Diplomacy & Crisis News

The top United Nations humanitarian official in Yemen has voiced apprehension over a series of deadly air strikes on a water well which killed and wounded dozens of people in the country’s centre.

Auteur de l’article « Colombie : la longue marche vers la paix ? » paru dans le numéro d’automne 2016 de Politique étrangère (3/2016), Guillaume Lasconjarias, chercheur au collège de Défense de l’OTAN à Rome, répond à trois questions en exclusivité pour politique-etrangere.com.

1) Votre article « Colombie : la longue marche vers la paix ? » était sous presse au moment de l’accord de paix du 24 août. Peut-on désormais retirer le point d’interrogation qui ponctue le titre ?

Oui et non. Le point d’interrogation pose la question du processus de paix et ce dernier est encore en cours. L’annonce de la signature officielle de la paix – le 26 septembre prochain – signifie qu’un accord a été trouvé et validé entre les parties. Est-ce la paix que chacun espérait ? Sans doute pas. Le chef négociateur, Humberto de la Calle, a admis que cet accord n’était pas parfait, mais qu’il s’agissait du meilleur en l’état. De son côté, Ivan Marquez, second des FARC et négociateur pour la rébellion, ne dit pas autre chose lorsqu’il reconnaît des « erreurs » faites au cours d’une si longue période et qu’il espère que « l’emploi des armes contre les citoyens puisse être évité ». Pour paraphraser Churchill, ce n’est peut-être pas le début de la fin, mais bien la fin du début de la marche vers une vraie paix. Et le pays n’en a jamais été aussi proche.

Cependant, la paix ne deviendra réalité qu’après plusieurs étapes importantes que nous devrons scruter dans les semaines et mois à venir : la première tient à l’acception par la guérilla dans son ensemble, et par le peuple colombien – via un plébiscite – de l’accord signé à La Havane. Les FARC devraient ainsi tenir prochainement leur 10e conférence qui sera sans doute un moment de discussion et d’opposition fortes au sein du mouvement, notamment entre les têtes du Secrétariat et les chefs de fronts FARC. Du côté du gouvernement, Santos devra faire le « service après-vente » dans une atmosphère peu facile, tant l’ancien président Uribe et une partie des conservateurs sont résolument hostiles à cette paix. Le choix du référendum est donc risqué, même si les derniers sondages donnent au « oui » une avance confortable (plus de 60 %). Un « non » pourrait avoir des conséquences désastreuses, car le gouvernement a d’ores et déjà annoncé qu’il ne chercherait pas à négocier plus avant. Ensuite, le Congrès colombien devra approuver une loi d’amnistie concernant les crimes « politiques » commis par les FARC, et non les crimes de guerre, mais se pose le problème des contingences juridiques et notamment de la classification des actes en relation avec le financement de la guérilla, par exemple trafic de drogue ou enlèvements… Enfin, 60 jours après le résultat du plébiscite, et s’il est positif, les FARC devraient se diriger vers 23 zones de regroupement (Zonas Veredales Transitorias de Normalización) et débuter leur désarmement sous le contrôle des Nations unies, en trois moments étalés sur 180 jours.

Il n’en reste pas moins vrai que de multiples questions demeurent : les principales tiennent au risque de glissement d’anciens guerilleros vers la pure criminalité – à l’instar de ce qui a été observé avec le désarmement des AUC, les paramilitaires –, tandis que la seconde guérilla – l’ELN et ses 2 000 combattants – ne se trouve pas incluse dans ce processus. Bref, la Colombie fait des pas vers la paix mais elle n’y est pas encore tout à fait parvenue.

2) Comment en est-on arrivé à cet accord de paix ?

54 mois de négociations après 52 ans de guerre, cela laisse rêveur. Et optimiste. En effet, ces négociations ont commencé en 2012, soutenues par la Norvège et Cuba (mais aussi le Chili et le Venezuela) dans un état d’esprit différent des autres tentatives. Ce n’est pas la première fois que les FARC et le gouvernement négociaient, et il y a avait potentiellement de quoi ne pas croire en des résultats positifs à l’aune des expériences précédentes. Au début des années 1980, les discussions avec l’administration Betancur avaient certes débouché sur un cessez-le-feu et une amnistie provisoires, mais les FARC n’avaient nullement démobilisé leurs troupes, tandis que le processus de transition vers une voie politique s’achevait dans le sang avec le massacre de milliers de responsables associés à l’Union patriotique, ce groupe censé représenter les rebelles. Depuis, toutes les tentatives se sont placées sous ce cas d’école : au début des années 1990, sous le patronage du Mexique et du Venezuela, une solution est envisagée mais ne conduit à rien. En 1998, le rapprochement avec le gouvernement d’Andrès Pastrana aboutit à la naissance d’une vaste zone démilitarisée qui sert en réalité de base arrière à partir de laquelle les FARC peuvent envisager la reprise des combats et la conquête du pays. On connaît la suite, avec la montée aux extrêmes et la politique d’Uribe qui vise la victoire, et non la négociation.

Finalement, l’accord de 2012 est différent car Santos n’est pas Uribe. Rappelons qu’il était dans l’équipe de Pastrana en 1997-1998 et servait avec ceux qui voulaient faciliter les accords avec les FARC. N’oublions pas le rôle des pays encadrant et même se portant garant de la paix. Je voudrais ainsi faire remarquer le rôle majeur de la Norvège, et de son diplomate Dag Nylander, qui a servi de voix raisonnable à toutes les étapes de la négociation, y compris à des moments où les exigences des uns et les refus des autres menaçaient de tout faire capoter. Enfin, le processus suit trois lignes directrices : les discussions préalables, le cessez-le–feu et la fin du conflit. En 2011-2012, il a fallu une année de rencontres secrètes pour que les parties s’accordent sur un agenda et sur une méthodologie qui ont été révélés en août 2012 lors des accords généraux sur la fin du conflit, donnant le cadre pour les négociations formelles.

3) Le cas colombien permet-il de tirer des leçons générales – peut-être applicables à d’autres guerres – en matière de sortie de conflit ?

La première leçon est justement que les acteurs ont tiré les enseignements des expériences passées et des erreurs commises. Ils ont donc développé un cadre original et des approches innovantes, par exemple en découplant les négociations du processus de paix lui-même. Ensuite, le point central a porté sur les victimes et les populations, comme aux racines du conflit : en mettant en avant les questions sociales et économiques, et en voulant réduire les inégalités, l’angle choisi a permis d’atteindre un accord minimum sur lequel l’idéologie a peut-être moins de prise. Enfin, la réflexion sur la mise en œuvre concrète a débuté bien avant que l’accord ne soit signé, en acceptant que la population colombienne dans son ensemble et la société civile jouent un rôle d’arbitre in fine. Je pense cependant que c’est au niveau local, celui des municipalités, que la paix se construira : le retour de l’État et la garantie du respect de l’accord de paix – et notamment de la redistribution des terres agricoles spoliées – sera l’une des clés de ce processus, tout comme le sera la lutte contre les cultures illicites via un accompagnement des paysans vers des productions légales.

Sur un tout autre plan, le processus de paix colombien montre deux caractéristiques qui me paraissent essentielles. D’abord l’investissement dans la durée de l’ensemble du politique pour mettre fin au conflit. Combattre une guérilla prend du temps et nécessite la concentration d’efforts conséquents sur des années. Entre le début du Plan Colombie et ses différents réorganisations ou réaménagements, il s’est passé 14 ans pendant lesquels le gouvernement colombien n’a jamais relâché la tension, a maintenu les crédits militaires et de développement au même niveau, et a poursuivi une ligne politique sensiblement égale, y compris lors du passage de relais entre présidents (il est vrai que Santos était initialement le dauphin d’Uribe).

Ensuite, le rôle donné à l’armée pour appuyer la politique de paix, au travers de l’action intégrale et de ses multiples rameaux. Même si les conflits sont très différents et les considérations ethniques et religieuses varient, je pense que le cas colombien offre de l’espoir à l’Afghanistan, dont souvent, on rapproche quelques facteurs – l’importance du trafic de drogue par exemple.

* * *

Retrouvez toutes les informations sur le dossier « Amérique latine : les espoirs déçus ? », publié dans notre numéro d’automne ici.

S’abonner à Politique étrangère.

 

La dérive autoritaire du gouvernement de M. Manuel Valls doit beaucoup au climat de guerre sociale qu'entretiennent les principaux médias du pays. Subissant la férule de ses propriétaires, la presse renonce au rôle de défenseur des libertés politiques. / France, Audiovisuel, Capitalisme, Démocratie, (...) / France, Audiovisuel, Capitalisme, Démocratie, Désinformation, Entreprise, Idéologie, Information, Médias, Mouvement de contestation, Politique, Presse, Syndicalisme - 2016/07

Dans son édition de la semaine dernière, l’hebdomadaire Actualité juive a publié un article sur le numéro d’été de Politique étrangère, n° 2/2016, consacré au Moyen-Orient.

« C’est un numéro à la hauteur des défis de la région qu’a fait paraître cet été Politique étrangère. La revue de l’Institut français des relations internationales s’intéresse au nouveau « grand jeu » qui se déploie au Moyen-Orient. La zone est aujourd’hui « un sujet brillant pour les drames qui s’y étendent sans cesse en nouvelles tragédies » observe l’éditorial. « S’y défient de nouvelles puissances locales ; s’y esquissent de nouvelles affirmations de puissances globales ; s’y interroge la durabilité des États dessinés par la fin des empires coloniaux. À défaut de « grande stratégie », la Russie a ainsi instrumentalisé, avec un certain succès, la crise syrienne pour se replacer comme un « acteur indispensable sur la scène internationale » juge la chercheuse Ekaterina Stepanova. L’Iran et la Turquie étendent une influence que Paris peine à rétablir, faute de choix politiques nourris de « contradictions » (Georges Malbrunot).

À cette aune, l’ambition d’un retrait substantiel américain au profil d’un pivotement stratégique vers l’Asie, espéré par l’administration Obama, pose question. « Mettre en cause cet engagement serait malavisé » prévient John McLaughlin, ancien directeur adjoint de la CIA. »

« Ce qui commence au Moyen-Orient ne reste pas au Moyen-Orient. »

Retrouvez le sommaire complet du numéro d’été, ainsi qu’en libre lecture les articles de Ekaterina Stepanova, « La Russie a-t-elle une grande stratégie au Moyen-Orient ? » et de Georges Mink, « L’Europe centrale à l’épreuve de l’autoritarisme ».

Découvrez également le nouveau numéro de Politique étrangère (n°3/2016) consacré à l’Amérique latine, en librairie depuis le 5 septembre.

S’abonner à Politique étrangère.

 

(Own report) - The ceasefire, set to begin today in Syria, mutes Berlin's hegemonic ambitions. Negotiated between Washington and Moscow the ceasefire has placed Moscow, for the time being, on an equal footing with the USA in the Middle East, while ignoring Berlin and its claim to become a regulatory power for the region. This is a clear setback for the German government and the hopes it had had four years ago. At the time, German government advisors and foreign policy experts were drawing up plans together with Syrian opposition members for reconstructing Syria after Assad's expected overthrow. The implementation of these plans would have provided Germany exclusive influence, while pushing Russia, politically, to the sidelines. But, this did not happen. However, the ceasefire cannot be considered stable. On the one hand, it is uncertain that the insurgent militia will respect it and, on the other, if Washington will - as was decided - really engage in joint operations with Moscow against the al Qaeda offshoot Jabhat al Nusra, or its successor, Jabhat Fatah al Sham. Because of the latter's close cooperation with the so-called moderate militias, the USA risks hitting its western allies, when bombing Fatah al Sham.

Actes de torture, massacres, disparitions : diverses organisations ont dénoncé la responsabilité de l'Etat dans ce qui constitue le quotidien des Mexicains. L'écrivain Sergio González Rodríguez éclaire ici cette réalité à travers son propre témoignage, d'une lecture parfois éprouvante. / Mexique, (...) / Mexique, Criminalité, Culture, Droits humains, État, Histoire, Justice, Médias, Violence, Drogue - 2015/08

À chaque période de vacances, tandis que le risque d'accidents de la route s'accroît, le thème de la sécurité au volant revient dans l'actualité. Le gouvernement multiplie alors les consignes de bon sens. En se focalisant sur le comportement individuel des conducteurs, ces préconisations négligent les (...) / France, Automobile, Inégalités, Sécurité, Protection sociale, Santé, Société, Transports, Violence - 2016/08

MSNBC's Commander-in-Chief Forum on Wednesday night was revealing, more so than the subsequent commentary seems to acknowledge.

The best stories from around the world.

More than ever before, navigating the Hajj by smartphone is a real option.

Gerald Knaus came up with the plan that stopped the flood of refugees from Turkey into Europe. Now it’s teetering on the brink of failure -- and he’s launched a one-man effort to save it.

Pyongyang is building more powerful nuclear weapons and more advanced ballistic missiles, forcing Washington and its allies to rethink how to counter the North’s advancing arsenal

The isolated regime conducted its fifth and most powerful nuclear test on Friday just months after the U.N. imposed new economic penalties. Are sanctions good for anything?

The social media site just keeps deleting an iconic Vietnam War photo.

This is now a serious nuclear arsenal that threatens the region and, soon, the continental United States.

The White House has pledged to veto the bill if it passes in the House.

Stanford has undertaken an important effort: envisioning the implications of artificial intelligence over a 100-year span.

Le nouveau numéro de Politique étrangère, n° 3/2016, est désormais disponible en version ePub !

Achetez dès maintenant la version numérique sur Immatériel.fr.

“I’ve been, in one capacity or another, in the intel business for fifty-two years and I don’t remember a time when we had been beset by more crises and challenges around the world, and a diversity of these crises and challenges than we have today.” –Remarks by James Clapper, March 2nd 2015.

“…unpredictable instability has become the “new normal,” and this trend will continue for the foreseeable future.” -Remarks  by  James Clapper Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Feb 9th 2016

I’ve opened with the two above quotes, not because I’ve turned into the mythological Chicken Little running around wrongly screaming that the “sky is falling”, but because I genuinely believe we are at a major cross road in national security policy. I agree with DNI Clapper. I’ve seen a lot in my life but never have I seen a time with greater threats to our national security. I’ve blogged about it before, but I believe we are currently involved in two world wide wars: an undeclared Cyber War and a global war against terrorism. The mainstream media mostly focuses on terrorists attacks in Europe and here in the U.S. Speaking before the Senate this year, Clapper reported “Violent extremists are operationally active in about 40 countries”. The 2015 Global Terrorism Index declared Boko Haram, which operates primarily in Nigeria and has pledged its allegiance to ISIS, the most dangerous terrorist group in the world.

In addition to terrorism and cyber, Russia is playing Pacman in Eastern Europe, China is now claiming much of the East and South China Seas and building “artificial islands” to back up those claims, North Korea keeps conducting provocative missile tests to include successfully firing a missile from a submerged submarine, and the fight against the Taliban in Afghanistan continues. During his aforementioned testimony before the Senate this year, DNI Clapper addressed some other potential problem areas with national security ramifications stating:

“Seven countries are experiencing a collapse of central government authority, and 14 others face regime-threatening, or violent, instability or both. Another 59 countries face a significant risk of instability through 2016. The record level of migrants, more than one million arriving in Europe, is likely to grow further this year. Migration and displacement will strain countries in Europe, Asia, Africa and the Americas. There are now some 60 million people who are considered displaced globally. Extreme weather, climate change, environmental degradation, rising demand for food and water, poor policy decisions and inadequate infrastructure will magnify this instability.”

In November we as voters must decide who the next President and Commander-in-Chief of our military forces will be. Call me old fashioned or a Geek but I believe we are doing ourselves and our nation a disservice if we don’t make an effort to educate ourselves on the key issues. In this era of “if it bleeds it leads” and/or covering major issues with controversial “sound bites” journalism, it is up to the individual to research issues in order to be better informed. Thanks to the wonders of technology, there has never been a better and easier time to do this. In my opinion, events like the Aspen Security Forum provide an invaluable service. Not only do they bring together national security leaders and policy makers in one venue but if you can’t attend they live stream these events on the web. One of my favorite moments from this year’s event and one that got the biggest laugh of the week was when Cyril Sartor, a senior CIA official, remarked: “it feels a little weird as well for a CIA officer to be live streaming on YouTube”. If you don’t have time to watch the videos they also have transcripts of the sessions on the Aspen Security Forum web sites.

I’ve already written two blogs on this year’s forum. For this last one I thought I’d share more of what jumped out at me from speakers focusing on Russia and China.

Russia

Elissa Slotkin, Acting Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs made the following key points:

– Putin is disgruntled with how the Cold War ended and is looking for ways to be a global peer competitor of the U.S. He is pushing where he thinks there’s weakness; he’s pushing to see how far he can get.
– He is using cyber as a tool of statecraft.
– U.S./NATO approach is strong and balanced. The strong means the U.S. and NATO have to have the capabilities they need in the right places to deter Russia and we have to support partners, not our allies but our partners, in building their resilience in response to Russia Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, that’s the strong.
– On the balance side, it’s absolutely holding open the idea that there are things of mutual interests that we should negotiate with and work with Russia on Iran deal, Syria, if we could possibly do it, and holding the door open for them to rejoin the family of nations in international standing, good international standing. We don’t want to be adversarial with the Russians […] we can’t stand aside while they push and illegally annex places and sow dissent in places and destabilize places.
– Pentagon looks at capabilities and intentions. In capabilities, they’ve seen significant modernization of the Russian military and seen them create a doctrine of conducting unpredictable snap exercises where they suddenly build up divisions of troops on their borders and then sometimes, as in Crimea, use that as a cover for an invasion of another country.
– They use “hybrid” techniques like cyber, their use of space, their use of propaganda and other asymmetric tools that are deniable, hard to see, and hard to identify as indications and warning the way we have in the past seen as a buildup before an invasion.
– Intent […] With Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, it was clear…going in to back up Assad, […] without any forewarning, […] sets a certain tone and it opens up certain questions about their intent. Their activities in terms of engaging in an extremely close proximity with U.S. forces, almost taunting U.S. forces, it just leaves open these fundamental questions about intent. So when you put those two together, capabilities and intent, it leads you down a road to an assessment that Putin has decided to take on a decidedly more aggressive foreign policy. And that deeply concerns us.
– Hope we have learned from Cold War not to overestimate the competitor. We were at fault for thinking that the Soviet Union was this amazing, uncrackable empire and there were many places, particularly in the U.S. government that just fundamentally did not predict the fall of the Soviets.
– We should be taking those lessons […] and applying them to Putin’s Russia today. They’re not unbeatable. They are not operating from a position of strength.

Heather Conley, a Senior Vice President, from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) made the following additional points:
– […] the piece that we are really missing […] Russia’s growing anti-access/area denial capabilities […] they are increasingly able to deny NATO and U.S. access to areas should we want to get in there. And we don’t have an answer for that right now.
– The other component that’s not quite there yet is the maritime component. We’re starting to get our hands around the increase in Russian submarine activity; anti-submarine warfare has to come back.

I disagree with Secretary Slotkin’s point about the Cold War. There seems to be this revisionist train of thought that the intelligence community over estimated the military capabilities of the Soviet Union and did not predict the fall of the Soviet Union. I spent most of my career in intelligence focused on not just the military capabilities of the Soviet Union but also trying to determine their intentions and when and under what circumstances they would flex their military muscles. I didn’t track the internal issues unless it had to do with their military spending. That did not mean that other members of the intelligence community weren’t watching what was happening in the internally in the Soviet Union.

I remember vividly the first person in the intelligence community to tell me the Soviet Union was going to fall because of their dire economic situation. This happened in the mid ‘80’s. I remember this not because of the analysis itself but because of the personality and character of the person who told me. He was the most dishonorable, back stabbing individual I ever ran into while working in the military but he was also one of the most brilliant. He had lived in the Soviet Union for a number of years so he had first hand knowledge of what he was talking about.

I don’t know if Ms. Slotkin was also implying that the intelligence community over estimated the Soviet Union’s military capabilities but I can say that intelligence estimates on capabilities were based on “close” observation of their military forces. In their book The Admiral’s Advantage , Christopher Ford and David Rosenberg remark:

“the Navy continually operated inside and among our opponent’s forces, maneuvering against real Soviet Units on a daily basis in an everyday life of war without the shooting on, above, and below the sea’s surface.”

Sometimes things got more personal. For example, in 1984, the aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk ran over a Soviet Submarine in the Sea of Japan.

I mentioned to Secretary Slotkin, that during the Cold War, President Reagan established a policy that before a proposed war plan became operational it had to be war gamed. During the games, intelligence analysts simulated command of the opposition forces. One of the main purposes of these games was to ensure the U.S. warfighters were familiar with how the Soviets would use their various war platforms in a conflict. I asked if they had conducted war games against simulated hybrid threats like those posed by Russia. She replied:

“We love our wargaming at the Department of Defense, rest assured you cannot imagine. You might even be concerned by the amount of wargaming we’ve done on these scenarios because, as the last questioner mentioned, it’s just so different for us. So we have done—this is what I’m talking about when I say contingency planning. Our contingency planning is based on a number of wargaming scenarios that showed us what we think the most likely invasion scenarios are and they’re not traditional. So, absolutely. If you’re interested in playing Team Red, we are happy to sign you up, but we have done significant wargaming on different scenarios.”

I agree with Heather Conley’s comments on the maritime component. In June of this year in an issue of U.S. Navy Proceedings magazine Vice Adm. James Foggo III outlined a new era in U.S. and Russian submarine warfare he dubs “The Fourth Battle of the Atlantic.” You can read the whole article here but one of the key points is:

“In the early 1990s, the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and commentary such as Francis Fukuyama’s landmark essay “The End of History?” led us to believe that our strategic rivalry with Russia and our need to stay one step ahead of Russian capabilities had faded. It has not. Once again, an effective, skilled, and technologically advanced Russian submarine force is challenging us. Russian submarines are prowling the Atlantic, testing our defenses, confronting our command of the seas, and preparing the complex underwater battlespace to give them an edge in any future conflict. Vice Admiral Clive Johnstone, Royal Navy, the head of NATO’s maritime forces, noted recently that his forces report “more activity from Russian submarines than we’ve seen since the days of the Cold War.” 2 Some analysts believe that even our underwater infrastructure—such as oil rigs and telecommunications cables—may be under threat by these new and advanced forces. Russian focus, investment, and activity in the undersea domain are now so unmistakable that even the head of the Russian Navy, Viktor Chirkov, has admitted that Russian submarine patrols have grown 50 percent since 2013.”

Next week I’ll conclude with some thoughts on China. As always my views are my own.

The post GailForce: Aspen Security Forum—Final Thoughts appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Chart: Sunni provinces of Iraq and Syria in Turkish and Egyptian occupation zones. Click to enlarge.

Much debate has taken place on the topic how the Islamic State should be militarily defeated, including various combinations of US, Russian, European, Turkish, Iranian and Arab powers. However, too little is being said on the political solution after the military campaign. Maintaining united Syria and Iraq may be favored by Iran wanting to extend Shi’a rule over the Middle East or by Turkey wanting to prevent emergence of an independent Kurdish state on its southern border. Experience with the post-occupation Iraq (2013-16) clearly shows how national unity governments fail to achieve political stability in countries with progressing ethnic emancipation. In this article, I would like to describe the political solution for the Sunni Arab portions of Iraq and Syria after the defeat of the Islamic State: a temporary Turkish and Egyptian occupation.

As I argued in my previous article “Partition of Syria and Iraq: Lessons from Europe”, Iraq and Syria after the Arab Spring are different places than they used to be before. Arab Spring was mostly a Sunni Arab national revolution and the Sunni-Shi’a strife became much more about ethnic identity than religious dogmas. I argued that leaving Syria and Iraq united countries would lead to further tragedies. I showed examples of failed federations in the Third World and described why existence of united Iraq and Syria are obstacles in introduction of democracy as well as further Arab integration. Therefore, there is an urgent need for partitioning Syria and Iraq along ethno-religious lines.

In another article “Sunni Areas Post-ISIS: Occupation by Sunni Powers?”, I argued that Sunni Arab populations of Iraq and Syria are unable to govern themselves in the next few years while their ruling by the Shi’a regime in Iraq and Alawi regime in Syria lead to popularity of the cancer of Islamic State among the Sunni Arabs in the recent past. I argued that global powers like the US or Russia lost their popularity in the Middle East with their military occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan, respectively. Therefore, they cannot be occupation powers in Iraq and Syria any more. I also argued why small and middle-sized countries cannot do this job after bad experience with international adventurism of their rulers like Qaddafi or Saddam. And I also mentioned why active role of Saudi Arabia and Israel are unacceptable.

Military occupation is a task that must be assigned to countries with a status of regional powers and with relatively stable political regimes and operational armies. After ruling out Saudi Arabia, the only two Sunni powers that are suitable to become occupation powers are Turkey and Egypt.

Egypt and Turkey: regional powers on the opposite poles of the Arab revolutions

Turkish President Erdogan and Egyptian President al-Sisi stand on two opposite poles of the political spectrum in events related to the Arab Spring. Turkey was the main supporter of the revolutionary forces led by the Muslim Brotherhood while the current Egyptian regime is one of the strongholds of counterrevolution and return of the Ancient Regime. However, both Turkey and Egypt are regional powers and they are able to conduct on a responsible manner as regional powers do. Both powers have or renewed their historically good relations with the great powers—The United States, Russia and China, with another regional powers—Israel and Saudi Arabia, and their status is more or less respected by the Arab public opinion.

That is why after defeat of the Islamic State and after evacuation of Assad’s regime to the Mediterranean coast, Sunni Arab territories of Iraq and Syria should get under occupation authorities of two Sunni Muslim regional powers—Turkey and Egypt.

After July 15-16 coup attempt in Turkey, a presidential dictatorship has been installed that was previously rejected by the voters in the two elections of spring and fall 2015. Selahattin Demirtaş, leader of the pro-Kurdish parliamentary party HDP, was one of the first politicians to reject the coup and to support President Erdogan. Despite that fact, Kurdish voters became a target of oppression as their vote was the main obstacle for installing a presidential rule a year earlier. Also, hunt for sympathizers of Fethullah Gülen became a mission for the new presidential regime.

Nevertheless, the attitude of the political parties to the military coup attempt showed an unprecedented national unity among Turkish Islamists, leftists and nationalists of AKP, CHP and MHP. This unity allows for mid term political stability in Turkey. It is a guarantee for their common political interest in stability of the occupied portions of Iraq and Syria. Refocusing of the Turkish army to a military occupation of parts of Iraq and Syria could relieve Turkish population suffering under the witch-hunt against the Kurd and Gülenists.

In Egypt, the military regime is still preoccupied with eradication and elimination of the Muslim Brotherhood. This witch-hunt is accompanied with an unprecedented wave of terror and hunt for political opponents of the regime. Refocusing of the Egyptian army to a military occupation of parts of Syria and Iraq could relieve Egyptian population suffering under this terror.

Partitioning of Syria and Iraq to occupation zones ruled by regimes from the opposite poles of the spectrum of attitudes to the Arab Spring would guarantee that the Sunni parts of Iraq and Syria would not become dictatorships after withdrawal of the occupiers. Egypt would tolerate development of secular and nationalist political forces including Baathist/Assadist ones in its occupation zone. On the other hand, Turkey would attempt to restore Muslim Brotherhood in its zone. This is a prerequisite for future political pluralism in the new Sunni countries. However, eradication of relics of Islamist extremism and Jihadism would be the main task for the two occupation powers, be it linked to al-Qaeda or Islamic State, or Wahabism and Salafism promoted by Saudi Arabia.

Turkish and Egyptian occupation zones in Syria and Iraq

In Syria, nine governorates can be considered predominantly Sunni Arab: Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor on the east, Aleppo and Idlib on the north, Hama and Homs in the middle and Damascus, Dara and Quneitra on the south. In Iraq, there are four old and one newly established governorates that are Sunni: Niniwe/Mosul on the north, Salahaddin and Diyala on the northeast and Anbar and the newly created Falluja (since January 2014) on the northwest. So there are 14 Sunni Arab governorates in total. They should to be split between the occupation powers—Turkey and Egypt.

Logically, an option with an equal number of governorates ruled by Turkey and Egypt, seven and seven, should be achievable. Further, northern governorates should be logically occupied by Turkey while the southern ones by Egypt. There are two dominant cities in the southern part of the Sunni Arab areas: Damascus, the Syrian capital, and Western Baghdad, a part of the Iraqi capital. Another two dominant cities with an original population of two million are in the northern part of the Sunni Arab areas: Iraqi Mosul and Syrian Aleppo. So the Turkish and Egyptian occupation zones would be equal as for the number of metropolitan areas.

Map: Occupation and Protection zones in Iraq and Syria. Click to enlarge.

The Turkish occupation zone on the north would logically include Iraqi governorates of Mosul/Niniwe, Salahaddin and Diyala and Syrian governorates of Aleppo, Raqqa, Idlib and Hama as well as metropolitan areas of Mosul and Aleppo.

The Egyptian occupation zone on the south would contain remaining two Iraqi governorates of Anbar and Falluja, and five Syrian governorates of Damascus, Dara, Homs, Deir ez-Zor and Quneitra as well as metropolitan areas of Damascus and Western Baghdad.

At the same time, it must be said that those Sunni occupation zones must exclude Kurdish and Christian portions of Diyala, Salahaddin, Niniwe, Hasakah, Raqqa, Aleppo, Idlib, Hama, Homs and Damascus governorates as well as predominantly Shi’a districts of Diyala, Salahaddin and Niniwe governorates.

New Sunni Arab states after the withdrawal of the foreign forces

Individual provincial administrations should be under direct military rule of the occupation armies. Early free elections as well as a demand that only Syrians and Iraqis should decide on their own future are unrealistic and they would result in further mass suffering. Central governments of the Sunni parts of Syria and Sunni parts of Iraq (Jezira) should be created only after several years of pacification under Turkish and Egyptian occupation authorities—something similar to post-war Germany in 1945-49 and Austria in 1945-55.

Withdrawal of the Turkish and Egyptian occupation forces could be only possible after stabilizing of the Sunni portions of Iraq and Syria and after creating of the central government of Jezira (Sunni part of Iraq) and the Sunni Syria. On these territories, two Sunni Arab states would be created: the Arab Republic of Syria with Damascus as a capital and the Arab Republic of Jezira with Mosul as its capital.

Sunni Arab refugees from Iraq and Syria to Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon and the EU would get an opportunity to to return to Turkish or Egyptian occupation zones of Syria or Iraq, as soon as the security situation allows that.

Referendum for the Syrian territories of Mesopotamia

It is true that the Islamic State represents one of the worst political regimes that ever emerged in the Middle East, combining the most conservative attributes of Salafism with delusion and militancy of modern Jihadism and brutality and apostasy of Saddam’s and Qaddafi’s ideological militia, all wrapped in sophisticated mass manipulation techniques used by the totalitarian regimes of the 20th century and IT skills typical for the 21st century “Big Brother” regimes of Russia and China.

But the same Islamic State was successful in correction of historical injustices caused by the hundred years old Sykes-Picot Agreement and uniting the divided populations of the northern Mesopotamia, also called Jezira. The inhabitants of the Syrian territories of Mesopotamia—Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor—got an opportunity to reunite with their historical kins in northern Iraq under the rule of the Islamic State.

As the defeat of the Islamic State should bring a stable solution for Iraq and Syria, the population of the two provinces of Syrian Mesopotamia must be given an opportunity to decide in a referendum whether they prefer to remain part of Syria or become part of Jezira together with the Sunni territories of the Iraqi Mesopotamia

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