Diplomacy & Crisis News

(Own report) - In its search for alternatives to Russian oil and gas supplies, Germany has entered an "energy partnership" with Algeria. Until now, Germany has hardly tapped that country's resources, which have great potential. Algeria is the world's sixth largest natural gas exporter and a significant oil producer. The development of new sources is urgent. In light of the West's policy of escalation in regards to Moscow, Germany would like to become less dependent on Russian energy resources. At the same time, the Libyan civil war threatens to cut off completely one of Germany's most important sources of oil. Because of the nuclear dispute with Iran, oil and gas imports from that country are not yet feasible. The West's aggressions and their repercussions are making energy procurement increasingly difficult. The new energy partnership with Algeria, which should help relieve this bottleneck, also offers the beleaguered German solar energy sector the possibility to gain ground on their Chinese rivals. German mechanical engineering and construction can expect supplementary profits.

At least 1,031 Iraqis were killed in May 2015 and another 1,684 injured in acts of terrorism, violence and armed conflict, according to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI), which said the actions of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant’s (ISIL) were to blame for the growing number of casualties.

Rand Paul managed to temporarily derail an NSA surveillance program. But it will live to spy another day, and Paul's maneuvering could cost him as he embarks on a 2016 presidential run.

In one of the hottest cities in India, residents blame overcrowding, rapid urbanization, and pollution for record-breaking temperatures.

Addressing some 4,000 government, worker and employer representatives, the head of the United Nations International Labour Organization (ILO) called for a global debate on the future of work at the 104th International Labour Conference in Geneva today.

Recently, two major developments in Somalia and Djibouti have attracted international media attention. John Kerry became the first U.S. Secretary of State to visit Mogadishu, while China has negotiated the construction of a military base in the strategic port of Djibouti.

These two “symbolic” and substantive developments represent both an opportunity and a challenge for the U.S. geopolitical interests in the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea.

The contemporary U.S. foreign policy which is hardwired on counterterrorism posturing has been on a losing streak — Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, to name a few. In the Horn of Africa, it is facing some serious challenges: China’s checkbook diplomacy, Ethiopia’s hegemonic adventures, and the indirect effect of the so-called Arab Spring.

Touchdown in Mogadishu

Kerry’s trip to Mogadishu came at an election year when the Democratic frontrunner is being accused of foreign policy recklessness, and at a time when the State Department is too cautious to even say when the American embassy might open there. As such, it is more than a symbolic gesture; it was a strategic one — the poor timing notwithstanding.

Contrary to some Somali and U.S. media headlines that were quick to claim that Kerry’s historic trip to Somalia was an expression of U.S. confidence and a “show of support” to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)/Ethiopia-led federalization process, the impetus driving the trip was geopolitical in nature. At the airport compound, days after concluding the latest of the Balkanization conferences in Garowe, Puntland, Kerry met with four Somali presidents and one prime minster, though not his Somali counterpart.

So, what was on the agenda? Were all those actors on the same page? Ironically, it did not matter. The trip was about a place holder — an affirmation that the U.S. is still interested in Somalia and is anxiously waiting for competent partners who know what they want and what they have as leverage.

In a five minute pre-recorded video that was intended to bypass the seemingly ragtag leaders that he was scheduled to meet, Kerry spoke to the people. He told the Somali people that he “focused on…steps that must be taken on Vision 2016 (election) to advance Somalia’s development as a unified, federal state.”

“We all have a stake in what happens here in Somalia,” he added.

While Kerry is right on the latter, supporting a “unified” Somalia governed through a clan-based federal system of ever-descending allegiance is nothing more than a pipe dream. The nation formerly known as Somalia is more divided today than ever before as a result of such dichotomous combination.

As erratic as its foreign policy toward Somalia may have been, the U.S. seems to have realized that it has made an error in its ways. U.S. lawmakers also seem to have realized that the current Somali politicians have indicated that they neither think nor function as leaders of a single nation.

Directly or indirectly, each one of them is committed to keeping politics at the clan level, or more bluntly, at the gutter level, where geostrategic negation that could benefit both nations is virtually impossible.

China’s Checkbook Diplomacy

China now has over $200 billion invested in Africa; a significant financial interest that may explain why China not only has economic, but “political, and military deals with a number of African states.” Djibouti is one of those states, and China has invested $9 billion in it.

On the one hand, the latest venture might underscore a consistent survival-oriented strategic pattern in which Djibouti — a tiny strategic country located in perhaps Africa’s toughest neighborhood — partners with any willing power that could empower her economically and security-wise. On the other hand, the latest could prove a counterintuitive enterprise that profoundly impacts the balance of power in one of the most important strategic waterways and thus ensure geopolitical advantage to China over the rest.

Against that backdrop, the shocking part is not that Djibouti is willing to become the first nation to host two competing superpower “frenemies,” but that China is confident enough to setup a military base right next to the U.S., France and Japan in the tiny Horn of Africa nation.

The Hegemon of the Horn

Meanwhile, as AMISOM is set to face the security threats emanating from al Shabaab’s party-balloon-effect, it certainly risks a mission creep. Such outcome, needless to say, would automatically boost the strategic position of Ethiopia — the only country with the military might, devout cronies, and political will to engross Somalia or feast on it a few bites at a time.

In the past two decades, Ethiopia has proven its ability to project itself as a problem-solving nation. Whether one gets its diplomatic façade that I refer to as “injera diplomacy” or its predatory side depends on Ethiopia’s immediate hegemonic interest.

Injera is a spongy Ethiopian flatbread served with a variety of meat and vegetable stews. With it one can easily scoop much of the stew one bite after another without dirtying one’s hand.

Make no mistake — Ethiopia is a stakeholder in the Djibouti and China deal. As a landlocked nation with growing economy, Ethiopia is counting on China’s scheduled project to expand Djibouti’s sea port. The former has recently purchased three merchant ships that are hosted in Djibouti. Ethiopia has been making its chess moves as it is mindful, that, sooner or later, its policy toward Somalia would collide with U.S.’ strategic interest in that country.

Ethiopia not only offers economic incentive to Djibouti and political clout within IGAD, it also grants her reassurances in dealing with future threats that may emanate from the ethnically-Ethiopian Djiboutian Afar community, which is a significant number of the population.

Geopolitics and geostrategy

It has been rumored for some time that U.S. and Yemeni officials plan to build a military prison — a “new Guantánamo” — on the remote island of Socotra. The island has a rare combination of strategic geographical location, minimal population, and remoteness from media attention and scrutiny.

Now, with a hybrid political/sectarian wildfire raging in the Gulf of Aden, the Houthis gaining the upper hand and subsequent Iranian direct influence in Yemen is looming, the U.S. is standing on thin ice in terms of its strategic maritime position and influence.

Unified and sovereign Somalia could be a significant factor in tipping the strategic balance of power both in the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea.

The next leadership team would have to be mindful of the importance of cultivating a strategic partnership with the U.S.; it is the only way to protect Somalia from neighborhood political predators. But, such a partnership could only happen with a new U.S. policy toward Somalia.

Many in China have been complaining about their education system for years.

Navy Petty Officer 3rd Class Gabriel Zisk scrubs the walls of a local school during a Community Assistance Volunteer project in which servicemembers and civilians assigned to Camp Lemonnier began preparing the school for painting. (U.S. Air Force photo/Staff Sgt. Austin M. May)

By Oren Litwin

In March 2006, President George W. Bush gave a speech in Cleveland, Ohio, about his foreign policy. During the question and answer section he was asked, “[F]rom the grassroots level, how can we… promote the cause of freedom and liberty for all peoples throughout the world?” That is, how can ordinary citizens work to make the world a better place? Bush answered, “[T]he best way you can help is to support our troops,” thus totally missing the point of the question. There is a growing sense that true change in the world needs to come from the drive and energy of ordinary people, working in ways large and small to solve the problems around them. The question is, what is the right way to do so?

In her new book Everyday Ambassador (Atria Paperback), Kate Otto lays out a program for young people seeking to make a difference. Otto wrote the book after a decade of volunteer work in places like Indonesia, Ghana and Tanzania, building off of her own experience and her observations of other young Americans engaged in volunteer work or study abroad.

She herself, and the legions of college volunteers whom she observed later, ventured out into the world filled with visions of all the good they could do for the disadvantaged, but did not start by listening to the people they ostensibly wanted to help. As a result, Otto writes, “foreign volunteers often create more problems than we solve.… [They are] supremely socially conscious citizens who have everything it takes to change the world—except a strong capacity for relationship development, which is the foundation that all social change is enacted upon.”

Why do young people find it so hard to do real good? For Otto, part of the answer is in what she calls a “disconnectivity paradox.” Our increasing use of powerful technology and social media is causing our social skills to atrophy. This is not an anti-tech jeremiad; much of Everyday Ambassador is spent discussing how social media can be used for social change.

However, Otto argues that our use of tech is teaching us four specific bad habits that breed social isolation. First, the urge to multitask harms our ability to focus on a single problem or conversation. Second, social media and adaptive web-search ends up creating an informational echo chamber that leads to polarized opinions, in politics and culture. Third, the convenience of technology and social media especially lead to self-centeredness. Fourth, our powerful tools inadvertently teach us impatience with the delays and complications of real life.

In response, Otto identifies four social skills that together can make someone an “everyday ambassador” — someone who can “transform good intentions into positive actions through strong relationships.” These skills are focus, empathy, humility, and patience. If you can master these skills, you can bring about powerful changes by communicating with other people, being receptive to what they actually need and to what you are capable of providing them.

“Rather than crossing borders of nation-states, everyday ambassadors cross borders of comfort zones, amending the communication lapses that are so prevalent in our environments, both online and offline,” she writes. Importantly, Otto emphasizes that one can be an ambassador not merely between different countries, but also between different social groups in your own community or even individuals. The skills of communication and listening are powerful in a multitude of settings, and most of us can do the most good in the places that we live.

Each of the four skills is given its own chapter, discussing the powerful trends in our society working against its development and then providing a gentle program for its cultivation. For example, Chapter 3, on focus, begins by describing the “Fear of Missing Out” that leads to distraction. Otto then lists strategies such as shutting off your internet during periods of sustained work, or at least “keep[ing] the number of tabs you have open to a smaller number than usual.” Then she discusses the idea of “presence” in interactions with real people, and the importance of focusing on specific concrete tasks rather than vast objectives such as “equal education for girls.” Each chapter ends off with a series of “inner reflections,” “outer reflections” and “action steps” meant to help train the skill in question.

Throughout the book, Otto provides case studies of social activists who have done exceptional work by building deep relationships with the people they seek to help. (In many cases, the reader is directed to the companion website everydayambassador.org, which has a staff of writers and is clearly trying to become a community for activists.) The case studies show the power of listening and building relationships, rather than charging onto the scene with assumptions of what the right answer is. The last forty pages of the book are made up of profiles of allied activist organizations written by the activists themselves, which range from the self-congratulatory to the genuinely moving.

Reading the book, I was struck by the contrast between the inspiring achievements of the highlighted activists, and how seemingly basic some of Otto’s prescriptions were. For example, her advice includes such things as minimizing the number of active screens on one’s smartphone, reading over an email carefully before sending it, and reading “at least one full news article per week” rather than skimming. Are things so bad at colleges today that even bright people who want to change the world have to be told these things? If so, Otto is providing a desperately-needed service; still, I wonder if her expectations aren’t set too low, perhaps to broaden her potential audience.

Because Otto’s program of personal development is geared to such a basic level, the advice she gives is elementary. I was hoping for a reading list for readers who wanted to learn more about topics discussed in the book like mindfulness, meditation, or conflict resolution; unfortunately, Everyday Ambassador does not provide such a reading list, nor does the accompanying website. Having a list of resources would be a great help for the well-intentioned young people Otto seeks to reach. In particular, I think that Crucial Conversations by Kerry Patterson et al., is invaluable for anyone seeking to develop the negotiation and conflict-resolution skills discussed in Chapter 5.

It is worth noting that of the activist programs featured in the book, all those with political implications tend to the left; politicians such as Cory Booker and volunteers for the Obama campaign are highlighted. Similarly, in the few places where Otto speaks of conservatives in passing, they are portrayed as bigots at worst (as when “socially conservative parents embracing their child’s interracial marriage” apparently merits special praise), and at best as essentially passive actors subject to the vagaries of their information sources. For example, in Chapter 1 Otto parallels “a Democratic leader following Republican constituents on Twitter for the purpose of staying in tune with a wide variety of perspectives” with “a conservative voter not defriending liberal friends on Facebook to incorporate a constant infusion of different perspectives.”

The one exception is a passage in Chapter 7, where Otto describes encountering cogent gun-rights arguments from social activists who were unexpectedly pro-gun. Her unconscious stereotypes of gun owners were challenged, and she was left with greater understanding of the subject even if her convictions remained the same. Yet the brief narrative only serves to highlight the lack of such political dialogue in the rest of the presentation. In a book about understanding different points of view, this unconscious slant is ironic and will turn off some readers. Since Otto repeatedly states and clearly believes that our growing political polarization and resulting habit of “othering” is harmful, perhaps she can encourage more acts of everyday ambassadorship across political divides as well as material ones.

In spite of these caveats, Everyday Ambassador delivers an important message and provides a beginner’s roadmap for those who want to train themselves in the skills needed to cross the world’s divisions. College students driven to change the world but with no clue where to start would benefit from reading this book. I hope that for Kate Otto, Everyday Ambassador and its accompanying web community represent only the beginning of a richer project.

Oren Litwin is a Political Risk Fellow at Young Professionals in Foreign Policy. He is an expert in non-state actors and just war theory, and he has extensive professional experience in financial advising, investing and alternative finance such as crowdfunding.

On the Day of Vesak, which acknowledges the contribution of Buddhism to the spirituality of humanity, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon is paying special tribute to the victims of the devastating earthquake that struck Nepal over a month ago.

The international community must intensify efforts to protect the world’s nuclear facilities from cyberattacks, the head of the United Nations nuclear watchdog declared today as he opened the Organization’s first-ever conference on the issue at the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) headquarters in Vienna.

When young people have decent jobs, political weight, negotiating muscle and real influence in the world, they will create a better future, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said today as he kicked off a Headquarters event on empowering youth through employment.

Photo credit: uwehiksch on Flickr

With all the attention turned to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), currently negotiated by the U.S. with 12 Asian countries, few seem to notice anymore the equally important Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the European Union and the United States. The two deals are similar in essence: They both seek to advance the beacon of free trade by tearing tariff and non-tariff barriers, with the promise of creating jobs and delivering a much-needed economic boost to the nations involved.

However, both trade agreements have been plagued by concerns raised by consumer groups, academics and politicians of all stripes over the so-called Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), an arcane mechanism that allows aggrieved corporations to challenge the validity of government regulations that can impact their bottom line in extrajudicial tribunals. According to critics, the threat of expensive lawsuits from multinationals can leave governments afraid to act in citizens’ favor, a phenomenon known as regulatory chill. Activists are increasingly skeptical of any measure meant to protect the profits of corporations, seen as largely responsible for the near collapse of the financial system and the start of the Great Recession.

Adding insult to injury, the fact that trade negotiations are conducted in secret did not advance the cause for the TPP and the TTIP and an amendment to force the White House to make the texts public was struck down in the Senate. As expected, Capitol Hill has been the scene of some particularly thespian speeches given by opponents and proponents of the ISDS, most recently evidenced on May 22, when the Senate overwhelmingly rejected another anti-ISDS amendment from Senator Elizabeth Warren.

Far from the limelight of the U.S. media, the European Commission has also went into damage control mode over the ISDS, facing off a multipronged crusade mounted by member states, the European Parliament, businesses and the public. Many fear the same fate for the TTIP as that of the shelved copyright infringement treaty, ACTA, rejected after massive popular demonstrations. Indeed, the general mood in Europe is sour to say the least. A petition against the TTIP and the ISDS has gathered almost 2 million signatures in eight months, twice the number needed for the European Commission to take action on the demands of petitioners. Moreover, a public consultation to assess the concerns of businesses on the proposed trade deal received a record 150,000 replies, in which 88 percent of respondents were opposed to the ISDS.

Making matters worse, the governments of France and Germany have voiced strong opposition to the ISDS, threatening not to sign the trade deal in its current form. Paris expressed outrage, with the Secretary of State for Foreign Trade saying that his country would “never allow private tribunals in the pay of multinational companies to dictate the policies of sovereign states, particularly in certain domains like health and the environment.” German Environment Minister, Barbara Hendricks, told the German press she believes that ISDS is “simply not necessary.” Further afield, the European Parliament has echoed such concerns, fully aware that without its vote, scheduled during the week of June 8, the TTIP would be scuttled.

Cobbling together all the elements, it’s clear that the TTIP will survive only after lawmakers on both sides of the Atlantic significantly review the investor-state dispute mechanism. Cecilia Malmström, the European Union’s Trade Commissioner sought to dispel fears when she announced earlier in May a reform plan for the ISDS. Calling the ISDS “not fit for the 21st century,” she put forth a concept paper to revisit it across four areas: the protection of governments’ right to regulate; the creation of an appellate mechanism; the establishment of a clear code of conduct for judges to reduce conflicts of interest and the reassessment of the relationship between ISDS and domestic courts.

But neither the European Parliament nor the United States responded favorably to Malmström’s proposal. European lawmakers insisted that the plan doesn’t go far and deep enough, with one MEP calling it “trying to put lipstick on the ISDS pig,” while the U.S. Undersecretary for International Trade, Stefan Selig, lauded the status quo and rejected the need for any reform to the extrajudicial court system.

However, the European Parliament’s trade committee managed to scrape together enough support and on May 28 backed a resolution in support of the TTIP on the condition that Malmström’s ISDS proposal stays on the table and will be included in the final deal.

“Deplorably, the European Parliament took a very ambiguous stance on the infamous ISDS system. We have yet to see any facts justifying its inclusion in an EU-US trade deal,” said one of the opponents of the trade deal. Even if the non-binding resolution was approved, it will be a long uphill climb in the Parliament once the bill comes to a vote.

Do we really need the ISDS? The answer is far from clear, but so far the “no” camp has the upper hand in the debate. With lawmakers deeply divided on the topic of the ISDS, it’s obvious that the far-reaching deal that would cover 800 million citizens and $35 trillion in GDP, will be the result of fierce political infighting and pork barreling. Nevertheless, the voice of the European Union will carry significant weight across the Atlantic and will certainly impact the equally fierce negotiations on Capitol Hill.

One of Geller’s ads in San Francisco.

The current debate over political advertising in the Washington, D.C.-area transit system moves the issue from “free speech” to “public safety,” and probably toward the Supreme Court.

Charles M. Schultz’s first Peanuts cartoon, 1950

Pamela Geller, the president of American Freedom Defense Initiative (AFDI), sought to bring her message to the nation’s capital using one of the cartoons from her May 2015 “Draw the Prophet” event. The event, which took place in Garland, Texas, was attacked by two gunmen, for which ISIS later claimed responsibility. Geller’s request was denied after the Washington-area transit authority, WMATA, temporarily suspended all advocacy advertisements on May 28.

Debates over advertising on public transportation are not new. Geller has had transit ads run in New York and Washington before. In 2012, New York and Washington posted “Support Israel, Defeat Jihad” ads that referred to war between “the civilized man” and “the savage,” and were widely labeled hate speech. It wasn’t until recently that the New York transit authority voted to ban all political advertising.

On a legal level, these ads have experienced mixed success. In March 2015, a federal court decided Philadelphia‘s transit system could not refuse ads linking Muslims to Hitler.

That same month, however, a federal court held that the transit authority in Seattle could refuse ads from both sides of the Israel-Palestine conflict. Judge Paul Watford cited public safety in the majority decision: “Municipalities faced with the prospect of having to accept virtually all political speech if they accept any — regardless of the level of disruption caused — will simply close the forum to political speech altogether.”

The Boston transit authority has implemented similar measures as well. In May, a federal court found in favor of the city transit authority’s restrictions on ads that “demean or disparage” individuals or groups. The decision allowed the city to permit ads in favor of Palestinians while refusing ads from Geller’s group.

Outside the United States there are competing approaches.  The Supreme Court of Canada, for example, struck down in 2009 an effort by British Columbia Transit to ban all political advertising. Transport for London, on the other hand, prohibits ads on buses and trains that may cause “widespread or serious offence.” Ads that touch on “matters of public controversy and sensitivity” and political causes, as well as ads which undermine the 1999 Greater London Authority Act’s commitment to “promote good relations between persons of different racial groups [or] religious beliefs,” are not permitted.

The U.S. Constitution’s First Amendment protects fundamental freedoms in American society, including the freedom of speech and freedom of religion. The text of the Amendment actually states “Congress shall make no law…abridging the freedom of speech,” but Congress and the states have made many such abridgments, and the Supreme Court has agreed to some of these limits.

One such limit came about through Schenck v. United States (1919). Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. wrote in the unanimous opinion,

“The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic. […] The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger….”

In other words, you can’t falsely shout fire in a theater.  You can’t create a clear and present danger.

In 2008, a Danish cartoonist was targeted for his depictions of the Prophet Muhammad.  A Swedish artist was attacked in 2010, and allegedly the intended target of a murder plot. In January 2015, 12 people were killed in Paris in an attack on the office of a French magazine. In May, two gunmen attacked the cartoonists event near Dallas. The winning cartoon is what Geller sought to bring to Washington.

With her application under review by WMATA, Geller, used inflammatory language to defend her position:

“Drawing Muhammad is not illegal under American law, but only under Islamic law. Violence that arises over the cartoons is solely the responsibility of the Islamic jihadists who perpetrate it. Either America will stand now against attempts to suppress the freedom of speech by violence, or will submit and give the violent the signal that we can be silenced by threats and murder.  We cannot submit to the assassin’s veto.”

But free speech remains an active area of litigation. In a recent Supreme Court decision, Justice Anthony Kennedy defended the marketing of pharmaceuticals, in part by referencing cases which permitted nudity in movies, advertising alcohol prices, and clothing with expletives. In the Court’s current term, it is expected to decide whether Texas can include the option of the Confederate flag on its license plates, and whether towns can restrict the size of church signs more than it restricts the size of other signs.  None of these, though, has the recent record of international terrorism and terrorist targets (public transportation) associated with it. Would depictions of Muhammad on a Washington bus or subway train be akin to shouting fire in a theater – would they create a “clear and present danger,” obvious targets for attack?

Transit authorities seem to think so. In a May 27 statement about an unrelated arrest on of a man for terroristic threats, WMATA’s police chief, Ron Pavlik offered that, “We have no greater responsibility than protecting Metro’s customers and employees. This case demonstrates the seriousness with which we take all threats.” That same mentality supported WMATA’s decision to temporarily suspend all “issue-oriented advertisements.” It also supports Philadelphia’s decision to do the same.

Still, with inconsistent results in different U.S. federal courts, and with some cities deciding to reject all political advertisements, a case rising to the Supreme Court seems inevitable.

Photo: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/6/69/First_Peanuts_comic.png

Serious human rights violations and abuses persist in eastern Ukraine, including shelling, executions, arbitrary and illegal detentions, torture, ill-treatment, human trafficking and the lack of justice and accountability, as well as deprivation of economic and social rights, deeply affecting the 5 million people living in the conflict-affected areas, a new United Nations report said today.

Sunni tribal fighters in 2007 (Photo Credit: U.S. Army)

For several weeks in late 2004, U.S. Marines pushed their way through Fallujah, fighting street-by-street, house-by-house, room-by-room. In that desert city, on the banks of a polluted Euphrates River, they experienced some of the heaviest urban combat the Corps had seen since the Battle of Hue City, Vietnam, in 1968.

The second battle to retake Fallujah, code-named Operation Phantom Fury, eventually secured the longstanding Sunni stronghold, 35 miles west of Baghdad. But a low-intensity warfare campaign against insurgent forces continued, preventing the conditions for Iraqi government control.

In mid-2007, Daniel Green, now a Defense Fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, was sent to Fallujah as a mobilized U.S. Navy reservist to work as a tribal and leadership engagement officer for a Naval Special Warfare unit. He worked alongside then-Lieutenant Colonel William Mullen III, a Marine infantry officer who served as the battalion commander in charge of the city for most of 2007. Together, Green and Mullen were able to successfully build partnerships with local Iraqis, apply a counter-insurgency strategy to the city, and contribute to routing al Qaeda insurgents by bolstering the city’s security, political, and tribal structures.

In January 2014, however, Fallujah fell again to al Qaeda and affiliated militants, including ISIS.

Paul Nash of the Foreign Policy Association spoke with Dr. Green and Brigadier General Mullen about the current situation in Fallujah and their experience in countering the city’s insurgency nearly eight years ago. That experience is recounted in their book FALLUJAH REDUX: The Anbar Awakening and the Struggle with al-Qaeda, published by the U.S. Naval Institute Press.

[Note: All opinions, interpretations, and analyses expressed in this interview are the interviewees’ own and do not reflect those of the U.S. government, the U.S. Marine Corps, the U.S. Navy, or the U.S. Department of Defense.]

Q: When you left Fallujah, did you ever sense that the city might one day fall again to insurgents as it did last year?

Dr. Green: I felt at the time that al Qaeda had so thoroughly brutalized the Iraqi people that the Sunni Arab population would never again embrace them. I also felt that the idea of politically marginalizing the Sunni Arabs had clearly not worked and that the central government would genuinely try to incorporate them into a viable national government. I think none of us anticipated the Arab Spring and how much the chaos in Syria would allow al Qaeda in Iraq to reconstitute itself.

Brig. Gen. Mullen: I think I knew it was always a possibility. There was a good bit of optimism when we left, but it was also clear that the long-term prospects for the city, and Iraq in general, were entirely up to the Iraqis. When asked whether I thought we won in Iraq in the years immediately after 2007, I replied that we would not know for sure for at least 10 years or more. The key, in my mind, was that they needed a Nelson Mandela-type figure to lead the country to a better future. Instead, they got a Shia party hack.

Q: Based on your experience, what do you think is the key to getting local Iraqis off the fence and turned against the insurgents?

Dr. Green: I believe there needs to be an overarching political rationale for the Sunni Arab population to once again turn against al Qaeda and ISIS. A political program of reconciliation between Iraq’s factions must be real, and it must be enshrined in Iraq’s constitution otherwise it will not be enduring. Additionally, Fallujah was pacified in 2007 by having the Iraqi army, Iraqi police, and the Sunni Arab tribes working together, mentored by U.S. military personnel. The strengths of one compensated for the weakness of another. These forces must work in concert and have their actions synchronized.

Brig. Gen. Mullen: You need to instill a sense of personal security and the feeling that when they do climb down off the fence, they are coming down on the winning side because it is a matter of life and death for them. If they can also feel like they are part of making a difference, that helps.

Q: Does the current situation in Fallujah differ from the one you encountered in 2007?

Dr. Green: My sense is that the residents of the Fallujah area only welcomed ISIS as a temporary measure to exert pressure on Iraq’s central government to not mistreat them and their interests. Local residents have also been coerced by ISIS and suppressed by them. I believe that the Sunni Arab population, at its heart, does not truly support ISIS but is only doing so out of short-term political calculations or because it is unable to turn against them due to intimidation. Any strategy going forward needs to factor these conditions into a comprehensive strategy.

Brig. Gen. Mullen: Since I have not stepped foot in Iraq since late October 2007, it is hard to say. News reports can be inaccurate. It seems that ISIS rolled into town and found a very sympathetic population that felt alienated by actions the Maliki government either took or neglected to take. I think I am also seeing some of the “buyer’s remorse” that Dan and I saw in Fallujah because ISIS is actually worse than al Qaeda was – and that is saying something. Al Qaeda learned from its mistakes in Iraq and sought to avoid them elsewhere. ISIS seems to think that al Qaeda in Iraq was too easy on people and has doubled down. That will not end well for ISIS.

Q: Do you feel ISIS can be confronted using the same strategy that worked so well in 2007? Or does the current situation call for something fundamentally different?

Dr. Green: In many respects, ISIS now operates like a conventional army, and so any solution informed by our experiences in 2007 will have to take that into account. Additionally, the Sunni Arab community has been marginalized twice since U.S. forces initially invaded Iraq. Any effort to convince them to turn against ISIS will need to factor that into any political strategy to integrate them into Iraq’s political structures. Finally, we obviously do not have the same numbers of troops there, so our ability to work with, and through our Iraqi partners is paramount and must be constantly improved.

Brig. Gen. Mullen: I believe it can, and it may work even faster due to how harsh ISIS has been. You do not torture and kill Al-Anbari tribe members without some form of retribution coming back at you. The Sunni piled on the bandwagon in the initial ISIS wave of success, and now that the tide is beginning to recede and ISIS is having fiscal difficulties as well as taking substantial losses, I believe we are once again approaching a tipping point. When the situation tips, the weak-willed will scatter like rats from a sinking ship, and the zealots will probably die very hard deaths at the hands of the people they have been abusing since last fall. The Sunni in Iraq neither forgive nor forget. Neither do the Shia, and they now have mass graves being uncovered in Tikrit to add to their desire for revenge.

Q: Do you think the Iraqi government could have done anything to prevent the emergence of a new insurgency? And is it now handling the situation in the most effective manner?

Dr. Green: I think it is very hard for a society emerging out of the shadows of dictatorship, especially one supported by a minority group, to then become magnanimous toward that same group once the formerly oppressed are now in power. In order for Iraq to go forward, a spirit of magnanimity, political tolerance, and inclusion, as well as a focus on decentralization, must be adopted. These efforts must be closely aligned with a security strategy that is highly synchronized and methodical, and one that brings together military, police, and tribal forces. I believe more efforts must be made to reform Iraq’s central government in order for it to be more inclusive of the Sunni Arabs and to empower local government through greater decentralization.

Brig. Gen. Mullen: I absolutely think more could have been done. And I have said before that if we had a list of things not to do in order to avoid a result like we have today, Maliki has not only done every one of them but has even added a few items of his own. He was the last person on earth who the Iraqis needed as their prime minister. Prime Minister Albadi seems to understand all this, and if he can get a truly inclusive government going – he seems to be off to a solid start – then they can beat ISIS and restore Iraq to some semblance of order.

Q: What role, if any, do you think American forces should play in Fallujah today?

Dr. Green: I believe we should serve as behind-the-scenes catalysts, facilitators, and coordinators of Iraqi efforts to address the underlying political problems of the country. And once progress has been made in this respect, we should work to bolster and empower an integrated security plan to secure the rest of the country.

Brig. Gen. Mullen: I think we should do as little as humanly possible. The Iraqis (both Sunni and Shia together) have to do this, to be seen doing it, and to fully understand that THEY did it together. That would be enormous and would go a long way towards the reconciliation that is needed after 30 years of horrendous Sunni rule under Saddam, and then the years since 2003 of sectarian torture and killings that have gone both ways. The reconciliation model used for Rwanda would be a good start.

Cette recension d’ouvrages est issue de Politique étrangère (1/2015). Alain Antil propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Lemine Ould M. Salem , Le Ben Laden du Sahara. Sur les traces du jihadiste Mokthar Belmokthar  (Paris, Éditions de La Martinière, 2014, 208 pages).

Parmi les différents ouvrages parus ces dernières années sur le terrorisme dans la zone saharo-sahélienne, le livre de Lemine Ould M. Salem est particulièrement stimulant. L’auteur, qui couvre cette zone depuis des années pour plusieurs journaux européens, a été l’un des rares journalistes à s’être rendu dans le nord du Mali en 2012, alors que la région échappait à l’autorité de Bamako et que ses principales villes étaient administrées par trois mouvements islamistes : Al-Qaïda au Maghreb islamique (AQMI), le Mouvement pour l’unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest (MUJAO) et Ansar Dine.

Mokthar Belmokthar, alias Khaled Abou Al-Abbas, alias Laouar (« Le borgne ») est un Algérien né à Ghardaïa en 1972 ; il part très jeune combattre en Afghanistan et s’engage, à son retour, comme des centaines d’autres « Afghans », dans l’islamisme violent. Membre du Groupe islamique armé (GIA) puis du Groupe salafiste pour la prédication et le combat (GSPC), il en devient l’un des cadres et participe à son internationalisation vers les pays du Sahel. Il est par la suite fondateur des Signataires par le sang, puis des Mourabitoune. L’ouvrage revient sur la ferveur salafiste de celui qui a souvent été décrit comme un terroriste devenu trafiquant – d’où son surnom de « Mister Marlboro ». Il est d’abord un combattant, avec plusieurs faits d’armes à son actif (attaque de la caserne de Lemgheity en Mauritanie en 2005, ou encore attaque d’In Amenas en janvier 2012), qui lui assurent un grand prestige dans la mouvance salafiste-jihadiste. Le livre confirme également que Belmokthar est l’un des principaux artisans de l’affiliation du GSPC à Al-Qaïda, et donc de la naissance d’AQMI, en janvier 2007.

Si la trame de l’ouvrage repose sur le parcours de Belmokthar, l’auteur dresse des portraits d’autres personnages clés du salafisme-jihadisme saharien, comme Younous Al-Mauritani et Abdelhamid Abou Zeid (AQMI), Hamada Ould Mohamed Kheirou (fondateur du MUJAO), Omar Ould Hamaha (AQMI, MUJAO, puis Mourabitoune) et oncle par alliance de Belmokthar. L’ouvrage comporte d’autres morceaux de bravoure. On signalera pêle-mêle : un récit saisissant de l’opération d’In Amenas, l’auteur étant aux premières loges car en liaison téléphonique avec certains des ravisseurs pendant l’action ; une mise en récit très éclairante de la relation entre la Mauritanie et le GSPC, et notamment de la fin de la moutaraka (pacte de non-agression) en 2005, marquée par l’attaque de Lemgheity ; le rôle des combattants mauritaniens dans AQMI, en particulier celui de Khadim Ould Semane, fondateur d’Ansar Allah Al-Mourabitoune Fi Bilad As-Shinguitt, qui rejoint le GSPC et est impliqué dans les premiers actes violents en Mauritanie.

Ould M. Salem présente un ouvrage basé sur des sources de première main, dont de nombreux entretiens, notamment avec certains salafistes-jihadistes qu’il a pu suivre des mois ou des années, comme le gendre mauritanien de Belmokthar. Le fait que le journaliste ait pu enquêter à Tombouctou et Gao pendant l’occupation de ces deux villes par les islamistes donne évidemment un grand relief à son livre.

On regrettera cependant l’absence de références et d’explications sur la méthode de recoupement et d’arbitrage entre les différents entretiens que l’auteur a eu à traiter : on ne sait ainsi jamais si les faits que rapporte tel protagoniste ont été, ou non, confirmés. Et lorsque des récits n’étaient pas convergents, comment l’auteur a-t-il tranché ? Quand il relaie les affirmations d’un islamiste algérien qui lui explique le soutien actif du Maroc au GIA et lui parle d’une rencontre avec Driss Basri et le roi du Maroc dans une villa de Rabat, on reste dubitatif…

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The U.N.-administered camp at Mazrak, northwest Yemen is now stretched beyond capacity after a Saudi military offensive against the Houthis starting early November uprooted a fresh wave of IDP families. (Photo credit: Hugh Macleod/IRIN)

Yemen had drawn little attention in the United States, or in many other parts of the world, until recent events thrust it into the headlines. It has an arguably strategic location on the Bab e-Mandeb, the strait controlling access to the southern end of the Red Sea (and, ultimately, the Suez Canal), and still it managed to remain ignored.

Yemen is the poorest country in the Arab world. Although much smaller geographically, its population is nearly equal to that of neighboring Saudi Arabia. It has a little oil, discovered only in the 1980s, but it is already running out. It has a little water; that is running out as well. Remittances from Yemenis working abroad are a major source of revenue.

For a while, it was two countries: Yemen (sometimes called North Yemen) and South Yemen. North Yemen suffered a civil war in the 1960s, after the army overthrew the monarchy and declared a republic. Nasser’s Egypt intervened to support of the new government’s fight against the traditionalist tribes of the north (northern North Yemen), who remained loyal to the royal family. This came to be known as Egypt’s Vietnam. Egypt cut off its participation after defeat in the Six-Day War (1967) forced it to change its priorities.

South Yemen grew from the British protectorate of Aden, which was granted independence as a separate country in 1967. South Yemen became a Soviet client state and still did not manage to attract much attention. In January 1986, a brief civil war erupted there among rival factions of the ruling party. (It actually began with a shootout at a politburo meeting.) In less than two weeks, the conflict had killed up to 10,000 people, including much of the political elite.

South Yemen never really recovered, and in 1990 it voluntarily merged with North Yemen to form today’s Yemen. While the North’s government considered this a natural outcome, a number of South Yemenis resented it. Yet another civil war, started by southern separatists, erupted in 1994, and separatist sentiments persist in the south to this day.

Thus, the fact that there is fighting in Yemen today is tragic but not really novel. Today’s conflict brings a complex array of old and new actors to the scene. It is often portrayed as a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran and as part of a greater struggle between Sunni and Shiite Muslims, but that is a distortion. Saudi Arabia and Iran do play key roles in the conflict, and their action affect the calculations of internal players, but no one in Yemen is fighting on behalf of either of them and the fight is not about religion. Who are the leading players in today’s drama?

The Houthis

The Houthis are not so much an organization as a clan — or at least a clan-based organization — from the northern province of Sa’dah. Traditional in their ways and highly chary of their independence, they formed the backbone of the 1960s rebellion against the military regime, and they have rebelled against the government of the united Yemen a half dozen times in just the past 15 years.

Religiously, the Houthis are Zaydis, or Fiver Shiites. Fivers were once the predominate branch of Shiism, but then, in the 16th century, the Safavid dynasty made Twelver Shiism the official state religion of Iran. Now the Shiites of Iran, Iraq, Bahrain, and Lebanon are Twelvers. Fivers are prominent only in Yemen, where they constitute at least two-fifths of the population. The original split between the Fivers and the Twelvers was rooted in a dispute over how many of Muhammad’s successors were true Imams. Theologically, the Fivers are probably as close to the Sunnis as they are to the Twelver Shiites of Iran, but today’s conflicts and alliances have little to do with theology. Fivers do, however, say they have a religious obligation to oppose unjust rule.

Although the Houthis have some (frankly, offensive) Iranian-inspired slogans, they are fighting for their own issues, namely against corruption and what they view as an overbearing central government. They do not appear to take direction from Tehran, and they accept Iran’s support because Iran offers it and no one else does. In fact, last September, they seized Yemen’s capital despite Iranian efforts to dissuade them.

Iranian support in the country is a way to annoy and distract Saudi Arabia. In the 1960s, however, when secular-socialist pan-Arab Nasserites were seen as the main threat, it was actually Saudi Arabia that armed and supported the Houthis. The Houthis have offered to cooperate with rival factions a number of times. They did not immediately depose the government when they seized the capital in September 2014, but merely forced themselves into the ongoing debate over a new constitution, from which they had been excluded.

On the other hand, they are not particularly skilled at cooperation. At one point, when they failed to get their way in the constitutional talks, they kidnapped the president’s chief of staff and threatened to hold him hostage until the government conceded the point. Eventually, they did put the president, prime minister and cabinet under house arrest. Once in power, they became more dictatorial, embodying the qualities they claimed to be fighting against. In February, al-Hadi escaped to Aden and proclaimed himself president again, and the current stage of the fight began. The Houthis began advancing to the south, and in March a Saudi-led coalition began their bombing campaign in support of al-Hadi.

Ali Abdullah Saleh

Ali Abdullah Saleh became president of North Yemen in 1978 and was the only president that the united Yemen knew until 2012. Like the Houthis, he is technically a Zaydi, but he is of a more Westernized variety, a secular nationalist at heart. The Houthis rebelled against his rule repeatedly. Although widely viewed as corrupt and a poor administrator, Saleh is highly adept at playing factions off one another.

After the rise of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Saleh permitted the United States to conduct drone attacks against the group. He also enjoyed increased military assistance from the United States, but he focused his own military efforts against the Houthis rather than AQAP. He viewed the Houthis as the greater threat to his own rule — a position vindicated by recent events — and, according to some analysts, he did not want to defeat AQAP outright. The new support that he was receiving from the United States was a direct result of AQAP’s presence in his country, and he understood that the United States would lose interest and turn its attention elsewhere if the group were actually eliminated. The Houthis have been much more vigorously anti-AQAP than Saleh.

In 2011, during the so-called Arab Spring, massive demonstrations formed in the capital, demanding that Saleh leave. A central city square was occupied for months. The demonstrators, mostly students in the beginning, attracted a broader cross section of society. A rival family, al-Ahmar, from Saleh’s tribe split with him. The army divided, with some units remaining loyal to Saleh personally and others to the al-Ahmar family. Houthis launched attacks against the presidential palace. Saleh was seriously injured by a bomb. With the prospect of civil war growing, the Gulf Cooperation Council mediated a solution. Saleh voluntarily stepped down and his vice president, Abd Rabbuh Mansour al-Hadi, a southerner, was “elected” in an election in which he was the only candidate.

Saleh, however, was not finished. Key units of the military remained loyal to him, even out of office. After the Houthis seized the capital in 2014, Saleh made common cause with them against al-Hadi, despite the fact that they had rebelled against him six times. He brought with him the elite divisions of the army and the entire air force. This is what allowed the Houthis to move so swiftly into southern Yemen after al-Hadi fled to Aden.

Today’s Yemen was formed from the merger of the former Yemen (North Yemen)and South Yemen (much of which lies to the east). (Map: CIA)

Saudi Arabia

The Saudis are backing the forces of President al-Hadi with aerial bombardments, but they are not popular on either side of the Yemeni divide. They have depicted the Houthi advances as an Iranian maneuver to encircle the Arab heartland. They are also concerned that a Houthi victory could inspire Saudi Arabia’s own Shiite minority. (Saudi Arabia’s Shiite minority and its oil deposits are both concentrated in its Eastern province.) They have apparently intervened for these reasons.

The new Saudi king, Salman bin Abd al-Aziz, came to the throne in January of this year, upon the death of his brother. He named his son, Muhammad bin Salman, minister of defense and deputy crown prince. Muhammad bin Salman, who is 29 years old and has neither military experience nor a military education, has become the public face of the Yemeni war within Saudi Arabia.

The Pakistanis, who were invited to participate in the Saudi-led coalition but refused, have described Saudi Arabia’s intervention as a panicked reaction to local events. They also say that the Saudis have no plan for victory. Saudi Arabia’s reputation for being cautious and risk-averse is giving way to a new reputation for being impulsive and rash.

The United States has pressed the Saudis to halt their air campaign for fear of triggering a larger regional conflict, but it has also enabled the campaign by providing logistical, material, and intelligence support. The latter probably reflects a perceived need to bolster relations with Saudi Arabia given Saudi suspicions that U.S. negotiations with Iran over the latter’s nuclear program might reflect some sort of pro-Iranian shift in U.S. policy toward the Middle East.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula

AQAP is viewed as the most dangerous member of the network of local al Qaeda affiliates. The group operates primarily in the eastern regions of the former South Yemen. It was formed in January 2009 through the merger of al Qaeda’s Yemeni and Saudi affiliates. The Saudis, having been crushed and pushed out of their own country, merged with and revitalized the Yemeni group. AQAP has focused primarily on local issues and enemies, like other al Qaeda affiliates, but over the years it has expanded into the broader international arena to an unusual degree. It was behind the failed “underwear bomber” over Detroit in 2009, another failed attempt to destroy an airliner in 2010, and the attack on the Charlie Hebdo editorial offices in Paris earlier this year. The group publishes an English-language online magazine for terrorists. Still, its primary focus has remained local.

AQAP has not been a principal player in the fight between the Houthis and the forces of President al-Hadi, but it has benefited from the disruption. It has taken advantage of the chaos to extend its area of control, and it has forged new alliances with Sunni tribes, including some that actively fought it in the past, that object to the expansion of Houthi control.

The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria

The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), sometimes called the Islamic State, is the newest newcomer to the cast. It has announced a presence in Yemen only since the beginning of the current fighting. The group’s suicide bombers have attacked a Zaydi mosque in Yemen as well as a Shiite mosque in Saudi Arabia. This is in an apparent attempt to fuel further sectarian violence in the region. So far, ISIS has thrived only in places already wracked by war and political chaos.

What Future?

More bombing is not what Yemen needs. Unlike ISIS in Iraq, the Houthis are deeply rooted in Yemeni society, or at least in a portion of it. The bombing will most likely escalate the conflict, driving the Houthis closer to Iran, which is the opposite of the outcome that the Saudis want. A preferable approach would be to neutralize the Houthis as a threat. Reconciliation in a broad-based government will be difficult — there is a great deal of mistrust, and U.N.-sponsored efforts have made little headway — but the longer it is delayed, the more difficult it will become.

The game has changed. By sending a military aircraft to take a close-up view of the outposts China is constructing and stating it “will fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows,” the U.S. appears to have drawn a red line for Beijing.

Al asumir la presidencia de Nigeria el 29 de mayo, Muhammadu Buhari toma las riendas de un país en emergencia. La inseguridad supone un problema gravísimo, la economía se encuentra en situación desesperada y la corrupción y la impunidad están extendidas.

As President Muhammadu Buhari assumes office this week, he takes the reins of a country in serious distress. Security poses a towering challenge, the economy is in dire straits, and corruption and impunity are rife.