraine, once this terrible war is over?

The insights from recent years clearly advocate for a shift from passive declarations to active, committed engagement in real anti-corruption efforts conducted by Western actors.

This also touches upon the current debate on transferring Russian frozen assets to Ukraine. This approach might bring about moral hazard: Western actors might be tempted to disengage in the reconstruction due to the “easy fix” of these assets. Instead, these assets should serve as a partial refund mechanism for Western reconstruction aid given to Ukraine, which must, however, be conditional upon meeting institutional benchmarks first that would be elaborated and monitored together with Ukrainian civil society. This would bind Western actors to truly commit to good institutional outcomes in Ukraine and use their leverage to push policymakers in Kyiv to conduct the necessary reforms.

 

In a nutshell, what will be the key to success?

The integration of internal and external actors from the onset: any internal reform drive must be supercharged with external pressure to sustain it. The challenge hereby lies not only in implementing anti-corruption measures formally, but also in crafting a cohesive and realistic assessment of factual progress, one that bridges the gap between theoretical ambition and practical achievement.

The path to meaningful reform is fraught with challenges but illuminated by the potential for profound, transformative change. The insights received from Ukraine’s experience can serve as a beacon for future post-war reform efforts, guiding policymakers and international actors towards more effective cooperative reform strategies.

 

And guiding Ukraine to its objective of eventual membership. Thank you very much, Michael Richter, for sharing your research insights on this topic. I recall you are postdoctoral researcher and lecturer at the University of Surrey, in Britain.

The post Ukraine’s other battle: the one against corruption appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

© European Union 2024 – Source : EP

Every Monday, a member of the international academic association ‘UACES’ will address a current topic linked to their research on euradio.

 

Listen to the podcast on eu!radio.

 

 

Simon Usherwood! I’m very pleased to welcome you back on Euradio. Your are professor at the Open University in Britain, and Chair of our partners UACES. Less than three months left until the elections to the European Parliament. What are your expectations? And: do you think these elections actually matter?

Whether these elections matter is a great question and one that often gets asked.

45 years after the first direct elections, it is still a key problem for the European Parliament that most people don’t know much about what it actually does. Instead, their main reference point is national politics.

As a result, many people vote to express their views about their national government’s performance, or to express their more instinctive political views. And many think there’s no real consequence: if you consider the European Parliament doesn’t do anything important, it’s your chance to get your general view, or simply your discontent out there.

Of course, you and I, Laurence, aren’t going to make the same mistake, because we both know that these elections do have consequences.

 

You are right: at EU!radio, we are well aware of the important role played by the 750 MEPs that will be elected in June.

To start with, it’s up to them to approve the formation of the new European Commission. Even if everyone expects right now that Ursula Von Der Leyen will most likely continue for another 5 years, she still has to get the votes of a majority of those MEPs, as will all of the other 26 Commissioners of her team. Given that she has raised various question marks over the past five years, this might not be as simple as it appears.

Secondly, the fields in which MEPs get to co-legislate cover a very wide range nowadays, from regional development to agricultural spending, from environmental protection to international development, so your choice at the ballot box really counts.

And finally, MEPs help to hold the rest of the Union to account. The Parliament’s committees can scrutinise the work of other institutions and invite individuals to give evidence. By holding up a mirror to the EU’s work, they can improve the quality and legitimacy of what it does.

 

Which is certainly not unnecessary. What do you expect for the election campaign?

The centre-right EPP group, with lead candidate Von der Leyen, is set to retain its position as the largest in the new Parliament, bolstered by substantial representation in every member state. On the centre-left, the S&D group will most likely be the second-largest group, making the current ‘grand coalition’ with the EPP and the liberal Renew group quite probable.

However, polls suggest that we are likely to see more critical voices in the Parliament than before. Mostly this comes from the nationalist and eurosceptic right, but also in part from the far left. Remember how I said voters often chose parties as a function of how they see their national government? Well, one consequence of that is that populist rhetoric about how ‘politics is failing’ or ‘all politicians are the same’ gets an outlet here. We see similar kinds of arguments in pretty much every member state.

 

Many of them sound like the UKIP’s pitch before the Brexit referendum eight years ago!

That’s right. At the same time, perhaps because Brexit was very messy, you hear fewer voices saying that leaving the Union is a good idea, but this doesn’t stop them criticising what the EU does and how it does it. Not without a certain inconsistency: the loudest critics are often the ones whose MEPs are the least present in the daily life of the Parliament.

The problem faced by the European Parliament are very similar to the problems in all democracies. Democracy lives through participation and engagement of citizens with those who make decisions on their behalf. And the first way to engage is to vote.

So the answer to the question whether European elections matter is: voting matters!

My message to the listeners: over the next three months, take a bit of your time to find out more about what parties say they will do for you and remember that your vote will have consequences.

 

Many thanks, Simon Usherwood, for sharing your thoughts on the forthcoming elections. I recall you are professor at the Open University, and Chair of our partners UACES.

The post European elections: voting matters! appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

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Every Monday, a member of the international academic association ‘UACES’ will address a current topic linked to their research on euradio.

 

Listen to the podcast on eu!radio.

 

 

 

Bonjour, Emilija Tudzarovska, you are Lecturer in Contemporary European Politics at Charles University, in Prague, and your research focuses on the democratic legitimacy of the European Union. How do you evaluate it today?

Let me start with going back to the economic crisis that struck the world in 2008. This crisis revealed deeper problems plaguing representative democracies and party politics, but also effected a profound change in EU member states’ political and economic systems.

One of the consequences has been the emergence of a new type of parties, movements and political leaders. These new parties are using appeals to both populism and technocracy, sometimes intertwining the two, as strategies to gain, hold and exercise power on behalf of ‘the people’. Their logic exploits what can be called clashes of sovereignty at the nation-state level.

 

Can you explain what exactly is understood by “clashes of sovereignty”?

Research has discussed EU democratic legitimacy from several different viewpoints. Some scholars have examined the transfer of key policy competencies in economic governance to the supranational level, especially since the Maastricht Treaty. In principle, national parliaments are supposed to exercise surveillance and accountability, on this share of authority, especially in economic policy, in order to provide legitimacy to democratic decisions, which should represent citizens’ interests.

The question is how well-equipped national parliaments are to do so. Their role has been changing, and the EU integration project has contributed to these transformations.

As a result, political systems and political parties are struggling to institutionalise popular sovereignty. In political science, this situation is best contextualized in a conflicts of sovereignty framework analysis. The framework identifies three main types of sovereignty conflicts: foundational, institutional, and territorial. What we are currently witnessing in Europe is an institutional conflict over where final authority lies.

 

If I understand correctly, this kind of conflict occurs between parliamentary sovereignty and claims to popular sovereignty?

Yes. In some other cases, it can also be between constitutional and popular sovereignty.

What these conflicts have in common is that they all came to the fore during the EU debt crisis in Southern and Eastern Europe. Events in Greece, Slovenia, Italy and Bulgaria, for example, show the degree to which institutional conflict has weakened the ‘institutionalization’ of political competition, and created a fertile ground for what is called a technopopulist logic – a new concept that describes a new way of doing politics.

The EU economic crisis was not only about clashes of sovereignty between the Troika and EU debt countries. It was also about how popular sovereignty is exercised within the EU, and it was underlaid by a crisis in party politics. All this results in different institutional conflicts of sovereignty.

 

What are the best strategies for resolving these conflicts?

Some European countries responded to citizens’ calls for more democracy by holding referenda. Many people think referenda enhance direct democracy because citizens can voice their opinions directly on a specific matter.

In Greece and Slovenia, states ignored demands for popular referenda. Instead, they introduced measures supported by supranational technocratic executives. Bulgaria and Italy organised two referenda to reform the institution of parliament. Both failed, but have substantially weakened parliaments in the face of national executives.

In all four countries, the clash between popular and parliamentary sovereignty has paved the way for “technopopulism”, and for the rise of political parties, movements and leaders, which combine appeals to populism and appeals to technocracy, to win elections. Both appeals, combined or not, constitute a challenge to traditional representative democracy.

The management of the Euro crisis brought politicians to pass policies through weak parliaments while at the same time invoking popular sovereignty to weaken parliaments even further.

 

Do you see a way out of this self-perpetuating crisis?

Not in the immediate. Popular and parliamentary sovereignty remains trapped in a technopopulist loop, which not only reflects the new conflicts of sovereignty but exacerbates them, leading to an ongoing crisis and challenging pluralistic forms of representative democracy. It will be difficult to break the loop that reinforces the tendency of government “for the people” rather than “by the people”.

 

Many thanks, Emilija Tudzarovska, for sharing with us your scientific approach to the crisis of representative democracy that we all perceive. I recall you are Lecturer in Contemporary European Politics at Charles University, in Prague.

 

A first text version of this contribution has been published on The Loop, the blog of ECPR, the European Consortium for Political Research.

The post Clashes of sovereignty appeared first on Ideas on Europe.