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Diplomacy & Crisis News

Tinder Is the Latest Social Media Battleground in Thai Protests

Foreign Policy - Fri, 02/10/2020 - 21:58
Authorities are struggling as protesters break anti-monarchy taboos.

The End of the Age of Insurgency

Foreign Policy - Fri, 02/10/2020 - 21:09
A wave of insurgent Islamism arrived in the West 20 years ago—and disappeared just as quickly.

The Death of Human Rights in India?

Foreign Policy - Fri, 02/10/2020 - 18:59
New Delhi has a long history of harassing international NGOs. But under Modi, things may reach a tipping point.

Beijing Is Winning the Clean Energy Race

Foreign Policy - Fri, 02/10/2020 - 18:51
The technology to build new green economies is mostly produced in China. That’s bad for the United States.

Will Trump’s Case of COVID-19 Endanger U.S. National Security?

Foreign Policy - Fri, 02/10/2020 - 18:50
Officials are warily watching for adversaries like Russia, Iran, and North Korea to exploit the moment.

Guterres: Only way to remove nuclear risk, ‘completely eliminate nuclear weapons’

UN News Centre - Fri, 02/10/2020 - 18:38
The elimination of nuclear weapons is vital to the “survival of life on this planet”, the UN chief told the final major event of the General Assembly’s high level week on Friday.  

Gorbachev Was Right About German Reunification

Foreign Policy - Fri, 02/10/2020 - 18:27
Thatcher and Mitterrand nearly stopped it from happening, but 30 years on, reunification remains the world’s most successful geopolitical experiment.

Iraq urged to investigate attacks on women human rights defenders

UN News Centre - Fri, 02/10/2020 - 17:13
UN-appointed independent rights experts have urged the Iraqi authorities to investigate the murder of a female human rights defender, and the attempted killing of another, targeted “simply because they are women”.

Samsung’s Q70R 4K HDTV QLED: Should You Buy This Over an OLED?

The National Interest - Fri, 02/10/2020 - 17:10

Ethen Kim Lieser

Technology,

Does it provide the right features at the right price? 

If you have a strong desire to dip your toes into the waters of Samsung’s QLED HDTV offerings, the 65-inch Q70R Series would be a great place to start.

Sporting a reasonable price tag of $1,600, know that the Q70R is much cheaper than its OLED TV rivals—which can easily dig deep into the $2K to $4K range. Despite the smaller investment, you can be rest assured that you’ll still be getting the second-best panel on the planet.

With this particular model, you’re on the receiving end of outstanding overall image quality with plenty-deep black levels. The high light output—a major strength of QLEDs—and next-generation full-array local dimming also work wonderfully well, so you’ll surely enjoy the lively and accurate colors.

You’ll also be blessed with a true 120Hz panel, which does improve the TV’s overall motion performance, and know that it fully supports HDR content in HLG and HDR10+ formats. The set’s robust video processing is known to be a welcome boon for hardcore gamers and lovers of intense action films.

Other reviewers had a similar take. “With a 120Hz refresh rate and software features to reduce motion blur and optimize the smallest of details (dew flying off a football, for example), and an approachable price tag, the Samsung Q70R is the perfect TV to catch up on all your favorite sports action,” Digital Trends recently wrote.

“It’s one of the best in its class, and the QLED screen with its higher brightness potential brings to life scenes brimming with natural light, like baseball, football, and soccer.”

Be aware that wide-angle viewing falls a bit short of the Q80 Series model, so if you have wider or wraparound seating arrangements, make sure to take note of that. And if you find yourself often watching TV during the daytime or in a bright room, the Q70R really does an honorable job of masking those annoying glares and reflections.

For the Q70R and many other QLED models, Samsung employs its own built-in digital assistant Bixby—but many users have shared their frustrations with this feature.

It, unfortunately, doesn’t come close to the skills of Google Assistant or Amazon Alexa, which can often be found on rivals from LG to Sony. Keep in mind that the 2019 and later versions, though, will be able to respond to voice commands issued via Alexa and Google Assistant smart speakers.

The set also comes with the ultra-cool Ambient Mode, enabling you to display a digital photo that matches the wall behind the panel.

The design of the Q70R Series can be described as classic Samsung. The panel is as thin as you can get for a QLED TV right now and it does exude a slick and refined look.

Ethen Kim Lieser is a Minneapolis-based Science and Tech Editor who has held posts at Google, The Korea Herald, Lincoln Journal Star, AsianWeek and Arirang TV. Follow or contact him on LinkedIn.

Image: Samsung. 

Double Trouble: MQ-9A Reaper Drone Can Now Carry 8 Hellfire Missiles

The National Interest - Fri, 02/10/2020 - 16:46

Kris Osborn

Security,

A new upgrade means that the battle-tested drone just got more deadly.

The U.S. Air Force MQ-9A Reaper drone is getting nearly double the amount of firepower, due to a new software upgrade that enables the aircraft to carry eight Hellfire missiles instead of four. 

The Reaper flew with eight live AGM-114 Hellfire missiles September 10 as part of what the service calls the drone’s “persistent attack” role. More weapons, coupled with longer-range, higher-fidelity sensors and improved fuel tanks naturally increases dwell time over enemy targets, an ability to re-task to new targets as intelligence emerges and of course put more effects on target when needed. 

The added weapons are part of an Air Force software upgrade program called the MQ-9 Operational Flight Program 2409. 

“Previous to this software, the MQ-9 was limited to four AGM-114s across two stations. The new software allows flexibility to load the Hellfire on stations that previously were reserved for 500-pound class bombs or fuel tanks,” an Air Force report states. 

The Reaper can still be armed with 500-pound bombs on any of the stations as well, so the platform will retain its attack flexibility, depending upon mission requirements. 

The Reaper will now fire the AIM-9X in addition to the AGM-114 Hellfire missile, a 500-pound laser-guided weapon called the GBU-12 Paveway II, and GBU-38 Joint Direct Attack Munitions or JDAMs. These are free-fall bombs engineered with a GPS and Inertial Navigation Systems guidance kit.

This added Hellfire attack possibility introduces several new tactical possibilities and, one could certainly observe, helps transition the platform into a modern warfare posture in an area of great power competition. Certainly in a large-scale mechanized warfare scenario, additional tank-killing Hellfire missile attack options could prove tactically useful.

During the last fifteen years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Reaper operated with great success conducting precision-drone strikes against terrorists and other high-value targets. 

Now the Air Force seems to be working toward further transitioning the combat-tested drone into preparations for great power warfare. This appears to be a sensible next step along an evolving trajectory for the drone through which the Air Force has consistently added new weapons and expanded mission scope for the aircraft. 

The move to fire an AIM-9X is significant as well, given that it adds additional possibilities for major power warfare, such as air-to-air combat. Earlier this year, the MQ-9 Reaper successfully destroyed a drone cruise missile target with the well-known and highly effective AIM-9X precision air-to-air missile. The AIM-9X fires from the F-35 and F-22 stealth fighter jets and has in recent years been upgraded with improved precision-guidance technologies. Other upgrades also include “off boresight” targeting, enabling pilots to destroy enemy targets behind the aircraft. This is quite significant, as “off-boresight” technology can actually guide the AIM -9X to turn around and change course while in-flight using a pilot’s helmet-mounted cueing system. This massively expands the Reaper’s target envelope. 

Engineering a Reaper for air-to-air combat missions does seem to represent a sensible and technically advanced evolution of the platform, greatly expanding its mission purview. Armed with an AIM-9X, a Reaper can perform new offensive or defensive operations by virtue of using the missile as an “interceptor” stopping approaching enemy cruise missiles or an offensive attack against enemy aircraft. 

Kris Osborn is defense editor for the National Interest. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Masters Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.

Image: Reuters

Should Ukraine Conduct Local Elections along the Donbas Contact Line?

Foreign Policy Blogs - Fri, 02/10/2020 - 16:22

Current military-civil administration in eastern Ukrainian frontline districts need to be kept in place and partially reformed. Should the Donets Basin return to Ukrainian control, they could provide institutional templates for a temporary special regime within the currently occupied territories.

On October 25th this year, Ukraine will hold its first nation-wide local and regional elections following the completion of the first stage of decentralisation reforms that began in April 2014. This year’s vote will thus have deeper political impact than similar elections in the past. This is especially true with regard to local parliamentarians and village elders elected in October as part of the newly amalgamated territorial communities (ATCs) who will be responsible for a whole new set of tasks. The upcoming local and regional elections constitute a significant step for Ukraine’s ongoing democratisation, reform and Europeanisation.

Elections are inconceivable, however, in the Russian occupied territories of the Donets Basin (Donbas). Contrary to plans in Moscow and also to the ideas of some unsuspecting Western politicians, Ukraine should not conduct elections in an area over which it currently does not have full sovereignty. After five years of intense discussion, one can still find interpretations of the 2014-2015 Minsk Agreements suggesting that Kyiv hold elections on territories not yet under its control. In the best case, such demands are naive. In the worst case, they betray their proponents’ limited commitment to such principles as national sovereignty, the rule of law and liberal democracy. The control of a territory by one (and only one!) national government comes before elections and decentralisation. Securing local democracy and self-government for Ukraine’s occupied territories can only become a matter of practical implementation after the question regarding sovereign state control has been comprehensively resolved.

The instrument of provisional military-civilian rule

Yet what about local elections in the government-controlled areas of the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts? What especially about those rayons, cities, and territorial communities that are in the immediate vicinity of the so-called “contact line”? Should elections be held along the artificial border created by the conflict?

Since 2015, the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, as well as most frontline settlements, have not been self-governed. Instead, they have been ruled by temporary so-called military-civil administration (MCAs). The key staff of the MCAs are directly appointed by Kyiv. They are subordinate to the Commander of Ukraine’s Joint Forces Operation (JFO) in the Donbas. Before officially enshrining MCAs in Ukrainian law, Petro Poroshenko argued in January 2015 that: “This will allow today to resolve the issue of the absence of power in the liberated territories from where in fact all the elected deputies of local councils who held separatist positions, committed crimes, and are hiding from justice have fled.”

Initially, the February 2015 Law “On Military-Civilian Administrations” was supposed to expire after one year. Yet, it has since been repeatedly prolonged and amended to meet changing circumstances. The number of municipal and sub-regional MCAs on the local and rayon levels has gradually increased. The MCAs hold all ordinary legislative and executive responsibilities, alongside some emergency powers, in the respective districts and settlements. Consequently, they have largely abolished local self-government and political life in these territories. The MCAs represent specific municipal or regional ‘hybrid regimes’, which merge the characteristics of ordinary centralised rule with elements of martial law. However, they do not yet constitute a full state of emergency.

The peculiar instrument of military-civil administration was and arguably still is a necessary intermediate solution to the immense problems in the territories. Classical local self-government is unsuitable in active or potential combat zones of low-intensity conflicts. Given the grave conditions of conflict-related political instability and economic deprivation in the area, the MCAs are an appropriate instrument to secure elementary order and to prevent Russian subversion across the contact line. Nevertheless, there is currently an intense debate within Ukraine regarding local elections in government-controlled areas of the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts that are situated close to the so-called contact line separating Ukrainian and Russian-led forces. This was caused by the decision of the Central Electoral Commission to not conduct elections in 18 of these communities and to leave military-civilian administration in place there.

The MCAs clearly contradict Ukraine’s far-reaching decentralisation reforms since 2014. As Konstantin Reutski and Ioulia Shukan noted in one of the first papers on this topic: “In the absence of an elected representative body, collective decision-making and separation of legislative and executive functions, checks and balances are weak. The MCA heads exercise personal control over their administrations (Article 6 [of the law ‘On MCAs’]): they hire and fire MCA employees, oversee the entire operation and are personally responsible for all areas of the MCA’s performance. In addition to this, they are the sole managers of the MCA’s budget. The law on military-civil administrations does not require any community boards to be established in association with the MCAs, and this lack of external supervision further increases the personal power vested in the MCA head and removes all barriers to autocratic governance.”

The necessity of continued military-civilian rule

Under peaceful conditions, the October 2020 local and regional elections would have been a key opportunity to replace the MCAs with properly elected councils, elders and mayors. This is all the more so given their enlarged responsibilities within the newly established ATCs. However, holding elections in the frontline districts seems, for three reasons, premature. First, meaningful elections are technically difficult to conduct in settlements close to the so-called contact line. Many of the inhabitants of these villages and towns have temporarily left their homes and moved to other parts of Ukraine out of fear or/and desperation. It would be difficult to involve such internally displaced persons within these elections concerning their native communities. Moreover, the physical, social and human infrastructure of the frontline regions has been deeply damaged by the war. These and other special circumstances make normal electoral campaigns and legitimate voting processes in the frontline settlements a considerable challenge. 

Second, the currently MCA-ruled regions and settlements are key targets for Russian infiltration and manipulation operations. Television and radio channels belonging to Russia and its two puppet states, the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk “people’s republics,” dominate mass media along the contact line. If Moscow has managed to interfere in voting process in France, Great Britain and the United States, then it is surely able and willing to try the same in Russian-speaking villages and towns located only a few miles away from its proxy troops and sattelite regimes in Donbas.

Thirdly and perhaps most importantly, questions still remain as to what newly elected bodies would be actually doing in many, if not most, of these towns and villages. Local self-government involves above all the collection and distribution of taxes and revenues within the community. Classical municipal administrations are also responsible for attracting domestic and foreign investment to their respective towns and territories. Yet, since spring 2014, these tasks have, as a result of the war, often become irrelevant to different degrees or even absent in settlements along the contact line. Normal economic, social, cultural and political life will likely remain greatly reduced in the frontline districts, for the time being.

Instead, the prevalent concerns along the contact line, from Stanytsa Luhanska in the north to Mariupol in the south, continue to involve issues of security and military affairs. Many of the frontline districts have checkpoints, whose functioning determines local economic life. Control over checkpoints is exercised by Kyiv, on the government-controlled side, and Russian proxy authorities in Luhansk and Donetsk on the occupied side. Local executives in frontline settlements are focused on how to best use scarce government subsidies to solve various competing infrastructure problems. These include the supply of electricity, water, heat and medicine, as well as the organisation of care for children, pensioners and the sick. There are also persisting issues with repairs to damaged residential houses and public buildings. In fact, some of these tasks have now been partially taken over by foreign organisations such as the International Red Cross, Norwegian Refugee Council, and “Doctors without Borders.” Under these circumstances, it is unclear what local self-government would actually mean along the frontline.

Instead of conducting risky and inconclusive local elections in the JFO area, Ukraine should maintain the MCAs as long as and where they are necessary. Kyiv should also introduce new legislation that would improve the functioning of these bodies. It may perhaps be even necessary to amend the Ukrainian constitution so as to legally embed these special intermediary local regimes. Currently, the MCAs are neither fully constitutional nor set up in a way so as to function over a longer period of time.

How to bring the MCAs closer to the people

Instead of conducting elections under uncertain circumstances, the current special regime has to be improved so as to set up alternative feedback mechanisms between the MCAs and local communities. MCA heads are often already in close contact with state-run institutions, such as hospitals and schools. Simultaneously, many also regularly interact with local NGOs, businesses, parties and media outlets. These relationships should be formalised through the creation of permanent advisory councils that are attached to the MCAs. The MCAs’ heads could be, by amending the law, forced to consider the opinion of these councils, which could be filled with NGO, business, party and media representatives. The authorities could be legally obliged to seek the advice of these councils in all decisions concerning municipal matters such as housing, transportation, education, public health, etc. (and less so with regard to security and military issues).

The Ukrainian government, civil society and their foreign partners should do more to support local conditions in Donbas, which have been weakened by the post-Euromaidan war and crisis more than any other region of Ukraine (except for Crimea). The improvement of administrative structures in the conflict-affected areas has a security-political dimension that goes beyond the usual demands of good governance. Particular attention needs to be paid to the development of new regional political and administrative elites. These groups could take over various leadership roles at municipal, rayon and regional levels in the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts, following their return to Ukrainian control.

Arguably, it may make sense to include local communities, in one way or another, in the process of choosing appropriate candidates for the staffing of the MCAs. It could be also useful to set up an official complaint procedure through which local civic organisations, business groups, media outlets and political parties could report any misconduct by MCA representatives to the JFO headquarters. These complaints may concern cases of bribe-taking, nepotism or arbitrariness by MCA heads and staff members. While such changes would still not represent properly democratic and decentralised rule, it may be the only way to establish a sustainable regime in the region as long as the war continues.

The MCAs as templates for transitional rule in the occupied territories

Last but not least, these hybrid regimes could provide a model for responding to other emergency situations in the future. Above all, the MCAs could provide a template for how to govern the currently occupied territories of Donbas during a potential transition period between their liberation from Russian occupation, and eventually full participation in Ukraine’s general decentralised rule of local communities. The MCAs as a provisional model will be especially useful should the occupied territories not be temporarily controlled by an international UN peacekeeping operation, following a possible Russian withdrawal.

In such a scenario, Kyiv will need to first create an emergency regime in the territories of the former so-called “People’s Republics” in order to properly and peacefully demilitarize them, and to re-ukrainianize these areas’ economies, polities and societies, with the help of MCAs. The amalgamation of small municipal communities and local elections to newly defined organs of self-government will only make sense after the territories’ full re-integration into Ukraine. At that point, the currently occupied territories will become full parts of the decentralised Ukrainian state.

Should Ukraine conduct local elections along the Donbas contact line?

Trump and First Lady Test Positive for Coronavirus, With Trump Showing Mild Symptoms

The National Interest - Fri, 02/10/2020 - 16:21

Rachel Bucchino

Security, Americas

The president has repeatedly downplayed the severity of the coronavirus since the start of the pandemic, as he’s said it was “going to disappear” and that it was “rounding the corner,” despite it infecting more than 7.2 million Americans. 

President Donald Trump and first lady Melania Trump have tested positive for the coronavirus, pushing the nation into another period of uncertainty in terms of the country’s leadership, as the virus’s death toll outstrips 208,000 people and millions remain sickened from the deadly disease. 

President Trump, seventy-four, was diagnosed after a suspenseful evening when a close aide to the president, Hope Hicks, tested positive Thursday morning. Hicks is among Trump’s closest staffers to have contracted the virus. The two of them had been aboard Air Force One and Marine One this week together and attended a campaign rally in Minnesota on Wednesday. The president took to Twitter to break the news, assuring the nation that the first couple “will get through this.” 

“Tonight, @FLOTUS and I tested positive for COVID-19,” Trump tweeted, “We will begin our quarantine and recovery process immediately. We will get through this TOGETHER!”

Just moments later, White House physician Dr. Sean Conley released a statement, noting that Trump and the first lady “are both well at this time, and they plan to remain at home within the White House during their convalescence." 

“The White House medical team and I will maintain a vigilant watch, and I appreciate the support provided by some of our country’s greatest medical professionals and institutions. Rest assured I expect the President to continue carrying out his duties without disruption while recovering, and I will keep you updated on any future developments," Conley added. 

The first lady also added to the Twitter feed and echoed the president’s remarks, saying “we are feeling good.” Melania reported that like “too many” other Americans, she and her husband would quarantine for the proper amount of time, forcing her to postpone “all upcoming engagements.” 

Both Trump and Melania have come into close contact with dozens of people on the campaign trail, considering there are only thirty-two days until Election Day. The news comes after he told an audience Thursday night that “the end of the pandemic is in sight.” The president and his entourage also flew to New Jersey for a fundraiser at his gold club in Bedminster on Thursday after hearing of Hicks’s diagnosis, where he came into close contact with a number of other people, including campaign supporters. Officials close to Trump told The Washington Post that the president did not wear a mask at the event. 

The New York Times reported that Trump is experiencing mild, cold-like symptoms Friday morning, but it’s unclear how far the infection has spread among the White House team. Vice President Mike Pence and second lady Karen Pence tested negative for the coronavirus on Friday, hours after news surfaced about the first couple. Pence’s press secretary Devin O’Malley took to Twitter to make the formal announcement, noting that the vice-president “wishes the Trumps well in their recovery.” 

In the meantime, aides will continue to be tested and contacts traced for the virus, with the heavy encouragement to remain home in quarantine. All presidential and political travel will be temporarily canceled, according to The Washington Post, which will impose enormous pressure on Trump’s campaign trail during the last four weeks heading into the election.  

Although he appears to be mildly symptomatic, the president will miss crucial time on his campaign trail against Democratic nominee Joe Biden. The White House did not indicate how long the first couple will remain contained, but it did cancel his in-person events for Friday in Florida, leaving the only measure on his public schedule a telephone call about “Covid-19 support to vulnerable seniors.” Other events for the weekend in key battleground states have also been squashed, posing a threat to his re-election chances in an already competitive race to the White House. The president has repeatedly downplayed the severity of the coronavirus since the start of the pandemic, as he’s said it was “going to disappear” and that it was “rounding the corner,” despite it infecting more than 7.2 million Americans.  

Trump also mocked Biden at the first presidential debate for wearing a mask. The president has been known to question the effectiveness of masks and placed distrust in public health experts in combating the virus. “I don’t wear masks like him,” he said, referring to his political opponent. “Every time you see him, he’s got a mask.” It’s unclear if Biden has been infected by the coronavirus after coming into contact with the president Tuesday night. 

The White House did not provide any statement regarding the next presidential debate on Oct. 15.  

If Trump does appear to be severely symptomatic, considering he places in several high-risk categories for the virus, questions will arise if he should still plea for a second term in the White House. 

According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, adults between the ages of sixty-five and seventy-four experience ninety times greater risk of death from the coronavirus compared to adults between the ages of eighteen and twenty-nine. The president is also clinically overweight, which is another factor that boosts the risk of the severity of the virus. 

It is unknown if Trump assumes any other health conditions that could place him in a high-risk group, but past physicals indicate a growing heart disease. 

His most recent physical with Conley said “there were no findings of significance or changes to report,” as there were no signs of cancer, kidney disease, diabetes or other severe conditions. The physician did report, however, that his blood pressure was somewhat elevated. 

Two years ago, Trump’s physical indicated that his coronary calcium CT scan score was 133, according to CNN. Anything in-between one hundred and three hundred “means moderate plaque deposits,” correlating with the threat of a heart attack or other form of heart disease within the next three to five years. In 2009, the president’s score was thirty-four and in 2013, it was ninety-eight, suggesting there’s been a build-up of plaque for a number of years. 

Another area of concern was Trump’s cholesterol levels and his LDL, of “bad cholesterol,” as the figures both jumped in 2017 and 2018, with the president taking the statin drug that serves to lower cholesterol, called Crestor. 

Trump and the first lady join the millions of people who have contracted the coronavirus in the United States, throwing the country in the lead for the number of reported cases. 

Rachel Bucchino is a reporter at the National Interest. Her work has appeared in The Washington Post, U.S. News & World Report and The Hill. 

Image: Reuters

Martin B-10: America's First All-Metal Bomber (It Fought in WWII)

The National Interest - Fri, 02/10/2020 - 15:56

Peter Suciu

History,

She was old by the time World War II was waged, but she made some serious history. 

If World War II had come a decade earlier it might have been the Martin B-10 rather than the Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress and Consolidated B-24 Liberator that might have been the workhorse of the U.S. Army Air Corps (USAAC). The aircraft was developed in the early 1930s but was largely antiquated by the time the war came – yet, the B-10 started a revolution in bomber design.

The plane began as a private venture in early 1932 at the Glenn L. Martin Company as the Model 123. It was not bound to any military specification and that gave the engineers at Martin free rein in the aircraft's development, and the focus was on maximum performance over other considerations for a military bomber. It was powered by two 750hp Wright R-1820-E Cyclone engines, which gave it a top speed of 207 mph, more than 22 mph faster than its competition of the era.

The plane was also the first all-metal monoplane and first all-metal bomber, and it featured many innovations including retractable landing gear, an enclosed rotating turret for defense and enclosed cockpits. In trials it was found that the aircraft would carry a bomb load of 2,200 pounds over a distance of 650 miles and at a maxim speed of 197mph. It also had a ceiling of 6,000 feet, which was higher than contemporary fighters.

Military planners saw that the bomber could successfully attack strategic targets without long-range fighter escort.

The Army immediately ordered 14 of the aircraft, but eventually, a total of 121 B-10s were ordered from 1933 to 1936, the largest procurement of bomber aircraft by any nation since the First World War. Another 32 were ordered with 700hp Pratt & Whitney R-1690 Hornet engines and designated as the B-12.

Notable Achievements

The B-10 was awarded 1932's Collier Trophy for outstanding achievement in American aviation and the trophy was presented to Martin by President Franklin Roosevelt shortly after he took office in 1933. That would be the first of six times that Martin received the prestigious award.

Military aviation pioneer General Henry H. "Hap" Arnold called the Martin bomber "the air power wonder of its day," and he led 10 B-10s  on a 8,290-mile flight from Washington, D.C. to Fairbanks, Alaska and back in 1934.

Even as the B-17s and B-18 Bolos began to replace the Air Corps' B-10s/B-12s, the plane was exported to the Chinese and Dutch air forces, and it was used in combat against Imperial Japanese forces – and actually saw its baptism of fire during the Sino-Japanese War in May 1938. The Martin B-10 was also used by the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army (Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger or KNIL) in the Defense of the Dutch Indies in late 1941 and early 1942.

While a total of 348 of all variants including 182 export versions were produced in total, there is only one complete B-10 in the world today. It is in the collection of the National Museum of the United States Air Force and was actually found in Argentina, where it was used by engineering students at the "Jorge Newberry" National School of Technical Education, No. 1 in Buenos Aires. As a gesture of friendship the Argentine Navy donated the aircraft to the museum in August 1970.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com.

Image: Photo of a Martin B-10 variant of the 23d Bombardment Squadron taken in 1941 over Oahu, Hawaii.

    Russia's New Military Micro-Drones: What Can They Do?

    The National Interest - Fri, 02/10/2020 - 15:45

    Peter Suciu

    Security, Europe

    Would they give Moscow any sort of edge in a future conflict? 

    The Russian military has been developing its next generation of combat gear and it could be integrated with new micro-drones that provide a tactical level automated command system. Such equipment was designed to enhance each soldier's situational awareness, facilitate the performance during combat missions and even minimize the level of physical effort of individual soldiers while reducing their risk of life.

    "One of the current research and development projects, being carried out at the request of the ground forces' command, envisages the creation of a new generation combat gear incorporating elements that enhance the personnel's physical abilities, such as combat and special exoskeletons, and the integration of combat and support robots as well as reconnaissance and attack drones of small and mini-class," explained commander of ground forces, General of the Army Oleg Salyukov, in an interview with the government-published Rossiiskaya Gazeta on Thursday.

    Tass reported that Russian defense contractor Rostec was working on a new generation combat gear called Sotnik (Centurian), which would replace the current Ratnik (Warrior) infantry equipment. It is being developed by one of the company's affiliates, the Central Scientific-Research Institute for Precision Machine Engineering TasNIItochMash.

    The Russian military has announced plans to have the first batch of Sotnik equipment delivered to special operations troops by 2025 and to the entirety of the Russian military within another five years. It has been suggested that such a timeline could be overly ambitious due to the fact that Sotnik consists of a great deal of high-tech items that may not be ready for combat troops in just a decade.

    Some of the equipment already exists, including anti-mine boots and special cloth that could reduce thermal (heat) signatures that identifies troops to thermal sensors – making them essentially invisible to those sensors – while other cloth could reduce radar effectiveness.

    The equipment could also be integrated with micro-drone technology, which would be connected with a tactical level automated command system. This could provide images from cameras on the drones that are transmitted and project to a soldier's helmet visor or protective glasses along with commands, maps of the terrain and other crucial information – sort of a "Google Glass" solution for the battlefield.

    Tass reported that nothing has been said about plans to integrate attack drones with the new generation of combat gear, but that could be the next step for Russia's soldiers of the future.

    Research and development for the new generation of equipment will reportedly last from 2020 to 2023, and the final list of Sotnik items is expected to be completed until at least then, but the equipment has been reported to be about 20% lighter than the current Ratnik equivalents. It is expected that the Sotnik combat gear will consist of new ammunition and firearms.

    While this could mark the end of the line for the Ratnik, experiences with it have proved information. The last major upgrade in terms of equipment was earlier this year when the new Russian assault rifle, the AK-12, was finally delivered to regular infantry units.

    Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com.

    Image: Sukhoi Su-35 jet fighters of the Russian Knights aerobatic team perform during International military-technical forum "Army-2020" at Kubinka airbase in Moscow Region August 25, 2020. REUTERS/Maxim Shemetov.

      Russia's Old Cold War Tanks Could Get Bigger Guns

      The National Interest - Fri, 02/10/2020 - 15:27

      Peter Suciu

      Security, Europe

      This month the commander-in-chief of Russia's ground forces told state media that its tanks could be armed with far larger caliber guns. Why is that needed? 

      While the first batch of T-14 Aramata main battle tanks (MBTs) is set to finally be deployed to the Russian military later this year, it will be years before the nation's older armored vehicles are retired from service. For this reason, the older tanks could soon be deployed with increased firepower.

      This month the commander-in-chief of Russia's ground forces told state media that its tanks could be armed with far larger caliber guns.

      The current tanks – T-72B3, T-72B3M, T-80BVM and T90M are armed with 125-millimeter guns and can be used to fire different types of ammunition to successfully cope with their tasks," General of the Army Oleg Salyukov told the government-published daily Rossiyskaya Gazeta according to Tass.

      "At the same time it is not ruled out the caliber of tank guns may be increased," Salyukov added during his interview on the occasion of Ground Forces Day, a professional holiday established in 2006.

      Cold War Weapons Upgraded:

      The tanks Salyukov mentioned are older platforms, but still largely feared ones that have been substantially modernized over the years. The T-72B3 version was introduced in 2010, and while it is part of the family of Soviet MBTs that first entered production in 1971, it was considered a third-generation MBT.

      The further upgraded T-72B3M, which was first exhibited at the 2014 Tank Biathlon World Championship, provided the Cold War tank with true 21st century capabilities. The layout of the tank is nearly identical to the original T-72, but it features an advanced fire controls system and new thermal sights. The mobility and combat characteristics have been improved to allow the T-72B3M to compete with some of the most advanced tanks in the world today.

      Likewise, the T-80BVM is a modernized version of the T-80, and this newest model was first publically revealed only in 2017. Originally, the Russian military had planned to retire its T-80 series tanks by 2015, but instead, the first batch of 31 of the tanks was upgraded to the T-80BVM standard and revealed during a military parade in 2018. Among the improvements is slightly improved Relikt explosive reactive armor protection. However, due to high operational costs, many of the T-80BVM are kept in reserve, according to Military-Today.

      The T-80BVM are unlikely to be retired anytime soon as the Cold War-era design works quite well in cold conditions! The turbine engine used in the tanks, which is more expensive to operate and maintain, has the benefit of functioning better in the northern parts of Russia where the temperatures can be very low. While Russian diesel tanks can take around 45 minutes to start at -30 degrees Celsius, gas turbine tanks can be up and running in around one minute. T-80s are also said to be more comfortable and warmer for the crew in such climates than other tanks.

      The T-90M, which remains arguably Russia's most advanced front-line tank, is a modernized version of a vehicle that first entered service in 1993. The Russian Army received the first new T-90M tanks as part of a batch of 400 last year.

      Clearly, the Russian military has been continuing to keep the tanks up and running with the latest advances, and based on Salyukov's latest statements the next round of upgrades could see these tanks have a bit more hitting power.

      Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com.

      Image: A Russian T-90S tank fires during the "Russia Arms Expo 2013", the 9th international exhibition of arms, military equipment and ammunition in the Urals city of Nizhny Tagil, September 26, 2013. REUTERS/Sergei Karpukhin (RUSSIA - Tags: MILITARY)

        Sudan alert: Flooding and surging inflation threaten humanitarian assistance 

        UN News Centre - Fri, 02/10/2020 - 15:24
        Catastrophic flooding and rising food and health costs in Sudan, have driven up the number of people in need, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) said on Friday. 

        South Korea Doesn’t Need U.S. Military Babysitting

        Foreign Policy - Fri, 02/10/2020 - 15:24
        Seoul is rich enough and strong enough to deter Pyongyang by itself.

        Donald Trump’s Coronavirus Diagnosis: A Nightmare for Him and the GOP?

        The National Interest - Fri, 02/10/2020 - 15:14

        Jacob Heilbrunn

        Health,

        Without Trump at the helm as impresario, his campaign and presidency, more than ever, are in danger of completely unraveling.

        President Donald Trump’s announcement that he and first lady Melania Trump have contracted the coronavirus is a political disaster for him and the GOP. This October surprise could not have come at a worse moment for him.  “Tonight, @FLOTUS and I tested positive for COVID-19,” he tweeted. “We will begin our quarantine and recovery process immediately. We will get through this TOGETHER!” Now that Trump himself has a positive diagnosis, the implications for his campaign and the country are numerous.

        For a start, there is the question of Trump’s own health. As a 74-year-old, he has comorbidities that put him at risk for serious complications. He will have to quarantine at the White House as will the first lady. White House operations may be compromised if it turns out that numerous other staffers were infected apart from Hope Hicks, who has been traveling with Trump on Air Force One. Vice President Mike Pence and his wife Karen have tested negative for the coronavirus.

        The highest priority will be to ensure the health of both Trump’s now that they have been stricken by the coronavirus. CNN’s Stephen Collinson notes, “A President in medical peril is a situation that calls for humanity. The most serious known threat to a commander-in-chief's health for decades also calls for unity since it can bear on the security of the nation itself should US enemies seek advantage and probe a potential leadership vacuum.”

        How did it get to this point? There will be serious questions about the White House’s flouting of pandemic protocols, including holding large-scale events at the White House where few wore masks such as the Republican Convention. Trump is also coming under fire for traveling to his golf club in Bedminster, New Jersey after Hope Hicks was diagnosed with the virus. Trump may have exposed dozens of his staunchest donors and fundraisers at the club to the coronavirus.

        As Politico observed, “Trump’s diagnosis will raise serious questions about whether the White House’s coronavirus protocols were adequate — and whether the West Wing took the threat of the virus seriously enough.”

        Trump’s campaign will also be in turmoil. It is unlikely that there will be any further debates between him and Joe Biden. Trump will be unable to lead the political rallies that were instrumental to his campaign in 2016. Above all, his campaign message has been crippled. It was predicated on the contention that the coronavirus was a mere speed bump that had already been left behind in the rearview mirror. “I just want to say that the end of the pandemic is in sight,” Trump declared on Thursday night in a videotaped message to the Alfred E. Smith Memorial Foundation Dinner, “and next year will be one of the greatest years in the history of our country.”

        At the same time, Trump consistently mocked former Vice President Joe Biden for wearing a mask. “I don’t wear masks like him,” he said. “Every time you see him, he’s got a mask. He could be speaking 200 feet away from it. And he shows up with the biggest mask I’ve ever seen.” For Trump wearing a mask was synonymous with a lack of virility. He also branded Biden a physical wreck and declared that the virus would disappear “like a miracle.” Instead, it has struck him and his inner circle. Trump’s botched approach to the coronavirus has been a hallmark of his presidency over the past year. Indeed, writing in the National Interest, Dimitri K. Simes astutely observed,

        “a lack of adequate preparation to a fairly predictable pandemic, an absence of minimally adequate supplies, a failure to organize mass testing comparable to what was done in most of Europe, China, Korea, and even Russia, has made the pandemic more severe than in most other advanced nations. The president’s emphasis on reopening the economy no matter what has also now contributed to a new wave of the virus, which in turn triggers new closings of the economy, more unemployment, zig-zags in financial markets, and a general uncertainty.”

        Now the stakes have grown even higher. Trump, who wanted to shift the focus to a law and order campaign and Biden’s own record, will be the almost exclusive focus of the media in the coming weeks as his handling of the coronavirus and own health come under intense scrutiny. New polls indicate that Biden may be headed for a landslide victory. Without Trump at the helm as impresario, his campaign and presidency, more than ever, are in danger of completely unraveling.

        FILE PHOTO: U.S. President Donald Trump walks with first lady Melania Trump at Cleveland Hopkins International Airport in Cleveland, Ohio, U.S., September 29, 2020. Picture taken September 29, 2020. REUTERS/Carlos Barria/File Photo

          The U.S. Army Wants to Arm Its Troops With Micro-Drones

          The National Interest - Fri, 02/10/2020 - 14:55

          Kris Osborn

          Security,

          These small drones would help squads keep track of the location of enemy units during combat.

          Under heavy enemy small arms fire, seeking cover behind walls and under rocks, dismounted, infantry units are often at a loss to know enemy positions and movements. Many enemy maneuvers are inside buildings, hidden by mountainous terrain or otherwise obscured from view by overhead drones and aerial surveillance. Closing with an enemy in the close-in-fight, often called Close Quarter Battle (CQB), requires an ability to adjust in seconds to unanticipated enemy actions, developments which in many cases are almost impossible to predict. 

          Having an organic, individually operated forward mini-drone, however, might enable infantry to look on the other side of a ridge, see into the next room in a building or simply offer that “unblinking eye” in otherwise inaccessible areas. 

          This tactical reality is exactly why the U.S. Army is now fast-tracking larger numbers of a tiny three-pound drones to, as Army documents explain it, “provide the squad with an organic ‘quick look.’”

          It’s called the Soldier Borne Sensor (SBS), a tiny mini-drone intended to give soldiers on the move a quick look around a corner, eyes into a building or over-the-ridge glance at enemy positions, providing an unprecedented tactical advantage. 

          “At a total system weight of less than three pounds, SBS minimizes the transport burdens placed on the squad while providing situational awareness to one kilometer with fifteen minutes of endurance,” the Army’s Small Unmanned Aircraft System Strategy states.

          The small platform consists of a hand-held mini-helicopter-like drone and a small soldier-held viewing screen engineered to work in tandem with one another to offer “forward eyes” to individual soldiers on-the-move. The Army is now in the process of acquiring thousands of these SBS systems, following several years of development. One such system bought by the Army is the Black Hornet Personal Reconnaissance System made by FLIR. 

          The 2020 SUAS Strategy document, written by the Army’s “Maneuver Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate,” delineates the strategic and tactical intent for the mini-drone system, explaining that it can give “scout squads” under enemy fire in a platoon a unique ability to “surveil danger areas.” 

          “SBS enables infantry squads to surveil target areas, develop a scheme of maneuver, and enhance survivability in and out of enemy contact. This system facilitates decision-making, protects the force, and enables movement and maneuver at the tactical edge of the battlefield,” the strategy says. 

          The Army’s ultimate goal, according to a 2018 service report, is to “field one SBS to nearly every squad in the Army, which includes more than 7,000 sqauds.” 

          Kris Osborn is the defense editor for the National Interest. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Masters Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.

          Image: Reuters

          To Free Stalingrad From Hitler's Grip, The Soviets Bet Big On Operation Gallop

          The National Interest - Fri, 02/10/2020 - 14:33

          Warfare History Network

          History, Europe

          With victory at Stalingrad close at hand, the Soviets launched Operation Gallop to liberate the Lower Don Basin.

          As Adolf Hitler’s vaunted Sixth Army lay in its death throes in the ruins of Stalingrad, German forces to the west of the city faced their own kind of hell. The inner ring of the Russians’ iron grip at Stalingrad was tasked with the total destruction of German and other Axis troops within the city, but Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin wanted more. In conjunction with the Soviet High Command (STAVKA), Stalin set forth an ambitious plan designed to liberate the Don Basin from Kursk in the north to the Sea of Azov in the south, bringing the vital agricultural and mineral-rich area once more under Russian control.

          Operation Gallop: Striking the Southern Flank

          Germany’s allied armies were a shambles. The Hungarian Second Army and the Italian Eighth Army, positioned along the upper Don River, were shattered by General Filipp Ivanovich Golikov’s Voronezh Front, causing a yawning gap south of the German Second Army, which was assigned to defend the Voronezh area.

          Farther south, General Nikolai Fyodorovich Vatutin’s South West Front, despite heavy opposition, moved toward Voroshilovgrad and Starobelsk. In the Caucasus and along the Donets River, the German troops of Heeresgruppe A (Army Group A) were in a race to the death to escape being trapped by advancing armies of the Trans-Caucasus and the Stalingrad Fronts.

          In mid-January, Stalin and STAVKA saw a very distinct possibility of forcing the entire southern flank of the German Army in the east to collapse. With a victory at Stalingrad all but assured, Soviet military planners developed operations aimed at pushing the Germans back to the Dniepr River. The more optimistic planners, including Stalin, hoped for an even bigger push.

          A two-pronged attack was finally approved. Operation Skachok (Gallop) would use Vatutin’s South West Front to clear the southern Don Basin of the enemy and push him back to the Dniepr. On Vatutin’s right flank, Golikov’s Voronezh Front was ordered to take Kharkov and then follow the retreating Germans as far west as possible in an operation called Zvezda (Star).

          The German Army in Disarray

          The German forces facing Vatutin had been ground down by weeks of fighting and retreat. Lt. Gen. Fedor Mikhailovich Kharitonov’s Sixth Army and Lt. Gen. Vasilii I. Kuznetsov’s First Guards Army were fast approaching the Aydar River in the Starobelsk area, while the Third Guards Army under Lt. Gen. Dmitri Danilovich Lelyushenko was threatening to cross the Donets River west of Voroshilovgrad. South of Lelyushenko, Lt. Gen. Ivan Timofeevich Schlemin’s Fifth Tank Army was also moving toward the eastern bank of the Donets.

          Vatutin also had a combined arms group commanded by Lt. Gen. Markian Mikhailovich Popov, which contained nearly half of the South West Front’s armor. In total, Vatutin had more than 500 tanks and about 325,000 men to fulfill his mission.

          Facing the South West Front was a hodgepodge of German units in the process of trying to regain some kind of defensive line and command control. About 160,000 men and 100 tanks from several decimated divisions struggled to pull themselves into some kind of cohesive force to meet the advancing Soviet forces.

          The First Panzer Army, commanded by General Eberhard von Mackensen, was just arriving from a grueling retreat from the Caucasus. It had about 40 combat-ready tanks and an estimated 40,000 troops. Army Abteilung Hollidt was a conglomeration of infantry and panzer division remnants. Commanded by General Karl Hollidt, the unit had about 100,000 men and 60 tanks. Another 20,000 troops came from various support and garrison units.

          General Nikolai Fyodorovich Vatutin: A Gifted Strategist

          Aware of the enemy disorganization facing him, Vatutin planned his actions accordingly. Born in 1901, Vatutin joined the Red Army in 1920. He saw service during the Russian Civil War and then attended the Frunze Academy, graduating in 1929. Furthering his career, Vatutin attended and graduated from the General Staff Academy and served on the General Staff from 1937-1940. During the Battle for Moscow, he distinguished himself as chief of staff of the Northwestern Front, and in 1942 he was named commander of the South West Front.

          Vatutin was considered a gifted strategist, and his opinions were highly valued. He was enthusiastic about the possibility of liberating the Lower Don Basin and destroying the German units defending it, and STAVKA gave him great latitude in forming his plan of attack, which he worked out with his army commanders and staff.

          The main blow was to come from the First Guards and Third Guards Armies, which would take Stalino and then Mariupol on the Sea of Azov. This action, supported by Group Popov and the Fifth Tank Army, would trap most of the German units on the Donets River Line south of Kharkov. Divisions of the Southern Front, on Vatutin’s left flank, would cooperate by advancing along the Sea of Azov to Rostov and beyond.

          In theory, the plan was a good one. Intelligence reports indicated that the Germans were in a state of near panic. Other reports stated that enemy troops were hastily withdrawing from the entire area, which gave Vatutin the view that his operation was a means to crush a beaten and demoralized foe.

          Strengthening Heeresgruppe Süd

          The Soviet assessments were wrong to a large degree. Although the Germans were disorganized, commanders were working together to retain a viable fighting force. German supply lines were much closer since the retreat from the Stalingrad sector, and the ability to form ad hoc units around regimental and divisional cadre was succeeding.

          There was also another major factor working for the Germans. Field Marshal Erich von Manstein was in command of the area slated for the Soviet offensive. Architect of the 1940 Ardennes strike against France and the conqueror of Sevastopol in 1942, von Manstein was regarded as having one of the best strategic and tactical minds in the Wehrmacht.

          Although the divisions of his Heeresgruppe (Army Group) Don, which became Heeresgruppe Süd (South) in mid-February, were battered, the German commander was already planning a response for what he correctly assumed to be a major Soviet attack in the Don Basin. He knew the Red Army supply lines had greatly lengthened as his own decreased, making it difficult for Soviet armor to receive proper fuel and ammunition replenishment. He also knew that although the Russians had superiority in manpower and equipment their reserves were lacking in numbers for a prolonged attack and breakthrough.

          Von Manstein was also lucky in another regard. While the debacle at Stalingrad was still being played out, he had managed to talk Hitler into allowing most of the German forces in the Caucasus to withdraw before being cut off. By the end of January, many of those units, including the First Panzer Army, were regrouping in the Don Basin. The Fourth Panzer Army, commanded by Col. Gen. Hermann Hoth, was also in the process of getting out of the Soviet trap.

          As he pressed the issue of the vulnerability of the entire southern sector of the Eastern Front, von Manstein persuaded the OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht–German Armed Forces High Command) to release six divisions and two infantry brigades from Western Europe and send them to Heeresgruppe Süd. Among the divisions released were three superbly equipped SS divisions, which had been resting and refitting after the hard-fought 1942 campaign.

          The Soviet Offensive Begins

          On February 1, 1943, Golikov’s Voronezh Front began its attack to liberate Kharkov. Excellent progress was made during the first days of the offensive, with General Ivan Danilovich Chernyakowskii’s 60th Army taking Kursk on February 8. As Kursk fell, Golikov’s 40th and 69th Armies, along with the Third Tank Army, advanced on Kharkov, slamming their way through the undermanned defenses of the German Second Army.

          Two days before Golikov’s offensive began, Vatutin launched Operation Gallop. On January 29, Kuznetsov’s First Guards Army crossed the Aydar River and hit General Gustav Schmidt’s 19th Panzer Division in the Kabanye–Kromennaya area along the Dnester River. Reeling under a series of hammer blows, the Germans were forced to retreat under a constant barrage of Soviet artillery.

          On Kuznetsov’s right flank, Kharitonov’s Sixth Army, after crossing the Aydar, smashed into elements of Colonel Herbert Michaelis’s 298th Infantry Division. With the bulk of the 298th dug in along the Krasnaya River, the forward elements of the division were brushed aside by the advancing Soviets.

          Pursuing the retreating Germans, Kharitonov’s 15th Rifle Corps made it to the Krasnaya before being stopped by the 298th’s makeshift defenses on the western bank. Under heavy fire, the 350th Rifle Division forced crossings north and south of Kupyansk and established bridgeheads on the German side of the river, but further progress was retarded until reinforcements arrived on the scene.

          January 30 found the First Guards Army crossing the Krasnaya near the town of Krasny Liman. Pleased with the progress of his assault troops, Vatutin ordered Group Popov to advance and form up at the juncture of the First Guards and Sixth Armies in order to exploit any major breaches in the German line.

          For the next few days, Vatutin continued to receive good news from the front. His planning of Gallop seemed to be validated as reports came from the First Guards Army stating that Kremennaya had fallen, the 19th Panzer Division was retreating toward Lisichansk to the south, and that Krasny Liman was also taken.

          In the Sixth Army sector, Kharitonov finally crossed the Krasnaya River after the 298th Infantry Division, fearing encirclement by advancing units of the Sixth Army and the Voronezh Front’s Third Tank Army, abandoned its positions on the eastern bank. From February 2-5, the 298th fought through Soviet units already in its rear before finally reaching a new defensive line around Chuguyev on the Northern Donets River.

          Sixth Army units also forced General Georg Postel’s 320th Infantry Division to retreat from the Krasnaya. While the Sixth Rifle Division attempted to surround Postel’s division, the 267th Rifle Division and 106th Rifle Brigade drove on to Izyum, which would fall on February 5.

          Sensing victory, Vatutin sent in Group Popov to act as the vanguard of the Soviet attack. A counterattack by some of the First Panzer Army’s XL Panzer Corps, commanded by General Sigfrid Henrici, halted Popov’s advance in several areas. Other elements of Henrici’s corps struck the First Guards Army around Slavyansk, forcing Kuznetsov to halt his attack. Farther south, Lelyushenko’s Third Guards Army had now crossed the Donets River near Voroshilovgrad and was engaged in breaking through the defenses of Army Abteilung Hollidt.

          Preventing a Soviet Breakthrough

          The battle around Slavyansk was pivotal for the Germans trying to stop Vatutin’s push westward. As long as the town was in von Manstein’s hands, Vatutin would have to extend his forces to bypass it, lengthening his supply lines and offering his flanks to German counterattacks.

          By February 4, Vatutin found himself facing an increasingly stubborn opponent. Elements of Henrici’s XL Panzer Corps were clinging to Slavyansk, fending off the First Guards Army with vicious counterattacks. Kuznetzov threw more units into the battle for the town, but Henrici’s men held firm.

          About 55 kilometers east of Slavyansk, the First Guards Army’s Sixth Guards Rifle Corps, commanded by General Ivan Prokofevich Alferov, was embroiled in a savage fight for control of Lisichansk. General Maximilian Fretter-Pico’s XXX Army Corps was charged with the defense of the sectors north and south of the town.

          General Karl Casper’s 335th Infantry Division, newly arrived from France, was one of the divisions tasked with defending the area south of Lisichansk near the town of Krymskoye. Alferov’s 44th Guards Rifle Division gained a small bridgehead on the western bank of the Donets and fought off repeated counterattacks by the 335th. Seeing that further assaults were a waste of manpower, Casper ordered his men to cordon off the bridgehead, hoping that reinforcements would be sent to break the Soviet line.

          At Lisichansk, Alferov’s 78th Rifle Division tried an end run. The 78th crossed the Northern Donets at several points, but once again German forces moved in to seal them off. For the moment, it was a stalemate.

          Frustrated, Vatutin threw the 41st Guards Rifle Division into the Lisichansk battle. Defended by Schmidt’s 19th Panzer, the Soviets had to clear the town street by bloody street. Aided by elements of the 78th Guards and 44th Guards Rifle Divisions, the Russians finally forced Schmidt’s men out of the town to positions in the southwest. The Sixth Guards Rifle Corps followed fast on their heels, but Schmidt was able to work his units like a boxer, bobbing, weaving, and shifting constantly to frustrate any further breakthrough.

          Negotiating a Retreat with Hitler

          On February 6, Hitler called von Manstein to his headquarters at Zaporozhye. The German leader was surprisingly docile, almost apologetic, as he opened the conversation by taking full responsibility for the Stalingrad disaster. Von Manstein was taken aback by the statement because Hitler never blamed himself for any of the misfortunes suffered by the German Army.

          With the surprising admission out of the way, the two men turned to the situation at hand. Von Manstein was blunt as he began explaining the position of his Army Group. He told Hitler that under no circumstances could the area between the Don and the Donets be held with the existing forces available.

          “The only question is whether, in trying to hang on to the whole basin, we want to not only lose the area but also Heeresgruppe Don,” he said. “We will also eventually lose Heeresgruppe A. The alternative is to abandon part of the Basin at the right moment to avert the catastrophe threatening to overtake us.”

          According to von Manstein, Hitler remained “utterly composed” during the ensuing conversation. Continuing, he told Hitler that trying to hold the entire Basin would allow the Soviets to send strong enough forces to slice through the thinly held German line and envelop the entire southern wing of the Eastern Front. Therefore, he proposed using the First Panzer Army and the Fourth Panzer Army, which were facing General Andrei Ivanovich Yeremenko’s Southern Front, to form a strike force to intercept the forces that Vatutin undoubtedly already had in mind for his continued advance.

          Moving the Fourth Panzer Army back from the Lower Don would mean giving up the area between the Lower Don and the Mius River to the armies of Yeremenko’s Southern Front, but it would also shorten the German line. To protect the southern flank, Army Abteilung Hollidt would also have to withdraw to the Mius. It was a risky plan, but the alternative meant almost certain disaster.

          When von Manstein finished, it was Hitler’s turn. The Führer could find no flaws in the plan, but his aversion to giving up ground to the enemy was still paramount. He argued that every foot of land cost the Russians men and materials—much more than it cost the Germans. There were also political considerations, such as the effect such a withdrawal would have on Turkey, which was watching developments in Southern Russia very carefully.

          Hitler promised reinforcements, cajoled, and used his famous charm and eloquence to convince von Manstein to remain on the Don, but von Manstein would not budge. The impasse went on most of the afternoon, but then Hitler suddenly gave in. Finally having the Führer’s blessing, von Manstein hurriedly flew back to his Stalino headquarters to begin issuing orders for the retreat.

          A Fighting Withdrawal

          Unless an early thaw suddenly hit the area, armored and mechanized units scheduled to pull back would have little problem reaching the Mius ahead of the Soviets. The infantry units of the Fourth Panzer Army and Army Abteilung Hollidt were a different matter. Vulnerable to Russian armored and mechanized forces, the retreating infantry would have to leave a rear guard to conduct a fighting withdrawal while main elements of the division remained on guard against Soviet ambushes and armored raids.

          The Soviets were by no means idle as the Germans prepared to withdraw to the shorter Mius Line. The South Front’s 44th Army took the city of Azov-on-the-Don. Around Salvyansk, where fighting was still raging, Red Army units also took the town of Kramatorsk, some 15 kilometers south of the city.

          The following day, February 8, Kharitonov’s Sixth Army liberated Andreyevka on the eastern bank of the Northern Donets, about 50 miles southeast of Kharkov. The Soviet commander then turned his forces northeast to strike at Zmiyev, which was on the river’s western bank. If Kharitonov could take the town and hold it, the way would be open for an attack on Kharkov from the south.

          Kharitonov’s spearhead ran headlong into the 2nd Regiment of the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler (LSSAH) Panzergrenadier Division commanded by SS Standartenführer (Colonel) Theodore Wisch. Wisch’s 1st Battalion, under SS Sturmbannführer (Major) Hugo Kraas, gave the advancing Russians a bloody nose at a small village northeast of Zmiyev. Supported by assault guns, Kraas’s men counterattacked, driving the Soviets back.

          Late morning found the Russians launching wave after wave of infantry against the village, but the SS held firm. The Soviets then proceeded to attack up and down the line of Wisch’s regiment. Supported by assault guns, some panzer companies, engineers, and a flak unit, Wisch successfully held his positions while causing heavy casualties to the Soviet 111th Rifle Division.

          Holding Slavyansk

          Meanwhile, the battle for Slavyansk continued unabated. General Hans Freiherr von Funck’s 7th Panzer Division was charged with holding the town. The division was down to only 35 serviceable tanks as it fought to defend Slavyansk against units of General Nikolai Aleksandrovich Gagen’s 4th Guards Rifle Corps.

          Born in 1895, Gagen was a tough no-nonsense commander who had fought in the brutal battles in the winter of 1941-1942 along the Volkhov River. He was determined to drive the Germans out of the town at whatever the cost. Gagen’s 195th Rifle Division had been roughly handled by the 7th Panzer as it tried to fight its way into the eastern part of the town. The Soviet general threw in the 57th Guards Rifle Division in an attempt to take the town from the north and west, but the Germans continued to hold, counterattacking when the situation required it.

          Overhead, Red Air Force bombers and ground attack aircraft roamed the skies over the embattled town. German flak batteries tried to drive them away, but the Soviet pilots pressed on, dropping their deadly cargo on von Funck’s position. Red Army artillery also kept up a deadly fire, but the German panzergrenadiers and the engineers of the division were still able to hold the Russians at bay.

          Holding Slavyansk helped give other units of the First Panzer Army a chance in their move westward. More of Henrici’s XL Panzer Corps was already arriving in the area to bolster the 7th Panzer. Although General Hermann Balck’s 11th Panzer Division had little more than a dozen tanks, it was a welcome sight to the men of von Funck’s command. Colonel Gerhard Grassman’s 333rd Infantry Division was in similar shape, having been savaged in earlier actions.

          Both sides realized the value of the area between Slavyansk and Kramatorsk, where the German defenses ran along the Krivoy Torets River. If the Soviets could force the Germans from their tenuous positions, Vatutin could use Group Popov’s forces to make a deep thrust to the southwest, which would basically cut off the First and Fourth Panzer Armies from the rest of von Manstein’s Heeresgruppe. Accordingly, Vatutin pushed more artillery units into the area to give his troops an added punch.

          Henrici’s XL Panzer Corps, weak as it was, defended the area with great skill. Coordinated attacks by the 4th Guards Tank Corps, 3rd Tank Corps, and the 4th Guards Rifle Corps were repulsed again and again. Balck’s 11th Panzer brazenly counterattacked Soviet armor with its few remaining tanks, leaving several T-34s blazing furiously on the battlefield, while the 7th Panzer fended off combined armored-infantry attacks, leaving hundreds of Red Army soldiers dead in the snow.

          Lieutenant Colonel Friedrich-Carl von Steinkeller, commanding the 7th Panzer’s 7th Panzergrenadier Regiment, was in the thick of the fighting. Keeping on the move, von Steinkeller went from company to company urging his men to hold firm. An artillery observer followed him, ready to call in fire as the situation demanded. He would later receive the Knight’s Cross, in part for his actions during the battle.

          Popov’s 4th Guards Tank Corps, commanded by Pavel Pavlovich Poluboyarov, succeeded in crossing the Krivoy Torets, threatening the rear of the 7th Panzer Division. Henrici immediately ordered Balck’s 11th Panzer Division, supported by a regiment from the 333rd Infantry Division, to counterattack. The Germans were met with the blazing guns of Poluboyarov’s tanks in front and from dug-in antitank weapons firing from the eastern bank of the Krivoy Torets.

          Despite the Soviet fire, Balck and his infantry support were able to push the 4th Guards back along the river valley. Russian infantry accompanying Poluboyarov’s tanks panicked and fled, forcing the armor to fend for itself. German sources indicate that 45 Russian tanks were destroyed during the fighting—a significant loss that could only partially be made good by the reinforcements that were trickling in after a grueling journey over extended supply roads.

          Vatutin, fed up with the inability of his forces to take Slavyansk and the positions along the Krivoy Torets, reshuffled his units for an all-out assault. Kuznetsov’s First Guards Army was ordered to coordinate with Popov for the attack, while Red Air Force units were given orders to support the operation at all costs.

          Underestimating the German Position

          The westward movement of German units, as per von Manstein’s plan, had given Vatutin, Golikov, and STAVKA a false sense of optimism. Hitler never conceded territory—every Russian commander knew that. He had shown it by letting his army freeze at the gates of Moscow and the stubborn refusal to retreat from Stalingrad only reinforced that view.

          To the Russian mind the retreat of Heeresgruppe Don from the eastern Don Basin could only be viewed as a somewhat panicked rout. The stubborn resistance around Slavyansk was seen as a desperate attempt to save the fleeing German divisions from being overwhelmed by troops of the South West Front and the South Front, and it was assumed that once the Krivoy Torets line was taken the enemy would collapse.

          To crack the German defenses Vatutin ordered the First Guards Army to shift south toward the Krasnoarmeiskoya sector, about 60 kilometers southwest of Slavyansk, to threaten the enemy rear. While that move was taking place, the 35th Guards Rifle Division of Gagen’s 4th Guards Rifle Corps forced units of the 333rd Infantry Division out of Lozovaya, a key rail center and supply dump located about 120 kilometers west of Slavyansk. Although the 35th Guards did not press their attack further, taking the town created a dangerous new bulge in the already extended and increasingly confusing lines of battle.

          Part of Vatutin’s plan was to use Popov’s 4th Guards Tank and 3rd Tank Corps to smash their way into Slavyansk, paving the way for the 18th and 10th Tank Corps to strike southwest toward Artemovsk. With Slavyansk secured, the 4th Guards Tank and 3rd Tank Corps were to advance to link up with the First Guards Army at Krasnoarmeiskoye. Together, the two tank corps and units of the First Guards Army would then move southeast to Stalino to trap German units retreating from the eastern Don Basin.

          As Vatutin prepared his operation, he received new orders from STAVKA. Golikov’s forces were making good progress toward Kharkov and, lulled by the belief that the Germans were indeed in the midst of a massive disorganized withdrawal to the Dniepr, Moscow saw a new chance to bag several enemy divisions in an even bigger pocket than Vatutin had planned.

          Vatutin was therefore given the task of setting up blocking forces to prevent an enemy withdrawal to Zaporozhye and Dnepropetrovsk. At the same time, he was ordered to advance southwest to cut off German and Axis forces in the Crimea. The STAVKA plan was overly ambitious by a wide margin, considering that the South West Front had already been in combat for more than two weeks and had received little in the way of supplies or reinforcements.

          With Kharitonov’s Sixth Guards Army already supporting Golikov’s drive on Kharkov, it would again fall to Kuznetsov and Popov, along with Lelyushenko’s Third Guards Army, to accomplish this new mission. The First Guards Army would have the dual tasks of taking Slavyansk with Alferov’s Sixth Guards Rifle Corps while other units continued on a westward drive toward Zaporozhye. While this was occurring, Group Popov would make a lightning strike to Krasnoarmeiskoye, taking the town’s rail center and threatening the German rear.

          Both Kuznetsov and Popov had voiced doubts about Vatutin’s earlier proposal. Their units had been manhandled by the Germans, and losses in men and equipment had still not been made good. The two Soviet generals had even graver doubts about the new plan. Supplying their forces as they moved south and west would be a nightmare with the existing supply line, which was already stretched to the limit.

          Popov, in making his dash to the south, would have a total of about 180 tanks spread between his four tank corps. He had enough fuel for one refueling and ammunition for two resupplies. The infantry units in his command were in even worse shape. Despite STAVKA’s assertions that the Germans were on the run, the field commanders had a more cautious view of the situation.

          Vatutin brushed aside his commanders’ doubts. These were orders from Moscow and had to be obeyed. The consequences of disobedience were well known, and no Soviet general in his right mind would think about going against the Kremlin at this stage of the war.

          A Bold Penetration

          Poluboyarov’s 4th Guards Tank Corps was chosen to spearhead the new attack. In the early hours of February 11, the Soviet armor began its 85 kilometer charge to Krasnoarmeiskoye. Led by the 14th Guards Tank Brigade, Polubarov’s forces cut through the German defenses and moved quickly down the one good road in the area. Following fast on the heels of the 14th were the 3rd Guards Mechanized Brigade, the 7th Ski Brigade, the 9th Guards Tank Brigade, and other corps units.

          The deep thrust caught the Germans off guard, and by mid-morning the 14th Guards Tank Brigade had taken Krasnoarmeiskoye. With the town secured, the victorious Soviet troops helped themselves to the supplies left in a supply dump by the retreating enemy. The loot, especially the fuel and rations, was a welcome sight to the exhausted Russians.

          Another important benefit, not readily apparent to the troops at the scene, was the severing of a vital German supply and communications line. With the capture of Krasnoarmeiskoye, the important Dnepropetrovsk-Mariupol rail line was rendered useless, leaving units of the First Panzer Army and Army Abteilung Hollidt in dire straits.

          Group Popov’s dramatic march to Krasnoarmeiskoye threw German plans for defending the western Don Basin into disorder. The defense of Slavyansk was now in jeopardy due to the Soviet units to the south and west of the position. Von Mackensen was also in the midst of planning an attack to recapture Kramatorsk, but that too had to be put on hold in light of Popov’s success.

          “Contain the Popov Tank Group”

          Realizing the precarious position of the German troops holding the river lines to the east of Krasnoarmeiskoye, von Mackensen called upon the 5th SS Panzergrenadier Division Wiking. Commanded by SS Gruppenführer (Major General) Felix Steiner, the Wiking was a multinational division made up of Germans, Norwegians, Danes, Swiss, Finns, Walloons, and Estonians. It had just arrived in the Don Basin after an arduous retreat from the Caucasus, and its troops were exhausted.

          As elements of the division were just passing through Stalino, Steiner received the following message: “PanzerArmy H.Q. to Division Wiking Urgent! Powerful enemy forces, Popov Tank Group, across the Donets near Izyum advancing southward toward Krasnoarmeiskoye. Wiking Division to immediately turn to the west. Attack toward Krasnoarmeiskoye. Contain the Popov Tank Group. (signed) von Mackensen”

          Steiner immediately ordered his division to halt. His original orders were to head north from Stalino to the Konstantinovka area, and the advance units of his Germania Regiment were already headed in that direction. With his chief of staff, Steiner hastily issued new orders. Artillery was regrouped, and the Nordland Regiment was ordered to take the lead in the new westward advance while Germania turned its units around. The division’s Westland Regiment was also readied to join in the mad race to stop the Soviets.

          With Nordland’s reconnaissance platoon leading the way, the regiment hastened toward Krasnoarmeiskoye. By the end of the day, the advance guard under SS Obersturmbannführer (Lieutenant Colonel) Wolfgang Joerchel had overpowered weak Russian forward positions and taken Hill 180, which overlooked the entire Krasnoarmeiskoye sector. Joerchel quickly sent for other battalions of the regiment, which deployed south and west of the town to contain any further Soviet expansion in those directions.

          Much of Group Popov was spread out along the road from Kramatorsk to Krasnoarmeiskoye in defensive positions. Von Mackensen realized that Wiking did not have the capability to contain and destroy the Red Army units along the entire length of the road, so he issued new orders to other divisions of his command.

          The occupation of Slavyansk was still of utmost importance. Shuffling his forces, von Mackensen ordered two regiments of the 333rd Infantry Division to make a forced march toward Krasnoarmeiskoye. As the weary infantry slogged toward its new goal, the 7th Panzer and 11th Panzer, which were fighting in the areas around Slavyansk and east of the Krivoy Torets River, were ordered to turn their units westward. The 3rd Panzer Division was ordered to extend its line to take over the defensive positions of the two departing divisions. Von Mackensen planned to use the two divisions to strike at Group Popov’s extended supply line while Wiking and the two regiments of the 333rd kept up the pressure at Krasnoarmeiskoye.

          The movements of the German divisions to their assembly areas were surprisingly fast, and the attack on the supply line began in the early hours of February 12. Soviet defense positions had been set up in each village along the supply road from Kramatorsk, and several strong antitank companies had been brought forward to reinforce the village bastions.

          “Assistance urgently required. Long live Stalin!”

          At Krasnoarmeiskoye Steiner planned to use the Germania to flank the town from the west. Supported by the two regiments of the 333rd, Germania was ordered to take the village of Grischino, northwest of the town. While the other Wiking regiments assaulted Krasnoarmeiskoye from the south, elements of von Funck’s 7th Panzer would attack from the east and secure the town’s northern flank.

          Polubayarov, knowing his precarious position, had kept the units of his 4th Guards Tank Corps on high alert. Each subordinate commander was told to be ready for a German counterattack, and orders were given down to company level to fortify lines of approach that could be used by the enemy. Each soldier was to make the Germans pay for every meter of land, every house, and every hill that the Red Army had recently liberated on its valiant march to Krasmoarmeiskoye.

          SS Standartenführer (Colonel) Jürgen Wagner commanded the Germania Regiment. His men stormed forward into a withering fire from the Soviet positions as they began the assault. Rifle and machine gun bullets slapped around them like angry bees, while tank and antitank shells tore into their ranks. Grenadiers fell, their blood turning the churned up snow a bright crimson, but Wagner continued to urge his men to attack.

          The artillery commander of the Wiking, SS Oberführer (Senior Colonel) Herbert-Otto Gille, deftly moved his artillery battalions closer to support the attacks on Krasnoarmeiskoye and Grischino. Supported by flak units, Gille’s artillery smashed one Soviet position after another, giving the Germans a chance to rush forward.

          Wagner swung his regiment around Grischino and finally broke into the northern edge of the town. At the South West Front headquarters a frantic radio message, which must have been garbled in transmission, was received from the Russian commander defending Grischino. “Have been attacked by 5 SS Panzer Divisions, can only hold out with difficulty. Assistance urgently required. Long live Stalin!”

          Once inside the town, Wagner’s men found themselves bogged down in house-to-house fighting. It was the same for the other Wiking regiments at Krasnoarmeiskoye. In the close fighting, Gille’s artillery was of little use. The lines were too close, and the Soviets used every house as a strongpoint. For the time being the battle for both towns was a stalemate.

          The 88s of Rovny

          North of Krasnoaremiskoye elements of the 7th and 11th Panzer Divisions drove westward in a forced march. The Germans ran headlong into the 10th Tank Corps and the 41st Guards Rifle Division. Heavy defensive fire from the Russians forced the panzers to slow and finally stop their attack. Seeing that the Soviets could not be broken, the divisions turned toward Kramatorsk to prepare for a new attack on that town.

          At Grischino and Krasnoarmeiskoye the battle continued unabated. Wiking had now been joined by the two regiments of the 333rd, and Gille’s artillery was hammering the Russian rear areas. In addition, the Soviets were now running short of supplies.

          Although Henrici’s XL Panzer Corps had its various units involved in several actions stretching from Kramatorsk to Krasnoarmeiskoye, he still had the opportunity to disrupt the supply line to the 4th Guards Tank Corps. Armored reconnaissance companies fought running battles with Soviet supply columns trying to make their way south, and the roads were soon littered with flaming trucks. The hit-and-run tactics of the Germans struck as the Russians were spread out in single file and usually ended with the destruction of most of the supplies.

          Poluboyarov, growing desperate, ordered the 9th Independent Guards Tank Brigade to try and breach the closing ring around Krasnoarmeiskoye. The 9th hit the Westland Regiment north of Krasnoarmeiskoye near the village of Rovny. More than a dozen tanks with mounted infantry pierced the German line and made a push toward the center of the village.

          The regimental commander, SS Sturmbannführer Erwin Reichel, had just taken over after SS Sturmbannführer Harry Polewacz was killed in combat. Reichel ordered a battery of 88mm guns supported by Panzergrenadiers into the center of Rovny as the Soviets approached. When the Russians reached the interior of the village, the 88s destroyed almost all of the tanks. The stunned Russian survivors fled, leaving 12 blazing hulks and dozens of dead behind.

          “Throw Everything in”

          Vatutin was not about to give up on Group Popov. Gathering all available reserves, the Soviet general sent them to reinforce the spearhead at Krasnoarmeiskoye. When word was received that Russian reinforcements were headed south, new orders were sent to the scattered German forces of the First Panzer Army. The Wiking and the 11th Panzer Division were told to halt their attacks on February 14 and attempt to pin down the Russian forces at Krasnoarmeiskoye and Kramatorsk. Meanwhile, the battle to hold the Slavyansk area would continue. Von Mackensen also ordered Henrici to use whatever resources necessary to keep pressure on the supply columns following the reinforcements heading toward Poluboyarov’s 4th Guards Tank Corps.

          Henrici angrily replied to the order, “What am I supposed to use? My men are stretched to the limit already.”

          “Just do it,” von Mackensen replied. “Throw everything in. I don’t care how you do it—just get it done!”

          While things were strained in the First Panzer Army, the situation around Kharkov was at a critical stage. By February 10, Golikov’s 40th and 69th Armies were battling on the outskirts of the city, with the recently arrived II SS Panzer Corps putting up fierce resistance. Bitter fighting raged for the next five days, and Hitler personally intervened, ordering the corps commander, SS Obergruppenführer (Lieutenant General) Paul Hausser, to hold the city at all costs.

          Infuriated at what amounted to a death sentence for his men, Hausser disregarded the order and pulled his SS divisions out of Kharkov, forcing other defending German units to disengage as well. On February 16, Golikov reported to Moscow that Kharkov was once again in Soviet hands.

          A Quartermaster’s Nightmare

          Logistically, both sides were facing a quartermaster’s nightmare and both the German and Soviet commanders were in dire straits. With Kharkov gone and the Russians occupying Grischino and Krasnoarmeiskoye, the only supply line open to the First Panzer Army and Army Abteilung Hollidt was the railway that ran through Zaporozhye. The task of supplying German units by this route was hampered by the fact that a main bridge spanning the Dniepr River, destroyed during the 1941 Soviet retreat, had not yet reopened. Supplies had to be unloaded from trains and reloaded to trucks and wagons before making their way farther eastward.

          Group Popov was in a similar situation. Reinforcements were trickling in to the 4th Guards Tank Corps but supplies were a different matter. Von Mackensen’s orders to Henrici were being carried out by ad hoc units and units taken away from their parent regiments. Although the Soviet armored columns came under some fire as they strove to reach Krasnoarmeiskoye, the supply formations continued to bear the brunt of the German attacks.

          Some good news came to Vatutin on February 16 when the rest of the 7th Panzer Division, finally ordered to give up its defense of Slavyansk, pulled out and headed toward Krasnoarmeiskoye. Units of the First Guards Army finally were able to occupy the entire town, but the victorious Soviets were in no condition to pursue the 7th. The 3rd Panzer Division quickly lengthened its lines to cover the 7th as it raced southwest to join elements of the division already engaging Gagen’s 4th Tank Corps.

          Von Manstein’s Plan to Take Kharkov

          On February 17, Hitler flew to meet von Manstein at Zaporozhye. Not one to mince words, von Manstein laid out the situation as follows: “Army Abteilung Hollidt had just occupied the Mius River Line, followed closely by the South Front. For the time being, the line could be effectively defended.”

          The First Panzer Army had halted the Soviets at Grischino and Krasmoarmeiskoye, but the issue there had still not been decided. Von Mackensen’s panzer army was also still involved in heavy fighting at Kramotorsk, Lisichansk, and the Slavyansk area, with the issue in all three sectors still in doubt. The forces retreating from Kharkov, now gathered under Army Abteilung Kempf, were withdrawing southwest toward Poltava and the Mozh River.

          At first, Hitler refused to believe the seriousness of the situation. Already furious at the loss of Stalingrad, and then Kharkov, he could not believe that the Soviets still had the men and equipment to carry out another operation that could threaten the entire southern wing of his eastern armies. Von Manstein let him rant for a while before submitting a plan to save his threatened Heeresgruppe.

          Von Manstein played his hand masterfully, laying out his formula to retake Kharkov. At the mention of recapturing the city, Hitler immediately calmed down and began to listen intently.

          Kharkov could only be taken if the southern flank of the Heeresgruppe was secure, so von Manstein proposed consolidating Hausser’s SS Panzer Corps into one striking force, taking it away from the Kharkov sector and sending it southeast toward Pavlograd. This action would prevent any further Russian advance on Dnepropetrovsk.

          At the same time, Col. Gen. Hermann Hoth’s Fourth Panzer Army, which had made the bitter retreat from the Caucasus, would concentrate its units west of Zaporozhye. Together, the two forces would strike the elements of the First Guards Army and the Sixth Army that were advancing toward the vital Dniepr crossings while the First Panzer Army would once again take on Group Popov.

          Throughout his briefing, von Manstein continuously played on the premise that the one condition necessary to retake Kharkov was the survival of the First Panzer Army and Army Abteilung Hollidt. When the Soviet threat in the southern Don Basin was eliminated, the Kharkov operation could begin.

          Hitler Concedes Operational Control to Von Manstein

          Although Hitler was swayed by von Manstein’s argument, he was not totally convinced of the plan. The following day, February 18, he again met with von Manstein to discuss the operation. Von Manstein was essentially calling for freedom to maneuver without micromanagement from Hitler or Berlin.

          In another heated exchange, Hitler once again voiced his opinion that, although the number of Soviet units facing von Manstein looked impressive on paper, they were really burned-out shells of what were once divisions and brigades. Although he was partially correct, the armies that had taken Stalingrad were already on the move and the threat of the South Front bursting through Army Abteilung Hollidt’s Mius River line would more than overpower the existing German forces in the southern Don Basin.

          In the midst of the meeting, von Manstein received reports that units of the First Guards Army had taken Pavlograd and Novomosskovsk, bringing the Soviets to within 20 kilometers of Dnepropetrovsk. Army Abteilung Hollidt also reported several small enemy penetrations along its Mius River defenses. The report also indicated that the Russians were consolidating around Kharkov while sending spearheads farther westward.

          A report from Krasnoarmeiskoye indicated that the newly arrived elements of the 7th Panzer Division were trying to break the 4th Guards Tank Corps. Overcoming fierce resistance from the 14th Guards Tank Brigade, units of the 7th succeeded in taking the town center before being stopped by a Russian counterattack. On the western side of the town the Wiking Division ran headlong into defenses set up by the 12th Guards Tank Brigade and was immediately stalled by heavy defensive fire.

          Von Manstein used these developments to hammer home his ideas for destroying the Soviet incursion in the Don Basin. He pointed out that once the muddy season arrived operations at the front would grind to a halt and the Russians could use their rail lines to resupply and reinforce their divisions holding positions deep inside the German lines.

          With their men and materiél built up once more, the southern German forces would be in even greater danger of being pinned against the Sea of Azov, and Kharkov would be virtually untouchable. The next day, Hitler suddenly gave von Manstein what amounted to a carte blanche for operations in southern Russia and then climbed aboard his transport plane and left.

          Krasnoarmeiskoye Falls to the Germans

          The German field marshal wasted no time in implementing his plan. Krasnoarmeiskoye was hit hard by the 333rd Infantry Division and the Wiking Division, while the 7th Panzer Division swung north of the town. Poluboyarov’s units in the town were now caught in a vise that could only be loosened by attacks from the outside. Popov had already ordered his 3rd Tank Corps to relieve the embattled forces in the town as quickly as possible, but that attempt was soon thwarted.

          While the 3rd Tank Corps was racing south, Balck’s 11th Panzer Division moved into blocking positions south of Kramatorsk near the village of Gavrilovka. As the 3rd Tank Corps sped toward Krasnoarmeiskoye its flank was shattered by a full-scale attack from Balck’s division. Burning Soviet tanks littered the landscape as the Russians desperately tried to regroup to meet the attack, but Balck’s men had already achieved their objective of halting the rescue attempt.

          By the end of the day, Krasmoarmeiskoye was all but in German hands, Grischino had fallen, and Poluboyarov’s 4th Guards Tank Corps was nothing more than a skeleton of a unit with almost all of its tanks destroyed. Leaving the 333rd to mop up Poluboyarov’s corps, von Manstein ordered the Wiking to join the 7th Panzer and head north toward the leading elements of Group Popov’s 10th Tank Corps, which had moved into defensive positions around the town of Dobropolye.

          February 20 was the final day for the Russian forces inside Krasnoarmeiskoye. Down to only 12 tanks, the Soviets could do little against the pressure brought to bear by the 333rd. In small groups, some of the Red Army soldiers were able to break through gaps in the German line and head north toward the 13th Guards Tank Brigade, which was guarding the area around Barvenkovo.

          STAVKA’s Strategic Stubbornness

          STAVKA’s plan was falling apart, but no one seemed to want to face that reality. Krasnoarmeiskoye was once again in German hands, and the First Panzer Army was hammering away at the Soviet units stretched out on the road south of Kramatorsk. In the north, von Manstein had sent Hausser’s SS Panzer Corps to link up with General Otto von Knobelsdorff’s XLVIII Panzer Corps, which was part of the Fourth Panzer Army. Together, the two corps struck the Sixth Army near Krasnograd.

          In the air, Field Marshal Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen’s Luftflotte 4 hit the Soviets with about 1,000 sorties that precluded any attempt by the Russians to form a coherent defense. The increasingly frantic calls from his commanders prompted Popov to ask Vatutin for permission to withdraw his forces. The request was forcefully denied.

          Despite the troubling news coming from the Don Basin, Stalin and his general staff still believed they were on the verge of a great victory. New intelligence reports concerning German concentrations were ignored by STAVKA, which was still in a state of euphoria after the victory at Stalingrad. The unrealistic goals set for the Don Basin offensive were part of that euphoria, and it was now costing the Red Army dearly.

          By February 21, it was clear to the Germans that the Soviets had been caught flat footed. Fretter Pico’s XXX Army Corps moved toward Stalino, while von Knobelsdorff’s XLVIII and General Friedrich Kirchner’s LVII Panzer Corps advanced on Pavlograd and Lozovaya. Soviet forces around Pavlograd were also under pressure from the II SS Panzer Corps, Corps Raus, and elements of the Fourth Panzer Army. As long as Army Abteilung Hollidt vigorously defended the Mius River line, Vatutin’s forces were going to be in a great deal of trouble.

          On February 22, oblivious to the real situation, STAVKA ordered Kharitonov’s Sixth Army and the Voronezh Front’s Third Tank Army even farther westward. They were met head on by the full power of Hausser’s panzers, which smashed Khartinov’s center and right wing. Despite the pounding he was taking, Kharitonov ordered his mobile reserves into the battle in a futile attempt to follow the orders from Moscow.

          Meanwhile, Group Popov was reeling under the attacks from Henrici’s XL Panzer Corps. Desperate for supplies, the Russians no longer had the fuel and ammunition to hold out against the German armored and infantry units. Air supply was tried by the Red Air Force, but von Richthofen’s fighters shot the transport aircraft out of the sky at an alarming rate.

          Khartinov’s Sixth Army was in no better shape. His 25th Tank Corps, which had been ordered to advance in front of the main army, was stretched out almost 100 kilometers to the west when the Germans struck. On February 23, Khartinov was hit on both flanks by the 2nd SS Panzergrenadier Division Das Reich and the Sixth Panzer Division. Pounded by the Luftwaffe as well, the 25th Tank Corps disintegrated, its surviving personnel abandoning their equipment and fleeing toward the northeast.

          By now, even STAVKA started to notice that something was going very wrong. Reports coming from Popov and Kharitonov painted a picture of panic among their troops, and their commanders begged for something to be done before they were all annihilated.

          With his Sixth Army almost in ruins, Vatutin sent a rifle corps from the First Guards Army to support Kharitonov. To the north, Golikov, sensing the impending danger to his left flank, ordered his 69th and Third Tank Armies to swing southward to add to that support, but it was already too late to stop the German momentum.

          A Bloody Red Defeat

          On February 24, von Manstein sent the II SS Panzer Corps toward Pavlograd. The attack rolled over the 1st Guards Tank Corps and the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps, which had been sent to defend the town. They were Vatutin’s last reserves. After a sharp battle, SS forces occupied the town and went on to pursue the fleeing Russians, who had left most of their equipment behind.

          Now fully aware of the consequences of the German attacks, Vatutin ordered the Sixth Army to take a defensive posture. The sad truth was that Khartinov had little resources left with which to defend his sector. With Hausser’s divisions surging forward, most of the Sixth Army was already in full flight.

          During the next two days the units of the First Panzer and Fourth Panzer Armies retook much of the land lost in the early days of February. By February 27, Group Popov had all but been destroyed and the Sixth Army was on the verge of disintegration. The First Guards Army had also suffered heavily under continued German attacks.

          It was now painfully clear to Moscow that Operation Gallop was finished. Orders were sent to the remnants of the Sixth Army and the First Guards Army to withdraw and set up new lines on the Northern Donets River. Any thoughts of renewing the attack in the near future were shattered in the first days of March, when the II SS Panzer Corps essentially destroyed the Third Tank Army.

          The combination of Soviet ambition and von Manstein’s brilliant handling of the battle culminated in a bloody defeat for the Red Army. The stage was now set for one of von Manstein’s greatest accomplishments—the recapture of Kharkov—which would take place in mid-March.

          That achievement has largely overshadowed the desperate February struggle for the Lower Don Basin. However, without the defeat of the Red Army on the Donets-Dniepr battlefield, the German reoccupation of Kharkov would probably never have been possible.

          Pat McTaggart is an expert on World War II on the Eastern Front and has contributed numerous articles on the subject to WWII History. He resides in Elkader, Iowa.

          This article first appeared at the Warfare History Network.

          Image: Wikipedia.

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