Ideas on Europe Blog

In the wake of the financial crisis, EU governments spent taxpayers’ money to rescue European banks. That displaced a financial crisis into political systems by straining public finances and social protections in all EU member states. Some states were brought to the point of insolvency, and the survival of the EU’s single currency, perhaps even of the EU itself, was threatened. But is the EU experiencing a legitimacy crisis?

Three types of legitimacy crisis

Legitimacy is at the core of ‘good government’. It means the justified or rightful exercise of political power. Since a right to exercise political power implies that people have an obligation to comply also with laws they do not like, legitimate political orders are more likely to enjoy the unforced compliance of citizens. Political systems that can concentrate on satisfying the needs and values of citizens, rather than coercing them, are more likely to deliver high levels of economic performance and to score well on indicators of human development.

Whilst the EU has experienced serial crises since the financial crisis, spanning from geopolitics and Brexit to dealing with refugee flows, it remains to be investigated whether it has experienced a legitimacy crisis. We lack the knowledge, concepts, theories and methods needed to investigate scientifically just how far, if at all, the Union’s ability to make legitimate use of political power corresponds to what it needs to do in crises.

We might say that legitimacy crises occur where a political order is unable to satisfy all necessary conditions for the justification of its powers. That is an intentionally abstract and generic definition, designed to avoid assuming any one form of political order; any one set of necessary conditions for legitimacy; any one set of standards of justification; and any one form of crisis. If we want to understand if a particular political order is subject to a legitimacy crisis, we must ‘fill in’ the generic definition by specifying standards and necessary conditions for the justification of powers specific to that order. Against this background, I argue that the European Union may experience three types of legitimacy crisis.

Failed direct legitimacy

The first type of legitimacy crisis occurs where the EU cannot satisfy all conditions to be directly democratically legitimate with citizens. The Union defines rights, makes law and allocates values. However, in democracies, citizens must be able to control as equals their own rights, laws and allocations of values.  Consider, though, the conditions that are needed for democratic institutions and politics. These include freedoms and rights, political competition that offers voters relevant choices, a civil society in which all groups have equal opportunity for organised influence, a public sphere in which all have equal access to public debate, and a defined people, a demos, or at least agreement on who should have votes and voice in the making of decisions that are binding on all.

Achieving all those conditions simultaneously may be hard for the EU, given that it is a multi-state, non-state political system that operates from beyond the state. The capacity of the state to concentrate power, resources and legal enforcement has historically been useful in ensuring that the decisions of democratic majorities are carried out; in providing universal and equal systems of representation; in guaranteeing rights needed for democracy; in drawing the boundaries of defined political communities; and in motivating voters and elites to participate in democratic political competition for the control of an entity which manifestly affects their needs and values.

Failed indirect legitimacy

So, what of the alternative where the EU somehow derives or borrows democratic legitimacy from that of its member state democracies? That might be more than a second-best where it is difficult for the European Union to develop its own democratic politics and institutions in full. There may also be important justifications for a form of European Union in which individuals are citizens of national democratic political communities of states that are member states of a Union that is itself an association of both national democracies and their citizens.

However, member state democracies could make contradictory demands on the Union’s legitimacy. Attempts to legitimate the EU via its member state democracies could produce democracy-on-democracy domination. Either suggests a second form of legitimacy crisis where the EU cannot be indirectly legitimated by all its member states simultaneously.

Failed input, output or throughput legitimacy

However, cutting across any need to be directly or indirectly legitimated by publics, the EU may also need to be input, output and throughput legitimate. Imagine a political system that was procedurally perfect in its voting and deliberations. Yet it had no outputs. Would we consider it legitimate? Perhaps not, if we think that political power is justified only where it has outcomes important to securing rights, justice and the most basic of public goods needed for personal security and economic and social welfare. So democratic legitimacy needs inputs from votes and voices, outcomes that are valued by citizens and throughputs, or procedures, that convert inputs from votes and voices into outcomes that deliver value, rights and public goods. A political system may also need to be able to make legitimate trade-offs between optimal outcomes and ideal procedures.

Hence, in a third form of legitimacy crisis, the Union might struggle to provide essential inputs, outputs and throughputs simultaneously. As a Union of democracies, a high level of agreement between member states may be a procedural condition for input and throughput legitimacy. However, multiple veto points may make it harder to secure the outputs that are thought to justify collective action at the European level.

The research project Post-crisis Democracy in the European Union (PLATO) explores these tensions. It aims to build new theory through multiple, connected PhD projects that investigate different actors with whom the EU needs to be legitimate, and different standards of democratic legitimacy. I invite you to explore findings from the individual studies on this blog and to engage in conversations on the EU’s struggle for legitimacy.

The post From financial crisis to legitimacy crisis? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Ceriana by Roberto Martini

The weeks and months following Brexit are taking those of us who would have preferred the UK to stay in the EU into strange new territory. While politicians and technocrats get on with working out the practicalities, the question for us ordinary Europhiles is: how to remain European?

On this new terrain is the underlying stuff, the issues that (from the Remainer point of view) the referendum was really about – relationships with other countries, curiosity about different cultures and participation in other ways of life. They’re expressed in various ways, through learning languages, taking trips or spending periods abroad: most Europhiles have one continental country they’re particularly attached to. Eyes lighting up at the thought of French cuisine, the Italian language, a Spanish village or a German city – all these are signs and elements of a European identity and set of affinities that will endure regardless of what happens at the institutional and multilateral level.

But, as with all relationships, Britain’s connections with its continental neighbours will need care and cultivation if they are to thrive – more so than ever, since the UK’s political decision to leave the EU has left many in Europe with a sense of hurt and bemusement.

Crucially, strong connections require a mood beyond the anger that characterised much of the Remain campaign, a constructive and creative set of emotions and attitudes that foster an outward focus rather than the tendency to stay locked into an insular battle with the ‘other side’.

So here, in no particular order, are some ideas about How To Be A New Remainer.

Be Consciously Continental

Cultivate continental habits and interests. As a practising glutton, I’ve long brought back favourite foods from places I’ve spent time in and integrated them into my everyday life, with the result that I consume Arabic coffee, drink tea like a Palestinian and put chorizo in everything. Having a periodic ‘Table for Europe’ – one of the ideas for marking the day of the UK’s departure from the EU – in which you share a continental meal with at least one fellow Europhile, is a simple but powerful way of giving an ordinary act cultural and political significance.

In a consumer society, we all have a degree of economic power which we can use to make our preferences matter. As K L McGhee points out on Facebook, another easy act of post-Brexit activism is Euro-consumerism, supporting cafes, delis and other continental businesses wherever possible.

But, as my Austrian great-aunt never actually said, there’s more to life than eating. There’s a vast pool of European culture to dip into, diverse enough to suit all tastes and deep enough to last a lifetime (or several). Jonny Watson, also on Facebook, suggests reading 27 books, each one written by an author from a different member of the EU: ‘Balzac for France, Cervantes for Spain, Goethe for Germany,’ he suggests, adding, ‘not sure what to suggest for Slovakia.’ Or confine yourself to one country and set yourself the task of reading some of its greatest classics, picking the sauciest one for your book group.

Following European news is a way of countering both the declining levels of foreign news coverage in the British media and the national self-absorption that has taken hold since the referendum. Learning Spanish in the run-up to Brexit, I found solace and a sense of perspective in El Pais, often discussing the latest developments with my incredulous Spanish conversation exchange partner. Many of the major outlets in European countries publish in English, such as the German public broadcaster Deutschewelle and the pan-European news channel Euronews.

Forge Partnerships and Connections

This article from The Spectator is a timely reminder of the lost innocence of the 1970s, when all things continental held a certain glamour. Back then, a ‘continental breakfast’ was a rare treat rather than just a couple of croissants that leave you hungry, and a continental quilt was an exotic feature of only the most sophisticated bedrooms.

New Remainers, of course, don’t believe in pointless nostalgia. But perhaps there’s a useful truth in this backward glance, one that has to do with recovering the romance and excitement of discovering how differently others organise their lives. In recent decades, this sense of discovery has largely been an individual, pleasure-seeking affair, pursued through regular holidays to the continent. But the post-Brexit world creates the need – and opportunity – to promote more formal links for cultural exchange.

Some potential partnerships will flow naturally out of the gaps left by a pro-Brexit government, generating the need to create and maintain pan-European links in academia, for example. Lobbying for the continuation of the Erasmus scheme is vital for future generations of Europe, as Timothy Garton Ash argues in this wide-ranging piece. In short, a kind of continental third sector could emerge out of the mess to provide a counterweight to the anti-Europeanism at the top.

Meanwhile there’s scope for developing connections at the municipal and local level with a revival of the twin town movement. This article, published before the EU referendum was even a twinkle in David Cameron’s eye, shows that there is untapped potential for links between towns within the framework already in place. Some councils are already seeing the potential. In a display of solidarity after the referendum, the mayor of Bromley visited the borough’s twin town in Germany. Neuwied’s mayor Jan Einig responded in kind: ‘We can look forward resolutely together despite Brexit, because what connects us is our friendship and our friendship cannot be destroyed by Brexit.’

Travel to the Continent

When it comes to understanding the Other, even in the digital age nothing can replace the in-body, analogue experience of travelling to another country.

Marcel Proust had it in this more nuanced formulations of the adage ‘travel broadens the mind’: ‘The real voyage of discovery consists not in seeking new landscapes, but in having new eyes.’ And since the evidence suggests that twenty-first century humans still have a problem with difference, Mark Twain’s claim that ‘travel is fatal to prejudice, bigotry, and narrow mindedness, and many of our people need it sorely on these accounts’ remains apposite.

The benefits of continental travel have been recognised in British society since the Grand Tour became an essential part of a gentleman’s education, a civilising post-study tour which survives in the democratised form of inter railing. In these climate-anxious days, such trips can circumvent the objections to flying because the continent to which the UK still belongs, having physically detached from mainland Europe a mere eight thousand years ago, is accessible by boat and train.

There are signs that long-haul train travel is becoming increasingly popular. The Austrian state railway has recently relaunched part of its overnight train service, while the Independent’s Europe correspondent Jon Stone has been sharing his experiences of a train journey from Brussels to Prague on Twitter, highlighting fares to rival those of budget airlines.

All of which calls to mind another adage-in-the-making: true remainers never leave, they just find new ways of staying European.

Alex Klaushofer is writing a book about the state of Europe by way of three lesser-known continental cities.

 

The post The New Remainers: How To Stay European After Brexit appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

“Islam or a certain kind of Islam,” might show resistance to the idea of democracy. While surveying the texts of Islamic political thought specifically of thinkers like Al Farabi and Ibn Ruchd, Derrida found a certain pattern. He saw that although these two thinkers incorporated the Greek philosophy of Philosopher King from Plato’s Republic and Nicomachean Ethics in their oeuvre of Islamic political thought, they entirely skipped the ideals of democracy.

He also added that a reference to democracy in a Muslim State never comes without bringing a certain amount of turmoil.

Although Derrida stated this possible incoherence in Islam and democracy, he believed otherwise. Democracy and Islam are perceived to be in opposition with each other, for Derrida a dialogue can be ensued to use Islam for betterment of a democracy to come.

He assigned a political duty to anyone who wants to see democracy flourish to help people of the Islamic world who are trying to bring a secular in the political for the re-emergence of laic subjectivity. And especially help to bring forth and re-establish the “democratic virtualities” inherent in Quran.

But the relationship of Islam and Democracy is a difficult one, to make a point; Derrida mentioned the elections of 1992 Algeria.

As happened in Algeria in 1992 the elected party leader (Islamic Front) had to step down by intervention of army because army wanted a better democratic process and their victory was deemed hazardous for democracy by army. Earlier President Chadli of Algeria had started democratic processes and through 1989 constitution enabled a free press, power to constitute political parties and education of masses for a democratic pole. In this consequence the Front Islamique Salut party won in the first round of elections in 1991 “taking 47.54% of 59% turnout.” This was also a precursor that Algeria might get rid of the ruling elite which were the Army and Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) party. These two had the authority soon after Algeria’s Independence from France. But Army overthrew Chadli’s government and put a state of emergency for a better development of democracy. Although that was all in the name of democracy what was to follow in Algeria was extreme fear, abductions, abuse and crackdown not only on the Islamists but common people.

Derrida opined that democracy suffered through the slogan of better democracy. The authority sabotages the electoral system in the name of democracy itself. This according to Derrida is the auto-destructive quality democracy is inherent with.

The example of Algerian elections shows this confrontation of Islam against democracy but also show how democratic powers are adamant of anything Islamic. It signals to the aporia related to democracy itself, it is when non-democratic forces suspend the democratic process in the name of democracy. Secondly it is the supposed tension between Islam and democracy, commonly perceived that that each entity is bad for another.

The dilemma of the elections of Algeria was that although the electoral process was fair but as the result an Islamic party gained majority, and that faction that took away their authority claimed that the Islamists might eliminate the very democratic system they came from. But the result of taking away Islamists electoral right came as a tumultuous blow on the people of Algeria.

Derrida mentioned that some of the people he was in contact with in Algeria were of the opinion that Army takeover was the right choice as democratically elected Islamic government might have been bad for democracy. Here is the example of biased Derrida, that certain people think that Islamist might have been bad for democracy. And this is also a negative point we can attribute to Derrida because despite of his claims of alterity and knowing that by clear democratic process FIS would have won he acknowledged some of his friend’s opinion that ousting of Islamic government was right.

But Derrida compensated his bias by asking for a dialogue between Islam and democracy. He emphasized that if we plainly assume Islamist will be bad for democracy, it will obscure the picture of the other side. If Islam is resistant to certain kind democracy on the outset, it also shows that westernized sections claiming to be democratic are adamant to assimilate Muslims in democracy.

Jacques Derrida also highlighted that it is not that simple matter of right and wrong and the two parties in Algeria simply do not stand against one concrete opponent. The westernized sections are afraid or against a certain kind of Islamists and Islamists only loathe democracy because they know a certain version of it. These two have to be receptive to the diversity of the other side.

The events of January 1992 Algeria show a suicidal quality of democracy; that it can democratically throw democracy out of itself, or it is not hospitable to other even though other was elected democratically. On one hand Derrida mentioned that a certain kind of Islam is hostile to democracy and on the other hand he demanded openness from the part of democracy to other kinds of Islam. Deconstruction should be able to extend democracy to the horizon of unfamiliar.

Here we have to see that Algeria had been in the influence of FLN and Army which was seen as the extension of westernization while as Algeria has been a Muslim country the FIS marketed itself as the Islamic alternative. So both of these viewpoints of FIS as Islamic revival and Army/FLN as savior of democracy/westernization were merely political tools and creating binaries of Islam/democracy, Arab world/Europe or East/West would be a naïve step.

The case of Egypt is completely similar to what happened in Algeria, in the relation between Islam and Democracy. The revolution of Tahrir Square ousted Hosni Mubarak and later electoral system was established to elect a ruling party democratically. Muslim Brotherhood won the elections of 2011 with a clear margin and its leader became the country’s premiere. But soon the Algerian history was repeated on Egyptian soil; army took over for the sake of democracy, crackdown on all the elected leaders and executed most of them. The persecution and torture and abductions of civilians, journalists and anyone not considered their own is still going on. Here again democracy was done badly in the name of democracy with the help of western powers.

For these matters, Derrida’s project for a dialogue with Islam is important. Although Derrida showed a little bias that Algeria was better off without that democratically elected Islamist party, he nevertheless emphasized that Democracy should be open to other religions. Derrida encouraged a dialogue with Islam and within Islam.

It is noteworthy to point out here that there are scores of Muslim thinkers who have worked on an Islamic reasoning of the concept of democracy. The same Muslims Derrida urged the philosophers of time to assist.  Syed Abul’ala Maudodi, an Islamic thinker of the South Asia believed that democracy is not in any contradiction from Islamic rule only if we accept that religion and worldly affairs should go hand in hand. He dubbed such rule as Theo-democracy but adds that only Muslims should be able to elect a ruler, have a say in legislature and consultation in government matters. He emphasized on consultation and authority should be in hands of ordinary Muslims which is indeed democratic.

Fetuhullah Gulen, an influential figure of Turkey and Central Asia, believed very much like Derrida that democracy has been going through changes and it will evolve and improve in the future. But to attain its perfection Islam is the political system that can help it. He stressed that Quran assigns similar duties to its citizen as has been entrusted by modern democratic entities.

Sadek Jawad Suleiman, thought democracy and Islamic Shura to be similar in essence. Ali Abdul Raziq, an Egyptian scholar, emphasized that democracy in relation to Caliphate “can not only be conciliated with Islam but is the one most according to its dogma.”

Derrida as mentioned earlier urged the scholars of the West to help those in the Islamic world who are trying to unmask the virtualities of Quran that has been shadowed by layers of traditions and interpretations. And there are scores of such Muslim thinkers who have been working on such a level. Derrida’s project for democracy can be beneficial for both democracy’s revival and political Islam’s survival.

On Derrida’s proposed idea of cohesion of Islam and democracy; Alex Thomson said that if Islam according to Derrida has political importance for future democracy and their collision can result in something different, then we should acknowledge these facts seriously.

On the course democracy might take, it might not be identifiable as democracy. The marriage of Islam and democracy might lead to something new and different.

On the discussion of openness towards Islam, Slavoj Zizek also converges with Derrida, although his theoretical and political aspirations are very much different from Derrida. Zizek said that despite seeing Islam resilient towards modernization and lamenting about it we should see Islam as an undecidable, open for a socialist project. The reason on focus of Islam is that although it retains the most severe possibility to turn into fascist project it also can be the site for the best. Islam is unlike other religions it has more powerful social linkages, it can counter any possibility to be assimilated into the world capitalism, so Zizek outlined the duty to use the equivocal qualities of Islam politically.

Derrida, aware of the importance Islam and its followers might be able to assert, wanted to use it for democracy’s own good. Scholars like Zizek also took Islam as a site for betterment and development.

Europe needs to peacefully engage in a dialogue with Islam and Muslims. With the ongoing terrorist situations engulfing Europe it might seem as a strategic mistake to not to react and keep negotiating a possibility for common ground between the other (Islam particularly) and democracy (the European ideal); but it may be perhaps a good option for Europe’s future.

Derrida did not simply wanted democracy taken as it is present and neither wanted Islam to be taken as is. What he envisioned will be a new horizon for both democracy and political Islam. For such unison, Derrida’s persistence for overcoming patriarchy that is found both in western democracy and Islamic political system will be of great help.

The post Derrida, Democracy and Islam appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

So, Brexit got done. The UK is no longer a member of the European Union. What happens in the next 11 months will dictate the UK’s economic landscape for decades to come, explains Maria Demertzis, Deputy Director of Bruegel.

Pro-Brexit protesters demonstrate outside the Houses of Parliament in London, Britain, October 28, 2019. REUTERS/Hannah McKay

Now negotiators must move on to harder things. To quote a famous British Europhile, ‘…this is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is perhaps, the end of the beginning.’

The UK has lost all its representation in EU institutions but, at least till the end of December 2020, it must comply with all EU regulations. For a little while then, everything continues as is, except the UK has no say, including in what decisions the EU takes between 1 February and the end of the year. Compromises hammered out in the next 11 months, by both British and European negotiators, will dictate the UK’s economic landscape for decades to come.

The UK would, understandably, want to limit this period as a pure rule-taker. But this depends on whether there will be an agreed relationship by the end of this year.

The UK has lost all its representation in EU institutions but, at least till the end of December 2020, it must comply with all EU regulations.

Can it be done? If this deal refers to just trade issues then any agreement made will have to be ratified by the Council and European Parliament only. And yet, if it is more than just a bare-bones trade deal, but refers to any other issues, national parliaments will in all likelihood need to be consulted. This is a much more complicated and time-consuming process.

So, what can the UK achieve in what is arguably a tight schedule?

The UK will be driven in its demands by the Brexit rationale for regulatory divergence. Mark Carney, the governor of the Bank England, argues in these terms for financial services. As one of the world’s major financial centres, the argument goes, the City of London should aim to go its own way. Given that the UK is leaving the EU, it should aim to maintain and expand the relative advantage it has in the financial sector, the way it sees fit.

But why should the EU agree to this? The City has served as the financial centre of the EU and the euro. Even if Brexit itself diminishes the City’s allure, there is no obvious substitute in continental Europe. This is true for banking services but is more so for access to capital markets. For as long as capital markets union is not a reality, London can still provide access to capital markets the European economy needs.

So, perhaps an agreement on financial services is within the realm of what is possible.

But what about trade? The UK will be looking to stay as close to the EU’s single market as it possibly can. The EU will want to accommodate that provided the UK accepts its rules. Here incentives are not as aligned however. The EU is unlikely to budge as it has the upper hand in the negotiations. By leaving the EU, the UK risks losing 27 markets. This reflects about half of its trade. The EU just risks losing one market, has less to lose and is not prepared to risk the integrity of the single market.  Can then the UK accept regulatory alignment in return for seamless trade?

By leaving the EU, the UK risks losing 27 markets. This reflects about half of its trade.

The chances are that it won’t. But nor can it afford to have no deal by the end of the year that would require prolonging its rule-taker status. That would mean that the only way forward is aiming to have a narrow deal on very specific sectors within the year, but then pursue regulatory divergence for the rest.

The only way forward is aiming to have a narrow deal on very specific sectors within the year, but then pursue regulatory divergence for the rest.

Together with some agreement on financial services this might suffice to declare a political victory. But it will be economically poor as it will not have avoided trade disruptions. This will have consequences for British industries and eventually the economy. But also, it could exacerbate the divergence between London, that will have been allowed to continue to thrive, and the rest of the country that will lose the benefits of frictionless trade. Ironically, this was one of the arguments that fed the Brexit cause to begin with.

The post The realpolitik of the day after Brexit appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

If Boris Johnson can negotiate agreements that are better than the EU system, it would be a serious challenge for the 27. 

Boris Johnson ‘got Brexit done’. The United Kingdom will, however, remain subject to EU rules until the end of the year (Photo: UK Parliament/Jessica Taylor)

He was believed to be an entertainer, he turned out to be a political strategist. Thanks to a crushing victory last December, where he managed to remove the Labour party from its working-class strongholds, Boris Johnson ‘got Brexit done’. The United Kingdom will, however, remain subject to EU rules until the end of the year. On 1st January 2021, its privileged access to the EU internal market will end in the absence of a new partnership agreement which is yet to be negotiated or an extension of the transition period (which Johnson does not even want to hear the word of).

For the past three years, the various options available to London have repeatedly been assessed, notably the so-called Canadian option (a free trade agreement for goods, a partial opening of service markets) and the Norwegian option (a full participation in the European market, in exchange for regulatory alignment and a contribution to the budget). But Sajid Javid, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, has recently put it bluntly: the UK will have its own trade and regulatory policies. It will not be a follower.

A new conflict with the 27 is thus around the corner. On January 8, in London, Ursula von der Leyen warned that the condition for a free trade agreement without tariffs or quotas is broad regulatory alignment. The more the UK diverges from the EU, the more its market access will be restricted.

The British position is unsurprising: it would be paradoxical, after having decided to ‘take back control’, as the Brexiteers proclaimed, not to make use of this freedom. But Johnson faces a triple contradiction.

The more the UK diverges from the EU, the more its market access will be restricted.

The first is geopolitical. If London could have hoped to negotiate a host of free trade agreements in the pre-2016 multilateral world, it will be much more difficult in the new Trumpian transactional world. Today, the most important thing is strength. A market of 66 million inhabitants (against 450 for the 27 EU countries) does not translate to much muscle.

The second contradiction is economic. The British economy’s best asset is not the production of goods, for which the UK records a heavy deficit vis-à-vis the Union, but services, for which it posts a surplus. The exchange of services requires a harmonised regulatory framework. A combination of free trade in goods and segmentation of the service markets would cost to British consulting or financial engineering firms far more than to German machine tool builders.

The third contradiction is social. By raising the minimum wage 6% and by declaring a preference for skills, Johnson rejected deregulation of the labour market. To do otherwise would be to compromise his political victories. And it is hard to imagine the UK undercutting the EU’s environmental or health standards, for which the preferences of British consumers are very close to those of their continental neighbours.

London’s room for manoeuvre is narrow. Johnson can bet on regulatory competition in finance, artificial intelligence or biotech, and rely on subsidies to reach his industrial policy goals. But this will not be without cost. The greater the divergence with the 27, the longer and more difficult it will be to negotiate an agreement and the more restrictive the EU will be in terms of access to its market.

This does not necessarily put Johnson in a corner. The weakness of the EU lies in its cumbersome procedures and the inertia of its legislation, which results from multiple compromises between competing interests. Take the EU budget, it has priorities that have little to do with those of the EU, which gets perpetuated from one cycle to the next because everyone is fighting to preserve its cherished spending items. Or consider the inability of the European Commission to present a financing plan commensurate to its climate ambitions. Both examples illustrate a sad logic of entitlement.

So where can Johnson go now? Certainly not ‘Singapore on Thames’, the illusion of a free-market paradise for which there is no political basis. He can, however, build an agile regulatory system able to foster innovation and steer it more efficiently than his counterparts in Brussels. Johnson could create a system that, far from contradicting that of the EU, is actually ahead of it.

The bet is far from won. Both on the British and on the EU side, Brexit will end up as just another chapter in the story of Europe’s decline.

If he succeeds, it would present a serious challenge for the 27. But it will also ultimately be beneficial because what the EU needs is not a Britain that drifts away, or isolates itself and fails. The EU needs a partner whose competition wakes up the continent. It’s a challenge that forces the EU to tackle the problem of differentiated integration head-on, instead of cementing a sometimes artificial unity built around the defence of the status quo.

The bet is far from won. Both on the British and on the EU side, Brexit will end up as just another chapter in the story of Europe’s decline. But let’s not stop dreaming. Since the EU and the UK are now condemned to cohabit, let’s try to do it productively. An intelligent partner and competitor is the best thing that can happen to the continent.

This opinion piece was originally published in Le Monde.

The post Britain faces a triple contradiction appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Just as the UK government is making its final preparations for the fast-approaching Brexit Day, I am just wondering who is looking forward to the Transition Period, and all the drama that might follow it.

My super cautious and alarmed older brother, who is a British Passport holder, has already made his final visit to Germany in the weekend, just before the 31st of January, just in case rules change and it becomes a hassle for him to make a swift appearance to his mates. He never ceases to amaze me, and I am sure he is not the only one feeling this way in the UK.

Illustration: Chris Riddell

There is a lot one could say about the UK’s imminent departure from the EU. I am not mentioning the clumsiness of the 50p coin, which was introduced by the government to commemorate the Brexit, as well as the amusement I feel for the extravagant parties planned by the Brexiteers for Friday night.

The thrill of being an independent country again without any ties to the EU is worth of glass champagne, which must be a product of the UK.

The morning after Friday will make some wonder about the Transition Period, and the benefits of being an independent country will also be questioned, but there is no going back from this locked-in trajectory. The UK’s Brexit path was set in by the results of the UK’s in-and-out Referendum in 2016.

The remaining EU-27

Though some EU member states (MS) may be feeling relieved that the UK is finally leaving, after years of political turmoil caused by uncompromising positions of all the parties involved. The Financial Times of 27th of  January reported that Dacian Cioloas, a former Romanian prime minister and leader of Renew Europe, the liberal, centrist political group

Francisco Seco/Associated Press

in the European Parliament, said: “For me, Brexit is a mistake of history and shows why the European project must never be taken for granted”.  Whereas some of the EU’s older members are less regretful about Brexit, for France London stood for excessive economic liberalism and kept blocking initiative that would have improved the EU’s cohesion and efficiency. ‘Bon débarras’ the French authorities may think.

The remaining 27 MSs, however, have more urgent problems to worry about, now that yesterday’s troublemaker is making its way out. The question is not about whether member states want more unity or less cooperation at the EU level. It is more about whether the core values of the EU, outlined in Article 2 of the Treaty of the European Union, are under threat. What ultimately thought to be threatening the survival of the EU, as we know it.

With the departure of the UK, the EU is beginning to close a chapter on a Eurosceptic member state, but its grip in keeping the remaining Eurosceptic MSs in line with the EU standards is proving difficult and critical. Poland and Hungary, who are the meddlers of the present and perhaps of the future too, are the first member states that come to my mind.

The Rule of Law debate

Yes, it is right that the governing political parties of Polish Law and Justice Party (PiS) and the Hungarian Civic Alliance Party (Fidesz) do not campaign against their country’s membership of the EU. Nevertheless, their policy choices put them at disputes with the EU institutions; let us not forget Poland and Hungary are suspected of having undermined the rule of law, and the Article 7 mechanisms were triggered against them in December 2017 and in September 2018, respectively.

The crisis of Rule of Law is a significant issue for the EU. Currently, there two developments underpinning the debate on the Rule of Law in the EU: (i) approval of a draft bill which allows judges who question the government’s reforms to be disciplined by the PiS controlled lower house (Sejm) of the Polish Parliament and (ii) the European People’s Party’s inaction on the suspension of Fidesz.

However Ian Bond and Agata Gostynska-Jakubowska’s ‘Democracy and the Rule of Law: Failing Partnership’ report, published by the Centre for European Reform (CER), attempts to pull in other EU countries, including France, Italy, Greece and Bulgaria, into the debate on the rule of law.

The report also mentioned the UK.  The tension between Prime Minister Boris Johnson and judges -during the prorogation of the Westminster Parliament in 2019- was highlighted as the Brexit-land’s moment of the problem with the rule of law.

What ultimately Bond and Gostynska-Jakubowska claimed is that apart from Poland and Hungary, there is a list of other countries undermining the rule of law in the EU. Thus they suggest that the European Commission should begin to treat member-states equally strictly rather than focussing exclusively on Central Europe, basing their arguments on the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators and The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Indexes.

Image Credit: Luis Vazquez/©Gulf News

I am not sure if I am convinced with Bond and Gostynska-Jakubowska’s reference to the East and West divide in how the European Commission treated the member states differently and not equally. While the core values of the EU are under threat, the European Commission or any other EU institutions’ main priority is, of course, the protection and defence of the rule of law. Suggesting otherwise is undermining the supranational nature of these institutions

However I agree with them on the following recommendation they made in the report, which read as: “that EU institutions should engage more with civil society organisations involved in raising public awareness of EU values and principles, and do more to promote respect for the rule of law throughout the Union”. I am too convinced that if we do take more actions on the ground, where the rule of law is systematically undermined, change is more likely to take deep root. This is something I will keep an eye on…

Last but not least, the UK is departing from the EU on Friday, maybe it will be a sense of relief for some, but what is waiting for the remaining 27 MSs is more complicated than the one awkward partner they had to deal with between 1973 and 2020. I think the increasing number of infringement cases of the rule of law is here to stay, and the tensions will get higher between MSs and the EU institutions. Thus the UK’s occasional arrogance might be missed by the remaining members.

The post Awkward partner is now out, the Rule of Law debate is here to stay appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

By Romana Oliveira Pinhal |

In the United Kingdom terrorism is presented, by the British government, as one of the most serious and dangerous threats to national security and justified the introduction of legislative, political and operational measures aimed at combating the terrorist threat.

The British securitizing narrative states the country is facing “a serious terrorist threat” and “as the nature of the threat we face becomes more complex, more fragmented, more hidden, especially online, the strategy needs to keep up”. The presentation of the terrorist threat as exceptional and creating a state of emergency that at any moment a terrorist attack could occur, favours the development of a climate of insecurity, instability, fear and suspicion that facilitates the introduction of preventive measures.

One of the most important duties of a State is to protect its citizens from security threats, but its duty to protect, on the other hand, should not compromise the respect for fundamental human rights and freedoms.

While action by States is necessary to prevent and effectively sanction terrorist acts, not all means are justifiable. As surveillance powers increase, giving the British government access to various aspects of the daily lives of its citizens, serious restrictions to the full enjoyment of the right to privacy emerge.

In the context of the fight against terrorism, surveillance is presented as a necessary evil that becomes justifiable in the name of national security. The increasing use of technology demonstrates that societies, fuelled by a “culture of fear“, are progressively evolving into States of overprotection and, as a consequence, we are witnessing the “silent erosion of privacy“.

The growing focus on technology is based on a model that promotes a trade-off between privacy and security, according to which a certain degree of privacy intrusion is necessary and indispensable to achieve higher levels of security. British citizens expect their government to protect them from security threats as well as safeguard their right to privacy.

The dominant political discourse states that citizens should accept and support the introduction of new surveillance measures, even if it results in intrusions to their privacy. What also happens is that, when describing terrorism as a new threat we are led to believe that only new counter-terrorism measures are appropriate and efficient to deal with this “newness“. Consequently, even if there is a lack of certainty and a minimum probability of attack, the potential severity of the attacks is considered enough to trigger preventive action.

The British counter-terrorism policy has changed to favour pre-emptive measures, deployed in accordance with knowledge produced about terrorism ‘risk’. Nowadays new measures are introduced based on risk assessment; they consider the potential of the threat and the possibility of a future terrorist attack. This is enough to justify and legitimize the introduction of new measures. Policy is based on a potential situation that may never happen, on a risk that may never become real.

In the British case, the securitizing narrative and the surveillance practices seem to value prevention and protection at the expense of the respect for the right to privacy. There is a major risk that it can be used for other reasons or purposes than security, giving the State the power to access to several aspects of citizens’ private life.

New counter-terrorism measures are presented as essential tools, as the only way to keep the country and its citizens safe from major security threats. It is said that is very import to give the police and the security forces all the powers they need to counter the terrorist threat in an efficient way.

The former Prime Minister Theresa May stated that “enough is enough” and “things need to change” to justify new online counter-terrorism measures. The effect on the right to privacy was not even taken into consideration. The fight against terrorism was an important challenge during her tenure as a Prime Minister, but in her last speech as the head of the Government the fight against this security threat was not contemplated. The same happened with Boris Johnson’s first speech as Prime Minister where he announced extra police and more powers to stop and search in order to keep the country safe, without having mentioned in detail how he proposes to deal with the terrorist threat. By granting new powers to the police and security forces the State claims to be more efficient in fighting security threats but in the long run this can prove to be a greater threat to our security than the threat posed by terrorism, since the police can exercise these powers based only on suspicion.

Recently, the new Home Secretary, Priti Patel, hosted the Five Eyes security summit where the opportunities and risks that new technologies pose were debated. The meetings were held in private with no agenda being made public but it was said that firms should not develop their systems and services in ways that empower criminals or put vulnerable people at risk. One of the main topics under debate concerned the increasingly effective encryption provided by technology companies who want to make their services more secure after a range of security breaches. This development was not seen as a positive step in the fight against terrorism as a clear intention to change the way data is encrypted (the process of encoding digital information) so governments can have access to data in a readable and usable format was expressed. This move was highly criticized as it could be a serious challenge to the right to privacy of users.

In 2016 the Investigatory Powers Act introduced new surveillance powers that were harshly criticized by the Court of Justice of the European Union that stated it “(…) exceeds the limits of what is strictly necessary and cannot be considered to be justified within a democratic society (…)”. As a consequence amendments were made with the government stating that the restrictions in place, so important to guarantee our right to privacy, were “severely limiting our agencies’ ability to stop terrorist attacks and bring criminals to justice”. When he was Home Secretary, Sajid Javid admitted that MI5 had breached surveillance safeguards in the way it handles information obtained under interception warrants. As a consequence, an independent review was established to consider and report back on what lessons could be learned.

The British securitizing narrative focuses too much on the exceptionality of the threat and on promoting the introduction of new legislative measures as a fundamental tool to deal with the terrorist threat, ignoring the potential effect of the surveillance practices on the disrespect of the right to privacy. It is often overlooked that the antiterrorist measures can have a negative impact on British citizens that accept them because they believe it is the only way to guarantee their safety, not considering its real danger concerning the restriction of their right to privacy. However, the disrespect of this basic freedom by the British government, which claims to be a committed supporter of liberal values, can be more than a necessity and turn out as an attempt to have access to several aspects of the lives of its citizens.

 

 

Romana Oliveira Pinhal

Bio
Romana Pinhal is a PhD researcher in Political Science and International Relations at the University of Minho in Portugal. Her main research interests concern International Security Studies, Surveillance Studies and Human Rights.

Summary
In the UK the presentation of terrorism as one of the biggest threats to security justified the introduction of new antiterrorist measures. The government asserts that keeping the country and its citizens safe is one of its most important duties. While action by states is necessary to prevent further terrorist attacks not all means are justifiable and the state duty to protect should not compromise the respect for fundamental human rights and freedoms.

The post Terrorism in the United Kingdom: Securitizing Narrative, Surveillance Practices and the Right to Privacy appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Ending. Starting

Change is coming to Brexit.

At the end of next week, the UK will leave the European Union, having now completed the passage of the Withdrawal Agreement Bill through the Lords: EU ratification is a given.

But there is another, broader change coming too.

The constellation of politicians, commentators and journalists who were brought together by the 2016 vote is starting to break up.

That’s most obvious in the political sphere. The EU has new Presidents aplenty and the Johnson government seeks to present itself as somehow brand-new, despite being a party of power for the past decade.

We can see it elsewhere too: Peter Foster – one of the preeminent media analysts – is on the move to the FT; @BorderIrish is hanging up its boots on Friday (possibly having made a fortune with its excellent tome). And I notice plenty of others online who seem to be winding things down or looking to pastures new.

That’s logical. The act of withdrawing from the EU will be a fundamental change; one that is irreversible. From here on, there can be no pretence (or vain hope) that things can go back to how they were.

And in all this, we have to remember that Brexit is very much not ‘done’.

Brrrrr

Which prompts an odd (for me, at least) thought: maybe we might think of this in an analogous (if very imperfect) way to the Cold War.*

The convention is to bracket the Second World War into the 1939-45 period, already neglecting the conflicts either side that existed outside of Europe, but we can also place it into a much longer era of tensions, both explicit and implicit.

The war obviously connects to the First World War, with the narrative of betrayal being used to frame the changing power balance in the continent, a change that then runs (in a very different way) from the fall of Berlin to the fall of the Berlin Wall, four decades later.

And even then, it’s clear that balance continues to change to this day, with Russia’s (and America’s) uncertainty and the distant haze of a Chinese dawn.

History is a stream, into which we dip from time to time, and our efforts to contain and compartmentalise it are necessarily imperfect. Indeed, it is precisely such efforts that mark our present situation.

And so I come back to a representation of the Cold War that happens to serve a contemporary structure of politics.

In 1945, there were victors and losers. There were celebrations, but ones tempered by the cost of achieving dominance.

And even before that victory came, there were divisions and rivalries, as the victors found that having a common enemy didn’t mean having a common agenda. Indeed, some of the former enemies turned out to be the staunchest supporters of both the new rival camps.

The recontextualisation of politics, in the shadow of the Bomb and of the Holocaust, was profound and irreversible too.

Badoom

And this is the key point. Politics does not stop.

All of the issues and problems that have been raised in and around Brexit these past years are not now suddenly solved and put behind us. Instead, they are still present, still urgent, still (largely) unanswered.

As we move into this new – and much, much longer – phase of Brexit, we might do well to remember this. Practically, we might usefully try to gather the insight of those who have done their Brexit time, so that the numerous wheels do not have to be reinvented once again.

If this sounds downbeat, then it’s because I feel rather downbeat. Not for the decision to leave per se – although it’s not one I voted for – but for the manner of how it proceeds.

At the risk of sounding like a scratched record (kids, ask an old person), the singular failure to build a consensus around any positive national project that is made possible by Brexit ranks at the top of my list of “why this will not end well.”

So as we move towards another day in history when everything changes, and yet nothing changes, we might start to work on how we are going to deal with, and shape, this new world around us.

* – one very obvious way it’s imperfect is that there aren’t necessarily the same number or arrangement of actors; i.e. no one is a Nazi or a Communist (or an American or Brit for that matter) in this, before we all go silly.

The post The Brexit Cold War appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

[This post has been published in https://eulawenforcement.com/, and it is now reproduced here for informative purposes]

With this blog post, Michiel Luchtman & Miroslava Scholten would like to announce the creation of the Jean Monnet Network on EU law Enforcement (EULEN). We would like to sketch briefly the relevance of this topic, thematic scope, structure and plans for activities of the network.

Enforcement of EU law: latest trends and implications

The enforcement of EU law and policies – whether they deal with securing our societies against transnational crime, the stability and competitiveness of our markets or migration and border management – have increasingly become a shared concern and responsibility for the EU and its Member States. Three developments mark the growing influence of the EU on law enforcement, i.e. on the monitoring of compliance of substantive norms of EU law, the investigation of alleged breaches of law and sanctioning for non-compliance (Scholten and Luchtman 2017, Scholten 2017):

1. the increasing emphasis of the EU legislator on enforcement convergence and on how nation states organize their systems of public and/or private enforcement (indirect or decentralized enforcement);

2. the proliferation of new models of transnational enforcement cooperation, i.e. the shift from traditional international cooperation towards new, transnational forms of cooperation under a framework of common goals, rules and institutions (e.g. the European Arrest Warrant, joint investigation teams, operational enforcement networks);

3. the proliferation of EU authorities with direct enforcement powers vis-à-vis private actors, including the sanctioning of infringements of EU law by these actors (direct or centralized enforcement).

These three developments bring along a delicate interplay between the many different actors involved and confront the EU and its Member States with the challenges to:

– align models for effective law enforcement, predominantly still based on the model of the nation-state, with rule of law standards in the shared legal order of the EU,

– obtain a fair balance between the need to integrate the enforcement of EU policies in national systems, customs and practices and the need to accommodate a level playing field at the transnational and supranational levels, and

– address the challenges for law enforcement in the digital era.

EULEN’s thematic scope and structure

EULEN is an initiative of 9 Universities from 8 European countries. This network’s thematic focus is twofold. On the one hand, its activities will focus on a number of selected policy areas where the mentioned trends and implications have had a role to play:

• The University of Warsaw, Poland (dr. M. Bernatt and dr. L. Zoboli), and Bocconi University, Milan, Italy (prof. dr. F. Ghezzi and dr. M. Maggiolino) will coordinate the topic of the enforcement in the area of EU competition law;
• King’s College London, the United Kingdom (prof. dr. A. Turk and dr. O. Stefan) will coordinate the topic of enforcement of EU banking and financial services law;
• The University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg (prof. dr. K. Ligeti and Mr. F. Giuffrida) will coordinate the topic of protection of the EU’s financial interest;
• The University of Deusto, Bilbao, Spain (prof. J. Abrisqueta Uriarte, dr. D. Fernández Rojo and dr. J. López Rodríguez) will coordinate the topic of migration, border management and asylum).

At the same time, three ‘horizontal themes’ will be addressed across these and other policy areas. These topics will be coordinated by Utrecht University, the Netherlands (prof. dr. M. Luchtman and dr. M. Scholten, also the main and contact coordinators of the network), in cooperation with the University of Bonn, Germany (prof. dr. M. Böse), and the University of Zurich, Switzerland (prof. dr. F. Meyer) (Ensuring effectiveness and the rule of law in a shared legal order) and the University of Castilla-La Mancha, Spain (prof. dr. L. Arroyo Jiménez), (Technological innovations and EU law enforcement). The topic of finding balance between differentiated enforcement and a European level playing field will be coordinated by dr. S. Princen of Utrecht University.

The network also has an advisory board with internationally recognized experts in the field of enforcement – dr. F. Blanc (World Bank), prof. P. Craig (University of Oxford), prof. W. Kovacic (George Washington University, former US Federal Trade Commission), prof. A. Ottow (Utrecht University, University Board), prof. J. Vervaele (Utrecht University; President of the Association International de Droit Pénal). EULEN will also set up a platform of Young Researchers to promote their research projects and dissemination of findings via blog posts and EULEN’s online collections of papers and other publications.

EULEN’s plans of activities

EULEN comes at a timely moment. It bridges the existing fragmentations along the lines of national jurisdictions, policy areas and scientific disciplines. In order to address the challenges for law enforcement in a world without territorial borders, EULEN will offer an academic network, connecting academic research and teaching to clear societal needs, objectives and stakeholders, open to join for the interested persons all around the globe (please contact the main coordinators about possibilities and benefits of joining as a member).

EULEN aims to:

• promote academic cooperation and identify the common trends and best practices, as well as develop new insights and models to meet the identified challenges,
• commit today’s practitioners to the network’s approach and goals, as well as develop trainings to help them to adjust to the quickly changing enforcement landscape,
• educate tomorrow’s practitioners and academics to take up leading roles in EU law enforcement structures, and to
• inform societies on the tremendous importance of law enforcement in an increasingly borderless world.

Through its large variety of activities – including round tables, conferences, online lectures and papers, a staff mobility program, a summer school and other – EULEN targets students, academics, officials from national and EU institutions, organisations and agencies, practitioners and societies at large. It will offer an annual master thesis award for the best master thesis written on the topic of enforcement of EU law!

The post EULEN: Jean Monnet Network on Enforcement of EU Law appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The foundation, on 13 January 1980 in Karlsruhe, of a nation-wide ecological party in West Germany came as a surprise. Not the idea itself: the time was ripe for creating a strong political movement based on environmental concerns, frustration with representative democracy, and radically pacifist convictions in the middle of the Cold War arms race. The surprise lied in the fact that this utterly heterogeneous smorgasbord of local protest initiatives and splinter groups, represented by approximately 1000 delegates, managed to get their act together in the first place (albeit under “chaotic” circumstances).

Karlsruhe, 13 Jan 1980.

But there it was, and two months later, at the federal congress in Saarbrücken, the party even succeeded in formulating a detailed manifesto of 47 pages proudly called a “Bundesprogramm”. This denomination clearly indicated that the project was to compete in the federal elections, building on the experiences at local and regional polls since 1977.

The German Greens were not the first ecological party to emerge in Europe. In Switzerland, a “popular movement for the environment” had been created as early as 1972, and the UK had seen in 1975 the establishment of the first party bearing the term “ecology” in its very name. Even the hopelessly scattered ecologist groups in France had managed to nominate (rather: persuade) a candidate for the presidential election in 1974, the remarkable René Dumont.

What made “Die Grünen” special right away was their fantastic name. Their founders may have had strong anti-capitalistic convictions, they definitely had an instinct for clever marketing! Turning a colour, which in German culture traditionally stands for the concept of “hope”, into a political brand, was a stroke of genius. So was the unique and unmistakeable “sunflower” emblem. So was dropping any further qualifier, like “party” or “list”. True, foreign media have trouble applying the appropriate declination of this German noun, but the benefits of this spectacular branding success clearly outweigh the grammatical drawbacks.

1980 poster.

As an eighteen-year-old citizen, about to vote for the first time, I was intrigued. While the Greens were quickly labelled, both by traditional politicians and mainstream media, as “dangerous leftists” and “muesli-crunching eco-nerds”, I had serious doubts about this categorisation, despite the look of most of the delegates. I was also unable to see why putting the fight against the ever more visible and smellable pollution of our industrial environment on top of the agenda should be a bad idea. And what on earth was wrong with eating muesli?

Two years earlier, in summer 1978, I had, by pure chance (probably waiting for some football news), bumped into a television programme of which I still remember the clever alliterative title “Gruhls Grüne Gründung”. The Gruhl in question was no Tolkien creature, but Herbert Gruhl, a well-known conservative MP who quit the Christian-Democrats after a quarter century of membership, reading an open letter to their president, a certain Helmut Kohl, in which he accused him, among other mistakes, of stupidly clinging to the growth dogma of the 1960s.

In my readings I had come across Gruhl’s 1975 book entitled “A planet is being looted – the terrifying balance sheet of our politics”, which introduced me to the Meadows report “The Limits to Growth”. Clearly, this guy was the only member of the CDU who had read and understood it rather than repress the uncomfortable truths it spelt out and buy the latest Mercedes or BMW instead. Most of all, he showed that evidence-based environmental concerns and their inevitable ethical consequences were not intrinsically leftist, but perfectly capable of transcending the political spectrum.

The TV programme in 1978 also informed the audience about Gruhl’s new creation, an ecological party named “Grüne Aktion Zukunft” (“Green Action for the Future”), which sounds like a prequel to Greta Thunberg’s movement, but which was much less successful. Two years later, Herbert Gruhl joined the Greens at their founding congress in Karlsruhe (third from the left on the picture above), but he only stayed one year in the new party, in which he never really felt welcome, and created the Ecological-Democratic Party (ÖDP), which never made it beyond 0.2% of the votes in the federal elections (the ÖDP does hold a seat in the European Parliament, though, obtained with 0.99%!).

The 40 years of the Greens may be interpreted as a success story. Favoured by Germany’s proportional voting system, they managed to disrupt a hermetically closed party system. Opting, after long ideological battles, for a pragmatic rather than a radical approach, they managed to take root in the middle-class electorate (at least in the West). And by being faithful to their convictions, they accumulated a tremendous credibility capital, which is likely to bear fruit in the years to come.

Would Herbert Gruhl, who died in 1993, have imagined that forty years after the foundation of the Greens the CDU would be the junior partner in a government run by a green minister-president in Baden-Württemberg, the land of the automobile? Or that there would be serious talk about the possibility of a green chancellor in Berlin? Probably not.

But the glass can also be seen as half empty. The questioning of the growth dogma may have made its way into mainstream political debate, but the time for practising what is starting to be preached is running out. Herbert Gruhl’s 1988 campaign slogan “Less is more” was utterly unsuccessful at the time. The fact that all those decades later it is more pertinent than ever and that the ÖDP did not even need to update it painfully reveals how difficult it is to subvert capitalist doctrines.

The post Forty years of green appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Transition remains the Cinderella of Brexit: unnoticed by the ugly sisters of Withdrawal and the New Relationship, but actually rather important.

This might have been understandable during the chaos of the past year, when most political efforts were being diverted into securing UK ratification of the Withdrawal Agreement, but it seems much less so now, when our progression to this next stage is all but guaranteed.

Debate about transition might now exist, but only with regard to when it might end.

While this is understandable, it is t

o miss much of what transition will be like and how that experience might condition what comes after.

Recall that this time will not only be for negotiating a future relationship, but also for continuing the UK’s participation in every current aspect of EU membership, bar voting.

We covered this ground back in September 2018 with the UK in a Changing Europe, in The Challenges of Transition, where we identified three challenges.

We put legitimacy ahead of negotiation and extension because the lived experience of non-representation is likely to be a powerful tool for various groups.

For those seeking the hardest of Brexits, the notion of BrINO (Brexit in name only) will be ideal for pointing the finger at any future relationship as being even more lopsided than membership was.

For the EU, the opportunity to foist decisions on a UK that cannot block anymore will be one that some might fail to resist,

 

precisely because of that same lopsidedness.

And for a public that still has to get a constructive and informed presentation of what’s happening, this year will be a source of further confusion and disillusionment.

Those tensions will undoubtedly suck up much attention during 2020, leaving less space for the discussion of what comes after, perpetuating the cycle.

All of which is to highlight the irony of taking back control. Control is all well and good, but without an objective for that control to work towards, it counts for very little. And no, ‘getting Brexit done’ isn’t that objective.

So as MEPs return from Brussels and Strasbourg, and improbably amounts of energy are spent on the clapper of Big Ben, perhaps we might all more profitably turn our attention to making the most of the situation that confronts us and laying our plans accordingly.

The post Settling in for transition appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

A multi-speed or multi-tiered Europe has often been presented as a solution to Europe’s current challenges. But this kind of differentiation can generate democratic problems, argues EU3D Scientific Coordinator John Erik Fossum.

The EU that emerged from the crises has also become more differentiated, explains EU3D Coordinator John Erik Fossum.

In the last decade, the EU has faced a broad range of crises and challenges, such as the financial and Eurozone crises, the refugee crises, the rise of nationalist and Eurosceptic movements, disintegrative pressures associated with the possible fallouts from Brexit, and an increasingly unstable geopolitical scene.

Although the EU has shown quite a bit of resilience and unity when facing these challenges, there is broad recognition that the measures taken have not been adequate. The crises and the EU’s reactions to these have had negative democratic effects. The EU that emerged from the crises has also become more differentiated in that EU member states appear less willing to move in the same integrationist direction than before, and some members seek to down-scale, roll back, or re-negotiate their relations with the EU.

Although the EU has shown quite a bit of resilience and unity when facing these challenges, there is broad recognition that the measures taken have not been adequate.

Post-crises EU appears less capable of directing its energies in a clear and coherent direction. A more differentiated EU is therefore a more open-ended and underdetermined entity. Thus, whereas differentiation in the past has been an important means for managing conflict and containing disagreements, it can also generate problems for democratic governing. When is differentiation part of the problem and when is it a part of the solution to the EU’s current challenges? This is what EU3D seeks to find out. Through developing a sorting mechanism, researchers from 10 universities in 10 European countries seek to distinguish between those forms of differentiation that are democratically problematic and those that are not.

All modern political systems are differentiated

Differentiation is not a problem unto itself. All modern political systems are differentiated in territorial and functional terms. The nation-state was established through a distinct process of differentiation: establishing a system of hierarchically structured government for a given territory. That system of government was at the same time functionally differentiated, in the sense that there were different bodies in charge of executive, legislative and judicial functions. Functional differentiation is important to prevent overly strong concentrations of power, for instance in the executive. In a similar manner, multilevel systems like the EU need territorial differentiation to avoid an overly strong concentration of power at the central level. In other words, multilevel systems need governments at multiple levels with a division of powers and competences.

Multilevel systems like the EU need territorial differentiation to avoid an overly strong concentration of power at the central level.

In this context, differentiation was an intrinsic aspect of national integration, and differentiation is intrinsic to EU integration. In other words, the political system that has been established at the EU-level is functionally differentiated. In contrast to states, which are based on the principle of territorial-functional contiguity – which implies that the state is formally in charge of all functional realms within its territory – the EU’s territorial control is far weaker and there is far less territorial-functional overlap. Non-member states, especially the EEA states, are included in the EU’s internal market and are affiliated with Schengen with responsibility for EU external border controls, whereas some EU member states are not inside the Schengen area. Further, only 19 of the EU’s member states are fully incorporated in the euro area. Opt-outs and opt-ins are common.

Exacerbating divisions in Europe

Meanwhile, some forms of differentiation that have come as a result of the crises have been problematic. European governance now exhibits more arbitrariness than pre-crises, associated with a certain turn towards informality, a greater reliance on intergovernmental bargaining arrangements that are less predictable and less transparent, and arrangements that yield a measure of functionality, albeit are democratically deficient. One example is the European Stability Mechanism, which has its own intergovernmental decision-making body that is not subject to public or parliamentary control. The crises had serious distributive effects as well as adverse effects on some states and citizens’ status, rights and entitlements. Given this, we may need to think of crises not simply as uniform waves with uniform across-the-board effects, but rather as ‘differentiating shocks’ that hit unequally and have differentiating effects; and which may thus exacerbate divisions across Europe.

Further, after the crises, the European Parliament as well as national parliaments have found themselves facing an uphill battle in catching up with executives and experts. Some member states have turned illiberal, notably Hungary and Poland, actively chipping away substantial portions of constitutional democracy.

After the crises, the European Parliament as well as national parliaments have found themselves facing an uphill battle in catching up with executives and experts.

Some of the possible solutions such as a two-tiered Europe have also generated debate. Concerns are raised that second-tier EU member states would be excluded from EU decision-making while nevertheless being subject to EU decisions due to Europe’s states’ and societies’ high degree of interdependence and interweaving.

Differentiation, democracy and dominance

In assessing whether differentiation is part of the problem or part of the solution, EU3D will develop a ‘sorting mechanism’. The sorting mechanism will help distinguish which forms of differentiation could lead to dominance, and which forms could be conductive to democracy. Dominance is understood as arbitrary forms of rule and arrangements that are exclusive, in-transparent and/or have very negative distributive effects. Dominance may ensue from crises and shocks; it may therefor be an unintended by-product of processes of problem-solving and conflict resolution under conditions of contestation.

We need to look at EU reform proposals and consider to what extent these are tailored to grapple with the problematic forms of differentiation and/or to the promotion of democratizing processes.

In more concrete terms, we need to start by establishing the nature and scope of the forms of differentiation that are clearly problematic. We need to clarify how well-entrenched these are in the EU’s overall structure and makeup, and in addition look for countervailing democratizing processes and reforms, especially in parliaments and civil society and at the level of citizens. Finally, we need to look at EU reform proposals and consider to what extent these are tailored to grapple with the problematic forms of differentiation and/or to the promotion of democratizing processes.

The post Differentiation: Problem or solution? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights recently delivered a judgment on a case concerning the murder of a Turkish Cypriot family. Nasia Hadjigeorgiou examines how this has broken new legal ground, while raising questions about the Court’s ability to address legal challenges in contexts of frozen conflict.

© Corgarashu / Adobe Stock

In January 2019, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights delivered its judgment in Güzelyurtlu and others v. Cyprus and Turkey (Güzelyurtlu). This case breaks new legal ground, while questioning the Court’s ability to address legal challenges in contexts of frozen conflict.

In order to understand the complexities of Güzelyurtlu, a brief explanation of the political situation on the island of Cyprus is necessary. The island is inhabited by Greek Cypriots, making up about 80%, and Turkish Cypriots, consisting of 18%, of the overall population. Since Turkey’s 1974 military invasion of Cyprus, it has been de facto divided in two: while the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) technically retains sovereignty over the whole of the island, it only exercises effective control over the south, which is inhabited mostly by Greek Cypriots. Turkish Cypriots primarily reside in the north of the island that remains under the military, economic and political control of Turkey, despite having declared itself as the independent ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (‘TRNC’). In compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 541 (1983) the ‘TRNC’ has not been recognised by any state, except Turkey.

Güzelyurtlu arose from the murder of a Turkish Cypriot family, which was (rather exceptionally) residing in the south of Cyprus. Following police investigations by the RoC, 6 Turkish Cypriots and 2 Turkish nationals were identified as being allegedly involved in the murder. However, by the time these investigations were completed, the suspects had returned to the north of the island and out of the RoC’s effective control.

At the same time, the ‘TRNC’ police started their own murder investigations and identified the same suspects. Problematically, Cyprus’s de facto division and the lack of recognition and cooperation between the RoC and the ‘TRNC’ meant that the suspects were in the north of the island, while the physical evidence linking them to the murder was in the south. There was no way of bringing the two together and beginning the prosecution process.

Consequently, the deceased persons’ relatives brought a case both against the RoC and Turkey (as the state that exercises effective control in the north of Cyprus). The accusation was of failure to carry out an effective investigation into their family members’ deaths, in violation of the right to life under Article 2 of the European Convention of Human Rights.

In an interesting development of the law, the Chamber held, and the Grand Chamber ultimately confirmed, that the two respondent states had an obligation to cooperate with each other in order to carry out an effective investigation into the victims’ deaths. The Court had already held that such an obligation to cooperate existed (notably, in another case against Cyprus). But, surprisingly, considering the longevity of the frozen conflict on the island, this was the first case in which it was held that cooperation between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot authorities was necessary.

Moreover, although this was a rather straightforward case legally speaking, it was politically very controversial, because cooperation between police forces of different states is inextricably connected with international recognition of these states. As expected, while the ‘TRNC’ tried to capitalise on the case and force the RoC to directly engage with it, the RoC was justifiably hesitant to act in any way that lent support to an illegal regime operating within its territory.

Although the Chamber and Grand Chamber agreed that there was an obligation to cooperate for the effective investigation of the death, there was disagreement as to what this obligation entailed. Initially, the Chamber found that the unwillingness of the RoC and the ‘TRNC’ to cooperate (the former by refusing to grant over evidence and the latter for not extraditing the suspects) resulted in a violation of Article 2 by both respondent states.

Arguably, this ruling asked too much from the RoC. Sharing evidence with the ‘TRNC’ so that the suspects could be tried in ‘TRNC’ courts would undermine its position – a position confirmed in numerous UN resolutions – that it is the only legitimate government on the island. This argument was taken more seriously by the Grand Chamber, which held that the RoC did not violate the procedural right to life, as it had done everything that was reasonably expected of it.

Conversely, Turkey was found to be in violation of Article 2. It had blatantly ignored all attempts at communication, and requests for the extradition of the suspects to the areas under the RoC’s control.

This outcome is undoubtedly more satisfying to the RoC. Yet, it potentially unduly lowers the bar of human rights protection, because all Turkey had to do to comply with its obligations was to respond to the extradition request. Even a negative response would have been sufficient for the Court, although it would not have actually resulted in a more effective investigation of the deaths.

Güzelyurtlu breaks new legal ground by expanding the obligation to cooperate in contexts of frozen conflicts. In light of the ECtHR’s tendency to transplant case law from Cyprus to other frozen conflict contexts, such as Nagorno-Karabakh and Transnistria, it is likely that we will see more such cases being adjudicated in the future.

Yet, if the Chamber judgment is criticised for being too interventionist, while the Grand Chamber judgment is criticised for not being interventionist enough, could any approach by the Court ever be truly satisfactory? And if not, perhaps it is worth considering whether the Court was right to intervene in the first place. Is it the judiciary’s place to adjudicate what are essentially political disagreements, especially in societies divided by frozen conflict?

A greater analysis of these questions, focusing on Cyprus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Northern Ireland and South Africa can be found in Nasia Hadjigeorgiou, Protecting Human Rights and Building Peace in Post-violence Societies: An Underexplored Relationship, to be published by Hart Publishing in January 2020. This monograph is part of the Human Rights Law in Perspective Series.

Nasia Hadjigeorgiou | @NHadjigeorgiou

Nasia Hadjigeorgiou is an Assistant Professor of Transitional Justice and Human Rights at the University of Central Lancashire Cyprus. She does research on the protection of human rights and the building of peace in post-violence societies.

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Being a member of the EU costs on average only around 34p a day each. That’s a bargain, especially as the value of EU benefits far outweigh the cost.

The Confederation of British Industry has calculated that EU membership is worth around £3,000 a year to every British family — a return of nearly £10 for each £1 we pay in.

 So, in reality, EU membership costs NOTHING – it makes Britain, and Britons, BETTER OFF. EU membership is PROFITABLE.

(Source: CBI Report: Our Global Future, page 11)

The calculations for our annual EU membership fee have been published by the UK’s Office of National Statistics. (Source: The UK Contribution to the EU budget – Office for National Statistics)

When deducting from the EU membership fee all the money we get back from the EU, including our £5 billion rebate, the net cost of EU membership in 2016 was only £8.1 billion – or £156 million a week, or just 34p per person per day.

That’s far short of the claim made on Boris Johnson’s campaign bus that we send £350m a week to the EU. That was entirely incorrect.

But after the referendum, the Vote Leave campaign director, Dominic Cummings wrote:

“Would we have won without £350m/NHS? All our research and the close result strongly suggests no.”

(Source: The Spectator ‘Dominic Cummings: How the Brexit referendum was won)

So, we are leaving the EU based on a whopper of a lie (actually, lots of whopping lies).

Ok, if Mr Johnson had instead put the accurate figure of ‘£156m a week’ on his bus, it would still have seemed a lot of money. But something Brexiters never like to do is reveal how much we get back in return for the membership fee.

Back in 2011, this was estimated by the government to be between £30 billion and £90 billion a year – a return of between 800% and 2370%.

(Source: UK government ‘The UK and the Single Market’ – Department for Business, Innovation and Business Skills)

Can anyone name any other government expenditure that gives a return of over 800%?

 Let’s put this in another context.

In 2016, the government spent £814.6 billion on all aspects of public spending. This means that the net annual EU membership fee represented only 1% of all UK government expenditure. (A minuscule amount.)

Furthermore, the EU funds many thousands of projects in the UK every year, that our national government would be unlikely to finance. Such as Liverpool’s John Lennon Airport, or superfast broadband in Cornwall.

(Source: EU Commission – Financial Transparency System)

In addition, across Europe, our annual membership fee helps to fund projects that benefit our continent and its people as a whole – such as Galileo, to give Europe its own satellite navigation system. (That Britain will miss out on if we leave).

And the Horizon 2020 project – the world’s biggest multinational research programme, funding leading-edge research in all aspects of science and innovation that will directly benefit all EU citizens. (That Britain will miss out on if we leave).

Individual European countries could not afford to take on the projects that the EU helps to fund for the welfare and prosperity of its half-a-billion citizens.

 The advantages of EU membership considerably outweigh the cost of membership. So, why leave?

There is not even one valid or validated benefit for Brexit. Not even one.

Indeed, by NOT paying the annual EU membership fee, we will all be POORER, according to the UK government’s own impact assessment reports.

(Source: The Guardian ‘UK significantly worse off under all Brexit scenarios’ – official forecast)

In the General Election on 12 December, vote for a democratic reversal of Brexit. We’ll all be better off by remaining in the EU.

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Brexit takes a low priority in Labour’s general election manifesto, as does Remain. That will be a disappointment to Labour Remainers, who represent a significant majority of the party’s members and voters.

Labour’s policy on Brexit is just three pages long and nestled deep in their manifesto on page 88.

That probably tells us as much as we need to know about how important Brexit is to Labour’s leaders – despite the fact that this snap general election was only called because of Parliament’s stalemate on Brexit.

But there is worse.

Labour’s manifesto panders to Labour Leavers – a minority – and has nothing good to say about Remaining in the EU.

Labour promises to “secure a new Brexit deal” with the EU.

“One that protects jobs, rights and the environment, avoids a hard border in Northern Ireland and protects the Good Friday Agreement and the peace process.”

This wonderful, sensible, credible version of Brexit will provide:

“..legal protection for citizens’ rights, meets our international obligations – particularly with regard to the Good Friday Agreement – and ensures an appropriate transition period to allow businesses and citizens to adapt to any new arrangements.”

And what’s more, Labour’s version of Leave will also:

“..secure robust and legally binding protections for workers’ rights, consumer standards and environmental protections, and ensure level-playingfield protections are maintained. Labour will never accept an outcome that puts rights and standards at risk.”

And then?

“Once we have secured this new deal we will put it to a legally binding referendum alongside the option of remaining in the EU.”

And the bottom line?

“Only Labour will offer the choice of remaining in the EU, or leaving with a sensible deal.”

So, it’s a choice between “remaining” or having a “sensible deal”.

Surely, there must be something good said in the Labour manifesto about the British people choosing to reject their “sensible” Brexit and opting instead to Remain in the EU?

Nope. I cannot find it anywhere. Quite the opposite.

The Labour manifesto almost dares people not to vote for Remain in their “legally binding” referendum, held sometime next summer (at the earliest).

The manifesto states:

“If in a referendum the British people decide to remain in the EU, this must not mean accepting the status quo.”

No, of course not. The authors of this Labour manifesto clearly don’t think much of the idea of the UK remaining in the EU, compared to the wonderful, beautiful, sensible, Brexit that Labour will offer instead.

If, heaven forbid, Britain does vote to Remain, then please be warned:

“The EU needs a new political direction and, if the people decide the UK should remain in the EU, Labour will lead the way to ensure that change.”

The manifesto continues with what’s wrong with the Remain option:

“For too long a politically inflicted wave of austerity has damaged communities across Britain and across Europe.

“The most vulnerable members in our society have suffered, while the super-rich continue to be rewarded by a system that allows them to thrive at the expense of the many.

“This must change. If the country decides to remain, a Labour government will take a different approach and strive to ensure that the EU works for people across our communities.”

Anyone reading this section of the manifesto cannot be in any doubt that Labour’s leadership thinks that Remain is not the way forward for Britain, and it’s the fault of the EU that we have austerity. (An entirely wrong analysis in my view).

A Labour government, clearly in my view, would urge the country instead to vote for their ‘sensible, credible Brexit.’

Yes, yes. Compared to the Tories, Labour offers the only way out of the Brexit mess. But any Remainer like me is going to feel deep disappointment and resentment by Labour’s policy on Brexit.

The party’s policy is aimed to appeal to Leavers, not Remainers, even though Labour is naturally made up of Remain supporters.

So, to me, none of this makes any sense.

But that has to be combined with the rest of Labour’s manifesto – the most radical we’ve known.

Of course, Britain needs radical change, but the plans Labour is now putting forward – many of them announced at the last minute without any pre-warning – are not going to win an election.

The proposals Labour is now proposing should have taken years in the planning, and years in the explaining and selling to the nation. Not three weeks before a vote.

The country at large would need to have such big plans sold to them carefully and convincingly over a long period of time, not over 21 days.

Labour’s hugely ambitious plans – probably too ambitious – would take at least three to four terms to achieve, even if they are achievable at all (and the costs involved are eye watering, with many respectable economists saying they are just not credible).

Yet by cramming everything into one manifesto, Labour will scare aware millions of moderate voters who are needed if Labour is to have any chance of winning.

In my view, far better for Labour to offer the nation a softer approach to change, with a better chance of winning power, than to present a manifesto so shockingly extreme that Labour is now likely to spend many more years in opposition.

Me writing this doesn’t make it true. I can’t affect the outcome. I am just expressing my view. So, if I am wrong when the results are announced on 13 December, I will eat my words, apologise, and admit I misjudged.

Come back after the general election and we will discuss it more then.

But I can tell you now: Labour’s ‘credible Brexit’ is not credible at all, and if they go ahead and implement any version of Brexit, Britain will be poorer, and there is no way that Labour would be able to fulfil even a small fraction of their remarkably radical plans.

 

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Britain’s been negotiating to leave the EU, just so we can negotiate another arrangement to get back as much as possible of what we’ve already got as an EU member, but on considerably inferior terms.

If we don’t get what we want (i.e. the EU benefits we desperately want back after we’ve left), the government will crash Britain out of the EU in a year’s time, without any agreement, plunging the country into deep economic crisis.

Does it make any sense? No, it doesn’t.

The EU is the world’s largest free trade area. As a member, we receive huge benefits worth enormously more than the small net annual membership fee of just £7.1 billion a year.

As a member, we enjoy free, frictionless trade with our biggest trading partner by far, right on our doorstep, where almost half of our exports go to and over half of our imports come from.

Nowhere else in the world comes close to that.

Both the Tories and Labour are pretending to the electorate that it’s possible to negotiate a Brexit deal after we’ve left that will give us key benefits of EU membership, but:

 WITHOUT being part of the EU Single Market.  WITHOUT agreeing to the rules of the EU and its market.  WITHOUT being subject to the European Court of Justice to oversee those rules.  WITHOUT paying anything to the EU for access.

It’s not going to happen.

What’s the point of a club if you’re going to allow non-members to enjoy the same or better benefits as members? What club allows that?

So, here’s the bottom line:

 We need free AND frictionless trade with the EU.  We need free movement of goods, services, capital AND PEOPLE for our country not just to survive, but to thrive.  We need to continue with the status quo: the arrangement we have now, as a FULL MEMBER of the EU.

Has this sunk in yet?

We’re leaving all the benefits of the EU, only to desperately try and get back as many of those benefits as we can after we’ve left.

This is complete and utter madness. It will be much better just to keep the current arrangement we’ve enjoyed for over four decades as an EU member.

As an EU member:

① We have a say and votes in the running, rules and future direction of our continent.

② We have full and free access to the world’s largest free marketplace.

③ We enjoy the right to live, work, study or retire across a huge expanse of our continent.

④ We enjoy state healthcare and education when living and working in any other EU country.

⑤ We enjoy free or low-cost health care when visiting any EU nation.

⑥ We are protected by continent-wide rights that protect us at work, when shopping and travelling.

⑦ We benefit from laws that protect our environment (and have, for example, directly resulted in Britain’s beaches being cleaned up).

⑧ We enjoy excellent EU free trade agreements covering over 70 countries, with more on the way, on advantageous terms that Britain is unlikely ever to replicate.

So, we’re going to throw that all away, just so we can get an inferior arrangement with the EU, in which we’d still have to agree to the rules of EU trade (over which we’d have no say) and we’d have less access to our most vital customers and suppliers outside of our home market.

And what are we gaining? Surely something?

NO.

ALL the reasons given to leave the EU are based on lies and false promises. Yes, ALL OF THEM.

There are no good reasons to leave.

 MORE SOVEREIGNTY? Nonsense. We’ll get less. In the EU, we gain a share of sovereignty of our continent. Outside the EU, we’ll still live on a planet and have to obey thousands of international laws and treaties. We share sovereignty with NATO, for example. Is that a reason to leave it?

 FEWER MIGRANTS? Really? Just think about it. Most EU migrants in Britain are in gainful employment, doing jobs that we simply don’t have enough Britons to do. So if they all left, we’d have to replace them with about the same numbers of migrants as we have now to get all those jobs done. What’s the bloody point of that?

 MORE HOUSES, SCHOOLS AND HOSPITALS? Think again. Without EU migrants, we’ll have fewer builders, teachers, doctors and nurses. Migrants are not the cause of our problems. Blaming them just excuses successive UK governments from investing sufficiently in our country.

 GET OUR COUNTRY BACK? We never lost it. If being in the EU means losing your country, why aren’t the 27 other EU member states planning to leave? (Really, none of them are: support for the EU is the highest it’s been in 35 years).

 OUR OWN LAWS? The vast majority of laws in the UK are our laws and passed by our Parliament in Westminster. But in the EU, we benefit from laws for our continent that no single country alone could ever achieve. Could our UK government have got mobile phone companies to scrap mobile roaming charges across the entire EU? Of course not. It took the might of 28 EU countries working together to achieve that, and so much more.

 THE EU IS RUN BY FACELESS BUREAUCRATS? Another lie. The EU is run and ruled by its members, the 28 countries of the EU, along with its democratically elected European Parliament. The European Commission is the servant of the EU, not its master, and the European Parliament has the power to choose, and dismiss, the entire Commission.

We are leaving for no good reason, not one. We will pay up to £40 billion (money the UK has agreed we owe) to settle our debts with the EU, to enable us to have an inferior deal.

We will be poorer, and with less sovereignty, fewer rights and protections, restricted trade, and diminished power after we’ve left.

What’s the point? There’s no point. The country really has lost its bottle.

We should have the courage to admit that Brexit is nuts and toss it away.

The general election on 12 December gives the electorate a key opportunity – maybe the ONLY opportunity – to bring an end to Brexit and Remain in the EU.

Please, vote wisely. Don’t bottle out.

 

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The Atomium, one of the symbols of Brussels. View from the Mini-Europe, a miniature park, showing famous European monuments on a scale 1 to 25. Photo by Tatyana Bajenova

Tatyana Bajenova

In the recent article Rescaling expertise in EU policy-making: European think tanks and their reliance on symbolic, political and network capital (Bajenova 2019) that appeared in the Globalisation, Societies and Education Journal, Tatyana Bajenova has examined the strategies which think tanks (TTs) employ to influence EU decision-making. Unlike some recent studies of European TTs, this paper analyses both Brussels-based and member-state TTs through the examples of the symbolic value of the ‘TT’ label, their ‘expert’ role, as well as their locational and networking strategies.

 

The Label Which Speaks for Itself

The ‘TT’ label itself possesses symbolic capital which is related to three dimensions of their public image. The first is the ‘TT’ generic name, which attaches to the organisations, using it in their self-description or associated with it in the public discourse. It helps to explain their mission abroad: in positioning themselves in transnational TT networks or international TT rankings. The second dimension is the function of research, which is one of the elements of their academic capital. TTs regardless their particular organisational structure or legal form are seen as groups of experts that produce ideas and recommendations for policy-makers. This ‘scientific’ approach differentiates them from lobby groups or NGOs aiming to influence policy decisions which promote values or special interests.

 

The third dimension consists in their simultaneous location in different social fields involving use of academic, publicity and political forms of capital, which distinguishes them from other types of knowledge providers. As distinct from universities, TT is perceived as a research group, engaged in networking with policy-makers and popularising their research among general public and the media. Although this activity is quite similar to advocacy, TTs successfully elude to be seen as ‘lobbyists’.

              

The Expertise which Meets the Selection Criteria

TTs provide expertise to the EU institutions on both ad hoc and contractual basis. Regardless the character of cooperation providers of expertise should meet certain criteria of credibility. Although TT credibility can be strengthened thanks to the quality of their research products, the academic background of their researchers, the soundness of their research methodology, and reputation in the academic realm, many TTs claim a higher level of policy-relevance of their research products in comparison to those produced in universities. However, the representatives of the EU institutions consider that universities can also produce policy relevant research without pursuing a particular policy agenda, while underscoring well-timeliness and practicality of TT reports and frequent exchange of research staff between TTs and universities.

 

Nevertheless, the quality of expertise for EU institutions assumes not only the quality of research team and research capabilities of its providers, but also their understanding of the EU policy-making process. This leads to increasing collaboration between the two types of organisation which aim to make use of their complementary skills, often encouraged by EU evaluation criteria that require academic excellence, policy impact and public outreach. At the same time, independence valued by TTs as guarantee of their credibility and public legitimacy is often sceptically perceived by EU officials, who consider transparency of TTs, which obviously have some kind of affiliation and certain sources of funding, a more important credibility factor in the selection of expertise providers.

 

Location in Brussels: to be, or not to be?

A physical presence in Brussels increases the visibility of Euro-oriented TTs and their access to EU policy-making. A Brussels location allows TTs to facilitate their collaboration with both EU and national officials through effective networking at various events. The leading positions of Brussels-based TTs in different lobbying channels prove successfulness of this strategy in approaching EU institutions.

 

However, the EU decision-making system offers national TTs opportunities for different locational strategies. TTs which are located outside Brussels try to achieve influence at a distance through occasional visits and e-mail contacts. In certain policy areas European policy can be shaped through influencing member-states rather than EU institutions. With increasing movement of the EU policy space online a strong social media presence can be also seen as an alternative strategy for those located in national capitals. Although high social media visibility gives more access to decision-makers, maintaining personal contacts with current or former EU officials is regarded as the most important element of political capital by European TTs regardless of their ‘presence’ strategies. A location in Brussels and European policy experience of their partners provide TTs with ‘insider’ status in the EU policy space.

 

The Multiplier Effect of Networks

The strategy of joining TT networks is widely employed by European TTs and is encouraged by the EU institutions. These networks involving both Brussels-based and national TTs can raise the research ‘quality’ in large comparative studies at EU level, adding both European and national perspectives in the policy recommendations for EU policy-makers. TT networks with their numerous members, including from new member states, can potentially deal with the exclusivity of the EU consultation process. Network coordinators frequently established in Brussels can facilitate dialogue between network members and EU institutions, undertaking for the administrative component of this cooperation. Networks also help to disseminate widely research through joint publications and events, using communication channels of both networks and their members.

 

The official EU documents regard the European NGO networks as furthering European integration and global integration of the EU. Considering these perceived benefits of European networks, the EU fund many of them through competition-based projects and institutional grants. This seeming mutually beneficial cooperation is however subject to the challenges of internal and external exclusivity where ‘weaker’ network members, seen as “amateurs’ in the EU policy space can be content with their ‘dormant’ role, while the most visible ‘insider’ Brussels-based network coordinators and the EU institutions seeking to reinforce their political legitimacy profit by the social capital accumulated due to the formal network representativeness.

 

Overall, this paper determines the EU-specific features of TTs as boundary organisations showing how they strategically use different forms of capital accumulated at European level to increase their legitimacy, credibility, visibility and influence in the Brussels policy-making scene.

 

This study was funded by the European Commission FP7 People programme: Marie Curie Initial Training Network UNIKE (Universities in Knowledge Economies) under the Grant Agreement number 317452.

 

Dr. Tatyana Bajenova (https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Tatyana_Bajenova) is Lecturer at the Westminster International University in Tashkent. She was previously Marie Curie Fellow in the EU-funded project Universities in the Knowledge Economy (UNIKE). She holds a Doctoral Degree in Political Sciences from the Ecole Normale Supérieure de Lyon (France), a Master’s Degree in Law and Management from the Jean Moulin Lyon 3 University (France) and a Master’s Degree “The EU and Central Asia in the International System” from the Institut für Europäische Politik and the Centre international de formation européenne, Berlin (Germany).

 

Reference:

Tatyana Bajenova (2019) Rescaling expertise in EU policy-making: European think tanks and their reliance on symbolic, political and network capital, Globalisation, Societies and Education, 17:1, 61-77, DOI: 10.1080/14767724.2018.1540926

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Regulation (EU) No. 2016/1624 and the recently adopted Regulation (EU) No. 2019/1896 represent the third and fourthlegislative revision of FRONTEX’ mandate and functions since the Agency was established. The adoption of Regulation (EU) No. 2016/1624 was extraordinarily fast since it did not take a year between its proposal by the Commission on 15 December 2015 and its publication in the Official Journal on 16 September 2016. Less than two years after the adoption of Regulation 2016/1624, the president of the European Commission announced in his speech on the 2018 State of the Union made on 12 September, the Commission’s intention to “to further strengthen the European Border and Coast Guard to better protect our external borders with an additional 10,000 European border guards by 2020”. On the same day, the Commission put forward an updated version of the recently adopted EBCG. Again, in record-time, Regulation 2019/1896 was published in the Official Journal of the EU on 14 November 2019.

Regulations 2016/1624 and 2019/1896 aim to develop a EU integrated management of the external borders by addressing both the existing deficiencies at the national level and responding effectively to exceptional and sudden migratory flows. This blog post centres on comparatively analysing the new operational powers conferred by Regulations 2016/1624 and 2019/1896 to the new EBCG when supporting the Members States.

 

1.     The EBCG’s Supervisory Role

Art. 3 para. 2 Regulation 2016/1624 conferred a monitoring role to the EBCG in order to guarantee a common strategy for the management of the European external borders. While FRONTEX also conducted supervisory activities to a certain extent, the EBCG may now deploy its own liaison officers in the Member States with the aim of fostering cooperation and dialogue between the Agency and the competent national authorities (art. 12 para. 3 Regulation 2016/1624). These responsibilities have been further detailed in art. 31 para 3 Regulation 2019/1896.

The information that the liaison officers gather contributes and facilitates the preparation of the EBCG’s vulnerability assessments. At least once every three years, the Agency shall monitor and assess the availability of the technical equipment, systems, capabilities, resources, infrastructure, and adequately skilled and trained staff of Member States for border control (art. 32 para. 2 Regulation 2019/1896). In turn, Member States are required to collaborate with the EBCG in elaborating the vulnerability assessment.

Source: Frontex

The recommendatory powers conferred to the EBCG are reflected in art. 32 para. 10 Regulation 2019/1896, which signals that if the recommended measures are not implemented in a timely fashion and in an appropriate manner by the concerned Member State, the EBCG’s Executive Director shall refer the matter to the Management Board and inform the European Commission. The Management Board shall then make a decision, based on the original proposal of the Executive Director, describing the necessary measures to be taken by the Member State and the time limit within which such measures shall be implemented. Importantly, art. 32 para. 10 Regulation 2019/1896 explicitly declares that the decision of the Management Board is binding on the Member State.

While it is still early to assess to what extent Regulation 2019/1896 improves the functioning of the vulnerability assessment and the swift deployment of liaison officers, a novel mechanism of impact levels to external border sections has been designed. Arts. 34 and 35 Regulation 2019/1896 state that the EBCG, in agreement with the Member State concerned, may declare three different impact levels and reactions with the aim of swiftly addressing at a given border section a crisis situation.

• Firstly, when the EBCG declares a low impact level, the competent national authorities shall “organise regular control (…) and ensure that sufficient personnel and resources are being kept available for that border section” (art. 35 para. 1 cl. a).
• Secondly, if a medium impact level is established, the concerned Member State shall “ensure that appropriate control measures are being taken at that border section” (art. 35 para. 1 cl. b).
• Thirdly, where a high impact level is declared the national authorities are encouraged to request operational assistance from the EBCG (art. 35 para. 1 cl. c).
• The EBCG may temporarily determine at a given border section a critical impact level, which shall be communicated to the European Commission. Under this scenario, the EBCG’s Executive Director will recommend the Member State concerned to request the EBCG’s operational assistance through the initiation of a joint operation or a rapid border intervention (art. 41 para. 1 Regulation 2019/1896).

While the obligations for the national border authorities under the low, medium and high impact levels are quite vague, under the critical scenario the Member State concerned shall respond, providing justifications for its decision, to the recommendation of the Executive Director within six working days (art. 41 para. 2). According to art. 42 Regulation 2019/1896, should the Member State ignore the EBCG Executive Director’s recommendation, the Council, on the basis of a proposal from the European Commission, may adopt a decision by means of an implementing act, identifying measures to mitigate those risks and requiring the Member State concerned to cooperate with the Agency in the implementation of those measures.

 

2.     The EBCG’s Expanded Operational Tasks

The EBCG continues to provide operational assistance to the Member States, as did FRONTEX, through the coordination of joint operations and rapid border interventions and through the deployment of teams on the ground (art. 37 Regulation 2019/1896). For the first time, Regulation 2016/1624 regulated the technical and operational capacity of the EBCG in the hotspots, where the national authorities face a sudden and disproportionate migratory pressure according to the 2015 Migration Agenda. In particular, pursuant art. 18 para. 2 Regulation 2016/1624, “the executive director, in coordination with other relevant Union agencies, shall assess a Member State’s request for reinforcement and the assessment of its needs for the purpose of defining a comprehensive reinforcement package consisting of various activities coordinated by the relevant Union agencies to be agreed upon by the Member State concerned”.

In this regard, art. 40 para. 1 Regulation 2019/1896 now details that in the hotspot areas migration management support teams, composed of experts from the relevant Union Agencies, will be deployed upon request of a Member State subject to large inward mixed migratory flows. The EBCG’s teams deployed in the hotspots are in charge of reinforcing the technical and operational assistance by “screening of third-country nationals arriving at the external borders, including the identification, registration, and debriefing (…) and, where requested by the Member State, the fingerprinting (…)” (art. 40 para. 4 Regulation 2019/1896). Notwithstanding that the hotspot approach has been incorporated in Regulation 2016/1624 and 2019/1896, which in turn reveals that the approach constitutes a EU long term measure to tackle extraordinary migratory pressures, there is to date no specific legal framework clarifying the functioning, powers and responsibility of the EBCG in the hotspots.

Furthermore, with the objective of reducing the dependence of the EBCG on the Member States’ technical equipment, art. 38 Regulation 2016/1624 stipulated that the Agency may acquire its own technical equipment to be deployed during joint operations, pilot projects, rapid border interventions and return operations. In this regard, art. 63 para. 4 Regulation 2019/1896 points out that where the EBCG acquires or co-owns equipment such as aircrafts, helicopters, service vehicles or vessels, the Agency shall agree with a Member State the registration of the equipment as being on government service. Regulation 2019/1896 aims to provide the EBCG with technical and human resources that are immediately and flexibly available to be deployed, with the goal of filling in the operational gaps that continuously afflicted FRONTEX. However, Regulation 2019/1896 does not design a clear framework of the EBCG’s responsibility, and continues to be highly questionable whether the Member States will authorise the registration of equipment that is beyond their control.

Lastly, a key operational power introduced by Regulation 2016/1624 was the establishment of a Rapid Reaction Equipment Pool, consisting of technical equipment to be deployed in rapid border interventions within 10 working days from the date that the Operational Plan is agreed upon by the Executive Director and the host Member State. In accordance with art. 20 para. 5 Regulation 2016/1624, the competent national authorities shall make available a minimum of 1,500 border guards to the EBCG for their immediate deployment in joint operations and/or rapid border interventions.

While the establishment of a Rapid Reaction Pool of 1,500 was a positive measure for emergency situations at the external borders, Regulation 2016/1624 did not manage to overcome the insufficient pooling of Member States’ border guards for concrete locations and concrete periods in regular joint operations. For this reason, Regulation 2019/1896 centres on designing a permanent, fully trained and operational Standing Corps of 5,000 Border Guards by 2021 and 10,000 by 2027 based on the distribution key set out in Annex I to Regulation 2019/1896.

Pursuant art. 54 para. 1 Regulation 2019/1896, the Standing Corps is composed of four categories of border guards:

• 1) operational staff members of the Agency (art. 55)
• 2) operational staff seconded from Member States to the Agency for a long-term deployment (art. 56)
• 3) operational staff from Member States ready to be provided to the Agency for a short term deployment (art. 57)
• 4) operational staff from the Member States ready to be deployed for the purpose of rapid border interventions (art. 58).

The main novelty is not so much the establishment of the Standing Corps, but rather the fact that the Standing Corps deployed as team members (category 1) are conferred executive powers (art. 54 para. 3 Regulation 2019/1896) such as verifying the identity and nationality of persons, authorising or refusing of entry upon border check, stamping of travel documents, issuing or refusing of visas, patrolling or, registering fingerprints (art. 55 para. 5 Regulation 2019/1896). Importantly, art. 82 para. 2 Regulation 2019/1896 states that the performance of executive powers by the EBCG’s operational staff members shall be subject to the authorisation of the Member State that is hosting the operation.

As the Meijers Committee and the European Council on Refugees and Exiles rightly noted, conferring executive powers to the EBCG’s operational staff members may breach the primary law provisions that regard the Member States as ultimately responsible for their own internal security and external border management. While the European Commission considers that art. 77 para. 2 cl. d TFEU provides the legal basis to bestow upon the EBCG’s staff members executive tasks if they are clearly defined to match the objective of the establishment of an integrated management system for external borders, art. 77 para. 2 cl. d TFEU shall also be read in light of arts. 72 and 73 TFEU.

 

3.     The EBCG’s Operational Power to “Intervene”

The new EBCG’s capacity to intervene led to considerable rejection by the Member States during the negotiations of Regulation 2016/1624. Currently, art. 8 para. 2 Regulation 2019/1896 specifies that “the multiannual strategic policy for the European integrated border management shall set out how the challenges in the area of border management and returns are to be addressed in a coherent, integrated and systematic manner (…)”. That is, the national authorities in charge of border management shall conform to the strategy adopted by the EBCG (art. 3 para. 3 Regulation 2016/1624 and 8 para. 6 Regulation 2019/1896).

The EBCG is thus conferred a supervisory and intervention role, which allows the Agency to adopt quasi-binding measures for the Member States and to directly intervene in the territory of the Member State if such measures are not effectively implemented (art. 18 Regulation 2016/1624 and 42 Regulation 2019/1896). In the event that a Member State neither adopts the measures recommended in its vulnerability assessment, nor requests/takes necessary actions in the face of disproportionate and sudden migratory pressure, the EBCG shall ensure a unified, rapid, and effective EU response so as not to jeopardise the functioning of the Schengen area. In this situation and according to art. 42 para. 1 Regulation 2019/1896, “the Council, on the basis of a proposal from the Commission, may adopt without delay a decision by means of an implementing act to identify measures to mitigate those risks to be implemented by the Agency and requiring the Member State concerned to cooperate with the Agency in the implementation of those measures”.

Since the Council decision is adopted, the EBCG’s Executive Director shall, within two working days, draft an operational plan and submit it to the Member State concerned (art. 42 para. 4 Regulation 2019/1896). Once the operational plan is submitted, the Agency’s Director and the Member State concerned shall agree on concrete actions to be adopted, including the deployment the necessary operational staff from the European Border and Coast Guard standing corps, for the practical execution of the measures identified in the Council’s decision.

Art. 42 para. 8 Regulation 2019/1896 requires the Member State concerned to comply with the Council decision by cooperating with the EBCG and taking the necessary actions to facilitate the implementation of the Council’s decision and the Agency’s operational plan. However, these obligations are tempered when art. 42 para. 10 Regulation 2019/1896 indicates that the European Commission may authorise the reestablishment of border controls in the Schengen area, provided that the concerned Member State neither executes the decision adopted by the Council, nor agrees with the EBCG’s Operational Plan within 30 days. Ultimately, the Member State concerned subject to the EBCG’s “intervention” shall expressly consent and agree with the Agency in regards to the operational support that will be provided in its external borders as to ensure the functioning the Schengen area (art. 42 para. 5 Regulation 2019/1896).

 

CONCLUSION

In the aftermath of the “refugee crisis”, the transformation of FRONTEX into the EBCG, as well as the need to promote a shared management of the European external borders emerged as a top political priority for both the EU and the Member States. Regulations 2016/1624 and 2019/1896 introduce the new EBCG as a guarantor of an integrated management of the European borders. In the European Commission own words, “by setting new standards and imbuing a European culture within border guards, the European Border and Coast Guard will also become a blueprint on how EU border management should be implemented”.

Both Regulations 2016/1624 and 2019/1896 clearly strengthen the EBCG’s autonomy since the Agency will depend to a much lesser extent on the specific operational secondments and support of the Member States. The EBCG should finally have its own equipment and operational personnel for its immediate deployment in joint and rapid operations. However, the most controversial, significant and novel operational powers included in Regulations 2016/1624 and 2019/1896 consist in introducing the Agency’s capacity to “intervene” and granting executive powers to the Agency’s staff members respectively.

Regulation 2019/1896 confers executive powers to the EBCG’s standing corps deployed as team members. While these executive powers may ensure a more effective, integrated and supranational administration of the European external borders, these activities also entail a significant, and difficult to control, degree of discretion that excessively stretches the Treaty provisions establishing the Member States as ultimately responsible for their own internal security and external border management.

However, it is still early to conclude whether we are only facing another revision of FRONTEX’ initial mandate as a reaction to an unprecedented migratory pressure or, on the contrary, Regulations 2016/1624 and 2019/1896 constitute the definitive step that will facilitate in the future the establishment of a European Corps of Border Guards with full executive, implementation and decision-making powers in the management of the European external borders.

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 Photo by Aaron Burden on Unsplash

 

This blog entry is a follow-up to the research agenda published last month. It presents further details of the research project. It captures the evolving complexity of the research project since the most recent reflections on Bourdieusian influences in the EU studies have encouraged embracing not just one of the overall three taxonomies of science diplomacy, but two of them. More importantly, this blog entry further clarifies the conceptual modalities via a display of two schematic visualisations of the overall theoretical model and interrelations of the selected components.

In general, science diplomacy comprises three taxonomies: diplomacy for science, science for diplomacy and diplomacy in science. First selected taxonomy ‘diplomacy for science’ for the research project “is mainly about the facilitation of international scientific collaboration. Here, classical tools of diplomacy are put in use to support the scientific and technological community. It is about using diplomacy to establish cooperation agreements at the government and institutional level. The goal of diplomacy for science actions is to benefit from foreign science and technology capacity to improve the national capacity.” (Berton et al., 2016, p. 27) In line with one of the three suggestions made by Luk Van Langenhove, this research project examines the EU “science and technology contributions towards enhancing regional security in its neighbourhood” (Berton et al., 2016, p. 29). Namely, as it was argued in the first outline of the research project (Šime, 2019), in the EU Southern Neighbourhood it is pursued via efforts directed towards stabilising an area affected by volatilities.

Earlier it has been identified that the key documents governing the overall EU Southern Neighbourhood Policy do not explicitly prioritise cooperation in higher education, research, science and innovation as the key defining thematic strands (Šime, 2019). Thus, the research project is presented with full acknowledgement that the examined phenomenon is implicit science diplomacy – collaborative ties which correspond to the selected taxonomy of science diplomacy but are not defined as such by the policy-makers and are not positioned in the key policy documents as having a pivotal role. However, as elaborated earlier (Šime, 2019), such positioning does not mean that cooperative ties in higher education, research, science and innovation have a limited role in contributing to the overall goals of the EU vis-à-vis its southern neighbours. One of the leading EU science diplomacy thinkers – Luk Van Langenhove – concisely describes this less visible but no less important role of scientists and researchers in shaping the international ties or being encouraged to engage in collaborations with their foreign colleagues to attract more minds to “the EU’s own scientific world” (Berton et al., 2016, p. 29):

“First, it is often said that the ‘invisible colleges’ of scientists across state-borders can contribute to building trust between nations or cultures. Secondly, it is also argued that the language of science can contribute to pointing to technical solutions for political problems. One can thus distinguish between science and technology relations that occur without government intervention and science diplomacy when governmental officials try to shape and stimulate relations to advance national interests.” (Berton et al., 2016, p. 27)

This quote guides to the second selected taxonomy ‘science for diplomacy’ which is understood as “science used as a tool to build and improve relations between states” (Van Langenhove, 2017, p. 8). These are good basic conceptual grounds for an examination of the EU relations with Southern Neighbourhood due to the interdependence factor which Luk Van Langenhove raises when explaining this particular taxonomy of science diplomacy in certain situations “where there are tensions in relations between certain states or when states are faced with common problems that they cannot solve on their own” (Van Langenhove, 2017, p. 8). This taxonomy was neglected in the initial scoping of the theoretical framework of the research project (Šime, 2019). However, while dwelling in more detail in the classical works of Pierre Bourdieu and its inspired more recent scholarly reflections on the evolving diplomatic practices in the EU setting, it became clear that the empirical examination of the field via interviews with EU funded project managers based in the EU mirrors this dimension of science diplomacy.

 

Graph no. 1: Hierarchical Relations of Science Diplomacy Inspired by the Practice Theory

‘Diplomacy for science’ is the upper hierarchical dimension which is defined and its policies maintained by the selected EU institutions – European External Action Service (EEAS) responsible for the EU Global Strategy, Directorate-General for Research and Innovation (DG RTD) steering the EU Framework Programme “Horizon 2020”, Directorate-General for Education and Culture (DG EAC) responsible for the Erasmus+ Programme, Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR), former DG ELARG (until the end of 2014) (Schumacher et al., 2017, p. 129),  managing the EU-Morocco (MA) and EU-Tunisia (TN) Annual Action Programmes as integral parts of the European Neighbourhood Instrument 2014-2017 (Šime, 2019). One of the reasons for such a comprehensive approach in the selection of the EU instruments for further examination is the absence of a clear-cut definition of what science diplomacy is. Earlier approximations of science diplomacy entail “support to academic exchange, networking and international cooperation, the exploitation of scientific networks for non-research purposes, the provision of scientific advice to foreign policy, etc.” (Rungius, 2018, p. 3). Since all of the identified institutions offer support for activities which can have a direct influence on the shaping and development of science, all of them are treated as relevant to a broad understanding of the implicit science diplomacy dynamics.

‘Science for diplomacy’ is embodied by the EU-based project managers who following the EU guidance and funding regulations are responsible for a successful implementation of the projects. ‘Science in diplomacy’ as the third taxonomy of science diplomacy is displayed in graph no. 1 without a bold outline because it is not covered by the research project. ‘Science in diplomacy’ stands for the use of “scientific knowledge in foreign policy decisions. The goal is to improve foreign policy actions through the use of scientific knowledge.” (Van Langenhove, 2017, p. 8) This taxonomy has a more pronounced relation to the science advisory services, which is a whole field subject to the intricacies of the multi-level governance system (Adler-Nissen, 2014, p. 179). Since the research project is not aimed at examining EU science advisory systems and whether or in what form the EU funded projects serve as sources of science advice for EU policies, the theoretical scope is limited to a two-dimensional approach to science diplomacy analysis focusing solely on the ‘diplomacy of science’ and ‘science for diplomacy’ taxonomies.

Overall, a study dedicated to the EU’s evolving science diplomacy is a fresh perspective looking beyond the EU’s unfolding novel diplomatic practices focused on the intergovernmental dynamics captured by Adler-Nissen’s ‘late sovereign diplomacy’ – “the intense integration of national representatives who adhere to an ever closer union, producing legislation that challenges the sovereignty of their own nations” (Adler-Nissen, 2014, p. 175). Likewise, the research project bears in mind but is not preoccupied with the EU intergovernmental dynamics of certain countries aiming at using “the EU as a power multiplier” and “a clear vehicle for uploading national interests” (Spence et al., 2015, p. 261)  such as the acclaimed decades’ long Spain’s foreign policy aspirations (Bremberg, 2010a, p. 132) to promote a “shared Mediterranean sensibility” and country’s efforts to upload the Southern Neighbourhood-related matters to the supranational (EU) level (Schumacher, Bouris, & Olszewska, 2016, pp. 266-267). Instead, the research project is tailored to offer more room for examination of the role of higher education and science cooperation managers as a component shaping the overall EU’s external relations in an intermestic setting.

Reproduction of a certain repertoire stemming from the basic conditions shaped by the expert-level project-driven science and higher education domain as a habitus (Bigo, 2011, p. 242) is placed in the limelight. The ‘regulated improvisations’ (Bigo, 2011, p. 242) facilitated by the higher education and research-oriented projects and project Coordinators and Lead Partners as their most informed witnesses hold a potential to show the formal or substantial role science plays in reaching the EU’s overarching goals towards the EU Southern Neighbourhood.  Bourdieu’s logic is as follows: “Official relationships which do not receive continuous maintenance tend to become what they are for genealogist: theoretical relationships, like abandoned roads on an old map.” (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 38, 1990, p. 35) Slightly paraphrasing, the research project is aimed at dissecting whether the engagement of MA&TN institutions in the EU funded projects results in ad-hoc or fragmented formal interactions resembling Bourdieu’s “theoretical relationships” or these projects spark “continuous maintenance” and substantial improvement of higher education and science potential in both selected countries.

 

Graph no. 2: The patterns of (potential) interaction

The theoretical underpinnings elaborated in the earlier sections and remarks on the EU focus published earlier (Šime, 2019), clarify that the research project is crafted to explore the EU framework positions, offered tools and cooperation opportunities to institutions in two selected Southern Neighbourhood countries. In such a manner the EU institutions and EU actors – represented by the Lead Partners or Coordinators of the projects funded by one of the earlier indicated EU programmes – are viewed as the objects offering insight into the subjects (graph no. 2) which shape the overall landscape of the science and higher education domains in the EU Southern Neighbourhood in general and two selected countries in particular.

The author of the research project does not ignore that there might be a multiplicity of additional interaction patterns. Such awareness is mirrored in the diversity of communication arrows indicated in graph no. 2. Likewise, the research project is crafted keeping at the back of the author’s mind the other consultative processes which potentially bear an imprint on those interactions which are selected for a more scrutinised analysis in the scope of the research project. Among such influencing factors might be the dominating perspective of the EU Member States, especially the so-called ‘patron’ Member States (Schumacher et al., 2017, pp. 119, 125) with a keen interest in shaping the EU’s approach adopted towards the EU Southern Neighbourhood. Instead, it primarily explores the key policies and their supporting funding measures EU institutions have established to structure their relations with the MA and/or TN in particular or the EU Southern Neighbourhood as a whole. Furthermore, the assessment of the EU project Lead Partners and Coordinators about their cooperation with the MA and/or TN institutions are prioritised to acquire an expert-level assessment what benefits do the European higher education and research initiatives provide to the capacity building and internationalisation efforts of the MA&TN higher education and research institutions. Overall, the arrows directed horizontally from EU side towards the MA&TN side describe the prevailing perspective and selected interactions to be examined during the research project to find out how content-rich or formally plain is the EU science diplomacy in the Southern Neighbourhood.

All in all, this blog entry is not a comprehensive update on the overall earlier outlined research project. Instead, it offers further nuances about one theoretical strand – science diplomacy. It is prepared to place so-to-say more meat on one sector of the bones in a manner which renders the latest thinking on the EU science diplomacy easily accessible to all interested thinkers.

 

 

Bibliography

Adler-Nissen, R. (2014). Opting Out of the European Union: Diplomacy, Sovereignty and European Integration. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107337916

Berton, B., Ekman, A., Schmidt, J., Selleslaghs, J., Stang, G., & Langenhove, L. Van. (2016). The EU Global Strategy: Going Beyond Effective Multilateralism? (B. Ujvari, Ed.). Brussels: Egmont/European Policy Centre. Retrieved from http://www.egmontinstitute.be/eu-global-strategy-beyond-effective-multilateralism/

Bigo, D. (2011). Pierre Bourdieu and international relations: Power of practices, practices of power. International Political Sociology, 5(3), 225–258. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-5687.2011.00132.x

Bourdieu, P. (1977). Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Retrieved from https://www.hf.uio.no/ikos/english/research/news-and-events/events/phd/2017/reading-list-power-and-authority-Bourdieu.pdf

Bourdieu, P. (1990). The Logic of Practice. Stanford: Stanford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00680104

Bremberg, N. (2010). La política exterior española hacia el Magreb: Actores e intereses. The Journal of North African Studies, 15(1), 132–134. https://doi.org/10.1080/13629380903310217

Rungius, C. (2018). State-of-the-Art Report: Summarizing Literature on Science Diplomacy Cases and Concepts. Retrieved from https://www.s4d4c.eu/s4d4cs-state-of-the-art-report-on-science-diplomacy/

Schumacher, T., Bouris, D., & Olszewska, M. (2016). Of policy entrepreneurship, bandwagoning and free-riding: EU member states and multilateral cooperation frameworks for Europe’s southern neighbourhood. Global Affairs, 2(3), 259–272. https://doi.org/10.1080/23340460.2016.1216230

Schumacher, T., Exadaktylos, T., Cebeci, M., Haukkala, H., Elsuwege, P., Kostanyan, H., … Delcour, L. (2017). The Revised European Neighbourhood Policy : Continuity and Change in EU Foreign Policy. (D. Bouris & T. Schumacher, Eds.). London: Macmillan Publishers. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-47182-6

Šime, Z. (2019). The EU’s Diplomacy for Science in the Southern Neighbourhood: Setting a Research Agenda. Retrieved October 16, 2019, from https://europeangovernance.ideasoneurope.eu/2019/10/15/the-eus-diplomacy-for-science-in-the-southern-neighbourhood-setting-a-research-agenda/

Spence, D., Bátora, J., Adler-Nissen, R., Onestini, C., Helwig, N., Murdoch, Z., … Duke, S. (2015). The European External Action Service: European Diplomacy Post-Westphalia. (D. Spence & J. Bátora, Eds.). London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Van Langenhove, L. (2017). Tools for an EU science diplomacy. Luxembourg. Retrieved from https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/e668f8cf-e395-11e6-ad7c-01aa75ed71a1/language-en

 

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This article is set to be published in the Hertie School’s student magazine, The Governance Post.  Teaser

The European Central Bank’s (ECB) policy meeting in September was strained by dissent over the decision to launch another monetary easing package. Governing council members disagreed on the economic outlook, interest rates, and, most notably, new bond purchases. The spate of dissent over the institution’s latest monetary stimulus highlights the conflict between monetary doves and hawks at the ECB and reflects some deeper tensions between Member States as core Eurozone countries resisted Draghi’s bid.  More than that, it also points to the fact that monetary policy is approaching its economic and political limits in bolstering Eurozone economic growth.

Introduction

In Oscar Wilde’s play, The Importance of Being Earnest, Miss Prism prompts her student, Cecily, to do her readings in Political Economy while she is away. The patroness advises her young student to omit the chapter on the Fall of the Rupee as it is somewhat too sensational, remarking that “even these metallic problems have their melodramatic side”. How right Miss Prism was. Last month’s contentious meeting of the European Central Bank’s (ECB) Governing Council was nothing short of melodramatic. The ECB became engulfed in its biggest public spat in years. It seems people in Europe are not only divided by weather, religion and cuisine, but also by monetary policy. The current economic slowdown has prompted a larger debate about the reorientation of economic activity across the Eurozone, causing disagreements between policy makers and Member States over the right course of action and pitting conflicting interests against each other. 

Last month the ECB pushed interest rates further into negative territory and revived its €2.6tn bond-buying programme. This was followed by a fierce backlash from members of the ECB’s Governing Council, with Germany’s representative on the institution’s Executive Board, Sabine Lautenschläger, quitting in protest. Dissent is coming Austria, the Netherlands, Estonia, and other usual suspects that oppose quantitative easing (QE) when it was launched back in 2015 as well. Nowhere is opposition towards the ECB’s monetary stimulus package stronger than in Germany where senior figures have been accusing the bank of expropriating money from the country’s savers in order to bailout profligate southern states. 

Bundesbank president, Jens Weidmann, has been the leading opponent of the ECB’s bond-buying programme since it was launched back in 2015. While recent tensions stem from the personal preferences of those who make up the Governing Council, they also highlight the fact that the ECB is not a normal  bank. It is the only central bank to serve a confederation of countries and we can expect their conflicting interests to be embedded in its decision-making processes. We then assume that, at least to a certain degree, central bank presidents also vote for monetary policies that correspond with their respective countries’ national preferences.

Hawks and Doves

First of all, the rift at the ECB reflects the long-standing conflict between monetary hawks and doves. In general, hawks are members who want a tighter monetary policy in order to temper inflation and growth, while doves encourage a looser monetary policy to support growth and inflation. Historically there has been no shortage of dissent in the ECB’s Governing Council between the two sides, but the intensity of the ongoing rift has prompted Carsten Brzeski, Chief Economist at ING Germany, to dub the latest spat a “War of the Roses”.  

A notable difference right now is that members who have previously taken a more dovish stance, such as Benoit Coeuré, have shifted to a more hawkish position in response to restarting ECB bond purchases reasoning that the timing is unwarranted. Similarly, members who have taken a more hawkish position in the past, such as Yves Mersch, have shifted to a more dovish stance now. 

The map below depicts where central bank governors and Executive Board members stand on the issue of the ECB’s monetary loosening measures as per last month’s meeting of the Governing Council based on country of origin. Full support refers to those who unequivocally support the measures. Partial Support refers to those who expressed doubts but ultimately agreed to back the package, such as Yves Mersch and Luis de Guindos. Partial Disagreement refers to those who do not oppose the stimulus on principle, but disagree on timing or technicalities. Full Disagreement refers to those who oppose it on principle, such as Jens Weidemann and Sabine Lautenschläger, both hailing from Germany. It is worth noting, however, that members of the ECB’s Governing Council sit as individuals and not as national representatives, and formal votes are rare.

Opponents of the ECB’s monetary stimulus say the measures are disproportionate given the already low bond yields and negative interest rates. Others warn about the adverse effects the stimulus has on financial markets, all while downplaying the risk of deflationary pressures. ECB doves support last month’s measures by pointing towards the surprisingly prolonged low inflation in the Euro area and the need to ward off the threat of deflation and economic slowdown.

The Economic Divide in Europe

However, these arguments go beyond mere technicalities. The ECB is also driven by conflicting national interests that are embedded in its decision-making processes.  More so, the strife at the ECB reflects wider Eurozone conflicts between the fiscally conservative member states and those which are opposed to fiscal retrenchment. The conflict also presents elements of the North-South divide and Core-Periphery dynamics. More than a decade after the the financial crisis, conflicts within the bloc reflect the divergence of interests between the northern “core” and the southern “periphery”. 

It’s already well established that there’s a North-South divide in the interest rate preferences of Member States, which is mirrored by the relative strength of their economies, as well as their specific growth models, employment, and inflation. Different economic contexts reflect, to a certain degree, the clash of interests among Eurozone Members States. Until fairly recently, the threat of deflation in Germany was low, with core inflation (excluding energy, food, alcohol and tobacco) at almost 1.5% per year. Countries like the Netherlands and Estonia are nowhere near deflation either, with core inflation over 2%. On the other hand, the Eurozone as a whole is experiencing an excessively low rate of inflation and there’s little prospect of it picking up anytime soon. Member States such as Italy, Portugal, Spain, Greece, Ireland and France hover around or below the Euro area average. A more severe downward shock could push these countries into deflation.  

Since inflation rates differ, real interest rates (inflation-adjusted) are also different across countries in the monetary union. Lower real interest rates encourage consumption and investment because they greatly help borrowers, while high real interest rates tend to slow economic growth and inflationary pressures because they tend to favour savers. This can have an effect on national preferences for euro area interest rates. For example, expected inflation in Germany is higher than in southern Europe, thereby driving a large gap in real interest rates. Countries with low inflation and higher real interest rates should, in theory, show stronger support for monetary stimulus. The opposite should be true for countries with higher inflation and lower real interest rates. 

This can explain the position of some frugal countries that stand by their savers. After cutting rates further into negative territory, Germany’s Bild accused ECB president Mario Draghi of “sucking dry” the accounts of Germany’s savers, while the Dutch government has spoken out against the latest stimulus measures arguing that negative interest rates are disproportionately affecting Dutch pension funds.

There have been numerous claims, emanating from the financial and political circles of the Eurozone’s surplus-based, export-led economies – such as Germany and the Netherlands – that the ECB makes policies in favour of southern member states.  Just last week, a group of former senior European central bankers, most of them known for having a hawkish view on monetary policy, have accused the ECB of the monetary financing of government spending. They also hold that the intent of these measures is to “to protect heavily indebted governments from a rise in interest rates…” The graph below shows the level of public debt of individual countries based on the level of support for the ECB’s stimulus.

Accusing the ECB of catering to the bloc’s debt-ridden southern states may be a bit of a stretch. While the bloc’s most indebted members have been generally supportive of the resumption of QE, they are certainly not alone in this. It is true that highly indebted countries have benefited a lot from the ECB’s loose monetary policy due to their large stock of eligible bonds. However, lower debt-service costs have been beneficial to countries with lower levels of public debt as well, including Germany. 

Not long ago, excess savings in the North were matched by excess spending in the bloc’s southern and peripheral members. However, fiscal and structural reforms after the European debt crisis have turned them into savers as well. Yet, it’s hard to imagine those countries have a strong appetite for another round of austerity measures and structural reforms anymore. 

The only area in which the ECB’s Governing Council found agreement was fiscal policy. All members agreed that monetary policy is not the only game in town anymore and governments with fiscal space should do more to pull their weight and loosen their purse strings. The current rift at the ECB highlights the fact that monetary policy is approaching its economic and political limits in dealing with sluggish growth in the Eurozone. Mario Draghi said the ECB could still do more to boost inflation, but the current stimulus will last a long time and be less effective in the absence of fiscal policy efforts to stimulate growth in the Eurozone. Countries like France, Italy and Spain don’t have much room to spend, but the pressure is mounting on Germany and the Netherlands, both from institutions and other Member States.

With the ECB divided over the merits of further monetary stimulus, the key question is if Draghi’s successor, Christine Lagarde, will be able to manage the vested interests involved in the ECB’s decision-making processes. Besides this, she will also have to convince governments with fiscal space to spend more. Hopefully that will happen before Europe is caught up in the midst of another crisis.

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