Diplomacy & Crisis News

La réglementation applicable aux données personnelles évolue, avec l'entrée en vigueur, le 25 mai 2018, du RGPD, adopté par le Parlement européen. C'est l'occasion pour « Le Monde diplomatique » de réaffirmer ses engagements en matière de confidentialité de vos données personnelles. / A propos du « Diplo (...) / A propos du « Diplo » - 2018/06

Changes in technology and antitrust laws are driving the strike by writers and actors.

Decoupling is seen as everything from a moral necessity to a U.S. imposition.

An entrenched culture of misogyny is keeping the country’s female lawyers away from the corridors of power.

Confrontés à un désastre électoral, la plupart des responsables politiques remettent en question les choix qu'ils ont faits. Mais les socialistes français semblent incapables d'imaginer une autre stratégie que celle qui les a condamnés. / France, Finance, Histoire, Idéologie, Parti politique, (...) / France, Finance, Histoire, Idéologie, Parti politique, Politique, Social-démocratie, Néolibéralisme - 2018/06

Après un demi-siècle de lutte armée marqué par de nombreux attentats et par plusieurs tentatives de résolution pacifique du conflit, l'organisation basque ETA a annoncé début mai sa dissolution. Renversé par le Parlement le 1er juin, le gouvernement conservateur espagnol avait parié sur une défaite (...) / Espagne, Basques, Mouvement de libération, Terrorisme, Conflit, Politique, Diplomatie, Accord de paix, Parti politique, France - 2018/06

Measures intended to punish autocrats are eroding the very Western order they were meant to preserve.

The trans-Atlantic alliance has made China a security priority.

It’s not just in NATO. It’s one of the alliance’s most confrontational members.

Warsaw’s support for Ukraine should not obscure its assault on democracy at home.

Why middle powers—and small countries—are vital to U.S. strategy.

Washington, Paris, and Doha are working to find a solution to Beirut’s nine-month presidential deadlock as well as to prevent another vacuum from plunging Lebanon into a deeper crisis.

A recent meeting held in Doha, Qatar, dubbed the “Quincy Committee,” sought to devise a strategy that can be delivered to the authorities in Lebanon. The countries that made up the committee were the United States, France, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Qatar. American ambassador Dorothy Shea attended the meeting alongside her French colleague, Jean-Yves Le Drian.

Le Drian, who is Paris’s special envoy to Lebanon, is expected to arrive on July 25 in Beirut after consulting with French president Emmanuel Macron and Foreign Minister Catherine Colonna about the conclusions reached in Doha. The French diplomat visited Lebanon in June to have a series of meetings with the different heads of the political parties. He also had spoken with caretaker Prime Minister Najib Mikati, whom he left with a grave warning, “time does not work in favor of Lebanon.”

Yet it does seem to be working in favor of Lebanese politicians. One example is that the European Parliament had recently decided to extend a waiver for the imposition of targeted sanctions against Lebanese who are undermining the country’s democracy for another year. This is effectively a deadline: Lebanese leaders have one year to vote for a new president before sanctions will be imposed.

This European lifeline is a bit contradictory when compared to Le Drian’s words. Lebanese share the perception that the international community is failing them. Perpetual calls by global leaders like Macron for reform and accountability have fallen on deaf ears. Despite threats of sanctions and punishment for ignoring international standards for good governance, no serious actions have been taken to rectify the behavior of Lebanon’s ruling class. Karim Bitar, an associate professor of international relations at Saint Joseph University, talked to the National Interest about what likely will result from the Quincy Committee and its impact on the presidency and central bank governorship.

“It is quite unlikely that this meeting will solve the presidential deadlock. The last time the five countries met in France, they decided unanimously that there should be no extension to the term of the central bank governor Riad Salameh.”

Salameh, seventy-three, has been governor of the Lebanese central bank since 1993. Prior to the 2019 crisis, he was seen as a financial genius and the man credited for protecting the Lebanese pound (lira) by pegging it to the U.S. dollar. Now, he is regarded with contempt by most Lebanese people and is considered to be the gatekeeper of Lebanese corruption. Ordinary citizens have been unable to access their own bank accounts since late 2019. Salameh is facing investigations at home and abroad for financial crimes such as embezzlement and money laundering.

Salameh denies the charges made against him and has vowed to challenge them. Back in February, the long-time banking chief said he would not renew his term as governor. There is now a discussion among the Lebanese political elite and attendees from the Doha talks about how to proceed on the central bank succession. In Beirut, talk of offering an extension for a limited period was believed to be put on the table. Yet the group from Doha is said to have reached a near-consensus that if there is no extension, all responsibilities should be transferred to the first deputy governor, Wassim Mansouri. Everyone is now waiting to see the results of Le Drian’s visit and how he is gauging where the winds of Lebanese politics are blowing. If Salameh’s term is not extended to a caretaker capacity and the government cannot find a suitable replacement, it will mean that there will be a double vacancy for the first time in Lebanese history: one for the president and one for the central bank governor. The government and the five countries from the Quincy Committee have one week to find a solution. If they don’t, the politics of improvision will continue to rule Lebanon.

Adnan Nasser is an independent foreign policy analyst and journalist with a focus on Middle East affairs. Follow him on Twitter @Adnansoutlook29.

Image: Karim naamani / Shutterstock.com

In recent months, there has been a flurry of diplomatic activity, with American, European, and Chinese diplomats jetting from one capital city to another. For the Europeans, these trips are part of a long-term strategy to hedge their bets. For the United States, the overtures have been an attempt to thaw relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In the meantime, President Xi Jinping and his Politburo have toned down their inner “wolf warrior” to capitalize on European equivocations and U.S. weakness to push the “rules-based international order” to their advantage. 

At its summit in June, the European Council reiterated its view that the PRC is “simultaneously a partner, a competitor and a systemic rival.” It and Europe have “shared interests … anchored in a respect for the rules-based international order,” and Europe will “continue to engage with China” to “tackle global challenges.” Yet many of the challenges that today menace the EU have their origins in the foreign policy ambitions of the Chinese Communist Party. The international order the CCP aspires to establish is opposed to the Westphalian nation-state system that emerged from Europe in the seventeenth century. Instead, Beijing envisions a Chinese civilization-state at the center of the political universe, upheld by a ruthlessly pragmatic Marxist-Leninist modus operandi.

European leaders appear little perturbed. Germany’s inaugural National Security Strategy acknowledged that “China is trying in various ways to remold the existing rules-based international order.” Still, it continues, the PRC is “a partner without whom many global challenges…cannot be solved.” Beyond the veneer of its more bellicose rhetoric, the new German China strategy asserts much the same. When Chancellor Olaf Scholz met with Premier Li Qiang in June, he avoided any mention of Taiwan, Xinjiang, Hong Kong, or economic de-risking. At the request of Beijing, he also avoided the press.

French president Emmanuel Macron has been more overt. Macron has long held that any EU policy on China should not reflect Washington’s position. Between photo ops in Beijing in April, he implored Xi to “play a major role” in Ukraine by finding a “pathway to peace.” At the June summit of his pet project, the New Global Financing Initiative, he extended a coveted speaking slot to Li. “China will unequivocally reject trade protectionism and all forms of decoupling and severing of supply chains,” the premier warned. Macron has since suggested that he should attend the upcoming BRICS summit in August. It would come as little surprise if he advocates for China’s inclusion in the G7 in the future.

The French and German position appears to be a feature rather than a bug in Europe’s approach to China. EU leaders increasingly speak of a “multipolar world” where China plays a prominent role. Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky—currently besieged by the man Xi once called his “best, most intimate friend”—has even suggested that his country could be a “bridge to Europe” for Chinese businesses. 

Outside of Europe, hedging has also become the path of least resistance. At a recent left-wing Sao Paulo Forum meeting, South American leaders applauded Macron’s push for European strategic autonomy and a China policy independent of Washington. Similar echoes can be heard from Africa to Southeast Asia, where China has been deploying its highest officials for the last two decades to solidify its influence.

China has aimed to portray itself as a more compatible partner, one that will not meddle in a country’s internal affairs while championing the interests of the Global South on the world stage—a convenient, if relativist, strategy that resonates in Egypt, South Africa, Myanmar, and Pakistan, among others. Despite the Biden administration’s assurances that American leadership is back and stronger than ever, policy failures in the Middle East and misguided agendas elsewhere have left the United States increasingly isolated, with key partners inching closer to Beijing. Exacerbating its loss of influence, Washington, like Europe, has been attempting to thread the Beijing needle—despite bipartisan hawkishness on Capitol Hill. 

During her trip to Beijing earlier this month, Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen repeated the administration’s new talking point: U.S.-China relations need to be “on a better track” that maintains “open and honest lines of communication.” “The world is big enough for both of our countries to thrive,” Yellen announced. What this means is unclear. But what is clear is that the PRC has little interest in honest dialogue or stabilization with the United States.

Consider what happened in June when Blinken traveled to Beijing. After it had refused a one-on-one with Xi until the last day of the visit, the CCP staged the encounter to depict the president as if he were holding court, with Blinken as a submissive petitioner. The trip's primary objective—to re-establish military-to-military communications—was, for the United States, a failure. Yet, for the CCP, it was a policy and public relations win. As long as Beijing delays the renewal of the bilateral military exchanges, it may draw more concessions from Washington. In the meantime, Xi’s feigned concern for fentanyl outflows into the United States and other policy issues came as wittingly crafted signs of “progress.”

Special Envoy for Climate, John Kerry, also supports engagement with China on environmental issues though this has not won him any goodwill in Beijing. Kerry returned from China last week without winning any further carbon reduction commitments from Xi. China is the world’s leading polluter, responsible for over a quarter of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions and more than half of its coal production. Last year, it sanctioned domestic coal production equal to two new large coal power plants per week. Consequently, Xi and his central committee have little interest in genuine climate talks. What they are interested in, however, is exploiting Biden’s green agenda to weaken U.S. industry and undercut national security. 

No doubt, planting a de-escalation ladder between the superpowers is a worthy aim. Yet as the New York Times noted, Biden “is betting that high-level dialogue can itself act as a ballast in a relationship.” Yet, that bet and the administration’s detente has only emboldened the PRC. Xi has made it clear he has no desire to de-escalate—or even meet Biden halfway in establishing a viable, working relationship. In the last six months alone, China has violated U.S. airspace, increased patrols and unsafe maneuvers in the Taiwan Strait, and placed export restrictions on minerals critical to the United States and allied defense production. While Washington continues to call for a “fair set of rules,” Beijing plays its own game, knowing that—beyond vacuous calls for more dialogue—it will be met with no meaningful response. Recent revelations that the CCP hacked multiple U.S. government agencies suggest that the provocations will not abate.

With Europe wavering, U.S. partners edging ever closer to Beijing, and a U.S. administration intent on engagement for engagement’s sake, China has carte blanche to do what it likes when it likes. Steadily, Xi is reshaping the rules-based international order with impunity. If neither Europe nor America resist, this diplomatic activity could herald China’s “new world order” sooner than expected.

Amy K. Mitchell is a founding partner at Kilo Alpha Strategies. She brings extensive national security and defense experience to the firm, having advised three Secretaries of Defense and several large defense contractors. Her unique understanding of U.S. national security and foreign policy interests provides companies with high-level insights and counsel. Ms. Mitchell is currently a Visiting Fellow at George Mason University’s National Security Institute, a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at New Lines Institute, serves on the advisory board of the Vandenberg Coalition and is a member of the U.S. Global Leadership Coalition Foreign Policy Study Group.

Aleksandra Gadzala Tirziu is the founder of the geopolitical risk and strategic communications firm Magpie Advisory. She is a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council, Visiting Fellow at the Independent Women's Forum, Contributing Editor with the New York Sun, and serves on the advisory board of the Vandenberg Coalition. She holds a Ph.D. in Politics from the University of Oxford.

Image: Shutterstock.

Despite another round of negotiations in Brussels on July 15, the situation in the long-contested region of Nagorno-Karabakh remains volatile as violence continues to rage between Armenia and Azerbaijan. In an attempt to stabilize boiling tensions, Armenian prime minister Nikol Pashinyan has vowed to recognize Nagorno-Karabakh as Azerbaijani territory. Future U.S.-hosted peace talks between Baku are critical for deciding the region's fate. While peacekeeping proposals focus on the two direct combatants, the involvement of Turkey, which supports Azerbaijan, and Iran, which supports Armenia, will be necessary for potential talks to form an enduring settlement.

Given its shared cultural and ethnic heritage and desire to protect its sphere of influence, Turkey has long supported Azerbaijan’s territorial claims in Nagorno-Karabakh. During the 2020 Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, Turkey grew bolder in its support by providing infrastructure and weapons assistance, including Bayraktar TB2 armed drones, which helped secure Azerbaijan’s overwhelming victory. Ankara’s support has encouraged Baku’s assertiveness and reluctance to grant concessions. This attitude persisted throughout the September 2022 border clashes. Turkish foreign minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu directly intervened, tweeting, “Armenia should cease its provocations and focus on peace negotiations and cooperation with Azerbaijan.”

Iran, meanwhile, played a pivotal role in perpetuating the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The Iranian army and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps have conducted large-scale military drills along its border with Azerbaijan. While Iran has a sizable Azerbaijani population, Tehran is concerned about Israeli influence in the Caucasus. Baku has received high-tech drones and other weapons from Jerusalem. Azerbaijan also supplies 40 percent of Israeli oil consumption. Iran is also concerned that Israel’s support for Azerbaijan is an opportunity for the former to conduct surveillance on Tehran via unmanned surveillance aircraft. Additionally, if Baku were to construct the Zangezur overland transport corridor, which would connect Azerbaijan and Turkey via southern Armenian territory, Iran could be further isolated from the South Caucasus.

Excluding the regional powers from future Nagorno-Karabakh peace negotiations would be an unwise error. Upcoming Nagorno-Karabakh talks present the opportunity for Armenia and Turkey to make concrete steps in pursuing the normalization of ties discussed in 2022. Iran could also appease its Azerbaijani population by achieving peace with its neighbor.

Reconciling Turkey and Iran could also serve as an avenue for Washington to improve its own relations with Ankara and Tehran. U.S.-Turkey relations have deteriorated since the early 2000s. U.S.-Iran links have been in a deep freeze since the United States withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018. As a result, the Iran nuclear crisis has worsened, with Iran now possessing enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon. Through cooperation over Nagorno-Karabakh, Washington and Tehran could potentially revitalize peace talks in other areas, including nuclear nonproliferation.

While diplomatic cooperation between Iran and the West may appear unlikely, all parties have clear interests in furthering peace. Iran’s Azerbaijani population, which has staged protests in the past, poses problems for Iranian unity. The United States and France are also home to sizable Armenian diaspora communities. American and EU investors maintain commercial interests in Azerbaijan’s energy projects. Baku helped build 2,174 miles of natural gas pipelines to Europe via Georgia and Turkey. These projects will be critical for the success of the EU-Azerbaijan energy plan to double Brussels’ gas imports from Azerbaijan by 2027.

What conditions will ensure a durable peace settlement in Nagorno-Karabakh? First, Azerbaijan must cease its blockade of the Lachin corridor. This blockade has restricted the freedom of movement for the 120,000 Karabakh Armenians and threatened their access to food and medicine. Ending the blockade would be a suitable concession, allowing Armenia to recognize Nagorno-Karabakh as Azerbaijan’s territory.

Protection of the Armenian population in Nagorno-Karabakh will also be crucial for lasting peace and will put to rest Yerevan’s concerns about a potential ethnic cleansing. Persecution of Karabakh Armenians would surely lead to an increase in Iran and Turkey’s military involvement in the region. The United States should make clear that failure to assure the security of Karabakh Armenians would negatively impact Baku's reputation as a dependable trading partner.

If these objectives can be met, a commitment from Iran and Turkey to reduce escalatory practices will keep Karabakh tensions from spiraling into a more significant conflict. UN peacekeepers are ideal, neutral guarantors of preserving these conditions, as Russian peacekeepers have been ineffective in quelling violence in the region. Peacekeepers from the United States are out of the question, as there are no vital U.S. national interests in the South Caucasus that would warrant the risk of starting new wars.

The United States should recognize that it can reap considerable benefits from including Turkey and Iran in future Nagorno-Karabakh peace talks. Not only is it a chance for open dialogue on a myriad of important issues, but it could provide the greatest likelihood of lasting peace in the Nagorno-Karabakh region.

Alex Little is an MS graduate of Georgia Tech and specializes in Russian and Central Asian affairs.

Image: Shutterstock.

Karl Schlögel recreates a lost world of long queues and shared spaces.

Pour sélectionner leurs étudiants, les universités américaines prennent en compte divers critères : les résultats scolaires, l'origine ethnique, le lieu de résidence ou encore le sexe. Les établissements les plus prestigieux considèrent également la filiation du candidat. Ils favorisent les enfants (...) / États-Unis, États-Unis (affaires intérieures), Éducation, Finance, Inégalités, Jeunes, Société, Université - 2018/06

Is economic war between the world’s two biggest economies inevitable?

A new history of Russia’s ruble highlights the reciprocal relationship between autocracy and monetary policy.

Washington’s search for a security model aimed at ensuring Russia’s “strategic defeat” in Ukraine continues in fits and starts.

In a CNN interview timed to reinforce the deliberations of NATO’s recent summit in Vilnius, President Joe Biden explained that “the United States would be ready to provide, while [Ukraine’s accession to NATO] was going on, to provide security a la the security we provide for Israel: to providing the weaponry they need, the capacity to defend themselves … If there is an agreement, if there is a ceasefire, if there is a peace agreement.”

The relevance of the Israel model embraced by Biden to Ukraine’s security is deeply flawed conceptually and practically. Biden’s interest in the concept suggests that either he has been poorly briefed about the history of U.S.-Israel security ties—an unlikely conclusion given Biden’s extensive experience on the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee—or the more likely explanation of continuing confusion in Washington about how to imagine a new security relationship with Kyiv during what is turning into a forever war against Russia.

In operational terms, the Israel model is barely relevant to the predicament that Ukraine finds itself in and hardly a good model upon which to build the desired security relationship between the United States, NATO, and Ukraine. In conceptual terms, there is little beyond a superficial comparison between Jerusalem and Kyiv to recommend the concept.

First a little history.

U.S.-Israel security ties were born out of three principal elements: (1) Cold War competition in the Middle East; (2) Israel’s overwhelming victory in June 1967; and (3) Israel’s surreptitious development of a nuclear weapons capability from the 1950s onward.

It is all but impossible that Ukraine will be able to exit its war with Russia with the kind of total territorial victory that provided the basis for U.S.-Israel ties after June 1967. Biden in his remarks appears to condition an enduring security relationship with Ukraine, let alone its invitation to NATO, upon a ceasefire and peace agreement with Moscow, a far cry from the unambiguous Israeli victory that provided the foundation for U.S.-Israel security ties.

The U.S. commitment to supply Israel with conventional weapons, principally aircraft, has always been at the heart of U.S.-Israel security ties, as it would be with Ukraine.

However, beginning with F-4 Phantoms in a deal brokered by Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin and U.S. diplomat Paul Warnke, and continuing more recently with F-35 stealth aircraft—the supply of such weapons remains an explicit and vital element of a bargain in which Israel pledged to maintain ambiguity about its nuclear weapons arsenal, and subsequently declare that Israel would not be the first to “introduce” nuclear weapons to the Middle East.

In this context, there may well be those in Ukraine (but one hopes not in Washington) who see the Israel model—creating an integrated nuclear weapons option while maintaining nuclear ambiguity as long as the conventional weapons pipeline from Washington is open—as instructive.

But here too reality intrudes. The U.S. bargain with Israel aims explicitly at assuring Israel’s superiority in conventional weapons against any combination of Arab/Iranian enemies. To that end, through FY2020, the United States has provided Israel with $146 billion in military, economic, and missile defense funding—$236 billion in 2018 dollars.

In just the first year of the war, Ukraine received $77 billion from Washington, about one-half of its total military, economic, and humanitarian assistance.

At best, the U.S. military support at current historic levels has won Kyiv a military stalemate. Ukraine, certainly out of NATO and arguably even as a member, will never enjoy an Israeli-style Quality Military Edge (QME) over Moscow, or be able to command the region’s strategic or security agenda as Israel has done in the Middle East.

Furthermore, unlike Ukraine, Israel has never aspired to win explicit and public alliance guarantees at the heart of Ukraine’s demand for formal participation in NATO. In contrast, Washington’s commitment to maintaining Israel’s QME is a key element of a policy designed to honor Israel’s (and Washington’s) preference to keep Israel out of NATO. Indeed, Israel has resolutely opposed any agreement with Washington that would constrain its “freedom of action” in a strategic perimeter once defined by Ariel Sharon to include any place between Morocco and Pakistan.

The Biden administration continues to search for a workable security assistance formula that promises Ukraine more than a tactical approach to incrementalism capable of achieving the strategic objective of imposing a “strategic defeat” on Russia. The Israel model is, at worst, a dangerous incentive for Kyiv to reinvigorate nuclear capabilities surrendered during the U.S.-Russia honeymoon a generation ago. At best, Biden’s interest is a reflection of the confusion that currently passes for strategic thinking on Pennsylvania Avenue.

Geoffrey Aronson is a non-resident fellow at the Middle East Institute and a former advisor to the EU and others on regional political and security issues.

Image: Shutterstock.

To remain competitive in the digital world, states, and the bureaucratic organizations that run them, must digitalize. This transformation requires several innovations such as the creation and maintenance of digital infrastructure, the collection and maintenance of large digital databases, the assignment of unique digital identities to citizens and businesses, the digital delivery of services, and new digital-friendly regulatory regimes.

For states that are able to successfully digitalize, several benefits will materialize, including improved economic performance, decreased administrative costs, and geopolitical or military advantages.

Yet, digitalization also poses significant risks, especially risks relating to the loss of privacy due to the creation of new opportunities for (digital) surveillance. These risks can be minimized if digitalization programs follow and respect democratic values and norms.

While the United States is well-positioned to lead the world in the development of digital states, it is currently falling significantly short of its potential. Instead, it is now other geopolitical actors, especially the European Union and China, that are leading the world.

The United States

The current digital shortcomings have not always been present. During the 1990s, it was the United States that was driving the world’s interest in the digitalization of the state. This is well captured by the 1993 report “Technology for America’s Economic Growth, A New Direction to Build Economic Strength” and the subsequent significant investments that were made in the development of America’s digital infrastructure.

These investments led the United States to consistently place as a leader in international rankings. Availability of internet access improved, opportunities to engage with the government (digitally) became available, and many of the internal operations of the government digitalized. Under the Obama administration, digitalization was made a priority and the chief technology officer of the United States was created to help drive and steer digitalization within the United States.

Yet, while the United States has made significant investments in its technical infrastructure, during the coronavirus pandemic it became increasingly clear that its digital infrastructure is antiquated and crumbling. In international digital government rankings, the United States has been on a consistently declining trajectory. Internet access is widely available, but there is still a problem with the digital divide.

Similarly, the United States continues to see significant failures with its digitalization projects, most notably the initial launch and failure of Healthcare.gov. While the United States has had a chief technology officer in office since 2009, under the Biden administration this role has been left vacant.

European Union

In contrast to the United States, the European Union (EU) has quickly become a world-leading digital superpower and is unlikely to fall from this position soon.

The EU has made one of its core focus areas the digitalization of its societies and governments, supported by the launch of the “digital decade” policy program. The program’s goals are ambitious but are being supported both politically and financially.

In the EU, public services and government data are being transformed so that they may be offered across state borders. Regulatory developments, such as eIDAS, have fostered the creation of interoperable and cross-border digital identity systems. To ensure that citizens and businesses thrive in the emerging digital society, numerous initiatives have been launched to bridge the digital divide.

The EU’s digital successes have led states around the world to adopt European approaches to digitalization—both technically and regulatorily. This process is what is known as the “Brussels Effect,” where international states and businesses adopt EU best practices while being based in a separate jurisdiction.

As states and businesses continue to adopt EU-supported digital innovations, they will only grow as a global digital leader.

China

Like the EU, China has made digitalization a significant priority and proposed a clear path for the creation of a “digital China” by 2035. To China, digitalization is essential for the long-term sustainability of the existing political regime; technology is a core component of their “social management” strategy.

Though there are many components to this, the most well-known digital component is the “social credit system,” which, to the surprise of many in the West, enjoys a high level of support from the general public. Infrastructurally, China is less hindered by legacy technologies like in the United States and is making quick progress in constructing state-of-the-art digital infrastructures—from 5G to quantum computing to data storage.

Drawing on this expertise, China has made a conscious effort to propagate its digital worldview internationally by exporting its digital technologies as part of the Digital Silk Road initiative. Though the West, and in particular the United States, is trying to push back against these initiatives, China is still seeing success in its digital development ambitions.

Coming Competition

To remain competitive in the emerging digital geopolitical competition, states must digitalize their governments and maintain cutting-edge digital infrastructure. As states begin to digitalize and develop such infrastructure, they will grow in strength and power.

However, this digital transformation does bring about real risks for the creation of a centralized or authoritarian future. These risks can only be confronted by the creation and development of digital infrastructure that is inscribed with democratic values.

Traditionally, this has been a role that the United States has willingly filled. Unfortunately, today, the United States is failing in this role, living within the shadow of the EU and an increasingly-digitalized China. 

If the United States wants to remain competitive in the world’s emergent digital future, it must invest in and modernize its crumbling digital infrastructure, making the digitalization of the state a priority. This will be hard to do and will require substantial transformations: funding must be made available, new regulations must be developed, new technologies must be built and implemented, and capacity within the public service must be developed.

Failing to develop itself as a digital state, the United States will quickly find itself a bystander between the EU and China as the world’s new digital powers. 

Dr. Keegan McBride is a lecturer in AI, Government, and Policy at the Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford. His research explores how new and emerging disruptive technologies are transforming our understanding of the state, government, and power.

Albi Nani is a research assistant at the Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford. His work focuses on the impact of digital transformation on industries, organizations, and wider society.

Image: Shutterstock.