Diplomacy & Crisis News

Lawrence Davidson

Afghanistan, Iraq, Middle East

Joe Biden’s decision to leave Afghanistan, and hopefully Iraq, is a belated recognition that the military strategy has not, and will not, work.

Editor’s note: In early August, The National Interest organized a symposium on American foreign policy in the Middle East under the Biden administration. A variety of scholars were asked the following question: “Given Joe Biden’s recent decisions in Afghanistan and Iraq, is the president right to be reducing the U.S. military presence in the Middle East?” The following article is one of their responses:

Let’s ask the question in a different way. Has a military presence in the Middle East served important U.S. national interests? For instance, has it protected the country from attack? The answer is no. In fact, one could make a good argument that U.S. military outposts in the Middle East were themselves targets of attack and finally helped provoke the attack on 9/11.

That attack did not come out of nowhere. Our interference in the region, aiding and abetting right-wing dictatorships (both secular and religious) rather than the growth of democratic processes earned us our enemies. Our singular backing of ever-evolving Israeli racism and illegal territorial expansion (I value international law over the Old Testament) earned us our enemies.

The counterargument that the Arabs should look to their own faults and stop blaming the West is really a red herring. Arab faults (which are real) do not exonerate Western, or U.S., wrongheaded behavior (which mainly reinforces Arab faults).

Joe Biden’s decision to leave Afghanistan, and hopefully Iraq, is a belated recognition that the military strategy has not, and will not, work. Yet, Biden’s planned actions cannot be seen as a strategically definitive shift in policy. As the president never tires of telling us, he is an “ironclad Zionist.” As long as the United States continues its role as the ally and financial backer of a regime that violates international law, perpetuates anti-democratic and racist based political policies, and relies on military force rather than diplomacy to settle disagreements, our nation will not only violate its own alleged ideals and values—it will, in doing so, continue to earn its enemies in the Middle East.

Lawrence Davidson is professor emeritus at West Chester University.

Image: Flickr.

Sami Jabarkhail

Afghanistan,

In his desperate pursuit for power, Ghani tried every feeble excuse he could think of to postpone and undermine peace talks.

The world woke up on Sunday, August 15 to the unprecedented triumph of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Their victory raises serious questions about who is responsible and who must be held accountable to the Afghan people. But the answer is no a brainer: President Ashraf Ghani. However, explaining why Ghani is responsible is no simple matter.

On February 9, 2020, the United States inked a landmark peace agreement with the Taliban in Doha, Qatar. One of the four principal points agreed upon was that the Taliban will start peace negotiations with the Afghan government on March 10, 2020. After signing the peace agreement with the Taliban, U.S. envoy Zalmay Khalilzad visited Kabul on March 1 to inform Afghan leaders about the historic opportunity for peace and encouraged them to send an authoritative delegation to Doha to negotiate peace with the Taliban.

While in Kabul, Khalilzad was able to meet every influential Afghan leader except the former, and now runaway, president, Ashraf Ghani. Ghani refused to meet Khalilzad, starkly expressing his disinterest in peace as well as his inability to recognize the strength of Washington’s conviction to withdraw U.S. and coalition forces from Afghanistan.

In his desperate pursuit for power, Ghani tried every feeble excuse he could think of to postpone and undermine peace talks. From calling an unnecessary Loya Jirga (grand council) to enlisting more than two hundred delegates to create parallel institutions, Ghani exhausted every avenue to remain in control.

Following immense pressure from senior officials in Washington, Ghani formed a team of negotiators. However, the Afghans and their international partners expected that Ghani would assign a small yet influential team of negotiators and give them enough power to effectively negotiate on behalf of the republic. In contrast to that anticipation, Ghani chose to send a large number of representatives to Doha. The Afghan negotiators, while diverse, had little or no leverage to engage the Taliban in meaningful peace talks.

In the meantime, Ghani and his team in Arg, Afghanistan’s presidential palace, worked deliberately to discredit Khalilzad and suppress pro-peace activists in Kabul. Moreover, Ghani and his associates attempted to lobby Washington to remove Khalilzad from his post and convince U.S. officials to maintain its military presence indefinitely in Afghanistan.

But Ghani was not the only one against peace with the Taliban. Afghanistan’s second in command, Amrullah Saleh, was yet another major obstacle to peace. He had been making not only disparaging remarks about peace with the Taliban but also tweeting war-mongering messages.

Before fleeing the country, Ghani had shown no signs to engage in serious negotiation with the Taliban. In one of his conversations in the Arg, Ghani had mocked the delegation by comparing it to a kite whose string he masterfully controlled and maneuvered from Kabul.

Afghan commentators who were criticizing Ghani’s fallacious intentions were effectively marginalized and even intimidated by his gang of security personnel.

Meanwhile, the Taliban, which felt emboldened after dragging the mighty United States to the negotiating table, had already realized that Ghani was not sincere about peace and decided the only way to accomplish its objective, which is to establish an Islamic government in Afghanistan, was to resort to force. The Taliban then began to seize hundreds of districts.

After Ghani’s final refusal to a proposal offered by the Taliban for a peaceful settlement that required him to resign from office and allow for a transitional government, the Taliban moved quickly to capture large cities across Afghanistan. Within two weeks, the Taliban changed Afghanistan’s map from being mostly government-run provincial capitals to bringing the whole country under Taliban control, including the capital city, Kabul.

Yet before the Taliban entered Kabul on Sunday evening August 15, 2021, Ghani had successfully escaped with his wife and close aides to an unknown country.

Today, Ghani is on the run and his whereabouts remain unknown. He has abandoned the Afghan people and destroyed their hopes for freedom. What is known is that Ghani and his wife left with loads of money. Some bags of cash were so heavy that they couldn’t carry them and were left behind, according to Nikita Ishchenko, spokesman for the Russian Embassy in Kabul.

Ghani is already being slammed by Afghans from different walks of life for misleading the nation about the peace process and pursuing divisive politics. 

Afghanistan’s history has been harsh on leaders who have abandoned the Afghan people and escaped with their lives. Ghani will be judged bitterly, especially about a promise he made in one of his recent speeches.

While speaking with local governors on August 4, Ghani distinguished himself from King Amanullah Khan who had fled office in the face of an uprising during the early twentieth century by saying, “I did not like that Amanullah Khan run away, but I will never run away.”

Sami Jabarkhail is a Ph.D. Candidate in Human Resource Development at Texas A&M University and a delegate to the 2014 NATO Future Leaders Summit in Wales, United Kingdom. Follow him on twitter @SamiJabarkhail

Image: Reuters.

Jay Mens

Iran, Middle East

A nuclear agreement with Iran is likely to be reinstated in Vienna by the end of this year. If it is successful, then it will delay Iran’s nuclear ambitions for another decade at most.

In 1963, the young Harvard professor Henry Kissinger contemplated how the United States might approach a rapidly growing Soviet nuclear program. In doing so, he described the dilemma of the statesman as “the choice between making the assessment which requires the least effort or making an assessment which requires more effort.” Six years ago, Kissinger’s biographer, Niall Ferguson, invoked this “problem of conjecture” to consider the Iran nuclear deal. The problem of conjecture remains an apt prism through which to think about Iran’s nuclear program because as in Kissinger’s Soviet example, whatever a policymaker does about the program, he will “never be able to prove that his effort was necessary. . . . If he waits, he may be lucky or he may be unlucky. It is a terrible dilemma.”   

Conjecture is the simultaneous attempt to interpret the present and to guess how the future will unfold. In the wacky world of punditry, conjecture about Iran’s nuclear program usually falls into one of two camps. The first argues that Iran is rushing towards nuclear weapons in order to fulfill a destructive, messianic ambition. The other argues that Iran’s push towards nuclear weapons can be indefinitely restrained by agreements like the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Both assessments are what Kissinger referred to as “assessments which require the least effort.” A different conjecture, which admittedly requires more effort, would view the danger of a nuclear Iran through a prism that unites most of the modern Middle East’s problems: an endemic deficit of legitimacy, and the consequent potential for political instability.   

The argument that the Islamic Republic desires nuclear weapons to annihilate Israel in an orgy of messianic fervor is fantastical. The evidence suggests that, far from being a nuclear suicide bomber, the Islamic Republic is obsessed with survival. A regime that regards itself as the standard-bearer of the Islamic world and is consumed with the violent repression of domestic protest is not a regime with a death wish. The function of the Islamic Revolution was, in the words of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, to create “a point in the start of the revolution of the great world of Islam.” This sense of mission has persisted to this day: it is the bedrock of the regime’s identity and gives the regime a will to survive, not to die. The idea that Iran would commit suicide with a first strike is far-fetched. But the argument for keeping calm and carrying on is just as thin.   

The argument that Iran will rush to obliterate Israel after acquiring nuclear weapons enables Iran’s apologists to caricature those worried about a nuclear Iran as swivel-eyed doomsayers. Yet Iran’s nuclear research has gone far beyond performative provocation, and its leaders boast a consistent fifty-year track record of calling for the destruction of Israel in addition to threatening Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates with the same demise. Ignoring the pace of Iran’s nuclear research and the extraordinary record of Iran’s threats is absurd. For that reason, both types of short-term conjecture are too short-sighted. In reality, however, if Iran does cross the nuclear threshold, the danger will come not when Iran acquires nuclear weapons but quite some time afterward. 

“If Sparta and Rome have perished, what state can hope to last forever?” This was Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s pessimistic assessment in The Social Contract. It holds especially true for the Islamic Republic. Iran’s population is becoming younger, much more secular, and more connected to the rest of the world. The regime’s authority is the product of a unique moment in history. Its authority will continue to dwindle as the Iran of today moves further away from the revolutionary moment in which it was conceived. Endemic corruption and economic mismanagement will continue to undermine a regime based on moral purity and will create the conditions for revolution. Dreams of the Islamic Republic becoming a flourishing “Islamic Civilization” are as premature as the late shah’s dreams for the Persian Empire. If the collapse of the Islamic Republic is more a question of when than if, then the question then begs: what happens after the fall?   

From the deposition of the Sassanids by Iran’s nobles to Nader Shah’s 1736 counterrevolution to the 1921 Cossack coup that brought the Pahlavi family to power, Iranian regimes have historically succumbed to mutiny. Today, overwhelming popular unrest would likely see the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, the modern equivalent of the Cossacks, come to power. They would do so by rescuing, not deposing, the revolutionary system. Were this to happen, Iran’s foes would be unlikely to resist the temptation of outfitting Iran’s armed domestic opposition groups. A bloody civil war could ensue. The regime could use nuclear weapons against backers of insurrection or could threaten to do so, bringing about a first nuclear strike on Iran. And if the regime really stood no chance of survival, it could opt for messianic suicide, taking Riyadh and Tel Aviv down with Tehran. This marriage of nuclear weapons with an unstable regime would make feasible contingencies much more dangerous. But not just in Iran.   

Were Iran to acquire nuclear weapons, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and possibly Egypt would move to do the same. For Saudi Arabia, it is an official position; Turkey has intimated that it would follow suit, and Egypt began hedging when early revelations about Iranian nuclear weapons appeared in the early 2000s. Some argue that the region would break into peace under the shadow of a Damocles’ mushroom cloud. Yet while mutually assured destruction is perhaps reasonable for most states, Iran and the countries that would follow in its nuclear footsteps are susceptible to state collapse. Adding a nuclear element into such contingencies would be extraordinarily dangerous.   

Saudi Arabia is currently in the process of renegotiating its social contract. A Saudi nuclear weapon would enormously raise the stakes of the kingdom’s successful political and economic transition. The outcome of that transition is far from certain. If it fails, then Saudi Arabia lacks any deeply rooted institution that could take over. The endurance of radical Islamist groups in the kingdom—as well as historic attempts by those organizations to seize the reins of power—offers a grim picture of where a Saudi nuclear weapon could go. While the risk of a Saudi nuclear weapon is the uncertainty of the kingdom’s political future, for Turkey, it would make the country’s current trajectory much more dangerous.

With its rapid march towards authoritarianism and a determined ideological agenda, Turkey’s ruling AK Party is transforming its political system and engendering a broad domestic opposition. The military has been purged since a 2016 coup attempt, and the AKP has since developed a band of well-armed partisans. It now has plans for constitutional reform which will most likely prolong President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s stay in the exorbitant White Palace. Beyond the AKP’s plans for how Turkey should look at home, it also has an expansive agenda for what Turkey should be doing abroad. With nuclear weapons, the AKP would likely press ahead with its ambitious regional agenda. Its record of using foreign policy crises to bolster its popularity could lead to a third marriage of nuclear weapons and regime stability and would give the world yet another unwelcome gift of more nuclear brinkmanship.

Since the Arab Spring, little progress has been made in creating durable bases of political legitimacy in the region. This undermines political stability and creates opportunities for ideological fanatics to take the reins of power, in Iran and across the region. The danger of a nuclear Iran must be understood in this context, and Iran’s own history best demonstrates the risks at play. Had the shah succeeded in acquiring nuclear weapons prior to the Islamic Revolution, then those weapons could have fallen into the hands of today’s regime. The next fifty years provided numerous occasions whereby those weapons could have been used against Iraq, Saudi Arabia, or Israel. Were Iran and its neighbors to acquire nuclear weapons, then the potential for such counterfactuals to occur in real life would be greater than ever.   

Crises, like pandemics, come in multiple waves. Contingency produces contingency, and nowhere would this be more the case than an Iranian nuclear weapon. The danger of a nuclear Iran is that it would enable extraordinary, entirely plausible contingencies to take place by arranging the marriage of nuclear armament and political instability in not just one, but at least three instances. The JCPOA is more likely than not to be reinstated in Vienna by the end of this year. If it is successful, then it will delay Iran’s nuclear ambitions for another decade at most. Yet this policy is the product of short-term conjecture. Most people are tired of hearing about Iran’s nuclear program because it has been given too much attention and treated with too little detail. Teasing out the longer-term consequences of vexatious foreign policy questions can require some effort but offers a view into the profound consequences of action and inaction. The problem of conjecture is alive and well with Iran and presents a terrible dilemma.   

Jay Mens is executive director of the Middle East and North Africa Forum, a think-tank researching Middle East politics and policy at the University of Cambridge.  

 Image: Reuters

Kris Osborn

military, Americas

A deployable, road-mobile hypersonic weapon could introduce an entirely new sphere of problems and complications for one of America’s adversaries.

The urgency of the Pentagon’s need to accelerate and deploy hypersonic weapons is serious, according to senior U.S. weapons developers who have expressed extreme concern about Russian and Chinese weapons.  

“We are number three in this race. We have to catch up,” Robert Strider, the deputy director of the Army Hypersonic Project Office, told an audience on August 11 at the Space and Missile Defense Symposium in Huntsville, Alabama. Strider was referring to fast-emerging Russian and Chinese progress with hypersonic missiles, which is a concern often discussed by Pentagon leaders. This concern is likely a primary inspiration for the Army’s current success in developing an emerging weapon called “Dark Eagle.” The new missile, known as the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW), will be ready for war by 2023.  

By this time, Strider explained, the new LRHW will be able to travel aboard an Air Force C-17 Globemaster III to a hostile forward location, set up for a launch, and destroy enemy targets at hypersonic speeds before returning to home base. This level of independent warfare ability with hypersonic missiles, expected by 2023, will be preceded by a series of what Strider called Joint Flight Campaigns involving tests, assessments and technological refinements of the weapon.

Initial configurations include plans to deploy a missile battery of four launchers and a battery operations center. Interestingly, the LRHW is a joint Army-Navy weapon that uses a common warhead projectile for ground and maritime attacks. Each launcher contains two hypersonic missiles, indicating a total of eight LRHWs in a battery.  

“Our all up round is a thirty-four-inch booster which will be common between the Army and the Navy,” Strider said. “We will shoot exactly the same thing the Navy shoots out of a sub or ship.”  

Transportable on board an Air Force C-17 Globemaster III, the LRHW is intended to be road-mobile such that it can hold targets at risk from multiple changing locations to maximize surprise and speed of attack.

“We took existing trailers and modified them with hydraulics and electronics and everything associated with being a launcher,” Strider explained. “We know what these systems are capable of.” 

The first missile to be shot off of a transporter will occur in 2022 as part of the Joint Flight Campaign 2.

A deployable, road-mobile hypersonic weapon could introduce an entirely new sphere of problems and complications for one of America’s adversaries. If a battery capable of firing eight LRHWs were to arrive at a secretive launching area close to a U.S. adversary with the ability to quickly power up and launch from changing locations on a mobile launcher, then that would put an adversary’s forces at great risk of destruction. Should a hypersonic weapon—one that is able to travel at five times the speed of sound— land in closer proximity to a set of enemy targets, then such a weapon could destroy high-value targets at a much faster rate and make it extremely difficult for that adversary to defend them. Perhaps most of all, having a mobile, expeditionary hypersonic attack capability in this fashion would surely make launch locations much more difficult to locate and destroy. An enemy might not have the ability to find that launch point due to the LRHW. 

Kris Osborn is the defense editor for the National Interest. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Master’s Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University. 
 

Image: Wikimedia Commons

Michael M. Gunter

Afghanistan, Iraq, Middle East

The Biden decision to draw down in the Middle East is more of an adjustment than a seismic sea change.

Editor’s note: In early August, The National Interest organized a symposium on American foreign policy in the Middle East under the Biden administration. A variety of scholars were asked the following question: “Given Joe Biden’s recent decisions in Afghanistan and Iraq, is the president right to be reducing the U.S. military presence in the Middle East?” The following article is one of their responses:

The Biden administration’s recent decision to reduce the U.S. military presence in the Middle East can be seen in terms of two different perspectives: first, the background of a partial return to the traditional U.S. policy of isolationism; and/or second, a more immediate, mid-course adjustment in pursuing its present, active foreign policy goals.

For most of its history, the U.S. national style was characterized by isolationism regarding political entanglements in foreign policy along with a self-righteous, almost missionary emphasis on its own exceptionalism and aversion to power politics. War, of course, constituted a necessary exception to such isolation. However, as soon as peace returned, the U.S. national style demanded a return to its traditional stance of political detachment toward the rest of the world. Only the changed international balance of power after World War II began to alter this traditional state of affairs and force the United States into a more normal involvement in world affairs. Nevertheless, its traditional isolationism continues to influence its foreign policy positions to take what it considers to be the morally correct position, in this case, seemingly to reduce its Middle East presence.

However, on a more immediate level, Joe Biden’s decision can be seen as a necessary mid-course correction of faulty mission creep in Afghanistan and Iraq. Although the United States initially and justifiably entered Afghanistan in force to punish Al Qaeda’s attack on September 11, 2001, and terminate its leader, Osama bin-Laden, this limited goal was partially accomplished almost immediately by overthrowing the Taliban government and more than a decade ago with bin Laden’s death. However, during these twenty long years, the United States lost sight of its original goal and fell into the trap of mission creep and its false goal of nation-building.

In an ideal world, of course, women’s rights and the full panoply of human rights would prevail in Afghanistan, but even U.S. power has its limitations. In this particular case, the United States cannot bring Afghanistan into the twenty-first century against its will. If anybody is going to do this, it would be the mainstream Islamic world. The United States, acting through the United Nations and other multilateral bodies, could offer background support. Indeed, its supposed withdrawal from this “endless war” remains only partial as U.S. air support for the incumbent government remains. Further, if deemed necessary, a return to full U.S. involvement again remains just “over the horizon.” However, the time has come to direct U.S. resources abroad toward more important threats such as China, where recently the total Chinese naval tonnage has actually forged ahead of that of the United States, while its nuclear missile stockpile has been rapidly expanding. 

As for the Biden withdrawal from Iraq, this too is not only the correct policy but less than meets the eye. Some U.S. troops, as well as air power, remain. And if necessary, they can easily return as they did when ISIS struck in 2014. This admittedly ignores whether ISIS ever would have struck in the first place if the United States had not earlier withdrawn from Iraq at the end of 2011 and failed to get more involved in the Syrian civil war that also began in that year—actions that arguably opened the space for ISIS to arise so shockingly.

In conclusion, the Biden decision to draw down in the Middle East is more of an adjustment than a seismic sea change. It is in no way comparable to the British decision a half-century ago to withdraw from east of Suez. Furthermore, U.S. support for Israel and the Kurds in Iraq and Syria will continue as it will for Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, among others deemed necessary. On the other hand, hostile Iran also will continue to require close attention.

Dr. Michael M. Gunter is a professor of political science at Tennessee Technological University in Cookeville, Tennessee.

Image: Flickr.

Charlie Gao

MiG-29,

These Russian jets forced NATO to change its war plans.

Here's What You Need To Remember: The modular design of R-27 missiles allows them to be used in both Su-27 and MiG-29 fighters. Additionally, the Russian Air Forces still continues to field R-27ER missiles because their long-range outclasses that of lesser adversaries who are less likely to use active radar homing. 

When the Su-27 “Flanker” and MiG-29 “Fulcrum” came onto the scene in the 1980s, they represented a significant generational leap in technology compared to earlier Soviet fighters. The missiles they carried also represented a generational leap in their own way.

Indeed, both the R-73 short-range air-to-air missile and R-27 medium-range air-to-air missile which were first fielded on those aircraft serve on to this day. But the R-27 design in particular has proven to be particularly adaptable and resistant to replacement by more modern designs. But why has the design proven to be so long-lived?

In 1974, the Central Committee of the CPSU approved for work to begin on the 4th generation of fighters—the MiG-29 and Su-27. As a result of this, the Vympel missile design bureau began work on the R-27 (referred to as the K-27 during prototyping and testing) missile.

It was first envisioned that there would be two different variants of the R-27 in service, a lighter K-27A for the MiG-29 with shorter range and a heavier K-27B for the Su-27 with longer range. As a result, the propulsion system for the missile was designed to be modular.

Due to the Soviet trend of creating both radar and IR-seeking versions of missiles, the R-27 was also designed with a modular seeker. This would come in handy later as many different variations of the R-27 were made with different seekers.

Another interesting design decision was the selection of the “butterfly” shaped control surfaces in the center of the missile. This was not uncontroversial. Some designers wanted a scheme similar to the earlier R-23 missile where control surfaces were mounted on the tail of the missile, as it afforded less air resistance at low angles of attack and was considered to be generally aerodynamically superior. However, the need for the missile to be modular took priority and that design was rejected, as mounting control surfaces on the rear would compromise the modularity of the propulsion system.

Also interesting is that the designers of the R-27 thought that even with advancements in Soviet technology the possible radar power and radar seeker sensitivity of the R-27 and its launching aircraft would be inferior in power and sensitivity to Western aircraft. To counter this, Soviet designers improved the lock on after launch (LOAL) capabilities of the missile.

While the earlier R-23 missile had inertial LOAL, where the missile’s seeker could home in on a target after being launched and flying without a lock for some time with an inertial navigation system keeping the missile flying straight, the R-27 improved upon this by adding the ability for the aircraft to issue course corrections via a radio datalink to the missile.

Tests were carried out at the end of the 1970s, with K-27s being fired from MiG-23s, although these were simply to test the telemetry of the missile and were not guided shots. The thermal version was also tested from the MiG-23, being shot at parachute targets. Test K-27 missiles were also shot from a prototype MiG-29 in 1980 with the thermal missile, though the prototype MiG-29 didn’t have a radar installed at the time.

Testing continued throughout the 1980s, with state trials concluding in 1984. The K-27 missile was finally adopted in 1987 as the R-27R and R-27T missiles, with R being the semi-active radar homing variant and the T being the heat-seeking variant.

At the same time, the K-27B “heavy” missile originally intended for the Su-27 had its designation changed to the K-27E, with the E indicating it would have more energy (longer range). It went through a longer development cycle than the lighter K-27 missile due to redesigns of the Su-27’s radar system to improve it and make it more competitive. Additional challenges posed by the extended range at which the K-27E was expected to operate at also caused a longer development cycle.

Testing for The K-27E was finally adopted in 1990 as the R-27ER and R-27ET, and the creators of the missile were awarded a state prize in 1991.

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During the long development cycle of the R-27, it was realized that the semi-active radar homing (in which the missile homes in on a radar signal created by the launching aircraft) on which these missiles was based might become obsolete. Studies were made into creating an active radar homing (ARH) version of the missile. ARH missiles have a small radar in the seeker, which allows the missile to self-illuminate the target instead of relying on an external aircraft.

This version was called the R-27EA. Drafted in 1983, it also underwent develop during the 1980s, but difficulties creating the small radar in the seeker delayed development. The fate of the project is uncertain, but most sources say major development was stopped around 1989 in order to focus on the R-77 missile instead, although work may have continued in private.

Overall, the main advantage of the R-27 series of missiles is the range on the ER variants, which is said to be around 130 km. This is far longer than any variant of the AIM-7 Sparrow, the closest NATO equivalent. The primary problem with the R-27 is that the long development cycle allowed American missiles to surpass it.

One example of this is the mid-course datalink course correction feature of the R-27. While it was originally designed with this feature in the 1970s, the final missile only reached service by 1987. By that time, American engineers had incrementally added updates to their existing AIM-7 missile, including the same capability by the AIM-7P Block II, which was also adopted in 1987.

The compromise nature of the control surfaces probably also contributed to the decision to not further develop the missile. The next-generation ARH missile that was meant to arm the Soviet Air Force, the R-77, featured grid-fins on the rear of the missile for better maneuverability. Since the R-27 would never reach the level of aerodynamic performance of the R-77, it probably was determined to be a waste of further effort to give the missile ARH capability.

In many ways, the R-27ER can be seen as the “last gasp” of the SARH. It was designed to be one of the most advanced missiles of its type with long range and mid-course correction capability, but by the time it entered service, its type of missile was nearing obsolescence. America fielded its first ARH missile in 1991, the AIM-120 AMRAAM, only one year after the R-27ER entered service.

The Russian Air Force probably continues to field them because their long-range outclasses most lesser adversaries who are unlikely to utilize ARH missiles. However, as seen in Syria, when danger is posed by a peer or near-peer air force, the R-27s will come off in favor of the R-77s.

Charlie Gao studied political and computer science at Grinnell College and is a frequent commentator on defense and national-security issues. This first appeared in August 2018.

Image: Wikipedia.

Stephen Silver

Stimulus,

You might be eligible. 

The Social Security Administration (SSA) has announced a rule change, so that benefits received through Supplemental Security Income (SSI) will not be affected by the recipient having received stimulus checks, and other certain government benefits.

As pointed out by Disability Scoop, after the rule change, “people with disabilities can save money received through stimulus checks and other COVID-19 relief programs indefinitely without losing out on their Supplemental Security Income benefits.”

“We recently changed our rules about what financial assistance can affect your eligibility for SSI or your monthly SSI payment amount,” the SSA said on its coronavirus website.

“Specifically, we no longer count the financial assistance listed below against your eligibility or payment amount. We are reviewing SSI claims and other SSI records going back to the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic to restore SSI payments for people whose SSI was affected by receiving any of the assistance listed below.”

Those benefits include “Economic Impact Payments”—the official name for stimulus checks from the federal government—as well as most state-issued stimulus payments, unemployment assistance, loan forgiveness from the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP).

Also included are benefits from the Economic Injury Disaster Loan (EIDL) Program, the Coronavirus Food Assistance Program, the COVID-19 Veteran Rapid Retraining Assistance Program, COVID-19 Funeral Assistance, the Emergency Rental Assistance Fund, the Emergency Assistance for Rural Housing/Rural Rental Assistance, the Homeowner Assistance Fund, Housing Assistance and Supportive Services Programs for Native Americans, the Tribal Payments from the Coronavirus Relief Fund and the Coronavirus State and Local Fiscal Recovery Funds, Supporting Foster Youth and Families, the Higher Education Emergency Relief Fund, the Emergency Assistance to Children and Families through the Pandemic Emergency Assistance Fund, the Farm Loan Assistance for Socially Disadvantaged Farmers and Ranchers, and the USDA Assistance and Support for Socially Disadvantaged Farmers, Ranchers, Forest Land Owners and Operators, and Groups.

What should beneficiaries do if they are affected by this change?

“In most cases, you do not need to do anything. If we do not need any information from you to restore your SSI payment, we will restore your SSI payment and we will mail you a letter explaining the change,” the SSA coronavirus page says. “We will send the letter to the most recent address we have available for you. If you have an appointed representative, or a representative payee, we will also send this information to your representative.”

Back in July, Democrats in Congress announced a proposal to expand SSI benefits.

“Disabled people and the poorest of the poor haven’t had really any help in years,” Sen. Sherrod Brown (D-OH) said in a July Time Magazine article about the push. “They’ve just been forgotten and neglected. So it’s time we do something about it.”

Stephen Silver, a technology writer for The National Interest, is a journalist, essayist and film critic, who is also a contributor to The Philadelphia Inquirer, Philly Voice, Philadelphia Weekly, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Living Life Fearless, Backstage magazine, Broad Street Review and Splice Today. The co-founder of the Philadelphia Film Critics Circle, Stephen lives in suburban Philadelphia with his wife and two sons. Follow him on Twitter at @StephenSilver.

Image: Reuters

Charlie Gao

ZTZ-96,

Although China's ZTZ-96 tank is a Lethal Threat, it is developmentally immature at least in contrast to the latest American and Russian tanks. 

Here's What You Need to Know: China's military capabilities are increasing. 

What's up with China's tanks? Can they keep up with the Armata and the M1A2D?

One interesting aspect of China’s tank fleet is that all of the designs are relatively young compared to European, American or Russian designs. Most of the predominant tank designs in the world originated in the late 1970s or early 1980s, but China’s ZTZ-96 and ZTZ-99 tanks only began development in the late 1980s and entered service in the late 1990s and early 2000s. But have Chinese designers taken advantage of the advances in technology that have occurred during the meantime?

The ZTZ-96 could be considered China’s first modern main battle tank. It grew out of a program to modernize the older ZTZ-88 tank, which was a stopgap design between the older Type 59s for the 1980s. The first ZTZ-96 was adopted in 1999.

It swapped the 105mm cannon that armed the earlier ZTZ-88s for a 125mm ZPT98 smoothbore cannon, a copy of the Soviet/Russian 2A46M. The fire control system (FCS) was based on earlier Marconi fire control systems imported and used by China. The FCS included a laser rangefinder (LRF), gun stabilization, and optic stabilization (for the gunner’s sight). However, for a 1999 tank, it was underpowered with only a 780hp power plant.

Overall, the tank was okay, but the armor left much to be desired. The armor was still a relatively old composite design, which would be almost totally ineffective against contemporary Russian and Western designs. For reference, the US was fielding M829A2 at the time, which was meant to cut through Russian tanks with heavy Kontakt-5 Explosive Reactive Armor (ERA) in front of composite armor. The basic ZTZ-96 did not even have light ERA.

As a result, armor upgrades composed the bulk of the changes when it came to the ZTZ-96A, adopted in 2009. It added significant amounts of armor to the basic ZTZ-96 chassis, then added ERA on top of that. As a result, the ZTZ-96A has a significantly different turret shape than the basic ZTZ-96. Slat armor was also removed on other portions of the tank and replaced by ERA. Some technology used to make the turret was taken from the later ZTZ-99.

The FCS and turret controls received a slight upgrade as well, though nothing too important. A laser-warning receiver was also added to the rear of the turret to improve defensive capabilities. A thermal imager was also added in the ZTZ-96A.

The weight of all these upgrades caused the ZTZ-96A to be rather underpowered with its 780hp power plant. Chinese tankers who utilized the ZTZ-96A during the 2014 Russian Tank Biathlon complained about being left in the dust by T-72B3s, which utilized more powerful 1000hp engines.

As a result, the ZTZ-96B upgrade includes a substantial engine upgrade, up to 1130hp. It also adds new FCS, crew environmental systems, and a remote weapons station. Other upgrades are also possible, but details on the ZTZ-96B are hard to come by as it is a very recent upgrade.

Despite the upgrades, the ZTZ-96B is based on very old designs. The Chinese military has known this for a long time: the ZTZ-99 was in development concurrently with the ZTZ-96B. As opposed to the ZTZ-96, which was meant to also kind of be a “stopgap” tank, the ZTZ-99 was meant to be a true competitor to international designs like the Abrams, Leopard 2, and T-80.

The design of the first ZTZ-99s was finalized around 1998, and the tank was first seen on parade in 1999. These pre-production models feature flat turret faces and are armed with the same 125mm cannon that the ZTZ-96 uses.

The basic model of the ZTZ-99 (9910) was equipped with an independent commander’s sight, a significant improvement over the ZTZ-96 and a feature the M1A1, Leopard 2A4, and T-72B lack. It also features a 1200hp engine in the basic model, which is more powerful than basic T-72B3s.

However, this design did not enter production due to perceived flaws in its armor layout and design. Rather, the tank went back into development. A slightly revised version called ZTZ-99 Phase-I Improved entered production. In 2008, further development was completed, resulting in the ZTZ-99 Phase-II. This new iteration featured angled turret faces similar to the Leopard 2A5, and ERA modules on the hull.

The entire tank underwent a large redesign yet again in the ZTZ-99A, where a new, more powerful 1500hp engine was placed in the tank. The hull’s shape is redesigned, and now resembles the M1 Abrams series of tanks with a rough wedge shape more than the Soviet T-series earlier hulls resembled. The turret is also redesigned, being wider and featuring thicker armor. The tank also has all the features you’d expect on a modern tank: thermal commander and gunner’s sights, hunter-killer capability, a soft-kill APS with laser warning receiver.

So how capable are the ZTZ-96 and ZTZ-99 in all their variants? The ZTZ-96B probably still relatively weak compared to other “frontline” tanks due to its antiquated armor. ERA can only improve armor so much. With the 125mm gun and modern fire control system, it likely will prove a lethal threat to targets, albeit one that is easily knocked out.

The ZTZ-99A is another beast. Given its armor and advanced networked and sensor systems, it’s likely to be a tough opponent. However, the quality of Chinese thermal imagers is uncertain. The latest American M1A2C tanks are said to be equipped with third generation thermal imagers, which may increase detection and identification ranges out past earlier Chinese thermals, giving the Abrams the edge. The existence of such a site does put it in front of most T-72B3s.

The Chinese tanks also use Russian/Soviet-style carousel autoloaders, which will probably not be very safe for the crew in the event of a hit. It’s surprising that the ZTZ-99A was not designed with a bustle autoloader, as many later third generation tank designs (including the Japanese Type 90 and Type 10 and Korean K2) utilize bustle autoloaders for increased safety. It’s possible Chinese designers thought the additional complexity and cost were not worth it.

In the end, the ZTZ-99A is likely a lethal threat for the older tanks in the American tank fleet and the majority of the Russian tank fleet, but both the latest versions of American and Russian tanks are likely to beat it in a fight. The constant flux of basic turret and hull designs being manufactured suggests that China is not really sure what its requirements for a tank are, and thus the ZTZ-99A is probably fairly developmentally immature, at least in contrast to the latest American and Russian tanks.

The M1A2D and Armata are likely to leave the ZTZ-99A in the dust. It’s unlikely for the Chinese military leadership will want to prioritize another new tank project, however, as the PLAN seems to have been the focus of recent developments.

Some details taken from The Technical Development of China's Tanks from the Type 59 to the Type 88 Main Battle Tank by Wu Zheren and Hu Xiaofang.

Charlie Gao studied Political and Computer Science at Grinnell College and is a frequent commentator on defense and national security issues.

This article first appeared in November 2018.

Image: Creative Commons "Tanks in Beijing" by gadgetdan is licensed under CC BY 2.0

Stephen Silver

Social Security Disability,

President Biden said in July that long COVID could soon qualify as a disability under federal law.

Most people who suffer from the coronavirus, and survive, recover relatively quickly. But other survivors keep suffering symptoms and effects for a long time afterward, in a phenomenon known as “long COVID’ or “long-haul COVID.”

Can those who have suffered from long COVID qualify for Social Security disability benefits? CNBC recently explored that question.

“We certainly have seen an increase of claims because of COVID-related issues, including long haulers,” one advocate who handles Social Security disability claimants told CNBC. That person added that while some in that situation have been awarded benefits, “the majority of those have been people with lingering complications from being put on ventilators.”

Most of those who receive Social Security disability benefits are those who have suffered an illness for twelve months or longer, and not many sufferers of long-haul COVID have had the disease for that long.

President Biden said in July that long COVID could soon qualify as a disability under federal law, per NBC News.

"We're bringing agencies together to make sure Americans with long COVID who have a disability have access to the rights and resources that are due under the disability law, which includes accommodations and services in the workplace and school, and our health care system so they can live their lives in dignity," the president said last month.

The same week, the Biden Administration issued a “fact sheet” listing resources available to those suffering from long COVID. The announcement came on the anniversary of the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).

‘Today the Administration is also releasing a package of guidance and resources to support individuals experiencing the long-term symptoms of COVID-19 or ‘Post- Acute Sequelae of SARS-CoV-2 infection (PASC),’ known commonly as 'long COVID,'” the administration said in the fact sheet. "The announcements from the Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS), Justice, Education, and Labor provide information about where individuals can access resources and accommodations and clarifies the rights for health and educational services and supports.”

The Office for Civil Rights at HHS and Department of Justice both issued guidances, “explaining that some individuals with long COVID may have a disability under various civil rights laws that entitles them to protection from discrimination.”

Also released were guidelines from the Department of Education Office for Civil Rights and Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services, aimed at helping children who have suffered from long COVID.

In addition, the Labor Department’s Office of Disability Employment Policy (ODEP) launched a website with information about benefits available to those with long COVID, such as job accommodations and employee benefits.

Stephen Silver, a technology writer for The National Interest, is a journalist, essayist and film critic, who is also a contributor to The Philadelphia Inquirer, Philly Voice, Philadelphia Weekly, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Living Life Fearless, Backstage magazine, Broad Street Review and Splice Today. The co-founder of the Philadelphia Film Critics Circle, Stephen lives in suburban Philadelphia with his wife and two sons. Follow him on Twitter at @StephenSilver.

Image: Reuters

En toile de fond du climat social régressif des années 70, le « pluralisme » est en train de se réaffirmer comme idéologie nationale américaine. Le pluralisme ethnique (ou néo-pluralisme) est venu s'ajouter à d'autres fantômes des années 50 que l'on remet actuellement au goût du jour, comme le respect du (...) / États-Unis, Capitalisme, Identité culturelle, Immigrés, Inégalités, Minorité nationale, Racisme - 1976/08

Charlie Gao

T-10 Tank,

The reason why the T-10M stuck around was likely institutional inertia. 

Here's What You Need to Know: The T-10M served for over 40 years before being decommissioned, making it one of the longest-lived tank designs in the world. Soviet doctrine, during the 40-year reign of the T-10M called for an extremely heavily armed breakthrough tank, and it was the tank for that job.

The T-10 is one of the longest-lasting tank designs in the world. Adopted in 1953, the tank served for over 40 years before finally being decommissioned in 1997.

Along the way, the design underwent several revisions to keep it modern, from the T-10A to the ultimate variant, the T-10M.

But what made the T-10 design so enduring? Just how good was the T-10M? Why was it kept in service so long?

The story of the T-10 beings in 1949. Originally called the IS-8 and IS-9 during development, the T-10 was a continuation of the Iosef Stalin line of heavy breakthrough tanks that debuted during WWII.

IS-2 heavy tanks were the standard late-war heavy tank of the Soviet Army, possessing a powerful D-25 122mm gun that could blast through enemy tanks and bunkers alike.

That gun would go on to be a hallmark of the IS-series, arming the later IS-3, IS-4, and eventually, the IS-8, which would be adopted as the IS-10. Following Stalin’s death in 1953, the IS-10 was renamed T-10 as part of the destalinization process.

The T-10 itself was a modernization of the IS-3, featuring the same “prow” front hull design, complete with the centrally situated driver’s position. The turret and hull were enlarged from the IS-3 to accommodate more armor. This necessitated the addition of another road wheel.

The D-25 was also beefed up with a longer barrel and bigger muzzle brake to allow for the firing of advanced armor-piercing rounds.

To help address a common weakness of the IS-series, low rate of fire, an electromechanical rammer was added to the T-10 to assist the loader. 30 rounds were available in an ergonomic configuration superior to earlier IS-tanks.

Altogether, this made for an incredibly formidable tank in the 1950s, with very thick armor and impressive lethality to boot. While not as nimble as upcoming Western tank designs, the T-10 was meant to be able to survive a hit.

The first upgrade for the T-10 came in 1956 in the T-10A. The T-10A was a fairly straightforward lethality upgrade. A fume extractor was added to the D-25, and the “Uragan” vertical-axis stabilizer was added to the T-10. This improved the ability of the T-10 to fire on the move by 5-6 times.

The T-10B came shortly afterward in 1957, featuring a 2-plane stabilizer.

The final variant, the T-10M was adopted in 1962. It was an almost total overhaul of the design, with the original D-25 cannon being swapped out for a more modern M62T2 cannon which featured yet another new muzzle brake and fume extractor. It also had a newer, more effective stabilizer.

The coaxial armament was also improved, swapping the 12.7mm DShK machine guns for 14.5mm KPV machine guns.

A myriad of other improvements round out the T-10M: night vision equipment for the gunner and driver, improved nuclear protection measures, and better sights.

But at that time the next generation of Western and Soviet tanks was well into development. The original T-10 had far better armor than the T-55s and T-54s that were its contemporary, but the T-10M didn’t possess significant advantages versus the T-62, much less the upcoming T-64 which utilized composite armor.

In the end, the reason why the T-10M stuck around was likely institutional inertia. Soviet doctrine called for an extremely heavily armed breakthrough tank, and the T-10M was the tank for that job.

This doctrine didn’t stick around for much longer given the suitability of faster, lighter tanks at exploiting breakthroughs, but at the time, it was a perfectly valid reason to keep churning out T-10s.

The T-10 was actually better in some ways than the newer tanks, perhaps simply due to its size. The stabilizer was more effective than the T-62s, and of course the high caliber coaxial and commander weapons fit is nothing to scoff at. These aspects would likely have made it a force to be reckoned with on the breakthrough in the 1960s when ATGMs were still in their infancy.

Charlie Gao studied political and computer science at Grinnell College and is a frequent commentator on defense and national-security issues.

This article first appeared several years ago.

Image: Creative Commons "Soviet Heavy Tank T-10. 1953. Тяжелый советский танк Т-10." by Peer.Gynt is licensed under CC BY-NC-SA 2.0

Nader Entessar

Afghanistan, Middle East

Several countries in the region, especially Afghanistan’s neighbors, have concluded that without the Taliban’s acquiescence and involvement, not only will peace remain ephemeral in that country, but their own national security interests will be endangered.

Editor’s note: In early August, The National Interest organized a symposium on American foreign policy in the Middle East under the Biden administration. A variety of scholars were asked the following question: “Given Joe Biden’s recent decisions in Afghanistan and Iraq, is the president right to be reducing the U.S. military presence in the Middle East?” The following article is one of their responses:

These questions do not lend themselves to a simple “yes” or “no.” Perhaps we can answer these questions with more certainty a decade from now. However, what is clear is that the U.S. military involvement and heavy presence in the greater Middle East in the past two decades has not served American national interests. Authoritarianism and war are more prevalent today in the region than before the U.S. military build-up of the past twenty years. Post-Saddam Iraq is still a fractured country that suffers from a myriad of economic, social, and political malaise and has become a battleground between domestic Iraqi groups and regional contenders for influence. There is no guarantee that the Islamic State (ISIS) or its offshoots will not once again threaten Iraq’s territorial integrity and become a serious threat to Iraq’s neighbors, especially to Iran’s national security. In fact, Iraq today is in a state of suspension between a failed state and a permanently unstable and fractured entity.

Furthermore, reports of the U.S. military withdrawal from the Middle East are exaggerated. The Biden administration may reduce overt U.S. military presence here and there, but these may simply be either repositioning the military presence or redefining it. For example, the Biden administration has announced the termination of the U.S. combat presence in Iraq but not the U.S. military presence in that country.

The desire to disengage the United States from the Afghan conflict, its longest war in history, was first manifested in the Trump administration. After years of maintaining a significant military presence in Afghanistan, the Biden administration must have concluded that there is no end in sight to the internal conflict in that country and that the United States was not “winning” the war there. Consequently, the United States began to engage in a series of talks with the Taliban, its previous nemesis, to prepare the ground for the termination of its official military involvement in the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan.

What can be observed at this time is that several countries in the region, especially Afghanistan’s neighbors, have concluded that without the Taliban’s acquiescence and involvement, not only will peace remain ephemeral in that country, but their own national security interests will be endangered. That is why some of Afghanistan’s neighbors have sought to arrange peace talks between the Taliban and the other contenders for power in that country, including Ashraf Ghani’s ruling government.

Iran has tried to mediate between Afghan groups by arranging talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban. Iran shares a long 921 km porous border with Afghanistan with several security threats emanating from that border area. Today, Iran fears that a forceful and violent takeover of Afghanistan will result, inter alia, in another massive refugee influx. Although the Taliban’s advances in the current conflict have been generally in areas away from the Iran-Afghan border regions, we are already witnessing a massive influx of would-be Afghan refugees to the Iranian border waiting to cross into Iran. If conditions continue to deteriorate inside Afghanistan, Iran will take a more active role in securing its border from the refugee influx and Taliban threats. Even Beijing, which only has a short and relatively unpassable 76 km border with Afghanistan, may feel compelled to try to fill the vacuum in Afghanistan to secure China’s Tajikistan flank which will become a transit point for extremism in Central Asia.

Nader Entessar is Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of South Alabama.

Image: Reuters.

Charlie Gao

Chinese Army,

Just because the day ends, does not mean the fighting does. 

Here's What You Need to Remember: The BBG-011A is clearly a clone of the Thales LUCIE night vision goggles, a popular European NVG that has seen use with the German Bundeswehr and French Army. The LUCIE is notable for being relatively “flat”, having the form factor of a rectangular box with a lens in the upper right corner. The choice to clone the European LUCIE device instead of American or Russian monocular-style devices is interesting, given that monoculars are generally held to have far more advantages over offset-lens binoculars.

Recently, various Chinese military night vision units have been showing up on the Chinese domestic market. This provides an interesting opportunity to evaluate the capability of such units, as manufacturers publish the specifications and characteristics of these units. However, as with most night vision technology, there are caveats. Typically a night vision unit consists of two basic elements, the image intensifier (I2) tube, and the housing. The tube generally is the largest determinant of the quality and resolution of the image, while the housing affects how the unit is mounted, how durable it is, and its other ergonomic properties. While the housings available on the civilian market are fairly representative of Chinese military stock, the I2 tubes in the housings may not be representative of what’s actually issued to the Chinese military.

The BBG-011A is an interesting example of a Chinese military night vision unit on the civilian market. The unit is clearly a clone of the Thales LUCIE night vision goggles, a popular European NVG that has seen use with the German Bundeswehr and French Army. The LUCIE is notable for being relatively “flat”, having the form factor of a rectangular box with a lens in the upper right corner. The offset lens is controversial among users of the LUCIE, with users often complaining that the offset lens makes “close up” work unintuitive and clumsy. However, it’s possible that the lens is offset to interface well with carryhandle mounted optics on the FAMAS rifle, which makes sense given that the Chinese QBZ-95 is set up in a similar way.

The BBG-011A on the civilian market comes with one of three I2 tubes, the NT-3, CNT-4, and DNT-6. NT-3s have figures of merit (FOMs) of around 1200, CNT-4s have FOMs of around 1440, and DNT-6s have FOMs of around 1960. DNT-6 tubes also have autogating technology, which helps preserve tube life when bright light sources are viewed through the tube. All of the I2 tubes the BBG-011A is available with are Gen 2+, which is behind the Gen 3 tubes commonly used by the US military. Most US military NVGs have FOMs of over 2000, with some even going above 2500. Modern Generation 3 military-used Chinese tubes are probably over 2000 FOM, but are not seen on civilian-available examples, and would probably not be used in the BBG-011A, as it is an older design.

The BBG-011A has a dovetail mount which is proprietary. PLA standard operating procedure appears to be the mounting the BBG to a headclamp style mount, which a ballistic helmet is then worn over. This is not ideal, as headclamp mounts are generally considered to be uncomfortable, especially with a helmet worn over them. Adapters are available that allow the BBG-011A to be mounted on a standard Notoros Rhino or Wilcox L4G24 mount that American PVS-series night vision are generally mounted on.

Overall, the BBG-011A is an interesting look into Chinese night vision development. The choice to clone the European LUCIE device instead of American or Russian monocular-style devices is interesting, given that monoculars are generally held to have far more advantages over offset-lens binoculars. But perhaps the desire for passive-aiming capability through a reflex sight and the similarities in layout between the FAMAS and QBZ-95 rifles lead to the adoption of the BBG-011A.

Charlie Gao studied political and computer science at Grinnell College and is a frequent commentator on defense and national security issues.

Image: Creative Commons "140410-Z-NI803-447" by Matt Hecht is marked with CC PDM 1.0

Why ending the war is more difficult than ever

Amidst an “alarming rise in hateful discourse” against transgender people globally, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) warned that this community still lacks safeguards against abuse.

A new development model for a world in crisis.

The delivery of lifesaving aid and medical supplies to millions of Afghans must not be cut, the World Health Organization (WHO) said on Wednesday, citing a more than threefold rise in the number of trauma cases.

Ethen Kim Lieser

economy, Americas

There are more than five online petitions that are demanding recurring monthly stimulus checks of $2,000 until the health crisis ends—the most well-known being the Change.org petition that was launched by Denver-area restaurant owner Stephanie Bonin. 

Here's What You Need to Remember: Moreover, several members of the influential House Ways and Means Committee stated in a letter to Biden that the “pandemic has served as a stark reminder that families and workers need certainty in a crisis. They deserve to know they can put food on the table and keep a roof over their heads.” 

Throughout this ongoing coronavirus pandemic, Congress has approved the delivery of three stimulus payments to most Americans—a $1,200 check in April 2020, $600 in December, and the current $1,400 payments under President Joe Biden’s American Rescue Plan.  

Despite these timely checks entering the bank accounts of tens of millions of financially struggling Americans, both Congress and the president are still being bombarded with questions regarding another round or two of stimulus checks.  

Ordinary Citizens Speak Out 

There are more than five online petitions that are demanding recurring monthly stimulus checks of $2,000 until the health crisis ends—the most well-known being the Change.org petition that was launched by Denver-area restaurant owner Stephanie Bonin. And over this past weekend, it eclipsed 2.8 million signatures—putting it just two hundred thousand short of its target.  

“My name is Stephanie, and I am one of millions of Americans who fear for my financial future because of this coronavirus crisis. . . . I’m calling on Congress to support families with a $2,000 payment for adults and a $1,000 payment for kids immediately, and continuing regular checks for the duration of the crisis," Bonin stated in the petition. “Otherwise, laid-off workers, furloughed workers, the self-employed, and workers dealing with reduced hours will struggle to pay their rent or put food on the table. Our country is still deeply struggling.”

“Our restaurant community is wrestling with seeing everything we all have worked so hard for irrevocably changed,” she continued. “Our hearts were breaking as we watched our staff divide the ingredients in our kitchen to bring to their homes: a dismal token for employees who worked tirelessly every day. Our talented and cherished team, some of whom have been with us since we opened our doors fifteen years ago, are now without an income. Like our team, my family has lost all of the income from our restaurant, and business owners and the self-employed can't claim unemployment. This is the story of America right now.”

Bonin’s petition has received so much support that the Change.org platform has recognized it as one of the top ten petitions that changed the year 2020.  

Stimulus Coming? 

However, whether or not this popular petition will have any actual impact on passing another round of stimulus remains to be seen. The Biden administration has yet to hint at any real plan for such an endeavor, but it appears that it is open to ideas.  

During a press briefing earlier this summer with reporters, White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki noted that “(President Biden) is happy to hear from a range of ideas on what would be most effective and what’s most important to the economy moving forward.”  

Moreover, several members of the influential House Ways and Means Committee stated in a letter to Biden that the “pandemic has served as a stark reminder that families and workers need certainty in a crisis. They deserve to know they can put food on the table and keep a roof over their heads.” 

Ethen Kim Lieser is a Washington state-based Science and Tech Editor who has held posts at Google, The Korea Herald, Lincoln Journal Star, AsianWeek, and Arirang TV. Follow or contact him on LinkedIn. This article is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters

Ethen Kim Lieser

Child Tax Credit,

Approved under President Joe Biden’s $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan, the federal government is now allowing eligible parents to collect as much as $3,600 per year for a child under the age of six and up to $3,000 for children between ages six and seventeen.

Here's What You Need to Remember: The latest Census Bureau Household Pulse Survey showed that parents who have received the funds reported less trouble paying for food and basic household expenses. It further revealed that about ten percent of households with children sometimes or often didn’t have enough to eat over the past week—the lowest percentage registered since the health crisis started in early 2020.

Last Friday, the Internal Revenue Service and the Treasury Department confirmed that the second batch of advance monthly payments worth approximately $15 billion from the expanded Child Tax Credits (CTC) were disbursed to about thirty-six million American families.

There was, however, a noticeable wrinkle that has the potential to confuse many cash-strapped parents who are waiting to receive the funds. Apparently, due to an unspecified issue, the tax agency announced that up to fifteen percent of families who received the cash payment in July via direct deposit now will be getting a paper check this month.

“Like the first payments, the vast majority of families will receive these payments by direct deposit,” the IRS said in a release.

“For those affected, no additional action is needed for the September payment to be issued by direct deposit. Families can visit the Child Tax Credit Update Portal to see if they’re receiving a direct deposit or paper check this month,” it continued.

Staying Patient

The tax agency also mentioned that for those who are receiving their credits via the post office, “be sure to allow extra time for delivery by mail through the end of August.”

Future payments from the child tax credits are slated to head out on the fifteenth of each month through December.

Approved under President Joe Biden’s $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan, the federal government is now allowing eligible parents to collect as much as $3,600 per year for a child under the age of six and up to $3,000 for children between ages six and seventeen—meaning that a $250 or a $300 payment for each child will be deposited each month through the end of 2021.

Benefits of CTC

Recent polls and studies also strongly support the fact that the Credits are already offering timely support to low-income households amid the ongoing coronavirus pandemic.

The latest Census Bureau Household Pulse Survey showed that parents who have received the funds reported less trouble paying for food and basic household expenses. It further revealed that about ten percent of households with children sometimes or often didn’t have enough to eat over the past week—the lowest percentage registered since the health crisis started in early 2020.

According to a separate analysis released by the Niskanen Center, it contended that the recurring monthly checks will help propel $27.6 billion in new household spending and support more than half a million new jobs.

“While only enacted for one year, the expanded CTC is expected to reduce child poverty by forty percent and support investments in children that promote family stability,” the think tank stated in a release.

Ethen Kim Lieser is a Washington state-based Science and Tech Editor who has held posts at Google, The Korea Herald, Lincoln Journal Star, AsianWeek, and Arirang TV. Follow or contact him on LinkedIn. This article is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters

Robert Farley, James Holmes

Submarines, World

Ranking the greatest battleships of all time is a tad easier than ranking naval battles.

Here's What You Need to Remember: In short, Bismarck turned out to be a bologna flask (hat tip: Clausewitz), an outwardly tough vessel that shatters at the slightest tap from within. In 1939 Grand Admiral Erich Raeder lamented that the German surface fleet, flung into battle long before it matured, could do little more than "die with honor." Raeder was righter than he knew.

(This is a series of 5 pieces combined for your reading pleasure that have ranked as some of our most popular ever.)

5 Best Battleships:

Ranking the greatest battleships of all time is a tad easier than ranking naval battles. Both involve comparing apples with oranges. But at least taking the measure of individual men-of-war involves comparing one apple with one orange. That's a compact endeavor relative to sorting through history to discern how seesaw interactions shaped the destinies of peoples and civilizations.

Still, we need some standard for distinguishing between battlewagons. What makes a ship great? It makes sense, first of all, to exclude any ship before the reign of Henry VIII. There was no line-of-battle ship in the modern sense before England's "great sea-king" founded the sail-driven Royal Navy in the 16th century. Galley warfare was quite a different affair from lining up capital ships and pounding away with naval gunnery.

One inescapable chore is to compare ships' technical characteristics. A recent piece over at War Is Boring revisits an old debate among battleship and World War II enthusiasts. Namely, who would've prevailed in a tilt between a U.S. Navy Iowa-class dreadnought and the Imperial Japanese Navy's Yamato? Author Michael Peck restates the common wisdom from when I served in mighty Wisconsin, last of the battleships: it depends on who landed the first blow. Iowas commanded edges in speed and fire control, while Yamato and her sister Musashi outranged us and boasted heavier weight of shot. We would've made out fine had we closed the range before the enemy scored a lucky hit from afar. If not, things may have turned ugly.

Though not in so many words, Peck walks through the basic design features that help qualify a battleship for history's elite -- namely guns, armor, and speed. Makes sense, doesn't it? Offensive punch, defensive resiliency, and speed remain the hallmarks of any surface combatant even in this missile age. Note, however, that asymmetries among combat vessels result in large part from the tradeoffs naval architects must make among desirable attributes.

Only sci-fi lets shipwrights escape such choices. A Death Star of the sea would sport irresistible weaponry, impenetrable armor, and engines able to drive the vessel at breakneck speed. But again, you can't have everything in the real world. Weight is a huge challenge. A battleship loaded down with the biggest guns and thickest armor would waddle from place to place. It would make itself an easy target for nimbler opponents or let them run away. On the other hand, assigning guns and speed top priority works against rugged sides. A ship that's fleet of foot but lightly armored exposes its innards and crew to enemy gunfire. And so forth. Different navies have different philosophies about tradeoffs. Hence the mismatches between Yamato and Iowa along certain parameters. Thus has it always been when fighting ships square off.

But a battleship is more than a machine. Machines neither rule the waves nor lose out in contests for mastery. People do. People ply the seas, and ideas about shiphandling and tactics guide their combat endeavors. Great Britain's Royal Navy triumphed repeatedly during the age of sail. Its success owed less to superior materiel -- adversaries such as France and the United States sometimes fielded better ships -- than to prolonged voyages that raised seamanship and gunnery to a high art. Indeed, a friend likes to joke that the 18th century's finest warship was a French 74-gun ship captured -- and crewed -- by Royal Navy mariners. The best hardware meets the best software.

That's why in the end, debating Jane's Fighting Ships entries -- lists of statistics -- for Iowa, Yamato, and their brethren from other times and places fails to satisfy. What looks like the best ship on paper may not win. A ship need not outmatch its opponents by every technical measure. It needs to be good enough. That is, it must match up well enough to give an entrepreneurial crew, mindful of the tactical surroundings, a reasonable chance to win. The greatest battleship thus numbers among the foremost vessels of its age by material measures, and is handled by masterful seamen.

But adding the human factor to the mix still isn't enough. There's an element of opportunity, of sheer chance. True greatness comes when ship and crew find themselves in the right place at the right time to make history. A battleship's name becomes legend if it helps win a grand victory, loses in dramatic fashion, or perhaps accomplishes some landmark diplomatic feat. A vessel favored (or damned) by fortune, furthermore, becomes a strategic compass rose. It becomes part of the intellectual fund on which future generations draw when making maritime strategy. It's an artifact of history that helps make history.

So we arrive at one guy's gauge for a vessel's worth: strong ship, iron men, historical consequence. In effect, then, I define greatest as most iconic. Herewith, my list of history's five most iconic battleships, in ascending order:

Bismarck:

The German Navy's Bismarck lived a short life that supplies the stuff of literature to this day. Widely considered the most capable battleship in the Atlantic during World War II, Bismarck sank the battlecruiser HMS Hood, pride of the Royal Navy, with a single round from her main battery. On the other hand, the leadership's martial spirit proved brittle when the going got tough. In fact, it shattered at the first sharp rap. As commanders' resolve went, so went the crew's.

Notes Bernard Brodie, the dreadnought underwent an "extreme oscillation" in mood. Exaltation stoked by the encounter with Hood gave way to despair following a minor torpedo strike from a British warplane. Admiral Günther Lütjens, the senior officer on board, gathered Bismarck crewmen after the air attack and "implored them to meet death in a fashion becoming to good Nazis." A great coach Lütjens was not. The result? An "abysmally poor showing" in the final showdown with HMS Rodney, King George V, and their entourage. One turret crew fled their guns. Turret officers reportedly kept another on station only at gunpoint. Marksmanship and the guns' rate of fire -- key determinants of victory in gunnery duels -- suffered badly.

In short, Bismarck turned out to be a bologna flask (hat tip: Clausewitz), an outwardly tough vessel that shatters at the slightest tap from within. In 1939 Grand Admiral Erich Raeder lamented that the German surface fleet, flung into battle long before it matured, could do little more than "die with honor." Raeder was righter than he knew. Bismarck's death furnishes a parable that captivates navalists decades hence. How would things have turned out had the battlewagon's human factor proved less fragile? We'll never know. Doubtless her measure of honor would be bigger.

Yamato:

As noted at the outset, Yamato was an imposing craft by any standard. She displaced more than any battleship in history, as much as an early supercarrier, and bore the heaviest armament. Her mammoth 18-inch guns could sling 3,200-lb. projectiles some 25 nautical miles. Armor was over two feet thick in places. Among the three attributes of warship design, then, Yamato's designers clearly prized offensive and defensive strength over speed. The dreadnought could steam at 27 knots, not bad for a vessel of her proportions. But that was markedly slower than the 33 knots attainable by U.S. fast battleships.

Like Bismarck, Yamato is remembered mainly for falling short of her promise. She provides another cautionary tale about human fallibility. At Leyte Gulf in October 1944, a task force centered on Yamato bore down on the transports that had ferried General Douglas MacArthur's landing force ashore on Leyte, and on the sparse force of light aircraft carriers, destroyers, and destroyer escorts guarding the transports from seaward assault.

Next ensued the immortal charge of the tin-can sailors. The outclassed American ships charged Yamato and her retinue. Like Lütjens, Admiral Takeo Kurita, the task-force commander, appeared to wilt under less-than-dire circumstances. Historians still argue about whether he mistook Taffy 3, the U.S. Navy contingent, for a far stronger force; lost his nerve; or simply saw little point in sacrificing his ships and men. Whatever the case, Kurita ordered his fleet to turn back -- leaving MacArthur's expeditionary force mostly unmolested from the sea.

Yamato met a quixotic fate, though less ignominious than Bismarck's. In April 1945 the superbattleship was ordered to steam toward Okinawain company with remnants of the surface fleet, there to contest the Allied landings. The vessel would deliberately beach itself offshore, becoming an unsinkable gun emplacement until it was destroyed or its ammunition was exhausted. U.S. naval intelligence got wind of the scheme, however, and aerial bombardment dispatched Yamato before she could reach her destination. A lackluster end for history's most fearsome battlewagon.

Missouri:

Iowa and New Jersey were the first of the Iowa class and compiled the most enviable fighting records in the class, mostly in the Pacific War. Missouri was no slouch as a warrior, but -- alone on this list -- she's celebrated mainly for diplomatic achievements rather than feats of arms. General MacArthur accepted Japan's surrender on her weatherdecks in Tokyo Bay, leaving behind some of the most enduring images from 20th-century warfare. Missouri has been a metaphor for how to terminate big, open-ended conflicts ever since. For instance, President Bush the Elder invoked the surrender in his memoir. Missouri supplied a measuring stick for how Desert Storm might unfold. (And as it happens, a modernized Missouri was in Desert Storm.)

Missouri remained a diplomatic emissary after World War II. The battlewagon cruised to Turkey in the early months after the war, as the Iron Curtain descended across Europe and communist insurgencies menaced Greece and Turkey. Observers interpreted the voyage as a token of President Harry Truman's, and America's, commitment to keeping the Soviet bloc from subverting friendly countries. Message: the United States was in Europe to stay. Missouri thus played a part in the development of containment strategy while easing anxieties about American abandonment. Naval diplomacy doesn't get much better than that.

Mikasa:

Admiral Tōgō Heihachirō's flagship is an emblem for maritime command. The British-built Mikasa was arguably the finest battleship afloat during the fin de siècle years, striking the best balance among speed, protection, and armament. The human factor was strong as well. Imperial Japanese Navy seamen were known for their proficiency and élan, while Tōgō was renowned for combining shrewdness with derring-do. Mikasa was central to fleet actions in the Yellow Sea in 1904 and the Tsushima Strait in 1905 -- battles that left the wreckage of two Russian fleets strewn across the seafloor. The likes of Theodore Roosevelt and Alfred Thayer Mahan considered Tsushima a near-perfect fleet encounter.

Like the other battleships listed here, Mikasa molded how subsequent generations thought about diplomacy and warfare. IJN commanders of the interwar years planned to replicate Tsushima Strait should Japan fall out with the United States. More broadly, Mikasa and the rest of the IJN electrified peoples throughout Asia and beyond. Japan, that is, proved that Western imperial powers could be beaten in battle and ultimately expelled from lands they had subjugated. Figures ranging from Sun Yat-sen to Mohandas Gandhi to W. E. B. Du Bois paid homage to Tsushima, crediting Japan with firing their enthusiasm for overthrowing colonial rule.

Mikasa, then, was more than the victor in a sea fight of modest scope. And her reputation outlived her strange fate. The vessel returned home in triumph following the Russo-Japanese War, only to suffer a magazine explosion and sink. For the Japanese people, the disaster confirmed that they had gotten a raw deal at the Portsmouth Peace Conference. Nevertheless, it did little to dim foreign observers' enthusiasm for Japan's accomplishments.Mikasa remained a talisman.

Victory:

Topping this list is the only battleship from the age of sail. HMS Victory was a formidable first-rate man-of-war, cannon bristling from its three gun decks. But her fame comes mainly from her association with Lord Horatio Nelson, whom Mahan styles "the embodiment of the sea power of Great Britain." In 1805 Nelson led his outnumbered fleet into combat against a combined Franco-Spanish fleet off Cape Trafalgar, near Gibraltar. Nelson and right-hand man Admiral Cuthbert Collingwood led columns of ships that punctured the enemy line of battle. The Royal Navy crushed its opponent in the ensuing melee, putting paid to Napoleon's dreams of invading the British Isles.

Felled on board his flagship that day, Nelson remains a synonym for decisive battle. Indeed, replicating Trafalgar became a Holy Grail for naval strategists across the globe. Permanently drydocked at Portsmouth, Victory is a shrine to Nelson and his exploits -- and the standard of excellence for seafarers everywhere. That entitles her to the laurels of history's greatest battleship.

Surveying this list of icons, two battleships made the cut because of defeats stemming from slipshod leadership, two for triumphs owing to good leadership, and one for becoming a diplomatic paragon. That's not a bad reminder that human virtues and frailties -- not wood, or metal, or shot -- are what make the difference in nautical enterprises.

James Holmes is J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the Naval War College

*****

5 Best Aircraft Carriers:

Anyone who's tried to compare one piece of kit—ships, aircraft, weaponry of various types—to another will testify to how hard this chore is. Ranking aircraft carriers is no exception. Consulting the pages of Jane's Fighting Ships or Combat Fleets of the World sheds some light on the problem. For instance, a flattop whose innards house a nuclear propulsion plant boasts virtually unlimited cruising range, whereas a carrier powered by fossil fuels is tethered to its fuel source. As Alfred Thayer Mahan puts it, a conventional warship bereft of bases or a coterie of logistics ships is a "land bird" unable to fly far from home.

Or, size matters. The air wing—the complement of interceptors, attack planes and support aircraft that populate a carrier's decks—comprise its main battery or primary armament. The bigger the ship, the bigger the hangar and flight decks that accommodate the air wing.

Nor, as U.S. Navy carrier proponents like to point out, is the relationship between a carrier's tonnage and number of aircraft it can carry strictly linear. Consider two carriers that dominate headlines in Asia. Liaoning, the Chinese navy's refitted Soviet flattop, displaces about sixty-five thousand tons and sports twenty-six fixed-wing combat aircraft and twenty-four helicopters. Not bad. USS George Washington, however, tips the scales at around one hundred thousand tons but can operate some eighty-five to ninety aircraft.

And the disparity involves more than raw numbers of airframes. George Washington's warplanes are not just more numerous but generally more capable than their Chinese counterparts. U.S. flattops boast steam catapults to vault larger, heavier-laden aircraft into the wild blue. Less robust carriers use ski jumps to launch aircraft. That limits the size, fuel capacity, and weapons load—and thus the range, flight times and firepower—of their air wings. Larger, more capable carriers, then, can accommodate a larger, more capable, and changing mixes of aircraft with greater ease than their lesser brethren. Aircraft carriers' main batteries were modular before modular was cool.

And yet straight-up comparisons can mislead. The real litmus test for any man-of-war is its capacity to fulfill the missions for which it was built. In that sense George Washington, a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, may not be "superior" to USS America, the U.S. Navy's latest amphibious helicopter carrier, or to Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force "helicopter destroyers"—a.k.a. light aircraft carriers—despite a far more lethal air wing and other material attributes. Nor do carriers meant to operate within range of shore-based fire support—tactical aircraft, anti-ship missiles—necessarily need to measure up to a Washington on a one-to-one basis. Land-based implements of sea power can be the great equalizer. Like any weapon system, then, a great carrier does the job for which it was designed superbly.

And lastly, there's no separating the weapon from its user. A fighting ship isn't just a hunk of steel but a symbiosis of crewmen and materiel. The finest aircraft carrier is one that's both well-suited to its missions and handled with skill and derring-do when and where it matters most. Those three indices—brute material capability, fitness for assigned missions, a zealous crew—are the indices for this utterly objective, completely indisputable list of the Top Five Aircraft Carriers of All Time.

5. USS Midway (CV-41):

Now a museum ship on the San Diego waterfront, Midway qualifies for this list less for great feats of arms than for longevity, and for being arguably history's most versatile warship. In all likelihood she was the most modified. Laid down during World War II, the flattop entered service just after the war. During the Cold War she received an angled flight deck, steam catapults, and other trappings befitting a supercarrier. Indeed, Midway's service spanned the entire Cold War, winding down after combat action against Saddam Hussein's Iraq in 1991. Sheer endurance and flexibility entitles the old warhorse to a spot on this list.

4. USS Franklin (CV-13):

If Midway deserves a place mainly for technical reasons, the Essex-class carrier Franklin earns laurels for the resiliency of her hull and fortitude of her crew in battle. She was damaged in heavy fighting at Leyte Gulf in 1944. After refitting at Puget Sound Navy Yard, the flattop returned to the Western Pacific combat theater. In March 1945, having ventured closer to the Japanese home islands than any carrier to date, she fell under surprise assault by a single enemy dive bomber. Two semi-armor-piercing bombs penetrated her decks. The ensuing conflagration killed 724 and wounded 265, detonated ammunition below decks, and left the ship listing 13 degrees to starboard. One hundred six officers and 604 enlisted men remained on board voluntarily, bringing Franklin safely back to Pearl Harbor and thence to Brooklyn Navy Yard. Her gallantry in surviving such a pounding and returning to harbor merits the fourth position on this list.

3. Akagi:

Admiral Chūichi Nagumo's flagship serves as proxy for the whole Pearl Harbor strike force, a body composed of all six Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) frontline carriers and their escorts. Nagumo's was the most formidable such force of its day. Commanders and crewmen, moreover, displayed the audacity to do what appeared unthinkable—strike at the U.S. Pacific Fleet at its moorings thousands of miles away. Extraordinary measures were necessary to pull off such a feat. For example, freshwater tanks were filled with fuel to extend the ships' range and make a transpacific journey possible—barely.

The Pearl Harbor expedition exposed logistical problems that plagued the IJN throughout World War II. Indeed, Japan's navy never fully mastered the art of underway replenishment or built enough logistics ships to sustain operations far from home. As a result, Nagumo's force had too little time on station off Oahu to wreck the infrastructure the Pacific Fleet needed to wage war. And, admittedly, Akagi was lost at the Battle of Midway, not many months after it scaled the heights of operational excellence. Still, you have to give Akagi and the rest of the IJN task force their due. However deplorable Tokyo's purposes in the Pacific, her aircraft-carrier force ranks among the greatest of all time for sheer boldness and vision.

2. HMS Hermes (now the Indian Navy's Viraat):

It's hard to steam thousands of miles into an enemy's environs, fight a war on his ground, and win. And yet the Centaur-class flattop Hermes, flagship of a hurriedly assembled Royal Navy task force, pulled it off during the Falklands War of 1982. Like Midway, the British carrier saw repeated modifications, most recently for service as an anti-submarine vessel in the North Atlantic. Slated for decommissioning, her air wing was reconfigured for strike and fleet-air-defense missions when war broke out in the South Atlantic. For flexibility, and for successfully defying the Argentine contested zone, Hermes rates second billing here.

1. USS Enterprise (CV-6):

Having joined the Pacific Fleet in 1939, the Yorktown-class carrier was fortunate to be at sea on December 7, 1941, and thus to evade Nagumo's bolt from the blue. Enterprise went on to become the most decorated U.S. Navy ship of World War II, taking part in eighteen of twenty major engagements of the Pacific War. She sank, or helped sink, three IJN carriers and a cruiser at the Battle of Midway in 1942; suffered grave damage in the Solomons campaign, yet managed to send her air wing to help win the climatic Naval Battle of Guadalcanal; and went on to fight in such engagements as the Philippine Sea, Leyte Gulf, and Okinawa. That's the stuff of legend. For compiling such a combat record, Enterprise deserves to be known as history's greatest aircraft carrier.

James Holmes is J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the Naval War College

*****

5 Best Submarines: 

There have been three great submarine campaigns in history, and one prolonged duel. The First and Second Battles of the Atlantic pitted German U-boats against the escorts and aircraft of the United Kingdom and the United States. The Germans very nearly won World War I with the first campaign, and badly drained Allied resources in the second. In the third great campaign, the submarines of the US Navy destroyed virtually the entire commercial fleet of Japan, bringing the Japanese economy to its knees. US subs also devastated the Imperial Japanese Navy, sinking several of Tokyo’s most important capital ships.

But the period most evocative of our modern sense of submarine warfare was surely the forty year duel between the submarines of the USSR and the boats of the various NATO navies. Over the course of the Cold War, the strategic nature of the submarine changed; it moved from being a cheap, effective killer of capital ships to a capital ship in its own right. This was especially the case with the boomers, submarines that carried enough nuclear weapons to kill millions in a few minutes.

As with previous “5 Greatest” lists, the answers depend on the parameters; different sets of metrics will generate different lists. Our metrics concentrate on the strategic utility of specific submarine classes, rather than solely on their technical capabilities.

· Was the submarine a cost-effective solution to a national strategic problem?

· Did the submarine compare favorably with its contemporaries?

· Was the submarine’s design innovative?

And with that, the five best submarines of all time:

U-31:

The eleven boats of the U-31 class were constructed between 1912 and 1915. They operated in both of the periods of heavy action for German U-boats, early in the war before the suspension of unrestricted warfare, and again in 1917 when Germany decided to go for broke and cut the British Empire off at the knees. Four of these eleven boats (U-35, U-39, U-38, and U-34) were the four top killers of World War I; indeed, they were four of the five top submarines of all time in terms of tonnage sunk (the Type VII boat U-48 sneaks in at number 3). U-35, the top killer, sank 224 ships amounting to over half a million tons.

The U-31 boats were evolutionary, rather than revolutionary; they represented the latest in German submarine technology for the time, but did not differ dramatically from their immediate predecessors or successors. These boats had good range, a deck gun for destroying small shipping, and faster speeds surfaced than submerged. These characteristics allowed the U-31 class and their peers to wreak havoc while avoiding faster, more powerful surface units. They did offer a secure, stealthy platform for carrying out a campaign that nearly forced Great Britain from the war. Only the entry of the United States, combined with the development of innovative convoy tactics by the Royal Navy, would stifle the submarine offensive. Three of the eleven boats survived the war, and were eventually surrendered to the Allies.

Balao:

The potential for a submarine campaign against the Japanese Empire was clear from early in the war. Japanese industry depended for survival on access to the natural resources of Southeast Asia. Separating Japan from those resources could win the war. However, the pre-war USN submarine arm was relatively small, and operated with poor doctrine and bad torpedoes. Boats built during the war, including primarily the Gato and Balao class, would eventually destroy virtually the entire Japanese merchant marine.

The Balao class represented very nearly the zenith of the pre-streamline submarine type. War in the Pacific demanded longer ranges and more habitability than the relatively snug Atlantic. Like their predecessors the Gato, the Balaos were less maneuverable than the German Type VII subs, but they made up for this in strength of hull and quality of construction. Compared with the Type VII, the Balaos had longer range, a larger gun, more torpedo tubes, and a higher speed. Of course, the Balaos operated in a much different environment, and against an opponent less skilled in anti-submarine warfare. The greatest victory of a Balao was the sinking of the 58000 ton HIJMS Shinano by Archerfish.

Eleven of 120 boats were lost, two in post-war accidents. After the war Balao class subs were transferred to several friendly navies, and continued to serve for decades. One, the former USS Tusk, remains in partial commission in Taiwan as Hai Pao.

Type XXI:

In some ways akin to the Me 262, the Type XXI was a potentially war-winning weapon that arrived too late to have serious effect. The Type XXI was the first mass produced, ocean-going streamlined or “true” submarine, capable of better performance submerged than on the surface. It gave up its deck gun in return for speed and stealth, and set the terms of design for generations of submarines.

Allied anti-submarine efforts focused on identifying boats on the surface (usually in transit to their patrol areas) then vectoring killers (including ships and aircraft) to those areas. In 1944 the Allies began developing techniques for fighting “schnorkel” U-boats that did not need to surface, but remained unprepared for combat against a submarine that could move at 20 knots submerged.

In effect, the Type XXI had the stealth to avoid detection prior to an attack, and the speed to escape afterward. Germany completed 118 of these boats, but because of a variety of industrial problems could only put four into service, none of which sank an enemy ship. All of the Allies seized surviving examples of the Type XXI, using them both as models for their own designs and in order to develop more advanced anti-submarine technologies and techniques. For example, the Type XXI was the model for the Soviet “Whiskey” class, and eventually for a large flotilla of Chinese submarines.

George Washington:

We take for granted the most common form of today’s nuclear deterrent; a nuclear submarine, bristling with missiles, capable of destroying a dozen cities a continent away. These submarines provide the most secure leg of the deterrent triad, as no foe could reasonably expect to destroy the entire submarine fleet before the missiles fly.

The secure submarine deterrent began in 1960, with the USS George Washington. An enlarged version of the Skipjack class nuclear attack sub, George Washington’s design incorporated space for sixteen Polaris ballistic missiles. When the Polaris became operational, USS George Washington had the capability from striking targets up to 1000 miles distant with 600 KT warheads. The boats would eventually upgrade to the Polaris A3, with three warheads and a 2500 mile range. Slow relative to attack subs but extremely quiet, the George Washington class pioneered the “go away and hide” form of nuclear deterrence that is still practiced by five of the world’s nine nuclear powers.

And until 1967, the George Washington and her sisters were the only modern boomers. Their clunky Soviet counterparts carried only three missiles each, and usually had to surface in order to fire. This made them of limited deterrent value. But soon, virtually every nuclear power copied the George Washington class. The first “Yankee” class SSBN entered service in 1967, the first Resolution boat in 1968, and the first of the French Redoutables in 1971. China would eventually follow suit, although the PLAN’s first genuinely modern SSBNs have only entered service recently. The Indian Navy’s INS Arihant will likely enter service in the next year or so.

The five boats of the George Washington class conducted deterrent patrols until 1982, when the SALT II Treaty forced their retirement. Three of the five (including George Washington) continued in service as nuclear attack submarines for several more years.

Los Angeles:

Immortalized in the Tom Clancy novels Hunt for Red October and Red Storm Rising, the U.S. Los Angeles class is the longest production line of nuclear submarines in history, constituting sixty-two boats and first entering service in 1976. Forty-one subs remain in commission today, continuing to form the backbone of the USN’s submarine fleet.

The Los Angeles (or 688) class are outstanding examples of Cold War submarines, equally capable of conducting anti-surface or anti-submarine warfare. In wartime, they would have been used to penetrate Soviet base areas, where Russian boomers were protected by rings of subs, surface ships, and aircraft, and to protect American carrier battle groups.

In 1991, two Los Angeles class attack boats launched the first ever salvo of cruise missiles against land targets, ushering in an entirely new vision of how submarines could impact warfare. While cruise missile armed submarines had long been part of the Cold War duel between the United States and the Soviet Union, most attention focused either on nuclear delivery or anti-ship attacks. Submarine launched Tomahawks gave the United States a new means for kicking in the doors of anti-access/area denial systems. The concept has proven so successful that four Ohio class boomers were refitted as cruise missile submarines, with the USS Florida delivering the initial strikes of the Libya intervention.

The last Los Angeles class submarine is expected to leave service in at some point in the 2020s, although outside factors may delay that date. By that time, new designs will undoubtedly have exceeded the 688 in terms of striking land targets, and in capacity for conducting anti-submarine warfare. Nevertheless, the Los Angeles class will have carved out a space as the sub-surface mainstay of the world’s most powerful Navy for five decades.

Conclusion

Fortunately, the United States and the Soviet Union avoided direct conflict during the Cold War, meaning that many of the technologies and practices of advanced submarine warfare were never employed in anger. However, every country in the world that pretends to serious maritime power is building or acquiring advanced submarines. The next submarine war will look very different from the last, and it’s difficult to predict how it will play out. We can be certain, however, that the fight will be conducted in silence.

Honorable Mention: Ohio, 260O-21, Akula, Alfa, Seawolf, Swiftsure, I-201, Kilo, S class, Type VII

Robert Farley, a frequent contributor to TNI, is a Visiting Professor at the United States Army War College. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

*****

5 Best Bombers:

Bombers are the essence of strategic airpower. While fighters have often been important to air forces, it was the promise of the heavy bomber than won and kept independence for the United States Air Force and the Royal Air Force. At different points in time, air forces in the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union, and Italy have treated bomber design and construction as a virtually all-consuming obsession, setting fighter and attack aviation aside.

However, even the best bombers are effective over only limited timespans. The unlucky state-of-the-art bombers of the early 1930s met disaster when put into service against the pursuit aircraft of the late 1930s. The B-29s that ruled the skies over Japan in 1945 were cut to pieces above North Korea in 1950. The B-36 Peacemaker, obsolete before it was even built, left service in a decade. Most of the early Cold War bombers were expensive failures, eventually to be superseded by ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

States procure bombers, like all weapons, to serve strategic purposes. This list employs the following metrics of evaluation:

· Did the bomber serve the strategic purpose envisioned by its developers?

· Was the bomber a sufficiently flexible platform to perform other missions, and to persist in service?

· How did the bomber compare with its contemporaries in terms of price, capability, and effectiveness?

And with that, the five best bombers of all time:

Handley Page Type O 400:

The first strategic bombing raids of World War I were carried out by German zeppelins, enormous lighter than aircraft that could travel at higher altitudes than the interceptors of the day, and deliver payloads against London and other targets. Over time, the capabilities of interceptors and anti-aircraft artillery grew, driving the Zeppelins to other missions. Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and others began working on bombers capable of delivering heavy loads over long distance, a trail blazed (oddly enough) by the Russian Sikorsky Ilya Muromets.

Even the modest capabilities of the early bombers excited the airpower theorists of the day, who imagined the idea of fleets of bombers striking enemy cities and enemy industry. The Italians developed the Caproni family of bombers, which operated in the service of most Allied countries at one time or another. German Gotha bombers would eventually terrorize London again, catalyzing the Smuts Report and the creation of the world’s first air force.

Faster and capable of carrying more bombs than either the Gotha IVs or the Caproni Ca.3, the Type O 400 had a wingspan nearly as large as the Avro Lancaster. With a maximum speed of 97 miles per hour with a payload of up to 2000 lbs, O 400s were the mainstay of Hugh Trenchard’s Independent Air Force near the end of the war, a unit which struck German airfields and logistics concentration well behind German lines. These raids helped lay the foundation of interwar airpower theory, which (at least in the US and the UK) envisioned self-protecting bombers striking enemy targets en masse.

Roughly 600 Type O bombers were produced during World War I, with the last retiring in 1922. Small numbers served in the Chinese, Australian, and American armed forces.

Junkers Ju 88:

The Junkers Ju-88 was one of the most versatile aircraft of World War II. Although it spent most of its career as a medium bomber, it moonlighted as a close attack aircraft, a naval attack aircraft, a reconnaissance plane, and a night fighter. Effective and relatively cheap, the Luftwaffe used the Ju 88 to good effect in most theaters of war, but especially on the Eastern Front and in the Mediterranean.

Designed with dive bomber capability, the Ju 88 served in relatively small numbers in the invasion of Poland, the invasion of Norway, and the Battle of France. The Ju-88 was not well suited to the strategic bombing role into which it was forced during the Battle of Britain, especially in its early variants. It lacked the armament to sufficiently defend itself, and the payload to cause much destruction to British industry and infrastructure. The measure of an excellent bomber, however, goes well beyond its effectiveness at any particular mission. Ju 88s were devastating in Operation Barbarossa, tearing apart Soviet tank formations and destroying much of the Soviet Air Forces on the ground. Later variants were built as or converted into night fighters, attacking Royal Air Force bomber formations on the way to their targets.

In spite of heavy Allied bombing of the German aviation industry, Germany built over 15,000 Ju 88s between 1939 and 1945. They operated in several Axis air forces.

De Havilland Mosquito:

The de Havilland Mosquito was a remarkable little aircraft, capable of a wide variety of different missions. Not unlike the Ju 88, the Mosquito operated in bomber, fighter, night fighter, attack, and reconnaissance roles. The RAF was better positioned than the Luftwaffe to utilized the specific qualities of the Mosquito, and avoid forcing it into missions in could not perform.

Relatively lightly armed and constructed entirely of wood, the Mosquito was quite unlike the rest of the RAF bomber fleet. Barely escaping design committee, the Mosquito was regarded as easy to fly, and featured a pressurized cockpit with a high service ceiling. Most of all, however, the Mosquito was fast. With advanced Merlin engines, a Mosquito could outpace the German Bf109 and most other Axis fighters.

Although the bomb load of the Mosquito was limited, its great speed, combined with sophisticated instrumentation, allowed it to deliver ordnance with more precision than most other bombers. During the war, the RAF used Mosquitoes for various precision attacks against high value targets, including German government installations and V weapon launching sites. As pathfinders, Mosquitoes flew point on bomber formations, leading night time bombing raids that might otherwise have missed their targets. Mosquitos also served in a diversionary role, distracting German night fighters from the streams of Halifaxes and Lancasters striking urban areas.

De Havilland produced over 7000 Mosquitoes for the RAF and other allied air forces. Examples persisted in post-war service with countries as varied as Israel, the Republic of China, Yugoslavia, and the Dominican Republic

Avro Lancaster:

The workhorse of the RAF in World War II, the Lancaster carried out the greater part of the British portion of the Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO). Led by Arthur Harris, Bomber Command believed that area bombing raids, targeted against German civilians, conducted at night, would destroy German morale and economic capacity and bring the war to a close. Accordingly, the Lancaster was less heavily armed than its American contemporaries, as it depended less on self-defense in order to carry out its mission.

The first Lancasters entered service in 1942. The Lancaster could carry a much heavier bomb load than the B-17 or the B-24, while operating at similar speeds and at a slightly longer range. The Lancaster also enjoyed a payload advantage over the Handley Page Halifax. From 1942 until 1945, the Lancaster would anchor the British half of the CBO, eventually resulting in the destruction of most of urban Germany and the death of several hundred thousand German civilians.

There are reasons to be skeptical of the inclusion of the Lancaster. The Combined Bomber Offensive was a strategic dead-end, serving up expensive four-engine bombers as a feast for smaller, cheaper German fighters. Battles were fought under conditions deeply advantageous to the Germans, as damaged German planes could land, and shot down German pilots rescued and returned to service. Overall, the enormous Western investment in strategic bombing was probably one of the greatest grand strategic miscalculations of the Second World War. Nevertheless, this list needs a bomber from the most identifiable bomber offensive in history, and the Lancaster was the best of the bunch.

Over 7000 Lancasters were built, with the last retiring in the early 1960s after Canadian service as recon and maritime patrol aircraft.

Boeing B-52 Stratofortress:

The disastrous experience of B-29 Superfortresses over North Korea in 1950 demonstrated that the United States would require a new strategic bomber, and soon. Unfortunately, the first two generations of bombers chosen by the USAF were almost uniformly duds; the hopeless B-36, the short-legged B-47, the dangerous-to-its-own-pilots B-58, and the obsolete-before-it-flew XB-70. The vast bulk of these bombers quickly went from wastes of taxpayer money to wastes of space at the Boneyard. None of the over 2500 early Cold War bombers ever dropped a bomb in anger.

The exception was the B-52.The BUFF was originally intended for high altitude penetration bombing into the Soviet Union. It replaced the B-36 and the B-47, the former too slow and vulnerable to continue in the nuclear strike mission, and the latter too short-legged to reach the USSR from U.S. bases. Slated for replacement by the B-58 and the B-70, the B-52 survived because it was versatile enough to shift to low altitude penetration after the increasing sophistication of Soviet SAMs made the high altitude mission suicidal.

And this versatility has been the real story of the B-52. The BUFF was first committed to conventional strike missions in service of Operation Arc Light during the Vietnam War. In Operation Linebacker II, the vulnerability of the B-52 to air defenses was made manifest when nine Stratofortresses were lost in the first days of the campaign. But the B-52 persisted. In the Gulf War, B-52s carried out saturation bombing campaigns against the forward positions of the Iraqi Army, softening and demoralizing the Iraqis for the eventual ground campaign. In the War on Terror, the B-52 has acted in a close air support role, delivering precision-guided ordnance against small concentrations of Iraqi and Taliban insurgents.

Most recently, the B-52 showed its diplomatic chops when two BUFFs were dispatched to violate China’s newly declared Air Defense Zone. The BUFF was perfect for this mission; the Chinese could not pretend not to notice two enormous bombers travelling at slow speed through the ADIZ.

742 B-52s were delivered between 1954 and 1963. Seventy-eight remain in service, having undergone multiple upgrades over the decades that promise to extend their lives into the 2030s, or potentially beyond. In a family of short-lived airframes, the B-52 has demonstrated remarkable endurance and longevity.

Conclusion

Over the last century, nations have invested tremendous resources in bomber aircraft. More often than not, this investment has failed to bear strategic fruit. The very best aircraft have been those that could not only conduct their primary mission effectively, but that were also sufficiently flexible to perform other tasks that might be asked of them. Current air forces have, with some exceptions, effectively done away with the distinctions between fighters and bombers, instead relying on multi-role fighter-bombers for both missions. The last big, manned bomber may be the American LRS-B, assuming that project ever gets off the ground.

Honorable Mention

Grumman A-6 Intruder, MQ-1 Predator, Caproni Ca.3, Tupolev Tu-95 “Bear,” Avro Vulcan, Tupolev Tu-22M “Backfire.”

Robert Farley, a frequent contributor to TNI, is a Visiting Professor at the United States Army War College. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

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What are the five greatest fighter aircraft of all time?

Like the same question asked of tanks, cars, or rock and roll guitarists, the answer invariably depends on parameters. For example, there are few sets of consistent parameters that would include both the T-34 and the King Tiger among the greatest of all tanks. I know which one I’d like to be driving in a fight, but I also appreciate that this isn’t the most appropriate way to approach the question. Similarly, while I’d love to drive a Porsche 959 to work every morning, I’d be hesitant to list it ahead of the Toyota Corolla on a “best of” compilation.

Nations buy fighter aircraft to resolve national strategic problems, and the aircraft should accordingly be evaluated on their ability to solve or ameliorate these problems. Thus, the motivating question is this: how well did this aircraft help solve the strategic problems of the nations that built or bought it? This question leads to the following points of evaluation:

Fighting characteristics: How did this plane stack up against the competition, including not just other fighters but also bombers and ground installations?

Reliability: Could people count on this aircraft to fight when it needed to, or did it spend more time under repair than in the air?

Cost: What did the organization and the nation have to pay in terms of blood and treasure to make this aircraft fly?

These are the parameters; here are my answers:

Spad S.XIII:

In the early era of military aviation, technological innovation moved at such speed that state of the art aircraft became obsolete deathtraps within a year. Engineers in France, Britain, Germany and Italy worked constantly to outpace their competitors, producing new aircraft every year to throw into the fight. The development of operational tactics trailed technology, although the input of the best flyers played an important role in how designers put new aircraft together.

In this context, picking a dominant fighter from the era is difficult. Nevertheless, the Spad S.XIII stands out in terms of its fighting characteristics and ease of production. Based in significant part on the advice of French aviators such as Georges Guynemer, the XIII lacked the maneuverability of some of its contemporaries, but could outpace most of them and performed very well in either a climb or a dive. It was simple enough to produce that nearly 8,500 such aircraft eventually entered service. Significant early reliability problems were worked out by the end of the war, and in any case were overwhelmed by the XIII’s fighting ability.

The S.XIII filled out not only French fighter squadrons, but also the air services of Allied countries. American ace Eddie Rickenbacker scored twenty of his kills flying an XIII, many over the most advanced German fighters of the day, including the Fokker D.VII.

The Spad XIII helped the Allies hold the line during the Ludendorff Offensive, and controlled the skies above France during the counter-offensive. After the war, it remained in service in France, the United States, and a dozen other countries for several years. In an important sense, the Spad XIII set the post-war standard for what a pursuit aircraft needed to do.

Grumman F6F Hellcat:

Of course, it is not only air forces that fly fighter aircraft. The F6F Hellcat can’t compare with the Spitfire, the P-51, or the Bf 109 on many basic flight characteristics, although its ability to climb was first-rate. What the F6F could do, however, was reliably fly from aircraft carriers, and it rode point on the great, decisive U.S. Navy carrier offensive of World War II. Entering the war in September 1943, it won 75% of USN aerial victories in the Pacific. USN ace David McCampbell shot down nine Japanese aircraft in one day flying a Hellcat .The F6F was heavily armed, and could take considerably more battle damage than its contemporaries. Overall, the F6F claimed nearly 5,200 kills at a loss of 270 aircraft in aerial combat, including a 13:1 ratio against the Mitsubishi A6M Zero.

The USN carrier offensive of the latter part of World War II is probably the greatest single example of the use of decisive airpower in world history. Hellcats and their kin (the Douglas SBD Dauntless dive-bomber and the Grumman TBF Avenger torpedo bomber) destroyed the fighting power of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN), cracked open Japan’s island empire, and exposed the Japanese homeland to devastating air attack and the threat of invasion.

In 1943, the United States needed a fighter robust enough to endure a campaign fought distant from most bases, yet fast and agile enough to defeat the best that the IJN could offer. Tough and reliable as a brick, the Hellcat fit that role. Put simply, the Honda Accord is, in its own way, a great car; the Honda Accords of the fighter world also deserve their day.

Messerschmitt Me-262 Swallow:

The Me 262 Schwalbe (Swallow, in English) failed to win the war for Germany, and couldn’t stop the Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO). Had German military authorities made the right decisions, however, it might at least have accomplished the second.

Known as the world’s first operational jet fighter, full-scale production of the Me 262 was delayed by resistance within the German government and the Luftwaffe to devoting resources to an experimental aircraft without a clear role. Early efforts to turn it into a fighter-bomber fell flat. As the need for a superlative interceptor become apparent, however, the Me 262 found its place. The Swallow proved devastating against American bomber formations, and could outrun American pursuit aircraft.

The Me 262 was hardly a perfect fighter: it lacked the maneuverability of the best American interceptors, and both American and British pilots developed tactics for managing the Swallow. Although production suffered from some early problems with engines, by the later stages of the conflict, manufacturing was sufficiently easy that the plane could be mass-produced in dispersed, underground facilities.

But had it come on line a bit earlier, the Me 262 might have torn the heart out of the CBO. The CBO in 1943 was a touch and go affair; dramatically higher bomber losses in 1943 could well have led Churchill and Roosevelt to scale back the production of four engine bombers in favor of additional tactical aircraft. Without the advantage of long-range escorts, American bombers would have proven easy prey for the German jet. Moreover, the Me 262 would have been far more effective without the constant worry of P-47s and P-51s strafing its airfields and tracking its landings.

Nazi Germany needed a game changer, a plane capable of making the price too high for the Allies to keep up the CBO. The Me 262 came onto the scene too late to solve that problem, but it’s hard to imagine any aircraft that could have come closer. Ironically, this might have accelerated Allied victory, as the Combined Bomber Offensive resulted in not only the destruction of urban Germany, but in the waste of substantial Allied resources. Win-win.

Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-21 “Fishbed”: 

An odd choice for this list? The MiG-21 is known largely as fodder for the other great fighters of the Cold War, and for having an abysmal kill ratio. The Fishbed (in NATO terminology) has served as a convenient victim in Vietnam and in a variety of Middle Eastern wars, some of which it fought on both sides.

But… the MiG-21 is cheap, fast, maneuverable, has low maintenance requirements. It’s relatively easy to learn to fly, although not necessarily easy to learn how to fly well. Air forces continued to buy the MiG-21 for a long time. Counting the Chengdu J-7 variant, perhaps 13,000 MiG-21s have entered service around the world. In some sense, the Fishbed is the AK-47 (or the T-34, if you prefer) of the fighter world. Fifty countries have flown the MiG-21, and it has flown for fifty-five years. It continues to fly as a key part of twenty-six different air forces, including the Indian Air Force, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force, the Vietnamese People’s Air Force, and the Romanian Air Force. Would anyone be surprised if the Fishbed and its variants are still flying in 2034?

The MiG-21 won plaudits from American aggressor pilots at Red Flag, who celebrated its speed and maneuverability, and played (through the contribution of North Vietnamese aces such as Nguyễn Văn Cốc ) an important role in redefining the requirements of air superiority in the United States. When flown well, it remains a dangerous foe.

Most of life is about just showing up, and since 1960 no fighter has shown up as consistently, and in as many places, as has the MiG-21. For countries needing a cheap option for claiming control of their national airspace, the MiG-21 has long solved problems, and will likely continue to serve in this role.

McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagle: 

What to say about the F-15 Eagle? When it came into service in 1976, it was immediately recognized as the best fighter in the world. Today, it is arguably still the best all-around, cost-adjusted fighter, even if the Su-27 and F-22 have surpassed it in some ways. If one fighter in American history could take the name of the national symbol of the United States, how could it be anything other than the F-15?

The Eagle symbolizes the era of American hegemony, from the Vietnam hangover to the post-Cold War period of dominance. Designed in light of the lessons of Vietnam, at a time where tactical aviation was taking control of the US Air Force, the F-15 outperformed existing fighters and set a new standard for a modern air superiority aircraft. Despite repeated tests in combat, no F-15 has ever been lost to an aerial foe. The production line for the F-15 will run until at least 2019, and longer if Boeing can manage to sell anyone on the Silent Eagle.

In the wake of Vietnam, the United States needed an air superiority platform that could consistently defeat the best that the Soviet Union had to offer. The F-15 (eventually complemented by the F-16) provided this platform, and then some. After the end of the Cold War, the United States needed an airframe versatile enough to carry out the air superiority mission while also becoming an effective strike aircraft. Again, the F-15 solved the problem.

And it’s a plane that can land with one wing. Hard to beat that.

A Contest Based on Parameters:

Again, this exercise depends entirely on decisions about the parameters. A different set of criteria of effectiveness would generate an entirely different list (although the F-15 would probably still be here; it’s invulnerable). Nevertheless, the basic elements of the argument are sound: weapons should be evaluated in terms of how they help achieve national objectives.

Honorable mentions include the North American Aviation F-86 Sabre, the Fokker D.VII, the Lockheed-Martin F-22 Raptor, the Messerschmitt Bf 109, the Focke-Wulf Fw 190, the Supermarine Spitfire, the North American Aviation P-51 Mustang, the McDonnell Douglas EA-18 Growler, the English Electric Lightning, the Mitsubishi A6M Zero, the Sukhoi Su-27 “Flanker,” and the General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcon.

This first appeared previously and is being reposted due to reader interest.

Robert Farley , a frequent contributor to TNI, is a Visiting Professor at the United States Army War College. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

Image: Flickr.