Diplomacy & Crisis News

Summary and Key Points: The USS United States (CVA-58) was an ambitious post-WWII supercarrier project that was ultimately canceled just days after its keel was laid. Designed as a massive, flush-deck carrier to accommodate long-range bombers, the vessel faced significant practical challenges, including lack of an island for command operations and difficulties managing aircraft on deck.

-The program's cancellation, driven by opposition from the U.S. Air Force and budget concerns, led to a significant shift in naval strategy, paving the way for more practical supercarrier designs like the USS Forrestal.

-The USS United States is now seen as a bold but flawed vision of naval aviation's future.

Since the founding of the United States Navy on October 13, 1775, there has been only a single vessel named USS United States – it was one of the original six frigates that served as the core of the U.S. Navy in the first half of the 19th century. Three other vessels were to bear the name, and that included a Lexington-class battlecruiser that was canceled due to the Washington Treaty when just slightly over 10 percent complete.

Much more recently, the U.S. Navy's ninth nuclear-powered aircraft carrier and the eighth in the Nimitz-class was to be named USS United States – but her name was changed to honor President Harry S. Truman in February 1995 at the direction of then-Secretary of the Navy John H. Dalton.

President Truman it should be noted had approved the construction of five new "supercarriers" in July 1948 and the proposed class was to be for the United States. It was never to be, and that's likely for the best.

The USS United States (CVA-58) was meant to be the lead ship of a new class of supercarriers developed after the Second World War. It remains unclear why it had the CVA designation, but it was either for attack or atomic.

Its design was seen as ambitious and even cutting edge but was likely entirely impractical and as a result just five days after her keel was laid down, the program was canceled.

Truman approved the construction of the new class of carriers after funds had been provided in the Naval Appropriations Act of 1949. The design was quite the radical departure from the World War II-era flattops and in some ways evoked the "streamline modern" of the Art Deco architecture and design movement that became common with post-war automobiles and aircraft.

It truly was a flattop in the literal sense, as the proposed 65,000-ton carrier (83,000 tons fully loaded) would feature a flush deck that was designed to launch and recover large aircraft of 100,000 pounds, which in turn could carry the nuclear weapons of the era that weighed as much as five tons.

The chief proponent for the proposed supercarrier was Admiral Marc Mitscher, who saw the need for the warship to be able to handle the latest and most effective aircraft of the day.

The vessel was to be 1,000 feet long, without an island, and equipped with four aircraft elevators and four catapults, while the flight deck was axial, not angled.

That flush deck was meant to provide more space for large bombers – such as the B-29 Superfortress or its successor – although those aircraft would have to be secured to the flight deck as it would have been impossible to move them up or down in an elevator to the hangar. In addition, a small hanger was to have been provided for the fighter escort. As the design evolved, additional space was given for those escorts.

It was planned that the vessel's air wing would be made up of about a dozen bombers as well as nearly fifty fighters.

Whereas the primary mission was to carry long-range bomber aircraft, the United States-class was also intended to provide tactical air support for the air and amphibious forces, as well as to conduct sea control operations.

The lack of an island on the flight deck presented a number of issues that the designers had to deal with. 

First, it meant the ship lacked a position for radar, but also other command and control capabilities. A small tower-like platform could help direct movement on the flight deck, but radar, navigation, war planning, and other operations would have been relegated to a specially outfitted command ship cruiser.

As a result, instead of being the flagship of a strike group, the USS United States and the other carriers of the class would have been floating airfields or arsenal ships.

The U.S. Navy's bombers would have had to remain on the flight deck during an entire voyage. That would have been a serious concern for the carrier during high winds – a fact noted in July 2022 when a F/A-18 Super Hornet flew off the deck of the USS Harry S. Truman (CVN-75) while the carrier was deployed to the Mediterranean.

Then there was the issue of how the smoke from the power plants and how it would be diverted away from the flight deck had to be resolved.

The Imperial Japanese Navy's light carrier Ryūjō had proved that a flush flight deck presented such problems and it addressed the smoke by moving the funnels higher up the side of the hull and curved them downward. The Japanese warship was noted for not being particularly stable in rough seas, however.

Designed as a conventional carrier, as nuclear technology was still in its infancy, the USS United States would have required eight Foster-Wheeler boilers and four Westinghouse turbines, which could produce 280,000 hp while four screws could allow the massive vessel to reach speeds in excess of 33 knots.

Construction costs were estimated to be around $190 million ($2.4 billion in 2023 dollars), while the cost of the task force to accompany the massive warship would have driven the total price tag to more than $1.265 billion in 1948 dollar – more than $16 billion in 2023 dollars.

As noted, the USS United States was canceled just five days after the keel was laid down – in no small part due to pressure from the United States Air Force, which had viewed the carrier as an embodiment of the U.S. Navy's nuclear aspirations. The Joint Chief of Staff and then Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson seemed to agree that such an aircraft carrier's main function would only serve to duplicate the role of the Air Force.

After the program was scuttled, then Secretary of the Navy John Sullivan immediately resigned, while the subsequent "Revolt of the Admirals" resulted in Admiral Louis Denfeld being relieved of his position as Chief of Naval Operations.

The cancelation of the USS United States didn't mark the end for the supercarrier. Instead, just five years later the U.S. Navy moved forward with the more conventionally figured USS Forrestal-class.

As nuclear weapons shrank in size it was also determined that a massive warship designed to accommodate bombers wasn't actually required. In fact, during the 1950s, nuclear weapons were sent to sea on the USS Franklin D. Roosevelt – a carrier far smaller than the planned USS United States.

Though some look back on the USS United States as a missed opportunity, it should be seen that the U.S. Navy really dodged a torpedo-sized bullet. The flush flight deck carrier wasn't a step forward.

 Art Deco was fine for cars and architecture – it was simply wrong for a carrier.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu.

All images are Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

President Joe Biden’s abrupt announcement to terminate his presidential re-election campaign upended the U.S. political landscape just a few months before the November election. While foreign policy rarely features prominently in a presidential campaign, the start of his political downturn can be traced to the disastrous U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. As we approach the third anniversary, the horrific scenes of chaos and confusion in Kabul will be revisited, and this unfortunate chapter in American foreign policy will torment his political legacy long after he leaves office. 

Although Biden enjoyed a “honeymoon period” at the start of his presidency, his approval rating noticeably dropped after the Afghanistan withdrawal, falling from 49 percent at the start of August 2021 to 43 percent a month later, according to Gallup polling. One year later, his approval rating plunged further to the 38 percent line, where it has languished since then. To be clear, Afghanistan was not the only factor affecting public opinion. The administration’s COVID-19 recovery policies created a sharp rise in inflation that compounded economic fears, intensified the (already fraught) political tensions in Washington, and exacerbated the sour mood of the country. Nevertheless, this foreign policy blunder provided an opening for his critics and political rivals to exploit during his re-election bid.

As I have written previously, President Biden deserves credit for ending America’s longest war. He concluded (correctly, in my view) that “nearly twenty years of experience has shown us that the current security situation only confirms that ‘just one more year’ of fighting in Afghanistan is not a solution but a recipe for being there indefinitely.” There was no clear path to “victory,” and the costs of continuing military operations in Afghanistan exceeded the benefits, especially given competing national interests in Europe (Russia) and the Indo-Pacific (China). Moreover, Biden inherited the flawed Afghanistan Peace Agreement from his predecessor, which included an infeasible deadline for withdrawing all U.S. forces by May 1, 2021. Although he subsequently extended the deadline, this did not provide nearly enough time to plan, coordinate, and execute an orderly retreat, as the administration would come to learn with horrendous consequences.

Some argue that President Biden should have maintained a small, enduring military footprint in Afghanistan (approximately 2,500 troops). Unfortunately, the Taliban would have likely viewed this as an abrogation of the agreement and created a daunting force protection challenge for U.S. troops remaining in the country. In fact, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley recently testified that he thinks “the probability is greater than not that the Taliban would have reinitiated combat operations.” In the White House, Biden described the choice in starker terms: “There was only the cold reality of either following through on the agreement to withdraw our forces or escalating the conflict and sending thousands more American troops back into combat in Afghanistan, and lurching into the third decade of conflict.” Shortly after the last U.S. troops departed Afghanistan, he took “responsibility for the decision” to terminate military operations in a war that “should have ended long ago.” While his words are commendable, Biden also deserves criticism for the conduct of the withdrawal itself.

Congress is investigating the botched withdrawal operation that resulted in the deaths of thirteen U.S. service members, including numerous interviews and hearings on the subject. Veterans testified about the “organizational failure at multiple levels,” a sentiment shared by senior leaders including Milley and former CENTCOM Commander General Kenneth McKenzie. House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Mike McCaul (R-TX) bluntly concluded that “what happened in Afghanistan was a systemic breakdown of the federal government at every level—and a stunning, stunning failure of leadership by the Biden administration.” More recently, Gold Star family members appeared on stage at the Republican National Convention, where they criticized the chaotic withdrawal—and Biden—in a genuine display of emotion that captured the human costs of foreign policy decisions going awry. 

While these events keep Afghanistan in the public eye (and collective memory), they also raise a question of whether there is time for Biden to notch any major foreign policy “wins” on his scorecard to offset the withdrawal fiasco before he retires from office. Two obvious possibilities come to mind: the ongoing wars in Ukraine and Gaza.

To his credit, Biden quickly pivoted from the debacle in Afghanistan by proactively responding to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and galvanizing international support to blunt President Vladimir Putin’s territorial ambitions. In addition to coordinating tough multilateral sanctions and increasing diplomatic isolation against Russia, his administration established the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, a coalition of some fifty nations that has provided over $100 billion in foreign assistance and support to help Ukraine defend its sovereignty. 

Russia’s aggression also provided NATO with a renewed sense of purpose. The alliance just celebrated its seventy-fifth anniversary in Washington, DC, where President Biden proclaimed that “today, NATO is more powerful than ever” while emphasizing the importance of collective security to confront autocrats who “want to overturn global order.” Alarmed by Putin’s belligerence, previously “neutral” countries Finland and Sweden have joined the alliance. Moreover, twenty-three NATO member states are expected to meet or exceed the target of investing at least 2 percent of GDP in defense, compared to only three allies in 2014.

Despite dire predictions that Russia would seize Kiev in days or weeks, the war continues two years later. Additionally, Biden overcame months of stiff resistance from some Republicans in Congress to provide Ukraine with the resources to continue the fight. That said, Moscow retains a formidable military force in Ukraine with a resilient economy and deep resources. As a result, the situation remains a stalemate, with the stakeholders looking to November’s U.S. presidential election as a significant indicator of conflict resolution.

Notwithstanding intense domestic criticism (including members of his own political party), President Biden has maintained steadfast U.S. support for Israel following Hamas’s monstrous attacks on October 7, 2023, that killed 1,200 people and took some 240 people hostage. During his recent speech to a joint session of Congress, Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu expressed gratitude that “[Biden] came to Israel to stand with us during our darkest hour, a visit that will never be forgotten.” That said, the two leaders have clashed over the conduct of the nine-month-long war in Gaza. Biden reportedly pressed Netanyahu to accept a ceasefire agreement during their subsequent meeting at the White House.

Meanwhile, in Gaza, the Israeli Defense Force continues military operations to defeat Hamas militants, and civilians suffer the devastating collateral effects of the war. While ongoing diplomatic efforts to achieve a ceasefire might succeed, a long-term political solution remains frustratingly elusive. Moreover, the situation in the Middle East remains tense, and events such as the appalling rocket attack in the Golan Heights that killed twelve children and Israeli retaliation against Hezbollah could provoke a wider expansion of the conflict.

The next president of the United States will inherit a wide array of foreign policy challenges that will require difficult choices and tradeoffs. Although national interests and strategy can (and should) guide these decisions, the Afghanistan withdrawal serves as a reminder they also produce political consequences. While President Biden’s emotional address to the nation formalized the end of his political re-election campaign, his political misfortune began years earlier with the calamitous events in Afghanistan and the associated stigma of “strategic failure” after nearly two decades of conflict. Although his foreign policy legacy can be framed by an unwavering support for democracy and the global order, as well as an enduring commitment to alliances and partnerships in a time of tremendous strategic uncertainty and conflict, he will always be associated with this tragic episode in U.S. history.

Jim Cook is a Professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval War College. The views expressed here are entirely his own and do not reflect those of the U.S. Naval War College, the Department of Defense, or the United States Government. Follow him on LinkedIn and X @jlcookri.

Image: Jonah Elkowitz / Shutterstock.com.

Summary and Key Points: Russian Tu-95 bombers, escorted by Su-35S and Su-30SM fighters, recently conducted a 10-hour flight over the Sea of Japan, marking another strategic patrol amid heightened military activities.

-This follows a joint patrol with Chinese bombers near Alaska's Air Defense Identification Zone. The Russian Ministry of Defense confirmed the operation complied with international airspace regulations, but did not specify which foreign fighters intercepted the bombers.

-This incident is part of Russia's increased bomber patrols in the region, with the Tu-95, a Cold War-era aircraft, continuing to play a crucial role in Moscow's long-range aviation strategy.

Less than a week after Russian Tupolev Tu-95 and Chinese Xi'an H-6 bombers conducted a joint patrol near the Alaska Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), the Russian Cold War-era long-range aircraft were deployed over the Sea of Japan on Tuesday.

"Two missile-armed Tu-95MS strategic bombers of the Russian Aerospace Force's long-range aviation have carried out a scheduled flight in the airspace over the international waters of the Sea of Japan. The flight lasted more than 10 hours," the Russian Ministry of Defense told state media outlet Tass while noting that the bombers were escorted by Sukhoi Su-35S and Sukhoi Su-30SM fighters.

"At certain stages of the route, the strategic bombers were escorted by foreign fighters," the ministry added. The flight followed international rules involving the airspace over the neutral waters. "Long-range aviation pilots regularly fly over the international waters of the Arctic, the North Atlantic, the Black and Baltic seas, and the Pacific Ocean."

Though the Kremlin acknowledged that the bombers were "escorted by foreign fighters," it didn't indicate which nations intercepted the Russian aircraft. However, according to a report from Stars & Stripes, South Korean jets "made sorties and the military took the necessary measure," while the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) also "scrambled fighters to intercept the Russian aircraft."

The exact type of fighters sortied by South Korea and Japan have not been confirmed.

This marks just the most recent offense in which Russian bombers took part in a flight over the Sea of Japan. Just last December, another pair of Russian Aerospace Force's Tu-95s were joined by two Chinese H-6 bombers and took part in a maritime patrol flight over the same waters. That air armada consisted of seventeen aircraft, a scene that the JASDF was quick to notice and respond to by scrambling its fighters to intercept the Russian and Chinese planes.

As with its flights to the waters near Alaska, Moscow has increased its bomber patrols in the Sea of Japan – often employing the Tu-95

The Tupolev Tu-95 (NATO reporting name Bear) is among the oldest aircraft designs still flying anywhere in the world, and it is further noted for being the only propeller-powered bomber currently in operation. The Russian Aerospace Forces operates the highly updated Tu-95MS variant, which was actually newly built at the latter stages of the Cold War.

Much like the United States Air Force's Boeing B-52 Stratofortress, the Tu-95 has been steadily upgraded and will likely remain in service well into the 2040s or later.

The choice of propeller-driven engines was made due to the fact that jet engines burned through fuel far too quickly, and the Soviet Air Force lacked the capability to refuel its bombers in flight. Instead of being a speedy bomber, the Tu-95 was noted for being able to fly slowly and steadily to get the job done. Moreover, it was among the only Soviet-era bombers that could fly a distance of 5,000 miles and strike targets within the United States from territory within its borders. The updated variants are reported to have a range that is greater than 9,300 miles (15,000 km).

Though the name "Bear" was originally employed by NATO, it was adopted by the Kremlin as the aircraft's official nickname. The bomber was also a symbol of pride for the Soviet Union and often was demonstrated at European Air Shows.

Despite its first entering service 70 years ago, the Tu-95 wasn't employed in combat until 2015 – when a pair of Tu-95s were used in a series of long-range airstrikes as part of the Russian military intervention in Syria.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

There has not been anything weird about Kamala Harris’ rollout of her campaign for the presidency. She’s moved swiftly to consolidate control over the delegates to the Democratic convention in Chicago, which will serve as a coronation if the elation surrounding her among Democrats is anything to go by. She’s also attacking Donald Trump head-on over immigration, claiming that he’s the one who has stymied real progress in choking off further influxes from Central and South America. A new poll from Bloomberg/Morning Consult suggests she has eliminated Trump’s polling lead in seven battleground states. Now, she is taking a leaf from the Trump playbook in delaying the announcement of her pick for vice president until next Tuesday. The longer she waits, the more she heightens the drama as various candidates, ranging from Minnesota Governor Tim Walz to Pennsylvania Governor Josh Shapiro, try to catch her eye with public performances.

Will Harris be Walzing to victory? He’s come on strong with his disarming, folksy manner. Rather than accept the framing of the media or the GOP about him being too left-wing, he mocks the notion from the outset. “What a monster,” he declared after CNN’s Jake Tapper queried him about his support for free school breakfasts and lunches. The sixty-year-old Walz is a former social studies teacher with a long record of military service who has regularly won re-election in rural districts as a Congressman. His experience as both a legislator and a governor may offer some extra appeal for Harris, who will need a loyal lieutenant who can collaborate with Congress successfully. Republicans will pummel Walz over his support for abortion rights and for failing to send in the National Guard into the Twin Cities immediately after rioting erupted in the wake of the murder of George Floyd. But the biggest reservation that Harris will have in tapping Walz is the most obvious one—he doesn’t come from a swing state.

Josh Shapiro does. The fifty-one-year-old, whose speaking cadence sounds uncannily similar to Barack Obama’s, would accentuate the age contrast with Trump. Shapiro enjoys a 61 percent favorability rating in Pennsylvania. He is also a centrist who tends to attract the ire of the progressive left for denouncing American protesters of Israel’s war in the Gaza Strip. He has also lowered corporate tax rates. The question mark hovering over Shapiro is whether he would suppress the enthusiastic wave of enthusiasm that Harris is currently experiencing among progressives who might see him as too pro-Israel and too pro-business. But if you believe that Harris needs to run to the center and to lock down the state’s 19 electoral to buttress the Democratic blue wall—and many Democratic pundits do—then Shapiro is your guy. Harris is slated to make her announcement on Tuesday in Philadelphia, which might suggest that Shapiro occupies the pole position.

Then there is Arizona senator Mark Kelly, who would send what the Wall Street Journal is calling a “tough-on-the-border” signal. The former Navy combat pilot, astronaut, and border-state senator would bring a lot of heft to the ticket and isn’t mired in controversies over Israel and the Gaza Strip. Kelly isn’t known as an attack dog, but given the ferocity of Harris’ own speeches, maybe she doesn’t really need one. As her speech in Atlanta on Monday indicated, she has no inhibitions about taunting Trump.

For now, Harris’ own version of the Apprentice show will continue as she ponders whom to choose. As Harris demonstrates her media savvy, it can’t be a comfortable feeling for Trump, who has become habituated to framing the 2024 race. No longer.

Jacob Heilbrunn is editor of The National Interest and is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. He has written on both foreign and domestic issues for numerous publications, including The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, Financial Times, Foreign Affairs, Reuters, Washington Monthly, and The Weekly Standard. He has also written for German publications such as Cicero, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, and Der Tagesspiegel. In 2008, his book They Knew They Were Right: the Rise of the Neocons was published by Doubleday. It was named one of the one hundred notable books of the year by The New York Times. He is the author of America Last: The Right’s Century-Long Romance with Foreign Dictators.

Image Credit: Shutterstock. 

Summary and Key Points: Russia's sole aircraft carrier, Admiral Kuznetsov, has long been plagued by technical issues, accidents, and maintenance woes, making it more of an embarrassment than a strategic asset.

-Laid down in 1982 and commissioned in 1991, the carrier was meant to project Soviet naval power but has instead become a symbol of Russia's naval shortcomings. Despite ongoing modernization efforts, many experts believe the vessel is beyond saving.

-Russia's insistence on keeping the aging carrier afloat, driven by national pride and fear of losing carrier capabilities, may be a futile effort, with Admiral Kuznetsov remaining a costly and ineffective relic.

Russia’s only aircraft carrier, the smoke-spewing, broken down Admiral Kuznetsov, is described by the Russian Navy as a “heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser.” While that might sound impressive, it is not. Admiral Kuznetsov is a continuing embarrassment for the proud Russian military.

The only reason one can assume that the Russians want to keep this national embarrassment around is to train crews for the future, supposedly better, aircraft carrier fleet that Moscow has been planning to build since 2017. 

Still, the carrier is a smoldering embarrassment that any other nation would have scrapped years ago. Indeed, Admiral Kuznetsov was more of an experiment than anything else – one undertaken at a time when the Soviet government was on its way to history’s dustbin. 

Originally laid down in 1982 and commissioned in 1991, the same year that the USSR collapsed, Admiral Kuznetsov was a product of the Soviet Union’s ambitions for a greater navy. The carrier was intended to project Soviet air power and provide a strategic advantage in any potential conflict.

Even at the start of this project, though, Moscow had to make compromises – if not for budgetary constraints or technological limitations, then for strategic disinformation purposes. For instance, its qualification of being a, “heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser” was done expressly to skirt international rules. Russia is a mostly landlocked nation. It has just four warm-water ports, with possibly its most important one, the naval base at Sevastopol in Crimea, existing along the Black Sea. Since Turkey controls the entry point to the Black Sea for Russia, Moscow must adhere to Turkish rules.

One of Turkey’s rules has been to deny access to aircraft carriers in the Black Sea under the Montreux Convention. With a displacement of nearly 62,000 tons, Admiral Kuznetsov is the largest warship ever built by Russia. But it can also transit the Turkish Strait, because it comes just under the requirements of the Montreux Convention. 

Admiral Kuznetsov has a sloped ski-jump flight deck, which enables conventional takeoffs and landings of its naval aircraft, including Su-33 and MiG-29K fighters. Of course, the ski-jump is highly limiting, which is why the United States prefers to use catapults to fling its aircraft into the air. The Soviets and later the Russians simply did not have the technical skills or funding to install such capabilities on this model of carrier. 

The carrier itself has been plagued by technical issues, accidents, and maintenance problems throughout its more than 30 years in service to Russia. These problems have severely limited the carrier’s usefulness to Russia and has ensured Admiral Kuznetsov is little more than a sunk cost for Russia’s navy.

Russia’s decision to maintain the aging Kuznetsov can be attributed to national pride as well as a fear of a capabilities gap. Russia already is behind the Americans, and now the Chinese, when it comes to carrier operations. Should Moscow let the decrepit Admiral Kuznetsov be retired, it could mean a lost generation of carrier capabilities for their navy. 

Then again, the wayward carrier spends most of its time in the shipyard, begging the question of whether those capabilities are already lost to Russia. Money might be better spent actually building a new generation of decent carriers.

As if unable to let go, Moscow is apparently investing to extend the service life of this failed carrier by another 25 years. The modernization efforts will include upgrades to the carrier’s air defense systems, propulsion, and flight deck, among other investments.

Despite their insistence that the carrier will be modernized, though, there is much evidence to suggest that the carrier is dead and cannot be modernized anymore. Regardless of what speculation exists on the internet and among analysts, Admiral Kuznetsov is an objectively awful flattop that should have been scrapped 30 years ago.

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock. All photos are of various submarine styles. 

From the Vault

Russia Freaked Out: Why the U.S. Navy 'Unretired' the Iowa-Class Battleships

Battleship vs. Battlecruiser: Iowa-Class vs. Russia's Kirov-Class (Who Wins?)

Summary and Key Points: The RAH-66 Comanche, envisioned as a stealth reconnaissance and attack helicopter by Boeing and Sikorsky, was set to revolutionize the U.S. Army’s aerial capabilities in the 1990s.

-Designed with advanced stealth features, it was fast, agile, and highly survivable. Initially, the Army planned for a fleet of 1,213 Comanches, later reduced to 650, but the program was ultimately canceled due to cost overruns, technical challenges, and shifting military priorities.

-While the decision remains controversial, with some arguing it was a missed opportunity akin to the F-22 Raptor, the Army opted to modernize existing helicopters and focus on UAV development instead.

The U.S. Army in the 1990s wanted to upgrade its aging Kiowa OH-58D and AH-1 Cobra helicopters. The RAH-66 Comanche was born. It was designed to be a stealth reconnaissance and attack helicopter developed by Boeing and Sikorsky. The Comanche was intended to be a highly advanced, stealthy, and versatile platform capable of performing reconnaissance, light attack, and air-to-ground missions. 

Fast and agile, with a top speed of around 200 miles per hour, this bird could hover out of ground effect at an altitude of 10,000 feet. It also had a maximum range of 345 miles and an operational ceiling of 18,000 feet. The estimated cost of each Comanche was around $30 million.

The Comanche was designed to be highly survivable, with features like low radar cross section, infrared signature reduction, and advanced self-protection systems. 

The Army originally envisioned a fleet of 1,213 Comanches. The number was later reduced to 650. Ultimately, a total of zero would go on to serve. The Pentagon worried about the helicopter’s ability to meet the changing requirements of modern war. Comanches were designed to fight the Soviet menace, but they would not have been ready until well after the Soviet Union collapsed and America was ensconced in its unipolar moment.

Had production continued as originally planned on the RAH-66 Comanche, it would not have entered service until the second decade of the Global War on Terror, a totally different fight. Rather than build what most experts agree would have been the world’s finest helicopter, the Army chose to invest in modernizing its existing fleet of helicopters and building unmanned aerial vehicles.

Terminating the Comanche program was a highly controversial decision at the time. Proponents argued the Comanche would have provided the Army with a much-needed capability for reconnaissance and light attack missions. They also argued the Comanche’s advanced stealth and survivability features would have been favorable in the kind of future conflicts the U.S. military faces now. 

Others, however, argue that the cancellation was the right decision. They point to the program’s cost overruns, the Comanche’s technical challenges, and the changing nature of warfare, all of which made the Comanche less relevant. These detractors also figured the Army’s decisions to invest in upgrades to its existing helicopter fleet and in developing UAVs were more cost-effective and flexible approaches to meeting the Army’s needs. 

Of course, these cogitations are pure hogwash. 

The RAH-66 Comanche would have been to America’s helicopter fleet what the F-22 Raptor is to the U.S. air fleet. 

But the Army, and its political authorities, lacked the vision needed to turn the Comanche into a real fighting force. 

The Comanches should have been built in the numbers originally planned. The failure to do so is a serious missed opportunity for the United States.

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock. All photos are of various submarine styles. 

From the Vault

Russia Freaked Out: Why the U.S. Navy 'Unretired' the Iowa-Class Battleships

Battleship vs. Battlecruiser: Iowa-Class vs. Russia's Kirov-Class (Who Wins?)

Summary and Key Points: The U.S. Air Force has announced a pause in its Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program, which aims to develop a sixth-generation fighter jet.

-Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall emphasized that while the fighter platform's development is paused, other elements of the air dominance system, such as the Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) drone program, will continue. The decision comes amid concerns over the NGAD's high costs, which are expected to reach "multiple hundreds of millions" per airframe.

-The pause allows the Air Force to reassess the program’s design and necessity before proceeding with further development.

Yesterday, the US Air Force announced that it will be “taking a pause” from the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program.

This news makes sense intuitively; the development of a sixth-generation fighter may seem exceedingly proactive, as no other world power can be reliably capable of matching America’s fifth-generation platforms. 

However, the American taxpayer is still bruised from cost overruns on the F-22 and F-35 projects, so this demographic will likely be glad to hear that the Air Force is stepping back with NGAD to get things right, rather than plodding ahead unrestrained.

“We’re taking a pause there,” said Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall. “With the platform itself, we’re taking a pause. With the rest of the elements of the air dominance family of systems, we’re moving forward as fast as we can.”

Exactly what elements of the air dominance system Kendall was referring to is not clear. Presumably, Kendall meant the Collaborate Combat Aircraft (CCA) – the autonomous drone system expected to serve as a “wingman” to the NGAD’s crewed aircraft.

Last week, the Air Force awarded contracts to five companies for the development of software to be used in the CCA. The award of multiple CCA contracts stands in stark contrast with the decision to pause the NGAD platform for which the CCA system is meant to complement – suggesting that the NGAD will proceed eventually.

Kendall did not offer specifics about how long the NGAD program will be paused, or even why this decision was made.

Kendall did say that Air Force officials would be “taking a few months right now to figure out whether we’ve got the right design and make sure we’re on the right course.”

Kendall also clarified that the NGAD program would merely be paused, and not outright canceled. “I’m absolutely confident we’re still going to do a sixth-generation crewed aircraft,” Kendall said, although he did acknowledge the possibility that a sixth-generation fighter could be unmanned. “There’s a chance it might be uncrewed…but I think we’re not quite ready for that. And we could always do something like an optional crewed platform.”

The NGAD’s costs were expected to be astronomical. Kendall said previously that each airframe would cost “multiple hundreds of millions.” Some have said it would cost around $300 million per airframe. 

The reason for the exorbitant price tag: exhaustive research and development into the cutting-edge technologies that would comprise the airframe.

For example, the NGAD was expected to feature advanced adaptive cycle engines that could offer more power, improved fuel economy, improved heat regulation, and better loiter times – just generally an improved type of engine. Similarly, the NGAD was expected to feature improved radar absorbent materials and a sensor suite that rivaled or exceeded that of the F-35s.

Of course, developing all of these technology features is an expensive proposition. Given the cost, the need for the systems, in the field, needs to be pronounced. It's possible that the Air Force took their NGAD pause because the need for such urgent resource spending just wasn’t there at the moment. Yet, given the nature of military-industrial relations, given the expectancy of Boeing and Lockheed Martin, and given the efforts of China to improve their military capabilities, the NGAD program will likely resume in due time.

Harrison Kass is a defense expert with over 1,000 published articles. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

Summary and Key Points: Despite its aging status, the B-2 remains a critical asset in the U.S. nuclear triad, thanks to its low observability and long range.

-With only 19 units in service, the B-2’s role is increasingly vital as tensions with China and Russia escalate.

The U.S. Air Force’s legendary B-2 Spirit stealth bomber showed its worth during the world’s largest naval exercise, which took place around Hawaii this month. 

During the U.S.-led Rim of the Pacific exercises, or RIMPAC 2024, a B-2 was used to take out a large surface ship in an exercise for the first time. Using an inexpensive guided bomb, the aircraft was able to “hit and sink” the retired USS Tarawa. The drill, called QUICKSINK, could demonstrate a “a low-cost method of achieving torpedo-like seaworthy kills from the air at a much higher pace and over a much larger area than covered by a lumbering submarine,” according to the Air Force Research Lab. 

The B-2 is one of the most versatile aircrafts in the U.S. military, but only 19 remain in service.

The B-2 is aging, but the stealth bomber continues to play a critical role in America’s nuclear triad. Capable of delivering nuclear and conventional weapons, the multi-role bomber deters U.S. adversaries by its mere existence. 

The Spirit is the product of stealth technology’s refinement during the early days of the Cold War, when aircraft engineers were uncovering methods to avoid interceptors and missiles. The military wanted an aircraft capable of flying nearly undetected by deflecting or absorbing radar signals. Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman were selected to develop prototypes incorporating this technology, leading to the F-117 and B-2, respectively. 

The B-2’s renowned flying wing design makes it virtually invisible to radar. As detailed by the Air Force, the bomber’s top advantage is its low observability, which provides the platform with greater freedom of action at high altitudes. Northrop Grumman created a radar-absorbent coating called alternate high-frequency material to preserve stealth characteristics while minimizing maintenance. Its unrefueled range is roughly 6,000 nautical miles. 

The Spirit first flew in the 1990s and achieved full operational capability in late 2003. 

The Spirit can carry up to 40,000 pounds of weaponry in two weapons bays at the center of the aircraft. Both weapons bays feature a rotary launcher in addition to two bomb-rack assemblies. A generic weapons interface system was added to the bomber as part of the Block 30 upgrade, which allows the B-2 to attack up to four different types of targets on one mission.

When the B-2 was designed, the Air Force was gearing up for a longer arms race with the Soviet Union. The collapse of the USSR, and the shift to the War on Terror that followed, certainly altered the Pentagon’s priorities. Initially, the Air Force intended to procure 75 B-2 bombers. The Bush administration cut this number drastically in the early 1990s. A total of 21 were produced, but not before the cost per bomber soared to roughly $800 million-900 million.

While a larger B-2 fleet probably would not have been critical to the U.S. military’s missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, the renewed competition with Russia and China changes priorities. The Air Force’s bomber fleet is small, and its upcoming B-21 Raider is still under development. Regardless of how capable the service’s remaining 19 Spirit bombers are, Beijing’s expansive naval force could dominate if a kinetic conflict were to erupt.

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. 

All images are Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

Less than a year after Hungary launched its rapid manufacturing program at its newly opened military vehicle factory, the first domestically-made KF41 Lynx infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) has been delivered. The Lynx was completed last December, but as the initial vehicle to roll off the assembly line at the facilities in Zalaegerszeg, it was put through extensive inspections and performance tests.

It was officially handed over to the Hungarian armed forces earlier this month – the first of a new batch of IFVs that will be produced in Hungary under license from the German-based Rheinmetall arms manufacturer. Budapest is already on track to receive forty-six of the German-made tracked IFVs by the end of next year, with the first of the Lynx already delivered in October 2022.

Production on the remaining vehicles began last year at the new Hungarian facility, which was opened as part of a Rheinmetall Hungary Zrt. joint venture – with Rheinmetall controlling a fifty-one percent stake and the Hungarian government maintaining a forty-nine percent share.

Hungary will receive a total of 209 of the modular Lynx vehicles as part of an August 2020 deal valued at 2 billion euros ($2.2 billion). Forty-five will be produced in Germany, while the remaining 172 vehicles will be built domestically in Hungary.

"We are grateful to be able to support the Hungarian armed forces as an industrial partner in the Lynx lighthouse project. We have now reached an important milestone within the project. With the production of the Lynx, we are seriously proving our commitment to creating local added value in Hungary and transferring technology to the country. This model is also transferable to other countries which might also be interested in similar partnerships," said Dr. Björn Bernhard, head of Rheinmetall Vehicle Systems Europe.

In addition to the basic IFV vehicle, other variants include a mobile command post, armored reconnaissance vehicle, fire control vehicle, mortar carrier, medical vehicle, and driving school vehicle. A Lynx air defense tank, armed with a Skyranger 30 turret, is currently in development as part of a second contract that was placed in December 2023.

"Peace requires strength, which means a lot of kinds of strength, and in this regard, we have gained real and serious strength with Rheinmetall and in this alliance, which significantly enriches Hungary," added Hungarian Minister of Defense Kristóf Szalay-Bobrovniczky. "This is a kind of strategic partnership that is more than strategy or partnership – this is a real alliance, and within this framework, we hope to win the future for Hungarians, and we're building something that will remain for the next generations, and we're strengthening Hungary."

In addition to supplying the Hungarian Army, the factory will produce the KF41 Lynx for other NATO members and partners. The Lynx was one of the platforms considered by the U.S. Army in its Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle program to replace the aging Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV).

However, the initial Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) was canceled in January 2020, only to be "rebooted" in July 2021. The program has since continued to move forward, and in June 2023, the American Rheinmetall KF41 Lynx was selected – along with an offering from General Dynamics Land Systems – as part of the program's efforts to produce the XM30 Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.

Summary and Key Points: The RAH-66 Comanche was the U.S. Army's ambitious attempt to create a stealth attack helicopter, designed to replace the OH-58 Kiowa and provide undetected reconnaissance and support.

-Despite the program's $7 billion investment from 1996 to 2004, the Comanche never entered production due to technological challenges and unproven stealth capabilities. The helicopter featured a smooth fuselage, Radar-Absorbent Material (RAM) coatings, and infrared-suppressant paint, along with a quieter composite rotor.

-Although the program was eventually canceled, the Comanche highlighted the potential value of stealth technology in helicopter operations, especially for special missions like the 2011 raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound.

For the the last several generations, American aerospace designers have invested heavily in stealth technology. The majority of new fighters and bombers that roll off the assembly plant are stealth airframes, with radar cross sections comparable to that of a bumble bee. Examples of new stealth aircraft include the F-117 Nighthawk, the B-2 Spirit, the F-22 Raptor, the F-35 Lightning II, and the B-21 Raider. But as one may have notice, the list does not include any helicopters, despite the use of the rotary-winged aircraft in attack, reconnaissance, and special operations roles which stealth capabilities would be quite useful.

Conceptually, a stealth helicopter makes a lot of sense. US war planners thought so, at least, which is why considerable resources were dedicated to building the RAH-66 Comanche, a stealth attack helicopter. The Comanche never quite panned out, but you can’t fault the effort.

Helicopters are inherently unstealthy. The turbine exhaust system is cacophonous; the tail rotor is loud; the fuselage vibrates vigorously during flight. Helicopters are simply not well suited for moving through air and space undetected. Yet, given the inherent challenges of sanding down the non-stealth corners of the rotary-winged aircraft, the fact that aerospace designers were willing to try speaks to the value that a stealth helicopter would add.

Stealth characteristics would be helpful for a helicopter in any situation in which you did not want the helicopter detected – that is to say, in most military operations. Consider how helicopters are used: fire support, troop transport, and reconnaissance. Nearly every facet of helicopter operations would benefit from stealth technology. And of course, helicopters are a central component of special operations, which are, almost innately stealthy.

Consider the raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound – an example of why the US might want stealth helicopter technology. The US needs to surreptitiously infiltrate a sovereign state (because the US did not have permission to enter the sovereign state), locate an approximate location (bin Laden’s compound), and deliver a SEAL Team. The needs of the mission all demanded a helicopter – aside from the need to enter the sovereign state undetected; which would require stealth. Fortunately, the US happened to have a stealth Blackhawk prototype on hand, two of which were deployed for the raid. This article isn’t about the bin Laden raid or the stealth Blackhawk, but rather a demonstration of why the US might be interested in developing a stealth helicopter like the RAH-66.

The RAH-66 made a lot of sense on paper, prompting the US Army to invest $7 billion dollars on the program between 1996 and 2004. The RAH-66 was slated to replace the OH-58 Kiowa, a scout helicopter that often attracts small-arms fire. Naturally, the Army would have appreciated a scout helicopter with the ability to move about unseen.

Two Comanches were built, with a smooth fuselage, Radar-Absorbent Material (RAM) coatings, and infrared-suppressant paint. The Comanche was also outfitted with an all-composite, five-blade rotor, which churned more softly than other helicopter rotors. But the Comanche never entered production, because “aspects of Comanche’s technology were deemed too risky (i.e. immature i.e. hadn’t been developed i.e. didn’t exist),” wrote Dan Ward for TIME.

The Comanche was a financial flop. But you can appreciate why the Army may have wanted such a stealthy helicopter.    

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

Summary and Key Points: The U.S. Navy's reliance on expensive, complex nuclear-powered submarines is under scrutiny as global rivals like China and Russia expand their naval capabilities.

-Despite the proven effectiveness of diesel-electric submarines—used successfully by allies like Japan, Sweden, and Israel—the U.S. has focused on nuclear subs, which are costly and slow to produce.

-Diesel-electric subs offer a quieter, more affordable alternative that could quickly bolster America's undersea fleet. By purchasing these submarines from advanced allies, the U.S. could enhance its naval power and meet current challenges more effectively, rather than waiting for long-term solutions.

The United States Navy has fallen in love, like the rest of the Armed Forces of the United States, with technological wizardry and expensive programs to augment, indeed replace, less sophisticated, affordable, and plentiful systems. America’s wünderwaffe is going strong today. 

Yet, the U.S. military is quantifiably the weakest it has been since the interwar years. One key system that the Navy will need to defend against America’s rising great power rivals is the submarine. And, thanks to long-running problems with America’s failing defense industrial base, as well as the increasing cost of complex systems, America’s vital submarine capability is insufficient to meeting the challenges America faces today.

There is no amount of funding that can address the bottlenecks in our defense industrial base. Nothing short of a complete overhaul of our infrastructure will make U.S. capabilities meet the needs of the U.S. Armed Forces. Despite having spoken wistfully of the need to restore America as the “arsenal of democracy,” no political leader—not former President Donald Trump or current President Joe Biden—has managed to revitalize the dying arsenal of democracy. In fact, as multiple crises across various fronts pull America’s limited supplies of critical systems, ammunition, and personnel to their breaking points, almost nothing has been proffered in the way of a reliable solution in the near term. 

And no one in Washington thinks about the long-term anymore (and whenever they do, the bureaucrats usually get it wrong).

The threats, however, persist. 

The need for a large and capable submarine force remains. We keep hearing about the glories of America’s allies. Although, increasingly, these alliances seem to be pretty one-sided: America gives and gives, while the allies take and take. But America does have competent and technologically advanced allies. 

Many of these allies, such as Sweden or France, routinely and unapologetically rely upon diesel-electric submarines to meet their strategic needs. 

This is not because America’s allies are technologically inferior to the Americans. Quite the contrary. It’s usually because America’s allies don’t want to spend the kind of money, time, and resources building the entire fleet of nuclear-powered submarines that the Americans have built. 

Even the recent Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) submarine deal demands that Australia purchase, and the Americans and British provide, nuclear-powered submarines. Thus, defense contractors are happy because these are long-term contracts that are worth far more than if the contracts were for diesel-electric submarines.

In the meantime, America’s rivals—notably China—grow stronger and their own navies grow larger and more competent. By the time these proposed new nuclear-powered submarines make it to the battlefield, the facts on the ground may have fundamentally changed in China’s favor. What’s needed, therefore, are solutions in the here and now. Not theoretical solutions for 2040 and beyond (which is what the Pentagon is planning for). 

The fact of the matter is that diesel-electric subs work. Indeed, these were the kind of submarines (although much less sophisticated than the diesel-electric subs operated by multiple modern navies today), that won the Pacific Theater of World War II for the Americans. After that conflict ended, though, the U.S. Navy was bitten by the nuclear bug. It’s an understandable trend. Nuke-powered subs are better than their conventional, diesel-electric submarine older brothers. 

But they’re expensive and take long to build—and require long stays in already overburdened U.S. shipyards.

Besides, a coterie of diesel-electric submarines has proven their worth against their nuclear-powered brethren. More importantly, diesel-electric subs have proven their mettle in a variety of instances against nuclear-powered U.S. aircraft carriers! 

That’s because diesel-electric submarines, on top of being cheaper than nuclear-powered boats, are usually quieter. They’re harder to pick up on sonar. An ancient Chinese Song-class diesel-electric submarine infamously popped up within torpedo firing range of the USS Kitty Hawk when the nuclear-powered carrier was on maneuvers in the Pacific. 

Similarly, a Swedish Gotland-class diesel-electric submarine got within firing range of an American aircraft carrier during joint training exercises. The crew of the American carrier was none the wiser until it was too late. 

A French diesel-electric submarine did the same to an American flattop during joint training between the U.S. and French navies.

The Israelis have also proven that diesel-electric submarines are more than capable of providing for their national defense. While never officially acknowledged, everyone understands that Israel possesses a flotilla of German-built, diesel-electric Dolphin-class submarines that can carry nuclear-tipped cruise missiles. Israel is a highly sophisticated nation that could easily build nuclear-powered boats. They chose not to because diesel-electric subs are cheaper, easier to maintain, and still get the job done. 

During World War II, America’s submarine force became a refined and essential element of America’s maritime defense. While the nuclear-powered sub had yet to be invented, and there were real limitations of diesel-electric subs back then, the fact remains that the United States was able to mass produce these subs and overwhelm the Japanese at sea. America’s rivals today, such as China and Russia, routinely rely upon a mixed force of diesel-electric and nuclear-powered subs to meet their strategic needs. 

Why can’t America do this as well?

The best part of this entire story is that America’s overburdened shipyards do not need to build diesel-electric subs from scratch. Washington should simply purchase a tranche of diesel-electric subs from one of America’s various advanced allies. James Holmes believes that the Japanese-built Soryu-class diesel-electric sub would get the job done. 

But why stop there? 

We should purchase a hodgepodge of various diesel-electric subs from Japan, Sweden, and France. Let our allies help us out. America needs to augment its submarine force with simple numbers. American allies are more than capable of helping us with this task.

After all, quantity has its own quality. 

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock. All photos are of various submarine styles. 

From the Vault

Russia Freaked Out: Why the U.S. Navy 'Unretired' the Iowa-Class Battleships

Battleship vs. Battlecruiser: Iowa-Class vs. Russia's Kirov-Class (Who Wins?)

Summary and Key Points: As tensions with China rise, the U.S. Navy's reliance on the F-35 Lightning II faces scrutiny, particularly regarding its range limitations. The F-35C, designed for carrier operations, has a combat radius of 600 nautical miles—outdistancing the F/A-18 Super Hornet but still within the reach of China's long-range anti-ship missiles.

-This raises concerns about the vulnerability of carriers in the Pacific theater.

-The Navy’s next-generation F/A-XX program aims to address these issues with enhanced range and capabilities, but the question remains whether any carrier-based aircraft can keep carriers safe from emerging threats.

Throughout its development history, the F-35 Lightning II was plagued by delays and budgetary overruns. Although it took much longer to reach initial operating capability than expected, the end result is a well-refined tactical aircraft. Detractors of the program have not been silenced, however, and continue to point out challenges facing the aircraft. As tensions with China increase and planners look to the wide expanse of the Pacific, questions about the F-35’s range become more acute, particularly in the case of the Navy.

Launching from a carrier far out at sea limits the options pilots have for landing to refuel; realistically, they usually must return to the boat. If their fighters don’t possess much range, that means the carrier must sail that much closer to the adversary in order to launch effective sorties, potentially exposing itself to enemy defenses.

So, does the F-35 have a range problem? And, if so, what can the Navy do about it?

Widely considered to be the most dominant fifth-generation platform in the skies today, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter incorporates stealth, versatility, range, top speed, and advanced electronic warfare/avionics. The F-35 comes in three different variants with their own specifications and, importantly, different ranges.

The F-35A is colloquially designated as the “runway queen” of the group as it is operated like a traditional fighter. This low-cost variant requires roughly 8,000 feet of standard runways to take off properly and land. The F-35B is the Marine Corps’ Lightning II variant. As the most mechanically complex of the three, the F-35B features short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) capability.

The Navy operates the C “Charlie” model. Designed for carrier operations, the F-35C has the largest fuel load and, consequently, the longest range. With full tanks, its combat radius is 600 nm, edging out the F/A-18 Super Hornet at 570 nm in the air-to-air mission configuration. For attacking ground or surface targets, the F-35 maintains its radius while the Super Hornet’s radius drops to only 320 nm.

While the Lightning II does outrange the Super Hornet, it cannot carry nearly the same payload. It makes up for this drawback in that it is a stealth aircraft with a radar cross-section about three orders of magnitude less than that of the F/A-18.

All the stealth airplanes in the world won’t hide the carrier itself, however, and even though the F-35C has longer legs, the carrier would still have to place itself in harm’s way in order to carry out strikes.

Although the F-35 is still a relatively new platform, the Navy is already looking for its next tactical aircraft in the form of the F/A-XX program. This jet, intended to replace the Super Hornet and the EA-18G Growler, is expected to have stealth capabilities, mount-directed energy weapons, and be capable of integrating with unmanned systems.

Depending on the direction the Navy pursues, it could also have an even greater range than the F-35.

Ultimately, however, no carrier aircraft will have enough range to keep the mothership safe. Tensions between Beijing and Washington have continued to escalate, indicating that the vast Indo-Pacific region is a likely future area of combat operations for the sixth-generation platform.

The Navy will require the jet to have long-range capabilities in order to evade China’s air defense systems across long distances. The rapid growth of the People Liberation Army’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities in the form of long-range, anti-ship ballistic missiles cannot be overstated.

Their current missiles are capable of reaching a staggering 2,200 nm or more, far beyond even the most ambitious of endurance aircraft.

Clearly, the Navy will have to consider other options for its carriers if it wants to keep them safe and relevant. 

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. 

All images are Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

Summary and Key Points: The F-35 Lightning II, the most advanced fighter jet in the skies, faces a hefty $2 trillion lifetime cost, according to the Government Accountability Office (GAO).

-The report estimates $1.6 trillion in sustainment costs, significantly higher than previous projections, and $445 billion in acquisition costs.

-Factors driving the increased expenses include the U.S. military’s plan to operate the F-35 until 2088 and higher inflation.

The F-35 program’s complexity stems from its three variants (A, B, and C), each designed to meet the specific needs of the U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps, replacing multiple older aircraft.

The F-35 Lightning II is the most advanced jet in the skies today. However, its journey to the skies hasn’t been easy. Indeed, the F-35 program had to overcome several challenges and setbacks to be where it is today. To a certain extent, these challenges continue to this day.

According to the latest assessment by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the F-35 Program will cost more than $2 trillion during its lifetime. This astounding cost makes it the most expensive defense program in recent history and one of the most expensive in military history in general.

Specifically, the GAO report estimates $1.6 trillion in sustainment costs, which include operational demands and maintenance – this is about 45 percent higher than the previous estimate in 2018 ($1.1 trillion). It also estimates approximately $445 billion in acquisition costs, which include the development and procurement of the stealth fighter jet.

One of the main reasons for the hefty half a trillion dollars increase in sustainment costs is the fact that the U.S. military plans to operate the F-35 fighter for an additional decade, or until 2088. Another reason is the higher inflation.

The fact that the GAO had to revise its estimate within six years coupled with the ongoing production and delivery of the aircraft, could indicate that the F-35 Program’s cost might further increase in the near future.

Lockheed Martin and the F-35 Joint Program Office have tried to bring costs down but without significant success. Nevertheless, for many, the high cost and challenges surrounding the F-35 Program have a reasonable explanation.

Much like the Russian Babushka wooden dolls that fit several similar toys of different sizes in each other, the F-35 Lightning II isn’t just one aircraft and isn’t intended to replace just one aircraft.

The F-35 comes in three versions: A, B, and C. Although they are essentially the same aircraft in terms of capabilities, each is designed differently to meet the different demands of the U.S. military’s services. Essentially, Lockheed Martin designed three different aircraft in one, and that is reflected in some of the costs.

The F-35A is the conventional take-off and landing aircraft that operates from runways; this is the version used by the Air Force and most of the 19 countries that comprise the F-35 Program.

The F-35B is the Short Take-Off, Vertical Landing (STOVL) version of the aircraft and can take off and land like a helicopter but still fly like a fighter jet; this version is used by the U.S. Marine Corps, as well as several foreign partners.

Finally, the F-35C is the aircraft carrier version of the aircraft and is designed to withstand the extreme pressures of carrier operations; this iteration is used only by the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps.

In addition, the three versions of the F-35 Lightning II are going to replace several older aircraft, including the A-10 Warthog close air support aircraft, AV-88 Harrier STOVL fighter jet, and also probably the F-16.

As such, they include capabilities that would normally be spread over several aircraft. This streamlining of mission sets in a single aircraft is a logistical miracle for the U.S. military and will benefit it in a time of war.

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a Greek Army veteran (National service with 575th Marines Battalion and Army HQ). Johns Hopkins University. You will usually find him on the top of a mountain admiring the view and wondering how he got there.

This article was first published by Sandboxx News.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

The program to replace America’s aging nuclear ICBM arsenal, known as the LGM-35A Sentinel, is already projected to go at least 81 percent over budget, which represents tens of billions of dollars in anticipated cost overruns. Yet, despite the program’s ballooning expenses, the Pentagon has reaffirmed its commitment to the effort, calling its continuation, “essential to national security.”

To many outside of the Defense apparatus, the Sentinel ICBM program may seem unnecessary. After all, the United States already maintains a standing arsenal of more than 400 nuclear-armed Minuteman III ICBMs, each of which can deliver its nuclear payload to targets more than 8,000 miles away, traveling at speeds over Mach 23. These weapons lay in wait, housed in hardened underground silos spanning Wyoming, Montana, and North Dakota, and represent only the land-based portion of America’s traditional nuclear triad.

A bevy of nuclear gravity bombs, spanning in yield from as low as 0.3 kilotons to as high as 1.2 megatons, serve alongside long-range air-launched nuclear cruise missiles as the airborne leg of the triad, delivered via a laundry list of bombers and fighters. And then, most importantly, a fleet of 14 Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines, each carrying 20 Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) with multiple warheads onboard, serve as the at-sea leg of the triad while also representing the majority of America’s deployed nuclear arsenal.

The land-based Minuteman III fleet is often seen as the least important facet of America’s deterrent nuclear posture, with many experts and analysts dismissing these weapons and their hardened silos as little more than a “warhead sponge,” meant to give adversary nations such a long and daunting list of targets for any potential first strike that there will have little hope of blunting the edge of America’s nuclear response. But while this might make these ICBMs seem less important than the Navy’s deployed SLBMs, for instance, the truth is, using these isolated facilities as a “warhead sponge” might make all the difference in a nuclear conflict. 

The known and permanent locations of these ICBM silos give enemy nations a list of hundreds of targets to focus on, allowing America’s missile subs and nuclear-capable aircraft to retaliate with less interference.

In other words, with hundreds of nuclear ICBMs lying in wait beneath the grasslands of the Great Plains, adversaries planning a nuclear first strike must address the looming threat of these missiles, which are dispersed and sufficiently hardened to nearly require a direct nuclear strike on each to eliminate the possibility of Minuteman III retaliation. 

Even for Russia, which maintains the largest nuclear stockpile in the world and claims to have some 1,710 deployed warheads at any given time, this would be a serious challenge. If you assumed a broadly unlikely 100 percent hit rate, using just one Russian warhead for each of America’s known 450 Minuteman III silos, nerfing America’s ICBM fields alone would require more than a quarter of the nation’s entire deployed nuclear arsenal. If Russia opted to play it safe and devote two warheads to each silo, it would dramatically increase its chances of success, but at the expense of more than half of its deployed nuclear arms. This, of course, also means no other nation on the planet besides Russia has the warheads and the means to mount an effective attack against America’s ICBM fields. 

China’s nuclear stockpile is growing faster than any other nation’s in the world, but its entire arsenal currently amounts to just 500 or so warheads, meaning it could feasibly require every nuclear weapon in China’s inventory – not just the ones deployed – to have the same effect. 

It might be easier to think of the importance of the Minuteman III as a guard standing his post with his rifle up at the alert. Adversaries know there are other guards hidden throughout the landscape and the known location of that rifleman might make him an obvious target, but attackers still have to deal with him first if they intend to mount a successful assault. 

“The land leg’s geographic dispersal creates targeting problems for our adversaries, and our missileers sitting in an alert posture 24/7 ensures responsiveness,” explained Air Force Vice Chief of Staff General James Slife on July 8th.

It’s a cynical and deeply depressing way to see this swath of the American midwest – with these remote, but populated communities carrying that target on their backs for the sake of the rest of the nation. Yet, that’s the inherent and objectively cold-blooded math of nuclear warfare: It’s a game that ultimately, has no winners; only survivors.

And it’s in the interest of continuing this nuclear game of chicken that the Air Force is now forced to swallow the now-projected $140.9 billion cost of replacing those “warhead sponge” Minuteman IIIs, as the ballistic missiles Uncle Sam has long kept tucked beneath the northern Great Plains are rapidly aging into what the Pentagon considers to be an unsafe and strategically neutered obsolescence.

This is a problem the Pentagon saw coming. The Minuteman III program began in the early 1960s, with the first operational missiles entering service in 1970 before microwave ovens were common in American kitchens. At the time, the projected service life of these weapons was just 10 years, meaning the Minuteman III arsenal was slated to be replaced starting in 1980.

Since then, the branch has invested billions of dollars into not just maintaining these weapons but updating them to remain viable in a rapidly changing technological world. After all, these missiles and their launch facilities were designed and built before personal computers, VCRs or portable tape players had been invented. In fact, it wasn’t until 2019 that the Air Force finally migrated away from using eight-inch floppy disks (from the 1970s) to operate the Strategic Automated Command and Control System, or SACCS, that’s responsible for launch functionality.

The dated electronics found throughout the Minuteman III weapon and support infrastructure create significant concerns about cybersecurity – a defensive realm that simply didn’t exist when the weapon was being designed. Likewise, despite limited updates and upgrades over the years, the Air Force has been clear that the Minuteman III’s intercept countermeasures, or classified systems carried onboard meant to hinder an enemy’s ability to shoot the missiles down before they reach their targets, are aging out of relevance, presenting the real possibility that the longstanding nuclear deterrent philosophy of mutually assured destruction may no longer be quite so mutually assured.

More pressing than concerns about hacking, or the unrealistic idea that an adversary state could intercept hundreds of inbound warheads simultaneously, are the continuously reduced reliability of aging systems and components that are now so old that there’s no vendor, contractor, or commercial entity that can support, repair, or replace them – at least, not without a prohibitively high price tag. 

To put it into simpler terms, the Minuteman III is the nuclear equivalent of a 1969 Dodge Charger. Its iconic design and powerful legacy are still enough to leave many in awe, but nobody in their right mind would want to race in the thing today. Upgrading the Charger to make it safe and competitive on the modern race track is certainly possible with enough money and willpower, but there’s no denying that it would be a whole lot cheaper (and easier) to just buy a modern race car.

And that’s exactly what the Air Force determined in 2014 when it conducted what the Congressional Research Service describes as a “comprehensive analysis of alternatives” to the Minuteman III, ultimately assessing that replacing these aging weapons with new, more modern ones would reduce life cycle costs while also ensuring America’s ICBMs are technologically capable of outpacing emerging threats. 

Of course, there are always two sides to a debate, and others have argued that continued service life extension programs (SLEPs) on the Minuteman III arsenal, replacing aging components with more modern ones and eventually producing the ballistic missile equivalent of the Ship of Theseus, might actually be the more cost-effective solution. 

That was the position taken by a group of analysts at the Rand Corporation in 2014 who were tasked with assessing possible alternatives to a new ICBM program (then known as the  Ground Based Strategic Deterrent program). While the Air Force’s 2014 analysis concluded that modernizing the Minuteman III would cost just as much as replacing them, the Rand study presciently argued that a replacement ballistic missile system “will likely cost almost twice (and perhaps even three times) as much as incremental modernization and sustainment of the MM III system.”

Yet, even the Rand analysis left the door open for replacement to be the logical conclusion based on three potential factors. These were, firstly, if the Air Force felt the pressing strategic need to increase the capability of these weapons, which wouldn’t be cost-effective using the old missiles as a basis. Secondly, if the threat environment outside the U.S. changed in such a way that demanded it – such as emerging missile defense capabilities reducing the likelihood of success for Minuteman III strikes. Thirdly, and most pressingly, if the number of Minuteman III missiles the United States had left to launch declined. 

As part of ensuring the land-based leg of the nuclear triad is ready and capable of responding to attack, the United States usually conducts four to five ICBM test launches per year. If the U.S. continued this pace of testing, it would run out of extra weapons to launch by 2035, forcing it to either halt test launches indefinitely or start shaving operational weapons off the inventory to be used for these tests. 

Yet, the Air Force contends that there are several other challenges it would have to face to keep the Minuteman III alive for the foreseeable future. The first and most prominent is the aging out of the rocket motors meant to carry the weapons to their targets. Rocket motor lifespans are determined by destructively testing a small number of them and measuring the degradation of physical, chemical, and mechanical properties to create statistical models that can be used to determine when the motor’s functionality would fall below operational thresholds. In other words, they subject these rockets to immense stresses, measure the damage, and then use that data to extrapolate an expiration date for when the rocket will no longer work well enough to accomplish its mission. 

Based on the Air Force’s rocket lifespan modeling, the three boosters in the Minuteman III will begin to expire in 2029. 

The next technical hurdle another service life extension program would need to overcome is the weapons guidance system also aging out of service. The Minuteman III originally came equipped with the NS-20 Missile Guidance System, which had already aged out of relevance by the 1990s, prompting the branch to kick off the Minuteman III Guidance Replacement Program midway through the decade. This program saw the NS-20 swapped out for the more modern and accurate NS-50 system. This cost some $1.6 billion in 1995 currency, or roughly $3.34 billion today, and would extend the lifespan of these guidance systems out to 2020. 

By 2012, the Federation of American Scientists reported that the Defense Department had already invested a total of $7 billion into various Minuteman III service life extension efforts – roughly $9.7 billion in today’s dollars, and it certainly didn’t end there. 

Then, 2020 came and went without a Minuteman III replacement, and the Air Force had to award several subsequent contracts to Boeing to stretch their lifespans out to 2030 and beyond – when the Minuteman III’s replacement was meant to come online. 

While not a conclusive list of these life-extending costs, public records exist for a $51.2 million contract award to Boeing for the job in January 2015 ($68.83 million today), followed by at least two contract modifications to add an additional $15.6 million the following February and an additional $8.1 million in July (a combined $31.43 million today for a total of $100.26 million). 

But even with all this invested, the Minuteman III still faces a laundry list of systems that are not only aging out of relevance but aging out of being feasible to maintain and support. 

A 2019 analysis conducted by the conservative think tank Hudson Institute posited that between 2031 and 2033, as many as 50 missiles might age out of service due to motor or onboard systems falling below the operational threshold, and by 2037, the operational Minuteman III fleet could be as small as 100 weapons. However, the Air Force awarded Boeing another $1.6 billion in February 2023 for Minuteman III “guidance subsystem support,” which is likely to curtail at least a portion of these losses, even if it did mean eclipsing the $10 billion mark on service life extensions. 

As the Pentagon sees it, continuing to funnel billions of dollars into keeping these Kirk-and-Spock-era weapons in service simply isn’t sustainable from either financial or strategic perspectives. 

As Lt. General Andrew Gabera, deputy chief of staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration explained, the Air Force has already modeled out the costs of keeping the Minuteman III relevant, but even those projections have limited value because they simply don’t know what the future may hold. Adapting to unforeseen threats would objectively be simpler (and cheaper) with a fully modern system. 

In 2021, the head of U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Navy Admiral Charles Richard, did not mince words regarding the future of the Minuteman III, saying it was simply no longer logical to pursue more service life extensions for the weapon, and issuing harsh criticisms for external calls to do so. 

“I don’t understand frankly how someone in a think tank who doesn’t have their hands on the missile, looking at the parts, the cables, all of the pieces inside that. I was out at Hill Air Force Base looking at this. That thing is so old that in some cases the drawings don’t exist anymore. Or where we do have drawings they’re six generations behind the industry standard. There’s not only not anybody working that can understand them, they’re not alive anymore,” he said. 

The admiral went on to highlight concerns about cyber vulnerabilities, saying the U.S. needed to replace what was “ basically a circuit switch system with a modern cyber defendable up-to-current standards command and control system.”

“Just to pace the cyber threat alone, GBSD is a necessary step forward,” he argued. 

He also highlighted the changing threat environment, one of the factors the 2014 Rand analysis acknowledged would justify an ICBM replacement. 

“This nation has never before had to face the prospect of two, peer, nuclear-capable adversaries who have to be deterred differently and actions to deter one have an impact on the other. This is way more complicated than it used to be,” Richard said. 

But if replacing the Minuteman III was supposed to be the budget-friendly solution, that appears to have backfired. Originally, Northrop Grumman and Boeing were competing for the opportunity to design and field this new missile, with both firms planning to use solid rocket motors produced by Orbital ATK. However, Northrop Grumman purchased the rocket maker in 2019, giving them the ability to procure their rocket motors at cost, while Boeing would have to buy them at market rate. This allowed Northrop Grumman to significantly undercut Boeing’s proposal, and recognizing that, Boeing bowed out, leaving Northrop to pursue the contract uncontested. 

The Air Force ultimately awarded the company a $13.3 billion developmental contract for the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) that would become the Sentinel ICBM in September of 2020, with a projected overall program cost of $77.7 billion by the time a new fleet of missiles, silos, and launch facilities had been constructed and put into service. 

Of course, it wasn’t long before that projected $77 billion price tag began to climb. By February of 2021, the projected program cost has already risen to $100 billion, a figure that held until 2023, when the Pentagon acknowledged that the program’s cost had risen so substantially that even a “reasonably modified” version of the ongoing missile program, meant to reduce overall costs, would still likely ring in at roughly $140.1 billion — representing an 81% cost overrun over the effort’s initial projections. More recent estimates from earlier this month saw another roughly $800 million increase, bringing the current total to $140.9 billion.

While cost overruns are pretty commonplace among the Defense Department’s highest-priority efforts, an increase this substantial is not — in fact, the Sentinel’s budget woes are so severe that the program ran the risk of being canceled by law until just a few weeks ago. 

Significant cost overruns in the 1980s associated with programs like the H-60 Series Black Hawk helicopter and MIM-104 Patriot Air Defense System prompted Senator Sam Nunn and Representative David McCurdy to sponsor what has come to be known as the Nunn-McCurdy Act, which mandated public reporting to Congress when Defense acquisition costs began to skyrocket. 

This law has seen at least nine amendments since, with today’s Nunn-McCurdy laws identifying two types of budgetary breaches separated by severity. Significant Breaches occur when a weapon system or platform’s per-unit cost exceeds 15 percent or more of the current baseline cost, or when overall program costs grow more than 30 percent above their original baseline estimate. More severe Critical Breaches occur when costs increase 25 percent or more over current baseline estimates or 50 percent more than the original baseline estimate. 

As of 2009, any program that meets the criteria for a Critical Breach is considered legally canceled unless certified otherwise by the Secretary of Defense, which is generally accompanied by a plan to restructure the program and a full written explanation of the problems — and intended solutions — for Congress. 

At 81 percent above the original program cost estimate, the LGM-35 certainly met the criteria to be classified as a Critical Breach, prompting a Defense Department review of issues the program is facing and potential alternatives to continuing its development. 

The results of that review were released to the public on July 8, with the Pentagon certifying the program to continue despite its immense cost for a number of reasons that could truly all be boiled down to one: The Air Force simply doesn’t have any other option. 

America’s deterrent nuclear posture requires that the country maintain at least 400 operational ICBMs, and even if all the technological hurdles to extending the Minuteman III’s life could be easily overcome, testing alone will ensure that number can’t be maintained through the foreseeable future, as Uncle Sam simply starts running out missiles to launch. 

“We fully appreciate the magnitude of the costs, but we also understand the risks of not modernizing our nuclear forces and not addressing the very real threats we confront,” explained Bill LaPlante, undersecretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment. 

“Based on the results of the review, it is clear that a reasonably modified Sentinel program remains essential to U.S. national security and is the best option to meet the needs of our warfighters.”

Over a 120-day review, the Pentagon considered options ranging from starting over with a new ICBM program to doing away with permanent silos in favor of road-mobile ICBM launchers like those employed by nations like Russia. However, it was determined that none of these options could meet the nation’s strategic needs without also coming with an even higher price tag. 

But it isn’t all bad news for the Sentinel program. As General Andrew Gebara pointed out, the missiles have actually been progressing well through development, and while this effort is centered around the new ICBM, the vast majority of cost overruns within the program aren’t related to the weapon itself. 

“It is important to remember the program that stage one, two and three of the missile have been successfully test fired already. I’m not going to say that we’ve retired every risk on the missile. But largely the issues of the missile are known issues that can be worked, and are largely okay,” he said.

The problems, it turns out, are almost entirely caused by the exploding costs of building the new missile’s command and launch facilities. While the plan is to reuse as much of the existing launch infrastructure left behind by the Minuteman III as possible, much of the communications systems, command and control infrastructure and even the launch silos themselves will need to be modernized at best and completely replaced at worst. 

Based on the Air Force’s original assessment, this will require the demolition of 45 missile alert facilities (MAF’s) in the existing silo fields, to be replaced by 45 new communications support buildings in their place, with 24 new “launch centers” constructed to support them, as well as a complete renovation of all 450 launch silos. 

The plans also call for the procurement of 62 plots of land, each roughly 5 acres in size, near existing missile fields to erect the same number of new 300-foot-tall communications towers, as well as the construction of some 3,100 miles of new utility corridors for utility lines to be housed entirely below ground, and a whole lot more. 

As of July 8, however, the Pentagon has rescinded the program’s Milestone B decision that would have allowed the Sentinel ICBM to move into the engineering and manufacturing development phase, pending a program revamp meant to keep the program at or beneath their newly projected $140.9 billion figure. Chief among these changes will be a “scaling back” of the planned launch facilities to make them smaller, simpler, and more cost-effective. 

The Air Force also fired Sentinel Systems Director, Col. Charles Clegg, at the end of June, citing a loss of confidence in his ability to lead the effort. The branch said his termination was not related to the Nunn-Mccurdy violation, but was instead because the colonel “did not follow organizational procedures.”

All told, the Air Force believes plotting out the new way forward for Sentinel may take as long as 18-24 months, and during that time, other big-ticket programs within the branch are also finding themselves in flux. The Air Force’s new air superiority fighter, being developed under the name Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD), is still expected to see a contract award this year, but senior Air Force officials have voiced uncertainty about its future, while being clear that it will have to see cost reductions — almost certainly informed by the need to pick up Sentinel’s financial slack. 

Ultimately, the LGM-35 Sentinel is still expected to enter service sometime in the 2030s, though it may be late in the decade before these new weapons finally do come online. Once they’ve finally made it into their silos, these weapons are expected to remain in service until at least the 2070s, with modular systems meant to allow for cheaper and easier updates as the years press on. 

Of course, there remains a growing chorus of dissenting opinions, with some arguing that the U.S. should simply continue to update the Minuteman III and simply reduce the total number of ICBMs kept in service to 300 or even just 100. This would allow for a continued land-based deterrent at a much lower cost, though others argue that doing so would defeat the purpose of using these sprawling missile fields as a conceptual shield for the rest of the nation, and importantly, the rest of the triad. 

Those who contend the Sentinel ICBM program is absolutely essential to America’s deterrent nuclear posture argue that it’s not just about maintaining a large number of targets for adversaries to worry about, but it’s also about distributing the focus — and the resources — of enemy states looking for ways to work around this deterrent nuclear shield. Put simply, with fewer ICBMs to worry about, Russia and China could allocate more money toward funding ways to detect or track America’s ballistic missile submarines, potentially reducing their efficacy in the long term. 

And therein lies the heart of the financial warfare that is nuclear deterrence. For the better part of a century, the United States’ greatest military asset has been a big pile of money that it can use to fuel a wide variety of defensive endeavors, but nowhere is cost a greater factor than when it comes to nuclear weapons — which are vastly expensive systems to develop, to build, and to maintain, despite having absolutely no utilitarian value beyond the threat of their use. 

While new fighters or bombers could be used in a wide variety of conventional combat operations, nuclear weapons have only two potential use cases: Holding off the end of the world, or directly causing it. 

And that makes the value of these high-dollar assets difficult to quantify. After all, there’s really no way to know how many times nuclear war has been deterred by the mere presence of America’s sprawling nuclear triad, if it truly ever has at all. But deterrence only has to fail once to change the face of our planet and civilization forever. 

And while $140 billion is a high price to pay for a few hundred missiles, some would argue that the cost of nuclear deterrence is worth it, no matter how big the price tag. 

Alex Hollings is a writer, dad, and Marine veteran.

This article was first published by Sandboxx News.

Summary and Key Points: China's Type 003 Fujian, the People's Liberation Army Navy's (PLAN) most advanced aircraft carrier, successfully completed its third and longest sea trial, returning to port after 25 days in the Yellow Sea.

-The Fujian, equipped with electromagnetic catapults similar to those on the U.S. Navy's USS Gerald R. Ford, is the second domestically-built Chinese carrier and the largest after U.S. supercarriers.

-The trials indicate smooth progress, with the carrier expected to enter service in 2024. China aims to have six carriers by the mid-2030s, signaling a significant enhancement of its naval capabilities.

The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) completed the third sea trials of its Type 003 Fujian, its second domestically-built aircraft carrier – and the first to be equipped with advanced electromagnetic catapults that are employed to launch aircraft. The carrier returned to the Jiangnan shipyard in Shanghai on Sunday after spending 25 days in the Yellow Sea.

The carrier's return to port was anticipated after a traffic restriction notice was issued by Shanghai's maritime safety administration on Saturday that warned a large ship was scheduled to enter the Yangtze River.

A video of the Fujian returning to port escorted by tug boats was shared on X, the social media platform formerly known as Twitter.

The recently completed sea trials marks the longest period the carrier has been out of port since being launched in 2022, and further serve to highlight that the PLAN's warship is slowly but surely completing its trials while is on track to enter service sometime next year. The Type 003 Fujian had previously conducted its eight-day first sea trial that began on May 1 and lasted until May 8. It was followed by a 20-day second sea trial beginning on May 23 and concluding on June 11, according to a report from the Chinese state media outlet The Global Times.

The Beijing-based news outlet cited Chinese military analyst Fu Qianshao, who said the completion of the three sea trials indicates the testing phase of the aircraft carrier is "going very smoothly." Each sea trial also includes additional tests, beginning with basic systems including the propulsion systems and the carrier's electrical systems. That has likely been expanded to the more complicated shipborne equipment, which likely includes the electromagnetic catapults.

The Type 003 Fujian is the first warship after the United States Navy's USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) to be equipped with the advanced launch system. While CVN-78 is nuclear-powered, the Fujian is still a conventionally-powered carrier – yet, it is still the 80,000-ton Chinese warship is still the largest aircraft carrier in service today after only the U.S. Navy's 10 Nimitz-class and sole Ford-class supercarriers.

The Type 003 Fujian, named after East China's Fujian Province, is expected to operate not only improved versions of the J-15 fighter jet, but also new aircraft including the next-generation stealth fighter J-35, as well as the fixed-wing early warning aircraft KJ-600, and the JL-10 advanced trainer jet. Launched in June 2022, the Type 003 Fujian completed its mooring trials, outfitting work, and equipment tests earlier this year in preparation for its sea trials.

In just over a decade, the People's Republic of China has made a great leap forward in aircraft carrier development. The PLAN's first aircraft carrier, the Type 001 Liaoning, a refurbished Soviet carrier, was commissioned in 2012. The second carrier, the Type 002 Shandong, was launched in 2017.

The PLAN has a goal of having six carriers in service by the mid-2030s, and Beijing is expected to soon reveal plans for its fourth aircraft carrier. Speculation abounds that the next carrier could be nuclear-powered, indicating that China will continue to improve its naval capabilities.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

All images are Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

Summary and Key Points: HMS Queen Elizabeth, the Royal Navy's flagship aircraft carrier, returned to Portsmouth after a four-month hiatus for mechanical repairs. Initially set to lead NATO’s Exercise Steadfast Defender, the £3.2 billion carrier encountered a mechanical fault in February.

-Repairs at Rosyth Dockyard included sea trials to ensure readiness for upcoming deployments.

-The 65,000-tonne warship, capable of deploying 36 F-35B Lightning II fighters, sailed under the Forth Bridge and exchanged salutes at the Isle of Wight’s Cowes Week regatta.

-Despite her time in dock, the crew engaged in extensive training exercises. HMS Queen Elizabeth is now preparing for operations later this year.

The Royal Navy flagship aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth finally returned home after being sidelined for four months.

The £3.2 billion ($4.17 billion) carrier had been preparing to serve as the flagship for Exercise Steadfast Defender, NATO's largest naval operation since the Cold War when a mechanical fault was discovered during pre-sailing checks in February. The carrier, forced to head to the Rosyth Dockyard in Scotland in March for repairs to her shaft lines, spent last week undergoing sea trials in advance of her next deployment.

"HMS Queen Elizabeth has completed her defect repair work and capability upgrades at Rosyth and will now undergo a period of sea trials to prepare for future tasking," a Royal Navy spokesperson said earlier this month.

The 65,000-tonne warship arrived in Portsmouth on Tuesday evening, where she will next prepare for operations later this year.

"Whilst no warship wants to find itself spending unscheduled time out of the water, I am enormously proud of the work that has gone on in Rosyth," said Captain Will King, commanding officer of HMS Queen Elizabeth. "Everybody on board is looking forward to getting back to sea, where we belong, and picking up a busy programme in the autumn."

It has already been a picturesque trip for the aircraft carrier – one of two currently in service with the Royal Navy. After departing Rosyth in Fife, Scotland on July 22, HMS Queen Elizabeth sailed under the iconic Forth Bridge towards the North Sea.

On Tuesday, the warship sailed past the Isle of Wight, where she exchanged gun salutes with the Royal Yacht Squadron as part of the iconic Cowes Week regatta, the BBC reported. The River-class offshore patrol vessel HMS Tyne was reported to be serving as the "guardship" for the regatta. Though the racing events were postponed due to a lack of wind, numerous dignitaries were in attendance for the gun salute, while large crowds gathered to see the carrier sail past on her way to Portsmouth.

Even as the ship had been sidelined in Scotland, the flagship carrier still hosted visits from the heads of the Swedish and Chilean Navies, while her crew was able to take part in various drills and training exercises. That included a team from the Fleet Operational Standards and Training (FOST) organization, which provided a week of firefighting and damage control instruction.

HMS Queen Elizabeth formerly entered service in 2020, becoming the first carrier operated by the UK's Royal Navy since the HMS Ark Royal was decommissioned in 2011. The 932-foot-long warship is far more automated and advanced; and is capable of deploying 36 of the F-35B Lighting II fifth-generation stealth fighters. The carrier is able to launch twenty-four of the aircraft in just five minutes and has a maximum recovery rate of twenty-four aircraft in as many minutes.

In addition to carrying what has been described as the most dominant fifth-generation jet fighter in service today, the carrier's air wing is also composed of nine anti-submarine Merlin HM2 medium-lift naval helicopters along with four or five Merlin choppers for airborne early warning missions.  For land operations, the carrier can also carry a mix of other helicopters including the CH-47 Chinook, AH-64 Apache, Merlin HC4, and Wildcat HM2.

However, apart from deploying F-35s against ISIS during her 2021 globetrotting voyage to the Indo-Pacific and back, HMS Queen Elizabeth had not taken part in combat operations.

There was speculation either the Royal Navy flagship or her sister carrier, HMS Prince of Wales, would be sent to aid the United States Navy's mission in the Red Sea to protect commercial shipping from the Iran-backed Houthi militants in Yemen, but the plans never materialized. It is unclear now if HMS Queen Elizabeth could finally be sent to the region later this year.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.