Diplomacy & Crisis News

Asia Bibi was accused of blasphemy after rowing with two Muslim women in her village in Punjab in 2009. (Reuters/Mohsin Raza)

I have previously written about the archaic blasphemy laws of Pakistan and its consequences. One such consequence was the murder of Punjab Governor Salman Taseer (whose son was later kidnapped, and escaped years later); and another, was the extrajudicial killing of the Minister of Minorities, Shahbaz Bhatti. Both were killed for defending Asia Bibi.

In my previous post, I talk about how blasphemy laws have no place in Islam and how they are used in Pakistan as a political ploy to gain power, and a personal tool to usurp neighboring lands of minorities. This is what happened to Asia—she was a berry-picker who dared to drink out of the same cup as her fellow berry-pickers. Outraged, they accused her of uttering blasphemous statements about the Prophet; statements so blasphemous that her lawyers dared not repeat them in court, lest they be tried for the same crime.

In 2009, Asia was convicted of blasphemy and sentenced to death by hanging. It was her case that Mr. Taseer was serving as a mediator for—he had sought to get her a Presidential Pardon, whilst Shahbaz Bhatti sought to eliminate the blasphemy laws through the legislature. The irony is that they were dubbed blasphemers for doing so, both killed by civilians in an act of protecting Islam’s honor.

Taseer was shot by his own bodyguard, Mumtaz Qadri, a murderer who admitted to the crime, and was hailed by masses as Islam’s savior. The story goes that Taseer’s wife went from lawyer to lawyer, pleading for someone to take her case to prosecute Qadri, but was turned away out of fear. The judge who, two years later, sentenced Qadri to death, has had to flee the country after repeated death threats following his verdict.

Protesters greeted Qadri with rose petals as he was driven off from the courthouse to the jail. In March this year, five years after the first trial and after a superior court too found Qadri guilty of murder, Qadri was hung to death for the murder of Salman Taseer. 10,000 protesters blocked the Capital for days.

But what of Asia Bibi? She never did get that pardon; her case was an open one in the High Court when Taseer attempted it. After his assassination, no one braved that stance again. Her final appeal to the Supreme Court was scheduled to be heard earlier this October, but has been postponed, as one of the three judges on the bench recused himself for a conflict just days before the hearing. Although his conflict is legitimate, there is speculation that he was threatened.

150 clerics have petitioned the government to hang Asia. Hundreds of thousands have signed online petitions to save her. Meanwhile, Asia sits in solitary confinement, as although no one has been sentenced and hung in Pakistan in a blasphemy case, many have been killed by cellmates in their search for atonement. Talking to The Guardian, Asia’s husband said: “If Asia is acquitted we will never be able to return to our previous life, as my wife has been labelled an infidel and an infidel doesn’t deserve to survive in a society full of hatred,” he said. “Too many want her dead and have put a bounty on her head.”

While Asia waits for a new judge to be appointed, the problem persists. Day after day, a member of the minority community is persecuted for blasphemy and either publicly ridiculed, beaten, or prosecuted. Human Rights Watch reported that in 2014, 17 people were on death row with another 19 serving life sentences under blasphemy laws; all from the a minority community.

The Center for Research and Security Studies in  Islamabad reported 60 cases of blasphemy related extrajudicial killings between the years of 1990 and 2014. That’s more than two people killed outside of the justice system a year—and these are cases that are reported; scores of others remain unreported for fear of further bloodshed.

Although the likes of Bhatti and Taseer have been moving to change the legislation that allows such cases to exist, the problem will not end there. The 150 clerics that are demanding Asia be hung are part of the problem, and therefore, must be part of the solution. Until the masses are continually led to believe that the honor of Islam is theirs to protect, legislation will not solve extrajudicial killing.

So while Asia waits for her justice, the government needs to take multiple measures—it needs to amend the legislation, yes, but it also needs to regulate the preachers and ensure what they are professing is not hatred in the garb of religion.

The post The Blasphemy Behind Blasphemy in Pakistan appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Suite à l’élection de Donald Trump à la présidence des États-Unis, Politique étrangère vous propose de lire en avant-première l’une des recensions de son prochain numéro (n°4/2016) à paraître début décembre, et qui fait l’analyse des ouvrages de Marie-Cécile Naves, Trump, l’onde de choc populiste (FYP Éditions, 2016) et de Laure Mandeville, Qui est vraiment Donald Trump ? (Éditions des Équateurs, 2016).

Marie-Cécile Naves et Laure Mandeville tentent d’éclairer le phénomène Donald Trump. Après la stupeur provoquée en mai 2016 par l’investiture du milliardaire new-yorkais comme candidat républicain à l’élection présidentielle de novembre, elles reviennent sur l’un des épisodes les plus étonnants de l’histoire politique récente des Etats-Unis.

Médiatique, rendu célèbre par ses grands projets immobiliers, Trump n’est pourtant pas rompu aux règles du débat politique. Peu porté sur la bienséance et délesté de toute ligne idéologique claire, il se démarque clairement de l’establishment républicain, apparaissant début 2016 comme un outsider inconséquent face aux favoris Jeb Bush, Ted Cruz et Marco Rubio. Mais contre toute attente, the Donald évince un à un ses concurrents. À partir d’analyses assez similaires, les deux auteurs montrent que ce succès était, à certains égards, prévisible.

Ils évoquent d’abord la révolte qu’incarne Trump : ses opinions iconoclastes sur l’immigration, le libre-échange, l’interventionnisme américain et l’OTAN renforcent sa popularité. Elles le rapprochent des populistes européens comme Marine Le Pen, mentionnée à plusieurs reprises, mais aussi, selon Mandeville, de la révolte « jacksonnienne », mouvement « culturel et économique », porté par une classe moyenne blanche lasse des oppositions partisanes traditionnelles et méfiantes vis-à-vis des élites financières et du libre-échange. Naves pointe un lien d’affiliation avec le Tea Party, dont Trump aurait largement repris les penchants jacksoniens.

Les deux livres soulignent aussi la singularité du personnage, insaisissable et imprévisible, ainsi que le mythe qu’il a construit autour de son nom. Mandeville invoque par exemple un destin exceptionnel (jeunesse, famille, succès médiatique). Mais ce qui marque encore plus les auteurs, c’est la capacité de Trump à adapter son discours aux circonstances : l’un pointe son « populisme à géométrie variable » (Naves), l’autre le qualifie de « pragmatique opportuniste » (Mandeville).

D’un point de vue sociologique, il faut voir dans le succès de Trump la mobilisation de la working class blanche inquiète pour son avenir, sa situation sociale et son identité fantasmée. C’est l’Amérique oubliée par les élites républicaines et démocrates, oubliées aussi de la mondialisation et de la reprise économique post-crise de 2008.

Les deux ouvrages refusent cependant d’aborder l’hypothèse d’un « fascisme trumpien ». Naves l’effleure tandis que Mandeville la balaye d’un revers de main. Certes, l’absence de corpus idéologique précis empêche de définir catégoriquement Trump comme fasciste ; tout comme son absence d’expérience politique rend bancal tout jugement a priori. Pourtant, les similitudes observées avec les droites populistes européennes poussent à poser plus sérieusement la question. Certes, l’« homme nouveau » et la révolution de la société en faveur d’un accomplissement idéologique n’apparaissent pas dans la doctrine trumpienne ; mais le candidat frôle sans crainte ces piliers principiels du fascisme : pas d’homme nouveau mais un Américain idéal, mâle, blanc, anglophone, chrétien ; pas de table rase, mais une destruction du système politique bipartisan et une contestation profonde du statu quo. En outre, le discours du candidat républicain et les expériences fascistes du XXe siècle convergent dans l’expression d’un nationalisme incantatoire, protectionnisme et racial. Enfin, comme le rappelle avec virulence Robert Kagan, la réminiscence du fascisme s’incarne dans la figure de l’homme fort prônée par le milliardaire : sûr de lui, viril et narcissique, il tient entre ses mains la destinée de la nation.

Brice Zanette

Découvrez également la contribution de Laurence Nardon, « À quoi ressemblerait une présidence Trump ? », publiée dans le RAMSES 2017. Un monde de ruptures (Dunod/Ifri, septembre 2016), ainsi que la mini-interview correspondante en cliquant ici.

S’abonner à Politique étrangère.

(Own report) - After Donald Trump's victory in the US presidential elections, the German government announced that it will continue its close cooperation with the United States and is calling for enhancing Germany's position in the transatlantic relationship. Chancellor Angela Merkel "offered" President-elect Donald Trump "close cooperation" on the basis of particular conditions. Jürgen Hardt, the German government’s Coordinator of Transatlantic Relations, spoke of the "necessity for us Europeans, and particularly for us Germans, to assume more responsibility." This "responsibility" would "grow" under a US President Trump and this concerns "all ... instruments of foreign and security policy." The call for more German influence reiterates positions recently voiced in Berlin's foreign policy establishment, demanding "not to leave stability policy proposals up to the USA," but to independently evaluate how to "shape the future global order." German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen and Chairman of the Munich Security Conference, Wolfgang Ischinger, are linking this demand to a call for significantly increasing the German military budget.

Chinese fishing boats are bound together with ropes to thwart an attempt by South Korean coast guard ships to stop their alleged illegal fishing in the Yellow Sea off the coast of South Korea (AFP/GETTY)

Waters are heating up again in Asia, as Chinese fisherman came under fire last Tuesday some 92 kilometers (57 miles) southwest of South Korea’s Socheong Island. The incident took place near the Northern Limit Line (NLL) maritime border with North Korea, and within 5.5 kilometers (3.4 miles) of South Korea’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ).  

The warning shots came from four M60 machine guns of the South Korean Coast Guard, in an attempt to crack down on illegal fishing by the Chinese boats. According to reports in South Korean media, the Coast Guard fired shots at the sky and in the sea to ward off a group of 30 Chinese fishing ships attempting to rescue two 98-ton Chinese vessels seized by South Korean speedboats.

Despite repeated warnings to back off, some of the Chinese boats attempted to ram a 3,000-ton Coast Guard patrol ship, and shots were fired toward the ships’ hulls in response. After some 600-700 warning shots were fired by the Coast Guard during a 45-minute standoff, the Chinese fishing vessels finally sailed away, and the two vessels and 20 Chinese crew were transferred to Incheon.

The conflict follows months of escalating violence and marked South Korea’s first significant use of combative force since last month’s authorization by South Korea’s Ministry of Public Safety and Security to use martial force (including ramming). Seoul approved the authorization following the sinking of a 4.5-ton Coast Guard speed boat by two 100-ton Chinese fishing boats early last month.  

The ramming of the South Korean Coast Guard boat came days after three Chinese fishermen died in a fire, which broke out in their steering room after the South Korean Coast Guard threw flash grenades. The Chinese fishing boat had refused to stop while illegally fishing in Korea’s EEZ without a permit. Previous incidents have led to chases and escalating violence against Chinese fishermen, who frequently resist capture by using hacksaws and knives.  

And the potential for further violence grows as the number of Chinese boats fishing in South Korea’s EEZ and near the NLL expands, exceeding some 100,000 for the first time last year. As of September, 50,022 Chinese boats have been detected so far this year, with few detained.  Chinese media outlets refer to the fishermen as “Those who desperately need to make a living”. Yet these same fishermen are likely responsible for significant overfishing which has driven them into the EEZ waters of other nations.

Chinese President Xi Jinping has plenty enough on his plate, from a shrinking economy and laid-off workers from state-owned enterprises, so is unlikely to rein in the fishermen – especially after Seoul’s plans to deploy a U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery in South Korea next year. And demonstrations by tens of thousands of South Koreans in Seoul demanding the resignation of President Park Geun-hye over a corruption row are sure to distract the South Korean government and people. All of which could suggest more violent confrontations between Chinese fishing boats and the South Korean Coast Guard in the near future.

The post Seoul’s Aggressive Plan to Combat Illegal Fishing appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

The GOP nominee's unrequited love for the Brexit campaign's leaders proves not all populists are created equal.

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China’s had a loving, and long-running, sibling rivalry with the United States – until Donald Trump barged in.

A recent Supreme Court ruling may hamstring Justice’s election-monitoring efforts — and civil rights groups are none too pleased.

To keep up with Democracy Lab in real time, follow us on Twitter and Facebook.  Christian Caryl warns that the murderous war on drugs led by President Duterte of the Philippines is just the beginning. Christopher Sabatini and Mercedes Hoffay explain why Nicaragua’s election yesterday marked the extinction of its democracy. Andrea Glioti calls for ...

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How the Republican nominee will rewrite America’s relationship with Asia.

Ankara’s growing authoritarianism is not just an internal problem. It’s time for the U.S. to wise up.

If Dems win the senate, they may have a foreign policy-heavy senate race in Wisconsin — and a dove in Russ Feingold — to thank for it.

La victoire de M. Trump, c'est donc avant tout la défaite du néolibéralisme « de gauche » incarné par Mme Clinton. L'instrument du châtiment est redoutable. Mais la leçon sera-t-elle retenue ailleurs ? Avec une sélection d'archives. / États-Unis, États-Unis (affaires intérieures), Démocratie, Élections, (...) / États-Unis, États-Unis (affaires intérieures), Démocratie, Élections, Politique, Néolibéralisme - La valise diplomatique

Ainsi qu’annoncé la semaine dernière, à l’occasion du 80e anniversaire de Politique étrangère, nous vous proposons de découvrir chaque semaine l’un des textes qui a marqué la revue. Cette semaine, (re)lisez l’article de Claude Lévi-Strauss, « La politique étrangère d’une société primitive », publié dans le numéro de printemps 1949 (n°2/1949).

Élu à l’Académie française en 1973, Claude Lévi-Strauss (1908-2009) est connu pour sa carrière d’ethnologue et d’anthropologue. Au début des années 1950, moment de sa contribution à Politique étrangère, il est maître de recherches au CNRS. Il deviendra ensuite sous-directeur du musée de l’Homme, puis directeur d’études à la section des sciences religieuses de l’École pratique des hautes études. Il publie en 1955 Tristes Tropiques (1955) et est élu à la chaire d’anthropologie sociale du Collège de France en 1959.

« Le sujet du présent article présente, dans son énoncé même, quelque chose de paradoxal. Nous ne pensons pas spontanément qu’une société primitive, ou du moins cet ensemble d’une extraordinaire diversité que nous groupons, de façon un peu maladroite, sous ce vocable qui ne signifie pas grand’chose, puisse avoir une politique étrangère. La raison en est que les sociétés primitives, ou prétendues telles, nous apparaissent comme des sortes de conservatoires, des musées vivants ; de façon plus ou moins consciente, nous n’imaginons pas qu’elles auraient pu préserver des genres de vie archaïque ou fort éloignés des nôtres propres, si elles n’étaient restées comme autant de petits mondes clos, complètement isolés de tous les contacts avec l’extérieur. C’est seulement dans la mesure où elles représenteraient des expériences isolées du reste de l’univers social qu’elles pourraient prétendre au titre de « sociétés primitives ».

En raisonnant de la sorte, on commettrait une fort grave erreur de méthode, car s’il est vrai que, par rapport à nous, les sociétés dites primitives soient des sociétés hétérogènes, cela n’implique nullement qu’elles le soient, au même titre, par rapport à d’autres sociétés.

Il est bien évident que ces sociétés ont une histoire, que leurs représentants ont occupé le globe terrestre depuis une période de temps aussi longue que n’importe quels autres; que, pour elles aussi, il s’est passé quelque chose. Cette histoire n’est peut-être pas la même que la nôtre. […] »

Pour lire l’article en intégralité, cliquez ici.

Pour vous abonner à Politique étrangère, cliquez ici.

President Rodrigo Duterte and People’s Republic of China President Xi Jinping shake hands prior to their bilateral meetings at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on October 20. (King Rodriguez/PPD)

Diplomatic relations between the People’s Republic of China and the Philippines have been especially sour ever since China claimed Scarborough Shoal in 2012. But now, Philippines’ President Rodrigo Duterte is exploring a new bilateral relationship with China, effectively conceding that territorial issue in the interests of setting a more independent foreign policy course in the region, much to the consternation of the United State, which regards Duterte as a loose cannon.

Duterte, for his part, has long distrusted Washington for a variety of reasons, and sees China as a bargaining chip in his contest of wills with the U.S. and local elites opposed to his rule.

Duterte selected China as the destination of his first state visit. This symbolic move received a warm welcome from China, as the Chinese ambassador to the Philippines, Zhao Jianhua implied, “The Clouds are fading away. The sun is rising over the horizon, and will shine beautifully on the new chapter of bilateral relations.” To make this even clearer, Beijing offered the Filipino delegation a $9 billion loan during the course of its recent visit.

Duterte’s four-day state visit held a full schedule. Mr. Duterte held meetings on separate occasions with President Xi Jinping, Premier Li Keqiang, and the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress. He also attended the opening ceremony of the China-Philippines Economic Trade Forum together with Vice Premier Zhang Gaoli.

Is Mr. Duterte trying to end the alliance with America? Not necessarily. Although he has insulted American officials on multiple occasions, including telling President Obama to “Go to Hell”, and calling him a “son of a whore”, it is unlikely that he will abandon this longtime defense ally, a nation that also has longstanding economic ties to the country and is home to a large population of Filipino expatriates.

As Duterte’s Foreign Secretary Perfecto Yasay noted, “The president, on many occasions, has said categorically that he will only have one military alliance, and our only ally in that respect is the United States”. Officials such as Yasay have often found themselves trying to walk back their boss’s remarks since he took office.

“Only China can help us,” Duterte said during an interview with Xinhua News. And he truly believes that mending relationships with China is the right choice for his country. As much as it is about flexibility and breaking with the past, the animosity he feels towards the United States is real.

Business partners

“We want to talk about friendship, we want to talk about cooperation, and most of all, we want to talk about business.”

The United States remains the largest source of foreign investment for the Philippines. With a total net flow of investment of $4.2 billion, U.S. investment to Philippines dwarfed the number from China ($0.05 billion) from 2005 to July 2016. Currently, this Southeast Asian country receives around $170 million aid from Washington annually. Yet this figure is nothing close to what U.S. has fund its strategic alliances elsewhere: Egypt and Pakistan each receives annual funding of $1.5 billion each.

This October, the U.S., the EU, and other Western investors put projects on hold in reactions to Duterte’s controversial “war on drugs”, in which killed more than 3,500 suspects within months. Several investment and trade missions from the U.S. and the EU were aborted, meaning there will hardly be any new business deals made in the near future.

The economic future for the Philippines is not promising under such circumstances. Unwilling to temper his campaign—modelled after his mayoral policies in Davao City that sharply reduced the crime rate while imposing draconian punishments on offenders—Mr. Duterte has good reasons to turn to China, one of the largest business partners for other ASEAN countries and one which is not going to harry him with diplomatic protests or human rights inquiries over his “war on drugs”.

While Beijing of course expects its payments to have real returns and not mere “goodwill” value, and also knows it too does not benefit from the island nation’s instability in the long run, the breaches in Manila’s Western diplomatic relations are too good opportunities to ignore.

Together with more than 200 business representatives, Mr. Duterte is hoping to boost Philippines economy with help from China and so far he has not been disappointed. China has promised to bring Philippines on board to its “one belt, one road” economic development project in Southeast Asia. Specifically, this visit to Beijing will bring 13 trade agreements with China, with total worth of $31.5 billion, back to Manila. Agreements of these trade deals included foreign direct investments on infrastructure, expanding Chinese tourism in the Philippines, and lifting previous import restrictions on the country’s agricultural and fishing products.

South China Sea

“There is no sense fighting over a body of water. It is better to talk than war.”

Relations, never very warm, worsened between the two countries after Beijing took claim of the Scarborough Shoal. Not only sending regular patrols in the troubled water, Beijing has also been building artificial islands for military purposes. The former president, Benigno Aquino III, allowed for a large U.S. military presence in his country expecting to counter China’s aggressive behaviors and to eliminate domestic insurgents. He brought the Scarborough Shoal case to the international tribunal at the Hague during his presidency, which ruled in favor of Philippines this July. In retaliation, Beijing put a ban on importing Philippine’s agricultural products, now lifted with the warming of ties under Aquino’s successor, Duterte.

Territorial claims over South China Sea. (Wall Street Journal)

Ironically, the Chinese government also warned its citizens to not travel to Philippines for its “unstable political environment”, a warning it is apparently less worried over now despite the rising body count in the “war on drugs” and continued disturbances by domestic insurgents, including the terrorist group Abu Sayyaf.

Unlike his processors, Mr. Duterte does not believe that U.S. will be the solution for the geopolitical disputes. Personal histories of him make quite clear he distrusts the U.S. for historical, personal, and political reasons. Historic, over the US’s colonial rule of his homeland, and then support for the Ferdinand Marcos dictatorship as well as the Vietnam and Iraq wars. Personal, in his negative experiences with U.S. nationals over the years and suspicion that the Americans went out of their way to protect their own at his and Davao City’s expense.

But political, perhaps, is the most influential one. As a man outside the islands’ traditional power structure for much of his career, he sees—reasonably so—people like the Aquinos, Marcoses, and the top police or army brass as aloof bureaucrats who long ignored the intercommunal violence plaguing the country while currying American patronage. In his interview with the Hong Kong-based Phoenix TV, he told the host that he and his cabinet are not optimistic about the U.S. to keep collective defense obligations. He is also considering abolishing the joint-military exercise in South China Sea with the US, indicating such actions would only “further provoke China” and “there is no need to intensify the situation”.

In response, Beijing rolled out red carpet. Chinese spokesperson Hua Chunying commented, “Duterte would make his policy in the best interests of his country and its people”.

Despite the friendly gestures he has made to China, Duterte knows where to draw the line of this negotiation. He reiterated that there is no bargaining room on the sovereignty of the disputed islands. “We will not give up anything there … You can only negotiate to prevent a war”, he told Al Jazeera in an interview before to his China visit.

However, Mr. Duterte still plans to set back the Hague ruling and start to build mutual trust on joint development of the natural resources in the region with China. Some small but significant progress was seen after the dialogue opened up. Discussion of bilateral fishery cooperation in the South China Sea is taking place and Beijing publicly announced its willingness to make arrangements to strengthen this partnership.

President Duterte has, for all his bombast against his allies, be savvy enough to send an olive branch to China to try and soften the tension between these two Asian neighbors as well while trying to shift course away from the U.S. For him, it is better to solve an Asian geopolitical problem with “no foreign forces”, only “an Asian neighbor to another”.

The post Rodrigo Duterte’s Pivot to China appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Members of the minority Yazidi sect in Iraq are demanding protection from the ISIS militants. (Reuters)

Anyone who has turned on a television news program over the last few months has likely been irritated by the non-stop mind numbing partisan bias broadcast by professional news organisations. The severe lack of any information on policy and general news in a time of deep political change globally adds to the further disservice to viewers and readers of modern journalism.

The real tragedy is that what could be considered the worst human rights abuse in the last few years has been taking place, with full knowledge of the atrocities being committed, and neither candidate has taken to openly discuss this issue in any detail.

Nadia Murad has been given a lot of attention by the UN in recent weeks. Nadia is a Yazidi survivor of ISIS. After escaping from her captors, she has chosen to become a voice to the world to help liberate her people, especially women and girls that are currently facing terrible violence.

 Cases of rape against Yazidi and other minority groups committed by ISIS are documented in horrific detail. Two cases that stood out in recent reports was a girl of nine years of age being subject to repeated rapes daily.. Another story that emerged in U.S. media was of a survivor who chose to light herself on fire so she would no longer be subject to rape, either by dying or by making herself so unappealing that they would avoid her or execute her.

In the process of liberating Mosul from ISIS, accounts of Yazidi girls being moved early on to Syria have been reported. Minorities being used as human shields have been also been  reported in several cases. While the U.S. Government had spent years doing the bare minimum to stop the genocide, the presidential campaigns—focusing often on women—have said little to nothing about helping these abused and tortured women. It could not simply be because it is 2016.

Fighting for recognition as human beings that deserve freedom from rape and torture has met a lot of resistance despite the world knowing almost everything about what has been occurring. Nadia Murad visited Canada recently to bolster an opposition party motion to help 300 rescued Yazidi girls be brought to Canada.

Despite the current government of Canada knowing full well of the atrocities and bringing in between 25,000 to 30,000 refugees on their own dime, it was estimated that they only brought in three Yazidi.

The appearance of Nadia Murad and months of pushing from local charity and action groups to save minorities in the region embarrassed the government to a sufficient degree that they finally accepted to help the first 300 girls. They were saved by Canadian organizations without any proper support.

Although the opposition parties and Canadian organizations have pushed to help Yazidis, it has been extremely difficult to get governments to even acknowledge the atrocities. At the end of the U.S. election, the president that addresses and handles this issue appropriately will have been the best choice.

A perpetuation of the status quo is a continuation of entrenching a society that does not see preventing genocide as a priority. That is the real choice for this current generation, and the best determinant of an issue that is worth a vote.

The post Nadia Murad, Genocide and the Post U.S. Election appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

La guerre du Donbass reprendrait-elle une partie interrompue dans les Balkans ? Les combattants croates interviewés par la presse de Zagreb confient tous le même rêve : être déployés face aux volontaires serbes, pour rejouer en Ukraine le conflit des années 1990. La plupart sont intégrés dans le bataillon ultranationaliste Azov (1). Parmi eux, M. Denis Seler, ancien chef des Bad Blue Boys, les supporters ultras du club de football Dinamo de Zagreb, pour qui l'Ukraine serait « le dernier front de la droite chrétienne en Europe (2) ».

Selon les autorités de Belgrade, plusieurs dizaines de Serbes se battraient aussi, principalement dans les rangs des milices des « Républiques populaires de Donetsk et de Lougansk », les deux régions sécessionnistes du Donbass (3). Cet afflux de volontaires représenterait une sorte de retour d'ascenseur à l'égard des unités de Cosaques russes qui avaient combattu aux côtés des forces serbes. M. Igor Strelkov, officier supérieur de la direction générale des renseignements (GRU) russe et ministre de la défense de la « République populaire de Donetsk » de mai à août 2014, raconte y avoir lui-même fait ses classes en 1992-1993.

M. Aleksandar Savic, dit « Svab », ne se fait pas prier pour commenter les tatouages qui recouvrent entièrement ses bras et son buste. On y trouve des saints orthodoxes, mais aussi le portrait de l'ancien chef des Serbes de Bosnie, Radovan Karadzic, ainsi que des croix et des symboles nationaux serbes et russes. L'homme, qui reçoit dans un café de Nis, dans le sud de la Serbie, est le chef de la branche serbe des Loups de la nuit, une organisation de motards russes créée il y a une vingtaine d'années. Il était présent en Crimée au début du mois de mars 2014. « Nous étions installés sur la route entre Balaklava et Sébastopol, raconte-t-il, chargés de sécuriser la zone pour éviter les violences. » Au moins trois membres du mouvement auraient déjà été radiés de la gendarmerie serbe pour avoir combattu en Ukraine.

Les Serbes présents dans le Donbass sont rassemblés au sein d'une brigade de « hussards » fondée par un ancien présentateur de télévision, Radomir Pocuca. En avril 2014, ce dernier avait été démis de ses fonctions de porte-parole de l'unité antiterroriste (PTJ) du ministère de l'intérieur serbe pour avoir appelé des hooligans à s'attaquer aux Femmes en noir de Belgrade, une organisation féministe et antifasciste.

(1) « Ukraine : la “Légion croate” se bat dans les rangs du bataillon Azov », Le Courrier des Balkans, 16 février 2015.

(2) « Denis Seler : “Ukraine is the last bastion of the Christian Europe” », 9 décembre 2014.

(3) « Serbian mercenaries fighting in eastern Ukraine », Deutsche Welle, 14 août 2014.

Faut-il lire la crise qui secoue la République de Macédoine depuis le début de l'année à l'aune de la confrontation entre la Russie et l'Occident ? Le régime conservateur et nationaliste de ce fragile pays multiethnique voisin du Kosovo est secoué par les révélations qu'assène jour après jour le chef de l'opposition sociale-démocrate, M. Zoran Zaev. Les enregistrements produits révèlent comment le premier ministre Nikola Gruevski et ses proches collaborateurs organisent la corruption au plus haut niveau de l'Etat, surveillent et orientent la justice et les médias, bref, mettent le pays en coupe réglée. L'origine de ces enregistrements reste controversée. M. Zaev affirme avoir une « taupe » au sein des services de renseignement, mais les regards se tournent vers de mystérieux services étrangers qui auraient choisi d'aider l'opposition. Depuis le début du mois de mai, celle-ci est dans la rue. Elle réclame la démission de M. Gruevski et campe devant le siège du gouvernement de Macédoine, selon un modèle qui n'est pas sans rappeler celui des « révolutions de couleur ».

M. Gruevski et son parti, l'Organisation révolutionnaire intérieure macédonienne-Parti démocratique pour l'unité nationale macédonienne (VMRO-DPMNE), ont remporté pour la première fois les élections en 2006. Ils revendiquaient alors le double objectif de l'intégration à l'Union européenne et à l'Organisation du traité de l'Atlantique nord (OTAN). Ils défendaient une vision ultralibérale de l'économie reposant sur des privatisations massives ainsi que sur un dumping fiscal et social censé attirer de miraculeux investissements étrangers. Ces derniers ne sont jamais venus, tandis que la Macédoine, engluée dans la crise économique, voyait sa candidature euroatlantique bloquée du fait du différend non résolu avec la Grèce sur son nom (1).

Face à cet échec, M. Gruevski a réorienté sa politique dans un sens de plus en plus nationaliste, exaltant le passé antique du pays, tandis que le régime s'engageait dans la spirale d'une dérive autoritaire. Longtemps courtisé par les Occidentaux du fait de l'importance stratégique de la Macédoine, M. Gruevski est peu à peu devenu infréquentable au cours des deux dernières années. Il s'est alors rapproché de Moscou — et de Belgrade, ce qui ne manque pas d'ironie, car il se veut l'héritier d'une tradition politique probulgare et violemment antiserbe. Alors que le gazoduc Turkish Stream doit passer par la Macédoine, la Russie a apporté un soutien marqué au gouvernement de Skopje en dénonçant les tentatives occidentales de « déstabilisation » du pays. Le premier ministre a, lui, semblé vouloir gagner du temps en annonçant des élections anticipées en réponse aux manifestations.

(1) Athènes considère que l'appellation « Macédoine » appartient de manière exclusive au patrimoine hellénique. En 1995, un compromis a été trouvé avec l'appellation provisoire d'Ancienne République yougoslave de Macédoine (ARYM). Des discussions se poursuivent depuis, sans progrès notable, sous l'égide des Nations unies.