Diplomacy & Crisis News

One must conclude that all of the government-inspired rapes that target Bangladeshi Hindu women merely because they were born into the wrong faith community constitute a form of state-sponsored terrorism.

Recently, it has been reported that a series of human rights abuses have occurred in Bangladesh.  In a recent interview, Mendi Safadi, who heads the Safadi Center for International Diplomacy, Research, Public Relations and Human Rights, stated: “The people of Bangladesh are held hostage by a cruel tyrant, who has no problem slaughtering tens of thousands of her opponents merely in order to hold onto power, detaining masses of opponents before the elections merely to prevent them from disturbing her overwhelming victory and holding hostages in prisons merely in order to prevent just voices from rising up against her.  Bangladesh in recent years has become a country that has suffered from a high number of ethnic murders, the mass rape of Hindu women and girls by mainly Muslim men and a high number of Hindus being expelled from their homes so that the Muslims can take over their lands.”  However, while international media outlets have covered Sheikh Hasina’s repression against her opponents, very few international media outlets speak out about the daily rape of Bangladeshi Hindu women and girls.    

In my new book titled Emerging from the Depths of Despair: A Memoir on Rising Above the Trauma of Childhood Rape, which I am in the final phases of editing, I wrote: “There is an international consensus that politically-motivated rape is a form of terrorism.   Rape, like terrorism, is all about obtaining power, dominance and control over the victims, thus prompting them to feel helpless and weak.  Thus, Judaism considers rape to be equivalent to murder for the very nature of that crime is that it literally slaughters the soul of the female victim.”  Given this, one must conclude that all of the government-inspired rapes that target Bangladeshi Hindu women merely because they were born into the wrong faith community constitute a form of state-sponsored terrorism.

Yet sadly, the world is silent about this horrific phenomenon experienced by Bangladeshi Hindu women.   Recently, the World Hindu Struggle Committee reported that Rekha Rani Biswas, a Bangladeshi Hindu mother of two, was murdered after being gang-raped in Faridpur by Muslim terrorists.  Her husband Goap Biswas proclaimed: “I have a son and a daughter.  How can I live with my daughter in a country where my wife was brutally gang-raped and murdered?”  However, despite the fact that it is believed that her gang-rape and murder was religiously motivated, not a single major English-language newspaper has covered what happened to her.   In fact, not a single major Bangladeshi newspaper even covered her story.   Only a few online news sites noted it.   

Rekha Rani Biswas is not the only Bangladeshi Hindu female victim ignored by the community of nations.  According to the World Hindu Struggle Committee, Haimanti Shukla, a Hindu student at the Khepurpara Government Model Secondary School in Kalapara, committed suicide after being exposed to intense sexual harassment and was once even sexually assaulted by Muslims.   One of the Muslim harassers threatened Shukla: “If you don’t marry him, they will throw acid on you and murder your father.”  The threats, the sexual assault and the sexual harassment bothered Shukla to the point that she just committed suicide.   However, her story also did not make it into the major English language newspapers or even a major Bangladeshi newspaper for that matter.  Again, only a few online news sites covered it.

In an interview, Shipan Kumer Basu, President of the World Hindu Struggle Committee, proclaimed: “These days, fathers, brothers and uncles in Bangladesh provide school girls with security.  This is because no Hindu girl feels safe on the way to school or college due to the increasing incidents of sexual harassment, rape and murder that are encouraged by the Awami League government.   In our society, girls and women are helpless, especially if they are Hindu.  Sheikh Hasina often claims that she is working for the development of women and girls.  Here is a question.  How can you call this reality the development of women and girls?  What have you done for the development of women and girls over the past 11 years?  Is this the kind of development for women and girls that you seek?   Bangladeshi Hindu women and girls don’t feel safe.  This must be changed or else Bangladesh won’t be headed in the right direction.”

 

The post Op-Ed: World ignores mass rape of Hindu women and girls in Bangladesh appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

On October 23-24, the Russia-Africa Summit and Economic Forum took place in Sochi. Over 10 000 participants and representatives of 54 African countries took part in the event.

The participants signed more than 50 deals, at a total value of more than 800 billion rubles. Moreover, African countries received 300 cooperation offers in different fields.

The event was a signal of Russia’s willingness to participate actively in the “battle for Africa”, which is being waged by leading actors of international relations. Africa is a resource-rich continent, has considerable “political potential” in the context of voting in international organizations. In addition, the continent is ready to cooperate with many countries. As a result, Africa becomes a “welcome piece” for the United States, China, the European Union, India, and Japan.

Although the focus was on economic cooperation, the Forum became an instrument to promote the main goal of Russia in Africa. It’s political influence through the control over natural resources and military support.

The above-mentioned Summit was only the beginning since the participants agreed to hold a similar event every 3 years and cabinet-level consultations – annually. For instance, the next summit, on the initiative of Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali, may take place in Ethiopia. 

Russia-Africa Summit laid the pillars for cooperation not only at the bilateral level. As the Government of Russia and the African Union, as well as the Eurasian Economic Commission and the African Union Commission, signed the memorandums of understanding and cooperation.

Statements of support for Algeria and Sudan to normalize the situation in these countries are also signals about Russia’s readiness to intensify political participation in the region. Likewise the agreements between the International Agency of sovereign development (IASD) with the governments of Niger, Guinea, DRC for political consultations and development.

The most interesting in this context is the Final declaration of the Russia-Africa Summit.

In addition to the general phrases on the UN Charter support, expanding official and informal cooperation, intensifying contacts within the UN, BRICS and other international forums, joint efforts on terrorism and extremism, intensification of trade interests, trade intensification regulations, the document has several interesting insights. It’s worth to emphasize the following:

1. “Develop an equitable dialogue taking account of the interests of the Russian Federation and African States on the basis of a multilateral world order”.
2. “Coordinate efforts to reform the UN, including its Security Council, as well as to increase its capacity to counter the existing and new global challenges and threats”.
3. “Strengthen global governance and consider reforming the UN Security Council taking into account the geopolitical realities with a view to making it a more representative body by ensuring greater participation of African States”.
4. “Continue strengthening contacts and coordination between Russia and non-permanent UN Security Council members from among African States with a view to jointly promoting shared interests”.
5. “Develop cooperation within other international organizations and provide greater mutual support when holding elections to their governing bodies and making decisions on issues of particular importance for the Russian Federation and African States”.
6. “Intensify Russia–Africa inter-parliamentary contacts and coordinate efforts for international parliamentary events to arrive at decisions and resolutions that would benefit the Russian Federation and African States”.
7. “The principle African solutions to African problems should continue to serve as a basis for conflict resolution”.

Obviously, such documents usually have general formulations, but even these selected replicas reflect the consistent tone.

It lays in strengthening the multipolar world order with a focus on reforming the Security Council. In this eventuality, Russia could promote its own interests easier, having support from a wider range of countries, including African ones.

African countries have significant “political capital” concerning voting in international organizations. 54 countries of Africa, representing almost a third of the votes in the UN General Assembly, are a very useful resource for Russia to “push” decisions across international venues.

The phrase “jointly promoting shared interests” reflects these Russia’s aspirations to seek the support of African countries to promote its interests, form a common agenda and make use of the African political potential. Most importantly, the phrase “multilateral world order” becomes more clear in the context of intensifying cooperation between BRISC and African countries, stated at the Forum.

The declaration of the Russia-Africa Summit also contains lucrative statements for Africa. For example, the principle of “African solutions to African problems“, that is so desirable to African countries, which try to avoid the trend of neo-colonialism and have Africa’s fate in the Africa’s hands. 

And “reforming the UN Security Council […] to making it a more representative body by ensuring greater participation of African States” reflects the aspiration of African countries to become P-5 members. For instance, we could recall speeches of Presidents of Sierra Leone, Angola, Zambia at the annual session of the UN General Assembly in September 2019. The representatives have stated firmly that it’s high time to give Africa representation which continent deserves. And these are just the last striking cases, not including earlier actions and arguments.

The participants signed agreements in the military, economic, mining, energy, infrastructure, educational and scientific fields during the Russia-Africa Summit.

Below is a list of the major arrangements in each area.

The main agreements in the economic sphere:

• The Investment Company “Uralkali” agreed to finance agriculture and mining projects in Zimbabwe.
• State Development Corporation VEB.RF is ready to provide up to € 425 million for the construction of an oil refinery in Morocco.
• The company “FosAgro” plans to open a trade office in South Africa and has signed the memorandum of understanding with Kropz.
• “Uralchem” together with Grupo Opaia are going to build a complex for the production of ammonia and carbamide in Angola.
• “EFKO” Group and Egyptian company United Oil have signed a partnership agreement, the main goal is to build a joint venture on fat-and-oil products.
• Negotiations are under way with Zambia and Ethiopia concerning more intense cooperation under a debt-for-assistance scheme.

Arrangements in the energy sector:

• Russia and Ethiopia signed the cooperation treaty in the field of the peaceful application of atomic energy.
• Russian Government intends to build new power plants in the CAR.
• Preliminary negotiations are held in the field of gas energy with Uganda, as well as with Zambia on the construction of nuclear power plants.

Mining Deals:

• The JSC “ROSGEO” signed memorandums with Sudan, Equatorial Guinea, Rwanda and South Sudan on mineral exploration.
• Lukoil signed the memorandum with Equatorial Guinea on the exploration and production of fossil fuels.
• JSC “Giprotsvetmet”, REC (Russian Export Center Group) and Afreximbank signed the agreement for establishing an intergovernmental platform to implement mining projects in Africa.
• By the end of 2019, Alrosa will receive 15 exploration licenses in Zimbabwe.
• Talks are under way with Sudan (gold), Mozambique (diamonds), Congo (joint gas pipeline).

Infrastructure Arrangements:

• Russian Railways and the Egyptian National Railways signed the protocol for collaboration on the construction of railway tracks in Egypt.
• Negotiations are under way with Egypt on charter flights.
• Morocco intends to become a logistics hub for Russian energy companies, which are going to cooperate with African countries.
• Russia and Angola signed the memorandum of understanding on the development of the railway sector.
• Russia expressed its desire to set up data centers in Africa to promote its software.
• Russian Railways will participate in the implementation of infrastructure projects in Nigeria, a number of projects have already been proposed, as well as in the DRC. The countries signed relevant agreements.

Deals in the field of education and science:

• The Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS) expects to set up offices in a number of African countries, primarily in Ethiopia, South Africa, Egypt and Uganda.
• Russia is considering increasing the quota of budget places in Russian universities for students from the continent.
• Russia and South Africa plan to sign the memorandum of cooperation in youth policy in 2020.
• Russian representatives presented the new dry Ebola vaccine, which was developed in Russia and could be used in Africa.
• Negotiations are under way concerning the possibility of establishing a research center for the prevention of infectious diseases, similar to one in Guinea.

Arrangements in the military field:

• $ 4-billion arms contracts were signed with 20 African countries, including Uganda, Rwanda, Mozambique, Angola.
• Russia and Niger are under the agreement for the supply of 12 Mi-35 combat helicopters.
• Russia plans to open weapons repair centers, as well as for helicopter and armored vehicles, in Angola, Uganda and Nigeria.
• Negotiations are under way with CAR (training of military personnel in Russian institutions), Namibia (armaments), Sudan (purchase of S-400 complexes), Ethiopia (possibility of building a service center for aviation), and South Africa (joint arms production).

Nevertheless, not everyone became enthusiastic over after Russia-Africa Summit.

Despite the declared “Russia’s return to Africa”, some experts (even Russian) are sure that it is just a smokescreen to promote those businesses, which have already been operating in Africa, a more introductory event after which nothing important will happen, a familiar PR action. Certainly, the main question is how all the declared goals and arrangements of the Russia-Africa Summit will be implemented.

Regardless of the other side of cooperation, Africa does not need projects that use its potential without altering the continent’s oppressive problems.

Obviously, these should be projects aimed at tackling poverty and unemployment, attracting new technologies, and ensuring sustainable development. But the formula of military cooperation in exchange for resources or political use – does not fit into this framework. 

The post Russia-Africa Summit: Policy Framework for Further Cooperation appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

President Donald Trump and First Lady Melania Trump arrive in Rihad, Saudi Arabia, Saturday, May 20, 2017, for the start of their overseas visit to Saudi Arabia, Israel, Rome, Brussels and Taormina, Italy. (Official White House Photo by Shealah Craighead)

Referring to the latest crisis between Iran and Saudi Arabia, President Trump said that he is not interested in going to war with Iran. I believe him. He has not shown an interest in starting new wars (although he has been quite willing to escalate ongoing ones on occasion). The real problem here, I believe, is that he is fundamentally incompetent—whether it is a question of devising a policy that will lead to a desired outcome or a question of identifying the actual problem in the first place—and thus rarely gets what he wants, or at least what he says he wants. Look at some of the issues he highlighted during his campaign. When he had an all-Republican Congress, he could not get them to hold a vote on funding for a wall on the southern border, or to introduce an infrastructure bill, or to consider a health-care plan that would offer more and cost less than the Affordable Care Act (“Obamacare”)—all things that he had promised during the election campaign but that were not part of the Republican Party’s agenda. The federal deficit—rather than being on the path to elimination as promised—has increased to the highest level ever seen in a time of peace and prosperity ($984 billion in Fiscal Year 2019, a $205 billion increase over 2018 and double the level of 2015), and we have seen the highest trade deficit in history. While the economy, overall, has done well—continuing the general trend that began in late 2009—the segments that Trump has focused on have seen a slump. The 2017 tax bill was designed to spur investment, which would eventually generate jobs and wage increases, but the burst in investment did not occur; investment has actually declined this year owing to the trade war and general policy unpredictability. Tariffs intended to support the steel industry prompted the steel industry to generate a glut, which has forced prices back down amid stagnating demand. Coal mines continue to close, and coal’s share in the U.S. energy mix continues to decline. While unemployment is low, Moody’s Analytics estimates that 300,000 jobs have been lost owing to Trump’s trade war with China. Manufacturing has declined in recent months as a consequence of falling investment, policy-related uncertainties, and supply-chain disruptions caused by the trade war. The places hit hardest in terms of lost manufacturing jobs are Pennsylvania and Wisconsin, two of the states that had put Trump over the top in terms of the Electoral College if not the popular vote. In foreign policy, China is not reorganizing its economy on Trump’s terms; North Korea is not moving toward nuclear disarmament; and Venezuela is not changing regimes. So, how is it going with Iran? Administration officials declare Trump’s policy a success because the reimposition of sanctions has had a serious impact on Iran’s economy, but that has not produced the political effects that were intended. Instead, we face a potential crisis in the Persian Gulf, with growing aggressiveness on the part of Iran and with Middle Eastern allies that appear to be rethinking their relationship with the United States.

Much of the ongoing failure regarding Iran stems from Trump’s approach. He has managed to teach Iran’s leaders that (1) he cannot be trusted to abide by an agreement; (2) their abiding by an agreement will not save them from his retribution; but (3) lashing out does not necessarily bring punishment. This particular combination is not well designed to achieve the results sought.

Trump appears to view past foreign policy as a series of expensive, unnecessary favors done for the benefit of ungrateful foreigners. When it comes to negotiation, he hopes for a mutually agreed settlement, but he expects it to be entirely on his terms, a sort of mutually agreed capitulation with the other side cheerily accepting the position of “loser.” To achieve this he relies on threats, bluster, and intimidation, all of which amounts to a massive bluff intended to bring results cheaply. He surrounds himself with other people who deal in threats, bluster, and intimidation only to discover at times—as in the case of John Bolton, his third, and second-longest-lasting, national security adviser—that they really mean it. (Back in 2015, as the JCPOA was being negotiated, Bolton famously penned an op-ed titled, “To Stop Iran’s Bomb, Bomb Iran.”) Trump also puts great store in being unpredictable. He believes that this gives him a negotiating advantage, but his negotiating partners tend to view it as chaotic and a sign of untrustworthiness. He also has to pursue his goals alone because he continually alienates allies, but he does not seem to see this as a problem.

In the case of Iran, Trump has painted himself into a corner in a crisis of his own making. When he entered office, he objected to the Iran nuclear deal—officially called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—that the Obama administration and Iran had negotiated along with five other countries: Britain, China, France, Germany, and Russia. There were other people who objected to the agreement as well, who objected to frozen Iranian funds being released, to the agreement’s sunset provisions, or to the fact that objectionable Iranian activities not related to its nuclear program were not restrained by it. The JCPOA, however, was as much as Iran would agree to, and it did an effective job of constraining its nuclear program in thoroughly verifiable ways. Both the International Atomic Energy Agency and the U.S. Intelligence Community regularly confirmed that Iran was in full compliance. Moreover, the JCPOA did not prevent the United States or others from dealing with Iran’s other objectionable activities in other ways. Even among those who had objected to the agreement, few saw any advantage to unilaterally withdrawing from it once it was in place and as long as Iran was in compliance.

During his first year in office, Trump seemed willing to comply with the JCPOA despite his rhetoric, evidently influenced by some of the people around him at the time. Brian Hook, the State Department’s director of policy planning was given the task of negotiating with the Europeans to develop a common position on demanding further restrictions, specifically, limits on Iran’s ballistic missiles and on its support for proxies abroad, such as Hamas and Hezbollah. Then, at the end of March 2018, Iran hawk Mike Pompeo replaced Rex Tillerson as secretary of state. Nine days later, Bolton replaced Lt. Gen. H. R. McMaster as national security adviser. When French president Emmanuel Macron visited the White House in April, Trump informed him that the United States would be leaving the JCPOA unilaterally. When Macron objected that he believed that Brian Hook and the Europeans were on the verge of a breakthrough in their negotiations, Trump’s response was, “Who’s Brian Hook?” In May he announced publicly that the United States was pulling out, effectively putting an end to Hook’s efforts. Withdrawal from the JCPOA was accompanied by a sanctions strategy, introduced over a period of months, that Trump referred to as “maximum pressure,” and by threatening rhetoric that spoke of “consequences the likes of which few throughout history have ever suffered.”

Evidently, Hook’s assignment, which aimed at fulfilling Trump’s stated objective of adding restrictions to those of the JCPOA, was never at the center of Trump’s strategy, if he had one. Whether anything would have come of Hook’s efforts if he had been allowed to continue cannot be known. He had only negotiated with the Europeans on how to approach the Iranians. Nothing says whether the Iranians would have gone along with the proposals—or whether the Russians and Chinese would have backed the Iranians if they refused. The Iranians, however, are sure to interpret the abrupt end of the negotiations—and Trump’s apparent lack of awareness of them—as a sign that he was never serious about those goals and actually seeks the overthrow of the Iranian regime.

The other five signatories also objected to Trump’s unilateral withdrawal. It added no new restrictions to Iranian behavior while potentially removing those to which Iran had agreed. Since Trump reimposed economic sanctions on Iran that had been lifted as part of the JCPOA (sanctions that had originally been imposed precisely to compel Iran to negotiate an agreement, which it had done), he put the United States in violation of the agreement. He did this while making assertions of Iranian violations that no other signatory believed, undermining U.S. credibility, and he did so while demanding that Iran continue to comply with the agreement that he was now violating. He thus showed Iran both that he could not be trusted and that he was willing to punish them for doing what all sides had previously agreed that they should do. Moreover, he did all this without making any provision for the almost inevitable Iranian backlash that would follow, a backlash for which U.S. allies would blame Trump.

The usually divided Iranian officials were relatively united on how to respond to Trump’s challenge. A few reformers and diplomats argued that they had no realistic alternative to staying in the JCPOA. The larger share of officials argued that remaining in the deal could not be justified if Washington reimposed sanctions. One division did exist within the latter group. Some demanded an immediate withdrawal, while others held out for a slow, piecemeal withdrawal that might avoid provoking the Europeans and might give the Europeans time to rescue the deal. The latter group prevailed. They generally agreed at the time that Trump sought regime change and that negotiating with him while under threat would be a mistake. While Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, who is closely identified with the JCPOA, reportedly did not believe that Trump wanted war, he was less sure about the influential people around Trump or his Middle Eastern allies.

Thus Iran continued to comply with the JCPOA for a year, from May 2018 to May 2019, while demanding that the Europeans do something to bring the United States back into compliance or otherwise compensate Iran for the economic problems that the Trump administration was causing. This the Europeans proved unable to do, partly because the Trump administration was willing to sanction anyone who dealt with Iran, including allies. European corporations were unwilling to risk their business in the United States in order to keep Iran within its nuclear regime. (Since the United States did not have any trade or financial ties to Iran itself, these secondary sanctions are what made the new sanctions as effective as they have been.) During this period, the administration may have believed it had hit the jackpot, since it had been able to reduce Iran’s resources while Iran continued to live within the deal’s constraints. For Iranians, this year reinforced the lesson that restraint and compliance would not bring results.

In April 2019 the Trump administration refused to renew waivers that had permitted some countries to continue purchasing Iranian oil in a transitional period. In May Iran announced that it would engage in a schedule of planned JCPOA violations. These would be limited and reversible violations—initially, at least—that were not going to move Iran appreciably closer to a nuclear weapon. Presumably, their purpose was to shake up the Americans and/or the Europeans with the notion that the nuclear regime was about to crumble and compel them to do something to prevent that outcome. That same month, the Pentagon began preliminary planning for a large-scale deployment to the Middle East in case of conflict with Iran. More immediately, Bolton announced that a carrier task force was moving into the region because the United States had intelligence that Iran was planning attacks on U.S. forces and warned that any attack would be met with “unrelenting force.”

At the same time, Iran was beginning to act more aggressively in the Persian Gulf region to show the United States that it would not be intimidated and to create incentives for the United States to back down. Thus the behavior that had not been covered under the JCPOA grew worse as a result of Trump’s actions. This, no doubt, reflected a partial unleashing of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a group that never trusted in negotiations with the Americans, now saw itself vindicated, and would be as happy as Trump to see the JCPOA abandoned and its restrictions removed. The increased IRGC activity began with small-scale attacks that damaged foreign oil tankers in the Persian Gulf, including a Japanese tanker while the Japanese prime minister was in Tehran attempting to mediate (at Trump’s request). Although the protection of sea-lanes had long been a U.S. priority and Bolton had recently made threats, Trump now insisted that China and Japan depended on Persian Gulf oil more than the United States did and that they should bear the burden of defending it.

On June 20, in a further escalatory move, Iran shot down a very expensive U.S. surveillance drone. Prompted by Bolton and Pompeo, Trump opted to respond by bombing three missile batteries and radars on Iranian soil. Pentagon civilians and military officers had opposed the strike as disproportionate, since they estimated that it would kill about 150 people. (No one had been injured when the drone was shot down.) They also feared it could provoke retaliation and further escalation, requiring the military to drain resources from the Far East. Whether he was concerned about the disproportionate loss of life (which he now cited, having apparently disregarded it originally) or about possible escalation, Trump reversed himself and canceled the strike in Bolton’s and Pompeo’s absence, after the aircraft were already in the air. Bolton left the administration shortly thereafter.

Trump’s desire to avoid loss of life and possible war is admirable, but he had put himself in this situation with his ill-considered withdrawal from the JCPOA and his provocative rhetoric. Now, having marched to the edge and then backed off, he taught the Iranians a further lesson: their objectionable behavior might not be punished after all, as their compliance had been. To be fair, Trump did not leave Iran completely unpunished. Behind the scenes, he authorized a cyber attack that struck Iran’s ability to track shipping in the Persian Gulf. In public, however, he had stood down, and he then highlighted that fact by announcing via Twitter that he had decided to bomb Iran and then changed his mind.

At this time Trump also called for increasing multinational naval patrols in the Persian Gulf, but several European allies refused to participate in a U.S.-led mission. Not only did they blame Trump for the rising tensions, they were wary of tying themselves to his erratic and unpredictable behavior. Instead, NATO allies France and Germany sought to organize their own alternative Persian Gulf coalition.

In a particularly brazen move on September 14, Iran launched a coordinated drone and cruise-missile attack against two Saudi oil-processing facilities, shutting down about 5 percent of the world’s daily oil supply for the time being. Iran then made the improbable claim that Yemen’s Houthi rebels had launched the attack. While Iran’s responsibility was clear almost from the beginning, some Europeans were initially credulous, reinforced no doubt by the Trump’s infamous penchant for fables and their reluctance to tie themselves to whatever he might do next. The administration’s rush to lay blame quickly and without offering evidence certainly did not help matters. Although Pompeo called Iran’s action an act of war, Trump’s response was limited to a modest deployment of aircraft and missile-defense batteries to Saudi Arabia. He also ordered a new round of sanctions that effectively cut off the only remaining transactions: food and other humanitarian aid.

Beginning over the summer, France had sought to mediate between Washington and Tehran so as to deescalate the crisis. For its part, the Trump administration was sending mixed signals. Trump at times lowered his demands dramatically, saying that he was only interested in preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. Objectively, this suggested a return to the JCPOA, which had achieved that goal, although it is not at all clear that he saw it that way. As Trump made those statements, Pompeo alternated between offering to talk without preconditions and insisting on a list of twelve demands that, in Iran’s view, amounted to full capitulation in all aspects of its foreign policy (although the Iranians would not have agreed with Pompeo’s characterization of that policy). Iran’s position was that it would not talk unless the United States lifted its sanctions.

On the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, shortly after the drone and missile strike had rattled everyone’s nerves, French president Emmanuel Macron succeeded in getting Trump and Iranian president Hassan Rouhani to agree to a four-point plan as a basis for a meeting that would reopen negotiations. In the view of the French, the document was designed to allow everyone involved to declare victory (including the French as peacemakers). The key points were: (1) Iran will agree never to acquire a nuclear weapon, to comply with its nuclear obligations and commitments, and to negotiate a long-term framework for its nuclear activities; (2) Iran will refrain from aggression and seek peace and respect in the region through negotiations (the French insisted that this provision covered Iran’s missile program as well); (3) the United States will lift sanctions reimposed since 2017; and (4) Iran will be free to export its oil and use its revenues as it wishes.

It is important to understand that the Iranians believed that they had already agreed to most of these conditions and had not been in violation of them when Trump pulled out of the JCPOA. The difficulties that would have followed from this accord would have flowed from differing interpretations of the facts (e.g., does support for the heinous but legal and widely recognized Syrian regime constitute aggression?).

While both sides tentatively agreed to pursue Macron’s proposal, it all fell apart in the end, when Rouhani refused to come to a secure telephone set up by the French for a call between him and Trump. For Iran’s hard-liners, Trump’s acceptance of a meeting was proof that their plan to escalate tensions in the Gulf was paying off and that it was too early to stop. Under pressure from the hard-liners for even considering talking to the American president, Rouhani would not commit to the plan unless Trump first committed to lifting the sanctions. Rouhani feared that Trump was interested only in a photo op that he could tout as a sign of Iranian capitulation—which would give Trump the foreign policy win he had been so sorely lacking—and that Trump would not comply with the plan afterward. Yet, somehow, Trump still believes that his unpredictability is an asset.

In the meantime, Middle East allies that Trump values appear to be reconsidering his value to them. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were struck by Trump’s failure to respond to Iran’s provocations and by his explicit lack of interest in defending non-American targets (although he has deployed some new units to the Gulf). Their apprehension about Trump’s reliability as an ally was no doubt reinforced when it emerged that Trump had withheld military aid from Ukraine in an effort to coerce Ukrainian actions to support his reelection efforts. Soon after that, Trump agreed to relocate U.S. troops in Syria, opening the way for Turkey to attack the Kurdish troops that had been cooperating with U.S. aims there. Apart from betraying an ally, this last move will likely ease Iran’s effort to build direct overland ties from Iran via Iraq and Syria to Lebanon.

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates began considering alternative approaches, exploring the possibility of reducing the threat by dealing with Iran. Already last summer, the United Arab Emirates announced its withdrawal from the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen and initiated direct talks with Iran to discuss maritime security and the rising tensions in the region. Since the missile and drone attack, even Saudi Arabia has shown new interest in a cease-fire in Yemen, and Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman has reportedly asked the prime ministers of Pakistan and Iraq to speak to Iran about the possibility of de-escalation. Kuwait has also reached out to Iran. Iran has said it is open to the idea. Previously, both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates had been at the forefront of those pressing the United States for a hard-line policy against Iran.

It would be interesting if Trump’s initiatives set off an independent process that brought greater stability to the Persian Gulf region. Yet this—if it turns out that way—would represent more of a foreign policy victory for Iran than for Trump. It certainly would not further his goal of building an anti-Iranian alliance in the region, and it would not build pressure on Iran to dismantle its nuclear program.

Remember, George W. Bush’s sanctions strategy did not compel the hard-line regime of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to dismantle his nuclear program. Instead, the sanctions led the Iranian electorate to throw out Ahmadinejad and replace him with the moderates led by Rouhani. The moderates then offered the United States essentially the same deal that they had offered in 2003, the last time they were in power. Bush had ignored it then, convinced that his sanctions strategy would bring more satisfactory results, if not bring down the regime altogether. If he had accepted it then, Iran’s nuclear program might have been frozen at a considerably lower level than was the case in 2015. (Iran had zero centrifuges for enriching uranium in 2003; by 2015 it had 19,000.) Now, Trump’s policy has disrupted the region and undermined the Rouhani regime, but no alternative regime is waiting behind the scenes eager to give in to Trump’s demands. The more likely alternative would be Rouhani’s replacement with a hard-line regime.

A former Pentagon official recently commented: “You saw Trump over the course of the first year become more confident in his abilities. It’s dangerous when you’re confident, but you don’t have the requisite competence to go with it.” In this case, Trump’s bluster and chaos, his provocation of Iran, his failure to honor promises, his loose use of threats that he does not intend to carry out, and his inability at this point to offer a credible diplomatic exit out of the confrontation have all contributed heavily to today’s fraught situation. The greatest danger is that the Iranian hard-liners, provoked and increasingly convinced that no one will stand up to them, overshoot, miscalculate, and press to the point of starting a new war in the Middle East, which could easily spread across borders or otherwise trigger other wars that no one wanted or planned for. If the crisis explodes, Trump will not be up to the task of dealing with it.

The post Trump, Iran, and the Foreign Policy of Bluster appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

 

The ongoing pro-democracy demonstrations in Hong Kong put the question directly to Americans: just how important is freedom to us?

There can be no mistake that the demonstrators aim for democratic rule, that they have reason to expect it, and that China denies it to them. The formal structure of the Hong Kong government, and even the 2014 offer of suffrage, control the options available to any electorate that might be tolerated, to maintain Chinese control over the territory. The protests started in June, over legislation that would facilitate criminal extraditions to mainland China. The proposed law came only a year after Hong Kong booksellers offering pro-democracy literature had disappeared and resurfaced in mainland Chinese custody. Protesters are clear in their objectives: vandalism of local Starbucks franchises aimed at pro-Beijing franchisees, not the western brand. U.S. and British flags have occasionally been waved as symbols of democracy. Not only is democracy denied to Hong Kong, but freedom of expression and human rights stand endangered, and the demonstrators know it.

Americans know it too. The question is how far we will go, what we would give up, what costs we would accept, for the sake of rights and freedom for others.

Of course we cannot force democratic reform in Hong Kong, or stop any Chinese crackdown, whether of troops and censorship or in other forms. Some might point to our ongoing assertiveness in the South China Sea, or the Trump administration’s moves against China in the form of trade measures and technology restrictions. But we undertake these for the sake of exports, job creation, property rights, or national security, Would we give up any material benefits for the sake of principle?

There have been historical cases where we sacrificed our advocacy of democracy in part because the country where it was in question seemed unlikely to sustain it, while other stakes loomed large. This does not apply to Hong Kong. The territory has a history of British administration and a lot of western-educated citizens, it is wealthy and informed, and even the hard core demonstrators speak in principled terms rather than of clan or tribal grievance. And while it is in many ways a different case, we know that Taiwan, another “second system” in the “one China” that we diplomatically espouse, has developed a working democracy. Democracy for these people is not a pipe dream that they don’t understand, it is a reasonable and normal expectation that fits with much of their modern history. What other stakes in Hong Kong outweigh democracy?

Institutionally, our answers so far are not uplifting. Tech firms have pulled apps used by Hong Kong protesters. The NBA stifled a franchise owner who tweeted support for the protests. Hollywood has long conceded its freedom of speech to make movies and sell them in China. The U.S. government, even in as unusual a form as the Trump Administration, continues our decades of swerving from trade issues to technology issues to geopolitical tension to human rights remonstrance, and back.   Yes, Congress passed Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act, but other acts passed simultaneously also addressed technology and trade matters.   The Chinese government could be forgiven for believing we care as much about our business deals as about freedom.

It may be that our decades of swerving balanced our widely varied interests. It may be that we maintained a pragmatic balance in sincere belief that Chinese development would lead to greater Chinese freedom. But today China challenges the full range of our interests, geopolitically in its Belt and Road Initiative and in the South China Sea, economically in its technology and trade practices, even in “soft power,” through its Confucian Institutes. We may need, or choose, to contest any number of these challenges. But the question will arise – to what end do we contest China?

America should declare that any balancing of interests, any willingness to collaborate for mutual benefit, occur for us against a backdrop of fundamental values. Equal endowment of all persons with unalienable rights, and governments existing to secure those rights. Chinese leaders may or may not accommodate our motives, but this is where our deepest reactions will come from. And an America premised on unalienable rights and a China espousing Confucian conformity need not be implacably hostile. Within limits, there is room for collaboration on shared interests, each side working to make their beliefs work and patiently waiting for the other to evolve. But the limits are clear: we are open to closer relations as they might grow their respect for rights and freedoms, but we will give up the benefits and accept the costs of unfriendliness the more they suppress freedom’s call. This, by the way, is not interference in Chinese internal affairs: our founding creed may tend to undermine non-democratic regimes, but asserting our nature as we shape external relations. Declaring our reasons for amity or enmity is our sovereign right. And those must be our reasons.

Will America stand up for its principles with Hong Kong? We have not had a consistent long-term policy toward China since the U.S. ping pong team went there in 1971. Now our policy must be clear, and clearly consistent with our own founding. The Hong Kong demonstrators put the question squarely to us. What will we stand for?

The post Why Hong Kong Really Matters to Americans appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

   
   
 
Les mémoires ou travaux de diplomates français se multiplient récemment, et il faut s’en réjouir. On ne saurait trop conseiller aux étudiants de relations internationales de commencer leur exploration du monde par ces témoignages vivants, avant d’aborder la théorie.
Une vieille tradition existe, dont on retrouvera quelques morceaux choisis dans le Dictionnaire amoureux de la diplomatie, de Daniel Jouanneau, qui fut (entre autres fonctions) ambassadeur au Mozambique (1990-1993), au Liban (1997-2000), au Canada (2004-2008) et au Pakistan (2008-2011). Comment, à cet égard, ne pas citer les Souvenirs d'une ambassade à Berlin 1931 – 1938 d’André François-Poncet, qui représenta la France en Allemagne à cette époque, et dont les chroniques permettent de retracer, avec une vision inégalée, la montée du nazisme ? On peut en continuer la lecture par Au palais Farnèse : après Hitler à Berlin, c’est Mussolini, de 1938 à 1940, que le même diplomate français a tenté de comprendre, de décrypter à Rome. De grands diplomates étrangers, ministres des Affaires Etrangères, ambassadeurs ou autres, ont nourri abondamment le genre, de Henry Kissinger (White House Years) à Evgueni Primakov(Au cœur du Pouvoir), de Hans-Dietrich Genscher (Erinnerungen) à Chris Patten (First Confession: A Sort of Memoir), en passant par Dennis Ross (The Missing Peace) ou Richard Holbrooke (To End a War).
Commencer par les mémoires, c’est comprendre la réalité diplomatique de l’intérieur, parcourir des témoignages sur un pays ou une région (comme sur le Moyen-Orient sous la plume de Bernard Bajolet), saisir un éclairage sur un épisode (comme sur le dossier nucléaire iranien, raconté par Gérard Araud), parfois sur une période longue (voir le remarquable ouvrage de Claude Martin qui retrace un demi-siècle d’histoire chinoise). C’est découvrir les faits avant les résumés qui en sont fait, souvent sommairement, dans le débat public. C’est comprendre l’histoire avant d’en lire une interprétation théorique voire idéologique.
Certes, les mémoires d’un acteur sont rarement neutres. Ils peuvent mêmes se prêter « à l’égocentrisme et au potin », comme l’indique d’emblée Gérard Araud. Ils peuvent dégager un parfum désuet à force d’être subtil, au détour d’une écriture convenue. Il peut même leur arriver d’être inintéressants. Mais même ennuyeux, ils dévoilent un auteur, une machine administrative, un dysfonctionnement. Lire les mémoires de nos diplomates, c’est entendre ceux qui ont fait vivre ou rencontré l’histoire. C’est retrouver le vivant derrière la théorie. C’est préférer le terrain aux analyses de seconde main.

Since the end of the Cold War, every U.S. president has come into office promising to build better relations with Russia—and each one has watched that vision evaporate. The first three—Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama—set out to integrate Russia into the Euro-Atlantic community and make it a partner in building a global liberal order. Each left office with relations in worse shape than he found them, and with Russia growing ever more distant.

President Donald Trump pledged to establish a close partnership with Vladimir Putin. Yet his administration has only toughened the more confrontational approach that the Obama administration adopted after Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2014. Russia remains entrenched in Ukraine, is opposing the United States in Europe and the Middle East with increasing brazenness, and continues to interfere in U.S. elections. As relations have soured, the risk of a military conflict has grown.

Read More

The story of how the Tunisian revolution began is well known. On December 17, 2010, a 26-year-old fruit vendor named Mohamed Bouazizi from the town of Sidi Bouzid set himself on fire outside a local government building. The man’s self-immolation—an act of protest against repeated mistreatment by police and local officials—sparked protests that quickly spread across the country. Within a few weeks, President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali had stepped down and fled the country after 23 years in power, offering Tunisia an unprecedented opportunity for a democratic opening. A massive wave of uprisings soon swept the country’s neighbors, reaching all the way to the Levant and the Persian Gulf. 

Read More

The Western Hemisphere faces a migration crisis on a scale similar to the European crisis of 2015, with consequences just as far-reaching.

Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro d’automne de Politique étrangère
(n° 3/2019). Julien Nocetti, spécialiste des questions numériques à l’Ifri, propose une analyse croisée des ouvrages de Henry Farrell et Abraham Newman, Of Privacy and Power: The Transatlantic Struggle over Freedom and Security (Princeton University Press, 2098), Shoshanna Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism. The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of Power (PublicAffairs, 2019) et Amaël Cattaruzza, Géopolitique des données numériques. Pouvoir et conflits à l’heure du Big Data (Le Cavalier Bleu, 2019).

Pour l’expertise en relations internationales, le sujet des données est particulièrement malléable et stimulant. Les données numériques représentent tout à la fois un enjeu de sécurité et de souveraineté pour les États, un enjeu démocratique pour les populations (à travers la question des données personnelles) et un enjeu fondamental de création de valeur pour les entreprises. Début 2018, l’affaire Cambridge Analytica s’était précisément située au croisement de ces différents enjeux, venant rappeler, d’une part, les capacités de riposte des États dans la sphère numérique et, d’autre part, que la vie privée de millions d’individus pèse peu face aux stratégies commerciales des grands acteurs de l’économie numérique. Les trois ouvrages présentés ici abordent, chacun à leur manière, les défis que fait peser l’exploitation toujours plus exponentielle des données en politique internationale, pour la relation transatlantique, et pour l’avenir du capitalisme.

Concis, l’opus du géographe Amaël Cattaruzza est celui qui présente de manière la plus claire et précise l’entremêlement de la problématique des données et de logiques géopolitiques toujours plus complexes. Longtemps, les données – et plus précisément leur circulation, leur stockage, leur traitement, par des acteurs privés et par des États – ont été une composante négligée des Internet studies et de la gouvernance mondiale du numérique. Or, elles s’imposent aujourd’hui comme un enjeu fondamental en matière de gouvernance ; sur ce plan, les enjeux de la gouvernance mondiale de l’Internet, par exemple, ont trop souvent été réduits à la question de la maîtrise du « cœur » de l’Internet, à savoir les ressources critiques et le système de nommage et d’adressage. Un point fort de l’ouvrage est de se distancier d’une stricte lecture de la donnée comme contenu, pour analyser la matérialité de ces données, leur caractère physique présentant un caractère éminemment stratégique à l’heure où les États entendent concevoir des politiques numériques souveraines.

Ainsi les données sont des composantes à part entière d’une souveraineté numérique âprement débattue, en Occident comme ailleurs. La question de la maîtrise des données est devenue la condition sine qua non de l’autonomie stratégique – tant sur le plan économique et industriel que géopolitique, affirme l’auteur. L’émergence d’un discours sur la souveraineté numérique entre dans ce cadre : maintenir les données sur le territoire national, via une politique de localisation, a structuré une véritable géopolitique des centres d’hébergement de données (data centers). La question de la territorialisation des données fait l’objet d’une deuxième partie très instructive. Cette territorialisation révèle des stratégies nationales de la donnée prenant des formes différentes et nuançant partiellement le consensus issu de la mondialisation. Les États-Unis ont fait du contrôle des données l’axe prioritaire tant du redéveloppement économique structuré autour de leurs géants technologiques que de leur stratégie de sécurité. Ces deux éléments se conjuguent dans une longue tradition d’open door policy visant à l’ouverture de marchés et au maintien de la prééminence américaine. La Chine, rappelle l’auteur, se situe dans une démarche décomplexée de puissance nationale, via un effort au long cours de rattrapage technologique et une volonté de briser le monopole numérique occidental. Dans cette optique, les données doivent permettre d’affirmer la vision chinoise du cyberespace autant que servir d’« instrument géopolitique » du projet des Routes de la soie. L’Europe, elle, pâtit d’un double effet ciseau : l’hégémonie américaine et l’affirmation chinoise affaiblissent le continent qui peine à se positionner en puissance industrielle de premier plan, adoptant en conséquence une posture pour l’essentiel défensive qu’est venu illustrer l’adoption du Règlement général sur la protection des données (RGPD), voté en mai 2018.

L’ouvrage des politistes Henry Farrell et Abraham Newman ne traite pas directement des données ; plutôt, il envisage ce sujet au prisme de l’évolution de la relation transatlantique et de la notion de privacy (respect de la vie privée). Les auteurs relèvent l’évolution inexorable des notions (et des tensions autour) de privacy et du secret. Ainsi le rôle traditionnellement prêté aux États en la matière – opacité des processus de décision, collecte d’informations sur les citoyens – a-t-il vécu ou, du moins, est très insuffisant pour appréhender la complexité des mutations en cours. Plutôt qu’un Big Brother centralisé, les auteurs soulignent la menace posée par une architecture de systèmes décentralisés, certains privés, d’autres publics, certains internes, d’autres internationaux, collectant tous des milliards de données sur les individus. L’État n’est ni absent ni obsolète : il recourt aux données pour rationaliser ses services, viser des opposants politiques ou poursuivre des criminels.

L’environnement autour des États a été radicalement altéré par la surveillance décentralisée des navigateurs Internet, l’ubiquité des téléphones mobiles avec des capteurs et réseaux satellitaires qui communiquent instantanément l’information aux maisons-mères, de vastes banques de données commercialisables, et de processus d’apprentissage autonome (machine learning) qui permettent de catégoriser des données et de prédire les comportements. Puisque les États de part et d’autre de l’Atlantique cherchent à globaliser les problématiques de sécurité intérieure, ceux-ci ne recréent pas les vieilles peurs mais les transforment. Ils louent – ou subtilisent – des données commerciales, les combinant avec les leurs, et mettent en place d’énormes bases de données destinées à des acteurs privés comme Palantir qui les exploitent à des fins lucratives. La ligne de démarcation public-privé vole en éclat, et les États ne peuvent que constater qu’ils dépendent d’initiatives privées pour la collecte de données. Aux États-Unis, les campagnes électorales de Barack Obama et de Donald Trump ont recouru à des techniques de micro-ciblage fondées sur la fusion d’informations commerciales sur les comportements des consommateurs et de tendances de vote politique. Les conditions de la privacy évoluent de la gestion de bases de données publiques vers la gestion d’un accès des États à des bases de données privées. Pour les démocraties, il s’agit d’une tendance de fond particulièrement inquiétante, ce que ne manque pas de nous rappeler le propos final de l’ouvrage.

L’universitaire américaine Shoshanna Zuboff prolonge de manière plus large les réflexions décrites ci-haut : selon elle, les violations toujours plus massives de la privacy ne sont ni fortuites ni facultatives ; elles représentent une source primordiale de profit pour les entreprises les plus riches de la planète. Ces acteurs privés ont un rôle financier direct dans le renforcement et le perfectionnement de la surveillance généralisée dont ils bénéficient – ainsi que dans le maintien de la légalité de cet appareil de surveillance. La thèse centrale de l’ouvrage est la suivante : si le capitalisme du XXe siècle reposait sur la production de masse et l’amélioration des revenus de la classe moyenne, le capitalisme du XXIe siècle repose sur la surveillance, soit l’extraction de données personnelles à l’insu des usagers qui en sont à l’origine.

En se concentrant sur les cas de Google et de Facebook, Zuboff démontre que la valeur créée par les grandes plateformes numériques découle de l’exploitation de données comportementales « cachées », comme les cookies (des fragments de code contenant des informations sur l’internaute, laissés sur son navigateur via les sites qu’il fréquente). Ce sont ces cookies qui assurent un profilage fin des internautes à leur insu. Ainsi, l’exploitation des données extraites à partir des comportements passés des individus (en ligne, mais également et de manière croissante dans le monde physique) permet des prédictions de plus en plus précises de leurs comportements futurs. Dès lors, selon l’auteur, le risque pour nos sociétés est qu’il devient possible d’inciter des individus à agir d’une certaine manière, à leur insu, et donc de les façonner.

L’argumentaire de Zuboff n’échappe pas toutefois à une certaine grandiloquence, au point même que certains techno-critiques pourtant acerbes comme Evgueny Morozov considèrent l’analyse de l’auteure trop alarmiste et pessimiste. Le portrait qui est dressé de la Silicon Valley est uniformément noir, ce qui grève la portée politique de son analyse. Selon Zuboff, la Silicon Valley est sous la coupe d’une idéologie instrumentaire radicale (un chapitre est consacré à instrumentarian power) dont l’objectif est de supplanter l’individualisme libéral par une ingénierie sociale à grande échelle. Elle affirme que Google et Facebook sont devenus le « contraire de la démocratie » – la formule est presque devenue mainstream dans la classe politique américaine depuis le scandale Cambridge Analytica et les fuites de données massives et successives qui concernent Facebook. Au final, le lecteur regrettera le manque de profondeur derrière la notion de « capitalisme de surveillance », laquelle aurait sans doute mérité une analyse davantage « micro » et politique. Il n’en reste pas moins que l’ouvrage donne du grain à moudre aux nécessaires et complexes formes de régulation à inventer pour encadrer l’action débridée des géants du numérique.

Julien Nocetti,
chercheur à l’Ifri

 

> > S’abonner à Politique étrangère < <

La rédaction a le plaisir de vous offrir à lire ce second article, « Sahel : soubassements d’un désastre », écrit par Alain Antil, directeur du Centre Afrique subsaharienne de l’Ifri. Il vient de paraître dans notre nouveau numéro de Politique étrangère (n° 3/2019), « Indo-Pacifique : un concept flottant ? ».

Au premier semestre 2019, l’exécutif français demandait au Quai d’Orsay, au ministère des Armées et à l’Agence française de développement (AFD) de travailler sur des scénarios d’évolution de la bande sahélo-saharienne (BSS), et d’envisager de nouvelles approches, tant la dégradation de la situation y semblait rapide. Un regard sur la cartographie dynamique des actes violents suffit en effet à se convaincre d’une aggravation des problèmes.

En premier lieu, les zones touchées par les violences sont en nette extension, et le nombre d’attaques et de victimes s’est accru fortement en 2018, avec un premier semestre 2019 qui prolonge ces tendances. La palette des violences s’est aussi enrichie : actes terroristes certes, mais également conflits entre groupes armés, entre milices d’autodéfense, violences de certaines forces de sécurité (FDS) contre des populations civiles…

Au premier trimestre 2019, des massacres de villages ont par ailleurs commencé à rythmer le centre du Mali et le nord du Burkina Faso. Début janvier, au nord du Burkina, suite à une attaque d’éleveurs peulh sur la localité de Yirgou qui avait occasionné plusieurs morts dont celle du chef de village, des expéditions punitives menées par des populations mossi auraient fait près d’une cinquantaine de morts selon le bilan officiel. En mars 2019, dans le village d’Ogossagou, au centre du Mali, plus de 160 victimes civiles étaient tuées lors d’une attaque d’hommes à motos, présumés liés au groupe d’auto-défense dogon Dan Nan Ambassagou. Ces derniers accusaient les communautés peulh de la zone, dont celle du village d’Ogossagou, d’attaquer des villages dogon, appuyées par les « terroristes » de la Katiba Macina. Conséquence de ces événements : le nombre de déplacés internes et de réfugiés continue de progresser rapidement.

Certes, les marges de progression des armées nationales, en particulier malienne et burkinabè, sont importantes, et, mieux équipées et aguerries, elles pourront sans doute à l’avenir mieux répondre aux défis sécuritaires. D’ailleurs, le Tchad et la Mauritanie, avec des moyens équivalents, pré-sentent de meilleurs résultats quant à la protection de leur territoire. Mais aujourd’hui, force est de constater les grandes difficultés des appareils sécuritaires.

De plus, l’horizon reste globalement sombre, tant les tendances fondamentales de la zone demeurent préoccupantes. L’explosion démographique n’est pas un problème dans l’absolu mais de facto elle accentue tous les problèmes, à commencer par les besoins de services de base des populations, déjà difficilement couverts. Les économies nationales sont des économies de rentes, caractérisées par une importante prédation des élites. Un nombre restreint de produits sont exportés ; d’où l’exposition de chaque économie nationale, de chaque budget, aux évolutions aléatoires des cours mondiaux des dits produits. La baisse du cours du pétrole brut depuis 2014 a ainsi cruellement impacté le Tchad.

Cette complexion économique produit des marchés de l’emploi particulièrement atones, dont les capacités à créer de bons emplois ne couvrent pas 10 % des entrants annuels. Dans des pays où l’âge médian de la population est particulièrement bas (entre 15 et 17 ans selon les pays du G5 Sahel), les économies ne pourront pas profiter du dividende démographique, et l’état des marchés de l’emploi est une mécanique infernale et menaçante de frustration pour la jeunesse.

Les États s’appuient sur des bases fiscales étroites, et dépendent structurellement de l’aide extérieure pour mettre en place leurs politiques, voire simplement pour le traitement de leurs fonctionnaires. Lorsque le boom minier ou pétrolier leur permet temporairement d’échapper à cette réalité, les largesses budgétaires ne sont pas forcément utilisées pour mettre les pays sur les rails du développement ou de la diversification économique. Pour la Mauritanie, Moussa Fall, président du Mouvement pour le changement démocratique (MDC), pointe, dans un document non publié intitulé 2008-2018. Une décennie perdue, le mésusage des ressources issues du boom minier, notamment au profit d’infrastructures de prestige, ou de la très discutable priorisation des investissements.

Les élites, ou tout du moins une partie d’entre elles, considèrent l’aide comme une rente et, plutôt que de d’ordonnancer les aides et les coopérations de développement en accord avec les plans de développement nationaux, préfèrent les recevoir de manière désordonnée, sans cohérence avec les politiques sectorielles nationales, afin qu’un maximum de flux de financements puissent être captés. Ainsi – on y reviendra –, c’est la présence même de l’État qui se détricote.

Enfin, l’absence de sursaut de ces élites est peut-être l’élément le plus inquiétant. On aurait pu espérer qu’au Mali par exemple, après la défaite de l’armée en 2012 et la rapide dégradation de la situation au Centre, s’instaure une autre gouvernance ; que des lignes rouges s’imposent contre les pratiques de corruption, de népotisme et de clientélisme qui avaient mené à la catastrophe. Or, le cours politique semble s’écouler paisiblement à Bamako, sans changement majeur, alors que plus de la moitié du territoire national est aujourd’hui contrôlée par d’autres acteurs que l’État. Cette incapacité à intégrer les leçons d’une triste décennie constitue sans doute la plus grande faute de ces élites contre le devenir national. […]

Lisez l’article dans son intégralité ici.

> > S’abonner à Politique étrangère < <

Le nouveau numéro de Politique étrangère (n° 3/2019) vient de paraître ! Il consacre un dossier complet à l’Indo-Pacifique et un Contrechamps à la stabilisation du Sahel. Comme à chaque nouveau numéro, de nombreux autres articles viennent éclairer l’actualité : l’Union européenne et les défis migratoires, la contestation de la mondialisation, le financement de la prolifération des armes de destruction massive…

Indo-Pacifique : le concept, qui n’a que quelques années, veut exprimer une nouvelle structure de la mondialisation de la planète. En termes d’échanges économiques, et de distribution de puissance, c’est bien une zone unitaire qui se dessine du golfe Arabo-Persique au Pacifique, où se croisent, se mesurent, s’affrontent toutes les grandes puissances. Il faut penser cette aire nouvelle, et les moyens d’y agir : dispositifs politiques, économiques et militaires.

Mais ce concept d’Indo-Pacifique est aussi une tentative d’encadrer la montée en puissance chinoise, de la brider dans un entrelacs de puissances limitant son poids. L’acceptera-t-elle ? Et pourra-t-on organiser la coexistence d’intérêts si divers, dans une zone si vaste, en tenant compte des spécificités régionales et locales ?

Le dossier de Politique étrangère pèse la pertinence d’un concept qui tente de penser une zone stratégique-pivot.

Autre espace d’importance, particulièrement pour les Européens : le Sahel – qui fait l’objet de la rubrique Contrechamps de ce numéro. Ce Sahel si proche de nous est-il condamné à la misère et à la violence ? Les États de la région parviendront-ils à rétablir leur autorité sur leur propre espace ? Les forces de sécurité à protéger les populations, et non à les insécuriser ? Et l’aide internationale a-t-elle vraiment pris la mesure des causes multiples de l’instabilité de la région, qui dépassent de beaucoup ce que nous résumons au terme de terrorisme ?

* * *

Découvrez le sommaire complet ici.

Lisez gratuitement :

• l’article d’Alain Antil, « Sahel : soubassements d’un désastre »
• l’article de Matthieu Tardis, « L’UE est-elle prête pour les prochains défis migratoires ? »
  

 

 > > Suivez-nous sur Twitter : @Pol_Etrangere ! < <

Le 11 Septembre 2001 le terrorisme frappait l’Amérique.

Redécouvrez le dossier publié par Politique étrangère (n° 3/2011), « Après le 11 Septembre : les États-Unis et le Grand Moyen-Orient », 10 ans après cet attentat terroriste à l’ampleur inédite.

« Dix ans après, pourquoi revenir sur un 11 septembre qui n’a cessé de faire parler ? Parce que, volens nolens, la date représente bien un seuil. Un seuil dans la découverte d’un monde nouveau né de l’après-guerre froide, mais demeuré, dans la dernière décennie du XXe siècle, une sorte de brouillon quelque peu mystérieux. Un seuil dans l’utilisation symbolique de la violence contre la puissance – le « génie » terroriste est là : non dans la frappe elle-même, somme toute assez élémentaire quant à sa manœuvre, mais dans le choix de la cible : les Twin Towers, image de la modernité, de la richesse et de l’arrogance du fort. Un seuil aussi dans l’évolution de la société internationale : la violente mise en cause de la force américaine s’est accompagnée ces dix dernières années de l’affirmation progressive de pays qui seront demain les puissances « émergées », lesquelles, au sens le plus précis de l’expression, bouleverseront l’ordre du monde.

La frappe traumatisante du 11 septembre a eu des effets directs sur les rapports de force dans le monde. Un instant tétanisée, la puissance dominante de la planète, fugitivement rêvée en « gendarme du monde » dans les années 1990, a violemment réagi, en développant une irrépressible force de transformation. Transformation des visions classiques de la sécurité – la « guerre contre la terreur » a d’abord été une lutte contre les terroristes, renforcée dans toutes les sociétés concernées et en définitive relativement victorieuse. Les victoires ne peuvent être ici que relatives, mais se prouvent par l’absence ou la limitation des faits : le monde n’a pas connu, ces dernières années, les dévastations qui semblaient promises par le coup inaugural du 11 septembre. Transformation de certains rapports internationaux au nom de cette lutte globale contre la terreur : rapports d’alliances redéfinis, coopérations entre services de police ou de renseignement, etc. Transformation, enfin, dans un espace cardinal supposé être à l’origine de nombre de maux « terroristes » : le monde musulman, plus ou moins assimilé, dans une certaine pensée américaine, au « Grand Moyen-Orient » des discours bushiens.

Cette puissance transformatrice, les États-Unis l’ont maniée sans complexe, appuyés sur leurs deux cartes maîtresses : la puissance économique et la puissance militaire. Avec des résultats complexes à analyser. L’efficacité a été moins globale que prévu : l’emblème est ici le destin pour le moins incertain de la zone AfPak. Et, paradoxe, là où elle fut incontestable, la transformation s’est révélée au final plus perturbatrice qu’organisatrice : voir l’exemple irakien et plus largement la région moyen-orientale au sens traditionnel de ce terme.

***

C’est donc à travers le prisme du Moyen-Orient – de stricte ou de large définition – que ce numéro de Politique étrangère a choisi d’analyser, dix ans plus tard, les conséquences du 11 septembre. Un Moyen-Orient décisif – politiquement, économiquement, moralement même – pour des Occidentaux qui donnent encore pour un temps le la des débats politiques de la planète ; mais décisif aussi, par exemple en termes énergétiques, pour la puissance chinoise. Un espace où se joue, depuis les révolutions arabes du printemps 2011, une grande part du débat sur la démocratisation des sociétés politiques, débat largement hérité de la fin de la guerre froide mais qui avait peu progressé après les premiers enthousiasmes des années 1990. Une aire où se joue une bonne part de l’assise diplomatique et militaire de la (toujours) première puissance de la planète.

Que représentent aujourd’hui les États-Unis dans le Grand Moyen-Orient qu’ils essayèrent de définir, de redéfinir sous les deux mandats de George W. Bush ? Une force économique et militaire considérable ? Une référence : positive, négative, ou mêlée ? Une force en voie de marginalisation, ou en plein retour à partir d’autres règles ? Le positionnement de Washington face au printemps arabe a été à la fois hésitant et subtil, et tels Européens qui annoncèrent voici plusieurs mois l’extinction de l’influence américaine dans la région paraissent aujourd’hui bien pressés.

Washington devrait continuer de jouer dans la région trois cartes majeures : sa puissance économique et militaire (même si cette dernière montre ses limites, chacun sait qu’elle reste décisive, comparée à celle des autres) ; son image, contradictoire et mixte dans la plupart des opinions publiques de la zone, sauf sans doute à l’est où elle est plus largement rejetée, en Afghanistan ou au Pakistan ; et l’absence des autres. Chacun souhaite que l’affaire libyenne se termine positivement, au premier chef pour le peuple libyen, puis pour nos armées qui y sont engagées. Mais on ne peut guère prétendre que les derniers mois ont mis en scène des acteurs internationaux susceptibles de remplacer les États-Unis face aux traumatismes régionaux qui s’annoncent.

***

Au-delà, se pencher sur le Moyen-Orient dix ans après le 11 septembre dans ses rapports avec l’Amérique, c’est aussi parler de l’ailleurs, du monde qui va, hors des obsessions de la « guerre contre la terreur ». L’équilibre des puissances change, même si le résultat futur du changement n’est pas connu, et le Moyen-Orient est aussi le champ d’exercice de ces nouveaux rapports de force : avec des puissances désormais de premier rang comme la Chine, ou d’autres comme l’Iran ou la Turquie. Ce nouveau damier de la puissance n’a pas trouvé les formes de cogouvernement qui lui correspondent : la nouvelle gouvernance mondiale hésite et balbutie, et cela se traduit d’abord dans cette région. Enfin, l’ouverture économique et technologique des sociétés modèle de nouvelles formes de vie sociale et politique, sans doute déterminantes pour les systèmes de gouvernement et les gouvernances futures : et cela est aussi à l’œuvre dans l’aire arabe et moyen-orientale.

Le dossier exceptionnel que propose ce numéro de Politique étrangère dépasse donc de beaucoup sa thématique : les rapports entre les États-Unis et le Grand Moyen-Orient dans le sillage du 11 septembre. À travers le devenir d’une région qui reste décisive et celui d’une puissance qui demeure, au-delà de ses traumatismes et de ses erreurs, la « puissance référente », c’est l’avenir des équilibres internationaux qui s’y joue dans ses multiples dimensions : énergétique, démographique, militaire et tout simplement démocratique. »

Retrouvez en libre accès tous les anciens numéros de Politique étrangère, de 1936 à 2005 sur Persée, puis à partir de 2005 en barrière mobile de 3 ans sur Cairn.

Pendant que le Sud-Soudan prépare son indépendance et le délicat partage des ressources pétrolières, un commerce moins exposé prospère dans la région : celui de la gomme arabique, une substance qui entre dans la composition de nombreux produits, dont le Coca-Cola… / États-Unis (affaires extérieures), (...) / États-Unis (affaires extérieures), Soudan, Agriculture, Agroalimentaire, Commerce international, Entreprise, Industrie, Islam, Relations internationales, Terrorisme, Fondamentalisme, Matières premières - 2011/04

Douze ans après le conflit qui devait conduire la province serbe à majorité albanaise sur la voie de l'indépendance, enquêtes et témoignages révèlent l'ampleur des exactions commises par des membres de l'Armée de libération du Kosovo (UCK). Les victimes se comptent aussi bien parmi les civils serbes que (...) / Albanie, Kosovo, République fédérale de Yougoslavie 1992-2003, Armée, Criminalité, Guérilla, Minorité nationale, Parti politique, Violence, Serbie - 2011/03

« Placer l'élève au centre du système éducatif », « respecter son rythme propre », « ouvrir l'école sur l'extérieur », le tout sur fond de « projets » et autres « partenariats »... Telle est la nouvelle idéologie qui occupe le devant de la scène scolaire française. Introduite par la loi d'orientation de 1989, (...) / Éducation, Inégalités, Société - 1998/11

The United States is in its 11th year of uninterrupted economic expansion, unemployment has hit a historic low, and growth, while decelerating, still hums along. Yet anxiety about the next recession seems to mount with each new tariff or tweet that President Donald Trump lobs at China as part of his trade war—and for good reason. The president’s policies are clearly hurting tradeable sectors of the U.S. economy, especially manufacturing, which must contend with the double whammy of U.S. tariffs on imported inputs and Chinese tariffs on exports of finished goods. U.S. producers of vehicles, electronics, and agricultural goods, among other things, are all scrambling to disentangle their supply chains from China. But doing so is costly and complicated, and many of them are suffering as a result.   

Inédite en Afrique, cette partition « à l'amiable » au Soudan vise à mettre un terme à des décennies de conflits. Mais elle laisse en suspens des éléments clés de la stabilité régionale : le partage de la rente pétrolière et la délimitation des frontières. / Afrique, Soudan, Christianisme, Islam, (...) / Afrique, Soudan, Christianisme, Islam, Colonisation, Frontières, Soudan du Sud - 2011/02

Dans le récent débat sur la réforme des retraites, un thème a progressivement fait consensus : il faut une grande réforme systémique, celle du système par points. C'est ce que préparent le Parti socialiste et la CFDT, au risque d'accentuer les inégalités. / France, Entreprise, Parti politique, (...) / France, Entreprise, Parti politique, Politique, Travail, Retraites - 2010/12

 

http://www.quiz-maker.com/QTEEGR0

The post Foreign Affairs Quiz appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

L'effondrement boursier et les faillites en cascade qui ont frappé la plupart des pays asiatiques n'ont pas épargné Hongkong, rentré dans le giron de la Chine en 1997. De plus, longtemps considéré comme la porte d'entrée du marché chinois, l'ancien « dragon » a vu son rôle se restreindre au fur et à (...) / Asie, Chine, Hongkong - 2003/06 Contestations