Diplomacy & Crisis News

A United Nations human rights expert has urged Cuba to consider introducing new legislation to ensure that everyone who falls victim to trafficking in persons can be identified and helped, and the authorities can take action against offenders.

The increase in reading and writing proficiency among women is a result of the significant up tic in their enrolment and completion of primary education over the last five decades, even as overall funding for adult literacy has remained low, a recently-launched study by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has found.

The United Nations refugee agency is shipping tents, mosquito nets and other essential relief items to Angola, where some 9,000 refugees from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) have fled this month alone.

Noting increases in number of migrants, including children, attempting to reach European shores using the Central Mediterranean route, and consequent rise in number of deaths, the United Nations Children&#39s Fund has called for safe and legal pathways for those who are fleeing conflict, poverty and depravation.

Secretary-General António Guterres today launched an initiative to boost efficiency of United Nations planes and flights, as it was revealed that the Organization spent close to $750 million from 2015 to 2016 on air assets in its peacekeeping and political missions.

Speaking to journalists after a meeting of the Humanitarian Taskforce (HTF), Staffan de Mistura, the United Nations Special Envoy for Syria, stated that the horrific attack on a convoy of evacuees this past weekend had impacted everyone at today’s talks.

By Shehab Al-Makahleh

This week, the Turks cast their votes in a historic constitutional referendum which appears to have granted controversial President Recep Tayyip Erdogan a significant expansion of executive power. Notably, a “yes” vote would eliminate the post of the Prime Minister, which formerly served as a balance to presidential authority. As official votes are counted, exit polls indicate that Erdogan’s “yes” campaign leads at 51.3%, with approximately 600,000 votes still to be tallied. But with such a slim victory, Turkey faces a complicated cluster of problems likely to reignite fissures between the Turkish government and several domestic parties which oppose Erdogan’s plans. Although the media is quickly hailing the referendum as a victory for the “yes” campaign, the final votes hold the potential to tip the scales back towards a “no”.

The “Yes” vote would essentially transform Turkey’s parliamentary system into an executive presidential system. Many of the campaign’s opponents, overwhelmingly including residents of Turkey’s three largest cities – Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir – fear that concentrating too much power in the hands of a man already disparaged by many in the West as an autocrat, an unreliable partner, and a man with pretensions to acting as a neo-Ottoman sultan bodes poorly for Turkish stability.

While most have focused on the outcomes of a ‘yes’ victory, few analysts have looked at the effects on Erdogan’s future – and that of the Turkish state – if the final votes tip the polls towards the ‘No’ option. So, let us consider both outcomes in turn.

The ‘Yes’ vote would lead to the concentration of power into the hand of one man via the removal of the Prime Minister. The campaign was led by the president himself ― who effectively rules the country through a deliberate misreading of the nation’s constitution ― and claimed that the proposed changes would bring stability to the country. Although stability is desperately needed in Turkey, many fear that the changes would only ensure that the current president can rule indefinitely. For those who fight for Western-style democracy, this would be a nail in the coffin for the hope that Erdogan’s slide towards authoritarian rule could be reversed.

Moreover, a ‘yes’ vote would have serious geostrategic implications for Turkey and the region. Situated on the crossroads between Europe and Asia, Turkey shares land borders with several Arab states and Iran as well as a maritime border with Russia at the strategically important Black Sea. Most analysts are concerned that the “Yes” vote will push Turkey further away from the West, Russia, and longstanding regional allies, inevitably leading to problems for Erdogan himself.

Since the Arab Spring, Turkey’s relationship with its Arab neighbors has been precarious at best. Culminating with the overt and covert support for various ‘rebels’, Turkey has been found to have supported terrorist groups in Syria including the Islamic State. While Turkey’s meddling was formerly only felt in the Syrian north, where it remains locked in conflict with Kurdish forces, Erdogan’s expansionist ambitions grew to include the Persian Gulf and even Africa with establishment of new Turkish military bases in Qatar and Somalia. Such military adventurism quickly raised the alert in some Gulf Arab states; the UAE, for example, saw such move as direct competition to its own regional power and influence, and has strongly opposed Turkey’s ambitious expansion. Given the referendum’s result, this trend shows no sign of slowing.

With the celebrated EU-Turkey agreement on refugees in 2016, diplomatic relations with Europe temporarily appeared to be on the upswing. However, after a year of internal dissent and terrorist attacks involving immigrants, the EU changed its tune toward Turkey and Erdogan has returned the favor. Just days before the referendum, the Turkish President stated that relations with the EU were at an all-time low. Internally, rabid anti-EU rhetoric became an effective tool for collecting popular support ahead of referendum.

While a notable cooling began during the Obama administration, US–Turkish relations also took a nosedive following the attempted coup d’etat in Turkey last July. Erdogan openly accused the United States of orchestrating the attempt, while Russia reaped the credited for warning the President – and potentially saving his hide. To this day, the Turkish government continues to insist that America extradite Erdogan’s main opponent, the Pennsylvania-based Fethullah Gulen, whom he considers the coup mastermind. Inside Turkey the counter-coup purge from the military, civil service, and universities continues unabated and runs in parallel with the crackdown on Kurds, journalists, dissidents and other opposition figures. Erdogan’s grab for power would create further complications in an already shaky relationship.

Although Russian-Turkish ties have warmed significantly since the 2015 Turkish downing of a Russian fighter jet, as evidenced by Russia’s role in warning Erdogan of the coup attempt against him in July, their support for opposing sides in the Syrian civil war create a minefield of challenges for a closer diplomatic relationship. Since the coup attempt, a landslide of internal troubles has plagued Erdogan, including a series of terrorist attacks hitting the country’s two major cities, the capital Ankara and the cosmopolitan Istanbul, and the assassination of Russia’s Ambassador to Turkey last December. The recent intensification of Turkish military actions against the Kurds, which have led to an escalation of activity in Syria, will certainly not help this dynamic.

The ‘No’ vote would deliver a short-term blow to Erdogan and push him to seek other avenues to establish stability and further his interests in the country, perhaps through compromise with political figures such as former President Abdullah Gul and former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, two key figures from his own ruling AKP party who have grown more distant from Erdogan over time. Further, the ‘No’ vote would help reduce public resentment against the President and ensure that Erdogan does not meet the fate of his neighbors, such as Assad or Hosni Mubarak, in the longer run. Indeed, he would be well advised, should he fail to reach compromise and stabilize the country, to seek a suitable successor rather than seek to remain in office interminably and invite a future Turkish Spring. Such an uprising would hardly be a surprise in the face of growing social, political and economic issues.

Shehab al Makahleh, a Jordanian political analyst and director of Geostrategic Media Middle East.

The post Why a ‘No’ Win at Referendum is the Best Option for Erdogan appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

 

The thaw in U.S.-Russia relations hit a snag this week when Secretary of State Rex Tillerson received a chilly reception in Moscow after President Trump ordered a missile attack on a Syrian military airbase. Trump had campaigned on putting “America First” and avoiding military entanglements abroad—a stance Russia welcomed. But the President’s position, took an abrupt turn after Bashar al-Assad reportedly deployed chemical weapons against defenseless civilians, in what seems to be Trump’s first exposure to how “God’s children” suffer under Assad. Relations with Russia, however, may be the least of Trump’s problems if U.S. involvement in Syria escalates.

Trump’s pivot from isolationism to interventionism while staying the course on his paranoid and miserly approach to immigrants and refugees reveals the fundamental incoherence of his worldview. What had seemed a stunted, transactional form of realpolitik has turned out to be nothing more than improvisation and reflex, and the President’s actions may very well commit the U.S. to a path for which we are ill-equipped in light of how other administration policies damage our credibility and chances for success.

For instance, the U.S. would need the help of local interpreters to succeed in Syria. We relied heavily on local interpreters In Iraq and Afghanistan, where they proved essential to carrying out military operations. These locals possess a deep understanding of local dialects and politics, which newcomers cannot readily learn. The average pay for a locally hired linguist is as low as $15,000 per year—a paltry sum, considering the grave risks to life, limb, and loved ones inherent in collaborating with U.S. forces.

To augment this pittance, the Obama administration leveraged the Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) program, which uses U.S. residency to entice support from local nationals with critical-needs linguistic skills. But only about 20 percent of applications are approved, and many applications languish, leaving thousands in limbo—and in grave danger of reprisal.

Worsening the situation is the Trump Administration’s revised order on immigration, which has halted the visa and refugee programs for at least 120 days, sending a message to local linguists that an anemic paycheck is all the compensation they can expect from the U.S. The SIV program’s years-long backlog only reinforces that impression. Therefore, if events in Syria continue to escalate and require additional U.S. troops, there will emerge a disastrous inability to attract local linguists to share their talents that are so necessary for success.

Local informants also stand as human-intelligence assets who are vital to successful military intervention. We depend on these trusted local informants to give credible information on everything from opposition troop movements to ground assessments of civilian casualties. And again, with collaborators facing death and worse, proper incentives are essential.

Informants are typically compensated with U.S. currency in an amount commensurate with the value of their information. But money does not adequately offset the risks involved.

By contrast, visas and legal immigration status provide powerful incentive for local informants wishing to escape dangers at home. But Trump’s well-publicized immigration policies erect near-insurmountable hurdles to Syrian citizens trying to obtain visas, leaving us without a proverbial carrot for would-be informants and linguists who otherwise face extreme risks and negligible rewards for providing information and helping our troops abroad. This, in turn, hinders our military’s ability to procure accurate, real-time intelligence at a speed useful in fast-paced military operations.

Moreover, our forces also need to collaborate with local allied groups in order to have any hope of navigating the complex local and geopolitical landscape that will greet them. But current U.S. immigration policies complicate our ability to garner allied support and cooperation by choking off key incentives for potential collaborators.

For instance, the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) is among the most effective anti-Assad forces in Syria, but it is considered a terrorist organization by the U.S. government, making aid to anyone affiliated with the PKK illegal. Similar complications arise with organizations such as the Al-Nusra Front, the Muslim Brotherhood, and militias reportedly affiliated with Iran. Despite their affiliations, not all members are true believers or hardliners, and their knowledge of the theater is a valuable asset for U.S. forces, providing “force multiplier” effects during ground operations. But Trump’s immigration policies remove our only bargaining chip to attract combatants out of such organizations in favor of U.S.-backed militias: the promise of visas and legal-resident status in the U.S.

Finally, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan also made clear the necessity of support from prominent figures within rival local factions. In Syria, most such organizations are riven with splinter sects and offshoots that frustrate military planning and post-operational civil recovery. And so courting local leaders in Syria’s fractured political environment can potentially solve many thorny problems, including curbing Russian interference and resolving the tension between the desire to “de-Baathify” post-conflict institutions and the need to provide stable government services.

But the administration’s dim view of refugees and other immigrants from predominantly Muslim nations makes these tasks all the more daunting by undermining U.S. credibility with Syrian opposition leaders, who will therefore tend to cynically view the U.S. only as a means to oust Assad, not as a credible ally willing to make a long-term investment in a better quality of life for Syrians. Cooperation with Americans under those conditions can serve only to undermine amenable leaders’ credibility with their own constituents.

In essence, current U.S. policy under Trump makes military intervention more difficult and more dangerous. Raising America’s drawbridge to immigrants and refugees does our military no favors, considering how these policies deplete scarce reserves of goodwill and credibility—vital assets with local human assets in war. The President’s incoherent approach to these interrelated issues represents a serious battlefield liability. We are charting a bumpy course, and we can expect to repeat the worst of our missteps from the last decade and a half of war—and some new missteps besides.

Jesse Medlong is a Navy veteran, an international lawyer, and a member of the Truman National Security Project’s Defense Council. Logan Goldstein is a former Army infantry officer who served two tours of duty in Afghanistan and currently works as a private military contractor and consultant. Views expressed are their own.

The post Trump’s Pivot from Isolationism to Interventionism? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

The ground-breaking, United Nations-backed International Finance Facility for Education is vital to ensure that half of the world’s children don’t miss out on the basic schooling needed to meet the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

Strongly condemning the 15 April ballistic-missile launch conducted by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), the United Nations Security Council today demanded that the country immediately cease further actions in violation of the UN body’s relevant resolutions and comply fully with its obligations under these resolutions.

Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro de printemps de Politique étrangère (n°1/2017). Auriane Guilbaud propose une analyse de l’ouvrage dirigé par Dominique Kerouedan et Joseph Brunet-Jailly, Santé mondiale. Enjeu stratégique, jeux diplomatiques (Presses de Sciences Po, 2016, 448 pages).

Cet ouvrage collectif rassemble 18 contributions issues d’un colloque de la chaire « Savoirs contre pauvreté » du Collège de France, de praticiens de la santé et d’enseignants-chercheurs.

La perspective choisie se veut résolument critique, ce qui se marque par l’emploi du terme de santé mondiale à la place de celui de santé globale, dont les connotations sont dénoncées dès l’introduction. L’objectif général de l’ouvrage est de « lever le voile sur la santé globale et découvrir les réalités de la santé mondiale et toutes les problématiques à l’œuvre : les enjeux, les stratégies, les jeux diplomatiques ». L’introduction propose donc une grille d’analyse ambitieuse, mais qui reste discutable avec des hypothèses parfois infalsifiables.

La première partie s’intéresse au contexte des (en)jeux de la santé mondiale, caractérisé par les conflits et les rapports de domination (avec des contributions abordant la place de l’Afrique dans la mondialisation, les conflits entre États et ONG, la pression des institutions internationales, la violence génocidaire et les guerres civiles). La deuxième partie présente la santé comme objet de politique étrangère, s’intéressant principalement aux stratégies d’acteurs (dans les diplomaties française, ivoirienne, brésilienne, et à la santé comme enjeu d’ingérence humanitaire). La troisième partie étudie les interventions de certains acteurs internationaux (comme le Groupe diplomatie et santé, le projet « Soins de santé en danger » du CICR, la coopération ACP-UE…). Enfin, la quatrième partie explore le rôle des représentations, avec deux contributions analysant la construction sociale des épidémies et la place de la justice dans l’éthique médicale.

Ces contributions éclectiques et souvent bien informées fournissent des éclairages bienvenus sur des thèmes d’ordinaire peu évoqués. Une des questions les plus intéressantes soulevées porte sur les arbitrages qui sont réalisés dans le domaine de la santé mondiale dans un contexte de ressources limitées. Comment arbitrer entre droits individuels et droits collectifs ? Sur quels critères devraient être fondés ces choix politiques ? La réponse à ces questions dépasse l’ambition de l’ouvrage car, comme le notent les co-directeurs en conclusion, il ne permet d’arriver « qu’à la moitié du chemin ».

En revanche, l’ouvrage s’intéresse aux arbitrages effectués et aux mécanismes qui les produisent. C’est en particulier la tâche de l’introduction, des propos d’étapes et de la conclusion, qui tirent ainsi un fil rouge donnant de l’unité à l’ouvrage. Mais cette recherche des « raisons plus profondes » et ce souci de montrer ce qui se passe « sous le manteau de protection de la santé » n’échappent pas à une tentation réductionniste. Celle-ci conduit par exemple à nier la pluralité des intérêts des acteurs, voire leur autonomie. Elle conduit également à méconnaître le fait que la recherche de l’efficacité n’est pas seulement « promue par les financiers ». Par ailleurs, la définition de l’efficacité ne se réduit pas à l’efficacité financière : il apparaît abusif de dire que « chez tous ces nouveaux acteurs […] le souci de la gestion des fonds prime absolument sur le résultat en termes de santé humaine, de morbidité ou de mortalité ».

Le débat démocratique sur les enjeux de santé mondiale que les directeurs de l’ouvrage appellent de leurs vœux est nécessaire, mais il requiert l’élaboration d’un cadre théorique approprié.

Auriane Guilbaud

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Le blog Reflets du Temps, qui consacre une large place aux questions internationales, a publié le 15 avril dernier un article mettant à l’honneur le Contrechamps du numéro de printemps (n° 1/2017) de Politique étrangère : « Que faire avec la Russie ? ».

Dossier « Contrechamps » de la revue Politique Étrangère, printemps 2017, une réflexion de toute première urgence : la Russie. Omniprésente dans notre actualité, encore cette semaine passée avec les événements de Syrie. Omniprésente dans la géopolitique de notre quotidien, et forcément alimentant peurs et fantasmes à moins qu’enthousiasmes bruyants :« Le grand méchant loup est de retour. Et il est russe… La Russie serait au mieux imprévisible. Vladimir Poutine serait le nouveau maître du monde… ».

Deux articles charpentés essaient avec maestria l’un comme l’autre d’éclairer nos lanternes sur « nous et la Russie ». Les titres posent des nuanciers différents entre « vivre avec la Russie » et « faire face à la Russie ». Aucun propos simpliste, ni caricatural dans ces analyses de l’Occident face à la Russie, notamment l’UE ; derrière, les USA.

Dominique David (Vivre avec la Russie) tisse son analyse autour de deux idées force : « La Russie puise sa force dans les erreurs et les illusions de l’Occident de l’après guerre froide » mais  « ni leader, ni modèle, elle a besoin des nations occidentales ». Nous recevons de l’immense voisin des reflets manquant d’objectivité que nous lisons à l’ombre de pré-acquis historiques, de réflexes et de crispations idéologiques, nous empêchant de « mesurer ce qui fait la force et la faiblesse russe aujourd’hui ». Les signes de bonne volonté de Poutine vis-à-vis de l’Occident, Amérique comprise, sont listés, depuis 2011, de même que leur échec. D. David éclaire en l’Occident ce « remplacement d’une société de stratégies par une communauté internationale des valeurs, et l’alignement universel sur les principes formels de la démocratie ». Ce qui fait sens au regard de l’Histoire récente. […] Comment du coup départager ce qui doit exister et être pesé entre « l’intérêt russe et notre intérêt » ; partout la Russie existe et « marginaliser, refouler cet acteur serait dangereux ; l’inclusion étant le but d’une stratégie pacifique ». Négocier, donc, en Ukraine (lever à terme les sanctions), négocier sur le Levant, négocier l’ordre de sécurité européen… Coexister avec un régime qui ne nous agrée pas. Entre autres… dit D. David.

Thorniké Gordadzé, qui fut ministre d’état en Géorgie (Faire face à la Russie), insiste sur le rôle de diviseur des Occidentaux de Poutine, tant en géopolitique pure, qu’en soutien par exemple des populismes européens à l’intérieur des états. Analyse précise est faite du système Poutine, « un régime qui se caractérise par l’accaparement du pouvoir politique et économique par les acteurs venant des services de sécurité, la suppression des contre-pouvoirs, médiatiques, comme opposition politique… Ces services s’auto-investissant d’une mission quasi métaphysique de sauvegarde d’une patrie en constant danger ». Accent mis, chiffres à l’appui, sur la considérable baisse du niveau de vie d’une grande partie de la population – 16 % vivent au-dessous du seuil de pauvreté. La Russie n’a donc pas les moyens de ses ambitions géopolitiques, essentiellement redevenir une très grande sur l’échiquier, via l’image martiale de son versus militaire. Elle se veut « un modèle alternatif à celui de la démocratie libérale occidentale », ce qui est plus difficile qu’au temps de l’URSS. Aussi, elle contourne ces réalités en s’attaquant – Wikileaks, et les réseaux sociaux – aux tares supposées du « modèle » occidental. Et échafaude un projet de sociétés conservatrices aux valeurs chrétiennes et familiales.

Très observée, évidemment, est l’image de « la guerre par les Russes », remise à sa probable juste place – pas d’affrontement direct avec les forces de L’OTAN ; Moscou n’en a pas les moyens. Par contre, détruire sa crédibilité, à terme, son utilité, travailler les pays de l’ex-URSS non membres de l’OTAN. Mais, dit l’auteur, à la différence du discours diplomatique européen qui vise avant tout l’évitement de la guerre, c’est cette menace diluée dans l’attitude diplomatique qui est agitée par la Russie… agitée…

« Fin des sanctions, accord avec les USA, retrouver un statut de puissance dominante, souhait d’un monde multipolaire où ne domineraient pas les valeurs libérales », voilà en gros, la Russie. Que peuvent les Occidentaux ? Peu d’espérances nettes et fiables. Pour autant, il faut bien évidemment « parler à la Russie, mais d’une position de force ». Et sans doute, d’une attentive vigilance.

Pour lire l’article dans son intégralité, cliquez ici.

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Territorial claims in the Spratly Islands. (Sydney Morning Herald)

The unpredictable Philippine president, Rodrigo Duterte, has again changed course in the South China Sea, cancelling his plans to plant a flag on Pag-asa (Thitu) Island over Philippine Independence Day on June 12th. Duterte’s reversal came immediately after Beijing threatened “there will likely be trouble” should every head of state wish to plant a flag on islands in the disputed South China Sea. Duterte also clarified an earlier statement, saying the Philippines intends to reinforce, not militarize, areas in the South China Sea controlled by Manila.

The need for the reversal and clarification follows earlier remarks during a visit to a Philippine military camp on Palawan island on April 6th. In those statements, Duterte riled Beijing, Hanoi and other governments by ordering his troops to occupy islands and reefs in the disputed South China Sea. Duterte also asked the Philippine military to build structures on all of the Philippine-held islands, reefs and shoals in the contested Spratly Islands. The Philippines occupies nine of some 50 islands and reefs that it claims in the Spratly island chain, while Vietnam and Taiwan occupy other features in the chain.

On Palawan, addressing his military, Duterte stated “We tried to be friends with everybody but we have to maintain our jurisdiction now, at least the areas under our control. And I have ordered the armed forces to occupy all these.” Without naming Beijing, Duterte further explained, “It looks like everybody is making a grab for the islands there, so we better live on those that are still vacant,” while adding, “What’s ours now, at least let’s get them and make a strong point there that it is ours.” China has been widely criticized for constructing seven man-made islands in the Spratlys and militarizing them with surface-to-air missiles, airstrips and military equipment and infrastructure.

The April 6 nationalistic rhetoric surprised many analysts—as it followed months of reconciliation with Beijing, including the courting of billions in aid and investment from China on a recent visit to Beijing. Since assuming the presidency last summer, Duterte has played a weak hand, by failing to assert a landmark ruling by an international court last July. The ruling, first filed by his predecessor Benigno Aquino, rejected Chinese maritime claims in favor of Manila.

Duterte’s comments on Palawan island were seen by many analysts as catering to his audience, the Philippine military. But his follow-up comments signal Duterte is still reluctant to anger his much larger and stronger neighbor. The seeming ease with which Beijing toned down Duterte’s patriotic and hawkish rhetoric puts this nationalistic strongman in a difficult position, coming ahead of talks between government leaders from Beijing and Manila on the disputed waters in China in May.

The post Duterte Backs Off Hawkish Rhetoric Over Spratly Islands appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

North Korean MiG-29s fly over a Parade in the nation’s capital.

The National Post recently published an article detailing in depth the size and complexity of the armed forces of North Korea. They showed in a graphic the number of planes, tanks, submarines, ships, and other weapons systems North Korea possesses. The goal of the article was to highlight how large the North Korean military really is, but it did not go into finer details of why a conflict might erupt, or how it might play out.

Missile tests into the sea of Japan, bouts of artillery fire, and the loss of an occasional ship are unfortunately expected by South Korea as the North postures and attacks aggressively towards their southern cousins. The conflict that never really ended since the mid-1950s has kept South Koreans in a stalemate that persists until today.

During the Korean War, US-led troops actually took over the North but were pushed back to the current borders by a surge in Chinese troops. Chinese interests and American strategic patience has kept the war at a stalemate.

For this reason, any resolution may only come from an agreement between the United States and China. Indeed, after 60 years the regional powers have become tired of threats to stability coming from the ruling family of North Korea.

China has been the North Korean lifeline, providing essential exports and weapons systems. One reason for this support are to maintain a physical buffer between Western powers and China’s border. China’s professed military support for the regime in case of a conflict also serves as a point of leverage against American and Japanese interests in Asia. An oppressive yet stable North Korea also limits the number of refugees that would flood into China if the regime were to fall.

While fighting the silhouetted army of North Korea might become an end game for American, South Korean and Japanese forces, it is likely the case that missile defense will take precedence and pressure on China will need to delicately balanced in order to meet everyone’s interests.

To avoid a chaotic result, China would likely have to decide and agree to remove the North Korean ruling family. Alternatively, taking away power from the Kims could occur without China’s assistance or consideration, but this would involve special forces incursions and the use of large and sophisticated weapons.

Political will to deal with a situation most political leaders would prefer to avoid is largely motivating the inaction in the Korean peninsula. But with nuclear weapons and threats to the US mainland it may be that Washington will decide on a policy of “now or never” if an aggression takes place, and China may see solutions beyond supporting a dictator that will produce beneficial leverage for its ever growing international presence.

The post North Korea after 60 Years of Status Quo appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

The 2008 financial crisis not only changed the shape and size of the global economy—combined productivity and employment shrank by 5.5 percent in 2014 across OECD countries—it also redefined how leaders across the world discuss and describe finance, banking, and wealth.

Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro de printemps de Politique étrangère (n°1/2017). Denis Bauchard, conseiller pour le Moyen-Orient à l’Ifri, propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Pierre Conesa, Dr. Saoud et Mr. Djihad. La diplomatie religieuse de l’Arabie Saoudite (Robert Laffont, 2016, 304 pages).

Le livre de Pierre Conesa aborde le sujet, peu traité en France, de la diplomatie religieuse de l’Arabie Saoudite. Sa thèse s’affiche sur la couverture, où derrière le drapeau saoudien apparaît en ombre portée celui de l’État islamique (EI) : l’Arabie Saoudite, « régime théocratico-tribal » est responsable du développement des groupes djihadistes dont elle promeut l’idéologie. Elle contribue à la « salafisation du monde » à travers une diplomatie religieuse très active et bénéficiant d’une « manne illimitée ». Cette politique résulte du « pacte du Nedj » conclu en 1744 entre la famille des Saoud et celle d’Abd Al-Wahhab, imam prônant un « islam vrai », prêché par les salafs, les compagnons du prophète. Ce pacte reste valide, la famille Al-Shaikh, qui descend d’Abd Al-Wahhab, occupant une place éminente dans l’Arabie Saoudite contemporaine.

Pour l’auteur, la diplomatie saoudienne appuie et finance généreusement la propagation du salafisme sous sa forme la plus rigoureuse et intolérante, à travers diverses institutions. La Ligue islamique mondiale est un de ces instruments, basée à La Mecque et présente dans de nombreux pays. Son action est multiforme : mise en place de tribunaux islamiques jugeant sur la base de la charia, création d’écoles coraniques, formation des imams. Un autre vecteur d’influence est l’université de Médine qui a formé depuis son origine près de 45 000 imams étrangers. L’Arabie Saoudite est ainsi le moteur de l’expansion du salafisme à travers le monde.

Outre les parentés idéologiques avec les groupes djihadistes, l’auteur souligne la part qu’a prise l’Arabie Saoudite à leur expansion en Afghanistan, en accord avec les États-Unis. Le fait que 15 des 19 djihadistes impliqués dans l’attaque du 11 Septembre aient été saoudiens a conduit le Congrès à s’interroger sur les liens entre ces terroristes et Riyad. Des documents internes du Département d’État ou du Trésor incrimineraient des filières de financement venant des pays du Golfe, et particulièrement d’Arabie Saoudite.

Ce livre est clairement une mise en cause, souvent polémique, d’une Arabie Saoudite qui aurait contribué au développement du terrorisme djihadiste. Mais en Orient rien n’est simple. Si l’Arabie Saoudite joue un rôle incontestable dans l’expansion du fondamentalisme islamique, il serait pourtant hasardeux d’amalgamer salafisme et terrorisme. De fait, les djihadistes ont des parcours très différenciés. Certains ont une idéologie salafiste, d’autres ont été Frères musulmans, mais la plupart n’ont qu’une connaissance sommaire de l’islam. Au sein de l’EI, les anciens cadres du Baas irakien laïque jouent un rôle important. Par ailleurs, des circuits de financements « privés » existent à partir des pays du Golfe ou d’ailleurs, notamment de la part de riches mécènes qui considèrent que l’EI défend efficacement les sunnites contre les persécutions dont ils sont l’objet. Enfin, comme le note l’auteur, la politique saoudienne a évolué : menacé par l’EI, verbalement mais également à travers de nombreux attentats, le gouvernement saoudien s’est engagé dans la lutte contre le terrorisme, même si sa priorité reste la lutte par procuration contre l’Iran plutôt que contre l’État islamique ou Al-Qaïda.

Ce livre suscitera la controverse. Il peut contribuer à alimenter un débat qui est loin d’être clos sur les causes de l’expansion du terrorisme se réclamant de l’islam.

Denis Bauchard

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