Foreign Policy Blogs

Emmanuel Macron – via Flickr (World Economic Forum)

The day after his inauguration as president of France on May 14th, Emmanuel Macron signaled his dedication to European unity by jetting off to Berlin to meet with Angela Merkel. The two leaders used the occasion to underline their commitment to the European Union and to discuss potential bilateral cooperation on areas such foreign policy, defense, and common asylum proposals.

There is no issue where Macron will need Merkel’s support more than the common asylum. At the moment, the European response to the ongoing migrant crisis consists mainly of talking big and pledging funds. Yet neither Macron nor any of his peers have offered a comprehensive answer for difficult, long-term questions such as resettlement.

It remains to be seen whether the optimistic, yet thin-on-details Macron will be able to change the response to the crisis. If he does not, this will amount to a massive missed opportunity.

After all, the migrant crisis was one of the most divisive issues of the French elections. Far-right politician Marine Le Pen skillfully exploited both the crisis and the Islamist-inspired terror attacks that have hit the country. She told voters she planned to close the country’s borders to refugees and cut immigration to no more than 10,000 people per year.

Macron, however, emphasized the need to address the humanitarian aspects of the crisis, praising Merkel’s open door refugee policy for rescuing “our collective dignity.” He called for a more unified European response to the crisis, demanding stronger European borders and a revisiting of the Dublin Regulation so that countries like Greece would not be forced to shelter the lion’s share of migrants.

Macron’ statements signal an important shift in French policy, but do not suggest any ground-breaking changes in how Europe will approach these issues.

So far, at least, fundraising efforts have gone reasonably well. In February 2016, international donors pledged a record $12 billion at the London Conference on Supporting Syria, co-hosted by the UN and the governments of the UK, Kuwait, Germany, and Norway. Then-Secretary General Ban Ki-moon said that it was the first time the international community had raised that amount of money on a single day.

The latest fundraising conference in April was overshadowed by a deadly chemical attack by the Syrian government, but with only $6 billion in pledges, it did not match the precedent set in 2016.

While some of these numbers might sound impressive, it is clear that European donors, in particular, could do more to address the humanitarian crisis. Kuwait, for instance, has not only hosted and co-hosted numerous conferences, but has pledged far more funds in proportion to its GDP than states like Germany.

At the latest conference, the Emir of Kuwait and the government committed $100 million for 2017 and another $100 million for 2018. This is roughly twice as much in relation to GDP as what Berlin pledged. Given the fact that the EU is the largest economy in the world, it is clear that both the European Commission and individual member states could do more on this front.

In addition to failing to commit enough funds to address the humanitarian crisis in Syria, Europe has dropped the ball on refugee management and resettlement.

While the tenuous EU-Turkey border agreement has had middling success, with the number of migrants traveling from Turkey to Greece per day dropping from 1,740 pre-deal to 48 in June, migrants continue to enter Europe through other access points.

Italy, for instance, experienced a surge in migration after the closing of the deal, with a new record of 171,000 migrants arriving from Africa as of November 2016.

Meanwhile, nearly every European state continues to refuse to take their fair share of refugees. Even the one exception, Germany, has experienced a severe public backlash from its initially welcoming refugee policy following terrorist attacks in July and December. The government has since made it significantly more difficult for refugees to gain asylum.

This situation could leave Macron as one of the sole voices in Europe still vehemently advocating for a humanitarian response to the crisis.

The main issue is that for such a response to succeed, the root causes of the refugee crisis—the conflict in Syria and economic deprivation in Africa—will eventually have to be addressed. Unfortunately, this is where no European leader, including Macron, has brought any comprehensive policy proposal to the table.

On Syria, Macron has gone from saying France should talk to “all parties” involved in the crisis to calling for a military intervention under the aegis of the UN—without explaining how he would go about squaring that circle.

Of course, Syria is far from Europe’s only concern. More than half of all conflicts that have contributed to the refugee crisis are located in African countries like Libya and Nigeria. Droughts in Ethiopia and Eritrea have worsened the problem. Yet Macron hardly said anything about his Africa policy during the campaign.

At this point Macron might succeed in shifting the rhetoric of the response to the refugee crisis but not much else. This would be a drastic disappointment for a head of state basking in the glory of having “saved France”. If Macron is serious about the European project, he’s going to have to do more than talk about policy priorities with Merkel and the rest of his peers, but sit down and answer some uncomfortable questions. Otherwise, the likes of Le Pen will have a real chance of taking the elections the next time around.

The post Emmanuel Macron and the Refugee Question appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

President Duterte poses with Chinese sailors during yesterday’s tour of the Chinese warship Chang Chun docked at the Sasa Port in Davao City. (The Philippine Star)

A Labor Day weekend phone call by U.S. President Donald Trump to his counterpart in the Philippines, Rodrigo Duterte, sparked criticism from human rights groups—one of which accused Trump of “essentially endorsing Duterte’s murderous war on drugs” while adding, “Trump is now morally complicit in future killings.”  Critics have also questioned Trump’s comments on May 1st that he would be “honored” to meet with North Korea’s dictator, Kim Jong-un, under the “right circumstances.” While his choice of words were not the best, American presidents oftentimes feel compelled to chose dialogue over outright avoidance in the hope of improving relations.

During the call to Duterte, Trump invited him to visit the White House and apparently expressed Washington’s commitment to the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951. Trump’s call represents an effort to improve relations after Duterte called the previous U.S. president a ‘son of a whore’ and told him to ‘go to hell’ following criticism of his war on drugs.

Duterte may accept (he says he may be too busy) the offer from Trump—a leader whom he said he shares similarities with: “Things have changed, there is a new leadership. He wants to make friends, he says we are friends so why should we pick a fight?”

While Duterte seems to be warming toward Washington, he is also keen to show friendship toward Chinese President Xi Jinping.

Earlier this month he visited three Chinese warships in his home town of Davao City on Mindanao island—the first Chinese navy port call to the country since 2010. The three Chinese naval ships, the Changchun (DDG-150), a guided missile destroyer; the Jinzhou (FF-G532), a guided missile frigate; and the Chaohu (890), a replenishment ship, were in Davao City for a three-day visit from April 30 to May 2.

Interestingly, his visit to Chinese warships came a day after issuing his chairman’s statement in Manila on behalf of the latest round of talks among the 10-nation Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Manila, involving Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.

Perhaps mindful of the coming warships, his statement on April 29 failed to mention an international tribunal ruling last year against China’s maritime claims, and did not use previous ASEAN language calling for a “respect for legal and diplomatic processes” in resolving the dispute. Rather, in his watered-down statement, Duterte alluded to “concerns expressed by some leaders over recent developments in the area”.

Statements such as this (and others) by Duterte, which downplay his nation’s claims to disputed maritime territory in the South China Sea, are dangerous, and for some, constitute a cause for impeachment. On Monday, a Congressional panel of Philippine lawmakers found a request for impeachment (which also accused Duterte of concealing assets and supporting extrajudicial killings), to lack substance and recommended its dismissal by Congress.

Right now, the “strongman” Duterte seems hard-pressed between appeasing his nationalistic citizens and military by asserting claims to the disputed islands while holding off an increasingly aggressive China. After visiting the Chinese warships, Duterte repeated that joint military exercises between the Philippines and China were a possibility.

However, his evolving friendships with Trump, and especially Chinese President Xi Jinping, are cause for worry among the other littoral states of the South China Sea, as they fear being left out of any grand compromise between the two major Pacific powers and the Philippines.

The post Trump Courts Duterte, Duterte Courts Xi appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Last Monday, Iranian president Hassan Rouhani rallied his supporters in the northwestern city of Hamedan, where he decried the “violence and extremism” of his hardline opponents ahead of the national elections that are scheduled for May 19th.

In its reporting on the event, the AFP explained that Rouhani has “pushed his liberal credentials” since coming under coordinated attack from hardliners, who emphasize his failure to turn the Iranian economy around after helping to secure relief from international sanctions under the 2015 agreement over the country’s nuclear program.

But this sort of appeal to the progressive attitudes of the young Iranian population is meaningless in light of the previous four years, during which Rouhani presided over a breathtaking orgy of government violence and persecution that earned the condemnation of human rights advocates worldwide, and the dubious distinction of being named the world’s number one state sponsor of terrorism.

It bears noting that the Iranian president holds little real authority, since the supreme leader remains the final authority on all matters of state while all legislation is vetted for conformity with the regime’s fundamentalist interpretation of Islamic law. But Rouhani has not even demonstrated the intention to counter existing hardline policies or to otherwise live up to his liberal-sounding campaign promises.

His administration’s Intelligence Ministry has contributed to the ongoing crackdown against activists, journalists, and supposedly pro-Western or secular social trends. And the administration’s Justice Ministry is headed by a man who is well known for serving as one of the judges that condemned 30,000 political prisoners to death in the summer of 1988.

Rouhani’s leading opponent in the current presidential campaign is the mid-level cleric Ibrahim Raisi and it is notable that he also played a leading role in the implementation of the fatwa that led to that massacre. It is little wonder, then, that the main target of that massacre, the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran, has been organizing a boycott of the election to call attention to the fact that there are no seriously different options to choose between in this or any other Iranian election.

Unfortunately, a surprising number of Western policymakers were eager to embrace Rouhani as a potential source of moderation within the theocratic regime. It is time to change all of that.

The past four years have repeatedly proven the naivety of this position, which led to the nuclear agreement and a slate of associated concessions to the Islamic Republic. Global security and the stability of the Middle East have suffered as a result, as have the Iranian people, who are suffering under the present crackdown being carried out by regime institutions that have gained wealth and influence in the wake of sanctions relief.

Fortunately, the change of leadership in the United States has improved the prospects for a proper response to the forthcoming Iranian election. The administration of President Donald Trump was quick to put Tehran on notice over its illicit tests of ballistic missiles, its destabilizing interference in the affairs of its neighbors, and its provocative gestures toward US naval vessels passing through Middle Eastern waterways.

Since then, US officials have not shied away from calling out Iran’s bad behavior, such as last month when UN Ambassador Nikki Haley appealed to the Security Council to make Iran’s sponsorship of Hezbollah a leading priority in Middle East policy.

Neither Mr. Trump nor his foreign policy advisors have shown any impulse to distinguish President Rouhani from the regime that he serves. On this point the administration is in agreement with the Iranian opposition, which has insisted that there is no real alternative in the Iranian election, since all the candidates are vetted and approved by the mullahs: Iran’s Guardian Council blocks the candidacy of anyone who has not demonstrated strict fealty to the supreme leader and the theocratic system.

This is not to say that there is no difference between Rouhani and Raisi. But although the hardline challenger can be expected to play a more obvious role in the regime’s antagonism of the West, the underlying policy will remain unchanged after this month’s elections, just as it remained unchanged after the last election in 2013.

If any good has come from the past four years of US policy toward Iran, it is a renewed awareness of how little change can be expected in the country even when the most “liberal” faction of Iranian establishment politics has been empowered. Now that the US enjoys newly assertive foreign policy leadership, it is important to recognize that the same way of dealing with the Islamic Republic is called for regardless of the outcome of the May 19th election.

It will then be as important as ever to use sanctions and the support for home-grown democratic movements as a means to undermine the institutions of terrorist sponsorship and domestic repression, and to ultimately encourage the creation of a government wherein electoral choice is not just an illusion.

Alireza Jafarzadeh, deputy director of the Washington office of the National Council of Resistance of Iran, is credited with exposing Iranian nuclear sites in Natanz and Arak in 2002, triggering International Atomic Energy Agency inspections. He is the author of “The Iran Threat” (Palgrave MacMillan: 2008). You can reach him at: Jafarzadeh@ncrius.org.

The post Iran’s Election Offers Voters Only a Rubber Stamp appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Two senior US intelligence officials reacted with dismay after learning moments before taking the stage at a speaking event in New York that the director of the FBI, James Comey, had been fired.

“James Comey has been officially fired,” said Charles McGonigal, special agent in charge of the FBI’s counterintelligence division at its New York field office. He spoke alongside William Evanina, director of the Counterintelligence and Security Center at an event organized by the Foreign Policy Association.

“I think we both felt that Director Comey was probably one of the most loved leaders that we’ve had in a number of years commanding a leadership role in the FBI,” McGonigal said. “I think many of us who were nominated for leadership positions by him will forever hold him in esteem as we progress through our FBI careers.”

President Donald Trump made the decision Tuesday to terminate Comey, who assumed the role as the US’s top law enforcement official in 2013. The White House’s account of Trump’s reasoning for the move has varied, but it immediately caused alarm that the president was attempting to curb a FBI investigation into Russia’s meddling in last year’s election and whether his campaign colluded with that effort.

The event was billed to cover foreign influence operations and counterintelligence, and Comey’s dismissal added gravity to the topics the intelligence officials covered.

The two sought to set the record straight about the extent of Russia’s election operation.

“No voting machine was hacked during the election. That is a fact,” McGonigal said.

“The precincts were not connected,” Evanina added. “At the end of the day and looking toward the next presidential election, this will end up helping us because of a lack of connectivity.”

McGonigal, who leads 150 counterintelligence agents in New York, told anecdotes about his career investigating traditional and economic espionage and technology proliferation cases. He said that of the 14 million visitors that come through John F. Kennedy Airport every year, he is certain that “non-traditional collectors,” individuals obtaining information for a foreign government, are among them.

“The FBI is aware that there are non-traditional collectors coming into the country for the sole purpose of collecting information,” he said. “ We are very mindful of that. We do our best to screen that, keeping in mid the rights and privacy of individuals traveling in the United States.”

On the other hand, Evanina said at NCSC his “optic is to drive strategic policy guidance for counterintelligence security across the US government.” He said that every year his organization creates a strategy signed by the president that is sent to the wider intelligence community including the FBI, CIA and NSA.

When inspecting a suspicious email, he said, take extra time to determine a link is legitimate by hovering the mouse over it and analyze what it is linked to. Over half of American adults have been victimized by theft of personal identifiable information, according to Evanina. More than 90 percent of those thefts occurred from spear phishing, or sending emails linked to malware.

When traveling overseas and a link is clicked on a foreign government’s internet or cell network, malware can be installed that allows that government to “own your phone forever,” Evanina said.

“When you turn your phone on, your phone is now the property of wherever you landed,” he added. “Not just your phone. Your emails, your texts, your database, your contacts is owned by them.”

He ultimately suggested buying a simple, cheap phone when going abroad and saving key contact numbers for the trip.

***

Are you interested in attending the Foreign Policy Association’s next lecture?

What: The sovereign citizen, a talk with HSH Prince Philipp of Liechtenstein

Who: HSH Prince Philipp of Liechtenstein
When: Thursday, May 25, 5:30pm to 8pm
Where: Harvard Hall, Harvard Club
35W 44th St, New York, NY 10036
New York, NY

Please click here for more information.

The post US Intel Officials: Comey Was ‘One Of The Most Loved Leaders’ appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

North Korea’s bellicose posture has reached an unprecedented peak after the recent threats of a thermonuclear war against the United States.

Last month, the Deputy Permanent Representative of the DPRK to the U.N. unleashed a new series of threats against Washington, determined to fiercely antagonize any additional implementations of the North Korea’s nuclear program. The program has  significantly accelerated since Kim Jong-un took the power in 2011.

For years, the threat posed by North Korea has been minimized. Now, the emergence of a more aggressive posture fueled by its leadership is not only undermining Washington’s influence in the region but also triggers the specter of nuclear proliferation in East Asia.

Pyongyang’s desire to conduct new missile launches has demonstrated North Korea leadership’s willingness to develop a nuclear-based offensive defense doctrine, improving the quality and the quantity of its nuclear arsenal. North Korea has already acquired a second strike capability, and by 2020 analyst expect that the country will be able to rely on nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles.

In defiance of Washington’s warnings, Pyongyang carried out four ballistic missiles tests in the past two months, including the last on April 29th.

The new missile test comes just after the US Secretary of the State Tillerson has warned North Korea of the catastrophic consequences of pursuing nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, Washington has urged for a new range of sanctions increasing the economic isolation of North Korea.

It has also tried to convince China to increase the pressure on its erratic ally. For decades Beijing has maintained a close entente with Pyongyang, considered as a valuable ally and precious buffer zone from America’s sphere of influence. Yet, the unpredictable and dangerous behavior that has characterized Kim Jong-un’s leadership has certainly contributed to foster mutual mistrust, putting their relations in disarray.

In a recent report on the state media Rodong Sinmun, North Korean’s leadership has expressed a rare criticism towards China for its renewed closeness with Washington It highlighted the severe consequences of any major changes that could negatively affect the North Korea-China relations, such as a new round of sanctions under U.S. auspices.

The Chinese leadership remains extremely concerned about a potential escalation of the confrontation between Pyongyang and Washington and its implications for regional security balance. Although Beijing is considered as a critical actor in restraining North Korea’s aggressive pursuit of nuclear weapons, Pyongyang has several times ignored President Xi’s calls to comply with the U.N. Security Council resolutions. A

After months of hostile rhetoric towards Beijing, culminated in labeling China as a currency manipulator, the Trump administration has shown willingness to mend ties with the Xi government. After the reconciliatory summit between Mr Trump and his Chinese counterpart in Florida last month, Washington has repeatedly stressed the need for a wider engagement with China to clamp down North Korea’s nuclear ambitions.

Many believe that this would represent a valuable opportunity for Beijing to fulfill its desire of emerging as a major power, demonstrating to the international community its ability to play a pivotal role in solving a delicate global security issue.

China’s economic leverage on Pyongyang is considered as a decisive tool to rein in its former protégé. Yet it is unlikely that Beijing will be pursuing drastic measures that could seriously jeopardize the stability of the regime.

Beijing, however, has bowed to the international community’s pressure and has undertaken significant steps such as joining Washington in imposing sanctions and also restricting of North Korean coal imports, considered as a critical source of foreign exchange revenue from Pyongyang. Aside from that, Beijing has maintained a certain reluctance to enforce unilateral economic and trade sanctions despite Washington’s continuous request.

The current U.S. administration claims to be prepared to act unilaterally against threat represented by North Korea. Certainly, the era of strategic patience has come to an end as reaffirmed by Vice President Pence during his visit to South Korea last month.

Yet, the risk of a dreadful military escalation could seriously endanger the regional order and eventually aliment the chance of a nuclear confrontation remains dangerously high. The Trump administration has harshly condemned the failed launch as an additional provocation from Pyongyang, stressing that diplomatic and economic pressure could be accompanied by significant military actions to curb North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile program.

U.S. Vice President Pence visiting the DMZ during his recent visit to South Korea.

In addition, the Trump administration’s recent decision to deploy the aircraft carrier Carl Vinson in the Sea of Japan aims not only to reassure allies that the U.S. is able to defend them from the North Korea’s threat but also to display a more robust engagement in maintaining the status quo in the Korean peninsula. North Korean’s nuclear activities are per se an evident threat to Washington and its allies, but also could represent a significant disruption of the global non-proliferation regime considered as a fundamental pillar of the U.S. security policy.

Since the policy of strategic patience promoted by the previous administration has failed to bring about the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, Washington is now determined to confront Pyongyang. Concerns from China, that perceives any shifts in the regional balance as a threat to its power projection capabilities, have exacerbated tensions with Seoul after the controversial decision to deploy the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense to deter missile threats from North Korea.

Previous administrations have failed to stop Pyongyang’s nuclear program. The program is considered not merely a bargaining chip at the negotiation table, but as a cornerstone of North Korea’s manifest destiny and ultimate tool to ensure the regime survival.

The Trump administration has inherited from its predecessors an increasingly aggressive North Korea, close to the final stage of acquiring ICBM capabilities and miniaturization technologies required to target the continental United States. Pyongyang’s decision to pursue an aggressive agenda aims at compelling Washington to accept Pyongyang’s nuclear power status as a fait accompli.

It is critical to understand that North Korea’s decision makers are determined to pursue the dangerous path of the nuclear power acquisition even if this could dramatically escalate in a military intervention in the Korean peninsula, marking the end of the regime. Acquiring a strong deterrence against any military threat and other external pressure is a keystone for the core leadership that is adamant in ensuring the regime survival at any costs.

North Korea’s perpetual state of war against the imminent threat posed by Washington and South Korea and the pursuit of a self-reliant defense system (Chawi) as enshrined in the Juche ideology has represented a dominant narrative for its people but also the ultimate source of legitimacy for its ruling elites. In the past notable example of pursuing similar outcomes such as the Military First Policy (Songun Chongch’i) under the leadership of Kim Jong-Il led to an economic breakdown and to an extensive famine in the attempt of revitalizing its core leadership whose legitimacy was rapidly eroding in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, exposing North Korea to a similar fate.

North Korea leadership strongly understands the importance of retaining its nuclear capabilities either to bolster domestic stability or as an effective deterrence tool to prevent any military threat. Albeit, Pyongyang has neither the military power nor a direct gain in attacking the United States and its allies without fearing dreadful retaliations that would undermine Kim’s regime, North Korea remains still committed to the reunification of the Korean peninsula on its terms. Since 1950’s invasion of the North and the conflict that inflamed the peninsula, North Korean leadership has rejected the legitimacy of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and still perceives Seoul as the most immediate source of destabilization for the regime.

Over the decades, North Korea has increased the level of confrontation with Washington over its interference in the Korean peninsula, demanding the end of the US nuclear umbrella, the withdrawal of the US forces stationed in South Korea and the end of the joint military exercise with the ROK Forces and more important the ultimate acceptance of North Korea as a legitimate nuclear power nation.

The recent impetuous shown by Trump administration to define the new contours of Washington’ strategy, saluted by the maximum pressure and engagement approach and the adamant rejection of any compromises regarding North Korea’s additional steps towards nuclear power status have not yet produced the expected results.

Aside from resorting to any military options that could eventually jeopardize Washington’s renewed commitment and role in the region, the chance of a successful diplomatic action that could resolve the dangerous standoff also relies on China’s role to convince Pyongyang to pursue a different direction under “the right circumstances” such as Washington’s reassurance of not pursuing any attempt to depose Kim’s leadership or encouraging any military interventions in the Korean peninsula.

While tensions have been high for months, Trump Administration has recently shown a certain inclination to engage Pyongyang in new talks. In the past, North Korea used the nuclear crisis to pressure Washington to normalize the relations, but this time the priority for its leadership has markedly shifted.

Undoubtedly, Pyongyang is still perceived as an unreliable actor with a proven record of violations and deceptions and all the diplomatic efforts to bring back North Korea to the negotiation and frame a longstanding deal that could prevent any additional dangerous shifts in the Korean peninsula have produced no tangible results so far.

The Trump administration is preparing to face a daunting challenge putting real pressure on North Korea to protect Washington’s role and strategic interest in the region. It could develop an appeasement policy toward Pyongyang to temporarily defuse the situation, but with no guarantees about the resurgence of the North Korea nuclear program in the future, this seems unlikely.

The post Trump’s Dilemma in the Korean Peninsula appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

A Vietnamese sinking boat (L) which was rammed and then sunk by Chinese vessels is seen near a Marine Guard ship (R) at Ly Son island of Vietnam’s central Quang Ngai province May 29, 2014. (REUTERS/Stringer)

Hanoi officially expressed its displeasure over Beijing’s annual fishing ban in the South China Sea at a regular press conference last week.

The unilateral fishing ban, announced by China’s Ministry of Agriculture, is in effect from May 1 to August 16 and ostensibly issued and enforced to protect against overfishing. The ban includes the Hoang Sa Archipelago (Paracel Islands), Gulf of Tonkin, and Scarborough Shoal (Bajo de Masinloc, or Panatag Shoal) and has applied to fishermen from both China and other countries since 1999.

During the press conference, Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Le Thi Thu Hang reiterated Hanoi’s position over the waters, arguing, “Vietnam vehemently opposes China’s unilateral ban on fishing as it violates Vietnam’s authority over Hoang Sa archipelago and its legitimate rights and interests regarding its seas.”

As noted by Hanoi, China’s action is not in the spirit of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China (East Vietnam) Sea (DOC) signed by ASEAN and China in 2002, that promises to “enhance favourable conditions for a peaceful and durable solution of differences and disputes among countries concerned.”

Indeed, Beijing’s annual fishing ban extends to waters that have been traditional fishing grounds of Vietnamese fishermen for years. In the last few years, there have been dozens of attacks by Chinese naval vessels on Vietnamese fishing boats in the Paracel Island chain, some of which took place during China’s annual fishing ban. In June 2015, the attacks came every week, as Vietnamese fishing boats were surrounded and boarded by Chinese crews, their fishing gear and catch confiscated, and their boats often damaged by water cannons.

With this history, and the recent fishing ban in mind, Vietnamese State President Tran Dai Quang travels to Beijing to attend the Belt and Road Initiative summit from May 11 to 15, joining some 27 other national leaders. The leaders will discuss the resurgence of the ancient Silk Road trading routes that once carried goods between China and Europe. The Belt and Road Initiative, formerly known as “One Belt, One Road,” was put forth in 2013 by General Secretary of the Communist Party of China and President of China, Xi Jinping.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative is important to Hanoi, as Vietnam exported some $16.6 billion (10 percent of total) to China in 2015, according to the World Bank. In recent months, Hanoi and Beijing have had a series of cordial meetings to reduce tensions, and President Quang’s visit next week to Beijing could be another opportunity to reduce tensions over the annual fishing ban.

Yet Beijing will be reluctant to lift the ban in waters it considers its own, and Quang (the former head of the ministry of public security) will likely focus next week on bringing more of the trade and investment benefits from China’s Belt and Road Initiative to Vietnam, while his fishermen stay close to shore.

The post Hanoi Protests China’s Fishing Ban appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

A Vietnamese sinking boat (L) which was rammed and then sunk by Chinese vessels is seen near a Marine Guard ship (R) at Ly Son island of Vietnam’s central Quang Ngai province May 29, 2014. (REUTERS/Stringer)

Hanoi officially expressed its displeasure over Beijing’s annual fishing ban in the South China Sea at a regular press conference last week.

The unilateral fishing ban, announced by China’s Ministry of Agriculture, is in effect from May 1 to August 16 and ostensibly issued and enforced to protect against overfishing. The ban includes the Hoang Sa Archipelago (Paracel Islands), Gulf of Tonkin, and Scarborough Shoal (Bajo de Masinloc, or Panatag Shoal) and has applied to fishermen from both China and other countries since 1999.

During the press conference, Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Le Thi Thu Hang reiterated Hanoi’s position over the waters, arguing, “Vietnam vehemently opposes China’s unilateral ban on fishing as it violates Vietnam’s authority over Hoang Sa archipelago and its legitimate rights and interests regarding its seas.”

As noted by Hanoi, China’s action is not in the spirit of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China (East Vietnam) Sea (DOC) signed by ASEAN and China in 2002, that promises to “enhance favourable conditions for a peaceful and durable solution of differences and disputes among countries concerned.”

Indeed, Beijing’s annual fishing ban extends to waters that have been traditional fishing grounds of Vietnamese fishermen for years. In the last few years, there have been dozens of attacks by Chinese naval vessels on Vietnamese fishing boats in the Paracel Island chain, some of which took place during China’s annual fishing ban. In June 2015, the attacks came every week, as Vietnamese fishing boats were surrounded and boarded by Chinese crews, their fishing gear and catch confiscated, and their boats often damaged by water cannons.

With this history, and the recent fishing ban in mind, Vietnamese State President Tran Dai Quang travels to Beijing to attend the Belt and Road Initiative summit from May 11 to 15, joining some 27 other national leaders. The leaders will discuss the resurgence of the ancient Silk Road trading routes that once carried goods between China and Europe. The Belt and Road Initiative, formerly known as “One Belt, One Road,” was put forth in 2013 by General Secretary of the Communist Party of China and President of China, Xi Jinping.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative is important to Hanoi, as Vietnam exported some $16.6 billion (10 percent of total) to China in 2015, according to the World Bank. In recent months, Hanoi and Beijing have had a series of cordial meetings to reduce tensions, and President Quang’s visit next week to Beijing could be another opportunity to reduce tensions over the annual fishing ban.

Yet Beijing will be reluctant to lift the ban in waters it considers its own, and Quang (the former head of the ministry of public security) will likely focus next week on bringing more of the trade and investment benefits from China’s Belt and Road Initiative to Vietnam, while his fishermen stay close to shore.

The post Hanoi Protests China’s Fishing Ban appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Senator Marco Rubio and Hong Kong democracy activist Joshua Wong (HKFP).

On May 3, prominent Hong Kong democracy figures gave testimony at a hearing with the U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) in Washington. Speakers included Hong Kong democracy activists Joshua Wong and Martin Lee, Hong Kong bookseller Lam Wing Kee, Hong Kong’s former British colonial governor Chris Patten, and writer Ellen Bork. The response from Beijing and from pro-Beijing media in Hong Kong was one of predictable nationalistic rage and ugliness, including accusations that Hong Kong democracy activists seeking international support are “race traitors.”

The CECC hearing “constitutes a blatant interference in China’s internal affairs including Hong Kong affairs,” said a Chinese foreign ministry spokesman, “The Chinese side is strongly dissatisfied with and firmly opposed to it…. Hong Kong is a special administrative region of China, and Hong Kong affairs fall totally within China’s internal affairs. We are firmly opposed to any country’s interference in Hong Kong affairs in any form. The attempts of some individuals in Hong Kong to collude with foreign forces in meddling with Hong Kong affairs will never succeed” (See South China Morning Post).

Such statements on everybody’s “interference in China’s internal affairs” are repeated ad nauseam by the Chinese foreign ministry and state-run media; and could be delivered as effectively from a voice recording, over and over again, as from a live human being.

Likewise attacking the activists for “asking foreigners to intervene in local affairs,” China’s state-run Global Times said: “Hong Kong independence advocate Joshua Wong has been condemned as a race traitor after defaming the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ policy in the U.S. and begging for attention from the U.S. government.” Pro-Beijing Hong Kong newspaper Ta Kung Pao also called Wong and Lee “race traitors” and ran an anonymous commentary saying, “It is obvious that Americans are using Wong to attack the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ policy and the [Chinese] central government, but he is happy about his role as a political clown manipulated by others” (See Hong Kong Free Press).

The pejorative term “race traitor” (汉奸 or hànjiān), which can also be understood as “traitor to the Han [Chinese] people” or “traitor to the Chinese nation,” is commonly used in nationalistic mainland Chinese circles to refer to Hong Kong democracy activists, to Taiwanese who don’t wish to be “reunified” with mainland China (which includes the vast majority of Taiwanese according to opinion polls), and to anyone else considered disloyal to the mainland Chinese “motherland” and its ruling Chinese Communist Party. Joshua Wong and Martin Lee have both been frequently referred to in nationalistic mainland Chinese news media and social media as hànjiān.

Hong Kong has struggled for its democratic rights since the former British colony was handed over to Chinese control in 1997. Under the handover agreement with Britain, China pledged a “high degree of autonomy” for Hong Kong and respect for its democratic rights under the “One Country, Two Systems” arrangement. China has broken these pledges, however, under a systematic program of “mainlandization” aimed at politically and culturally assimilating Hong Kong into mainland China, thereby consolidating mainland control over Hong Kong and preventing “democratic contagion” from Hong Kong seeping into mainland China and challenging authoritarian Chinese Communist Party rule.

As a result, human rights and civil liberties in Hong Kong are now at their lowest point since 1997, and “One Country, Two Systems” has been exposed as a lie. Press freedom and freedom of expression in Hong Kong are in decline, and democratic development is stalled due to interference from Beijing. There is now little reason to believe that Beijing ever intended to keep any of its pledges to Hong Kong in the handover agreement with Britain (See Amnesty International, China Post, Freedom House, Human Rights Watch, Reporters Without Borders).

Joshua Wong and Martin Lee in Washington (HKFP).

“On the night of July 1, 1997, my home, Hong Kong, a territory of then-7 million people was handed over from Britain to the People’s Republic of China,” said veteran democracy activist Martin Lee in his statement to CECC, “Twenty years later, we have come to a critical moment: Promised democratic development has been totally stopped, and the autonomy and core values we have worked hard to preserve under both British and Chinese rule are in serious danger…. Twenty years ago, the ‘one country’ part of [the handover] agreement was completed, when China assumed control over Hong Kong…. But I am here to tell you today that we are still waiting for the ‘two systems’ promises to be upheld.”

Ellen Bork likewise said: “Beijing has dropped the pretense of respect for Hong Kong’s autonomy and the ‘one country, two systems’ arrangement. The Party is not only preventing Hong Kong from moving forward toward full democracy, it is also advancing communist political culture and taboos within Hong Kong’s society” (See also Lam Wing Kee, Joshua Wong, Joshua Wong and Jeffrey Ngo).

Speaking for the United Kingdom by video conference, Chris Patten said that “China is supposed to keep its word to the people of Hong Kong, and Britain has every right to interfere in that.” However, Patten also criticized the UK government for not being “very robust in drawing attention to breaches – whether large or small – in the undertakings of both the letter and spirit [in the agreement] made by China.” Since his departure as Hong Kong’s last British governor in 1997, Patten has been outspoken in his support for democracy in Hong Kong and in his criticism of the UK government for failing to take a stronger stand against China’s violations of the handover agreement.

“Despite the multitude of challenges, Hong Kong’s future, indeed its destiny, must not be sidelined,” said U.S. senator and CECC chairman Marco Rubio, “China’s assault on democratic institutions and human rights is of central importance to the people of Hong Kong and to its status as a free market, economic powerhouse and hub for international trade and investment…. We cannot allow Hong Kong to go the way of Beijing’s failed authoritarianism and one-party rule.”

Rubio is also a co-sponsor of the bipartisan Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act introduced in February 2017. If passed, this act would establish “punitive measures against government officials in Hong Kong or mainland China who are responsible for suppressing basic freedoms in Hong Kong.”

“Maintaining Hong Kong’s autonomy is a critical U.S. interest,” said U.S. representative and CECC co-chairman Chris Smith, “The U.S. also has a clear interest in Beijing abiding by its international agreements — in Hong Kong and elsewhere…. The democratic aspirations of the people of Hong Kong cannot be indefinitely suppressed. I promise to stand with Hong Kong and call attention to violations of basic human rights as long as I serve in Congress.”

The post China Rages as Hong Kong Democracy Figures Speak to U.S. Commission appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Senator Marco Rubio and Hong Kong democracy activist Joshua Wong (HKFP).

On May 3, prominent Hong Kong democracy figures gave testimony at a hearing with the U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) in Washington. Speakers included Hong Kong democracy activists Joshua Wong and Martin Lee, Hong Kong bookseller Lam Wing Kee, Hong Kong’s former British colonial governor Chris Patten, and writer Ellen Bork. The response from Beijing and from pro-Beijing media in Hong Kong was one of predictable nationalistic rage and ugliness, including accusations that Hong Kong democracy activists seeking international support are “race traitors.”

The CECC hearing “constitutes a blatant interference in China’s internal affairs including Hong Kong affairs,” said a Chinese foreign ministry spokesman, “The Chinese side is strongly dissatisfied with and firmly opposed to it…. Hong Kong is a special administrative region of China, and Hong Kong affairs fall totally within China’s internal affairs. We are firmly opposed to any country’s interference in Hong Kong affairs in any form. The attempts of some individuals in Hong Kong to collude with foreign forces in meddling with Hong Kong affairs will never succeed” (See South China Morning Post).

Such statements on everybody’s “interference in China’s internal affairs” are repeated ad nauseam by the Chinese foreign ministry and state-run media; and could be delivered as effectively from a voice recording, over and over again, as from a live human being.

Likewise attacking the activists for “asking foreigners to intervene in local affairs,” China’s state-run Global Times said: “Hong Kong independence advocate Joshua Wong has been condemned as a race traitor after defaming the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ policy in the U.S. and begging for attention from the U.S. government.” Pro-Beijing Hong Kong newspaper Ta Kung Pao also called Wong and Lee “race traitors” and ran an anonymous commentary saying, “It is obvious that Americans are using Wong to attack the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ policy and the [Chinese] central government, but he is happy about his role as a political clown manipulated by others” (See Hong Kong Free Press).

The pejorative term “race traitor” (汉奸 or hànjiān), which can also be understood as “traitor to the Han [Chinese] people” or “traitor to the Chinese nation,” is commonly used in nationalistic mainland Chinese circles to refer to Hong Kong democracy activists, to Taiwanese who don’t wish to be “reunified” with mainland China (which includes the vast majority of Taiwanese according to opinion polls), and to anyone else considered disloyal to the mainland Chinese “motherland” and its ruling Chinese Communist Party. Joshua Wong and Martin Lee have both been frequently referred to in nationalistic mainland Chinese news media and social media as hànjiān.

Hong Kong has struggled for its democratic rights since the former British colony was handed over to Chinese control in 1997. Under the handover agreement with Britain, China pledged a “high degree of autonomy” for Hong Kong and respect for its democratic rights under the “One Country, Two Systems” arrangement. China has broken these pledges, however, under a systematic program of “mainlandization” aimed at politically and culturally assimilating Hong Kong into mainland China, thereby consolidating mainland control over Hong Kong and preventing “democratic contagion” from Hong Kong seeping into mainland China and challenging authoritarian Chinese Communist Party rule.

As a result, human rights and civil liberties in Hong Kong are now at their lowest point since 1997, and “One Country, Two Systems” has been exposed as a lie. Press freedom and freedom of expression in Hong Kong are in decline, and democratic development is stalled due to interference from Beijing. There is now little reason to believe that Beijing ever intended to keep any of its pledges to Hong Kong in the handover agreement with Britain (See Amnesty International, China Post, Freedom House, Human Rights Watch, Reporters Without Borders).

Joshua Wong and Martin Lee in Washington (HKFP).

“On the night of July 1, 1997, my home, Hong Kong, a territory of then-7 million people was handed over from Britain to the People’s Republic of China,” said veteran democracy activist Martin Lee in his statement to CECC, “Twenty years later, we have come to a critical moment: Promised democratic development has been totally stopped, and the autonomy and core values we have worked hard to preserve under both British and Chinese rule are in serious danger…. Twenty years ago, the ‘one country’ part of [the handover] agreement was completed, when China assumed control over Hong Kong…. But I am here to tell you today that we are still waiting for the ‘two systems’ promises to be upheld.”

Ellen Bork likewise said: “Beijing has dropped the pretense of respect for Hong Kong’s autonomy and the ‘one country, two systems’ arrangement. The Party is not only preventing Hong Kong from moving forward toward full democracy, it is also advancing communist political culture and taboos within Hong Kong’s society” (See also Lam Wing Kee, Joshua Wong, Joshua Wong and Jeffrey Ngo).

Speaking for the United Kingdom by video conference, Chris Patten said that “China is supposed to keep its word to the people of Hong Kong, and Britain has every right to interfere in that.” However, Patten also criticized the UK government for not being “very robust in drawing attention to breaches – whether large or small – in the undertakings of both the letter and spirit [in the agreement] made by China.” Since his departure as Hong Kong’s last British governor in 1997, Patten has been outspoken in his support for democracy in Hong Kong and in his criticism of the UK government for failing to take a stronger stand against China’s violations of the handover agreement.

“Despite the multitude of challenges, Hong Kong’s future, indeed its destiny, must not be sidelined,” said U.S. senator and CECC chairman Marco Rubio, “China’s assault on democratic institutions and human rights is of central importance to the people of Hong Kong and to its status as a free market, economic powerhouse and hub for international trade and investment…. We cannot allow Hong Kong to go the way of Beijing’s failed authoritarianism and one-party rule.”

Rubio is also a co-sponsor of the bipartisan Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act introduced in February 2017. If passed, this act would establish “punitive measures against government officials in Hong Kong or mainland China who are responsible for suppressing basic freedoms in Hong Kong.”

“Maintaining Hong Kong’s autonomy is a critical U.S. interest,” said U.S. representative and CECC co-chairman Chris Smith, “The U.S. also has a clear interest in Beijing abiding by its international agreements — in Hong Kong and elsewhere…. The democratic aspirations of the people of Hong Kong cannot be indefinitely suppressed. I promise to stand with Hong Kong and call attention to violations of basic human rights as long as I serve in Congress.”

The post China Rages as Hong Kong Democracy Figures Speak to U.S. Commission appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

The conflict taking place in Syria, initially concentrated solely in the Middle East has spread internationally in recent years. While the effects abroad are not of a violent nature as they are in the streets of Syria and Iraq, many communities in Europe are taking direct and immediate action within their own societies.

Approaches to create safe zones are being sought by Russia, Turkey and Iran in an effort to reverse the mass migration out of Syria. A similar policy position is also being promoted by the current U.S. Administration. While the plan is one that could diffuse mass migration from Syria, it is often those groups with the least protection and international consideration that would still be treated as low priority.

Issues abroad affect the fate of many individuals and groups in the Middle East. For those who are targeted for simply being born into a certain group and at risk of seeing its community go extinct, the situation is the most precarious. In those case, often assistance does not come, depending greatly on Western leaders foreign policy priorities. Unfortunately the essential foundations of humanitarian values are usually disregarded in the calculations of politicians seeking reelection.

Safe zones will be affected greatly by politics locally and abroad. The overwhelming pressure that will lead to decisive policy decisions in Europe will come from the two to three million additional refugees coming through Greece and eastern EU members into the heart of Europe.

European politics to a great degree may become dependent on a working safe zone and brokered peace in Syria. Two million migrants in Turkey could return home, or be pushed into another quagmire while passing through to Europe, contributing to the ever worsening of EU-Turkey relations in 2017.

The ones who will benefit from safe zones may be refugees who side with the stronger forces in the region, set up often by the same armies that created indiscriminate conflict in the first place. Refugees may be the ones fleeing attacks by the forces running those same zones, and enemies of those forces may be targeted again. The catalyst of the conflict in Syria and Iraq may persist in regions where it would be safe for those supporting the local government.

A safe zone cannot absolve itself from the larger religious conflict, or ignore the fact that minorities in the region are often targeted by both sides

Groups like Yazidis, Christians, and other minorities that are often targets of genocide remain safe. Without a concerted effort by the United States, Russia and European powers, the most vulnerable populations will remain in danger.

Resolving the humanitarian crisis in Syria today requires a holistic plan to end conflict between all active groups. Without safe zones it will be difficult to address both local and foreign concerns and succeed in stopping conflict in the region.

The post Decompressing A Crisis Through Safe Zones appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

The conflict taking place in Syria, initially concentrated solely in the Middle East has spread internationally in recent years. While the effects abroad are not of a violent nature as they are in the streets of Syria and Iraq, many communities in Europe are taking direct and immediate action within their own societies.

Approaches to create safe zones are being sought by Russia, Turkey and Iran in an effort to reverse the mass migration out of Syria. A similar policy position is also being promoted by the current U.S. Administration. While the plan is one that could diffuse mass migration from Syria, it is often those groups with the least protection and international consideration that would still be treated as low priority.

Issues abroad affect the fate of many individuals and groups in the Middle East. For those who are targeted for simply being born into a certain group and at risk of seeing its community go extinct, the situation is the most precarious. In those case, often assistance does not come, depending greatly on Western leaders foreign policy priorities. Unfortunately the essential foundations of humanitarian values are usually disregarded in the calculations of politicians seeking reelection.

Safe zones will be affected greatly by politics locally and abroad. The overwhelming pressure that will lead to decisive policy decisions in Europe will come from the two to three million additional refugees coming through Greece and eastern EU members into the heart of Europe.

European politics to a great degree may become dependent on a working safe zone and brokered peace in Syria. Two million migrants in Turkey could return home, or be pushed into another quagmire while passing through to Europe, contributing to the ever worsening of EU-Turkey relations in 2017.

The ones who will benefit from safe zones may be refugees who side with the stronger forces in the region, set up often by the same armies that created indiscriminate conflict in the first place. Refugees may be the ones fleeing attacks by the forces running those same zones, and enemies of those forces may be targeted again. The catalyst of the conflict in Syria and Iraq may persist in regions where it would be safe for those supporting the local government.

A safe zone cannot absolve itself from the larger religious conflict, or ignore the fact that minorities in the region are often targeted by both sides

Groups like Yazidis, Christians, and other minorities that are often targets of genocide remain safe. Without a concerted effort by the United States, Russia and European powers, the most vulnerable populations will remain in danger.

Resolving the humanitarian crisis in Syria today requires a holistic plan to end conflict between all active groups. Without safe zones it will be difficult to address both local and foreign concerns and succeed in stopping conflict in the region.

The post Decompressing A Crisis Through Safe Zones appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Students from Volgograd Institute of Management and American University.

With Kseniia Zheleznikova, assistant at the Department of Corporate Management and head of non-formal education in the Project Laboratory, at the Russian Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA)’s Volgograd Institute of Management.

While formal ties between Russia and the United States are uncertain, Kseniia Zheleznikova’s students at the Volgograd Institute of Management engaged American students in some diplomatic bridge-building.

Zheleznikova was a delegate to Open World Leadership Program last year. She spent a week in Cleveland, Ohio, living with an American family and working with political communications professionals. In Washington, she joined a tour of the Library of Congress with American University’s Jim Quirk. They decided they should get their students together on Skype.

Russian students asked their American peers about political engagement in student government and local government. American students asked about Russia’s perspectives on Syria, President Trump, and the economy. Students at both universities are engaged in climate change issues and the environment. Each campus has held recent clean-up activities near parks and rivers, and both universities recently held film festivals focused on the environment.

Students also talked about more relaxed topics, like what kinds of things they do for entertainment—sports, movies, music, parties, and more.

After the videoconference, each group talked about the benefits of this kind of event. For most of the American and Russian students, it was their first activity of this kind. The planned 30-minute call extended to over an hour, and the students were eager to continue the conversation.

Russian students were impressed with the American students’ direct involvement in international and domestic policy issues—many worked on the 2016 presidential campaign and intern with Members of Congress. The Russian students emphasized the importance of personal and professional development, through efforts such as the scientific extracurricular activities available on campus. They wanted more informal seminars, joint projects conferences, and perhaps online academic competitions.

Finally, they noted the value of these “face-to-face” meetings: broadening horizons, fighting stereotypes, establishing professional ties, and insights that help shape personal and career strategies.The American students were similarly excited by the personal and professional nature of the exchanges, and look forward to continuing the conversation.

President Trump has proposed massive budget cuts to the Department of State and other “soft power” programs. But programs like Open World that sent Zheleznikova and her colleagues to the United States, and other U.S. government programs that have sent Quirk to Bosnia, Serbia, and other Balkan nations, help form relationships at a personal level. Formal government and business relations are critical, of course. But connections among students—the future government, business, and cultural leaders in Russia and the United States—can help establish long-term relationships and shape positive opinions and perspectives of each other.

The students at RANEPA-Volgograd and American University are big beneficiaries from these kinds of conversations. The United States Government should work to make more of them, not fewer. The students of Zheleznikova and Quirk will do their part, at least.

Special thanks for expert translation during the videoconference go to Dr. Ekaterina Stepanova, associate professor of the Department of Linguistics and Intercultural Communication, Volgograd Institute of Management.

The post Soft Power: Russian and American University Students Find Common Ground appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Students from Volgograd Institute of Management and American University.

With Kseniia Zheleznikova, assistant at the Department of Corporate Management and head of non-formal education in the Project Laboratory, at the Russian Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA)’s Volgograd Institute of Management.

While formal ties between Russia and the United States are uncertain, Kseniia Zheleznikova’s students at the Volgograd Institute of Management engaged American students in some diplomatic bridge-building.

Zheleznikova was a delegate to Open World Leadership Program last year. She spent a week in Cleveland, Ohio, living with an American family and working with political communications professionals. In Washington, she joined a tour of the Library of Congress with American University’s Jim Quirk. They decided they should get their students together on Skype.

Russian students asked their American peers about political engagement in student government and local government. American students asked about Russia’s perspectives on Syria, President Trump, and the economy. Students at both universities are engaged in climate change issues and the environment. Each campus has held recent clean-up activities near parks and rivers, and both universities recently held film festivals focused on the environment.

Students also talked about more relaxed topics, like what kinds of things they do for entertainment—sports, movies, music, parties, and more.

After the videoconference, each group talked about the benefits of this kind of event. For most of the American and Russian students, it was their first activity of this kind. The planned 30-minute call extended to over an hour, and the students were eager to continue the conversation.

Russian students were impressed with the American students’ direct involvement in international and domestic policy issues—many worked on the 2016 presidential campaign and intern with Members of Congress. The Russian students emphasized the importance of personal and professional development, through efforts such as the scientific extracurricular activities available on campus. They wanted more informal seminars, joint projects conferences, and perhaps online academic competitions.

Finally, they noted the value of these “face-to-face” meetings: broadening horizons, fighting stereotypes, establishing professional ties, and insights that help shape personal and career strategies.The American students were similarly excited by the personal and professional nature of the exchanges, and look forward to continuing the conversation.

President Trump has proposed massive budget cuts to the Department of State and other “soft power” programs. But programs like Open World that sent Zheleznikova and her colleagues to the United States, and other U.S. government programs that have sent Quirk to Bosnia, Serbia, and other Balkan nations, help form relationships at a personal level. Formal government and business relations are critical, of course. But connections among students—the future government, business, and cultural leaders in Russia and the United States—can help establish long-term relationships and shape positive opinions and perspectives of each other.

The students at RANEPA-Volgograd and American University are big beneficiaries from these kinds of conversations. The United States Government should work to make more of them, not fewer. The students of Zheleznikova and Quirk will do their part, at least.

Special thanks for expert translation during the videoconference go to Dr. Ekaterina Stepanova, associate professor of the Department of Linguistics and Intercultural Communication, Volgograd Institute of Management.

The post Soft Power: Russian and American University Students Find Common Ground appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Sixty years after the 1957 signing of the Rome Treaties, on March 25, leaders of 27 EU member states united in Rome to celebrate the anniversary. Britain did not send a representative. The event took place in the midst an existential crisis that has infested the European project. Yet, despite all the pessimism that surrounds the European project, the meeting in Rome showed that leaders remain committed to a strong EU-27 that will play a major role in the 21st century international system. The success of this scenario is contingent upon a concrete internal reform program that includes all layers of society.

The problems facing the European Union since 2008 resulted from a combination of crisis mismanagement, partial institutional failure, and a highly unstable international environment. While these factors are closely intertwined, the focus of attention has gradually shifted to the last of these three issues. The alleged “end of history”, which invested neoliberal thought as the dominant and dominating narrative of the current world order and gave the European project a special momentum in the early 1990s, now seems to turn against its inventors.

Within Europe, the resulting sentiment of confusion and defeat has produced new societal divides that defy the traditional left-right spectrum. Denouncing the negative consequences of globalization, populist forces have emerged as part of the European political landscape. In their quest for power, populist parties prescribe protectionism and the reestablishment of national sovereignty as panacea to all of the EU’s ills.

In so doing they contribute to the widening ideological chasm between globalists on the one side and nationalists on the other. If the EU fails to address these divides as part of a larger reform process, the Union is likely to become bereft of both its cosmopolitan ideals and republican identity.

Aware of the looming danger, EU leaders portrayed the celebrations in Rome “as the beginning of a process for the EU-27 to decide together on the future of their Union.”[1] The message to which the 27 Heads of States committed to when signing the Rome Declaration, is clear: “Europe”, as Council President Donald Tusk put it in a statement reminiscent of the revolutionary language of a Benjamin Franklin, “as a political entity will either be united, or will not be at all. Only a united Europe can be a sovereign Europe.” Tusk shows himself expressively defiant, battling on two fronts—the domestic and the international—when making the case for unity being the requirement for stability, prosperity, and sovereignty.

After three days of high level exchanges in Rome, the EU-27 in their final declaration confirmed Tusk’s position and simultaneously acknowledged Europe’s declining influence on the international scene when stating that “taken individually, we would be side-lined by global dynamics. Standing together is our best chance to influence them, and to defend our common interests and values”.

Unity is portrayed as Europe’s last chance to remain at the table of the world’s major powers. For Europe’s leaders, the EU needs to overcome internal divisions to show external strength. The same message of unity was put to the forth more recently during the first EU Council summit meeting without a UK Prime Minister, during which the remainers agreed on “how to go into Brexit negotiations, set to start in June”. After the meeting, Council President Juncker shared his optimism by tweeting, “Unity in action:#EU27 adopt #Article50 Guidelines in less than 15 minutes. #Brexit”.

Transforming this abstract concept of unity into palpable policies is feasible, yet will take more time and energy than Juncker’s hashtagged tweet suggests. Most importantly, leaders need to concede that the concept of unity cannot be reduced to its intergovernmental meaning, referring to consensus among national governments. The functionalist logic according to which the forces of trickle down and spill over will eventually satisfy the European people as long as political elites agree has proven dangerously wrong.

In other words, it is not enough if the executive branches of the EU-27 are in agreement whilst representatives in national parliaments and citizens continue blaming Brussels for their relative deprivation. Instead, unity must be achieved along both the horizontal and the vertical dimensions of the public sphere, recognizing the needs of Europe’s diverse dêmoi. Only in so doing, the EU-27 will be able to defy populists and disintegrationists.

The challenge is huge. Even if Marine Le Pen is defeated in the second round of the French presidential elections on May 7, thus undermining populist momentum, the tasks the EU has to deal with in the immediate are still colossal:

The EU faces a rising current of populist nationalism in the eastern half of the bloc that puts its democratic values in question. It must deal with Russian aggression and with the flow of migrants across the Mediterranean. The architecture of the eurozone does not work as well as it should and its economic recovery remains uneven. Greece’s debts are still unsustainable; and Britain’s departure will inevitably consume energy and alter the balance of power between member states. [2]

To overcome these problems, the EU-27 agreed on a four-point strategy that envisions a safe and secure Europe, a prosperous and sustainable Europe, a social Europe, and a stronger Europe on the global scene. All four propositions place the European citizen at the heart of the solution. While it is too early to offer a final assessment of a reform that is projected to be realized by 2025, it is striking to see how much emphasis is being put on the military and security dimensions of the Union.

This move confirms earlier attempts of the European Union to refashion its identity as a new and powerful security provider on the international scene. Once and for all European leaders seem determined to bid farewell to the notion of Europe being “merely” a normative power. Instead, they acknowledge the existence of a Hobbesian anarchy and the need for hard power as the ultimate means to assure the survival of the Union. Being a “soft power”, the Commission argues, “is no longer powerful enough when force can prevail over rules”.

Whilst developing common hard power capabilities might indeed help strengthen the EU’s role in the world, leaders should be careful not to undermine Europe’s other commitments to global governance and cosmopolitan rule of law, two of the pillars that have made the EU the actor it is today.

Whilst the current phase of reflection and debate is crucial, the EU cannot stop there. It needs to rally the European people behind specific ideas that allow citizens to identify with this abstract supranational polity. As the Financial Times put it in a recent commentary, “far more important will be rekindling public enthusiasm for the EU. The original architects of the European union combined dry, technocratic pragmatism with a fervent belief, founded in personal experience, in Europe as a political project. This emotional attachment has largely been lost.”

Politicians carry a responsibility to defend the European project and to help create a Europe that speaks to its citizens and is carried not only by elites but also by the people. In order to achieve this situation, Europe needs to become the discursive environment that embeds all other debates. European citizens need to regain trust in this political project that governs so many aspects of their daily lives but seems too distant all the same. In other words, what is needed is a Europe of the people, by the people, and for the people.

Of course, defense is not the only issue area the EU can nor should consider when reinventing its identity as a 21st century superpower. Lots can be gained from constructing a new pan-European identity around issues such as renewable energies, smart cities, improved mobility, the promotion of efficient yet regulated market economies, and the image of a responsible third force be it in the UN or as a powerful member of the global financial institutions.

From a foreign policy perspective, for the EU to remain a successful and credible actor in the international system it eventually must transcend the nation-state. None of the other future scenarios the European Commission considered in a recent White Paper, such as a European Union of different speeds, a European Union re-centered on the single market, or a European Union of opt-outs and cherry-picking are likely to defend Europe’s place in the world to the same extent and with the same effectiveness as a federal Europe.

The transformation of the EU into a new political community transcending the nation-state is the toughest of the tasks lying ahead and likely to lead to major resistance on the part of the member states and their constituents.

However, the outlook for the future of “the only converging meta-national continental arrangement of its kind in the world” is brighter than most analysts currently are ready to admit. The EU experienced substantial crises before and pundits predicted its failure many a time. For sure, the EU needs to undergo a process of thorough reform and address the numerous flaws of its present institutional set-up, but if done so properly, the EU will remain an important global player in the future.

[1] European Commission. 2017. White Paper on the Future. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/white_paper_on_the_future_of_europe_en.pdf, accessed on 5 May 2017, p.26.

[2] Financial Times. 2017. The EU has much to celebrate – and to do. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/7c6116ac-1084-11e7-b030-768954394623, accessed on 5 May 2017.

The post The EU at 60: Between Globalism and Nationalism appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Sixty years after the 1957 signing of the Rome Treaties, on March 25, leaders of 27 EU member states united in Rome to celebrate the anniversary. Britain did not send a representative. The event took place in the midst an existential crisis that has infested the European project. Yet, despite all the pessimism that surrounds the European project, the meeting in Rome showed that leaders remain committed to a strong EU-27 that will play a major role in the 21st century international system. The success of this scenario is contingent upon a concrete internal reform program that includes all layers of society.

The problems facing the European Union since 2008 resulted from a combination of crisis mismanagement, partial institutional failure, and a highly unstable international environment. While these factors are closely intertwined, the focus of attention has gradually shifted to the last of these three issues. The alleged “end of history”, which invested neoliberal thought as the dominant and dominating narrative of the current world order and gave the European project a special momentum in the early 1990s, now seems to turn against its inventors.

Within Europe, the resulting sentiment of confusion and defeat has produced new societal divides that defy the traditional left-right spectrum. Denouncing the negative consequences of globalization, populist forces have emerged as part of the European political landscape. In their quest for power, populist parties prescribe protectionism and the reestablishment of national sovereignty as panacea to all of the EU’s ills.

In so doing they contribute to the widening ideological chasm between globalists on the one side and nationalists on the other. If the EU fails to address these divides as part of a larger reform process, the Union is likely to become bereft of both its cosmopolitan ideals and republican identity.

Aware of the looming danger, EU leaders portrayed the celebrations in Rome “as the beginning of a process for the EU-27 to decide together on the future of their Union.”[1] The message to which the 27 Heads of States committed to when signing the Rome Declaration, is clear: “Europe”, as Council President Donald Tusk put it in a statement reminiscent of the revolutionary language of a Benjamin Franklin, “as a political entity will either be united, or will not be at all. Only a united Europe can be a sovereign Europe.” Tusk shows himself expressively defiant, battling on two fronts—the domestic and the international—when making the case for unity being the requirement for stability, prosperity, and sovereignty.

After three days of high level exchanges in Rome, the EU-27 in their final declaration confirmed Tusk’s position and simultaneously acknowledged Europe’s declining influence on the international scene when stating that “taken individually, we would be side-lined by global dynamics. Standing together is our best chance to influence them, and to defend our common interests and values”.

Unity is portrayed as Europe’s last chance to remain at the table of the world’s major powers. For Europe’s leaders, the EU needs to overcome internal divisions to show external strength. The same message of unity was put to the forth more recently during the first EU Council summit meeting without a UK Prime Minister, during which the remainers agreed on “how to go into Brexit negotiations, set to start in June”. After the meeting, Council President Juncker shared his optimism by tweeting, “Unity in action:#EU27 adopt #Article50 Guidelines in less than 15 minutes. #Brexit”.

Transforming this abstract concept of unity into palpable policies is feasible, yet will take more time and energy than Juncker’s hashtagged tweet suggests. Most importantly, leaders need to concede that the concept of unity cannot be reduced to its intergovernmental meaning, referring to consensus among national governments. The functionalist logic according to which the forces of trickle down and spill over will eventually satisfy the European people as long as political elites agree has proven dangerously wrong.

In other words, it is not enough if the executive branches of the EU-27 are in agreement whilst representatives in national parliaments and citizens continue blaming Brussels for their relative deprivation. Instead, unity must be achieved along both the horizontal and the vertical dimensions of the public sphere, recognizing the needs of Europe’s diverse dêmoi. Only in so doing, the EU-27 will be able to defy populists and disintegrationists.

The challenge is huge. Even if Marine Le Pen is defeated in the second round of the French presidential elections on May 7, thus undermining populist momentum, the tasks the EU has to deal with in the immediate are still colossal:

The EU faces a rising current of populist nationalism in the eastern half of the bloc that puts its democratic values in question. It must deal with Russian aggression and with the flow of migrants across the Mediterranean. The architecture of the eurozone does not work as well as it should and its economic recovery remains uneven. Greece’s debts are still unsustainable; and Britain’s departure will inevitably consume energy and alter the balance of power between member states. [2]

To overcome these problems, the EU-27 agreed on a four-point strategy that envisions a safe and secure Europe, a prosperous and sustainable Europe, a social Europe, and a stronger Europe on the global scene. All four propositions place the European citizen at the heart of the solution. While it is too early to offer a final assessment of a reform that is projected to be realized by 2025, it is striking to see how much emphasis is being put on the military and security dimensions of the Union.

This move confirms earlier attempts of the European Union to refashion its identity as a new and powerful security provider on the international scene. Once and for all European leaders seem determined to bid farewell to the notion of Europe being “merely” a normative power. Instead, they acknowledge the existence of a Hobbesian anarchy and the need for hard power as the ultimate means to assure the survival of the Union. Being a “soft power”, the Commission argues, “is no longer powerful enough when force can prevail over rules”.

Whilst developing common hard power capabilities might indeed help strengthen the EU’s role in the world, leaders should be careful not to undermine Europe’s other commitments to global governance and cosmopolitan rule of law, two of the pillars that have made the EU the actor it is today.

Whilst the current phase of reflection and debate is crucial, the EU cannot stop there. It needs to rally the European people behind specific ideas that allow citizens to identify with this abstract supranational polity. As the Financial Times put it in a recent commentary, “far more important will be rekindling public enthusiasm for the EU. The original architects of the European union combined dry, technocratic pragmatism with a fervent belief, founded in personal experience, in Europe as a political project. This emotional attachment has largely been lost.”

Politicians carry a responsibility to defend the European project and to help create a Europe that speaks to its citizens and is carried not only by elites but also by the people. In order to achieve this situation, Europe needs to become the discursive environment that embeds all other debates. European citizens need to regain trust in this political project that governs so many aspects of their daily lives but seems too distant all the same. In other words, what is needed is a Europe of the people, by the people, and for the people.

Of course, defense is not the only issue area the EU can nor should consider when reinventing its identity as a 21st century superpower. Lots can be gained from constructing a new pan-European identity around issues such as renewable energies, smart cities, improved mobility, the promotion of efficient yet regulated market economies, and the image of a responsible third force be it in the UN or as a powerful member of the global financial institutions.

From a foreign policy perspective, for the EU to remain a successful and credible actor in the international system it eventually must transcend the nation-state. None of the other future scenarios the European Commission considered in a recent White Paper, such as a European Union of different speeds, a European Union re-centered on the single market, or a European Union of opt-outs and cherry-picking are likely to defend Europe’s place in the world to the same extent and with the same effectiveness as a federal Europe.

The transformation of the EU into a new political community transcending the nation-state is the toughest of the tasks lying ahead and likely to lead to major resistance on the part of the member states and their constituents.

However, the outlook for the future of “the only converging meta-national continental arrangement of its kind in the world” is brighter than most analysts currently are ready to admit. The EU experienced substantial crises before and pundits predicted its failure many a time. For sure, the EU needs to undergo a process of thorough reform and address the numerous flaws of its present institutional set-up, but if done so properly, the EU will remain an important global player in the future.

[1] European Commission. 2017. White Paper on the Future. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/white_paper_on_the_future_of_europe_en.pdf, accessed on 5 May 2017, p.26.

[2] Financial Times. 2017. The EU has much to celebrate – and to do. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/7c6116ac-1084-11e7-b030-768954394623, accessed on 5 May 2017.

The post The EU at 60: Between Globalism and Nationalism appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

The outlook for the U.S. economy in the next 12 months is a picture of low but steady growth, at least according to U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin. The Treasury Secretary says his department is predicting that it will take the American economy two years to reach an annual growth rate of 3%(of full year growth). This would fit with the post-financial crash pattern for the American economy, which has not grown faster than 3% in any year since the end of the last recession in mid-2009, almost a decade ago.

But storm clouds are gathering on the horizon for the U.S. growth in the first quarter of the Trump presidency has been disappointing, with the first three months of 2017 seeing the weakest first-quarter growth in America in three years. But analysts blamed a mild winter and higher than usual inflation for depressing consumer spending rather than administration policy. But Mnuchin argues that a combination of planned regulation relief measures, tax cuts and a renegotiation of international trade deals which the Trump presidency has planned will see full year growth rise to 3% by 2019.

Opinion is certainly divided over how effective the administration’s plans will be. Critics generally believe they are not ‘revenue-neutral’ and will fail in their objective to get U.S. multinationals to repatriate their profits back to America. If this is the case then the U.S. budget deficit will again start to yawn alarmingly open as Trump struggles to combine implementing his campaign promises on increased infrastructure spending, a higher U.S. defense budget and his famous wall on the Mexican border with his plans to cut federal revenues.

Meanwhile experts worry that the controversial nature of the Trump administration has politicized analysis of the U.S. economic outlook for 2017 and sharply reduced the changes of bi-partisan cooperation on reform. Political opposition to Trump from Congressional Republicans on increased government spending and from progressives on his ‘tax cuts for the rich’ may mean that the White House struggles to pass its agenda. Gridlock in Washington will increase uncertainty about U.S. economic intentions and therefore depress growth in the final three quarters of 2017. All of which means efforts to boost the U.S. economy to 3% annual growth by 2019 could still flounder.

One ominous sign that all is not well in America is the news that Puerto Rico Governor Ricardo Rossello announced on Wednesday May 3 that he was requesting a Title III proceeding from the U.S. territory’s federal financial oversight board. Title III is an an in-court debt restructuring process akin to a U.S. Bankruptcy; the governor’s request comes a day after several large creditors started legal action against the territory’s government for defaulting on $70 billion worth of debts.

The post Outlook for the U.S. Economy is Shaky in the Trump Era appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

The outlook for the U.S. economy in the next 12 months is a picture of low but steady growth, at least according to U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin. The Treasury Secretary says his department is predicting that it will take the American economy two years to reach an annual growth rate of 3%(of full year growth). This would fit with the post-financial crash pattern for the American economy, which has not grown faster than 3% in any year since the end of the last recession in mid-2009, almost a decade ago.

But storm clouds are gathering on the horizon for the U.S. growth in the first quarter of the Trump presidency has been disappointing, with the first three months of 2017 seeing the weakest first-quarter growth in America in three years. But analysts blamed a mild winter and higher than usual inflation for depressing consumer spending rather than administration policy. But Mnuchin argues that a combination of planned regulation relief measures, tax cuts and a renegotiation of international trade deals which the Trump presidency has planned will see full year growth rise to 3% by 2019.

Opinion is certainly divided over how effective the administration’s plans will be. Critics generally believe they are not ‘revenue-neutral’ and will fail in their objective to get U.S. multinationals to repatriate their profits back to America. If this is the case then the U.S. budget deficit will again start to yawn alarmingly open as Trump struggles to combine implementing his campaign promises on increased infrastructure spending, a higher U.S. defense budget and his famous wall on the Mexican border with his plans to cut federal revenues.

Meanwhile experts worry that the controversial nature of the Trump administration has politicized analysis of the U.S. economic outlook for 2017 and sharply reduced the changes of bi-partisan cooperation on reform. Political opposition to Trump from Congressional Republicans on increased government spending and from progressives on his ‘tax cuts for the rich’ may mean that the White House struggles to pass its agenda. Gridlock in Washington will increase uncertainty about U.S. economic intentions and therefore depress growth in the final three quarters of 2017. All of which means efforts to boost the U.S. economy to 3% annual growth by 2019 could still flounder.

One ominous sign that all is not well in America is the news that Puerto Rico Governor Ricardo Rossello announced on Wednesday May 3 that he was requesting a Title III proceeding from the U.S. territory’s federal financial oversight board. Title III is an an in-court debt restructuring process akin to a U.S. Bankruptcy; the governor’s request comes a day after several large creditors started legal action against the territory’s government for defaulting on $70 billion worth of debts.

The post Outlook for the U.S. Economy is Shaky in the Trump Era appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

In the latest display of Beijing’s growing naval prowess, Chinese officials last month celebrated the launch of the country’s first home-built aircraft carrier. While the ship will not enter active service until 2020, the lavish ceremony surrounding the launch sent a clear message to the world that China’s burgeoning naval defense industry is becoming increasingly sophisticated.

Once fitted out with the latest seafaring technology and maritime weaponry, the ship will join a repurposed Soviet-era carrier China bought second hand from Ukraine and launched in 2012.

Together, these vessels will help Beijing boost its presence on the increasingly overcrowded waters in and around the South China Sea, where neighboring countries continue to squabble over natural resources, islands and shipping routes.

While the two carriers will be no match for those operated globally by the U.S. once they are both in active service, they will provide China with a distinct advantage over regional rivals. No other littoral country involved in the South China Sea territorial disputes is able to project a similar degree of force.

The U.S. still outweighs China’s navy with its 10 aircraft carriers currently in operation, but analysts have suggested the two vessels will allow Beijing to go toe-to-toe with the American navy in the Asia-Pacific region, owing to the fact that the U.S. has military responsibilities elsewhere in the world that consistently tie-up its resources. Lessons learned from the construction of its first aircraft carrier will likely help China build others, making the process of bringing future vessels to combat readiness in a shorter space of time much easier.

In a move that further augmented Beijing’s power projection capability, China also recently completed work on three major military bases on artificial islands in the South China Sea, allowing Chinese military aircraft to operate over all of its waters. However, for Chinese military experts these efforts are not nearly enough.

According to local media, the military is calling for at least six aircraft carriers and 10 bases across the globe to cement China’s foothold in other regions of the world and execute missions in tune with becoming a naval superpower. These bases would be located in regions were the Chinese have “concentrated interests”, such as Pakistan.

Yet thus far, Beijing has found only one country willing to allow the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to use its land for this purpose. China built its first military base abroad in the small African state of Djibouti, securing access to the Indian Ocean, and allowing the Chinese military to better protect the growing investments Beijing continues to make in a number of African nations.

The base represents the PLA’s move away from homeland defense to the protection of Chinese interests overseas, and is very much a symbol of things to come. When the base was confirmed, China’s regional rivals were quick to voice concerns that the development looked more like an aggressive military build-up, rather than the construction of a “logistics and fast evacuation base,” as claimed by Beijing.

Far from being a strategic outpost with little geopolitical significance, the building of China’s Djibouti base has pitched Beijing directly against the U.S, which has its own naval facility in the small African state.

Djibouti’s autocratic ruler Ismael Guelleh welcomed the building of the Chinese base after the Chinese government invested billions of dollars into his country, which helped him pay legal bills from pursuing a political rival abroad. Beijing also committed to pay $20 million annually for use of the site, while Guelleh forced the US to leave one of its naval facilities.

Unsurprisingly, U.S. officials are worried the close proximity of China’s base to its own Camp Lemonnier facility will allow Beijing to monitor U.S. counterterrorism operations in North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula.

For its part, Beijing insists the PLA’s expansionist behavior is merely defensive, and that the building out of its military capability and search for naval outposts serves the protection of China’s national sovereignty and interests overseas.

Despite this, developments within the military speak another language. It is becoming increasingly clear that China’s military is broadening its mission as China is no longer downplaying the role of its Djibouti camp as logistical and anti-piracy base, but hinting at roles beyond anti-piracy.

Simultaneously, the PLA is boosting its rapid deployment marine corps from 20,000 to 100,000 as part of a push to increase its military presence in the Indian Ocean. The move is one aspect of a wider plan to refocus the PLA’s resources away from land forces to specialized units able to respond to a range of security threats.

While it will likely be decades before China fulfills its ambition of rounding out its aircraft carrier fleet to at least six vessels and creating more overseas naval bases, the scale of its plans indicate that Beijing is behaving more and more like a confident great power.

By expanding its land reclamation activities in the contested waters of the South China Sea and rapidly improving the PLA’s global clout, China is reinforcing its claim to the title as the most powerful and influential nation in the Asia-Pacific. Make no mistake: this is but a prelude of things to come.

The post With Its Second Aircraft Carrier, China Extends its Global Reach appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

In the latest display of Beijing’s growing naval prowess, Chinese officials last month celebrated the launch of the country’s first home-built aircraft carrier. While the ship will not enter active service until 2020, the lavish ceremony surrounding the launch sent a clear message to the world that China’s burgeoning naval defense industry is becoming increasingly sophisticated.

Once fitted out with the latest seafaring technology and maritime weaponry, the ship will join a repurposed Soviet-era carrier China bought second hand from Ukraine and launched in 2012.

Together, these vessels will help Beijing boost its presence on the increasingly overcrowded waters in and around the South China Sea, where neighboring countries continue to squabble over natural resources, islands and shipping routes.

While the two carriers will be no match for those operated globally by the U.S. once they are both in active service, they will provide China with a distinct advantage over regional rivals. No other littoral country involved in the South China Sea territorial disputes is able to project a similar degree of force.

The U.S. still outweighs China’s navy with its 10 aircraft carriers currently in operation, but analysts have suggested the two vessels will allow Beijing to go toe-to-toe with the American navy in the Asia-Pacific region, owing to the fact that the U.S. has military responsibilities elsewhere in the world that consistently tie-up its resources. Lessons learned from the construction of its first aircraft carrier will likely help China build others, making the process of bringing future vessels to combat readiness in a shorter space of time much easier.

In a move that further augmented Beijing’s power projection capability, China also recently completed work on three major military bases on artificial islands in the South China Sea, allowing Chinese military aircraft to operate over all of its waters. However, for Chinese military experts these efforts are not nearly enough.

According to local media, the military is calling for at least six aircraft carriers and 10 bases across the globe to cement China’s foothold in other regions of the world and execute missions in tune with becoming a naval superpower. These bases would be located in regions were the Chinese have “concentrated interests”, such as Pakistan.

Yet thus far, Beijing has found only one country willing to allow the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to use its land for this purpose. China built its first military base abroad in the small African state of Djibouti, securing access to the Indian Ocean, and allowing the Chinese military to better protect the growing investments Beijing continues to make in a number of African nations.

The base represents the PLA’s move away from homeland defense to the protection of Chinese interests overseas, and is very much a symbol of things to come. When the base was confirmed, China’s regional rivals were quick to voice concerns that the development looked more like an aggressive military build-up, rather than the construction of a “logistics and fast evacuation base,” as claimed by Beijing.

Far from being a strategic outpost with little geopolitical significance, the building of China’s Djibouti base has pitched Beijing directly against the U.S, which has its own naval facility in the small African state.

Djibouti’s autocratic ruler Ismael Guelleh welcomed the building of the Chinese base after the Chinese government invested billions of dollars into his country, which helped him pay legal bills from pursuing a political rival abroad. Beijing also committed to pay $20 million annually for use of the site, while Guelleh forced the US to leave one of its naval facilities.

Unsurprisingly, U.S. officials are worried the close proximity of China’s base to its own Camp Lemonnier facility will allow Beijing to monitor U.S. counterterrorism operations in North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula.

For its part, Beijing insists the PLA’s expansionist behavior is merely defensive, and that the building out of its military capability and search for naval outposts serves the protection of China’s national sovereignty and interests overseas.

Despite this, developments within the military speak another language. It is becoming increasingly clear that China’s military is broadening its mission as China is no longer downplaying the role of its Djibouti camp as logistical and anti-piracy base, but hinting at roles beyond anti-piracy.

Simultaneously, the PLA is boosting its rapid deployment marine corps from 20,000 to 100,000 as part of a push to increase its military presence in the Indian Ocean. The move is one aspect of a wider plan to refocus the PLA’s resources away from land forces to specialized units able to respond to a range of security threats.

While it will likely be decades before China fulfills its ambition of rounding out its aircraft carrier fleet to at least six vessels and creating more overseas naval bases, the scale of its plans indicate that Beijing is behaving more and more like a confident great power.

By expanding its land reclamation activities in the contested waters of the South China Sea and rapidly improving the PLA’s global clout, China is reinforcing its claim to the title as the most powerful and influential nation in the Asia-Pacific. Make no mistake: this is but a prelude of things to come.

The post With Its Second Aircraft Carrier, China Extends its Global Reach appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

In Da Nang, a coastal city in the center of Vietnam, locals and tourists alike flock every night to Be Anh, one of the city’s most popular seafood restaurants. Many diners are oblivious to the toxic waste spill last April which killed over 100 tons of fish along a 200-kilometer coastline just north of the city.

The release of chemicals, including cyanide, phenols and iron hydroxide was eventually blamed on a steel mill waste pipeline in Hà Tĩnh owned by Taiwan’s Formosa Plastics Group. The steel mill was later cited for more than 50 violations, with the company promising to pay $500 million in compensation.

Vietnam’s environmental ministry has stated it will take at least a decade for the region to recover from the spill.

Others diners are mindful of the effects, but insist the pollution does not extend into Da Nang’s waters and the seafood they eat, as tourists flocked to the beaches over the holiday celebrating Vietnam’s Reunification Day (April 30) and International Workers’ Day (May 1). Still others have not forgotten, and continue the protests which rocked major cities throughout Vietnam in April and May of last year.

Marking the first anniversary of the spill, protesters in the town of Kỳ Anh blocked the country’s main highway the first week of April. Some 100 Vietnamese used fishing nets, bricks and heavy rocks to block the highway, reportedly delaying thousands of vehicles. Vietnam’s government promised to identify and prosecute protesters for “causing public disorder”. In Ho Chi Minh City, the streets were quiet that same week with few security personnel on guard.

While Vietnamese government officials promise to prosecute instigators of protests, such as Nguyễn Văn Hóa, a 22-year-old resident of Kỳ Anh (arrested for using a flycam to record and publish protests), they also punished four high-ranking government officials for their lack of supervision over environmental safety.

Nguyễn Minh Quang, the former environmental minister, was rebuked and two of his deputies were fired.  Võ Kim Cự, the 60-year old party chief secretary of Hà Tĩnh province, was also fired and has offered his resignation as a delegate of the lawmaking National Assembly, citing “health reasons.”

While the threat of punishment may help deter future environmental disasters and increase oversight, Vietnamese officials are also responding to citizens’ concerns over future pollution. Starting in April, officials in Ho Chi Minh City are installing a network of 53 outdoor LED boards throughout the city which will allow residents to monitor air and water quality in real time. The LED boards will display levels of nitrogen dioxide and carbon monoxide, as well as the water quality of rivers and canals, and levels of noise pollution.

The U.S. Consulate in Ho Chi Minh City already publishes air quality readings from its own monitor on this website, as Vietnam experiences worsening air pollution, resulting in a rising number of Vietnamese being hospitalized for respiratory illnesses.

The city’s efforts to improve citizens’ access to information regarding their quality of living is laudable, but more effort needs to be done in other cities and poorer provinces to ensure local officials at the provincial level pay heed to environmental laws. Vietnam is growing quickly, drawing in manufacturing from many countries, including China, and will need strict vigilance to assure its residents that this developing country will not repeat the mistakes of its neighbor in the north.

The post One Year On From Vietnam’s Worst Environmental Disaster appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.