The Point of No Return: Climate Change Nightmares Are Already Here
By Eric Holthaus
Rolling Stone
From acidification and warming waters to the disappearance of entire species, climate change has already begun to take its toll on the earth. Some of these changes may be irreversible, and what’s particularly frightening is a lot of them are coming sooner than expected.
Hiroshima
By John Hersey
The New Yorker
Pulled from the archives in remembrance of the 70th anniversary of Hiroshima, this extraordinary article provides an in-depth look into the lives lost and those who somehow managed to survive.
The harrowing story of the Nagasaki bombing mission
By Ellen Bradbury and Sandra Blakeslee
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
Although the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were touted as clear and decisive victories by U.S. leadership, the Nagasaki mission in particularly was riddled with screw-ups and errors that could have plunged the plane into the Pacific Ocean. This comprehensive account of the bombing on August 9, 1945, looks at what went wrong and how it changed the course of history.
The Bureaucrats Who Singled Out Hiroshima for Destruction
By Paul Ham
The Atlantic
At first glance, Hiroshima may have seemed like an odd target for the 1945 bombing. It wasn’t Japan’s biggest city, nor was it as obvious of a military target as, say, Kokura. In this excerpt from Hiroshima Nagasaki: The Real Story of the Atomic Bombings and Their Aftermath, Paul Ham tells the story of the reasons military strategists chose their targets and the process that led to dropping the two atomic bombs a few months later.
When Canada Learned It Had Spies
By Graham Templeton
Vice
Canada’s intelligence gathering efforts remained largely a secret until 1972, when a senior analyst at the U.S. National Security Agency divulged the name of its intelligence branch in an interview with the leftist magazine Ramparts. Dubbed the Communications Branch of the National Research Council, or CBNRC, the 1970s marked the death of anonymity for Canada’s SIGINT program. Templeton explores how this information came to light.
Blogs:Rebuilding Afghanistan: The Way Forward by Elly Rostoum
Russia and the World are not on Good Terms by Hannah Gais
Netanyahu’s Problematic Remarks on the Iran Deal by Josh Klemons
GailForce: Aspen Security Forum Part II – Terrorism by Gail Harris
Beijing Attempts to Stifle South China Sea Discussion at ASEAN by Gary Sands
The turbulent modern history of Afghanistan provides a sketch of a nation either battling or recovering from a series of wars, political unrest and corruption scandals — the confluence of which has left the country facing poverty and an uncertain future.
Afghanistan’s economy is largely reliant on an international community that provides billions of dollars a year to prevent the country from falling into complete chaos. Despite these efforts, international influx of money in Afghanistan has done little to build a sustainable economy that could eventually stand independent of international support.
The perennial challenge for international reconstruction efforts lies with the lack of fiscal and economic sustainability, and in the absence of proper political governance at the governmental level.
Earlier this month, the Center for Rebuilding Sustainable Communities After Disasters (CRSCAD) at the University of Massachusetts Boston, hosted an international conference on “Rebuilding Sustainable Communities in Afghanistan: The Way Forward.” I had a chance to catch up with the center’s founding director and a professor of Urban Planning and Community Studies, Dr. Adenrele Awotona, who explained,
In March 1948, just after the end of World War II, the United States Congress passed the Economic Cooperation Act and approved funding of over $12 billion for the rebuilding of war-ravaged Western Europe. That comprehensive European Recovery Program was nicknamed the “Marshall Plan.” In 2014, after over a decade of war in Afghanistan, records show that more United States and NATO money had been invested in the “reconstruction” of that country than was spent on the Marshall Plan.
For once, money doesn’t seem to be the problem. Corruption and the lack of regulatory, fiscal and constitutional structures have lead to an uneven distribution of wealth in the country — mostly concentrated with the top 15 to 20 percent of the population. The economic disparity is a bit of deja vu, and had previously been an contributing factor the original Communist takeover in the 1978. Today, competing political ideologies remain a problem. They are mostly sectarian and Islamic in flavor and continue to divide the country, eliminating any semblance of good governance.
The challenge for Afghan reconstruction is ensuring sustainability. The international community’s reconstruction strategy in Afghanistan has not stressed the need for sustainability. The majority of the hundreds of billions already poured into reconstruction has gone to building roads, dams, hospitals and schools – but the Afghans are not able to sustain much of that infrastructure without the continued financial support. In other words, when the money stops flowing, the structures won’t last long.
Perhaps a better strategy to rebuilding Afghanistan lies in focusing efforts on 1.) formulating a strong constitution that is embedded and reflective of the country’s history, culture, faith and one that is deeply committed to a modern understanding of human and civic rights; 2) strengthening law enforcement — not through militarization, but in the ability to enforce laws, keep the peace, and prosecute those who break the law — this point is particularly important in helping curb corruption — which remains rampant given the inability to prosecute those who break the laws; 3) providing a strong regulatory and fiscal framework to facilitate and protect investment. A viable solution for Afghanistan’s economic woes and development lies with the private sector. Private international investment can help develop profitable business enterprises that can spur and generate greater economic development in the country, and produce needed revenues for the government to aid in rebuilding Afghanistan.
The caveat lies with the substantial above-ground security risks of doing business in Afghanistan. Providing the conditions for private sector growth requires proper political governance at both the national and local levels. It also requires that the international community focus its efforts on paving the way and providing the right conditions for private sector growth both in terms of infrastructure, but perhaps most importantly in building a robust, enforceable regulatory structure to secure and protect investments.
You can follow Elly on Twitter @EllyRostoum
Putin at a BRICS summit in 2014. Photo Credit: Presidential Press and Information Office
Is Russia’s aggressive foreign policy finally catching up to it?
A recent poll of 26 countries, which was conducted by the Pew Research Center, found that views of Russia and its president, Vladimir Putin, are largely unfavorable, and in some countries, still on the decline.
Anti-Russian sentiment was highest in Jordan and Poland, where 80 percent of participants expressed a negative view toward the country. Some notable runner-ups included Israel (74 percent), Japan (73 percent) and Ukraine (72 percent). In Western Europe, Germany and France followed shortly behind, with 70 percent of participants expressing unfavorable opinions toward the country.
For the most part, public perception of Putin was lower in all of these countries, even if only marginally, than perception of Russia. Here, Spain took the lead, with 92 percent of participants expressing no confidence in Putin’s ability to do the right thing in world affairs. Poland (87 percent), France (85 percent) and Ukraine (84 percent) followed closely behind.
To some extent, these numbers are not tremendously surprising. Even before the conflict in Ukraine kicked off in early 2014, relations between Germany and Russia had begun to sour. In 2010, 50 percent of Germans expressed favorable views toward Russia; by 2014, that number had dropped to a staggering 19 percent. Meanwhile, in Russia, positive feelings toward Germany dropped from 78 percent in 2011 to 35 percent in 2015.
Distrust runs rampant — and for good reason. Eastern European and Baltic states, even those that are NATO members, view Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as a stepping stone. “Little green men,” the title given to the unmarked, unacknowledged forces that entered Ukraine in 2014, are just a hop, skip and a jump away. In preparation, Baltic and Eastern European states have girded themselves up in a defensive position. Some, like Poland, have witnessed a dramatic rise in membership to paramilitary associations. There’s even been a proposal to scoop up some of the members of these associations to establish a Territorial Defense Force, somewhat akin to the U.S. National Guard.
Of course, pissing off — or at the very least, freaking out — the EU is undoubtedly on Putin’s agenda. The question is how Russia’s relationship with those countries with a positive opinion, or even no opinion at all, will change in the years to come.
Pro-Russian sentiment was highest in Vietnam (75 percent), Ghana (56 percent) and China (51 percent). All three were mostly supportive of Putin’s conduct in world affairs as well. That makes sense: Russia’s own so-called pivot to Asia has emphasized both Vietnam and China.
Where things get murky for Russia is in Africa. Although Russian influence in Africa was extensive during the Cold War, it pulled back dramatically after the fall of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, Russia continues to engage in arms and resources trade with a number of Africa nations, albeit under different ideological pretexts. This time it’s more about business, not exporting a revolution.
Although Russia has actively pushed for more economic engagement in both Africa and Asia, more trade doesn’t necessarily lead to an empathetic public. In South Africa, a member of the BRICS partnership, of which Russia is an integral part, only about 25 percent of people viewed Russia in a positive light. As a leader, Putin was viewed slightly more favorably — 28 percent were confident he would do the right thing in world affairs. Meanwhile, over half of South Africans held negative opinions of Russia.
But there were also a number of countries where participants claimed to have no opinion of Putin. In Ethiopia, for example, only 10 percent expressed an unfavorable view of Russia, but that’s because a little less than 50 percent of those polled expressed any opinion at all. So as Russia pushes to build its ties with Africa and Asia, a little charm offensive may be in order.
Auteur de l’article « Les enjeux du chaos libyen » paru dans le numéro été 2015 de Politique étrangère (2/2015), Archibald Gallet a accepté de répondre à trois questions en exclusivité pour politique-etrangere.com.
Quels sont les principaux acteurs du conflit libyen ?
Depuis juillet 2014, deux gouvernements, l’un à Tobrouk, l’autre à Tripoli, s’affrontent pour le contrôle des institutions et des richesses libyennes. Chaque gouvernement exerce une souveraineté théorique sur une mosaïque de territoires contrôlée par les différentes milices qui la soutiennent. Après près d’un an de guerre civile, l’enlisement du conflit a mis chacune des coalitions à l’épreuve. La montée en puissance de l’organisation État islamique (EI), puis plus récemment la signature d’un accord de paix sous les auspices de l’Organisation des Nations unies mettent à jour les divisions internes à chaque camp. Beaucoup de groupes armés ne rendent de compte à personne, et le Sud saharien jouit d’une autonomie de fait. Les milices des ethnies locales Toubou et Touareg s’y affrontent pour les routes de commerce transsahariennes et des revenus de protection des installations pétrolières du Sud-Est.
L’organisation État islamique peut-elle durablement s’implanter en Libye ?
L’EI a jusque-là fait preuve d’une résilience remarquable sur les théâtres ou elle s’est implantée, et la Libye d’aujourd’hui lui offre des conditions particulièrement favorables : une économie à l’arrêt, une situation sécuritaire fortement dégradée, un discours islamiste dominant le champ politique, et une immense quantité d’armes aux mains de milices. En 2014, l’organisation s’est progressivement implantée dans l’Est du pays, puis à l’Ouest de Tripoli, se livrant notamment à des activités de soutien des djihadistes internationaux. Son recrutement au sein des autres milices, ainsi que son agenda régional ont rapidement été facteur de tension avec les autres groupes armés, souvent pourtant de la même obédience islamiste radicale. L’EI est désormais en difficulté dans le port de Derna face à Ansar Al-Sharia, et autour des infrastructures pétrolières de Syrte contre les milices de la ville de Misrata. Comme en Irak, l’EI cherche à s’implanter là où sont les richesses naturelles. À cet égard, la mort probable de Belmokhtar, le leader des Mourabitounes qui gardait la haute main sur le djihadisme saharien, ouvre des opportunités autour des champs pétroliers du Sud-Est. Une consolidation de la présence d’EI dans le Sahara libyen pourrait aussi permettre une jonction avec Boko Haram à travers le Niger et le Tchad.
Comment peut-on contenir les effets du chaos libyen (contagion djihadiste en Tunisie, afflux de réfugiés en Europe, etc.) ?
La menace djihadiste et l’augmentation du trafic de migrants demeurent deux problèmes distincts. Les réseaux de passeurs libyens ont pignon sur rue et entretiennent des complicités avec des responsables des deux gouvernements, utilisant souvent des infrastructures publiques pour détenir et transporter les migrants. Les groupes terroristes préfèrent, pour leur part conserver une certaine clandestinité, et n’ont pour l’heure nul besoin d’avoir recours à une traversée hasardeuse de la Méditerranée pour s’infiltrer en Europe. La Libye s’est constituée comme le principal pays de transit en provenance de l’Afrique subsaharienne à cause de la corruption généralisée et de l’absence totale d’état de droit. Seul le rétablissement d’un contrôle effectif du territoire par un gouvernement légitime pourra avoir un effet significatif dans ce domaine. La solution du périmètre de sécurité maritime en Méditerranée est à cet égard un aveu d’impuissance de l’Union européenne, tandis que les partenaires européens se méfient, à juste titre, de l’idée d’une intervention militaire sur le sol libyen. Au-delà, le problème des migrants appelle une politique régionale ambitieuse. La création d’opportunités économiques tant pour les candidats au départ que pour ceux qui les transportent aura certainement plus d’effets sur les flux migratoires qu’une politique simplement axée sur le renforcement des capacités sécuritaires des pays concernés.
S’abonner à Politique étrangère.
NEW YORK, NY – SEPTEMBER 27: Benjamin Netanyahu, Prime Minister of Israel, points to a red line he drew on a graphic of a bomb while addressing the United Nations General Assembly.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu just addressed the American Jewish community via live webcast. He spoke for 10 minutes, followed up with a 10 minute question and answer.
All of his standard arguments against the deal were there; he didn’t cover too much new ground. But there were some interesting tidbits.
For one, he re-stated the idea that giving Iran 24-days notice of inspection was like giving several weeks notice to a drug dealer that you’ll be raiding their labs. It’s a great talking point, and he’s used it before. The problem is that the response is stronger than the accusation.
FACT: The half-life of uranium is 700 million years. That’s 10 billion 24-day periods. It will be detected, thanks to the #IranDeal.
— The Iran Deal (@TheIranDeal) July 23, 2015
Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz, one of the architects of the Iran deal — and an MIT trained nuclear scientist — prefers to refute this line with an example of Iran from 2003.
“In February 2003, the IAEA requested access to a suspicious facility in Tehran, and negotiations dragged on as Iran tried to remove evidence. But even after six months, tests revealed nuclear activity despite Iran’s attempt to cover it up.”
Netanyahu commented that after receiving notice, Iran would flush their “nuclear meth” in order to hide it from inspectors. It’s powerful language that conjures criminal mastermind Walter White, the main character in the award-winning show “Breaking Bad,” outsmarting the authorities, season after season. But it’s not in line with the facts, and Netanyahu surely knows that. It undermines his position to use talking points that are so blatantly without merit. He clearly believes deep in his heart than this deal is bad — for Israel, the U.S. and the world. But he won’t win his argument through manipulation.
Netanyahu argues that he is not against all deals, only this deal. The glaring problem here is that he is been vocally, vehemently and vociferously against this deal since well before this deal even existed. He says he believes a better deal could have been reached. The Obama administration is just as vehement in their rejections. But it doesn’t matter. Bibi has been talking about a better deal for years! He is the face of all global opposition to this deal, he seems to see himself the leader of a movement, bent on preventing the actualization of this deal. He has thus made himself irrelevant as a force for change. He’s been arguing, since 1993, that Iran is just years away from a nuclear weapon. How can anyone take seriously the Bibi who cried bomb?
The most glaring issue with his remarks, however, revolved around Israel’s neighbor’s reactions to the agreement. When Bibi first came out against the deal, he pointed out that both Israel and the Arab states were against it. He posed the question: How often do Israel and our Arab neighbors see eye-to-eye on anything?
It’s a powerful argument. Israel was against the deal, so too Saudi Arabia and their Arab allies.
But the day before this speech, the Washington Post reported that during a visit from Secretary of State Kerry, the Persian Gulf Arab states had publicly endorsed the Iran nuclear deal. They continued:
“The GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) support leaves Israel as the only country in the Middle East to vehemently oppose the agreement.”
This is extremely problematic for Netanyahu since he is supposed to be the learned teacher, patiently explaining why this deal is so bad for the entire world. Ignoring such developments make him look either dishonest or uninformed. Neither are great traits for the leader of a movement, especially not one as serious as this.
Follow me on Twitter @jlemonsk.
Secretary Kerry presides over meeting of anti-ISIS coalition members at NATO Headquarters in Belgium. Photo Credit: U.S. Department of State
I went into this year’s Aspen Security Forum with the opinion that an effective terrorism strategy should not just be about addressing our options against Al Qaeda and/or the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) operations; rather, I viewed defeating these groups as a worldwide problem that requires a worldwide policy. In spite of the many critics, the Obama administration does have a robust strategy for dealing with terrorism; it just does not go far enough in forming an effective, unified global alliance against all violent extremist organizations (VEOs). What you have are separate ongoing, unconnected efforts of various nations, many with varying degrees of U.S. assistance, against groups like Boko Haram in Nigeria and Al Shabaab in Somalia.
What is needed, in my opinion, is an organization much like the NATO alliance, which was formed to deal with the threat of Communism during the Cold War. This time around, however, such an alliance would be directed against VEOs. The organization would maintain a multinational standing rapid deployment force that would be dispersed when requested by a member nation. Although the U.S. government, specifically the Department of Defense, has tried to tackle this issue with varying degrees of success, I heard nothing during the forum that caused me to change my views.
Many of the speakers were asked if Al Qaeda was still a threat. Others weighed in with their opinion on whether ISIS or Al Qaeda posed a the greater threat. My takeaway was that while it has been severely degraded, Al Qaeda was still a threat, but ISIS presented what I call a more “clear and present danger” to the homeland because of the efficacy of their outreach and the potential effect of “lone wolfs.”
As I mentioned in my last blog, FBI Director James Comey considers ISIS the greater threat to the homeland. Others weren’t so sure. James Clapper, the director of National Intelligence, when asked if the use of social media by ISIS made it a greater threat to the homeland than Al Qaeda replied: “Well, that’s a hard…question because it’s different; it’s threatening. To say one is of greater magnitude than the other at least for me is hard.”
Still, I think Jeh Johnson, Secretary of Homeland Security, summed this issue up best during his talk when he remarked:
[O]ver the last 14 years, since 9/11, we’re seen core Al Qaeda, as everybody knows, AQAP, the Al Qaeda-affiliated elements of Al Shabab, which, while I was at DoD, we were focused on in our counterterrorism efforts. We have done a lot to degrade core Al Qaeda, through our good efforts. We have done a lot to degrade AQAP and Al Shabaab through our good efforts. The global terrorist threat now, as everybody knows… has evolved, and it has evolved in a very significant way from those groups to more groups, [ISIS] being the most prominent example, obviously, and it has evolved from terrorist directed terrorist attacks to terrorist-inspired attacks.… I think that the distinction between terrorist directed and terrorist-inspired is a significant one that the American people need to understand…why we are where we are in our efforts.
And so if you catalog the terrorist attacks and attempted attacks in this country and in Europe, for example, they almost fit neatly into one of two boxes, the terrorist-directed attacks, with an operative who has been recruited, trained, directed overseas and exported to someplace else to commit a terrorist attack, to terrorist-inspired attacks, which very often, most often involve a homegrown or even homeborn threat, and the individual has never even come face to face with a member of [ISIS] or AQ, but is inspired, through the very effective use of social media, to commit an attack or attempt to commit a small-scale attack.
And I think the American people need to understand how we have evolved to this new phase, because it does involve a whole of government approach, it does involve a lot of domestic-based efforts, in addition to the good work of the FBI and in addition to taking the fight to the enemy overseas.
Since most of the terrorism discussions revolved around ISIS, that will be my focus for the rest of this blog. I’m a bottom line kind of person, so it seems fitting to start with defining what is President Obama’s ISIS strategy and the status of the threat and the challenges as described by the intelligence community. The White House was represented by Lisa Monaco, Deputy National Security Adviser and Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism. Monaco stated the goal was “to degrade, defeat and ultimately, to destroy [ISIS]. But we’ve got to be very clear-eyed about this. It is going to take time.”
ISIS’s leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, “the caliph,” has urged other groups to join them. Many VEOs around the world, such as Nigeria’s Boko Haram have responded and declared allegiance to ISIS. Monaco indicated the Obama administration was prepared to respond to this challenge by taking the fight into areas other than Iraq and Syria.
[ISIS] is undertaking an effort to establish an Islamic State, first in the heartland of Syria and Iraq. But…they’re trying to expand to at least eight provinces at this point, Libya being the most advanced and concerning in terms of sending actual operative focused on external attacks, but everywhere, from North Africa to the Caucasus. So yes, we’re absolutely concerned about their ability to find safe haven, to take root, and to attract fighters and to then extend their reach against our partners, our allies and ultimately to the homeland. And we’re going to make sure that we’re taking steps. If there is a threat posed to the United States from Libya, from one of these places, there should be no satisfaction amongst [ISIS] that they’re going to have a safe haven and that that threat won’t be addressed.
What form these efforts take or how robust they would be was unclear. The Obama administration has been pretty adamant about the boots on the ground issue.
Nevertheless, the Obama administration is working with a coalition of 62 nations to implement its strategy. Former Marine General John Allen, now the Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, remarked that the coalition operated along five lines of efforts: military, counter-finance, countering flow of foreign fighters, counter-messaging, and humanitarian assistance and stabilization support. The intent of the effort is to achieve the U.S.’s strategic goals.
As for the challenges the intelligence community faces, the senior leaders present were pretty much in agreement. Clapper best summarized these challenges:
[T]he problem for us in intelligence is with the way people radicalize on their own or are radicalized via social media where they don’t leave out a signature. They don’t emit, if you will — and I mean that in a holistic sense — some attribute or trait or behavior that would lead you to begin watching them.
And so we’re lacking that. And this phenomenon of the radicalization, either on one zone or through the vehicle of social media — and I think [Comey] spoke to the challenge we have now where someone is proselyted by an [ISIS] recruiter sitting in Syria or some place, and then if there is an interest that is evoked on the part of the one being proselyted or the potential extremist, and then they’ll switch to, you know, encrypted communications that we can’t watch, we can’t warrant.
And as Jim has said, probably there are now investigations in every one of the 50 states. And this is a real worry, a real concern for us because I personally think it’s a question of time before we have more of these than we have already. And it’s a very daunting challenge for us. And so — and I think it’s illustrative of how the threat has morphed to a certain extent from, you know, industrial-size attack of the magnitude of the 9/11 in which there are or were, as we learned afterwards, signatures that could have forewarned us had we seen them.
And in this case, you don’t have those, even though there are a smaller scale, but as we’ve seen with the case of the shootings in Chattanooga, the psychological impact that has is, I think, quite profound. So it’s a serious threat.
Think I’ll end here. More to follow on terrorism, cyber and other issues discussed at the Forum in the coming days.
Representatives of ASEAN countries gather at Putra World Trade Centre on Saturday. RAJA FAISAL HISHAN/The Star.
“It should not be discussed,” remarked Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin on Monday, referring to the South China Sea dispute prior to Tuesday’s meeting in Kuala Lumpur of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). China claims close to 90 percent of the South China Sea, amid rival claims by Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Taiwan and Brunei, many of which overlap.
Liu, in an interview with Reuters, warned non-ASEAN countries, such as the U.S., not to interfere. “This is not the right forum. This is a forum for promoting cooperation. If the U.S. raises the issue we shall of course object. We hope they will not.” Other non-ASEAN participants in this week’s meeting include China, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Russia and the European Union.
Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi also argued on Monday that the upcoming ASEAN meeting is not “the appropriate place for discussing specific bilateral disputes” and noted that discussion would “heighten confrontation.”
The most vocal of nations criticizing China’s actions in the South China Sea is the Philippines, which recently took Beijing to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague for a ruling over its right to waters in a 200-nautical mile “exclusive economic zone” off its coast. The U.S. has also been critical of Beijing’s actions, calling for a halt to the construction of artificial islands and an airstrip on Fiery Cross Reef. Last week, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) speculated Beijing is building another artificial island for military purposes.
While the U.S. is officially neutral in the dispute, arguing for freedom of navigation to protect the $5 trillion in shipping trade that passes through the region each year, the U.S. military has become increasingly active in the region, stepping up military drills with regional allies such as the Philippines and Japan. The Obama administration will send Secretary of State John Kerry as its representative to Kuala Lumpur on Wednesday, who will likely press for a halt to island reclamation and a demilitarization in the South China Sea, regardless of any attempt by Beijing to stifle discussion.
Indeed, the dictatorial attempt by Liu to halt discussion is almost laughable in diplomatic circles. It is counter to Beijing’s policy of non-interference in other countries affairs and inherently unenforceable. Furthermore, Wang’s similar attempt to stifle discussion of the South China Sea at the ASEAN meeting by suggesting the forum is not “the appropriate place for discussing specific bilateral disputes,” purposely fails to take into account that some of these disputes are multilateral. Many disputes are multilateral and overlapping.
Beijing, of course, prefers to approach the dispute on a bilateral basis, using potentially lucrative trade deals as an economic carrot and its vast military clout as a stick. This carrot and stick approach has been used to stifle discussion during other ASEAN meetings held in Laos and Cambodia, but this time around in Kuala Lumpur may prove more difficult, given heightened island reclaiming activity by China in the Spratley Island chain, increased military activity by Beijing, budding anger among other South Sea claimants, and (given the slow pace and inability to enforce any decision reached by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague) the lack of an alternative multilateral platform for resolving the issues.