Defence`s Feeds

Jorge Domecq, Chief Executive of the European Defence Agency and Ine Eriksen Søreide, Norwegian Minister of Defence met today for discussions on Norway’s involvement in EDA projects as well as ways to further enhance defence cooperation.

“I am very pleased to welcome the Chief Executive of EDA to Norway”, said Defence Minister Eriksen Søreide. “EDA is an important partner for Norway in the development of our Armed Forces. Although a non-member of the EU, Norway has a strong interest in maintaining European security and prosperity. European cooperation is vital to bolster European defence capabilities and in strengthening European allies’ contribution to the wider trans-Atlantic defence and security community”, said the Minister. 

“Norway is actively engaged in European as well as regional defence cooperation. This is not only of benefit for Europe but also for the Norwegian armed forces and defence industry. Today’s discussions concentrated on future projects. At the Agency, we see Norway’s strong support to the Agency’s air-to-air refuelling programme as well as to our research and technology initiatives with a focus on maritime capabilities and to counter chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats”, said Jorge Domecq.

Not being a member of the European Union, Norway signed an Administrative Arrangement with the Agency in 2006. Norway regularly participates in EDA projects and programmes such as helicopter exercises and other flying events, the air-to-air refuelling programme and the Joint Deployable Exploitation and Analysis Laboratory. Additionally, since 2006 Norway has contributed more than € 30 million to EDA’s research and technology initiatives.

More information:

• Administrative arrangements with non-EU members
• Norwegian Ministry of Defence

Taleban fighters broke into the Ghazni jail and freed hundreds of inmates, including key Taleban commanders, in the early morning of 14 September 2015. It was the ninth spectacular jailbreak since 2001, but the Ghazni jailbreak was different than most of them: better planned and with more fighters. The government forces, on the other hand, lacked coordination between the jail protection unit and other security forces, and there may have been someone on the inside helping the Taleban. AAN’s Fazal Muzhary talked to government officials, local witnesses and people close to the Taleban, to find out whether it was the weakness of the Afghan government or the better planning of the Taleban fighters that led to the successful jailbreak.

The Ghazni jailbreak; how it happened

On 14 September 2015, at 1:50, the attack started. Taleban fighters first shot a rocket at the main entrance of the jail to open the way for a suicide attacker who drove his Toyota Corolla to the gate and blew it up. The blast was so big that it shattered the windows of several houses nearby and caused the entrance post to catch fire. The first suicide attacker was said to have had nine comrades, who were ready to blow themselves up if the jail protection guards showed strong resistance. Three of them were killed during the initial, short resistance by the jail guards. After the blast and the short fight, a group of 40 attackers, who had been waiting in an adjacent canal, entered the jail to free the prisoners.

An eyewitness who lives about 120 meters from the Ghazni prison and who was asleep at home when the attack happened, described how the blast shattered the windows of his house and woke him. He first heard the shouting of “Allahu Akbar” and then gunfire. The shooting lasted for a few minutes. The explosion had set the police post at the entrance on fire, so what was happening at the prison’s gates was clearly illuminated. “I could see a large number of people coming out of the jail,” he told AAN. The jail guards, he said, had resisted only briefly and at nearby police check-posts there was only “shooting in the air.” An hour later, he said, “at 2:50am when the [other] government security forces arrived, they started shooting in all directions until sunrise.”

A source close to the Taleban said the group of Taleban fighters that freed the prisoners had been told beforehand that there would be ten persons, who also were inmates, inside the jail who would be wearing white clothes and would be waiting for them. These ten persons had broken the doors of several cells immediately after the blast. When the fighters got in, they did not face any problem freeing the prisoners. The group apparently went from cell to cell fearlessly freeing prisoners. The interior ministry later said a total of 355 prisoners had been released. As a result of the attack, four attackers and seven guards were killed, both by the blast and in the firefight.

At 2:50 when the government security forces from Ghazni city finally arrived at the jail, witnesses said they started shooting in every direction, but by this time, everything had already ended. The freed prisoners were on their way to Andar and other areas out of the government’s reach; some had probably already arrived to safety. The freed prisoners were from Ghazni, Paktika, Paktia and Zabul provinces. They were first moved to Kalakhel, Alizai, Khadokhil and several other villages in Andar district, about 17 kilometres to the south, and were then sent to neighbouring Giro, Qarabagh and other districts of the province.

In a statement later that day, on 14 September 2015, Taleban spokesman Zabiullah Mujahed said that hundreds of fighters from several districts had participated in multiple attacks in the city. Indeed, the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) had been caught in a complex situation, as Taleban fighters launched attacks, not just on the prison, but on several other security check posts and key government institutions at the same time, including the main police headquarters. This made it difficult for the security forces to identify the main target of the attacks and probably led to confusion and great difficulty with coordination.

What is clear, however, is that the Afghan National Army (ANA), the prison guards and the police who were in the vicinity of the jail did not put up much of a fight. Although the guards at the gate fought for a short time, the guards in the central and other towers did not support them and the few guards who resisted were ultimately killed. Moreover the jail guards did not contact the police headquarters to ask for help, until much later. Ghazni police chief Muhammad Hakim Angar, who has since then been replaced, told AAN that when they were finally contacted, supporting forces arrived at the jail within ten minutes, but by that time everything was already over.

The Ministry of Interior, on the same day of the attack, sent a delegation to Ghazni to officially investigate the incident. On 19 September, five days later, interior ministry spokesman Sediq Sediqqi told Hasht-e Subh daily that the investigation was completed and the findings had been sent to the president’s office. He said they would share the findings with the media, but months later still nothing has been shared. AAN has tried several times to reach the spokesman, but his phone has either been off or he did not respond.

The media and other commentators, in the meantime, were swift to come up with their own verdict. A day after the attack, local media vehemently criticised what they saw as the security officials’ incompetence and lack of coordination. Hasht-e Subh daily in an editorial wrote: “After the first Kandahar jailbreak, officials said they had learned and were now prepared to prevent similar attacks in the future, however the Ghazni jailbreak proved that the officials did not learn anything.” According to Sarkhat daily, jail superintendent Muhammad Latif Hassanyar and security director Omarakhan had not been at their duty stations when the attack happened.

Taleban preparation

The multiple attacks in Ghazni on 14 September 2015 was a complex operation, targeting a large number of check posts and involving a large number of Taleban fighters. Most of them had apparently not been told what the main target was (except 50 of them, among them, the ten suicide attackers). Interestingly, several separate groups of Taleban fighters participated in these attacks and every group was given a different task without knowing the tasks of the other groups. A source close to the Taleban said that one group of fighters had simply been instructed to follow their commander and only around midnight, when they realised they were close to the main Ghazni-Paktika highway and near the jail, were the fighters told they were attacking the central jail of Ghazni. This group, which he said consisted of 180 men, did not attack the security check posts around the jail; instead, some of them entered the jail after the blast and freed the inmates. Others were told to target the government reinforcements if they showed up, and otherwise to just accompany the freed prisoners to the villages – which they did.

Moreover, the Taleban simultaneously attacked several security posts around the jail and in other parts of the city, as well as in the districts. Targets included the base of the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) and the check-post in the former base of the US Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Ghazni city, two posts in Qala-e Qazi and Zargar immediately outside the city, and posts in Suleimanzai (in Deh Yak district), and Mullah Noh Baba (in the south west of Andar district). This seems to have successfully confused the Afghan security forces, a trick that the militants did not try in other jailbreaks. Not letting their own fighters know the full plan also appears to be a tactic not used in other, similar attacks, particularly on jails.

Later on the day of the attack on 14 September 2015, the Ministry of Interior said that three – of the 355 – escaped prisoners had been re-arrested, although local sources a week later could confirm only one (a prisoner who had originally been sentenced for theft and who was re-arrested in the Zarghar area near Ghazni city). Former police chief Angar later told AAN that, since then, 28 prisoners had been recovered; he said most of them had returned voluntarily and a small number were re-arrested. This figure has not been confirmed by other sources aware of the incident.

Although NDS director Ali Ahmad Mubariz on 3 October 2015 said that an operation had been immediately launched to track down the freed prisoners, no one in the surrounding areas appears to have seen a single police or government force. If the government had indeed conducted such an operation, local people said they would probably have encountered the Taleban fighters who were waiting for them in Mangor area, not more than ten kilometres to the south of the city.

After the Ghazni jailbreak; flowers and executions

AAN has followed what happened to the prisoners who were freed and found that they were first moved by the Taleban to several villages in Andar district (which neighbours the district centre to the south-west) and then sent to Giro and other districts of the province. Locals in Alizai, Kamalkhel and Hayatwal villages told AAN that a large number of people came to Andar to greet their freed relatives with flowers. Habib Rahman, a Taleban commander from Hayatwal village who is also known as Mansur, and his brother, were welcomed in this way; both received flowers after they arrived in Andar.

Taleban jailbreaks do not only involve the release of their own comrades, but often also general criminal prisoners. After the prisoners’ arrival in Andar, the Taleban divided the prisoners in groups, selecting those whom they believed should be punished and those who should be released. The first group included former members of the Afghan Local Police (ALP) and major criminals. Two prisoners were executed by the Taleban. All others, AAN was told, were freed a week after the jailbreak. Some of the freed prisoners who had previously worked in the ANSF were asked for a guarantee that they would not rejoin the government’s forces.

The two prisoners the Taleban executed were Enayatullah Taqat, also known as Natak, from Andar district, and Alawadin from Qarabagh district. Natak ran in the provincial council election in 2014, while Alawadin was with the police in Qarabagh district. The reason for the executions, according to a local source, was that they had committed serious crimes. Natak, who was also the stepbrother of former Andar district chief Lahur, had apparently been involved in kidnappings as well as murders. According to a local teacher who spoke to AAN, Natak had, in the autumn of 2014, killed a man called Sharaf from Laghar village and married his wife a month later. He said Natak had also kidnapped a person from Ghazni city in spring 2015 and had only freed him after receiving a ransom.

Alawadin was executed in the neighbouring district of Qarabagh. He had been involved in killings and robbery. A local resident told AAN that Alawadin had killed his brother, who was working as a doctor in Kandahar, on 1 March 2015. The brother had been driving from Kandahar to his hometown Moqur, when Alawadin, who had recently been deployed to Moqur district as a policeman, asked the victim to drop him off at Moqur bazaar, together with a friend who was a member of the ALP. On the way, between Janda and Moqur, Alawadin and his friend stabbed the doctor, threw his body into a nearby well and stole his car. When the family of the victim learned about this, they informed the district officials, who arrested Alawadin. The other man fled.

How the jail break could have happened

Talking to AAN, deputy governor Ahmadi gave several reasons why the Ghazni jailbreak may have been so successful. He said that, first of all, also according to the investigation team from Kabul, there had been a lack of coordination between the security forces. The jail guards did not inform the nearby security posts; and the police and the army stationed nearby did not show any reaction, even though they must have seen and heard the fighting. There is a security post of ANA soldiers about a kilometre to the southeast of the jail on Kohibad hill, from where soldiers only fired a couple of warning shots in the air, but according to former Ghazni Governor Faizanullah Faizan, they did not contact the jail guards to ask what was happening or if they needed help; nor did the jail guards inform them.

There are, all in all, ten police check-posts in the neighbourhood, but none came to help or rescue the jail guards or to stop the attack. There may be valid reasons for inaction by some of the posts: they could have been confused because they were also attacked, or they did not receive information from the jail security guards. Others may not have come out of their posts for fear of being ambushed by the Taleban fighters outside the posts. However, according to Ahmadi, if they had reacted and with coordination, the attack could have been fought off, or at least they could have prevented such a large number of prisoners from fleeing.

Secondly, according to Ahmadi there was weak management and coordination within the jail protection unit, who did not act as they were supposed to: they barely fought the attackers and did not prevent them from getting into the jail. He said the jail guards did not resist because they were not “serious and faithful people.” Some of the guards were sleeping, he said, while some others had intentionally failed to resist. Last but not least, he said there was the possibility that the Taleban had a secret agreement with some of the jail officials. Ahmadi particularly mentioned superintendent Muhammad Latif Hassanyar and his deputy Agha Jan, who were arrested on 14 September 2015, together with three security guards, on suspicion of negligence and collusion with the Taleban.

Faizanullah Faizan, a former Ghazni Governor who closely followed the jailbreak, also said the jail guards did not honestly resist the attack. He confirmed that the guards near the entrance did show a reaction but received no support from their colleagues, and that this was why only these seven guards were killed. He moreover said that, if the jail guards had immediately informed the nearby soldiers and the police, they could have at least stopped the prisoners from escaping the jail. Faizan, who was a mujahedin fighter in the 1990s, had at the time himself participated in an attempted jailbreak. Comparing this jailbreak with his own experience, he told AAN: “We failed to break into Ghazni jail in the 1990s because the police forces reacted honestly and were well-coordinated.”

One source close to the Taleban said that after the prisoners were freed, a Taleban commander looked around the entire jail, but could not find a single security guard. “It means all the guards of the jail either hid somewhere or escaped during the attack,” he said. This, despite the fact that, based on the attendance sheet, 110 of the total of 173 guards were supposed to have been present on the day of the attack (although according to deputy governor Ahmadi only 60 guards were actually there). Moreover, according to Ghazni police chief Angar: “We found that only four pika machine gun bullets, seven kalashnikov bullets and five pistol bullets were fired by the jail’s security guards and not a single bullet hole could be seen in the exterior walls of the towers.” This is another indicator that the jail guards in the central towers did not resist; if they had done so, they would have been shot at by the Taleban fighters.

Angar also pointed to what he considered interference in the hiring of jail staff. He said that parliamentarians in Kabul and provincial council members in Ghazni had interfered in the appointment of the staff (including the superintendent and security guards) which meant that they were more loyal to the MPs than the government, lacked professional skills and had not been trained in security tactics. He thought they had either lacked the ability to inform the other security forces and/or had not seriously tried to resist the attackers.

Earlier jailbreaks; differences and similarities

Since 2001, Afghanistan has experienced eight Taleban-planned jailbreaks in which a total of 1,954 prisoners were freed and 17 jail guards killed. In the first jailbreak in 2003 in Kandahar’s Sarpoza prison, the Taliban tunnelled their way out of Sarposa and forty-one prisoners escaped. After a weeklong search, only a handful was recaptured). In a second jailbreak in Kandahar in 2008, Taleban fighters carried out a massive attack, which killed 15 security guards, and freed at least 1,200 prisoners including important Taleban members. Before the attack, the Taleban had apparently warned locals living in the vicinity of the prison that they should evacuate their houses. (1) In the third break into Sarpoza prison in 2011, 500 prisoners were freed through a one kilometre long underground tunnel that had been dug by the Taleban. In the north, in Sar-e Pul province, Taleban fighters were able to free 170 inmates in 2012. The jailbreak followed a powerful bomb blast inside the building and a well-coordinated attack from three directions.

Smaller jailbreaks include from Farah prison when inmates broke out by digging a tunnel from their cell to the outside, on 28 November 2009. Officials captured a thirteenth prisoner as he tried to escape. Eight months later, on 18 July 2010 after a bomb went off at the main gate of the same prison, nineteen inmates escaped. Officials said that only one guard was killed. They also had said that eight escapees were re-arrested. In Zabul, eight prisoners overpowered a jail guard, who had taken them out for the Fajr dawn prayer, and fled on 15 July 2009. Lastly, four foreign prisoners escaped from the heavily fortified and well-guarded then US-controlled Bagram jail in 2005. Military officials familiar with the episode said the suspects are believed to have picked the lock on their cell, changed out of their bright orange uniforms and made their way through the heavily guarded military base under cover of night. They then crawled over a faulty wall where a getaway vehicle was waiting for them.

Interestingly, none of these jailbreaks caused many casualties on the side of the Taleban. Only during the Sar-e Pul jailbreak were three insurgents reportedly killed, and one suicide attacker in Kandahar in 2008. This suggests these operations were all well-planned, but also points to the likelihood of repeated inside assistance.

Since the Ghazni jailbreak, two more have ensued. When Kunduz city fell to the Taleban on 28 September 2015, about 700 prisoners were freed, (see a video here), while in another jailbreak, in Ghorian district in the western Herat province on 21 October 2015, six Taleban prisoners were released.

Conclusion

It seems that the Taleban fighters were smart enough and well-prepared enough to carry out their operation exactly as they wanted. They distracted the Afghan government forces by attacking several security check posts at the same time. They also kept their own fighters largely unaware of the plan. Though officials said there was inside cooperation with the Taleban at the government’s side, it also seems that, if this had indeed been the case, there would have been no need for such a big, complicated operation or such a high level of secrecy. Even bearing in mind the multiple attacks that night, the Afghan government displayed great confusion in response to the attack. They were uncoordinated and failed to even try to foil the attack and the escape of the prisoners. If the jail protection guards had immediately informed all the surrounding check posts, the Taleban fighters could have faced a much stronger resistance. It is less likely they could have freed all the prisoners and taken them to local areas while losing so few fighters.

Although, the jailbreak in Ghazni is over, it is clear that similar attacks can happen again, unless the Afghan government manages to improve the protection of its jails and other key institutions.

 

(1) For a detailed account of 2008 Sarpoza jailbreak see Graeme Smith’s book “The Dogs are Eating them Now: Our War in Afghanistan,” Alfred A. Knopf, Canada, 2013 (pp. 215-233).

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

More than 80 experts from national administrations participate in the first plenary session of the Consultation Forum for Sustainable Energy in the Defence and Security Sector. Opened today by EU Commissioner for Energy and Climate Action Miguel Arias Cañete, EDA Chief Executive Jorge Domecq and European Commission's Director-General for Energy Dominique Ristori, the Consultation Forum will examine how energy efficiency measures and renewable energy sources could be better used and implemented within the European defence sector. The consultation will take place through a series of meetings between experts from national administrations, armed forces, industry and academia. 

"Some of the world’s most efficient militaries are progressively replacing expensive fossil fuels with power generated by solar panels, wind turbines and rechargeable batteries. This is not only about more reliable on-site energy generation. It's also about making it safer and cheaper for troops to complete their missions", said Commissioner Miguel Arias Cañete.

“Sustainable energy use starts at home. This is true for individuals as well as for the armed forces. The energy bill for Europe’s armed forces amounts to billions of euros. The EU legislation in place for energy efficiency, renewable energy and energy performance in buildings can certainly improve the armed forces’ energy output. Ultimately this will not only benefit their environmental footprint but will also result in considerable savings”, said Jorge Domecq during the opening of the first plenary session. 

 

Consultation Forum

The Consultation Forum for Sustainable Energy in the Defence and Security Sector is a European Commission initiative managed by the EDA. It brings together experts from the defence and energy sectors to share information and best practice on improving energy management, efficiency and the use of renewable energy in the civil uses of the military. The focus will be on facilitating the sharing of good practice and expertise by assessing the existing EU energy legislation, in particular the Energy Efficiency Directive, the Energy Performance in Buildings Directive and the Renewable Energy Directive in order to see how different measures could be implemented in the defence sector thus contributing to on-going decarbonisation efforts.The Forum will also be a place to stimulate projects in key areas as well as identifying possible funding streams. Depending on the findings, the Forum might also develop recommendations on how to further develop directives or amending policy in relation to European funding mechanisms for defence.

The Consultation Forum will take place in a series of five plenary meetings over two years. The work will be carried out in three parallel working groups each with a particular focus: (1) Energy management, (2) Energy efficiency & 3) Renewable energy.

Energy and the military

Defence is one of the largest energy consumers in Europe. One of the key challenges is to quantify the extent of this energy usage and to assess how projects stimulated through this Consultation Forum can impact on overall EU energy usage.

More information:

• Consultation Forum for Sustainable Energy in the Defence and Security Sectorwebsite 
• Consultation Forum for Sustainable Energy in the Defence and Security Sector factsheet
• European Commission, Directorate-General for Energy
• EDA Energy & Environment Programme

Background: EDA Energy & Environment Programme

The Agency pursues a comprehensive approach to energy management which is part of its wider Energy and Environment Programme. The programme also aims to identify fully integrated solutions where both energy reduction and environmental impact are assessed together. The EDA Energy and Environment Working Group was established in June 2014 and has so far worked on a number of projects including the Strategic Research Agenda, a Demand Management (Smart Camp) Technical Demonstrator which has recently been deployed to Mali and Power Purchase Agreements (Go Green). A new project addressing water and energy use in military barracks, called “Smart Blue Water Camps” is due to start in 2016.

 

 

Image: Victor M.S. Barreira EUROSAM will develop an improved versio

American / Israeli Desert Eagle Pistol

DRS Technologies has delivered the first hybrid electric drive (HED) system, developed for the Republic of Korea Navy's (ROK) new Incheon-class FFX Batch II programme.

Interesting footage features an historic A-7 Corsair jet “sling loaded” by a CH-47 Chinook helicopter Taken on Aug. 15, 2013, the following video shows members of the Iowa Army and Air National Guard “sling loading” a historic U.S. Air Force jet, an A-7K Corsair II, via CH-47F Chinook helicopter. The A-7, from 185th Air Refueling […]

Americas

• The US Navy successfully tested a Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) Block II from the SeaRAM anti-ship missile defense system for the first time. SeaRAM, used on the Independence class of Littoral Combat Ships, successfully detected, tracked and engaged an inbound threat, and fired a RAM Block II that successfully intercepted the target. The SeaRam system utilized Raytheon’s Phalanx Close-In Weapon System for the test which is a rapid-fire, computer-controlled radar and 20mm gun system that acquires, tracks and destroys enemy threats that have penetrated all other ship defense systems. The two systems combined can also be found on the Navy’s destroyers.

Europe

• The Belgian government has approved a plan to modernize its airforce by 2030, but at a cost of a reduction in personnel. $10 billion will be made available for upgrades to equipment and machinery, however it will necessitate a decrease in the military and civilian workforce from 32,000 to 25,000. While no preferences have been made as to what will be bought, the investment will see thirty-four fighter bombers bought to replace the fifty-six aging F-16s in service. This will go alongside two new frigates, six minesweepers and two new UAVs. Brussels is also considering participation in the Tanker Aircraft Program.

• United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) is to supply fifty more of their Su-35 fighters to the Russian Army. When delivered, this will bring the number of the jets in operation by the Russians to ninety-eight. The deal is estimated to be worth between $787-800 million. UAC subsidiary Sukhoi, who manufactures the jets, looks to have a busy 2016 ahead as the order from the defense ministry adds to a recent agreement to export twelve Su-32 bombers to Algeria.

• There are unconfirmed reports that Serbia may purchase MiG-35 warplanes from Russia as part of a wider defense package for the country. The rumours come as Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin is visiting Belgrade to take part in a meeting of the Serbia-Russia Intergovernmental Committee for Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation which ended yesterday. Serbia’s recent economic recovery has been praised tentatively by the IMF as it looks to increase foreign trade with Russia, a potential growing partner. Serbia is anxious to increase its defensive capabilities at a time when neighbouring NATO members are modernizing their militaries.

• The delivery of four Phoenix 30 UAVs to the Romanian Army has been completed. Developed by UAV Solutions, the rotorcraft also come equipped with the company’s Dragon View combined electro-optical/infrared stabilized camera, a ground control system, spares and ground support equipment. The sale was approved under the US Foreign Military Sales program. Romania is also one of fifteen NATO member states participating in the NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance program. The program will see five RQ-4 Global Hawk acquired from Northrop Grumman, and operated by NATO on behalf of the members.

Asia Pacific

• Swiss defense company Rheinmetall is to supply four Oerlikon Skyguard 3 systems to the Royal Thai Army. This is the first purchase the kingdom has made from Rheinmetall. The order includes four fire control systems and up to eight 35mm Oerlikon GDF 007 twin guns, the company’s Ahead airburst ammunition and additional support services. The system uses air surveillance, target acquisition, calculation of the derivative-action values, and the control of two Oerlikon 35 mm anti-aircraft guns and can quickly be deployed to bring down fast moving, small targets.

• Hindustan Aeronautics Limited is making final preparations for their HAL Tejas lightweight fighter debut at the Bahrain Air Show next week. With plans to impress the experts and pick up a few potential customers along the way, HAL’s display apparently “significantly surpasses any aerobatics display the fighter has presented earlier”. The company plans to have gained final operating clearance (FOC) by mid-2016, and has also annouced that it is to test fire the Rafael Derby beyond-visual-range missile (BVRAAM) in March. The Israeli made missile has been bought as a stopgap arrangement as India grapples to make BVR missile Astra, which is still in development, operational.

• Remington has completed its $40.1 million delivery of M4 carbine rifles to the Philippine Army ahead of schedule. Over 56,000 of the rifles have been delivered in total, and will replace the antiquated 1960s era variant of the M-16 currently in use by the PA. Prior to distribution, a third of the new arms will undergo mandatory ballistic testing while the M-16s will be distributed to reservists.

Today’s Video

• A look at South Korea’s plans to develop stealth UAVs:

An M4 – or is it?
(click to view full)

The 5.56mm M-16 has been the USA’s primary battle rifle since the Vietnam war, undergoing changes into progressive versions like the M16A4 widely fielded by the US Marine Corps, “Commando” carbine versions, etc. The M4 Carbine is the latest member of the M16 family, offering a shorter weapon more suited to close-quarters battle, or to units who would find a full-length rifle too bulky.

In 2006 an Army solicitation for competitive procurement of 5.56mm carbine designs was withdrawn, once sole-source incumbent Colt dropped its prices. The DoD’s Inspector General weighed in with a critical report, but the Army dissented, defending its practices as a sound negotiating approach that saved the taxpayers money. As it turns out, there’s a sequel. A major sequel that has only grown bigger with time.

The M4/M16 family is both praised and criticized for its current performance in the field. In recent years, the M4 finished dead last in a sandstorm reliability test, against 3 competitors that include a convertible M4 variant. Worse, the 4th place M4 had over 3.5x more jams than the 3rd place finisher. Was that a blip in M4 buys, or a breaking point? The Army moved forward with an “Individual Carbine” competition, but as the results started to show the M4 again lagging – even with ammunition changed to a round specially formulated to make the M4 shine – the Army abruptly stopped the process once again, stating that the performance superiority of the competing gun was not better to a degree making it worthwhile. The Army stated after the tests that only a result that was twice as good as the existing gun’s performance would signify an actionable performance difference.

More recently, the Marines have considered adding
various after-market upgrades to the platform in order to increase accuracy, learning from the private sector and competitive shooting circuit what appears to be providing the best bang.

The M4 Carbine M203 on M4 Carbine
(click to view full)

It seemed like a routine request. Order more M4 carbines for US forces in the FY 2007 supplemental, FY 2008 budget, and FY 2008 supplemental funding bills. It has turned into anything but a routine exercise, however – with serving soldiers, journalists, and Senators casting a very critical eye on the effort and the rifle, and demanding open competition. With requests amounting to $375 million for weapons and $150 million in accessories, they say, the Army’s proposal amounts to an effort to replace the M16 as the USA’s primary battle rifle – using specifications that are around 15 years old, without a competition, and without considering whether better 5.56 mm alternatives might be available off the shelf.

The M4 offers a collapsible buttstock, flat-top upper receiver assembly, a U-shaped handle-rear sight assembly that could be removed, and assortment of mounting rails for easy customization with a variety of sight, flashlight, grenade launchers, shotgun attachments, etc. It achieves approximately 85% commonality with the M16, and has become a popular weapon. It has a reputation for lightness, customizability, and, compared to its most frequent rival the AK-47, a reputation for accuracy as well. The carbine’s reputation for fast-point close-quarters fire remains its most prominent feature, however. After Action Reviews done by the Marines after the early phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom revealed that urban warfare scenarios made employment of the M16A2 difficult in some situations; Marines were picking up short AK-47s with folding butt-stocks, or scrounging pistols for use inside buildings.

Like its predecessor the M16, the M4 also has a reputation as an excellent weapon – if you can maintain it. Failure to maintain the weapon meticulously can lead to jams, especially in sandy or dusty environments. Kalashnikovs may not have a reputation for accuracy, or lightness – but they do have a well-earned reputation for being able to take amazing amounts of abuse, without maintenance, and still fire reliably. The Israeli “Galil” applied these lessons in 5.56mm caliber, and earned a similar reputation. Colt’s M16 and M4 have never done so.

The original order for the M4 Carbine in the mid-1990s was a small-scale order, for a specifically requested derivative of the Army’s primary battle rifle, to equip units who would otherwise have relied on less accurate 9mm submachine guns. As such, its direct development and sole-source contract status raised little fuss. Subsequent contracts also raised little scrutiny.

So, what changed?

1. Extended combat in dusty, sandy environments that highlighted the weapon’s weak points as well as its comparative strengths, leading to escalating volumes of complaints;
2. The emergence of alternatives that preserve those strengths, while addressing those weak points;
3. The scale of the current request for funding.

Nobody Loves Me but My Mother – and She Could Be Jivin’ Too… XM29 OICW Prototype
(click to view full)

There have been sporadic attempts to field more modern weapons during its tenure, including the unwieldy 20-or-so pound, 2 barrel, “someone watched Predator too many times” XM-29 OICW, and more recently the aborted contract for the G36-derived XM-8 weapon family from Heckler & Koch. Still, the M4’s designers could never sing B.B. King’s famous tune.

The M16/M4 family has achieved a great deal of success, and garnered many positive reviews for its features and performance. Even its critics acknowledge that it has many positive attributes. The M4 has also attracted criticism – and at least 1 comprehensive fix.

According to briefing documents obtained by Gannett’s Army Times magazine:

“USMC officials said the M4 malfunctioned three times more often than the M16A4 during an assessment conducted in late summer 2002 for Marine Corps Systems Command at Quantico, VA. Malfunctions were broken down into several categories, including “magazine,” “failure to chamber,” “failure to fire,” “failure to extract” and “worn or broken part,” according to the briefing documents. During the comparison, the M4 failed 186 times across those categories over the course of 69,000 rounds fired. The M16A4 failed 61 times during the testing.

The Army conducted a more recent reliability test between October 2005 and April 2006, which included 10 new M16s and 10 new M4s… On average, the new M16s and M4s fired approximately 5,000 rounds between stoppages, according to an Army official who asked that his name not be released.”

In a subsequent letter to the magazine, M4 manufacturer Colt argued that the US Army had disagreed with the USMC study, then added that the Army and Colt had worked to make modifications thereafter in order to address problems found.

Gannett’s Army Times magazine also obtained a copy of Project Manager Soldier’s Weapons Assessment Team’s July 31, 2003, report:

“The executive summary said that M16s and M4s “functioned reliably” in the combat zone as long as “soldiers conducted daily operator maintenance and applied a light coat of lubricant.”

Soldiers had their own comments, however, which were also included in the report and relayed in the magazine article. 3rd ID soldier:

“I know it fires very well and accurate [when] clean. But sometimes it needs to fire dirty well too.”

25th Infantry Division soldier:

“The M4 Weapon in the deserts of Iraq and Afghanistan was quick to malfunction when a little sand got in the weapon. Trying to keep it clean, sand free was impossible while on patrols or firefights.”

82nd Airborne Division soldier:

“The M4 is overall an excellent weapon, however the flaw of its sensitivity to dirt and powder residue needs to be corrected. True to fact, cleaning will help. Daily assigned tasks, and nonregular hours in tactical situations do not always warrant the necessary time required for effective cleaning.”

75th Ranger Regiment member, SOCOM:

“Even with the dust cover closed and magazine in the well, sand gets all inside; on and around the bolt. It still fires, but after a while the sand works its way all through the gun and jams start.”

The 507th Maintenance Company, ambushed outside Nasariyah in 2003 during the opening days of the ground invasion of Iraq, might concur with all of the above. The post-incident report released by the US Army had this to say:

“Dusty, desert conditions do require vigilance in weapons maintenance… However, it is imperative to remember that at the time of the attack, the 507th had spent more than two days on the move, with little rest and time to conduct vehicle repair and recovery operations.”

Even without those extenuating circumstances, however, there have been problems. A December 2006 survey, conducted on behalf of the Army by CNA Corp., conducted over 2,600 interviews with Soldiers returning from combat duty. The M4 received a number of strong requests from M-16 users, who liked its smaller profile. Among M4 users, however, 19% of said they experienced stoppages in combat – and almost 20% of those said they were “unable to engage the target with that weapon during a significant portion of or the entire firefight after performing immediate or remedial action to clear the stoppage.” The report adds that “Those who attached accessories to their weapon were more likely to experience stoppages, regardless of how the accessories were attached [including via official means like rail mounts].” Since “accessories” can include items like night sights, flashlights, etc., their use is not expected to go away any time soon.

US Army Ranger Capt. Nate Self, whose M4 jammed into uselessness during a 2002 firefight after their MH-47 Chinook was shot down in Afghanistan’s Shah-i-kot Mountains, offers another case. He won a Silver Star that day – with another soldier’s gun – and his comments in the Army Times article appear to agree that there is a problem with the current M4 design and specifications.

M4 SOPMOD
(click to view full)

SOCOM appears to agree as well. While US Special Operations Command is moving ahead on their own SCAR rifle program with FN Herstal, they’re also significant users of the M4 Carbine’s SOPMOD version. By the time Capt. Self was fighting of al-Qaeda/Taliban enemies in Afghanistan with a broken weapon, Dellta Force had already turned to Heckler & Koch for a fix that would preserve the M4 but remove its problems. One of which is heat build-up and gas from its operating mechanism that dries out some lubricants, and helps open the way for sand damage.

In response, H&K replaced Colt’s “gas-tube” system with a short-stroke piston system that eliminates carbon blow-back into the chamber, and also reduces the heat problem created by the super-hot gases used to cycle the M4. Other changes were made to the magazine, barrel, etc. The final product was an M4 with a new upper receiver and magazine, plus H&K’s 4-rail system of standard “Picatinny Rails” on the top, bottom, and both sides for easy addition of anything a Special Operator might require.

HK416, labeled
(click to view full)

In exhaustive tests with the help of Delta Force, the upgraded weapon was subjected to mud and dust without maintenance, and fired day after day. Despite this treatment, the rifle showed problems in only 1 of 15,000 rounds – fully 3 times the reliability shown by the M4 in US Army studies. The H&K 416 was declared ready in 2004.

A rifle with everything they loved about the M4, and the fire-no-matter-what toughness of the Kalashnikov, was exactly what the Deltas ordered. SOCOM bought the first 500 weapons right off the assembly line, and its units have been using the weapon in combat ever since. Other Western Special Forces units who liked the M4 Carbine have also purchased HK416s, though H&K declines to name specific countries. US Major Chaz Bowser, who has played a leading role in SOSOCM’s SCAR rifle design program:

HK416: Desert Testing
(click to view full)

“One thing I valued about being the weapons developer for Special Operations is that I could go to Iraq or Afghanistan or anywhere with whatever weapons I wanted to carry. As soon as the H&K 416 was available, it got stuffed into my kit bag and, through test after test, it became my primary carry weapon as a long gun. I had already gotten the data from folks carrying it before me and had determined that it would be foolish to risk my life with a lesser system.”

Actually, they don’t even have to buy the whole gun. Christian Lowe of Military.com reports that:

“In a routine acquisition notice March 23 [2007], a U.S. Special Forces battalion based in Okinawa announced that it is buying 84 upper receiver assemblies for the HK416 to modify their M4 carbines… According to the solicitation for the new upper receiver assemblies, the 416 “allows Soldiers to replace the existing M4 upper receiver with an HK proprietary gas system that does not introduce propellant gases and the associated carbon fouling back into the weapon’s interior. This reduces operator cleaning time, and increases the reliability of the M4 Carbine, particularly in an environment in which sand and dust are prevalent.”

But the US Army won’t consider even this partial replacement option. The Army position was reiterated in a release on April 2/07:

“The M4 Carbine is the Army’s primary individual combat rifle for Infantry, Ranger, and Special Operations forces. Since its introduction in 1991, the M4 carbine has proven its worth on the battlefield because it is accurate, easy to shoot and maintain. The M4’s collapsible stock and shortened barrel make it ideal for Soldiers operating in vehicles or within the confines associated with urban terrain. The M4 has been improved numerous times and employs the most current technology available on any rifle/carbine in general use today.

The M4 is the highest-rated weapon by Soldiers in combat, according to the Directorate of Combat Development, Ft. Benning, Ga. In December 2006, the Center for Naval Analysis conducted a “Soldiers’ Perspective on Small Arms in Combat” survey. Their poll of over 2,600 Soldiers reported overwhelming satisfaction with the M4. The survey included serviceability and usefulness in completing assigned missions in Iraq and Afghanistan.”

The Cry for Competition: How Much Is That HK In the Window? HK416s
(click to view full)

The HK416 isn’t the only alternative out there by any means – but it has been a catalytic alternative. In an analogous situation, limited USMC deployment of mine-resistant vehicles like Force Protection’s Cougar and Buffalo in Iraq, and the contrast between v-hulled casualties and Hummer casualties, led to a cascade that now looks set to remove the Hummer from a front-line combat role. The technology to deal with insurgencies that used land-mines has been proven for over 30 years – but awareness of that fact didn’t rise within the US military and among its political overseers until an obvious counter-example was fielded. One that demonstrated proven alternatives to the limited options people had previous been shown. Likewise, the use of the high-commonality HK416 has served to sharpen awareness that the M4 might not be the best option on offer for US forces.

Couple that with a major buy that looks set to re-equip large sections of the US military with a new battle rifle, and the question “what if we can do better?” starts to take on real resonance. The Army’s $375 million sole-source carbine procurement, on the basis of specifications that have not been changed to reflect these realities, is starting to raise hackles – and attract a wide spectrum of opponents.

Gannett’s Army Times quoted former Army vice chief of staff Gen. Jack Keane (ret.), who tried at the end of his tenure to update the USA’s infantry rifle with the XM-8 project, as saying:

“We are not saying the [M4 and M16 are] bad,” said “The issue for me is do our soldiers have the best rifle in their hands… The fact of the matter is that technology changes every 10 or 15 years and we should be changing with it. And that has not been our case. We have been sitting on this thing for far too long.”

An aide to Sen. Tom Coburn [R-OK] agreed, and added that the substantial price reduction created by the mere threat of an open competition in 2006 was evidence that Colt had been using its sole-source status to overcharge the government. The Senator has sent a formal letter to the Secretary of the Army requesting an open competition in order to ensure both the best deal, and the best off-the shelf rifle that incorporates modern improvements. The winner could well be Colt, said Coburn’s aide – but they should have to prove it, and earn it. “This is supposed to be a battle rifle.” He said. “We’re supposed to have a rifle that just doesn’t jam.” Impossible, of course – but one that jams far less often, and requires far less maintenance to avoid jams, while offering all of the M4’s compactness and add-on ease… that would represent a significant step forward.

Ironically, even Colt may have a better system ready to go. In a letter to Army Times magazine, Colt COO James R. Battaglini (US Marine Corps Maj. Gen., ret.) said:

“The gas piston system in the H&K 416 is not a new system. Rifles were being designed with these systems in the 1920’s. Colt proposed a piston operated weapon to the Army in the early 1960’s. Today Colt Defense has the ability and expertise to manufacture in great numbers piston system carbines of exceptional quality should the U.S. military services initiate a combat requirement for this type of weapon”

Unfortunately, fighting the Army for improvements is no easy task. Colt CEO William Keys, who is also a retired USMC General, explained out to Army Times that Colt has to build what the US Army asks for, to the Army’s exact specifications:

“If we have a change that we think would help the gun, we go to the Army… which is not an easy process, by the way. We spent 20 years trying to get [an extractor] spring changed. They just said ‘well, this works good enough.’ “

Sen. Coburn’s letter to Secretary of the Army Peter Green took a dim view of this entire situation:

“I am concerned about the Army’s plans to procure nearly a half a million new rifles outside the any competitive procurement process… There is nothing more important to a soldier than their rifle, and there is simply no excuse for not providing our soldiers with the best weapon – not just a weapon that is “good enough”… In the years following the Army’s requirements document [DID: for the M4 in the early 1990s], a number of manufacturers have researched, tested, and fielded weapons which, by all accounts, appear to provide significantly improved reliability. To fail to allow a free and open competition of these operational weapons is unacceptable… I believe the Army needs to rapidly revise its rifle and carbine requirements. Free and open competition will give our troops the best rifle in the world…”

The positions were, and are, clear. The US Army says the M4 isn’t broken, and adds that an Army-wide fix would cost $1 billion. Critics contend that these costs may be exaggerated given some of the potential solutions, and add that an army already planning to spend $525 million to re-equip the force with M4s has a moral and financial imperative to see if a better rifle exists. Meanwhile, calls about the M16/M4 had been coming in from Oklahoma, and other Senators and representatives had also been hearing from constituents on this matter.

By 2007, a second letter from the Senate was likely if the Army dug in its heels – and that letter would have had far more signatures at the bottom. In the end, however, legislative tactics forced the Army’s hand. The issue finally came to a head when Sen. Coburn [R-OK] exercised his ability as a Senator to block nomination of the proposed new Secretary of the Army, until the US Army relented and agreed to testing at the Army’s Aberdeen Test Center in Maryland. Secretary Geren was confirmed shortly thereafter, in July 2007.

The tests were conducted. The M4 finished last. The Army declared that performance to be acceptable. By 2010, however, there were noises about an “Individual Carbine Competition”, which became a full solicitation. A number of firms are lining up to provide new designs for the Army’s next-generation carbine, including Colt. Some of them even offer alternate caliber options that could make a real difference to lethality at range, a serious need in environments like Afghanistan. By August 2011, known competitors and designs included:

• Colt: CM901 multicaliber rifle (5.56mm through 7.62mm)
  
• ADCOR: B.E.A.R. Elite (5.56mm)
  
• FN USA: SCAR-16 (5.56mm)
  
• HK USA: HK416 (5.56mm).
  
• Remington: Adaptive Combat Rifle multi-caliber (5.56mm, 6.5mm Grendel, or 6.8mm)

Smith & Wesson was also reported to be entering the competition, but eventually decided not to take part.

The bigger question is whether this competition, like the ones before it, will ultimately prove to be an expensive mirage. As of April 2013, in the words of the old magic 8-ball, “signs point to yes.” Though one could also use “outlook not so good.”

Any Last Words? G36s: Norwegian
Telemark battalion
by Torgeir Haugaard
(click to view full)

Sgt. Charles Perales of Fort Bragg, NC had this to say in a letter reprinted by Defense News:

“My unit – B Company, 2nd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment – was deployed to Afghanistan from April 2005 to March 2006. While there, we were attached to Special Forces at Camp Tillman on the Afghan border… I saw first-hand what happens when your weapon jams up because of the harsh environments we have to call home there. An 18B weapons sergeant was shot in the face due directly to his weapon jamming. I just can’t believe that after things like this happen, the Army is still buying more M4s.

Why not rotate them like we used to before the war? All rapid-deploying units used to get the new M4, the support units would get the excess M16s and so on. I’m not saying they need to outfit the whole Army with a new weapon, but why not start phasing it in? …Soldiers’ lives are on the line. Why is it a hassle to make an improvement that could save lives?

The M4 isn’t a bad weapon; it just needs improvements. It’s about time people stop fighting to keep things the same and start moving toward a better weapon system.”

The last word will be left to SOCOM’s Major Chaz Bowser:

“We buy new laptop computers every few years across the gamut, so couldn’t we do the same with our single most important piece of military equipment? … Waiting for a leap-ahead technology based on a kinetic energy weapon platform is a waste of time and money, so we need to look at what is out there now… What the Army needs is a weapon that is now ready for prime-time and not a developmental system… The requirement comes from the field, not from an office in some garrison activity, not from some consultant and definitely not from a vendor.

Let’s do this quickly without all the bureaucracy typically associated with change. Find someone in our ranks who can make a decision – who hasn’t floated a retirement resume with a gun company – and make the decision now. Just look how fast we were all issued the ‘highly coveted’ black beret or the digital uniform. Find that recipe card, change out the word ‘Velcro’ with ‘battle rifle’ and that may be a start to finding a solution [DID: which, he acknowledges, could be Colt’s M4 if that’s what the competition shows]. Our men and women deserve much better than we are giving them, and shame on us.”

Updates: The Tests, Reactions, and Subsequent Developments FY 2012 – 2016

Army looks to cancel Individual Carbine; USMC won’t join IC; Smith & Wesson out – will sell their innovations to law enforcement and civilians. Remington ACR
(click for video)

January 13/16: Remington has completed its $40.1 million delivery of M4 carbine rifles to the Philippine Army ahead of schedule. Over 56,000 of the rifles have been delivered in total, and will replace the antiquated 1960s era variant of the M-16 currently in use by the PA. Prior to distribution, a third of the new arms will undergo mandatory ballistic testing while the M-16s will be distributed to reservists.

March 16/15: The Army released a Sources Sought notice (W15QKN-15-X-7820), looking for one vendor that can bundle together a series of aftermarket improvements to the M4A1 carbine. The package, to be called the M4A1+, includes increased accuracy, rails, mounting surfaces, neutral, non-black, color, coatings, backup sites and a kitchen sink full of other, smaller improvements.

Feb 18/15: The Marines are considering adding
various after-market upgrades to the platform in order to increase accuracy, learning from the private sector and competitive shooting circuit what appears to be providing the best bang.

June 14/13: The Army excuses their decision to cancel the Individual Carbie competition by saying that none of the candidates met their criteria of 3,592 mean rounds between stoppages, using the new M855A1 Enhanced Performance Round. As a point of comparison, the original requirement for the M4 was 600.

The Army’s PEO Soldier says that SOCOM’s M4A1 achieved 1,691 MRBS, but refuses to release the results of the trials and provide a basis for relative comparison. Military.com.

May 2/13: Military.com reports that the Individual Carbine’s Phase II firing tests are done, but the US Army is about to cancel the Individual Carbine competition, and direct its tiny $49.6 million in FY 2014 to other things. The original plan involved 3 Phase III contracts, and soldier user tests that would include a total of 800,000 rounds fired.

Overall, the budget for new carbines is $300 million through 2018, and the decision on how to proceed reportedly rests with Secretary of the Army John McHugh. This paragraph sums it up best:

“Gun makers involved in the competition said they have heard nothing from the Army about Phase III of the competition. Competitors didn’t want to be named in this story but said they would not be surprised if the effort was canceled because they never believed the Army was serious about replacing the M4 family.”

March 19/13: Inspector General. In testimony before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, the Pentagon’s Inspector General says they’ll audit the Individual Carbine program, as “DoD may not have an established need for this weapon nor developed performance requirements… such as accuracy, reliability, and lethality”.

Aside from the presumptuousness in the wake of incidents like Wanat, they’re also absolutely wrong on a factual level – the IC competition has had those standards for 3 years now. Source.

Aug 1/12: Political. Sen. Tom Coburn [R-OK] delivers a floor speech about the M4 and the Army’s failure to replace it. He reminds the Senate about the dust testing in which the M4 came in last, and points out that the average rifle age is 26 years, compared to 12 years in Germany, or 8 years for US Special Forces. The Army has been able to rush MRAP competitions for much more expensive equipment, but:

…secretary of Army Guerin… assured me that we would have a new competition for a new rifle for our troops. That was 2007. Here we are, six years later, and the army is now telling us we’re going to have a new competition in 2014… Because the guys that are responsible for making the decision on purchasing the rifles are not the guys that are out there on the line. Because if they were, we would have already had this competition…

On July 13, 2008, in the battle of Winot [sic] in Afghanistan, 200 Taliban troops attacked the U.S. troops at a remote outpost in Eastern Afghanistan. The Taliban were able to break through our lines… Believe it or not, do you know what killed most of us? Our own rifles. Practically every one of our dead was found with his m-16 torn down next to him where he had been trying to fix it. That’s occurring now. Except it’s not getting any press.

…You know, a lot of people do a lot of things for our country, but nobody does for our country what the soldier on the frontline does – nobody. Mr. secretary of the Army. This is a moral question. Get the rifle competition going. Members of congress, members of the senate who are on the armed services committee don’t allow this to continue to happen.

Nov 17/11: USMC sticking with M16A4 & M27 IAR. Military.com reports that the USMC has considered the HK416-derived M27 IAR as a future individual weapon, but decided to stick with improvements to the M16A4 rifle for that role.

It also means that the Marines won’t be adopting the winner of the Army’s Individual Carbine competition, which lowers the odds of having IC turn into a contract for a new weapon. HK might still walk away a winner in the USMC, though. The M27 IARs are being evaluated as future substitutes for FN’s M249 5.56mm light machine gun, and have been fielded to Afghanistan in a combat trial.

Nov 10/11: Smith & Wesson out. Military Times’ Gear Scout reports that Smith & Wesson won’t be competing in the Individual Carbine:

“I talked to David Holt, S&W’s VP of Military Programs who confirmed [the M&P4] was S&W’s entry into the U.S. Army’s individual carbine competition. He explained the company’s decision not to compete in the Army’s search for a new carbine… cited the program’s long acquisition timeline as one of the factors that made it difficult for Smith and Wesson to assume the risk of joining the carbine fray… They’ve put a lot of hours into the project and are very proud of the reliability improvement’s [sic] they’ve made over the M4 design. So, the carbine will likely end up for sale on the commercial LE/Gov market…”

FY 2009 – 2011

M4s and M249s fail at the Battle of Wanat; Key “Taking Back the Infantry Half-Kilometer” report leads to caliber questions; SOCOM cancels FN’s 5.56mm SCAR-L; US Army going through the competition motions, slowly, and giving mixed signals. B.E.A.R. in detail
click for video

Aug 8/11: ADCOR. Military.com covers ADCOR’s announced interest in the IC competition, and its B.E.A.R. design. It’s a gas piston system with some clever features for keeping dust out, a free floating barrel, an adjustable cyclical rate, faster and simpler cleaning, and a “forward charging handle” that lets the soldier clear a jammed weapon with their off hand (also present in Remington’s ACR). Military.com | ADCOR page.

June 21/11: Data Rights Issue. Daniel E. Watters of The Gun Zone explains how the Army got here, the deal with Colt, and the difficulty they’ll have getting a new weapon in the Individual Carbine competition. Read “Colt M4 Data Rights & The Individual Carbine Competition.”

June 14/11: M4. FBO.gov releases Presolicitation W56HZV-10-R-0593, covering 70,000 – 100,000 M4 and M4A1 carbines over 5 years. The Government expects to order 25-30% in each of years 1 and 2, and 13-17% in each of years 3 through 5. They’re certainly serious about the M4, if not about its replacement.

The contractor(s) winning the best value competition will also be required to provide ancillary equipment as specified by the contract, and will be paid only for produced items, not for setup and manufacturing costs. Bidding is restricted to firms in the U.S. & its territories, and the carbines will be produced in accordance with the M4/M4A1 Technical Data Package (TDP) and the license agreement between the U.S. Government and Colt Defense, LLC. That TDP is restricted/ export controlled, and requires submission of a Non-Disclosure Agreement. The TDPs will not be available until an NDA is submitted, and an FBO.gov solicitation is issued. Read “Colt M4 Data Rights & The Individual Carbine Competition” for an analysis of how the Army reached this point, and what it could mean in practice.

June 14/11: Competition. Defense Procurement news reports that the US Army still has a 2-track strategy (vid. March 10/10 entry). One is the IC competition. The other involves competing the M4 design, now that the Army and not Colt owns the data rights. Colt has reportedly reacted to the announced Army plans by ramping up their lobbying efforts, so Congress can pressure the Army to keep the program with them.

May 25/11: Lobbying. An Associated Press article lays out the hired lobbyists and political backers for some of the Individual Carbine contenders, while discussing possible offerings. See also Fox News‘ coverage. Contenders, and their lobbyists, include:

Colt:
CM901 multicaliber rifle (5.56mm – 7.62mm)
Roger Smith, a former deputy assistant Navy secretary @ $120,000 a year
Rep. Rosa DeLauro [D-CT, Appropriations]. Rep. John Larson [D-CT], Sen. Joe Liberman [I-CT, retiring].

FN Herstal:
SCAR-L 5.56mm.
American Business Development Group @ $120,000/ year.
Sen. Lindsey Graham [R-SC, SASC], Joe Wilson [R-SC, HASC].

HK USA:
HK416 5.56mm.
Parted ways with Greenberg Traurig in 2009, and with Mark Barnes and Associates in early 2010. No replacement mentioned.

Remington:
Adaptive Combat Rifle multi-caliber (5.56mm or 6.8mm).
$500,000 over last 2 years to Winborn Solutions, and Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough
Sen. Chuck Schumer [D-NY]

Smith & Wesson:
(M&P4, will not be entering the competition)
Greenberg Traurig @ $360,000/ year

April 18/11: Competition. In published responses to questions from industry over Draft RFP W15QKN-11-R-F003, the US Army has laid out a schedule for its “Individual Carbine”. The RFP is expected in May 2011, with Phase 1 evaluations from July to October 2011, and Phase 2 evaluations extending to July 2012. The contracts, if any, would be awarded in October 2012, followed by even more evaluations of the remaining contenders, lasting until March 2013.

While there is no caliber or mechanical type requirement, the Army may not choose to do anything, in the end. It is openly espousing a “dual path” strategy to upgrade existing M4s, even as it launches this competition. Given a long past history of declaring that new designs don’t offer enough benefits over existing M4s to justify a purchase, outside observers can be forgiven any skepticism they may have over the Army’s determination to field anything else when all is said and done. PROCNET Q&A responses | PEO Soldier | Gannett’s Army Times | Aviation Week Ares.

Jan 31/11: Competition. The US Army issues Draft RFP W15QKN-11-R-F003 for an “Individual Carbine.” In practice, the solicitation announces an Industry Day on March 30/11, and offerors are directed to NOT submit proposals at this time. Interested parties are advised that only firms within the Small Arms Industry will be granted admittance at the Doubletree Hotel Washington DC – Crystal City, and that ITAR export control procedures are in effect.

Col. Doug Tamilio, the service’s project manager for soldier weapons, reportedly said in a statement that “We’re challenging industry to develop the next-generation carbine and we’re looking forward to the results.” On the other hand, there have been previous industry days (vid. 2008), and other next-generation carbines have been shelved in the past, on the nebulous ground of not being enough of an improvement over the M4. FedBizOpps | Wall St. Journal.

SCAR-L top, SCAR-H
(click to view full)

June 25/10: FN SCAR. Military.com reports that SOCOM has decided to cancel further 5.56mm SCAR-L Mk.16 rifle purchases on cost and efficiency grounds, and will probably recall the 850 fielded weapons, rather than continue to support them. SOCOM will be adding to their stock of 750 7.62mm SCAR-H Mk.17 riles, however, and will field an extended SCAR-H Mk.20 with sharpshooter enhancements.

SOCOM cancels 5.56mm SCAR-L

March 10/10: Competition. In testimony before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces, senior Army officers state that [PDF]:

“We are currently taking a dual approach to improve the current weapon, the M4, as we move forward with a new carbine requirement. The Project Manager (PM) released a market survey in January 2010, seeking the best industry has to offer for improvements to the current M4. The PM expects to release an RFP soon to compete the upgrade program. Additionally, the Army will conduct a full and open competition to address a new requirement for an individual carbine. Once the Joint Requirements Oversight Council approves the new requirement, the PM will initiate the competition with the release of an RFP for comments from industry. This is the first step in conducting the competition. The Army is working with the other Services in these programs to ensure their requirements are included in our process and they are always invited to participate in the programs’ development and production.”

Jan 12/10: HK. Heckler & Kock announces that they will begin producing civilian variants of the HK416 and the 7.62mm HK417 in a new HK manufacturing facility in Newington, New Hampshire. It’s co-located within an existing 70,000 square foot facility, and would create an American manufacturing base from which to offer military HK416s as well. EVP Wayne Weber of Heckler & Koch USA:

“It is our intention for all U.S. made HK products to equal the quality and reliability of the products made in Germany… By establishing American-based manufacturing, we can compliment our German production and ensure that HK can be more competitive in the U.S. and comply with government contracts requiring U.S. manufacturing. HK products made in the USA will be fully compliant with federal solicitations giving preference to domestically produced products.”

USMC M240B,
Afghanistan
(click to view full)

Nov 30/09: Report. US Army TRADOC releases a paper by Major Thomas P. Ehrhart of the Command and General Staff College titled “Increasing Small Arms Lethality in Afghanistan: Taking Back the Infantry Half-Kilometer” [PDF]. It points out that American forces are routinely engaged in Afghan firefights beyond 300 meters, where their weapons are less effective than their opponents. Excerpts:

“Comments from returning non-commissioned officers and officers reveal that about [50%] of engagements occur past 300 meters. The enemy tactics are to engage United States forces from high ground with medium and heavy weapons, often including mortars, knowing that we are restricted by our equipment limitations and the inability of our overburdened soldiers to maneuver at elevations exceeding 6000 feet. Current equipment, training, and doctrine are optimized for engagements under 300 meters and on level terrain.

There are several ways to extend the lethality of the infantry. A more effective 5.56-mm bullet can be designed which provides enhanced terminal performance out to 500 meters. A better option to increase incapacitation is to adopt a larger caliber cartridge, which will function using components of the M16/M4. The 2006 study by the Joint Service Wound Ballistics – Integrated Product Team discovered that the ideal caliber seems to be between 6.5 and 7-mm. This was also the general conclusion of all military ballistics studies since the end of World War I.

The reorganization of the infantry squad in 1960 eliminated the M1D sniper rifle and resulted in the loss of the precision mid-range capability of the infantry squad… All 5.56-mm weapons are most effective when employed within 200 meters due to velocity limitations. Once contact is made, the fight is limited to machine gunners, mortars and designated marksmen. In the table of organization for a light infantry company8 only the six -M240B 7.62-mm machine guns, two- 60-mm mortars and nine designated marksman armed with either 7.62-mm M14 rifles or accurized 5.56-mm M16A4’s rifles are able to effectively engage the enemy. These weapons systems represent 19 percent of the company’s firepower. This means that 81 percent of the company has little effect on the fight. This is unacceptable.”

Reclaiming the Infantry Half-Kilometer

Oct 12/09: Field. The Associated Press reports that M4 carbine and M249 SAW light machine gun failures contributed to the debacle at Wanat, Afghanistan, in which an American outpost was overrun by the Taliban, and to another situation at nearby Kamdesh. An excerpt:

“[Douglas Cubbison of the Army Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth, KS] study is based on an earlier Army investigation and interviews with Soldiers who survived the attack at Wanat… The Soldiers said their weapons were meticulously cared for and routinely inspected by commanders. But still the weapons had breakdowns… Cubbison acknowledges the high rates of fire during the two-hour battle may have led to the failures. But he says numerous problems occurred relatively early in the engagement.”

Defense Tech adds that:

“Basically, the most damning conclusions are compiled in the recommendations section of the report. There are a few instanced specified in the report of an M4 fouling, and one where the M4 fouled and the Soldier picked up a SAW and that was jammed up as well… Staff Sergeant Phillips poured out fire, as recalled by another Engineer Specialist loading for him, [SSG Phillips] went through three rifles using them until they jammed.”

Debacle at Wanat

FY 2007 – 2008

Army holds test – M4 last by far. M4, EDT-III
(click to view full)

Sept 17/08: Competition. Military.com’s Christian Lowe reports that that the Army issued a solicitation to industry in August 2008, asking companies to submit proposals that would demonstrate “…improvements in individual weapon performance in the areas of accuracy and dispersion… reliability and durability in all environments, modularity and terminal performance.”

The intervening years have seen a number of new carbine designs hit the market, as well as a number of “personal defense weapons” that attempt to deliver carbine-class firepower in a weapon only slightly larger than a pistol. Most use calibers other than 5.56mm or 9mm, however, which has prevented their adoption for use by pilots, vehicle crew, and other specialists who need an extremely compact weapon. The Army solicitation also asks for ideas on a “subcompact” variant that would fit in this category.

The article quoted Richard Audette, project manager for Soldier weapons at the US Army’s Picatinny Arsenal. The Army is currently working on its carbine requirements document, and is trying to write it in a way that does not exclude other calibers:

“We’re at the point now where we’re going to go out and compete… We’re looking for anyone that has a world-class carbine… We’re interested in any new technologies out there… We want to know about everything that’s out there, regardless of caliber… If you’ve got a 6.8 [mm caliber weapon], we’re interested in that and seeing what that brings to the table.”

What the Army will insist upon, however, is production capacity. Colt can churn out 10,000 M4s per month, and in June 2009 the M4s blueprints will no longer be a Colt exclusive. Experience with ongoing M16 orders suggests that this will expand production capacity, and drive down prices. In contrast, manufacturers of weapons in promising new calibers like 6.8mm have not received large military orders to ramp up their production capacity to the same levels. Producibility is certainly a valid concern. It must be part of any fair and reasonable competition. It can also be abused to become a back door method of ratifying existing decisions, while adopting the veneer of competition. Which will it be in this case? Only time will tell.

July 11/08: Demonstration. Military.com reports that about 30 legislative aides signed up to attend a July 11 demonstration at Marine Corps Base Quantico. Congressional and industry sources report that the event feature the standard 5.56mm M4 carbine, plus the FN SCAR Mk17 7.62mm (SCAR MK16 is the 5.56mm version that was tested by the Army), – and a modified “M4-style MURG (Modified Upper Receiver Group)” rifle capable of firing a new 6.8mm special purpose cartridge round, among others. Attendees included FN-USA, HK, LWRC who offers receiver group switchouts like HK’s and adds a 6.8mm version, Barrett (REC-7 6.8mm), and Bushmaster. All reportedly avoided commercial sales pitches, and stuck to facts and demonstrations.

Complaints persist from troops on the front lines regarding the current 5.56mm round/riling combination’s lethality. The ballistic characteristics of calibers around 6.8mm have yet to feature a breakthrough military purchase in the face of 5.56mm standardization, but these calibers are gaining growing recognition for their balance of size (can be used with M16 magazines), light weight, and knock-down power.

Participants reportedly had the opportunity to observe the effects of different caliber rounds in translucent ballistic jelly, which simulates human tissue, and to fire the weapons involved. Sens. James Coburn [R-OK] and Ken Salazar [D-CO] remain very active in this area, but the number of participants suggests that their efforts may be gaining traction in spite the Army. Military.com | American Mohist.

Late December 2007: Test results. DID obtains some exact results from the Army’s testing. The Army has now done 3 dust tests. In the late 2006/Jan 2007 report “Baseline Reliability and Dust Assessment for the M4, M16, and M249,” the M4 jammed 9,836 times – 1 jam every 6 rounds. In a May 2007 “Extreme Dust Test II”, with no competitors, the M4 had 1 jam every 88 rounds, using heavy lubrication. In the November 2007 “Extreme Dust Test III”, as DID has discussed, the competing rifles were subject to significantly more maintenance and lubrication than elite American forces like Delta used in their weapon selection process, or indeed in HK’s own field testing of its HK416s prior to shipment.

We’ll begin with the Army’s overall results, from its own release:

“Even with extreme dust test III’s 98.6 percent success rate there was a total of 863 class 1 and 2 weapon/magazine stoppages with 19 class 3 stoppages. During extreme dust test II conducted during the summer, there were 296 total class 1 and 2 stoppages and 11 class 3 stoppages.

A class 1 stoppage is one a Soldier can clear within 10 seconds; a class 2 stoppage is one a Soldier can clear, but requires more than 10 seconds; and, class 3 is a stoppage that requires an armorer to clear.”

DID will simply point out that 10 seconds can be a rather fatally long time when people are shooting at you, and at your friends. So, what happens when the Extreme Dust Test III stoppages are broken out by weapon?

The M4 Carbine is the Army’s existing weapon.

• 882 jams, 1 jam every 68 rounds, again using heavy lubrication. In addition all 10 of the M4 barrels needed to be replaced, and a number of their parts were replaced during the test. None of the cold hammer forged HK416 and XM-8 barrels needed replacement.

The HK416 is a modified M4 carbine, which can be and has been converted from existing rifles. Used by US Special Forces.

• 233 jams, 1 jam every 257 rounds, 3.77x more reliable than the M4.

FN SCAR is US special Forces’ new weapon, designed by SOSOCM. It just went into production in late 2007.

• 226 jams, 1 jam every 265 rounds, 3.85x more reliable than the M4

XM-8 is a developmental rifle. It’s an advanced version of HK’s G36, a rifle in wide use by many NATO armies. The US Army cancelled the XM-8 weapons family 2 years ago.

• 127 jams, I jam every 472 rounds, 6.95x more reliable than the M4.

The failure of M4 barrels at 6,000 rounds confirms SOCOM objections that date back to the Feb 23/01 report “M4A1 5.56mm Carbine and Related Systems Deficiencies and Solutions,” which ended up concluding that “M4A1 Carbine… does not meet the requirements of SOF.” The barrel replacement also increases the rifle’s life cycle costs when compared with the 10,000 round advertised barrel life, as additional barrels are sold to the Army for $240 each. A longer, heavier M16 barrel, which is a competed production weapon, cost $100 by comparison. While the dust test is indeed an extreme test, the 10,000 round requirement is under “all conditions” – not just ideal conditions.

Dec 18/07: The US Army publishes “M-4 Carbine Has High Soldier Confidence Despite Test.” Not exactly a headline to inspire confidence, as the Army acknowledges that the M4 Carbine finished last among the 4 contenders – but amazingly, asserts that the rifle is just fine and shows no interest in buying even the HK416’s parts swap-out into the existing M4:

“After being exposed to the heavy dusting, 10 of each weapon fired 6,000 rounds apiece. They were fired in 50 120-round cycles. Each was then wiped and re-lubricated at the 600 round mark. After 1,200 rounds were fired from each weapon, they were fully cleaned and re-lubricated… “While the M-4 finished fourth out of four, 98 percent of all the rounds fired from it went off down range as they were supposed to do,” Brig. Gen. [Mark] Brown [commander of Program Executive Office Soldier and the Natick Soldier Systems Center] said. “However, the three other candidates did perform better at about a 99 percent rate or better, which is a mathematically statistically significant difference, but not an operationally statistical difference.”… The Army has put an option on an existing contract for 64,450 M4s, according to the general.”

“A mathematically statistically significant difference, but not an operationally statistical difference.” Statistically, 99% is a 100% improvement over 98%. Operationally, I jam every 68 rounds is almost one jam for every 2 30-round magazines. Whereas one jam in 257 rounds would only happen about once in 8 30-round magazines. Readers are left to contemplate the operational significance of those probabilities in a sustained, serious firefight.

4-Rifle test: M4 finishes dead last

June 29/07: Testing. A document circulated on Capitol Hill asking for testing includes these excerpts:

“The Army has claimed “83% reported confidence that the M4 will not suffer major breakage or failure that necessitates repair before further use” – A soldier should be 100% confident that his weapon will not break the next time he fires it… Since the M16 was introduced in Vietnam the answer has always been “It’s the soldiers’ fault”… The Special Operations Command has the most proficient soldiers in the world, they shoot the most and they operate in the most difficult environments – In 2001 SOCOM was highly critical of the reliability of the M4, and they chose to adopt a new weapon – the SCAR. Our Tier 1 units – like Delta Force, and Seal Team 6 have all abandoned the M4 for other weapons that is [sic] significantly more reliable.”

M4 Carbine Contracts Announced to Date M4 carbine, firing
(click to view full)

The following contracts concern the M4 Carbine and its variants directly; other than spare parts or magazines, all other related contracts for accessories etc. were excluded. We also excluded M16 contracts that did not also include M4s.

No announced DefenseLINK contracts have fit these criteria since February 2009, though some sole-source orders may be found in other venues. The FBO.gov June 14/11 presolicitation may lead to additional announced orders.

March 6/14: US Army Contracting Command at Picatinny Arsenal, NJ awards $16.3 million in contracts as a firm-fixed-price, multi-year contract for M4 rifle bolts under the M4 product improvement program. Each request will be competed between Colt Defense LLC in West Hartford, CT (W15QKN-14-D-0027) and FN Manufacturing LLC in Columbia, SC (W15QKN-14-D-0026), though 6 bids were received. The contract runs until Feb 28/18.

Jan 7/13: Colt Defense LLC in West Hartford, CT receives $14 million firm-fixed-price contract for the M4 Product Improvement Program replacement barrel and front sight assembly. Work location will be determined with each order, with an estimated completion date of Dec 30/16. The bid was solicited through the Internet, with 6 bids received by the US Army Contracting Command in Warren, MI (W56HZV-13-D-0040).

Dec 19/12: From FBO.gov, amended solicitation #W15QKN-13-R-0039, originally issued Nov 27/12:

“…requirement for up to a total of 350,000 Replacement Bolts used in the conversion of the M4 Carbine to the M4A1 Carbine. To meet continuous requirements for FY13 through FY17, the United States Government intends to award one or more four-year IDIQ contracts with Firm Fixed Price (FFP) orders based on Other Than Full and Open competition… Competition for this requirement shall be other than full and open, and limited to the United States and its territories, island possessions and protectorates, in accordance with the license agreement between the US Government and Colt Defense LLC, limiting distribution of the Technical Data Package (TDP). The authority to limit competition is in accordance with 10 U.S.C. 2304(c)(1), as implemented by FAR 6.302-1(a)(2)(ii)(A), only one responsible source and no other supplies or services will satisfy agency requirements. FAR 6.302-1(a)(2) applies when supplies or services required by the agency are available from only one responsible source, or for DoD, NASA and the Coast Guard, from only one or a limited number of responsible sources, and no other type of supplies or services will satisfy agency requirements.

The maximum contract ceiling price for the total anticipated contract award is $21,350,000.00. The maximum quantity of units is

350,000. The anticipated award date for this action is 3rd Quarter of Fiscal Year 2013.”

Nov 16/12: The GAO dismisses Colt’s protest.

Oct 9/12: Colt protests again. For the 2nd time in 5 months, Colt lodges a protest of the US Army’s efforts to upgrade its M4 carbines to M4A1s. This protest is aimed at the amended Sept 21/12 solicitation. Military.com.

July 24/12: Colt Protests, Wins. The US Government Accountability Office’s ruling forces the US Army to rework the original M4A1 upgrade competition that Remington had won (q.v. April 25/12 entry), so vendors in the competitive range could re-submit. Colt protested both Remington Defense’s win, and the miscalculation of royalties Colt would receive.

More than 6,000 soldiers in the 101st Airborne have already received the rifles, but the Army will need to resolve these protests if it wishes to begin installing conversion kits in summer 2013. The M4A1 includes a heavier barrel, a full automatic trigger assembly, and ambidextrous fire controls. A free-float forward rail, which improves accuracy is widely available on civilian guns, might receive a contract by the end of 2014. What’s conspicuous by its absence is a more reliable firing system. Col. Scott Armstrong of PM Soldier Weapons:

“There were 11 [vendors] that competed in that; they went through nearly a year of testing…. None of the offerers completed the first phase or outperformed the current bolt and bolt carrier group on the M4A1 configuration. Areas that the competitors really fell short in were reliability, durability as well as high temperature and low temperature conditions. The M4A1 bolt outperformed [the competition] in all of those areas.”

See: GAO ruling | Military.com

April 25/12: M4s from Remington. Remington Arms Company, LLC in Ilion, NY receives an $83.9 million firm-fixed-price contract for 24,000 M4A1 carbines. Remington is positioned for any future carbine competition, if there is one, with the ACR. Meanwhile, its “R4” seems to have found a production niche, now that Colt no longer owns all rights. This is the 1st non-Colt M4 contract, and Remington beat 5 other bids – presumably including Colt.

Work will be performed in Ilion, NY until April 12/17. U.S. Army Contracting Command in Warren, MI manages the contract (W56HZV-12-D-0056).

Oct 5/11: GTD, Inc. in Lola, MT, received an $8.6 million firm-fixed-price indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity contract for M4/M4A1 Carbine Trigger Components. Work will be performed in Lola, MT, with an estimated completion date of Sept 30/16. The bid was solicited through the Internet, with 4 bids received by the U.S. Army Contracting Command in Warren, MI (W56HZV-11-D-0207).

June 14/11: RFP. FBO.gov releases Presolicitation W56HZV-10-R-0593, covering 70,000 – 100,000 M4 and M4A1 carbines over 5 years. The Government expects to order 25-30% in each of years 1 and 2, and 13-17% in each of years 3 through 5.

The contractor(s) winning the best value competition will also be required to provide ancillary equipment as specified by the contract, and will be paid only for produced items, not for setup and manufacturing costs. Bidding is restricted to firms in the U.S. & its territories, and the carbines will be produced in accordance with the M4/M4A1 Technical Data Package (TDP) and the license agreement between the U.S. Government and Colt Defense, LLC. That TDP is restricted/ export controlled, and requires submission of a Non-Disclosure Agreement. The TDPs will not be available until an NDA is submitted, and an FBO.gov solicitation is issued. Read “Colt M4 Data Rights & The Individual Carbine Competition” for an analysis of how the Army reached this point, and what it could mean in practice.

Feb 2/09: Colt Defense LLC in Hartford, CT received a $9.5 million firm-fixed-price 5-year Requirements contract for 18,000 Barrel & Front Assemblies; 13,600 Hand Guards; 7,100 Heavy Barrel Assemblies; 22,000 Receivers and Cartridges; and 200,000 Extractor Spring Assemblies. Work is to be performed at Hartford, CT with an estimated completion date of Sept 28/12. US Army Tank and Automotive Command Rock Island in Rock Island, IL manages this contract (DAAE20-03-D-0191).

April 17/07: Small business qualifier Colt Defense LLC in Hartford, CT, was awarded on April 6, 2007, the full delivery order amount of $50.8 million as part of a firm-fixed-price contract for M4 and M4A1 carbines. Work will be performed in Hartford, CT, and is expected to be complete by July 30, 2008. This was a sole source contract initiated on Feb. 16, 2007 by the U.S. Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command in Rock Island, IL (W52H09-04-D-0086). See also July 26/06.

Jan 22/07: Small business qualifier Colt Defense LLC in Hartford, CT received a delivery order amount of $5.6 million as part of a $24.3 million firm-fixed-price contract for Unique Spare Parts for the M4 and M4A1 Carbine. Work will be performed in Hartford, CT, and is expected to be complete by May 30, 2008. This was a sole source contract initiated on April 5, 2004. The U.S. Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command, Rock Island, Ill., is the contracting activity (DAAE20-03-D-0191).

Sept 26/06: Small business qualifier Colt Defense LLC in Hartford, CT received a maximum $10 million firm-fixed-price, indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity contract for M4A1 machine guns. The M4A1 Carbine and variants will be utilized with the family of carbines that are currently in the U.S. Military arsenal. The M4A1 Carbine will come in four basic versions, which consist of longer and shorter versions of the M4A1 Carbine. Work will be performed in Hartford, CT, and is expected to be complete by September 2011. Contract funds in the amount of $278,300, will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was not competitively procured by the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division in Crane, Indiana (N00164-06-D-4805).

July 26/06: Small business qualifier Colt Defense LLC in Hartford, CT received a delivery-order amount of $53.8 million as part of a $242.5 million firm-fixed-price contract for procurement of M4/M4A1 carbines. Work will be performed at Hartford, CT, and is expected to be complete by Sept. 30, 2007. This was a sole source contract initiated on June 30, 2006. The Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command, Rock Island, Ill., is the contracting activity (W52H09-04-D-0086).

Jan 13/06: Small business qualifier Center Industries Inc. in Wichita, KS received a $7,712,600 modification to a firm-fixed-price contract for aluminum magazines for the M16 rifle/M4 carbine. Work will be performed in Wichita, KS and is expected to be complete by Oct. 31, 2007. This was a sole source contract initiated on Dec. 30, 2005 by the U.S. Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command in Rock Island, IL (DAAE20-02-F-0022).

April 1/05: FN Manufacturing Inc. in Columbia, SC received a delivery order amount of $6.7 million as part of a $29.8 million firm-fixed-price contract for M16A4 rifle and M4 carbine. Work will be performed in Columbia, SC, and is expected to be complete by Dec. 31, 2008. There were 2 bids solicited on Dec. 20, 2004, and 2 bids were received by the U.S. Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command in Rock Island, IL (W52H09-05-D-0080).

FN Manufacturing LLC writes in to say that they have won “the vast majority of M16A2, A3 and A4 contracts as well as spare parts contracts for these systems since 1989” through “full and open competition.” Having said that: “…never was FN Manufacturing LLC, or any other small arms manufacturer, awarded M4 contracts. The M4 cannot be competed and always has been awarded sole source to Colt because of licensing rights restricting full and open competition until 2009.”

Aug 30/04: Small business qualifier Colt Defense LLC in Hartford, CT received a delivery order amount of $0 as part of a $123 million firm-fixed-price contract for 124,803 weapons in either M4 carbine or M4A1 carbine configurations. Work will be performed in West Hartford, CT, and is expected to be complete by Sept. 30, 2007. This was a sole source contract initiated on Oct. 14, 2003 by the U.S. Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command in Rock Island, IL (W52H09-04-D-0086).

Jan 15/04: Small business qualifier Colt Defense LLC in Hartford, CT received Jan. 13, 2004, a delivery order amount of $4,029,095 as part of an $8,058,190 firm-fixed-price contract for M4 unique spare and repair parts. Work will be performed in Hartford, CT, and is expected to be complete by Jan. 30, 2009. This was a sole source contract initiated on Sept. 18, 2003 by the U.S. Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command in Rock Island, IL (DAAE20-03-D-0191).

July 31/02: Colt’s Manufacturing Company Inc. in Hartford, CT received an $18.5 million undefinitized contracting action for 25,764 M4 carbines and 300 M4A1 carbines, in support of the U. S. Air Force, U. S. Army, and foreign military sales countries on July 30, 2002. Work will be performed in West Hartford, CT, and is to be complete by Sep. 30, 2004. This was a sole source contract initiated on June 6, 2002 by the U.S. Army Tank and Automotive Command in Rock Island, IL (DAAE20-02-C-0115).

Sept 19/96: Small business qualifier Colt’s Manufacturing Company Inc. in Hartford, CT received a $5.5 million firm fixed price contract, with a potential value of $.5 million if all options are exercised, for 9,861 M4 Carbines, 5.56mm and 716 M4A1 Carbines. Work will be performed in Hartford, CT and is expected to be complete by April 30, 1998. This is a sole source contract initiated on September 6, 1996 by the U.S. Army Tank-Automotive & Armaments Command in Rock Island, IL (DAAE20-96-C-0391).

Appendix A: Testing, Testing – Fairly? XM-8 Family
(click to view full)

The promised tests included the M4 and 3 other rifles: the M4-based HK416, the FNH USA-designed Mk16 SOCOM Combat Assault Rifle (best known as FN SCAR-L), and the H&K XM8 carbine. Unlike the M4, the HK416, XM8, and FN-SCAR all use gas-piston operating systems to achieve automatic fire. The XM8 family is an very updated version of the popular G36 in use with many NATO militaries; it was slated to be the M4’s replacement, but that RFP was suspended by the Army in July 2005 and then canceled in October 2005. The FN-SCAR is a “live” program, and July 2007 marked the beginning of Special Operations Command’s operational tests of the FN-SCAR 5.56mm Mk16 and the 7.62mm Mk17, which could become its future mainstays.

Miltary.com reported that the US Army sand tests will include 10 samples of each weapon through which engineers will fire 6,000 rounds. Each weapon and loaded magazine will be exposed to “extreme dust” for 30 minutes then test fired with 120 rounds. Each weapon will be wiped down and lubricated every 600 rounds, with a full cleaning every 1,200 rounds. The firing, collection of data and analysis of data is expected to take approximately 5 months.

FN SCAR w. Grip Pod
(click to view full)

One’s first reaction upon seeing the proposed testing regimen was to compare it very unfavorably with the regimen Delta Force put the HK416 through, firing it day after day without maintenance for thousands of rounds. Or even the testing HK itself uses for its HK416s. Indeed, it seems on its face to be a test designed to minimize the very weaknesses in the M4 incumbent that have triggered this controversy. Those who believe the cycle is reasonable cite 300 rounds as the soldier’s 1-day load, and say that under sand storm conditions, a once a day wipedown is the bare minimum for any weapon. Every 600 rounds is thus a safety factor of 2 against the worst possible conditions. Of course, sandstorms have a way of lasting more than one day, and when they do – as in the initial portion of Operation Iraqi Freedom – even vehicle interiors may feature a fine particulate haze.

Within its chosen regimen, there were 3 key ways the Army could choose to bias the test. One was the size of the particulate in the dust chamber – which can be made large in relative terms to lower the number of problems with fouling and jams. The biggest problems in theater are with the very fine particulates. This is especially relevant given the October 2004 report prepared by the Desert Research Institute for the US military. “Geochemical and Physical Characteristics of Iraqi Dust and Soil Samples” [PDF, 2.9 MB] stated that:

“…current chamber test methodology misrepresents real-world conditions. The character of the soils and dust collected from areas of military activity in Iraq is greatly different from the material used in current weapons testing procedures. Current procedures employ laboratory generated dust that is 99.7% silicon dioxide (i.e. quartz), contains no salt or reactive chemicals, and contains coarser particle sizes than most of the Iraq samples. Use of this material cannot simulate conditions in Iraq that have contributed to the weapons failures.”

The next item to watch was whether the rifles used were randomly chosen, or cherry picked and then pre-maintained to perform at an unusual reliability level vs. a field weapon. A third way of gaming the testing system could involve the level of lubrication used. One source noted that the first dust test new M4s had 9,836 jams in 60,000 rounds – almost one jam every 6 rounds. The Army kept working on the test until they figured out a “generous lubrication” approach that used far more than the manufacturer recommended, but lowered jams to 1 in 88 rounds. A fair test must match the manufacturer’s manual for each weapon, or use the same lubrication for each weapon based on the minimum recommended among all test weapons.

Additional Readings Background: Weapons & Key Trends

• DID – Colt M4 Data Rights & The Individual Carbine Competition. guest Article by Daniel E. Watters of The Gun Zone.

• The Gun Zone – A 5.56 x45 mm “Timeline”. The prologue section begins in 1882, and subsequent sections go all the way to the present day. The feature includes M4-related contracts that were never announced on the Pentagon’s DefenseLINK.

• Gary K. Roberts, LCDR, USNR at NDIA 2008 conference – Time for a Change [PDF format]. LCDR Roberts offers a history of US military small arms programs, as well as testing results from the 2007 multi-agency M4A1/MK12 Modified Upper Receiver Group (MURG) project. Includes evaluations of 6.8mm and 7.62mm caliber performance.

• Winds of Change – Taking Back the Infantry Half-Kilometer. Links to official report re: the need for lethality at range in Afghanistan, and related materials.

• NY Times At War: Notes from the Front Lines – The Weakness of Taliban Marksmanship. And how they make it work for them anyway. Effective, accurate counterfire at range offers an especial advantage against such opponents.

• Colt – M4 5.56mm Carbine

• Quarterbore – Special Operations improves M4 carbine. Written by SGT. Nelson Mumma Jr.

• Special Operations.com – A Short History of the M4 Carbine. More of a chronicle of variants and add-ons.

• Hartford Courant (Dec 5/04) – Ex-Marine has West Hartford, Conn., Gun Maker Colt Shooting Straight. Also notes the firm’s political backers in Washington, most prominently Rep. Jack Murtha [D-PA, now deceased].

• Gun Websites – Colt CM901 modular battle rifle. Can be chambered in 5.56mm through 7.62mm.

• ADCOR: The B.E.A.R. Story

• Modern Firearms [Guns.RU] – FN SCAR: Mark 16 and Mark 17- Special Forces Combat Assault Rifle (USA / Belgium). One of the 7.62mm SCAR’s most interesting and potentially life-saving features is the ability to switch its chambering, which would let operators scavenge Russian/Chinese magazines from the enemy for ammunition.

• Defense Update – Special Operations Combat Assault Rifle (SCAR)

• National Defense Magazine (July 2005) – Custom-Designed Rifle Aims to Fit Commandos’ Special Needs. Discusses the FN SCAR.

• Heckler & Koch USA – HK416

• Soldier Tech – HIGHLY EVOLVED: The HK416 Enhanced Carbine

• HK Pro – The HK416: The M16 has finally been fixed (Cal 5.56 mm x 45). There’s also a larger 7.62mm version in development, the HK417.

• DID – IAR What IAR: The USMC’s SAW Substitution. The FN-SCAR, HK416, and Colt variants of the M16 were all competing. A variant of the HK416 won, and became the M27 IAR.

• Remington Defense – ACR. Their Adaptive Combat Rifle is multi-caliber in 5.56mm, 6.5mm Grendel, or 6.8mm.

• GlobalSecurity.org – XM8 Future Combat Rifle / Lightweight Assault Rifle/ Modular Assault Weapon System

• National Defense Magazine (February 2004) – Army Tests New Rifle That Could Replace M16, M4. Referring to the canceled XM-8; it also discusses the XM-29 OICW.

• Ghost Recon.NET – XM29 Objective Individual Combat Weapon. Very good coverage.

News & Views

• EveryJoe (May 12/14) – Are U.S. Soldiers Dying From Inadequate Weapons? By Lt. Col. Tom Kratman (ret.), who summarizes a number of significant improvements in rifle design since the M4.

• Washington Times (Feb 20/14) – Cover-up? Army historian says report on deadly Afghan battle was altered to absolve faulty gun.

• Washington Times (Feb 19/14) – Troops left to fend for themselves after Army was warned of flaws in rifle.

• US DoD Inspector General (Sept 16/13, #DODIG-2013-131) – Army Requirement To Acquire Individual Carbine Not Justified. Because asking bean counters what the combat troops need is the way to win wars.

• NDIA National Defense (March 2013) – Industry Shooting for Army’s First New Rifle in Half Century (UPDATED). Details the contenders.

• Defense Procurement News (June 14/11) – Colt May Face World Without M4 Carbine Production

• AP (May 25/11) – INFLUENCE GAME: As Army eyes a new combat rifle, companies load with lobbyists to win the work

• Defense Tech (Dec 30/10) – Enemy Performance at Wanat. Not such a positive review of the M4.

• NY Times At War blog (July 7/10) – Examining the Complaints About American Rifle Reliability. Positive review of the M4/M16.

• US Army (Nov 13/08) – Army looking at new carbines as follow-on to M-4. Industry day for firms to show their small arms products to Secretary of the Army Pete Geren and representatives of the Army’s Program Executive Office-Soldier. The US Army remains clear that buying almost 500,000 M4s in the near future remains their priority – at which point, the space for a follow-on purchase is questionable.

• Tactical Life, via Military.com (Oct 10/08) – M4 Round Has Strong Competitors. Shooting tests involving the 6.8mm SPC and 65mm Grendel round are discussed; note that 6.8mm versions of the M-16/M4 family are already available in the marketplace.

• Anarchangel (Nov 1/07) – Stuck on You. Looks at the issues of network effects and sunk costs as they apply to rifles etc. Author’s own opinions.

• Military.com (July 27/07) – Army Agrees To M4 Sand Test Shoot-Off

• FN Herstal USA (July 12/07) – FN Herstal SCAR And EGLM Receive Approval To Proceed With Initial Operational Test & Evaluation (IOT&E). Money is requested for procurement in FY 2008. EGLM is the SCAR rifle’s grenade launcher.

• Military.com Defense Tech (May 25/07) – Soldiers Want a Bigger Bang. Describes a December 2006 survey, conducted on behalf of the Army by the Center for Naval Analyses. Figures included jamming in combat, based on over 2,600 interviews with Soldiers returning from combat duty. The M249 SAW light machine gun and M9 pistol fared especially poorly.

• Military.com (April 30/07) – Senator Tells Army to Reconsider M4

• Defense Tech (April 30/07) – M4 Debate Fires Up

• Sen. Tom Coburn, R-OK (April 12/07) – Letter to the Hon. Peter Green, Secretary of the Army re: M4 competition. DID also spoke with Sen. Coburn’s office.

• Military.com (April 6/07) – Army Won’t Field Rifle Deemed Superior to M4

• Murdoc Online (April 3/07) – Jammed. Reprints a letter to Defense News from a Sgt. Who served in Afghanistan with B Company, 2nd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment.

• US Army (March 29/07) – Army position: M4 Carbine is Soldier’s battlefield weapon of choice

• Colt Defense Weapon Systems (March 26/07) – Letter to the Editor from Colt Defense LLC in response to Army Times staff writer Matthew Cox article, “It’s Better Than the M4, but You Can’t Have One.” No permalink, just a position on the web site’s news page at this time. Signed by Colt COO Marine Corps Maj. Gen. James R. Battaglini (ret.)

• Gannett Company Inc., Army Times (March 19/07) – Straight shot: Next rifle should be tested, selected by soldiers who’ll use it. Author Maj. Chaz Bowser is a leading weapons designer within US Special Forces, and has helped lead the development of their SCAR Rifle system.

• Gannett Company Inc., Army Times (Feb 26/07) – Army Times Editorial: Field the best weapon

• Gannett Company Inc., Army Times (Feb 26/07) – Out of Reach: Better than M4, but you can’t have one

• US Center for Naval Analyses (December 2006) – Soldier Perspectives on Small Arms in Combat [PDF format]. Includes statistics and reports re: jamming and other issues.

• DID (Nov 2/05) – OICW-1 Canceled, Door Closes on XM-8 For Now

• DID (July 22/05) – OICW Individual Weapon RFP Temporarily Suspended. Well, maybe not so temporarily.

• The Shepherd and the SEAL: An Afghan Tale. Describes the aftermath of the Red Wing Down incident in Afghanistan, and the eventual rescue of a Navy SEAL thanks to Afghan traditions of hospitality and a very brave man.

• US Army News Service (July 17/03) – Army releases findings from 507th ambush

• Association of the US Army (Jan 30/03) – Chief Awards 8 Silver Stars to Rangers. Including Capt. Nate Self.

Belgian F-16
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Belgium is embarking on minor but useful modernization of its remaining F-16 fleet, which is expected to serve until at least 2022, and could easily end up serving past 2030. Under Belgium’s 2000-2015 Modernization plan, the Belgian Defense Forces plan to keep just 60 F-16s in the fleet, creating a total of 48 operational aircraft (46 for NATO duties and 2 for domestic air defense).

BAF F-16s & AdlA C-135FR
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The F-16.net database shows a current active fleet of 49 F-16As and 10 F-16B trainers/ fighters, with likely delivery dates from 1982-1991. A Mid-Life Upgrade modernization was ordered in 1997 – 1998, which included a full Aircraft Structural Integrity Program.

This upgrade will help the F-16s remain useful for deployments like Kandahar, Afghanistan and Baltic air policing, but it won’t substantially change the fighter’s core capabilities. The AN/APG-66(V)2 radar remains, for instance, instead of being replaced with the APG-68(V)9 or something equally modern. Belgium’s addition of JHMCS helmet-mounted displays in recent years was more consequential.

On the other hand, the M6 OFP adds the Universal Armament Interface, which will make it much easier and cheaper for the Belgian Air Force to add new weapons to their F-16s. This upgrade may be one that becomes consequential with the passing of time.

Updates

January 13/16: The Belgian government has approved a plan to modernize its airforce by 2030, but at a cost of a reduction in personnel. $10 billion will be made available for upgrades to equipment and machinery, however it will necessitate a decrease in the military and civilian workforce from 32,000 to 25,000. While no preferences have been made as to what will be bought, the investment will see thirty-four fighter bombers bought to replace the fifty-six aging F-16s in service. This will go alongside two new frigates, six minesweepers and two new UAVs. Brussels is also considering participation in the Tanker Aircraft Program.

May 12/14: The US DSCA announces Belgium’s official export request for upgrades to its F-16A/B Block 15 Mid Life Upgrade (MLU) aircraft with:

• Operational Flight Program (OFP, core mission software) tapes S1, M5 and M6.
  
• 69 LN-260 Embedded Global Positioning System-Inertial Navigation Systems (GPS-INS).
  
• 8 Remote Operated Video Enhanced Receivers IV (ROVER IV) terminals, which greatly improve coordination with ground forces.
  
• 62 BAE AN/APX-125 Transceivers (AN/APX-125 Air Identification Friend of Foe Radios), with the latest NATO Mode 5/ Mode S capabilities so they can operate with other NATO countries. IFF Mode 5 needs the M6 OFP software to work.
  
• 43 AN/ARC-210(V) RT-1990(C) Ultra High Frequency/Very High Frequency (UHF/VHF) radios. They need the M5 OFP tape to work.
  
• 32 KIV-78 encryption devices.
  
• 1 Joint Mission Planning System (JMPS).
  
• 4 BRU-61/A Carriage Systems, used for the GPS-guided GBU-39 Small Diamater Bomb I. SDB-I needs the M6 OFP software to work.
  
• Plus spare and repair parts, support equipment, repair and return services, software development/ integration, test and equipment, personnel training and training equipment, publications and technical data, and other forms of US Government and contractor support. The estimated cost is up to $113 million.

The principal contractor will be Lockheed Martin Missile and Fire Control in Orlando, FL, and implementation of any negotiated sale won’t require any additional US government or contractor personnel in Belgium. Sources: US DSCA #14-13, “Belgium – F-16A/B Block 15 Aircraft Mid-Life Upgrade”.

DSCA request: Belgium

SU-35 flight test, 2009
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The Russian Su-35 was something of a mystery for many years. Pictures from Russian firms showed different fighter jets carrying that label, even as the aircraft remained a prospective design and research project, rather an active program of record.

Revelations after 2007 began to provide answers. This article explains the sources of the widespread confusion regarding the Su-35’s layout and key characteristics, reviews what is now known about the platform, and tracks its development. Those developments are likely to have broad consequences. The aircraft now has a home customer in the Russian Air Force, and the Su-35 is being positioned to replace most Su-30MK variants as Russia’s fighter export of choice within the coming decade. Will its succession bid succeed?

Which Sukhoi? The SU-35 Platform SU-35 ?
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As one of our readers noted, DID’s articles from 2005-2007 seem to describe 2 different SU-35s. One was a mid-life modernized SU-27 Flanker, but there’s also a much more re-engineered “SU-35” variant with canards, thrust vectoring, etc. which has been confused with (and possibly redesignated between) the SU-37. So… what do we mean by “SU-35”?

Until very recently, only KnAAPO had listed the SU-35 as a product on its site; Sukhoi now does so as well, but Irkut does not. If this seems confusing, it’s because Sukhoi subcontracts production to affiliate firms – IAIA (Irkut) and KnAAPO (Komsomolosk un Amur). Each has their own intellectual property, and their own interests. In addition, the designation “SU-35” has been used in several different contexts over the years. It has been referred to, and even photographed, in ways that referred to both mid-life Flanker upgrades, and canard-equipped next-generation aircraft. KnAAPO’s site added the confusion by showing SU-35 pictures on its type page and gallery that display the aircraft both with and without canard foreplanes.

The current “SU-35”, which has been definitively described by Sukhoi, appears to be something of a compromise between the upgrade and full redesign visions. Reader assistance, and sources from Sukhoi and various media, offer an outline of its key systems and characteristics.

SU-35 flight, 2008
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“…(known as Su-35BM by some sources- ie. T-10BM to the original Su-27s internal T-10S designation). Differences and features largely speak for themselves in the video, but a short summary follows as related in various other sources follows:

1 – N035 Irbis-E PESA (Passive Electronically Scanned Array) Radar, a follow-on to the Bars-M.
2 – No canards
3 – Rear-looking self-defense radar in shorter tail sting
4 – AL-37FU/ 117S thrust-vectoring turbofan engines rated at 142-147kN
5 – Extended high-lift devices with large flaperon occupying the full trailing edge of the wing
6 – L175M Khibiny-M electronic-warfare self-defense system
7 – Reduced-area empennage
8 – Larger Air Intakes
9 – New and lighter systems, including quadruple digital fly-by-wire flight-control system.
10- New man-machine interface with fully-glass cockpit with two large LCD screens and helmet mounted display.”

Movable nozzles
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Sukhoi says that the fighter’s structures have been reinforced because of the increased takeoff and landing weight of the aircraft, and the front bearing has 2 wheels for the same reason. Performance is touted as 1,400 km/h (Mach 1.14) at sea-level, and 2,400 km/h (Mach 2.26) at altitude, with a ceiling up to 10 km/ 60,000 feet. Sukhoi has not touted loaded supercruise (Mach 1+, with weapons and without afterburners), which is likely to require improved engines. Thrust vectoring adds new dimensions of maneuverability, however, once pilots understand when to use it and when to avoid it.

The SU-35S will also depend on its sensors. It couples an electronically-scanned array radar with a 2-step electro-hydraulic drive unit, which creates a maximum radar beam deflection angle of 120 degrees. The NIIP Tikhomirov Irbis-E passive phased-array can reportedly detect and tracks up to 30 air targets, simultaneously engaging up to 8. It can also reportedly detect, choose and track up to 4 ground targets, and engage 2. Detection ranges of over 400 km/ 240 miles have been reported for airborne targets, which are the easiest, but resolutions are unspecified. Detecting a 747 passenger jet at 400 km is much easier than detecting a JAS-39 Gripen lightweight fighter, and information about the radar’s resolution would be needed before its real capabilities would be clear.

Full stealth jets like the F-22A Raptor, of course, create drastic reductions in radar detection range that make them a special case. In an emerging age of stealth fighters, therefore, the 80+ km detection range of the SU-35S’ IRST (infra-red search and track) system is very significant.

The SU-30 family has never been especially stealthy, and their overall airframe design limits what one can accomplish in this area. Nevertheless, Sukhoi cites an unspecified amount of “reduced reflectance” for the SU-35 in the X-band, which is a popular choice for modern radars, and in the angle range of plus or minus 60 degrees. Further improvements were made during testing by adding radar-absorbent materials, and removing or modifying protruding sensors that create radar reflection points.

The reported service life of the new aircraft is 6,000 flight hours, with a planned operational life of 30 years. The claimed service life of NPO Saturn 117S thrust-vectoring engines is 4,000 hours. Time will tell.

SU-35: Export Prospects Flanker customers
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The SU27/30 Flanker family was designed and built after American had completed its “teen series” (F-14/15/16/18) fighters, and uses lessons from those designs as well as Russia’s own approaches. The result was a very extensible design that boasted impressive performance, and quickly became the global fighter reference point among global military planners. Exports followed, and Flanker variants quickly surpassed the MiG-29 as Russia’s most popular export fighter.

The SU-35 aims to build on that legacy, as a final bridge to the 5th generation PAK-FA. Three key changes to Sukhoi’s circumstances may make a similar level of export success much more difficult.

1. A globalized market.

When it was first introduced, the S-27 family was the main global competitor to any western offerings, and was sold to countries whose ties and access to western technologies were weak. An array of SU-27s were gifted to breakaway Soviet satellites by virtue of being located on their territory, but India and China were its real anchor export customers. Now, SU-35 exports can expect to compete on 2 fronts. On the one hand, a less balkanized global market means that it must compete globally with western offerings that include upgraded American “teen series” fighters; and matured 4+ generation European designs that include Saab’s JAS-39 Gripen, France’s Rafale, and EADS’ Eurofighter. On the other end, it will be competing with Chinese offerings, including the J-11 that Russia correctly accuses China of copying/deriving from the SU-27, the smaller and less expensive 4+ generation J-10, and even the joint Chinese/Pakistani JF-17.

Chinese J-10
(click to view full) 2. The China factor

China has a large inventory of SU-30MKKs, but it’s less than they contracted to produce. They’re also pressing ahead with their own J-11B, which substitutes Chinese electronics, radars, and engines in an SU-27 family airframe. Russia is very upset by this theft of its intellectual property, which has reportedly hindered sales of its carrier-capable SU-33 variant into the Chinese market.

The J-11 has run into some problems, in particular China’s inability to copy Russian engine performance. That has made exports to China thinkable again for some Russian officials, but the J-11 experience remains a barrier to further Chinese sales on both sides of the table. A preliminary agreement has reportedly been signed to negotiate a 24 plane sale, but it’s controversial. China’s questionable status among the roster of future SU-35 customers, and its certain presence as an export competitor, both create more difficult dynamics for SU-35 export success.

IAF SU-30MKI
(click to view larger) 3. Other decisions by key markets.

With Eastern European countries no longer buying Russian equipment, the Flanker family’s key export markets likely closed, and key emerging markets that have decided to go in different directions, the SU-35’s export potential is likely to be much more limited than its predecessors.

India has fielded, and continues to field, the SU-30MKI, a design that includes locally-built electronics, canard foreplanes, and full thrust vectoring. Malaysia has ordered a less customized SU-30MKM variant that uses Russian and French technologies instead. Both of these designs are highly capable, and comparable to the SU-35. India in particular is unlikely to upgrade, as it continues to produce the SU-30MKI and expects to do so for several more years. That removes a major potential market, and this design is even filtering back into Russian orders, as the SU-30SM.

On a similar note, Algeria and Venezuela are inducting less advanced SU-30MK2 and MKAs, which means that future spending is likely to focus on other military areas.

Elsewhere, South Korea has opted for American F-15Ks instead of the SU-35 or European fighters for its F-X buy, and their next competition has skipped the SU-35 to invite the next-generation PAK-FA/ future SU-50. Saudi Arabia, which has become more receptive to purchases from Russia, bought Eurofighters as the future of their air force. Brazil, which could have significantly expanded Russia’s Latin American penetration, did not shortlist the SU-35 for the final round of its F-X2 future fighter competition.

The Middle East offers limited opportunities for Russian fighters these days, with some potential among long-standing clients in Libya, Syria, and possibly Iran, but competition from France’s Rafale in particular must be expected in Libya, in the wake of Gadhaffi’s ouster. Assuming that Libya buys any high-end fighters at all over the next decade. The SU-35 could be useful to other countries in the Middle East, but most are already committed to other suppliers. Success is possible, and it would be important to the platform, but any win would require a breakthrough.

The newly oil-rich countries around Africa’s Gulf of Guinea offer easier opportunities, but sales will face competition from China, as well as from the west.

Emerging South Asian markets like Indonesia and Vietnam also offer promise, and are less inclined to buy either Chinese or western fighters, but initial orders from that quarter have involved earlier-generation SU-27/30s, and future orders are likely to be limited.

Overall, the numbers add up far less favorably for the SU-35 than they did for its earlier cousins.

SU-35: Contracts and Key Events 2014-2016

Opportunities: Indonesia; Why is Russia buying Su-30SMs and Su-35s? “The UFO” at Paris

January 13/16: United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) is to supply fifty more of their Su-35 fighters to the Russian Army. When delivered, this will bring the number of the jets in operation by the Russians to ninety-eight. The deal is estimated to be worth between $787-800 million. UAC subsidiary Sukhoi, who manufactures the jets, looks to have a busy 2016 ahead as the order from the defense ministry adds to a recent agreement to export twelve Su-32 bombers to Algeria.

November 30/15: The Chinese ministry of defense has confirmed the the $2 billion purchase of Su-35 fighters from Russia. China’s plan to also purchase the S-400 missile defense system is also going ahead smoothly according to Colonel Wu Qian and will generate another $3 billion in revenue for Russia. While arms sales between China and Russia are nothing new, the sale of Russia’s most developed military technologies to China represents a policy shift within the Kremlin primarily brought on by financial necessity.

Indonesia has announced that it will order 12 Su-35 fighters following the the $2 billion sale of the aircraft to China last week. The fighters will replace the 16 F-5 Tigers which have been in service since 1980. The Su-35 saw competition from the Lockheed Martin F-16 Viper. The Indonesian Air Force also operate the Su-30 in its fleet and already have an existing maintenance system that will be compatible with the new Su-35.

November 25/15: Russia is to install communications systems for China as part of the $2 billion sale of Su-35 fighters. The deal includes the delivery and installation of the NKVS-27 communications system which will begin in 2016. The delivery of the 24 fighters will follow in 2017. It has been speculated that the Chinese may attempt to reverse engineer and copy the design of the aircraft as it did Su-27SK and could include the communications system. The NKVS-27 is designed to ensure information interaction between CPs and crews of any aircraft. Interaction may be by means of conversations through voice communications radio networks as well as data exchange through data exchange radio networks.

November 20/15: China has signed a substantial contract with Russia to purchase 24 Sukhoi Su-35 fighters in a deal that is said to be worth $2 billion. The agreement comes shortly after speculation that a number of countries were interested in purchasing the advanced fighters, including Pakistan, Indonesia and UAE, during the Dubai Air Show. This comes at an important time for Russia who have been suffering economically from falling oil prices and frosty trade relations with western nations and Ukraine. Arms sales have been one constant in this rather bleak financial outlook as the Kremlin looks to find new buyers for its military technologies.

Following China and their inking of contracts for the Sukhoi Su-35 fighters, the Indonesian ambassador to Russia has announced that they too are interested in making a purchase. Ambassador Djauhari Oratmangun told news agency RIA Novosti that a delegation will be sent from Russia to Jakarta to discuss contracts for the purchase of a number of the aircraft. No further details about the deal are known but seem to be part of a plan to increase trade between the two in 2016 by $5 billion.

November 9/15: The United Arab Emirates is engaged in talks with Russia over a potential acquisition of Su-35s, according to Ria Novosti. The discussions are taking place at the Dubai Air Show, with Pakistan also thought to be considering an acquisition of the type, and China and Indonesia also possible export customers for the Su-35.

September 11/15: Pakistan and Russia are reportedly in talks over the supply of Su-35 fighters and Mi-35M helicopters, according to both Pakistani and Russian press reports Thursday. The sale of Mil Mi-35M helicopters was also reported in August, with it unclear whether current negotiations are a continuation of this previous contract or a new one entirely. The two countries signed a bilateral military cooperation agreement last November, with the fourth-generation Sukhoi Su-35 also eyeing potential export customers in China and Indonesia.

Oct 10/14: Delivery. Another batch delivery from Sukhoi, SU-35 and SU-30M2 fighters for Russia’s VVF, handed over at the Komsomolsk-on-Amur aviation plant.

Note that the SU-30M2 is the “standard” SU-30, as opposed to Irkut’s SU-30SM which is based on the canard-winged SU-30MKM. Sources: Sukhoi, “Sukhoi handed over a batch of Su-35 and Su-30M2 aircraft to the Ministry of Defense”.

Oct 7/14: Indonesia. Indonesian Military Commander General Moeldoko tells Republika Online that they’re leaning toward the Su-35 as their F-5 replacement, with the JAS-39 in 2nd place and the F-16 a distant 3rd:

“Menurut dia, jet tempur buatan negeri Paman Sam itu sudah tidak layak pakai lantaran teknologinya sudah ketinggalan zaman…. “Untuk udara, ada pengajuan penggantian F-5. Sukhoi Su-35 menjadi pilihan pertama, Saab JAS 39 Gripen pilihan kedua, dan pesawat F-16 pilihan ketiga,”…”

This isn’t the end, because negotiations, budgets and other considerations will still come into play. If that pick does stand, it would keep the Flanker family as the backbone of the TNI-AU, but the fleet would also be fragmented among 3+ types with partial commonality at best: 5 Su27SKM, 11 Su-30 (2 MKs, 9 MK2s), and 16 Su-35SK. The Su-27SKM and Su-30MK fighters will retire first, which will simplify matters, but that’s unlikely to happen before 2025 or so. Sources: ROL, “Helikopter Apache dan Sukhoi Su-35 Segera Perkuat TNI”.

Feb 21/14: No mystery. “Russia’s New Air Force Is a Mystery” wonders why Russia is buying SU-30MK2s, SU-30SMs and SU-35s, in addition to the future PAK-FA. It turns out that the answer is extremely simple: industrial priorities that bought up aircraft the Chinese stopped buying, took advantage of successful advanced SU-30MKx export developments, and aim to provide the SU-35 with a home country order base for potential exports. That sort of thing happens all the time, everywhere. The article ends up stinging itself with this quote re: the PAK-FA:

“The T-50’s schedule has stretched farther and farther to the right. Originally planned for handover to the air force’s Akhtubinsk flight test center for evaluation in 2014, recent announcements suggest this might now slip until the second half of 2016. This would derail plans to declare initial operational capability, and the start of full-scale production, at the end of 2016.

The best-case scenario would have seen 60 production T-50s delivered between 2016 and 2020, but this now seems a distant hope. As a result, the air force is badly in need of supplementary equipment.”

The 1st PAK-FA/ T-50 arrives in Akhtubinsk for testing that same day, but even if the new stealth fighters arrive on time, Russia will still need more warplanes to replace its aging force. Sources: War Is Boring, “Russia’s New Air Force Is a Mystery”.

Jan 7/14: Indonesia. Indonesia wants to replace its 11 remaining F-5E/F Tiger II light fighters with 16 modern aircraft. Defense Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro confirmed that they “have received proposals from several jet fighter manufacturers,” and are evaluating them. Indonesian Military Commander General Moeldoko added that the TNI-AU has studied the SU-35, F-16, F-15, and JAS-39 Gripen.

Moeldoko wants the requisition plan included in Indonesia’s Strategic Plan II for the 2015 – 2020, but the air force’s choice will also depend on available funds. The F-15 is significantly more expensive than other options, and if the air force wants 16 fighters, the state of Indonesia’s economy will influence what they can buy.

There are always extraneous considerations in Indonesia. Still, if commonality matters, the F-16 is the only fighter currently in Indonesia’s inventory. The F-15 and JAS-39 are used by its neighbors, and have Asian support networks in place. Picking the SU-35 seems odd, as it would leave Indonesia vulnerable to becoming the 1st export customer, while worsening the fragmentation within an already-split Flanker fleet. Still, the existing SU-30MK fleet is a known quantity, which means the SU-35 is the only variant would require study for a full consideration of their options. Sources: Antara News, “Defense Ministry looking to replace aging F-5 tiger fighter aircraft”.

2011 – 2013

Russia buys SU-30SMs; Russian plans to 2020; Final SU-35S model flies; Libya derailment; China impasse unblocks, but still no deal. Russian SU-35
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May 20/13: Brazil. RIA Novosti quotes Rosoboronexport’s SITDEF exhibition lead Sergey Ladigin, who says they’ve offered to deliver Su-35 fighters and Pantsir S1 air defense systems to Brazil outside the framework of a tender, and says the offer is being considered.

Brazil wants the Pantsir short-range air defense gun/missile systems, but the SU-35 failed to make the shortlist in 2009. On the other hand, if you don’t ask, you’ll never get. So Russia’s is throwing in the SU-35 offer, and Ladigin said in Lima that they were “ready to transfer 100% of manufacturing technologies,” as well as some technologies from their T50 (future SU-50?) stealth fighter.

It doesn’t help. In December 2013, Brazil picks Saab’s JAS-39E/F Gripen. Russian Aviation.

March 26/13: China. Media reports say that a deal has been signed for 24 SU-35 fighters, and 4 advanced Amur/Lada Class submarines, during President Xi Jinping’s visit to Russia.

Defence News claims that “During a recent visit by Chinese President Xi Jinping to Moscow from Friday to Sunday, no discussions took place regarding “military-technical cooperation” issues, the ITAR-TASS news agency reported Monday.” Our Russian isn’t very good, but the Google Translate version simply quotes the CCTV report of a deal, while saying that there were no problems regarding military-technical cooperation issues. Defense News also quotes outside observers within Russia; readers will have to make up their own minds. ITAR-Tass [in Russian] | CCTV [in Chinese] | South China Morning Post | Defense News | International Business Times.

March 7/13: China confirmed. China and Russia have apparently signed an intergovernmental agreement, as the 1st step toward a contract for 24 SU-35s. Reports credibly place the agreement date as January 2013, but contract negotiations could take a while.

A trickle of reports from November 2012 to February claimed that Russia and China had a preliminary agreement in place, which would let them negotiate a deal for varying numbers of SU-35s. Russia’s Interfax confirmed the existence and date of that agreement in February 2013, but didn’t specify numbers. Now, a March 8/13 article in The Hindu confirms that talks involve 24 planes, a climbdown from Russia’s initial insistence on 48.

The Russians are said to have more confidence that China can’t copy their engines, and are also said to need SU-35 orders. Russia has placed an initial contract, but a deal with Libya fell by the wayside when its regime did, Venezuela has pulled back, and even Russia’s VVS is ordering follow-on buys of SU-30SMs instead. On the other side, there’s speculation that SU-35’s improved AL-117S engine could be “of interest” for China’s J-20 stealth plane. If so, it would be a setback to India on 2 fronts: breaking an old pattern by selling China a more modern fighter than India’s SU-30MKIs, and strengthening a competitor to the Indo-Russian PAK-FA stealth fighter project. South China Morning Post | Defense News | Voice of Russia | The Hindu.

China agreement to negotiate

April 17/12: China. RIA Novosti quotes Russian state-controlled arms exporter Rosoboronexport said on Tuesday, who says that the 18+ month long negotiations to sell Su-35s to China have been put on hold. The Chinese only wanted to buy a few, and the Russians weren’t interested in selling them a few templates for Chinese copying efforts.

Rosoboronexport deputy chief Viktor Komardin characterized Russia as wanting “a large consignment to make [the deal] economically viable.” Translation: China would have to buy large numbers of SU-35s, under a contract with strict and enforceable cancellation penalties. See also Nov 16/10 entry.

March 30/12: Russia plans. Russian Air Force commander Gen. Alexander Zelin discusses their aircraft acquisition plans under Russia’s Weapons Program 2011-2020. Those plans include about 100 SU-35 and SU-30SM fighters put together, and their conflation could be a worrying sign. The VVS also expects to field 60 Sukhoi PAKFA (T-50) stealth fighters by 2020, and intends to buy 140 SU-34 long range strike fighters.

The SU-35’s future may ride on how many of the 70 remaining VVS orders before 2020 request it, instead of more SU-30SMs. AIN Online. See also March 16/10 entry.

March 23/12: Russian setback. Russia’s own VVS moves to buy 30 SU-30SM fighters, for delivery by 2015. These planes are a version of the canard-winged, thrust-vectoring SU-30MKI/M variant that was developed for India, and has since been exported to Algeria and Malaysia. Which raises the question: why didn’t Russia buy 30 more SU-35S fighters? A RIA Novosti article offers one explanation:

“Irkut has been churning out these planes for 10 years thanks to its completely streamlined production method. This means that its products are of high quality, relatively cheap… and will be supplied on time.

It is one thing if, in order to make 30 aircraft, you have to breathe life into an idling plant, to fine-tune (or develop anew) your technological method, buy additional equipment, and – still worse – hire personnel. But it’s quite another if you have been manufacturing standardized aircraft for years and years and can easily divert your workforce to produce an “improved” modification for your own country’s Air Force… This approach (buying quickly and on the cheap what can be produced immediately) has been growing in popularity in the Russian military.”

There is a contract for 48 SU-35s, but the production rate doesn’t appear to be very advanced yet. If Bogdanov’s analysis is correct, the SU-35 could have a problem. It would mean that more SU-30SMs become a very attractive near-term choice for the next few years, as Russia’s rearmament program kicks into gear. Farther down the road, the T-50 PAK-FA stealth fighter (likely to become the SU-50), will be a priority after 2016 or so. In that scenario, the SU-35 could find itself starved of budgetary oxygen at home, followed by avoidance abroad in favor of the SU-30MKx models that have already been exported to Algeria, India, and Malaysia.

Sept 19/11: Testing. Sukhoi says that its SU-35 fighters have carried out more than 300 test flights at the 929th State Flight Test Center (GLITS), and offers a number of data points regarding the aircraft.

“The maximum ground-level speed is 1,400 km/h, speed at altitude – 2400 km/h, the ceiling – 18 thousand meters. The detection range of targets in the “air-to-air” mode is over 400 km. This is significantly higher than that of the combat aircraft currently in service. The onboard OLS (optical locator station) can detect and track multiple targets at ranges exceeding 80 km… a new phased antenna array radar with a long aerial target detection range and with an increased number of simultaneously tracked and engaged targets (30 aerial targets tracked and 8 targets engaged plus the tracking of 4 and engagement of 2 ground targets)… The radar signature of the fighter has been reduced by several times as compared to that of the fourth-generation aircraft by coating the cockpit with electro-conducting compounds, applying radio absorption coats and reducing the number of protruding sensors. The service life of the aircraft is 6,000 hours flight hours… The assigned service life of vectored thrust engines is 4,000 hours.”

May 3/11: Final SU-35S model. Sukhoi begins flight tests for its final series production version SU-35S model. Among other things, it marks the program’s recovery from the April 26/09 accident. Sukhoi [in Russian] | Russia’s RIA Novosti | China’s Xinhua | DefenceWeb | Flight International.

Feb 27/11: Libya. Russia’s Interfax news agency says that a recent UN embargo on arms sales to Libya, in the wake of the regime’s military attacks on demonstrators, could cost Russia $4 billion:

“The already-signed arms deals between Moscow and Tripoli amount to $2 billion, while deals for another $1.8 billion are in the final stage of readiness. In January 2010 the two sides agreed on supply of Russia’s small arms, six operational trainers Yak-130 and some armored vehicles for total of $US 1.3 billion. Libya has been supposed to become the first country to get Su-35 fighter jets, the contract to buy 15 jets for $800 million is fully accorded and ready to be signed. Tripoli also expressed interest in buying 10 Ka-52 Alligator assault helicopters, two advanced long range S-300PMU2 Favorit air defense missile system and about 40 short range Panzir C1 air defense complexes for a total over $1 billion. The Libyan military has also discussed possible supply of modern tanks, multiple rocket launcher systems, high speed missile boats etc.”

If the civil war drags on long enough, don’t be surprised to see a number of these potential sales revived, even as other counter-insurgency related equipment steps to the fore. Russia could wind up finds ways to skirt UN sanctions and support its client, something that has been an issue before with countries like Sudan. China could do the same, and has a long history of supporting civil war factions without regard to human suffering or disposition, in exchange for medium-long term resource deals. Russia Today | AFP.

2009 – 2010

Russia orders 48; KnAAPO gets financing; Crash delays program; Opportunities in China, Libya. Ready for takeoff
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Nov 16/10: China. At Airshow China 2010 in Zhuhai, Rosoboronexport Deputy General Director Alexander Mikheyev tells RIA Novosti that Russia is ready to hold talks with China on selling SU-35 fighter aircraft to the Chinese air force. That’s a bit of a surprise, given China’s consistent record of buying, copying, and then competing with Russian technologies – see “The China Factor,” above. On the other hand, Mikheyev also told RIA Novosti that:

“We have made progress in an understanding of [illegal production of Russian arms in China]. Moreover, all the documents concerning the protection of intellectual property have been signed… China does not refuse to discuss these issues, which are primarily a concern for Russia.”

It would be darkly amusing to many in western defense organizations to have Russia fleeced in arms-related agreements, by a country that follows their own pattern of offering paper guarantees, while doing something else.

Sept 20/10: Financing for KnAAPO. Sukhoi Holding Company the Yuri Gagarin Aviation Industrial Concern (KnAAPO) in , Komsomolsk-na-Amure strikes a financing agreement with Sberbank, the Savings Bank of Russia. The agreement will allow the firm to invest in producing the Russian Air Force’s SU-35S orders. Brahmand | Frontier India.

July 23/10: Update. Aviation Week reports from Farnborough 2010. Sukhoi CEO Mikhail Pogosyan says that the Russian air force is still set to take delivery of its first Su-35S by the end of 2010, and the firm issues its own release with test results.

Preliminary testing of Su-35 has now been concluded with 270 flights and 350 flight hours, using 2 rather than 3 aircraft after a fire destroyed one of the prototypes (vid. April 26/09). The NIIP Tikhomirov Irbis passive phased-array radar was also a focus of testing, and moves were made to reduce radar signature by adding radar-absorbent materials and removing protruding sensors. They add:

“Tripoli will likely be the launch export customer [for the SU-35S]. Alexander Mikheev, deputy head of Rosoboronexport, Russia’s state-owned arms export agency, confirmed at Farnborough that the contract for delivery of undisclosed number of aircraft to Libya, one of the traditional recipients of Soviet armaments, is expected to be signed this year. The first export production slots are available from 2012.”

March 16/10: Russian plans. In “The future of the Russian Air Force: 10 years on“, RIA Novosti military commentator Ilya Kramnik discusses planned buys and pending recapitalization of the Russian Air Force over the next decade:

“According to various media reports, the Ministry wants to buy at least 1,500 aircraft, including 350 new warplanes, by 2020. The fleet would include 70% new equipment at that point, said Air Force Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Alexander Zelin… The Defense Ministry has now signed contracts for the purchase of 32 Su-34 Fullback advanced fighter-bombers to be delivered by 2013, 48 Su-35 Flanker-E fighters by 2015, 12 Su-27SM Flanker-B Mod. 1 fighters by 2011, 4 Su-30M2 Flanker-C planes by 2011 and 12 Su-25UBM Frogfoot combat trainers. This year, the Defense Ministry intends to sign a contract for the delivery of 26 MiG-29K Fulcrum-D fighters by 2015. Additional contracts for the delivery of at least 80 Su-34s and 24-48 Su-35s are expected to be signed. In all, the Russian Air Force is to receive 240-260 new aircraft of these types. It is hard to say much about the specifications of another 100-110 aircraft, due to be manufactured primarily after 2015. They will probably include 25-30 MiG-35 fighters, another 12-16 Su-30 combat trainers for Su-35 squadrons and 40-60 Sukhoi T-50 PAK FA (Advanced Frontline Aviation Aircraft System) fifth-generation fighters…”

Nov 17/09: Sukhoi announces that it has begun work on Russia’s SU-35S contract.

Nov 15/09: Libya. Interfax quotes Rosoboronexport’s special missions director and Dubai Airshow delegation chief Mikhail Zavaly:

“Libya wants to buy our aircrafts, including Sukhoi fighter jets and Ilyushin Il-76 military airlifters,” Zavaly told Interfax on Sunday. The talks deal with the technical details of the planes offered to Libya, he said. After technical arrangements are approved, “the Russian side will make commercial proposals to Libya,” Zavaly said.”

Oct 19/09: Libya. Russia’s Interfax media agency reports that Libya plans to buy 12-15 Sukhoi Su-35 multirole fighters, another 4 Su-30s as an immediate interim order, and 6 Yakovlev Yak-130 trainer and light attack aircraft aircraft. Reports indicate that a contract could be signed with state arms export agency Rosoboronexport by the end of 2009, or early 2010.

Libya has also been in talks with France to buy its Rafale fighters since late 2007. A Sukhoi deal is likely to end the Rafale’s near-term chances in Libya. UPI report.

Aug 18/09: Russia orders 48. The Russian government signs the SU-35’s inaugural production contract at the Russian MAKS 2009 air show. The Russian Defense Ministry has reportedly signed a contract with Sukhoi to deliver 48 SU-35s by 2015, plus an interim buy of 12 single-seat SU-27SM and 4 dual-seat SU-30M2 multirole fighters by 2011.

RIA Novosti cites “open sources” that estimate the flyaway cost an SU-35 at about $65 million. This contract should be larger, since it’s a new type that must carry the additional costs of training spares stocks, etc. Statements place the contract’s value at “over 80 billion” roubles, where RUB 80 billion is currently about $2.51 billion. The contract follows on the heels of RUB 3.2 billion (about $100 million) in capital injected into Sukhoi, and Vnesheconombank head Vladimir Dmitriyev said the national development bank would grant Sukhoi a 3.5 billion-ruble (about $109 million) loan to start SU-35 production. ITAR-TASS | ITAR-TASS re: loans, contract value | RIA Novosti | RIA Novosti’s Russia Today | domain-b | Flight International.

April 26/09: Crash. An Su-35 burst into flames and exploded before take-off at the Komsomolosk-na-Amure Aviation Production Association (KNAAPO) Dzemgi flight test aerodrome. Yevgeniy Frolov, one Sukhoi’s most experienced pilots, managed to eject safely before the aircraft exploded. The crash may jeopardize the SU-35’s expected appearance over Russia’s May Day festivities, and will delay testing. To make matters worse, this 2nd operational aircraft was carrying a new NIIP Irbis-E radar set, which will require some effort to replace. The Weekly Standard adds:

“Su-35 programme representatives told THE WEEKLY STANDARD that the crash was the fault of one of the NPO Saturn 117S engine’s PMC units and not a failure of a fuel pump, as had been previously reported. “One of the engine’s control systems failed and the engine was working at only 93 per cent power,” said the representative.”

March 23/09: Flight #100. KNAAPO announces that the Su-35 has made its 100th flight, during which they conducted final tests of the flight control system. Flight tests began Feb 18/08, and in the second quarter of 2009 another test aircraft is expected to join the current 2-plane fleet.

The firm expects to bring the number of flights up to 150-160 on 3 fighters, allowing them to finish static tests and start the super-maneuverability mode testing with the plane’s thrust-vectoring engines. First deliveries to Russian and foreign customers are still scheduled for 2011.

2007 – 2008

Maiden flight; Eliminated in Brazil. SU-35 early concept
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Oct 2/08: 2nd test plane. Sukhoi says they have started flight tests of the second SU-35 production fighter. “The addition of the second aircraft to the testing program will speed up its completion and ensure the beginning of deliveries to our customers in 2011.”

Since its demonstration flight on July 7/08, the first production aircraft has made over 40 more test flights. RIA Novosti.

Oct 1/08: Brazil loss. Brazil has decided on its 3 finalists: Boeing’s F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, Dassault Aviation’s Rafale, and Saab/BAE’s JAS-39 Gripen.

EADS Eurofighter, Lockheed Martin’s F-16BR, and Sukhoi’s SU-35 all failed to make the cut. Brazilian FAB release [Portuguese] | Reuters | Boeing release | Gripen International release.

July 9/08: A Sukhoi release says that it has presented the newest SU-35 multi-role to the “Flight Scientific Research Institute named after Gromov in Zhukovsky near Moscow,” where earlier test flights have taken place.

It adds that the SU-35 is one of the priority programs of the new United Aviation Corporation (UAC), resulting from the government’s consolidation of Russia’s aerospace industry, and notes that Russia’s 5th generation PAK-FA fighter project will not be fielded before 2015-2017. In contrast, batch production and deliveries of the SU-35 are promised between 2010-2011. Moscow News | Russian release (English version not yet on web).

March 6/08: Maiden flight. Russia test flies SU-35. The first Su-35 prototype made its maiden flight on Feb 18/08, and 2 more aircraft are being prepared for similar tests at an aircraft manufacturing plant in Russia’s Far East. The company expects the jet to enter service with Russia’s military in 2-3 years. RIA Novosti.

Sept 4/07: Clarity? A subsequent Flight International article may begin to offer clarity re: the platform. It states categorically that the SU-35-1 design, unveiled at Russia’s MAKS 2007 air show, is a single-seat aircraft without canard foreplanes, but with a lighter airframe than the SU-27, enlarged fan and engine inlets, 2 NPO Saturn/Ufa MPO Item 117S engines that reportedly offer thrust vectoring and supercruise performance in clean layout, 2t more fuel, modernized electronics at all levels, a Tikhomirov NIIP Irbis (updated N-011M Bars) passive electronically scanned array radar, 6,000 hour airframe life, and 4,000 hour engine life.

Additional Readings

• Sukhoi – Su-35

• KnAAPO – THE SU-35 Single-Seat Multi-Role Super-Maneuverable Fighter

• Fighter Tactics Academy, via WayBack – Sukhoi Su-35. By Sergei Drobyshev, Head of the Regional Policy and Marketing Department, KnAAPO.

• Ubisoft Forums, via WayBack (Aug 20/04) – How is SU-35UB different from SU-MKK? Reader forum Q&A. Caveat reader.

• Air Power Australia – Sukhoi Flankers: The Shifting Balance of Regional Air Power. Program history, details, regional procurement notes, and analysis of the SU-30 family’s current capabilities and likely future upgrades.

• DID – PAK-FA: India, Russia Cooperating re: “Fifth-Generation Fighter”. The PAK-FA, likely to be renamed SU-50. The SU-35 is competing with the SU-30MKI/SM right now, but as the SU-50 moves closer to reality, it will also implicitly compete with that stealth jet.

• RosOboronExport Air Forces Catalog [odd mixed web/PDF format]

Tejas LCA
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India’s Light Combat Aircraft program is meant to boost its aviation industry, but it must also solve a pressing military problem. The IAF’s fighter strength has been declining as the MiG-21s that form the bulk of its fleet are lost in crashes, or retired due to age and wear. Most of India’s other Cold War vintage aircraft face similar problems.

In response, some MiG-21s have been modernized to MiG-21 ‘Bison’ configuration, and other current fighter types are undergoing modernization programs of their own. The IAF’s hope is that they can maintain an adequate force until the multi-billion dollar 126+ plane MMRCA competition delivers replacements, and more SU-30MKIs arrive from HAL. Which still leaves India without an affordable fighter solution. MMRCA can replace some of India’s mid-range fighters, but what about the MiG-21s? The MiG-21 Bison program adds years of life to those airframes, but even so, they’re likely to be gone by 2020.

That’s why India’s own Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) project is so important to the IAF’s future prospects. It’s also why India’s rigid domestic-only policies are gradually being relaxed, in order to field an operational and competitive aircraft. Even with that help, the program’s delays are a growing problem for the IAF. Meanwhile, the west’s near-abandonment of the global lightweight fighter market opens a global opportunity, if India can seize it with a compelling and timely product.

LCA Tejas: India’s Lightweight Fighter Tejas, side view
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Within India’s force structure, the LCA is largely expected to replace its 400 or so MiG-21 aircraft with a more versatile and capable performer. The MiGs are being retired as age claims them, and even India’s 125 or so upgraded MiG-21 ‘Bisons’ are only scheduled to remain in service until 2018. The LCA’s overall performance is expected to be somewhat similar to India’s Mirage 2000s, with lower top speed but more modern electronics.

The Tejas LCA design uses a tailless compound delta plan that’s designed to be unstable, but controllable over an 8g / -3.5g flight range thanks to advanced flight software and quadruplex fly-by-wire technology. Composites are used heavily in order to to save weight, and proper placement can also lower the plane’s radar profile. Japan’s F-16-derived F-2 fighters also made heavy use of composite technologies, but Japanese issues with delamination and cracking required repairs and changes. ADA has conducted Static and fatigue strength studies on finite element models, and aeroservoelastic studies have been performed on the Tejas design; nevertheless, only full testing and actual service will reveal how it fares. So far, composites haven’t become a public problem for the aircraft.

Unfortunately, reports indicate that the lack of early pilot input has compromised several aspects of the design, while a failure to consider maintenance up front has made key components difficult to reach. Barring published comparisons from experienced pilots or evaluating countries, it’s very difficult to pin down the extent or seriousness of these issues, but Tejas has certainly spent a very long time in testing.

The following sub-sections go into more detail about the fighter’s equipment rationales, and that equipment’s specific capabilities. The above list seems straightforward, but getting there has been anything but.

Electronics

The plane’s avionics architecture is configured around a 3 bus, distributed MIL-STD-1553B system, using a 32-bit Mission Computer (MC) and software written in Ada. A “glass cockpit” of colour Active Matrix Liquid Crystal Displays (AMLCDs) provides the pilot with information, and is supplemented by Elbit’s DASH helmet-mounted display for commonality with other IAF aircraft.

The Mk.II is slated to use a more advanced glass cockpit with better computing and graphics processors behind it, full-duplex cross-Switched Ethernet (AFDX) based back up avionics, and digital maps. Elsewhere on the plane, a Universal Pylon Interface Computer (UPIC) will replace the Pylon Interface Boxes.

Radar Love: Weapons & Fire Control Radar Failure & Replacement EL/M-2032
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The Tejas project’s original radar, like its original engine choice, very nearly sank the project. The state-run Aeronautical Development Agency had originally intended to use Ericsson Microwave Systems’ PS-05/A radar, until they changed their mind and decided to develop their own. India’s Multi Mode Radar (MMR) program was started in June 1991, with a “Probable Date of Completion” of 6.5 years. More than 15 years later, development was still plodding away as a joint effort between Hindustan Aeronautics Limited in Hyderabad, India’s Electronics and Radar Development Laboratory in Bangalore, and the Centre for Airborne Studies. Even worse, test results for the radar were poor.

By August 2007, over 16 years into the project, even India’s MoD finally had to admit that the MMR faced serious problems. Radar co-development has now been initiated with Israel’s IAI Elta, with the EL/M-2032 as the radar base and interim solution. The EL/M-2032 multi-mode radar was originally developed for Israel’s Lavi fighter, and already equips India’s Sea Harrier fleet and Jaguar IM strike aircraft, and is popular around the world. M-2032s can be found on some F-16s in Israel and elsewhere, Kfir C10s flown by some Latin American customers, Chile’s upgraded F-5s, Romania’s MiG-21 Lancer upgrades, and South Korea’s FA-50 lightweight fighter. The radar features modular hardware design, with software control and flexible avionic interfaces, and a TWT coherent transmitter with a low-sidelobe planar antenna. The M-2032 functions in several air-to-air modes, as well as the air-to-ground, air-to-sea, ground-mapping in RBS, DBM, SAR with moving target tracking, and terrain avoidance modes.

Detection and classification ranges will vary depending on the aperture size. A radar adapted to fit in an F-5’s narrow nose will have lower performance than one that fits into a larger F-16. The Tejas’ dimensions suggest that performance may be near the radar’s claimed 80 nautical mile maximums for detection of fighter-sized objects.

There have been reports that the Tejas Mk.II and operational LCA Naval will fly with IAI’s EL/M-2052 AESA radar instead. That change would roughly double performance, while drastically reducing radar maintenance costs. These reports are unconfirmed, however, and other accounts cite American pressure to prevent Israeli AESA radar exports.

Other Sensors & Defensive LITENING pod

RAFAEL’s LITENING advanced surveillance and targeting pod will give Tejas long-range looks at ground targets, independent laser designation capability, and (rumored) fleet commonality with India’s Jaguars, MiG-27s, Mirage 2000s, and SU-30MKIs. The Mk.II will reportedly be adapted for a more advanced variant of the LITENING pod, but that means the pods would have to be bought and given to the Tejas fleet, rather than the SU-30MKI fleet for example.

The defensive system will be designed in India. Late testing means that it won’t be fully effective in the Mk.I aircraft, which must depend on an external Israel Aerospace Elta ELL/8-2222 jamming pod. The Mk.II is supposed to have a fully effective system of warning receivers, automated decoy dispensing, etc. In advanced western aircraft, these systems can even feed geolocation data from pinpointed threats into the plane’s targeting computers. Time will tell whether the Mk.II also has those capabilities.

Weapons LCA Tejas, armed
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Unsurprisingly, RAFAEL’s Derby radar-guided fire-and-forget missile will serve as the Tejas’ initial medium range air-air armament. It lacks the range and datalink of Raytheon’s AMRAAM or Russia’s R-77/AA-12, but in practice, positive identification requirements have kept most aerial fights within Derby range. Derby reportedly has good seeker cone coverage, which improves performance. It has already been integrated with the EL/M-2032 on India’s own Sea Harriers, and equips the country’s new SPYDER mobile anti-aircraft missile systems. If India’s own Astra MRAAM continues to progress, it will be integrated later.

For shorter-range engagements, Derby will be complemented by TMC’s infrared-guided Vympel R-73/AA-11 “Archer,” giving Tejas partial weapon commonality with India’s large MiG fleets. The R-73 is known for its exceptional maneuverability and a “wide boresight” seeker cone, a combination that inaugurated the era of 4th generation missiles. There’s even a rear-facing version, which offers enemies a nasty surprise. The jets will also carry RAFAEL’s Python 4/5, which can face forward and still hit targets behind their fighter.

Tejas planes are expected to carry a range of ground attack weapons, from ordinary bombs and unguided Russian S-8 80mm rockets, to precision munitions. Tests for unspecified laser-guided bombs and cluster bombs are expected, though they’re expected to be Russian KAB-1500L and RBK-500 weapons, along with Russian Kh-31/35/59 anti-ship and precision strike missiles. Specifications don’t mention a MIL-STD-1760 electrical interface with carriage stores, which is very helpful when integrating GPS-guided munitions. Time will tell, but the Tejas Mk.I’s initial weapons don’t include GPS guidance.

Engines & Alternatives F414-GE-400 engine
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With its radar issue solved by a foreign partnership, the fighter’s indigenous Kaveri engine (vid. Appendix B) was left as the project’s biggest unresolved issue. That was resolved with a stopgap, followed by a competition to field a working engine; even so, India’s DRDO continues to pour dollars and time into Kaveri development.

The removal of American arms trade sanctions allowed smooth incorporation of a slightly modified F404-GE-IN20 turbofan in initial Tejas Mk.I production models. Over the longer term, an international competition for the Tejas Mk.II’s engines had 2 shortlisted competitors, 1 unofficial competitor, and 1 winner in GE’s F414.

The winner: F414. GE’s F414 is that company’s more advanced alternative to the F404 family that equips the Tejas Mk.I; it currently equips Saab’s JAS-39NG Gripen and Boeing’s F/A-18 Super Hornet family. India’s F414-GE-INS6 engines will include the same single-engine FADEC modifications as the Gripen’s F414Gs, and may include some components of the F414-EPE research program for enhanced thrust. Standard F414 engines can reportedly produce up to 22,000 pounds of thrust on afterburners.

GE has been remarkably coy about its thrust in normal operation, but the figures it supplied to India were obviously good enough to beat Eurojet’s EJ200, which reportedly revised its bid too close to the deadline to change its fortunes.

Slow fade: Kaveri. This was supposed to be the fighter’s main engine, but India couldn’t develop a world-leading jet engine from a base of no experience. Kaveri was sidelined in 2008 by GE’s F404, in order to allow flight testing to go forward. DRDO finally admitted defeat in 2013 and stopped advocating Kaveri for the Tejas, after around 6 fruitless years of negotiations with French engine maker Snecma. A global re-tender for assistance was proposed, but late 2014 saw DRDO finally admit the obvious and file the paperwork to end the program.

In the Navy… Naval LCA 2011 briefing
click for video

Indian officials were interested in an improved engine for 2 reasons. One is simply better performance, thanks to an improved thrust:weight ratio. Another is the need for additional thrust, in order to operate the Tejas successfully as a naval aircraft.

India will induct the 40,000t INS Vikramaditya in 2013, after extensive modifications to Russia’s former Admiral Gorshkov carrier. The navy is also proceeding with construction of 2 more 35,000t “air defence ship” Vikrant Class carriers, designed in collaboration with Fincantieri and built in India. Orders have been signed for 46 Russian MiG-29Ks, but India also wants to operate navalized LCA fighters from their decks.

These fighters are actually being designed in a trainer variant first, which will then be converted into a naval fighter. Key changes to the Naval LCA include:

• Dropped nose, for better visibility in high angle-of-attack (nose pointed up) landings.
  
• Leading edge vortex controls that can extend from the edges of the main wing. They help the aircraft safely sink faster to land in smaller spaces, and can also improve takeoff response.
  
• Arrester hook to catch landing wires.
  
• Strengthened spine and related systems, to absorb the high impact of carrier landings (7.1 m/s descent vs. 3m/s for IAF).
  
• Longer, strengthened undercarriage. That actually ended up being a bit overdesigned.
  
• Powered nose wheel steering for better maneuverability on deck.
  
• Fuel dump system that can shed 1,000 kg of fuel from the fighter’s wing tanks, in case of an emergency just after take-off. Fuel weighs a lot, and that added weight can imperil attempted emergency landings.

Naval LCA rollout
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The other change will be the engine. India’s military and designers believe that the naval Mk.I derivative, powered by the same F404-GE-IN20 engine in the IAF variant, can be used for training and testing. At the same time, they believe that only the a Tejas Mk.II derivative with its more powerful F414-GE-INS6 engine will be capable of loaded carrier operations from the Vikrant Class’ “ski jump” ramp, in just 200m of takeoff space.

The naval Tejas program began in 2003. Variant paper designs were produced, and an initial order placed in 2009 began turning those designs into prototypes. April 2012 saw the 1st flight of NP-1, and a 2012 decision gave the go-ahead for initial production of 8 planes. The naval variant is expected to receive a different designation than “Tejas.”

LCA Tejas: Program, Prospects, and Future The Program India’s LCA Programs
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The Tejas Light Combat Aircraft program began in 1983, and is currently in Full-Scale Engineering Development (FSED) Phase-II, under which India’s DRDO was trying to deliver production fighters to the IAF by December 2010. Initial Operational Clearance wasn’t granted until January 2011, and then only with significant waivers. Limited Series Production aircraft in final configuration have arrived, but IOC wasn’t declared until November 2013, and even that was done under pressure from the ministry. The plane’s core self-protection systems were only installed in October 2013, most weapons haven’t been tested yet, and neither has aerial refueling. The ministry is pushing for Final Operational Clearance as a day/night, all-weather platform, and the official induction of a Tejas squadron at Sulur Air Base in Tamil Nadu near Sri Lanka, by the end of 2014. It isn’t clear that the fighter can actually achieve those performance goals in time.

So far, 40 Tejas Mk.I fighters have been ordered. Current plans call for another 100 aircraft (mostly Mk.II) for the air force, and up to 60 naval variants for the Navy.

When it was originally approved in 1983, the Tejas program’s cost was set at Rs 560 crore (5.6 billion rupees). The cost had risen to over 3,300 crore by the late 1980s, and has continued to rise since. The Times of India places the 2011 program total at 17,269 crore/ $3.77 billion for all variants. As shown above, subsequent reports show continued cost increases.

LCA Tejas Mk.II: Delhi, we have a problem… MiG-21bis: Hanging on
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The first test-flight of the improved and re-engined Tejas Mark-II is currently scheduled for December 2014, with production beginning in June 2016. Unfortunately for the air force, those markers are looking less and less likely, and switching in a new engine adds design and testing changes that will complicate matters. Engineers must rebalance the aircraft’s weight, adjust fuel capacity for changed consumption rates, etc. It’s already known that the LCA will need to add 0.5m in length to fit the F414, and its air intakes offer inadequate airflow and will have to be redesigned.

One also expects that an LCA Mk.II will add newer technologies in some areas, and there are reports that India intends to upgrade from IAI’s ELM-2032 phased-array radar to the ELM-2052 AESA. India’s avionics industry also continues to advance, leading to potential component swaps and re-testing. Finally, Tejas Mk.I has placed many key components in inaccessible places. Unless significant redesigns are forthcoming in Mk.II, maintenance costs will be high, and readiness will be low.

Redesign processes usually takes several years, even in a best-case scenario. China’s shift to a Russian RD-33 engine for its J-10 fighter was the centerpiece of a redesign that took more than a decade. Sweden’s JAS-39 Gripen made a similar shift from Volvo’s F404-derived RM12 in the JAS-39 A-D models, to GE’s F414 for its new JAS-39E/F, over a few years. There was a standing offer to have Saab adopt a significant role in Mk.2 development, with strong support from DRDO, but that offer remains in limbo.

Major delays to Tejas Mk.I production mean that activity probably won’t end until 2018. The delays will buy time for Mk.II testing, at the cost of IAF readiness and force strength. If the Mk.II also runs into testing problems, the LCA program will face a hard choice: produce more than 40 Tejas Mk.Is, or buy Mk.IIs before testing is done, with the accompanying risk of expensive rework and fielding delays.

Meanwhile, India’s MiG-21 fleet continues to age out.

Industrial Team

The Tejas industrial team is weighted toward government participation, which is one of the reasons for its long development cycle. Instead of buying finished and tested equipment from abroad, new designs had to be invented by government research agencies, then tested by themselves until they were ready, followed by integration testing with other elements. These choices were driven by India’s desire for long-term self-sufficiency in many aircraft sub-systems, in order to reduce their dependence of foreign suppliers.

There have also been a wide variety of sub-contracts to Indian firms for Tier 3 or Tier 4 participation to supply tooling, testing equipment, software development, or sub-assemblies. They are not covered in our list.

In late 2013, HAL told India’s Business Standard that it aimed to roll out the first 2 Tejas IOC fighters by March 2014, and deliver 8 more by the end of 2014. The next step after that will be to enhance to production line to 16 fighters per year, a task that might prove challenging without outside aid (q.v. Dec 9/12). That would leave 10 Tejas Mk.I IOC fighters to be built in 2015, whereupon HAL would be able to begin production of 20 Tejas Mk.I Full Operational Capability variants.

Required FOC upgrades to the IOC fleet, and initial naval production orders, will also compete for production space. An early 2013 interview with ADA director Shri PS Subramanyam saw 2018 as a realistic date for Mk.I production to end.

Tejas Prospects: Think Globally, Begin Locally Tejas: 2 views
(click to view full)

Exports are important to fighter programs. The added buys keep production lines open at no cost to the home country, and drop prices per plane. A combination of profits and paid-for modifications would help keep the design current, allowing the plane to add new technology and remain relevant. On the industrial front, if ADA can move the plane from the current 55% Indian content to around 80% without creating more problems, it would help to insulate prices from currency exchange swings.

The Tejas Light Combat Aircraft’s exact per-plane flyaway price point isn’t known yet, but the goal is an inexpensive fighter in the $20-25 million range, with performance that compares well to early model F-16s and Mirage 2000s. Historically, the low end of the market is where the largest volume of global fighter buys have taken place. In recent years, however, pressure from home-country buyers has pushed the West into a niche of high-end platforms like the F-15, F-35, Eurofighter, and Rafale. Some mid-tier options exist, like new F-16s, the F/A-18 Super Hornet, and JAS-39 Gripens, but even those are fairly pricey for emerging economies. As regional tensions rise, it remains to be seen whether the last decade has seen a permanent shift toward mid-level and high-end platforms, or whether traditional buying patterns will reassert themselves through emerging economies.

Long-term Tejas competitors in the $20 – 40 million range include the market for second-hand F-16s, the Chinese/Pakistani JF-17, and Korea’s T-50 Golden Eagle family of supersonic trainers and light fighters. RAC MiG has received enough work from India and others to retain the MiG-29M family as a viable platform in this bracket; Russia’s chosen pricing approach will determine whether the thrust-vectoring MiG-35 multi-role fighter also becomes a competitor.

click for video

India’s growing geopolitical influence, and the ability to price toward this bracket’s low end, offers the Tejas decent prospects, even in this crowded field. HAL’s problem is that the Tejas must first achieve success in India.

Delays have taken their toll. Bangalore-based Aeronautics Development Agency (MoD ADA) chief R K Ramanathan promised a 2010 in-service date, while touting a reduction from over 30,000 components to around 7,000. Even that was a late milestone, fully 27 years after the program began, but it didn’t come close to happening. Plans to field 40-48 interim aircraft in the first 2 operational air force squadrons won’t take place until 2015 (32 years), and the final “Tejas Mk.II” version will be very hard-pressed to become operational before 2018 (35 years).

A lot can change in 35 years. Official plans still call for 100+ fighters, but the IAF has embarked on a wide set of upgrade and purchase commitments for existing MiG-29s and Mirage 2000s, the new mid-tier MMRCA fighter, and a high-end FGFA stealth fighter joint venture with Russia.

Meanwhile, the IAF is now taking something of a “wait and see” approach to a longer term commitment, until the final aircraft is delivered with working systems and the “Tejas Mark II” design has shown what it can do. One the one hand, the project’s long development period, and DRDO’s past performance on defense projects, tend to justify that wait-and-see approach. On the other hand, the project can easily run into danger without adequate military and political backing. On Feb 6/06, The Telegraph in Calcutta reported that:

“Though air headquarters has not said so in public, it is weighing whether it should commit funds because it is anticipating a resource crunch for the big ticket purchases of multi-role combat aircraft – that could cost the exchequer more than $5 billion over 10 years – and other equipment that it has projected as an immediate need.”

The rumored growth of the MRCA foreign fighter program to 170-200 aircraft, naval plans for 32 more ships in the next 10-15 years, submarine construction imperatives, and other planned capital purchases do indeed have the potential to squeeze the Tejas. The reality of limited funds and budget cuts began to hit home in 2013, and another global economic slowdown will press India into harder choices still. Confidence in the Tejas, or the lack of it, will influence India’s choices.

So will other negotiations. India’s choices mean that the MMRCA program will deliver fewer aircraft at a flyaway price tag of $100+ million each. That makes $25-35 million Tejas LCA fighters look more attractive, in order to plus up numbers. Just as long as the LCA can in fact be produced to that cost level, be delivered in time to replace the MiG-21s, and perform at an adequate level.

Unfortunately, every one of those variables is currently in question.

At present, the worst-case scenario for the Tejas program is truncated production at about 40 operational aircraft, which would doom exports. In that scenario, Tejas Mk.I is built, but other expenditures grab priority. The plane’s role is then divided among upgraded MiG-29UPGs, new naval MiG-29Ks, upgraded Mirage 2000s, and possibly even Hawk Mk.132 trainers that are armed in a backup role.

The generally accepted goal for Tejas is 5 IAF squadrons plus 2 Navy squadrons, or about 140-150 planes. Even that is a relatively short production run at full capacity, which is the rate India must use in order to field new lightweight fighters in time.

The best-case scenario would involve full production for the IAF that raises planned order totals beyond 120, a serving STOBAR (Short Take Off via ramps, But Assisted Recovery via arrester gear and wires) naval variant in service by 2020, and export successes that drive up production totals and help finance future upgrades.

Contracts and Key Events 2014-2016

ADA Tejas video

January 13/16: Hindustan Aeronautics Limited is making final preparations for their HAL Tejas lightweight fighter debut at the Bahrain Air Show next week. With plans to impress the experts and pick up a few potential customers along the way, HAL’s display apparently “significantly surpasses any aerobatics display the fighter has presented earlier”. The company plans to have gained final operating clearance (FOC) by mid-2016, and has also annouced that it is to test fire the Rafael Derby beyond-visual-range missile (BVRAAM) in March. The Israeli made missile has been bought as a stopgap arrangement as India grapples to make BVR missile Astra, which is still in development, operational.

October 27/15: India has offered Sri Lanka the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft as an alternative to the JF-17 Thunder, co-developed by China and Pakistan. Previous reports in June by the Pakistani press indicated that the Sri Lankans had signed for an undisclosed number of JF-17s, with this subsequently denied by the Sri Lankan Air Force which stated that it was still evaluating possible fighter options. However, Sri Lankan and Pakistani officials are due to meet in November to discuss the possible acquisition of the JF-17, with India likely looking to export the problematic Tejas LCA in an attempt to undermine strategic rival Pakistan.

October 8/15: The Indian government’s recent decision to procure seven squadrons of the heavily-criticized indigenous Tejas Mk.1A was pushed on the Indian Air Force by the Modi administration, according to a report by Reuters on Wednesday. The Indian Air Force had reportedly requested 44 additional Rafale fighters on top of the 36 announced in April turned down by the government, instead the Modi government pushed the Tejas on the IAF despite concern over the aircraft’s performance.

October 1/15: India will induct seven squadrons (112 to 126 aircraft) of Tejas Mk.I-A light combat aircraft, despite the aircraft’s Final Operating Clearance delayed in July until next year. Despite improvements to the heavily-criticized original indigenous Tejas Mk.I design, the Mk.I-A still has a fair share of problems, including issues with the aircraft’s radar and weapon payload. The fighters are slated for delivery from next year and are intended to provide the Indian Air Force with a much-needed air defense capability.

July 22/15: In a characteristic set-back, India’s Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) will see its Final Operating Clearance delayed until next year. The schedule has slipped consistently for the indigenous fighter, with FOC previously pushed back to December this year. The Indian Defense Ministry has blamed the delays on late delivery of components from foreign manufacturers; however the program also came under severe criticism from the Indian government’s principal oversight body in May, with the aircraft’s performance in question after over three decades of development. The new FOC for the aircraft is now reported to be timetabled for March 2016.

May 11/15: India’s indigenously-developed Tejas Mk I light combat aircraft has come under serious criticism from the country’s Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG), with 53 deficiencies cited in a recent report. A major concern is the lack of defensive countermeasure capability, with the jet reportedly failing to meet Indian Air Force (IAF) survivability standards. The LCA achieved initial operating clearance in December 2013, with the project severely delayed from its original scheduled induction date of 1994. The CAG report to Parliament also highlighted how the IAF will likely be forced to induct the aircraft without a trainer variant available for pilot training, with a repair and overhaul facility also yet to be established at manufacturer HAL’s facilities, a requirement previously set out by the IAF.

Nov 18/14: Kaveri. The DRDO is doing something unusual: submitting documents to cancel a major research project, after INR 21.06 billion has been spent by the Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) in Bangalore. The request to end the GTX-35VS Kaveri program must now be approved by the Ministry of Finance, and receive clearance from the top-level Cabinet Committee on Security. Which also helps explain why so few projects are canceled, but the biggest change required still involves the DRDO’s mentality. Director-General (Aero) Dr. K. Tamilmani indicates that elections do have consequences:

“These are part of the bold stand being taken by DRDO. Whereever we have found bottlenecks for long time, with no realistic solutions, it’s better to move on. It is an honest stand we are taking…. If you are fit to run only for 50 km, why attempt 100 km? DRDO has realized its mistakes of the past and we have no hesitation in taking some bold steps.”

It is an honest stand, and DRDO can take it without giving up on India’s strategic industrial policy to become more self-sufficient in jet engine technologies. The project delays created by Kaveri remain a total waste, but the research itself can be harvested. DRDO intends to press on with jet engine research, and it’s possible to undertake projects that are militarily useful but much less ambitious. INR 3 billion has reportedly been earmarked for such work, and DRDO wants to make progress is 12 identified technical areas. Sources: OneIndia, “OneIndia Exclusive: DRDO to abandon indigenous fighter jet engine Kaveri project”.

All Kaveri research to end

Oct 4/14: Industrial. Defense News quotes an unnamed source, who says that the Indian government has been talking to major private sector industrial players about setting up a full production line for up to 250 Tejas Mk.2s. That would certainly justify the investment.

If carried out, that move would sidestep HAL’s production difficulties (q.v. Dec 9/12) by partly or wholly removing Tejas from HAL’s purview, create a full competitor to HAL in the aerospace sector, and turn the winner into India’s 1st major private sector defense firm. It would also double planned Tejas Mk.2/naval buys, based on past reports (q.v. Jan 11/14).

Since it seems apparent that the Indian government would have to fund a new production line for HAL anyway, funding the line elsewhere and reaping the benefits of diversification and competition is a logical policy option. Especially since the resulting competitor would also be a potential source for programs like India’s light transport competition, which stalled out because the private sector can’t afford to set up a full production facility for just 40 planes.

The challenge is that setting up a production line for modern combat jets isn’t simple, and major problems could really mess with already chancy schedules for Tejas Mk.2 and the planned naval variant. One obvious way to reduce this risk would be to bring in a foreign firm like Boeing, Saab, Dassault, et. al. to help set up the plant, and assist with management for the first few years. If done in conjunction with Mk.2 design assistance (q.v. June 17/14), the Tejas program as a whole could get a substantial boost.

Tata Group, Mahindra & Mahindra and Larsen and Toubro have been mentioned, and L&T Heavy Engineering President Madhukar Vinayak Kotwal has confirmed that discussions are taking place, but that’s all he is prepared to say. Watch this space. Sources: Defense News, “India Offers To Spend $12B To Break Monopoly”.

Aug 17/14: Industrial. HAL and DRDO’s ADA are trying to encourage more small and mid-size manufacturers to make parts for the aircraft:

“They aim to raise the LCA’s indigenous content to 80 per cent in three years, up from the present 50 to 55 per cent…. HAL Chairman R.K. Tyagi told them that starting 2015–16, “we aim to roll out 16 LCAs every year, [increasing] from the initial target of eight a year”.

Currently, 168 of the 344 LCA components are made in the country.

A key defence scientist involved in the programme said HAL and ADA would help manufacturers to pick up at least 10 more simple components and offer the use of government-owned manufacturing and test facilities.”

If they can do that while maintaining quality, and pick manufacturers who are capable of further innovation, they would make future upgrades easier. More local content would also reduce cost shifts based on currency exchange rates, and create a wider base for future programs like the Su-50/FGFA. The bad news? This policy falls into the “simple, but not easy” category. Sources: The Hindu, “A few small production pushes for LCA”.

June 17/14: Saab for Mk.2? As M-MRCA negotiations to buy advanced Rafale fighters stall, and projected costs rise sharply, Saab remains in position with a different offer. Instead of touting their superior JAS-39E/F Gripen, they’ve proposed to take a 51% share of a joint venture company, then leverage their expertise to create the LCA Mk.2. DRDO chief Dr V K Saraswat was enthusiastic, and they issued an RFI in 2012 and an RFP in 2013.

It isn’t a crazy idea. The Indo-Russian BrahMos missile has been very successful using a similar structure, and a 51% share plus freedom from Indian government strictures would remove many of the program’s decision-making and organizational issues. Saab is the only aircraft major with single-engine fighter conversion experience from the F404 to the F414 engine, so tasks like stretching the fuselage 0.5m, changing the air intakes, etc. have already been thought through in another context. Their Gripen has also achieved low operating costs, in part due to maintenance-friendly design. That’s another Tejas weakness, thanks to very maintenance-unfriendly placement of key components.

Since LCA Mk.2 is also expected as a carrier fighter, success already matters to India. they need to complete development successfully. From the IAF’s perspective, replacing M-MRCA with Tejas Mk.2 would simplify their future high-medium-low mix by avoiding a 2nd fighter in the same class as the SU-30MKI, while allowing them to field more squadrons. The flip side is that their high-end capability becomes irretrievably Russian-dependent: SU-30MKIs now, and FGFA/SU-50s later. For Saab, a JV would give them a major new niche in the global marketplace, providing a low-end fighter in a class below the Gripen and its Western competitors.

The catch? Incoming DRDO chief Dr Avinash Chander is more focused on developing the Mk.2 alone, and believed that any foreign partnership would require a global tender. In India, that would take years. Re-opening the opportunity would depend on a failure of M-MRCA negotiations, and continued failure to field Tejas, pushing the new BJP government to take a second look at all of its options. Sources: India’s Business Standard, “Rafale contract elusive, Eurofighter and Saab remain hopeful”.

Feb 12/14: Costs. India’s MoD releases another set of official cost figures for the program, leaving out the Kaveri engine but adding a “Phase-III” development period. LCA development costs have now risen from an original INR 71.16 billion to INR 140.33 billion (+97.2%), or INR 168.72 billion (+137.1%) if one properly counts the Kaveri engine. Expected production line investments would push those figures even higher. India’s MoD was savvy enough to compare development costs to Saab’s more advanced Gripen NG:

“Developmental cost of Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), Tejas is Rs.7965.56 Crore ($1.09 Billion) including building of 15 aircraft and creation of infrastructure for production of 08 aircraft per annum. This compares with the developmental cost of JAS 39 NG Grippen is $1.80 Billion for developing 5 Proto Vehicles.”

That’s actually just the current predicted cost of the IAF’s MK.I/II development, minus the Kaveri engine, and arguably without creating infrastructure that could actually deliver 8 aircraft per year. The Gripen NG figure would need to be checked carefully, to see what it included and excluded. Even so, the simple act of making the comparison shows a greater sense of external awareness than we’re used to seeing from India’s MoD. Source: India MoD/ PIB, “Developmental Cost of LCA Project”.

Feb 10/14: A written reply from Minister of State for Defence Shri Jitendra Singh to Lok Sabha parliamentarians triggers stories about the IAF raising their planned LCA buys from 200 to 300. Unfortunately for the media reporting that story, it rests entirely on an error of logic. Here’s the exact quote, which can’t be linked anymore thanks to MoD web site changes:

“The MiG-21 and MiG-27 aircrafts of the IAF have already been upgraded and currently equip 14 combat squadrons. These aircraft, however, are planned for being phased out over the next few years and will be replaced by the LCA. Steps have been initiated for upgradation of other fighter aircrafts like MiG-29, Jaguar, Mirage-2000; transport aircraft like AN-32 and Mi-17/Mi-17 IV helicopters.”

What this statement does not say is that the replacement will happen on an equal basis. It’s perfectly possible to replace existing squadrons with fewer squadrons and fewer planes, if one is so inclined. The Americans have been doing so for decades, and they’re hardly alone. So far, firm IAF commitments involve 126 LCA Tejas planes: 6 squadrons of 21 planes each, with only 96 (16 x 6) as front-line fighters. Each squadron also has 3 rotation aircraft to cover maintenance absences or loss replacement, and 2 twin-seat trainers, to make 21. Beyond those 2 Tejas Mk.I squadrons and 4 Tejas Mk.II squadrons, we’ll have to see. Sources: India MoD, “Modernisation of IAF” | India’s Business Standard, “IAF will buy 14 Tejas squadrons, lowering costs”

Jan 12/14: Budgets. India’s defense budget will drop by INR 78 billion in 2013-14, after a drop of INR 100 billion in 2012-13. A more sluggish economy, and a weakened ruling Congress Party that’s trying to shore up its electoral base, are the issues. At the same time, India is negotiating the MMRCA deal for 126 Rafales, the FGFA deal with Russia for their future high-end stealth fighter, the Project 75i submarine buy that’s becoming an emergency, and attack and heavy-lift helicopter buys with Boeing. They also want to add to their fleet of P-8i long-range maritime patrol planes, buy AWACS early warning jets as a priority, and improve their aerial tanker fleet as a priority. Among other priorities.

That explains why the MoD asked for INR 400 billion more, instead of 78 billion less. Unless this gap changes, future Tejas production will find itself caught in an environment where everything can’t be funded, but big air force commitments have already been made. Sources: Times of India, “Despite budget cut, defence ministry continues with modernization drive”.

Jan 11/14: Pricing. Sources tell India’s Business Standard that HAL has quoted the Ministry a price of INR 1.62 billion (about $26.5 million) per plane for the first 20 Tejas Mk.I fighters. The Ministry wants to know why its 40% higher than the INR 1.165 billion quoted in 2006, and HAL has a good answer. One, inflation over the past 8 years takes a toll. Two, 45% of the plane’s cost involves imported parts, and the Indian rupee is sinking. Three, Tejas is still about half the $45.8 million price of a Mirage 2000 upgrade ({EUR 1.4 billion is now INR 118.3 billion + INR 2.02 billion to HAL}/ 49 jets = INR 2.8 billion or $45.8 million per), and those upgrades are even more dependent on currency rates.

HAL sees eventual purchases of 40 Mk.Is, 84 Mk.IIs, 11 naval trainers, and 46 naval variants (TL: 181), and recent government declaration have used 200 aircraft as a possible figure. Now that Tejas is on surer ground, and the opportunity is clearer, HAL is trying to control costs using longer-term commitments of its own. Step one reportedly involves Long Time Business Agreements (LTBAs) of 3-5 years and 40-50 aircraft sets with key sub-contractors, including clauses that let it vary annual production rates to some extent, a feature also seen in many of the US military’s multi-year purchase agreements. Long lead time components have been identified, and industrial improvements are underway. Practices like having 5-axis CNC machines on hand, and using computerized drilling of 8,000 holes or so in the composite wing skin, are more or less assumed in North America. They’re a step forward for HAL, which needs that kind of long-term investment in its industrial capacity.

Will that investment, and higher production, improve costs enough? Pakistan’s JF-17, which has already delivered 50 planes, is reportedly priced around $23-24 million per plane. If the Tejas Mk.II comes in around $30 million in current dollars, pointing to composite construction and supposedly better avionics isn’t going to cut it in export competitions as a reason for the 25% price difference. An AESA radar might, depending on what Pakistan does for the coming JF-17 Block II, and how much it costs. Sources: Business Standard, “HAL pegs price of Tejas fighter at Rs 162 crore”.

2013

GE F414 engine contract; No Kaveris for Tejas fleet; AESA radar?; Why the multi-year delay for self-protection EW?; IOC at last, but is the plane ready? LCA Naval
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Dec 20/13: IOC-2. the LCA program achieves Initial Operational Clearance II. This is closer to the F-35’s IOC than traditional American IOC designations: limited capabilities with some initial weapons, and more testing required, but regular air force pilots can now fly it. Sources: Economic Times of India, “Indigenous fighter aircraft LCA-Tejas gets Initial Operational Clearance”.

Dec 19/13: What’s next? Centre for Military Airworthiness and Certification Director-General Dr K Tamil Mani explains what’s next for Tejas, whose remaining testing and certification needs show the IOC-2 designation’s limits. The fighter needs to pass 6 milestones in the next 15 months, on the way to G=Final Operational Clearance. They include:

• Integrating the Russian GSH 23mm gun, which also requires certifying the surrounding LRU electronics boxes for much higher vibration levels.
  
• Integration of additional weapons, incl. Python 4/5 short-range air-to-air missiles and Derby medium range air-to-air missiles.
  
• Integrating Cobham’s air refueling probe.
  
• Increasing sustained Angle of Attack parameters from 22 – 24 degrees.
  
• Improved braking system with higher heat tolerance. They might even need to add fans, as they did for some of their MiGs.
  
• Change the nosecone from composite materials to a quartz-based material, in order to remove the current 45-50 km limit on the radar and bring it to its design level of 80+ km.

Sources: Indian Express, “Tejas Needs to Cross 6 Milestones in 15 Months”.

Dec 18/13: IOC process. India’s Centre for Military Airworthiness and Certification (CEMILAC) explains what IOC-2 certification involved to the Indian Express. The bureaucracy takes credit for the plane’s accident-free history, of course, and proudly notes their “concurrent participation in all development activities,” without discussing Tejas’ developmental delays.

The did have a lot to do between the incomplete Initial Operational Clearance on Dec 10/11, and IOC-2 about 2 years later. Full integration and testing of IAI’s ELM-2032 radar, testing of stores integration and release, flight envelope expansion from 17 degrees Angle of Attack to 22 degrees. Maximum flight parameters are now 6gs maneuvering, with a maximum speed of Mac 1.4 and a service ceiling to 50,000 feet. Safety-related work included safe emergency jettisoning of all stores, engine relight, wake penetration, night flying and all weather clearance. Sources: Indian Express, “Clearing Flight Test Parameters was a Challenge, Says Airworthiness Centre”.

Dec 17/13: Updates. India’s MoD summarizes the state of the LCA program. The key takeaways? As on Nov 30/13, they’ve conducted 2,415 flight tests using 15 Tejas Aircraft. A lot of reviews are riding herd on the program, which can add urgency or slow down actual work, depending on how that’s handled. Structurally, the Phased Development Approach has been changed to Concurrent Development Approach, which adds development risk but can cut time if it works, and Quick Reaction Teams have been formed to address design and production issues as they arise.

IOC-2 is still expected on Dec 20/13, but another release makes it clear that the Mk.II project continues to slip. The Probable Date of Completion for LCA Phase-II full-scale engineering design work is now December 2015: 9 months later than the previous March 2015 goal, and 7 years later than the original plan. Sources: India MoD, “LCA project” and DRDO projects“.

Dec 17/13: MiG-21 update. India’s MoD summarizes the state of the IAF’s MiG-21 fleet. The MiG-21FLs are retired now, but the answer shows that the remaining MiGs may have to serve longer than intended:

“254 MiG-21 aircraft are still in service with the Indian Air Force. During the last ten years (2003-2004 to 2012-2013) and the current year (upto 30.11.2013), a total of 38 MiG-21 aircraft have crashed.

Phasing out of aircraft and their replacement with new generation aircraft depends upon national security / strategic objectives and operational requirements of the defence forces and are reviewed by the Government from time to time. This is a continuous process.”

On Dec 12/13, Air Chief Marshal N A K Browne confirmed that the LCA Tejas would replace the MiG-21 in the IAF fleet. That may appear to have been obvious, but official confirmation indicates a greater degree of confidence in the program. Sources: India MoD, “MIG-21 Aircraft” | Indian Express, “Tejas to Officially Replace MiG-21 FL”.

Dec 9/13: Defence Minister A K Antony is scheduled to give the Tejas its Initial Operational Certificate (IOC) on Dec 20/13, which would allow Tejas to be flown by regular IAF personnel outside of the test pilot community. Note that IOC doesn’t include key performance parameters like qualification with many of the fighter’s weapons, basic self-protection systems, air-to-air refueling, or finalization of the Tejas Mk.I’s design. Those will have to wait for Final Operation Clearance (FOC), and an increasingly-impatient defense minister has reportedly ordered DRDO to ensure that FOC takes place before 2014 ends.

The first Tejas squadron of 18-20 fighters will be built to IOC standard, and based at Sulur AB in Tamil Nadu, near Sri Lanka. They should be able to handle the minimal threats from that quarter, and one hopes that reported problems (q.v. April 21/13) were either untrue, or have been fixed.

On the industrial front, HAL has told India’s Business Standard that it aims to roll out the first 2 Tejas IOC fighters by March 2014, and deliver 8 more by the end of 2014. The next step after that will be to enhance to production line to 16 fighters per year, a task that might prove challenging without outside aid (q.v. Dec 9/12). That would leave 10 Tejas Mk.I IOC fighters to be built in 2015, whereupon HAL would be able to begin production of 20 Tejas Mk.I FOC variants. Required FOC upgrades to the IOC fleet, and initial naval production orders, could probably keep HAL at a minimum activity level through 2017; but an early 2013 interview with ADA director Shri PS Subramanyam saw 2018 as a more realistic date for Mk.I production to end. That might actually be helpful. If Tejas Mk.II isn’t ready to begin production by time Mk.I is done, India will have an industrial problem on its hands. Sources: Business Standard, “Tejas LCA sprints towards IAF’s frontline squadron” | AeroMag Asia, Jan-Feb 2013 issue.

Dec 7/13: Testing. The LCA’s 1st firing of an AA-11 short range air-to-air missile is successful, as the missile hits a target that was towed by a drone. The demonstration was conducted off the coast of Goa, in the Arabian Sea. Sources: The Hindu Business Line, “Light combat aircraft Tejas fires missile on target”.

Dec 7/13: MiG-21FL retires. After 50 years of service, the IAF is about to phase out its MiG-21FL variant, which is prepping to fly its last sortie on Dec 11/ 13 over Kalaikunda AFS in Bengal. Other MiG-21 variants will remain in service, and current expectations will extend the most modern MiG-21 Bison variants to at least 2018. Sources: The Calcutta Telegraph, “Supersonic jet set for last sortie”.

Aug 7/13: Costs. A Parliamentary reply to Shri S. Thangavelu in Rajya Sabha sets out the costs for each phase of the Tejas program in slightly more detail. Our chart above has been amended to reflect the current figures.

India is still in Full Scale Engineering Development Phase II, which aims to build 3 prototypes and 8 Limited Series Production (LSP) aircraft, and establish infrastructure for producing 8 aircraft per year. LSP-8 made its maiden flight on March 31/13, but reports to date suggest that meeting the infrastructure goal will require a significant increase in development costs (q.v. Dec 9/12). India MoD.

BEL on EW, 2011
click for video

Oct 16/13: Why no EW? The DRDO has finally fitted a Tejas fighter (PV-1) with electronic warfare/ self-protection systems, and intends to begin flight tests in November and December. Why has this key development been delayed for 5 years? Believe it or not, they thought it was more important to preserve the plane’s flight safety record:

“For almost eight years, a section of the aeronautical community has been resisting its fitment, anxious that the add-ons may cause a first crash…. They have been very keen on securing the operational clearance, initial as well as final from the Indian Air Force, even if the LCA did not have the electronic system…. no one wished to risk an add-on on the LCA that had not been tried. The idea was to defend the ‘zero crash’ record. This was made known sometimes explicitly to engineers and scientists working on the electronic systems, who, however, had been pressing for very long that the systems ought to be fitted and trials conducted to be able to fine-tune them.”

Unfortunately, PV-1 hasn’t been flying recently, so they may end up introducing risk that way. Tejas Mk.Is will have an Israeli IAI Elta jamming pod available as an external store, with the full RWJ system slated for the Mk.II. Sources: Deccan Herald, “Finally, Tejas gets electronic warfare systems”.

DRDO’s problems, in a nutshell

June 1/13: Excuses. DRDO chief V K Saraswat tries to deflect criticism of Tejas’ continuing delays, by citing the effects of sanctions that ended 13 years ago. Lack of cooperation and foreign help might explain why Tejas was slow to develop from the early 1980s to 2000. It doesn’t explain why DRDO didn’t follow professional practice by working with experienced pilots and the IAF, which created a multitude of poor design decisions that required years of delay to produce only partial fixes. Or the reason DRDO has wasted so much time with engine and radar choices that were obviously inadequate, all well after sanctions had ended. Or why, 13 years after sanctions had ended, Tejas isn’t ready for service yet, while Pakistan’s JF-17 equips 3 squadrons.

Weak excuses do not inspire future confidence. Brahmand Defence & Aerospace.

April 21/13: Tejas a lemon? The Sunday Standard reports that the Tejas is much farther away from viability than anyone is admitting, and says that DRDO’s notional stealth AMCA (Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft) has been put on hold until the LCA project can be made to work. A stealth FGFA/SU-50 is already in co-development with Russia, so AMCA’s value is unclear anyway. With respect to the Tejas LCA, the Sunday Standard’s unnamed sources say:

“The plane cannot fly on its own. It needs a lifeline in the form of support and monitoring of its systems from the ground by technicians…. The common man thinks the plane is doing fine, its engine sounds great and the manoeuvres are perfect. But those flying and weapons firing displays are done with ground monitoring and support. The plane is still not ready to flying on its own”…. the sources noted that LCA was grounded for three months between September and December 2012 following problems with its landing gear. “Normally, a combat plane is ready for its next sortie following a 30-minute [servicing]. In the case of LCA, after a single sortie of about an hour or so, it needs three days of servicing before it can go for its next sortie,” they said.”

These revelations come against a backdrop of pressure from India’s defense minister Antony and India’s government to buy designed-in-India items unless there’s no other choice. He’s selling changes to India’s Defence Procurement Policy as an anti-corruption effort – but what do you call spending billions of dollars on politically-allied state organizations, who don’t deliver on the critical defense projects assigned to them, and never pay any serious penalties for it? Their competitors in China and Pakistan are consistently faster and often better – while doing a better job developing their industries. See also India PIB.

March 20/13: More delays. A Parliamentary reply confirms the obvious, formally extending the scheduled end of the LCA’s Phase 2 Full Scale Engineering Development from December 2012 to March 2015.

The IAF has ordered 20 fighters in “Initial Operational Clearance” (January 2011) status, and another 20 in “Full Operational Clearance” (i.e. combat-ready) configuration. Full Operational Clearance is now expected in December 2014. PTI, via Zee News | India MoD.

Feb 6/13: AESA Radar? At Aero India 2013, Defense Update files a report that adds the short-range Python 5 air-to-air missile to the Tejas’ list of integrated weapons, alongside the Russian R-73/AA-11. It adds:

“The LCA will also carry the EL/M-2052 active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar developed by IAI Elta. Originally, the EL/M-2032 was selected but the new 2052 now available with a more compact antenna is best designed to fit the nose cones of LCA and Jaguar, offering enhanced capabilities for both fighters.”

If the Defense Update report is true, it would roughly double the Mk.II fighter’s radar performance, and sharply lower its maintenance costs. DID has been unable to confirm this report, and there have been previous reports (q.v. Jan 14/11 entry) that said M-2052 sales for the Tejas Mk.II had been barred by American pressure. Indeed, the Americans managed to pressure the Israelis not to install the M-2052 in their own F-16i fighters.

Feb 5/13: On the eve of Aero India 2013, Indian defense minister AK Antony tells DRDO that:

“I am happy for your achievements of DRDO but not fully happy. Delay in delivery is a real problem… Try to speed up your process and reduce time for research, development and production. [DRDO is getting ready for a 2nd initial clearance for Tejas, but] I am impatient for the Final Operational Clearance (FOC)….. Antony also expressed his disappointment over reported lack of cohesion between the aircraft development agencies under DRDO and aircraft maker HAL.”

In India, FOC means “ready for combat operations”, which is closer to the US military’s idea of “Initial Operational Capability.” The Pioneer.

Jan 20/13: F414 deal. India Strategic quotes DRDO Director General V.K. Saraswat, who says that India’s government has finalized the terms of GE’s F414 contract, including the difficult issues surrounding Indian production. That process took over 2 years, as the engine was picked in September 2010.

The deal is reportedly a Rs 3,000 crore (about $560 million) contract for 99 of the Tejas Mk.II’s F414-GE-INS6 engines, with an option to buy another 100 at fixed terms. IANS via Silicon India | Times of India.

F414 engine deal finalized

Jan 4/13: Kaveri. India’s Business Standard reports that India’s Ministry of Defence has failed in its 6 years of sole-source negotiations with Snecma, and will try a global tender to secure cooperation in developing the Kaveri engine. The engine’s development has hit a technical dead-end, and cannot incorporate key alloys, single-crystal blades, and other manufacturing and design technologies without foreign help. The DRDO’s GTRE department has also conceded defeat with respect to the LCA, according to its chief Dr. C.P. Ramnarayanan:

“We were planning to re-engine first 40 Tejas fighters with the Kaveri. But now they will continue to fly with the F-404 engine.”

DRDO swill use Kaveri for its UCAV, and still holds out hope that a redesigned Kaveri can power a locally designed AMCA twin-engined medium fighter. To power AMCA, the engine would need to improve afterburner performance of about 15,825 pounds thrust. That means foreign help, but DRDO has made global solicitations before, and had no takers beyond Snecma.

2012

Cert & program delays; Naval prototype flies; Kaveri for UCAV; Shaping up HAL – which clearly needs it. IUSAV: News report
(click for video)

Dec 26/12: Kaveri. India wants to develop a long-range, jet-powered armed drone, powered by a modified Kaveri engine (vid. March 21/12 entry). These are commonly called UCAVs (Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles), but India refers to their project as IUSAV (Indian Unmanned Strike Air Vehicle). Note that most of the video and pictures in the video are of other countries’ efforts, since India is at a very early stage.

Now DRDO’s GTRE has asked the Ministry for another Rs 595 crore (about $93 million), covering a 48-month program to develop 2 prototypes of a modified Kaveri engine with no afterburner. This includes removing the base design flaws detecting during 2010-11 testing in Russia, ground testing in Bangalore, and confirmatory tests in Russia at the Gromov Flight Research Institute. The program would be capped by flight testing of the 2 no-afterburner prototypes in LCA prototype PV-1.

This idea actually makes sense. The Missile Technology Control Regime makes it problematic for countries to sell India a USAV jet engine, since a cruise missile is also an armed unmanned aircraft. On the Indian side, the Kaveri engine has the most problems adding enough thrust in afterburner, but “dry” statistics of 11,060 pounds thrust are close to the project’s goal of 11,500. Dropping the afterburner sheds engine weight, which has been an issue for Kaveri, and UCAV engines to date don’t have afterburners anyway. Other countries’ UCAV designs have all been sub-sonic drones that rely on stealth or low-threat environments to survive. Business Standard.

UCAV: a good use for Kaveri

Dec 12/12: Naval LCA. India’s Navy is upset by the fact that only 1 naval LCA has been built, and need aircraft to train with. Media reports say they’re about to issue a an Rs 1,000 crore (about $185 million) RFP to produce the first 8 Limited Series Production Tejas naval fighters, which would include both single-seat test aircraft and 2-seat trainers. This would turn the Feb 27/12 approval into a contract after negotiations with HAL, and work is expected to begin in 2013. Whether HAL’s production capacity can handle it (vid. Dec 9/12) is another question.

Business Standard reports the Indian military’s current belief that the navalized Tejas Mk.I can be used for training, and the state-owned ADA is touting a 1st representative takeoff by mid-2013 and a 1st representative landing by the end of 2013. At the same time, they believe that only the Tejas Mk.II will be capable of loaded carrier operations, using just 200m of space and a “ski-jump” ramp. The design has also turned out to be harder than expected. Commodore CD Balaji, who directs the Naval LCA project at ADA told India’s Business Standard that:

“In the paper design it looked feasible [to convert the IAF’s Tejas], similar to what Eurofighter proposed for a navalised Typhoon; or what Gripen proposed for the Sea Gripen [DID: both of which are higher end designs, with better base performance]. But when we started the detailed design and the actual build… we realised the benefits of what Dassault had done with the Rafale. They designed and built the naval variant first, the Rafale Marine. The air force Rafale is just a subset of Rafale Marine. That is the easiest path.”

Dec 9/12: Industrial fail, more $. India’s Business Standard offers a scathing portrait of incompetence at HAL, which has been unable to set up and operate a production line for the LCA, even though many of its projects involve assembling foreign designs on production lines in India. On the other hand, see the March 24/11 entry, where HAL executives point out that it doesn’t make much sense to establish a full modern production line for a program that has only featured limited production orders and an uncertain future.

As a result, Tejas fighters built to date have been custom-built limited-production and prototype aircraft. The immediate consequence is that the Ministry of Defence has to budget another Rs 1,500 crore (about $277 million) to try and set up a modern production line. Air Marshal (ret.) Pranab K Barbora:

“HAL’s assembly line expertise is outdated by at least three decades. They have done nothing to upgrade their technology. Setting up a modern assembly line for the Tejas is far beyond HAL’s capabilities.”

The paper points out that HAL’s new CEO RK Tyagi has “no experience in aeronautical development or manufacture,” and openly doubts the government ADA’s program manager, P. Subramanyam. He promises that HAL will build 20 Tejas Mk.I fighters in 2.5 – 3 years, with production of the next 20 in just over 2 more years, by 2018. That might be possible if an experienced foreign manufacturer is contracted quickly to help set up production, and the MoD is reportedly studying that idea. By itself, however, HAL hasn’t been able to build even 2 Tejas fighters per year over a prolonged reference period, and India has no operational squadrons. Meanwhile, Pakistan has already fielded almost 3 squadrons of their JF-17 Thunder fighter, which began its design cycle after Tejas.

Note that the Business Standard’s figure of INR 155.470 billion (Rs 14,047 + 1,500 crore) for the entire LCA Tejas program is almost exactly double the Indian government’s official March 2012 figures. The math indicates that they’re probably including the Kaveri engine. DID considers the 2 programs to be separate, and pegs unofficial total Tejas development costs at INR 131.015 billion (Rs 13,101.5 crore, currently about $2.15 billion), including current and forecast costs for the naval variant, and the expected Rs 1500 crore for production line help. With Kaveri included, our figures rise to INR 144.405 billion, and are probably slightly behind actual Kaveri spending. Business Standard.

HAL: Industrial fail

Dec 3/12: Kaveri. India’s state-owned Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) aims to integrate the Kaveri powerplant with a Tejas fighter operated by India’s Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA), with the aim of flying it by the end of 2013. Whether it can perform to standard won’t change DRDO’s advocacy, but it may matter to the IAF. As of May 14/12 (q.v.), India’s Minister of Defence said that it couldn’t meet India’s 90kN/ 20,200 pound thrust requirement.

A March 21/12 answer to Parliament (q.v.) pegged the Kaveri’s development cost at INR 28.39 billion ($520 million), nearly 10 times greater than the original INR 3.83 billion. Flight International.

Aug. – Nov. 2012: Testing halted. The Tejas encounters a DASH of trouble, as India discovers that the top of the pilot’s DASH-III integrated helmet display can end up above the top of the Martin-Baker ejection seat. That’s a serious problem, because it means the helmet could hit the canopy as the seat rockets out of the cockpit, killing the ejecting pilot. India had to halt testing for 3 1/2 months before the problem was fixed. Their response was to modify the seat, and to provide a backup mechanism that they calculate will blow the canopy off before the pilot’s head can hit it. They had better be right.

DRDO chief V. K. Saraswat has confirmed to India’s Business Standard that the fixes are done, adding that ADA used the down time to make other modifications as a result of flight test feedback. Even so, a string of setbacks has shifted Tejas’ Initial Operation Clearance (IOC) from a re-baselined end-2010 to mid-2013 – if nothing else goes seriously wrong. Final Operational Clearance (FOC) for combat operations was scheduled for end-2012, and now looks unlikely until 2014-2015.

To the west, Pakistan has already inducted 3 squadrons of its comparable JF-17 fighters, whose joint development with China began 16 years after Tejas. India’s Business Standard.

A DASH of trouble

Oct 18/12: Lessons Learned. Air Commodore Muthanna’s “Challenges In Design To Deployment: Critical Lessons From the D&D of LCA” [PDF] has some interesting bits in it. The Commodore believes that the fighter deserves to enter service. Unfortunately, Indian officials and firms didn’t involve aviators in the initial design process, either by teaming with the IAF or by the widespread practice of embedding aviators in the design teams. The IAF had to get involved after the 2006 contract, and a lot of the time and cost slippage from then until now has involved RFAs aimed at fixing deficiencies that should have been addressed in design. Beyond that, he cites serious issues in management, manufacturing, and training:

“A fundamental challenge has been the structure of the Indian higher defense management. Broadly speaking, there are three verticals within the Indian Ministry of Defense that steer this program…. In this totally State funded and State managed program, interdepartmental oversight has been lacking. It is necessary that a single political entity take charge….

….[Transitioning from design to manufacture,] the necessity to convert frozen design drawings into production drawings…. [is] an elaborate process…. Other shortcomings are; inability to meet manufacturing tolerances; non availability of correct jigs, fixtures and tooling to mee t DAL requirements; non availability of suitable calibrating equipment; and, lack of trained manpower.

….With the flight simulators, however, it was a strange story. While the ASR did envisage the requirement of a simulator before deployment, no such development was undertaken…. there would be no representative flight simulator available for use by the customer aircrew. The situation will be aggravated by the non availability of a trainer variant of the aircraft in the required time frame.”

Lessons learned report

May 14/12: Kaveri. Minister of Defence Shri A K Antony replies to Shri Bal Kumar Patel in Lok Sabha. No, DRDO still has no time frame to fully develop its Kaveri engine. Antony reiterates that the engine does not meet requirements for the Tejas, but will be used in UAVs and marine applications. A technology demonstrator may fly in a Tejas Mk.I fighter around 2015. The operative word here is “may”.

April 27/12: Naval LCA. NP-1, the 1st Tejas naval prototype, has its maiden flight. The plane is piloted by chief test pilot of the Indian Air Force’s (IAF) national flight test centre (NFTC) Commodore TA Maolankar and co-piloted by the centre’s flight test engineer, Wing Commander Maltesh Prabhu. NP-2 will be the single-seat naval variant. Zee News.

Naval variant flies

March 21/12: Costs. Defence minister Antony answers a Parliamentary question, and provides cost and schedule slips for the LCA Tejas, LCA Naval, and Kaveri engine. Those are reproduced above along with other information. Antony also discusses what’s being done about these slips, which amounts to more oversight and monitoring. That won’t cure a system whose main problem is a lack of accountability or consequences for the state-run development agencies, and whose secondary problem is the system’s own red tape. On the other hand, the answer makes it sound like the government is doing something. Antony adds that:

“Tacit knowledge acquired by the DRDO scientists during this project will also be applied for further aerospace technology. Kaveri spin-off engine can be used as propulsion system for Indian Unmanned Strike Air Vehicle (USAV).”

Readers may note that he is not referring to the LCA Tejas program as a destination for Kaveri, despite DRDO’s wishes in the matter. See also Indian government PIB | Flight International.

March 14/12: Goal – 6 squadrons. Indian minister of state for defence M M Pallam Raju tels the Rajya Sabha upper chamber that the IAF plans to induct 6 LCA squadrons over the next decade or so, including 4 squadrons of Tejas Mk.II fighters. Given current schedules, past performance, and the extent of the redesign and testing involved, India may be lucky to induct any Mk.II fighters by 2022. Deccan Herald.

March 11/12: Naval LCA. India’s Sunday Guardian reports that India’s Centre for Military Airworthiness and Certification (CEMILAC) has refused flight certification for the Naval LCA, until the new landing gear’s weight is reduced, and its wing leading-edge vortex controls are redesigned. The US Navy and EADS are reportedly being consulted to help fix the problems.

CEMILAC’s decision will add further delays to a program that is already late, and effectively ends hopes for a March 2012 flight. The naval variant’s initial flight was initially slated to happen by the end of 2010, following a July 2010 roll-out. As of Sept 26/11, it had managed only an Engine Ground Run.

March 10/12: Testing. While Tejas continues to make test flights, and has been granted initial certification, final certification and full production continues to face delays, and will not come until late 2013 or even 2014 now.

New test aircraft LSP-7 had a maiden flight, without a chase plane, “to test many indigenously-developed instruments,” as well as the M-2032 radar and DASH helmet. It’s close enough to the final standard that it will be one of the planes offered for IAF user-evaluation trials, but the final-configuration LSP-8 won’t be ready until later in 2012. LSP-8 will be the version presented to CEMILAC for full certification and flight clearance, a necessary step before full production can begin for the two 20-plane orders. The Hindu.

Feb 29/12: HAL, shape up. India’s MoD explains that changes are coming to HAL, and cites the Tejas program as one reason behind the push:

“The Defence Minister Shri AK Antony today asked the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) to realign its business processes for strategic alliances and joint ventures, as also, to step up R&D efforts to remain globally competitive… Keeping in mind the mammoth role that the HAL would assume in the coming years in the aerospace industry and the challenges that it would face, the government has set up an expert group under the chairmanship of Shri BK Chaturvedi, Member, Planning Commission to suggest measures to strengthen and restructure HAL… the Group will suggest how best the spin offs from HAL order book can be earnest to ensure better involvement of the private industry in the defence sector. It will also suggest measures to enhance the synergies between HAL, the private defence sector and the civilian industry.

“Taking part in the discussion the Members of Parliament appreciated the role played by HAL in the defence arena of the country over the years. They, however, pointed out certain shortcomings such as the delay in the induction of the Light Combat Aircraft in the Indian Air Force, delay in the development of Kaveri Engine, delay in phasing out of Mig-21 aircraft and lack of an aggressive strategy to export HAL products.”

See also March 24/11 entry, The Pioneer | Flight International | IN FOCUS: India advances air force modernisation.

Feb 27/12: Naval LCA. The Indian Ministry of Defence’s Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) has sanctioned the building of 8 Naval LCA aircraft by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), and reportedly allocated the necessary funds for a contract. That does not mean a contract has been signed yet.

The 8 planes will be built as a mix of single-seat test fighters and twin-seat trainers, and would begin to add production fighters on top of the ordered fleet of 6 test aircraft. The first flight is announced for sometime in March, though talks last year of a maiden flight in July did not pan out. Business Standard.

2011

Tejas initial clearance; RAFAEL Derby picked as MRAAM; Kaveri engine still alive but in limbo; HAL pushed to outsource. IOC flight
(click to view video)

Dec 21/11: Kaveri. In response to Parliamentary questions, Defence Minister Antony explains the Kaveri engine’s current development status:

“So far 9 prototypes of Kaveri engines and 4 prototypes of Kabini (Core) engines have been developed. Total 2050 hours of testing have been conducted on various Kaveri and Kabini engines at ground and altitude conditions for various requirements including performance, operability, endurance, environmental, etc. Two major milestones viz. successful completion of Official Altitude Testing (OAT) and completion of first block of flights of Kaveri engine in Flying Test Bed (FTB) has demonstrated the technological capability and maturity of this indigenous effort. Kaveri engine prototype (K9) was integrated with IL-76 aircraft at Gromov Flight Research Institute (GFRI), Russia and flight tests have been successfully carried out up to 12 km maximum forward altitude and a maximum forward speed of 0.7 Mach No. Twenty seven flights for 55 hours duration have been completed on IL-76. Critical subsystems and its associated knowledge know-how and know-why has been acquired in association with Indian public & private sector industries, including certification methodologies.”

Nov 23/11: Kaveri. In response to Parliamentary questions, Defence Minister Antony says that nothing has changed with respect to the Kaveri engine’s successor. He doesn’t put it like that, but that’s the reality. India MoD.

Aug 8/11: Kaveri. In response to questions, the Indian MoD clarifies the status of the Kaveri engine project. There is no signed co-operation agreement with SNECMA, but the Air Force has reviewed the draft technical specification and approved it.

“The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has made no agreement with a French firm to develop the Kaveria aero engine to be used for the Light Combat Aircraft, Tejas. However, DRDO is negotiating with M/s Snecma, France for co-development and co-production of Kaveri aero engine for the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas MK-II. The project proposal will be put up for Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) approval after the completion of price negotiation… IAF has further suggested that the engine design should have minimal impact on the LCA Tejas airframe for future retrofitment.”

If it succeeds, India’s Tejas fleet would have an alternative engine option, much like the popular F-16. Several countries fly F-16s, and even F-15s, with 2 different types of engine (PW F100 or GE F101) in their fleet, as insurance that keeps their air force flying even if an engine type develops problems. First, however, an agreement must be signed. Then, the development project must succeed at a reasonable cost.

July 20/11: Naval LCA. The naval Tejas will probably get a different name. Meanwhile, an F404-IN20-powered naval variant is undergoing ground integration tests at HAL’s Bangalore facility, followed by engine runs and ground runs in the coming weeks. A 1st flight within 3 months is considered optimistic.

Meanwhile, India’s ADA has asked the US Navy to help it define carrier suitability plans, and the US Navy is assisting. Flight International.

May 23/11: Testing & Weapons. Aviation Week reports that the Tejas Mk.I is due to undergo a 2nd phase of night trials. Aircraft LSP-5 reportedly made 6 night flights in April 2011, which tested avionics, the instrument landing system, and integration involving the IAI ELTA multimode radar, Elbit’s DASH helmet-mounted display, and RAFAEL’s LITENING pod. The push to finish night operations clearance will also include items waived for the IAF’s initial clearance (vid. Jan 10/11 entry) – waivers that the service does not intend to grant again.

The next 16 months will see assessments of Tejas’ angle of attack, g-forces and sustained turn rate, with limited series production aircraft #6 arriving to help speed things along. It will also see a greater focus on weapons integratiopn tests – so far, only R-73/AA-11 Archer short-range air-to-air missiles and standard bombs have been tested. Still to go: Laser-guided bombs, cluster bombs, and Russian 80mm S-8 rocket pods. RAFAEL’s Derby medium-range air-to-air missile isn’t set to test until mid-2012, and the IAF also expects Russian Kh-31/35/39 anti-ship and precision strike missiles as part of the Tejas Mk.I’s intended configuration.

March 24/11: Industrial. India’s Business Standard reports that the Indian DRDO is pushing HAL to outsource some Tejas production or set up joint ventures, in order to meet required delivery schedules and keep the IAF’s fighter fleet at acceptable numbers. The current line can reportedly produce just 8 planes per year, and a high-level HAL team has reportedly toured Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Eurofighter GmbH facilities.

A request of this nature from the DRDO is nothing short of revolutionary. HAL has 2 serious problems, however, which make such a different approach thinkable for India’s bureaucrats. One is low real orders for Tejas. As one HAL executive put it: “…how much money could we have realistically invested in a production line?… So far, future Tejas orders of 100-120 more fighters are only plans.” The other problem is the load level on the state-owned firm’s Aircraft R&D Centre, which is is simultaneously trying to develop the Tejas Mark II; the Sitara Intermediate Jet Trainer (IJT); the Sukhoi-HAL Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA); and the Irkut-HAL Multi-Role Transport Aircraft (MRTA). The firm is also developing Dhruv helicopter variants, including a light attack helicopter. That’s a tremendous amount of competition for attention and resources, and HAL will face more strains if/when each project becomes a production demand.

Other likely candidates for partnerships wold have to include France’s Dassault Aviation, Sweden’s Saab, and Israel Aerospace Industries, as well as BAE and Northrop Grumman. The latter 3 firms have considerable experience as fighter program sub-contractors. Northrop Grumman is looking to sell its E-2D AWACS and Global Hawk UAVs to India; while IAI supplies a range of equipment to India already, and has industrial partnerships in place. So, too, does BAE, who is already working with HAL to produce its Hawk advanced trainer jets in India.

Feb 14/11: Tejas runs the Derby. Indian Aeronautical Development Agency director P.S. Subramanya says they have picked RAFAEL’s Derby as the Tejas’ initial beyond visual range air combat missile. He expects a contract by March 2011, with delivery expected in the second half of 2012, in time for the final phase of Tejas Mk.I testing.

Derby has range limitations, and was accepted on India’s Sea Harrier fleet despite not meeting the program’s original range goals. It also lacks a datalink. On the other hand, it offers a fire-and-forget weapon that’s already in India’s inventory, and integrated with Tejas’ EL/M-2032 radar, possessing what’s reported to be a wide boresight cone. It’s also true that given the need to avoid fratricide and positively identify targeted aircraft, most aerial engagements have taken place within Derby’s range, and future conflicts involving India are expected to feature that same limitation.

Long-term plans were to deploy the locally developed Astra missile as the Tejas BVRAAM, but in 2010 India decided to use a foreign missile and get Tejas into operational service. If Astra succeeds, it can always be integrated later. Meanwhile, Tejas gets ordnance commonality with India’s Sea Harriers, which also carry the EL/M-2032 radar, and with India’s SPYDER anti-aircraft systems. Defense Update | Livemint | RAFAEL on Derby | ACIG on Derby.

RAFAEL Derby BVRAAM picked

Feb 3/11: Kaveri. DRDO hasn’t given up trying to force the issue with its long-delayed Kaveri engine. After proposing it as a naval turbine, the newest gambit is to specify it for a proposed twin-engine Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (A-MCA), which would be developed by 2020 and operational by 2025. The proposal is an aircraft somewhat comparable to America’s F-35 – not an encouraging comparison, given that plane’s development costs.

Government acceptance of that plan would buy the engine project another decade, but the question is whether the A-MCA project is even realistic. India’s M-MRCA medium fighter competition hopes to field an advanced 4+ generation plane by 2015, but deliveries will take years, and real operational capability isn’t likely until 2016 or later. Meanwhile, the 2020-2025 time frame is also the expected window for India’s FGFA 5th generation collaboration with Sukhoi. Both are very big budget programs, even as India looks to field a much larger Navy to counter Chinese ambitions in the Indian Ocean basin, and faces a growing need for expensive ballistic and cruise missile defenses. In that environment, MCA could easily find itself fighting hard to avoid becoming yet another sidelined Indian technology demonstrator project.

DRDO also hopes to muscle the Kaveri v2 engine into the Tejas. They want the Indian government to swap the engines in when the initial 40 GE F404 equipped Tejas Mk.Is come in for their scheduled overhauls, during the 2015-2020 time period. Flight International | The Hindu | UPI.

Jan 31/11: Kaveri. Livemint reports that India’s DRDO expects to close price negotiations for a Kaveri joint venture (JV) with France’s Snecma by the end of February 2011, following over 2 decades and INR 28.8 billion spent on the project in India. DRDO declined to reveal the estimated cost of the Snecma-GTRE project, which reportedly aims to produce a viable competitor to the GE F414 that powers the F/A-18 Super Hornet family, Saab’s JAS-39 Gripen NG, and will almost certainly power the Tejas Mk.II.

Reports suggest that Snecma will bring in critical technology for the hot engine core, which is key to the 38% thrust gain sought over existing Kaveri models, while DRDO’s Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) will work on the “cold” sections around it. GTRE would be left with complete know-how and intellectual property rights for the engine,which will also need to become lighter.

Jan 10/11: Tejas IOC. The Tejas LCA is given Initial Operational Clearance by the Indian Air Force, marking their first induction of an Indian designed and built front line fighter. It has been a long road. The Hindustan Times reports that: “The government has so far pumped Rs 14,428 crore into the LCA programme which was pegged at Rs 560 crore when conceived in 1983.” The program cost was set at over 3,300 crore by the late 1980s, and has continued to rise. At today’s exchange rates, the INR 144.28 billion figure translates into about $3.15 billion. The Times of India places the program total even higher, at 17,269 crore/ $3.77 billion for all variants.

Note that India’s IOC designation is not the same as Initial Operational Capability for America’s military, which represents a combat-ready unit. India doesn’t have that yet, and Tejas receives this designation without all of its advertised capabilities, such as air-air engagements using radar-guided missiles. Indeed, subsequent reports reveal that key criteria for even minimal operations were waived, including wake penetration tests, lightning clearances, and some basic all-weather and day/night items. What India’s IOC does, is allow regular IAF pilots to begin flying it.

Indian Air Force chief P.V. Naik says that Final Operational Clearance for induction and formation of a Tejas squadron isn’t expected until 2013 or 2014, an event that will take place at Sulur Air Base in Tamil Nadu. The first test flight of the Tejas Mark-II version is currently scheduled for December 2014, with production beginning in June 2016. Indian Government | Economic Times of India | The Hindu | Hindustan Times | IBNLive | LiveMint | New Delhi TV | Sify | Times of India | Times of India op-ed || BBC.

Tejas IOC

Jan 14/11: Radar. domain-b reports that American pressure has forced Israel to bar exports of its EL/M-2052 AESA radar to India. The radar was reportedly intended to replace the EL/M-2032 on the Tejas Mk.II aircraft, where it would sharply improve radar performance and sharply lower maintenance costs (q.v. Oct 3/08, Dec 4/09 entries).

Israel wanted to install the radar in its own F-16s and F-15s, but the Americans moved to strangle a potential competitor by telling the Israelis that installing the M-2052 would cut off all manufacturer support for its fighters. On the export front, the USA can use ITAR restrictions to block technologies developed with American assistance, and forced Israel to implement a set of military export controls that add up to unofficial American review. Israel has reportedly sold a limited number of M-2052s to 1 undisclosed customer, but use in the Tejas Mk.II would represent the radar’s 1st major sale anywhere.

2010

GE’s F414 engine for Tejas Mk.2/Naval; 1st Naval LCA prototype rolled out. EJ200s in Eurofighter
(click to view full)

Nov 21/10: Cost. The Times of India places the cost of India’s Tejas program at 17,269 crore, or over $3.7 billion. The report adds:

“Latest figures also show each of the first 40 Tejas fighters will cost around Rs 150 crore [DID: about $33 million], over and above the huge developmental cost… Tejas, incidentally, has clocked around 1,420 flights with 10 prototypes till date. Its FSED (full-scale engineering development) Phase-I till March 2004 cost Rs 2,188 crore [DID: 1 crore = 10 million rupees]. The Phase-II, to be completed by December 2012, will cost another Rs 5,778 crore. To add to that, there is fabrication of two Tejas Mark-II, with alternate engines, to be completed by Dec 2018 for Rs 2,432 crore, along with development of indigenous technologies for Rs 396 crore. Naval Tejas FSED Phase-I, in turn, is to be completed by Dec 2014 for Rs 1,715 crore, with Phase-II slated for completion by December 2018 for another Rs 1,921 crore.

Tejas will, of course, also be powered by American GE engines, with its indigenous Kaveri engine floundering despite Rs 2,839 crore being spent on its development since 1989. Towards this, India recently finalised a $822-million deal for 99 GE F-414 engines.”

These figures are later shown to fall short of government figures. India’s goal of a $20-25 million fighter at full rate production may still be achievable, but it will bear close watching. It is very normal for the first production sets of a fighter to cost far more than fighters at full-rate production, with figures of double or even triple the price common for aircraft with very long production runs.

Nov 6/10: F414. During President Obama’s visit, the White House provides further details regarding the F414 engine order, which it places at 107 engines:

“…Upon finalizing the contract, General Electric’s facility in Lynn, Massachusetts, and other sites across the United States will be positioned to export almost one billion dollars in high technology aerospace products. This transaction is tentatively valued at approximately $822 million, all of which is U.S. export content, supporting an estimated 4,440 jobs.”

This is strictly true, since any contract with GE would be 100% export content, but the deal itself may still contain provisos for technology transfer and related contracts in India. UK Financial Times Beyond BRICs blog | Hindu Business Line | Indo-Asian News Service (IANS) | NDTV | Sify | WSJ India Real Time blog.

Nov 3/10: At the end of the India-UK “Indra Dhanush 2010” exercise, Indian Air Chief Marshal P V Naik tells the media that LCA Mark-I will be inducted into operational squadrons by the middle of 2011, while the LCA Tejas Mark-II should be operational in the next 2-3 years, as “the process of selection of engine for LCA Mark-II is nearing completion.” It doesn’t happen that way.Deccan Herald.

Nov 1/10: Testing. Aviation Week reports that LSP-5, the 11th test jet and 1st final configuration Tejas Mk I aircraft, is readying for flight trials as the ADA tries to meer a Dec 27/10 deadline for release-to-service certification. Changes include internal cockpit lighting for night flying, a revised internal communication set similar to HAL’s Druhv helicopter, and National Aerospace Laboratories’ auto-pilot mode. Aviation week adds that:

“If the delivery schedules are met, then the Indian Air Force will have LSP-7 and LSP-8 for user evaluation trials by March 2011. LSP-6 will be a test vehicle for high angle of attack. The Tejas squadron is expected to be in Bengaluru by mid-2011 and the first two series production aircraft (SP-1, SP-2) also should be ready by then.”

Oct 25-28/10: Engine II. Report, and denial. After NewsX’s Vishal Thapar broadcasts a reports that a Eurojet consultant has been expelled from India for illegally obtaining information on GE’s bid, trying to substitute a new Eurojet bid by offering a monetary inducement, and then planting media reports that Eurojet was ahead on price. Thapar also claims that this is why the Indian MoD took the unusual step of announcing GE as its low-cost bidder, before a contract was signed.

The follow-on effects could be very severe if true, making it very difficult for India to pick the Eurofighter as its M-MRCA medium fighter. Eurojet’s communication agency subsequently issues the following denial. See Milplex | India Defence:

“Eurojet Turbo GmbH categorically denies unfounded allegations made in the NewsX report titled ” India expels arms dealer”, authored by Vishal Thapar and released on 23 October 2010. The report lacks any factual base and is a work of fiction.”

Oct 1/10: Engine II – F414. India’s Business Standard may want a word with its sources. GE announces that its F414 engine has been picked to power the Tejas Mk.II fighter. India’s Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) will order 99 jet engines, with GE Aviation supplying the initial batch of F414-GE-INS6, engines and the rest manufactured in India under transfer of technology arrangements. When questioned by DID, GE sources confirmed that this is not a contract yet, merely preferred bidder status.

The selection of GE’s F414 deepens a relationship that has supplied 41 earlier model GE F404 engines so far, in order to power initial Tejas LCA Mk.I fighters and LCA Naval prototypes. GE describes the F414-GE-INS6 as “the highest-thrust F414 model,” without offering specifics, but is has been working on an F414 Enhanced Performance Engine. The INS6 will add single-engine safety features in its digital controls, something GE also installed in the F414 variant powering one M-MRCA candidate, the JAS-39 Gripen NG.

F414 engine picked for Tejas Mk.2

Sept 20/10: Engine II. India’s Business Standard reports that the European EJ200 engine may have the edge in the competition to supply the Tejas Mk.II fleet’s powerplants:

“Informed sources have told Business Standard that when the bids were opened last week, European consortium Eurojet bid $666 million for 99 EJ200 engines, against US rival General Electric, which quoted $822 million.”

Both engines have been ruled technically suitable, so the lower priced bid will win, but the bidding process isn’t 100% final yet. The paper also quotes Air Vice Marshall Kapil Kak (ret.) of the Indian Air Force’s Centre for Air Power Studies, who draws the obvious conclusion:

“It is as clear as daylight. Selecting the EJ200 for the Tejas would boost the Eurofighter’s prospects in the MMRCA contest. Its engines, which form about 15-20 per cent of the cost of a modern fighter, would be already manufactured in India for the Tejas [after the 1st 10 were built abroad]. For the same reason, rejecting the GE F-414 would diminish the chances of the two fighters [F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet and JAS-39NG/IN] that fly with that engine.”

Aug 25/10: Kaveri. Defence Minister Shri AK Antony updates progress in the Kaveri engine in a written reply to Shri N Balaganga of India’s Rajya Sabha (upper house of parliament). It’s phrased in terms of what DRDO is doing as development and testing continues, and gives various reasons why the engine is so late. It does not mention that the IAF isn’t interested, except to note at the end that “LCAs are, meanwhile, as decided by user, being fitted with imported engines.” Unlike some Indian programs, the Kaveri program has managed to spend most of its yearly budgets; over the last 3 years, these expenditures have been:

2007-2008: INR 1,525.1 million
2008-2009: INR 1,535.4 million
2009-2010: INR 1,220.6 million

As of Aug 25/10, INR 100 million = $2.15 million, so INR 1.2206 billion = $26.05 million.

July 6/10: Naval LCA. NP1, the first naval Tejas prototype, is rolled out. HAL will build NP1 and NP2 for testing, which will take place at a new facility in Goa. The naval variant adds a tailhook, strengthened undercarriage, leading-edge vortex controllers to slow down landings, auto-throttles, and a fuel dump system.

Naval LCA rollout

May 5/10: Engine II. GE describes 3 of the programs underway to improve its F414 engine. The most relevant is probably the F414 EPE (Enhanced Performance Engine), which has a new fan to increase airflow, and aims to increase thrust by 20%. It’s explicitly “targeted for potential international customers,” which includes India’s Tejas Mk.2.

The US Navy wants the F414 EDE (Enhanced Durability Engine), which uses an advanced high pressure turbine and 6-stage high pressure compressor (HPC) that offers a 2-3X hot-section durability gain, and reduced fuel consumption. F414 EDE forms the base of the EPE engine, but the gains will not be the same in both engines, owing to other design differences.

Crowded India may also appreciate the retrofittable F414 noise reduction kit project, with serrated edges where each “lobe” penetrates into or out of the primary airflow and generates a secondary flow, reducing jet noise by 2-3-decibels. The USN has identified funding for a program to mature the technology and prepare it for incorporation in the USN F414 engine fleet, with work scheduled to continue through 2011. GE Aviation.

Feb 3/10: Engine II. Eurojet says it will share single-crystal engine blade technologies with India if Eurofighter wins MMRCA, or the EJ200 engine is selected for the LCA Tejas Mk2.

Eurojet’s EJ200 equips the Eurofighter Typhoon. The EJ200 weighs about 2,200 pounds and produces 13,500 pounds of thrust in normal operation, or 20,000 pounds with afterburners. There were even rumors of a thrust-vectoring version, to improve Tejas maneuverability, but the engine lost the Tejas MK.II competition, then the Eurofighter was edged out by France’s Rafale in India’s M-MRCA finals.

Feb 2/10: Indian defence minister AK Antony watches flight demonstrations by twin-seat (PV-5), and single-seat (LCP-2) Tejas test aircraft, and declares: “Serious doubts were raised about Tejas… Now I can proudly say we will fly our own fighters.” He states Cabinet Committee of Security approval to add Rs 8,000 crore (about $1.73 billion) to the 27-year program for continued air force and naval development, and development of a new engine for the Mk.2, and expresses confidence in final operational clearance for the Mk.1 version by end of 2012. Antony also agreed that the government is in talks with parties abroad for the development of that Mk.2 engine, but would not be more specific.

The Indian Air Force has already ordered 20 LCAs, and has reportedly expressed interest in ordering another 20 aircraft. Meanwhile, the Navy is building 2-seat trainer (NP1) and a single-seat fighter (NP2) prototypes, with NP1 nearing completion of equipping after the structural assembly. NP1 is scheduled to roll out by April 2010, followed by a hoped-for first flight in June 2010. The single-seat NP2 is scheduled for its first flight by June 2011. India’s Business Standard | The Hindu | Indian Express | Times of India | Agence France Presse | The Asian Age.

2009

First 6 LCA Naval ordered; Tejas Angle of Attack flight issues; US red tape trips Lockheed Martin; Engine competition to equip Tejas Mk.II. Tejas test
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Dec 31/09: Kaveri. The Hindu reports that India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has been given government permission to accept an offer from France’s Snecma to ‘partner’ with the Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) to jointly develop a new version of the Kaveri jet engine. Senior GTRE officials tell The Hindu that talks could begin early in 2010. When that might result in a signed contract is anyone’s guess.

This article’s Dec 26/08 entry covers the verdict of a senior Indian committee, which had recommended against the DRDO-Snecma collaboration. The Hindu highlights the Matheswaran team’s criticism that using Snecma’s fully developed ‘Eco’ engine core would not create sufficient transfer or control of technology, but reports:

“Snecma, which indicated that an engine run of at least 250 is required to make their offer economically viable, agrees that an existing core would be at the heart… will take at least five years before the first production engine comes out. Snecma chairman and chief executive officer Philippe Petitcolin told The Hindu: “Yes we first stated a 15-year period to hand over the design technology, but now we have indicated that the technology can be given as fast as the Indians can assimilate it.”

Note that the article does not indicate commitment to use the “Kaveri II” engine for any particular purpose, or offer a likely timeline. Rather, the emphasis seems to be on continuing to develop India’s industrial capabilities, rather than fielding an operational engine. StrategyPage places the cost of that collaboration at $200 million, but this must be an estimate, as no firm deal has been negotiated. See also Sri Lanka Guardian. See also Aug 20/08 entry.

Dec 14/09: Kaveri. In a written Parliamentary reply, Defence Minister Shri AK Antony responds to Shri Gajanan D Babar:

“The proposal on the Kaveri-Snecma engine joint venture for the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas is under consideration of the Government. Request for Proposal (RFP) for procuring 99 engines have been sent to two short-listed engine manufacturers, namely GE F414 from General Electric Aviation, USA and EJ200 from Eurojet Germany. The engine houses have responded to the RFP. Both Commercial and technical responses have been received for procurement of 99 engines along with Transfer of Technology.”

Dec 7/09: A Parliamentary response from defense minister Antony offers details regarding the initial Tejas Mk.1 contract:

“A contract for procurement of 20 Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) in Initial Operation Clearance (IOC) configuration, along with associated role equipment, reserve engines, engine support package, engine test bed and computer based training (CBT) package from Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) was signed in March 2006. The total contract cost is Rs. 2701.70 crores.” [currently about $580 million]

Dec 4/09: Radar – AESA? DRDO’s Bangalore-based Electronics & Radar Development Establishment (LRDE) reportedly invites global bids to become the development partner for a Tejas active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar. This would presumably replace the IAI Elta EL/M-2032 derivative that will requip Tejas Mk.1 fighters.

The Active Array Antenna Unit (AAAU) would be supplied by the development partner. Responsibilities would include “detailed design, development and realisation” of the antenna panel (main antenna, guard antenna and sidelobe cancellation antenna), transmit/receive modules/groups, the RF distribution network (RF manifold/combiners and RF interface), antenna/beam control chain (T/R control and T/R group control), and array calibration/BITE among other areas. Livefist.

Nov 26/09: Testing. Tejas PV-5, a 2-seat trainer version, makes its maiden flight. The Deccan Herald says that commonalities between the 2-seat trainer and Tejas naval version will help that sub-program as well, but it will take hundreds of flights over a year or more before the trainer version can be qualified for use by IAF, as a key step in pilot training and induction of the single-seat fighter into IAF operational service.

Sept 28/09: US red tape. India’s Business Standard reports that Lockheed Martin was selected in June 2009 as a consultant for developing the Naval version of the Tejas. Lockheed Martin has no serving carrier-borne fighters, but they’re developing the F-35B STOVL and F-35C Lightning II for use from carriers.

Unfortunately, delays in US government approval has led DRDO’s Aeronautical Development Agency to recommend that another consultant be chosen instead; Dassault (Rafale) and EADS (no carrier-borne aircraft) were recommended as alternatives,and EADS was eventually picked. Lockheed Martin is still fighting to get through the red tape and salvage the contract, and may continue trying until V K Saraswat, India’s Scientific Advisor to the Defence Minister, makes a decision.

This has happened before, and recently. Boeing was the front-runner for a similar role with respect to the main (IAF) version, and would be a logical consultant for any naval version – but the Indian MoD awarded EADS that contract in early 2009, after the US government failed to grant Boeing a Technical Assistance Agreement clearance in time.

Sept 21/09: Naval LCA. India’s Business Standard reports that the Tejas Mk.II is attracting funding from India’s Navy, who believes that a modified, EJ-200/F414 equipped Tejas would have the power required to operate from its future aircraft carriers in STOBAR (Short TakeOff But Assisted Recovery) mode:

“Business Standard has learnt that the navy has okayed the placement of an order for six Naval LCAs. At an approximate cost of Rs 150 crore per aircraft, that will provide a Rs 900 crore infusion into the Naval LCA programme.”

At today’s rates, Rs 900 crore = $187.8 million. Naval LCA fighters would operate from India’s 30,000t-35000t Indigenous Aircraft Carrier (IAC), which is being built at Cochin Shipyard with assistance from Italy’s Fincantieri, and is expected to join the fleet by 2014. That creates a potential timing issue, as the Tejas Mk.II’s engine selection and ordering process isn’t supposed to produce new engines before 2013-14. Aeronautical Development Agency director P S Subramaniam told Business Standard that they would fly the modified Naval Tejas airframe with the current GE-404 engine, to test its flight characteristics and structural strength. The new INS Hansa in Goa, with its land-based carrier deck outline and equipment, will be extremely helpful in that regard. If those tests go well, a naval Tejas variant would not operate from a carrier until the new engines were delivered and installed. See also: India Defence

India: 6 Naval LCA.

Aug 4/09: Engine II. Flight International reports that the Eurojet consortium has done tests regarding the EJ200’s fit into the Tejas’ space, and believes itself to be in a strong position for the expected 99-engine order to equip the Tejas Mk.II. The RFP response date is Oct 12/09.

Aug 3/09: Kaveri. India’s DRDO is attempting to resurrect the Kaveri engine project, but the IAF’s lack of enthusiasm is pointed. MoD release:

“Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has offered to co-develop and co-produce 90 kN thrust class of upgraded Kaveri engine with M/s Snecma, France to meet the operational requirement of Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), Tejas with 48 months from the date of project inception… The proposal for co-development was considered by Indian Air Force. Indian Air Force has suggested a proven engine that is already in production and flight worthy for meeting immediate requirement. Request for Proposal (RFP) has been issued to reputed engine manufacturers.”

A separate MoD release gives December 2012 as the target date for the LCA Tejas Mk.I’s “final Operational Clearance,” adding that project oversight currently involves a high level review by the Chief of Air Staff once per quarter, and by the Deputy Chief of Air Staff once per month.

March 4/09: Testing. India Defense reports that a multi-agency team is carrying out 2-weeks of Phase 2 weapon testing for the LCA Tejas. The focus is on safe separation, aerodynamic interference data, and complex weapon release algorithms in different modes of release. Note that the tests still involve aerodynamics, rather than full weapons system integration.

Feb 25/09: Government of India:

“A contract for 20 indigenous Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) has been signed. One IAF squadron is expected to be equipped with this aircraft in 2010-11. Government is not planning to set up a hi-tech facility at Nagpur costing about Rs. 300 crores [3 billion rupees, or about $60 million] for indigenizing components of these aircrafts. Product support including spare parts will be supplied by the vendor as per the terms of the contract that will be concluded.”

Feb 17/09: Engine II. Flight International reports that the Eurojet engine consortium may be about to change the competitive field for the expected RFP to equip LCA Tejas MkII aircraft. The firm has been working on a thrust-vectoring model of its engine, and the magazine reports that it will be offered to meet India’s expected RFP for up to 150 engines.

The Eurofighter is also an MMRCA medium fighter competitor, and twin wins for Eurojet could offer India important commonality benefits, even as they justified an in-country production line. Thrust vectoring would also offer the Tejas a level of maneuverability and performance that could be a difference-maker in combat, and on the international market. The Eurofighter is considered a long shot to win the MMRCA competition, however, and timelines could become an issue. Flight tests of a thrust vectoring EJ200 engine are not expected to begin for another 2 years.

Feb 6/09: Engine II. The Press Trust of India quotes Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) Director P Subrahmanyam, who says that India’s state-run DRDO is still looking for partners to develop the indigenous Kaveri engine. That hasn’t stopped the Ministry of Defence’s ADA from preparing a competition to equip the LCA Mark II version from 2014 onward, after the initial aircraft are fielded with F404-IN-20 engines:

“We are looking to procure either the GE-414 from US or European consortium Eurojet’s EJ 200 to fly with the LCA Mk II version [after going through offers from various global manufacturers]. Request for Proposals (RFP) is just about to go out and very soon it would be floated.”

Eurojet’s EJ200 equips the Eurofighter Typhoon, while GE’s F414 equips Saab’s JAS-39NG Gripen and Boeing’s F/A-18 Super Hornet family. All 3 of these fighters are competitors in India’s MMRCA, which aims to buy at least 126 medium multi-role fighters to fill the gap between Tejas LCAs and India’s top-tier SU-30MKIs.

The article appears to indicate that India would be looking to switch production to the new engines, after low-rate initial production equips the first 2 IAF squadrons with 48 aircraft. In practice, required engineering changes and aircraft testing make such an early switch unlikely.

Jan 29/09: AoA issues. Indopia reports that India’s DRDO/ADA and HAL are proposing a $20 million collaboration with EADS to assist with flight trials, and help to increase the fighter’s flight envelope. Performance at high “angles of attack,” in which a fighter’s nose and wings are tilted at steep angles, will reportedly be the focus for EADS efforts.

At any aircraft’s critical angle of attack, the wing is no longer able to support the weight of the aircraft, causing a tail slide that generally worsens the problem and can lead to an aerodynamic stall. Different aircraft have different critical angles of attack, and design changes can lead to an expanded range for safe, sustained flight maneuvers. In some cases, such as India’s Sukhoi 30MKIs with their modern triplane configuration, the design’s flight envelope can become so large that maneuvers like the near 90 degree “Cobra” become safe and routine.

Jan 23/09: Testing. The Tejas LCA completes its 1,000th test flight since the first 18-minute flight by Technology Demonstrator-1 on 04 Jan 4/01. Frontier India | The Hindu | The Times of India.

Flight #1,000

2009

Why Kaveri was a failure, demonstrated; Kaveri for naval ships? Inverted flypast
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Dec 26/08: Kaveri. The Hindu reports that a committee set up by the IAF in September 2008 has recommended against Snecma’s offer (see Aug 20/08 entry). The report says that the result would not be a co-designed, co-developed engine, but rather a license production arrangement. The group recommends continued development of the Kaveri engine and its core technologies instead, despite the failures to date.

These conclusions are less surprising when one examines the committee’s composition. Air Vice Marshal M. Matheswaran chaired the group, which included representatives from India’s state-run Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA), Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), the Centre for Military Airworthiness and Certification, and IAF officers posted at ADA, the National Flight Test Centre and the Aircraft Systems and Testing Establishment. All are state-run groups that have been involved in the Kaveri’s ongoing development, and have strong incentives to protect that turf.

Dec 13/08: Testing. A Tejas fighter prototype lands at Leh air base in the high-altitude Ladakh region of Jammu and Kashmir, at an altitude of 10,600 fee. Leh is one of the highest airfields in the world, with a temperature variation ranging from 5 to -20 C/ 41 to -4F. .

That was the whole point, of course: perform cold weather testing, while making an assessment of the aircraft’s performance in high-altitude conditions, without the confounding influence and additional challenge of high temperatures. India Defence

Oct 3/08: Radar. The Hindu newspaper relays news from ADA Programme Director P.S. Subramaniam that the Israeli Elta “EL/M-2052” radar has already undergone tests on the flight test bed and ground rig in Israel, and “airworthy units” are expected to arrive early next week.

There had been some unconfirmed mentions of EL/M-2052s in connection with the Tejas, and it’s possible that ADA is beginning tests related to the Mk.II. It’s more likely that the radars are IAI Eltas M-2032, instead of Elta’s AESA option. The Elta M-2032 multi-mode radar already serves on India’s Sea Harriers and some Jaguars, and was picked as an “interim option” until India’s indigenous radar program performs to the required standard. Because the indigenous radar has failed to perform to standard, the ADA has reportedly been running weaponization tests on the Tejas using a weapon delivery pod, and has been forced to keep critical tests on hold. Past experience suggests that the Tejas’ radar will remain an import.

Aug 20/08: Kaveri & Snecma. The Wall Street Journal’s partner LiveMint.com has an article that more or less sums up the Kaveri project in a nutshell, and also the DRDO: “In aircraft engine development, you cannot set a timeline.” The article interviews T. Mohana Rao, director of India’s state-run Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE). Rao explains why the Kaveri engine is effectively dead as a fighter aircraft engine, leaving GE’s popular F404-GE-IN20 variant to power the Tejas for at least the next 4 years.

Rao quotes the Kaveri’s performance at 11,000 lbs./ 5,000 kg dry thrust at sea level, and 16,500 lbs./ 7,500 kg thrust on afterburners. That’s about 1,000 lbs./ 400 kg short of specifications. The engine is also overweight by 330 lbs./ 150 kg, and has yet to perform long-endurance tests to assess its durability.

The GTRE cannot promise any date for successful delivery, and so political approval was granted to form a partnership with a foreign engine firm on a risk-sharing basis. Russia’s NPO Saturn and France’s Snecma responded, while GE, Rolls-Royce, and Pratt and Whitney declined. After almost 2 1/2 years, the GTRE chose France’s Snecma, but there’s no contract yet. industrial issues need to be settled, and the government requires consultation with the Indian Air Force before any contract and requirements are signed.

Snecma’s proposal involves an engine core (compressor, combustor and high-pressure turbine) called Eco. Snecma would have a workshare of 45%, and GTRE’s would be 55%, with nearly 85% of the manufacturing within India. Snecma says the aircraft could be certified for fitting in the Tejas within 4 years. Assuming that project remains on time, of course. The policy question is whether this outcome was predictable from the outset. As the Live Mint article notes:

“Nearly 20 years after it promised an indigenous engine to power India’s light combat aircraft Tejas, the… country’s sole aero engine design house, is now seeking outside help…”

Aug 13/08: Kaveri KMGT. The DRDO’s GTRE in Bangalore believes it may have found a use for the Kaveri engine, in naval vessels. Using the core of the Kaveri engine, plus a low-pressure compressor and turbine, the engine would become a gas-fired 12 MW propulsion unit in warships up the he Rajput Class, or find uses as on-shore electricity generators. A Kaveri Marine Gas Turbine (KMGT) has been transported to naval dock yard at Vishakapatnam, and installed on to the marine gas turbine test bed there. Yahoo! India | RF Design.

The Rajput Class “destroyers” are modified Russian Kashin-II Class ships, though their top weight of just under 5,000 tons would mark them as large frigates in many navies.

Aug 3/08: Kaveri – And Replacements? The Wall Street Journal’s partner LiveMint.com reports that France’s Snecma will partner with India’s DRDO to develop a new engine, sidelining the Kaveri project.

“GTRE has spent nearly Rs1,900 crore of the Rs2,800 crore that was sanctioned since an engine project Kaveri, named after the river in southern India, began in 1989… Vincent Chappard, a Snecma spokesman in France, said he could not immediately confirm the development.”

While the IAF waits for Snecma’s efforts, reports also suggest that the DRDO’s Aeronautical Development Agency has invited both General Electric and Eurojet Turbo GmbH, a European engine consortium, to bid for higher-powered interim engines. GE offers the F414, and the Eurojet 2000 already has higher thrust, but the engines will have to fit the Tejas’ design – or vice-versa. These engines would be slated for Tejas aircraft produced beyond the initial 48 plane order, but before any indigenous engine is certified. WSJ partner Live Mint | domain-b

March 4/08: Radar. There are reports that Europe’s EADS has offered to co-develop an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar with India, for installation on board the Tejas fighters. Work is currently underway on an AESA radar to equip EADS’ Eurofighter, which is a long shot in India’s 126-190 aircraft MMRCA fighter competition.

The nature of AESA radars makes it possible to scale them up or down while retaining high commonality with larger versions, the main difference being changes to radar power and hence overall performance. Northrop Grumman whose AN/APG-77 AESA radar equips America’s F-22, recently introduced its AESA Scalable Agile Beam Radar (SABR) at Singapore’s February 2007 air show. It’s designed to equip existing F-16 fighters with no modifications required, and is advertised as being scalable to other platforms.

A win for EADS in this area offers to solve a problem for India, while creating a commonality hook for the Eurofighter – or at worst, a supplier diversification option for India that adds external funding to help EADS catch up in this key technology area.

March 3/08: Indian Defence Minister Shri A K Antony responds to a Lok Sabha (lower house of Parliament) question by saying that the Tejas flight test program is:

“…progressing as per the schedule. So far, 829 flight tests have been completed. Efforts are being made to accelerate the flight tests… Presently, no need is felt for strategic partner. To complete the project at the earliest, a top level review is being conducted by the Chief of Air Staff once in every quarter and review by the Deputy Chief of Air Staff once in every month. So far, Rs. 4806.312 cr [DID: 48.063 billion rupees, or about $1.19 billion at current conversion] have been spent on development of various versions of Light Combat Aircraft.”

2006 – 2008

1st 20 production Tejas ordered; IAI to substitute for MMR radar failure; F404 engines ordered; AA-11 fired; Naval Tejas contemplated. AA-11/R-73 Archer
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Oct 25/07: Testing. The Tejas fires a missile for the first time: Vympel’s short-range, IR guided AA-11/R-73 Archer air-to-air missile. Test aircraft PV-1 fired the missile at 7 km altitude and 0.6 Mach within the naval air range off the coast of Goa, marking the beginning of weaponization as a prelude to initial operational clearance (IOC) phase of the Tejas program.

The main objectives of test firing were to validate safe separation of the missile, the effect of missile plume on the engine’s air-intake and on composite structures, the workings of the stores-management displays and software, and quality assessment. India DoD release | Times of India.

While the beginning of weaponization is a significant event, the state of the fighter’s indigenous radar development means that the critical weaponization event for the Tejas LCA will be its first successful test-firing of a radar-guided missile.

Aug 13/07: Radar – IAI. Defence Minister Shri AK Antony states the obvious in a written reply to Shri Sugrib Singh and others in Lok Sabha, but adds new information concerning foreign cooperation:

“There has been a time and cost overrun in the said project. The project to develop two MMR systems for ground testing was sanctioned at a cost of Rs.62.27 crore. This activity was completed in 2004 at a cost of Rs.105 crore.

Yes, but see poor testing results in the April 8/06 and May 1/06 entries, below. He does not mention them, but effectively concedes the point by adding that:

A co-development activity of MMR has been initiated for Limited Series Production and Series Production with M/s ELTA Systems Ltd, Israel, which has experience in developing similar types of radars. To expedite the project, close monitoring of activity at the highest level of Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) management has been put in place.”

See also India Defence follow-on | Flight International.

IAI Elta radar agreement

April 26/07: Testing. The 1st of the Limited Series Production Tejas jets (LSP-1), makes its successful maiden flight at HAL airport in Bangalore, reaching an altitude of 11 km/ 6.6 miles and a speed of Mach 1.1 during the 47 minute flight.

According to the Indian government release, LSP-1 marks the beginning of series production of Tejas for induction into the Air Force.

1st production flight

March 1/07: India’s Defence Minister Shri AK Antony offers an update re: the Tejas LCA:

“Five Tejas are currently being flight tested for Initial Operational Clearance by the Indian Air Force pilots posted at National Test Centre of Aeronautical Development Agency, Ministry of Defence. So far 629 flights accumulating 334 hours have been completed. Twenty aircraft have been ordered by the Indian Air Force as the first lot.”

Feb 7/07: F404. HAL ordered an additional 24 F404-GE-IN20 afterburning engines in a $100+ million contract, in order to power the first operational squadron of Tejas fighters for the Indian Air Force.

This buy follows a 2004 purchase of 17 F404-GE-IN20 engines, in order to power a limited series of operational production aircraft and naval prototypes.

F404 engine order #2

Jan 25/07: India tries to throw a large monkey wrench into Pakistan’s rival JF-17 project. They almost succeed.

Nov 22/06: Reuters India: “Pakistan set to get eight JF-17 fighter jets next year.” Anxieties are becoming more acute as Pakistan readies its JF-17 fighter developed in conjunction with China and Russia, and prepares to induct them into service in 2007-2008. The JF-17 is a sub-$20 million fighter designed to replace F-7P (MiG-21+) and Mirage 3/5 aircraft in Pakistan’s fleet, and is a comparable peer for the LCA Tejas.

Sept 19/06: India set to induct 28 LCA Tejas aircraft by 2007. They would have GE F404 engines rather than the Kaveri, says former project director Dr. Kota Harinarayana. As it turns out, India has 0 inducted aircraft, 5 years after that stated date.

May 2/06: India Defence reports that the Indian Navy may be interested in a Tejas LCA version of its own.

May 1/06: Radar. More bad news for the radar project. The Vijay Times also notes that that the performance of several radar modes being tested still “fell short of expectations,” and may force acquisition of American or Israeli radars (likely APG-68 or Elta’s EL/M-2032) as an interim measure.

April 8/06: Radar. The Sunday Telegraph reports that the Tejas’ radar, which was also set up as an indigenous project after foreign options like the JAS-39 Gripen’s fine PS05 radar were refused, could only perform at the most basic levels, putting tests on hold:

“According to the IAF, which proposes to buy 220 of the planes when they are ready, the radar is now “marooned in uncertainty”… While two basic radar modes have been tested, the other modes have failed, throwing up serious questions about the system’s fundamentals.

In written replies to queries sent by The Indian Express, DRDO chief M Natarajan said: “Because of the complexity of technologies involved (in the radar project) and the extent of testing to be done, help of specialists in the field may be sought to complete the task… When Natarajan was asked why there was uncertainty over the radar so long after development began, he said: “The radar is under development by HAL and not at LRDE (the DRDO’s lab).” This, even when the signal processor built by the DRDO is the very heart of the radar.

Security analyst K Subrahmanyam has earlier called the dogged refusal to entertain foreign help by the DRDO as reflective of the organisation’s bad project management.”

March 2006: Order #1. India signs a contract with HAL for 20 Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) in “Initial Operation Clearance (IOC) configuration,” along with associated role equipment, reserve engines, engine support package, engine test bed and computer based training (CBT) package.

The total contract cost is INR 27.017 billion. Source.

India: 20 LCA

February 2006: Kaveri. Jane’s claims that SNECMA won the contract to assist India in developing the Kaveri.

Appendix A: DID Analysis & Op/Ed (2006) More exportable Kaveri

The complexities inherent in designing a new fighter from scratch are formidable, even for a lightweight fighter like the Tejas. As Air Marshal Philip Rajkumar (Retd) notes, India’s industry had significant experience deficits going into this project, which have delayed the project significantly, and raised costs. The insistence on pushing the envelope with a new fighter design, a new engine, and a new radar all at once has had consequences. In the long run, those consequences will lead to a smaller IAF, and could be set to create major force gaps if MiG-21 lifespans can’t be extended long enough.

As experts like Richard D. Fisher have noted, Chinese projects tend to quickly hand off significant components to others and confine the kinds of domestic expertise required. The J-10 has been an example, and the massive changes required when Israeli and Western cooperation ended made the project incredibly challenging. Only a Chinese decision to outsource major components like the engines to the Russians kept the project from failing completely.

As the J-10 shows, delays remain possible, even with extensive foreign cooperation. It’s also true that every new jet engine type can expect teething issues when it is first installed. This may explain why even Sweden, with their long history of indigenous fighter development, chose the less risky approach of adopting the proven GE F404 & F414 engines for the JAS-39 Gripen. They made minor modifications as required in conjunction with the manufacturer, then concentrated their design efforts elsewhere.

All the more reason, then, to bring in foreign partners for components like the engine etc., and minimize the complexities faced by India’s indigenous teams in its state-run organizations.

Sainis and Joseph’s examination of the benefits to Indian industry from the LCA program demonstrate that most industrial benefits would have been retained had India taken this route. So, too, would the project’s timelines, which have suffered instead as India’s fighter fleet dwindles.

In India’s case, these added complexities can also spill over onto the export front. If potential Tejas export customers aren’t offered a common, fully tested international engine like the GE F404, with a broad network of support and leverage across multiple aircraft types, risk calculations will get in the way of some sales. When deciding on their buy, potential customers will have to evaluate the Kaveri engine’s prospects for future spares, upgrades and support, available contractors with relevant skills in maintaining them, etc. This tends to make potential buyers more cautious, and is likely to reduce Kaveri’s odds when competing against options like the Chinese/Pakistani JF-17, which uses a modified version of the engine that equips many MiG-29s around the world.

As the French have found with the Rafale, lack of exports for a limited production indigenous fighter equals rising maintenance and upgrade burdens that hit right in the home budget, and make it that much harder for the design to keep up with contemporary threats over its lifetime. Which in turn affect export prospects in a vicious circle.

Will India’s decision to proceed with the Kaveri engine offer short-term customization benefits, at the expense of long-term pain? Or can HAL maintain the Tejas airframe design, and field a lightweight fighter that offers its customers a choice of engines?

Appendix B: The Kaveri Saga – Keystone, or Killer? Kaveri prototype
(click to view full)

The GTRE GTX-35VS Kaveri was envisioned as a variable cycle flat-rated engine, in which the thrust drop is compensated by increased turbine entry temperature at the spool. The variable cycle flat-rated engine would be controlled by a Kaveri full authority digital control unit (KADECU/ FADEC). The goal was a powerplant with slightly more thrust than GE’s F404 engines, whose characteristics were uniquely suited to India’s hot and humid environments.

India’s frequent goal of “100% made in India content” has derailed a number of its weapon projects over the last few decades, but foreign decisions also played an important role in the Kaveri project’s genesis. In 1998, India’s nuclear tests prompted the US to place sanctions on military exports, including GE’s F404 turbofans and Lockheed Martin’s assistance in developing the Tejas’ flight control system. In response, India began its program to develop an indigenous engine. As the Rediff’s Feb 5/06 report notes:

“DRDO scientists had kept the development of the Kaveri engine under wraps, exuding confidence that India had developed the technological edge to develop its own aircraft engine, so far confined to handful of developed countries.”

The prospect of ending that dependence is a powerful lure, but some of the reasons for that small club are technical. Modern jet engines are far more complex than even Vietnam-era engines like the GE J79 that equipped the F-4 Phantom. Producing a working, reliable engine that can operate at these high pressures and thrust ratings isn’t easy, and weaking and troubleshooting a new and unproven jet engine always involves a great deal of work and expense. The Kaveri engine’s climate performance targets added even more challenges to an already-full plate. That proved difficult for the program when the program’s entire context changed.

Eventually, the USA lifted its weapons export restrictions on India. In contrast, the natural barriers to developing an advanced engine from scratch, in a country with no past experience doing so, to technical specifications more challenging than current market mainstays, were not lifted so easily. The complexities inherent in this challenge belied DRDO’s apparent confidence, forcing India to bring in turbine experts from Snecma in France and from US firms like Pratt and Whitney.

In the end, the Indian DRDO was finally forced to look for a foreign technology partner, and issue an RFP. Even then, acceptance of program realities was slow in coming. In the initial stages, DRDO secretary M Natarajan referred to it as an effort to “add value and look for a partner to stand guarantee,” and stated that any partners would have to work to India’s terms. A committee in which IAF experts would be included would evaluate the bids to decide on:

“…how much to take and from whom… But Kaveri is and would remain an Indian project… We have gone this way to shorten time for making the engine airborne, as we don’t wont to delay the LCA induction schedule.”

GE F404

Those goals did not prove to be compatible.

US engine manufacturer General Electric, who supplies the F404 jet engines that power initial Tejas models, seemed unenthralled with those proposed terms. They declined to respond to the RFP for foreign assistance. Eventually, India’s state agencies were forced to concede that they could not develop an engine with the required specifications, and that seeking foreign help to improve the basic design was also unlikely to produce a design that met the required specifications.

With no engine in production as late-stage aircraft testing began, and none forthcoming in the forseeable future, India’s drive to develop an indigenous “Kaveri” jet engine had become a key roadblock for the Tejas program in India – and very possibly, beyond India as well.

In contrast to the Kaveri, F404 family engines are already proven in a number of aircraft around the world including Saab’s 4th generation JAS-39 Gripen lightweight fighter, the F-117A Nighthawk stealth fighter, models A-D of the F/A-18 Hornet fighter aircraft in service around the world, South Korea’s T/A-50 Golden Eagle supersonic trainer & light attack aircraft, and Singapore’s soon to be retired A-4SU Super Skyhawk attack jets. Kaveris equipped with F404/F414 engines would present a lower risk profile to potential export customers, due to the engines’ long-proven performance, GE’s global support network, and the number on engines in operation around the world.

Kaveri would offer none of these important benefits, in exchange for one offsetting feature: foreign sales would not require US military export approval for the engines.

India has not been a major weapons exporter, so export realities didn’t carry a lot of weight. On the other hand, the technical and timeline difficulties experienced by the main Tejas program created a potential natiional defense crisis that could not be ignored. By August 2008, the Kaveri program had effectively been sidelined, in order to get the Tejas into service within an acceptable time frame and preserve India’s operational fighter strength. While political changes may resurrect the Kaveri program as a political exercise, the Tejas program’s technical procurement path has been moving in the other direction.

This kind of vague drift away from an indigenous option is common in India’s procurement history. It usually ends with off-the-shelf “interim” buys becoming permanent; and an indigenous program that’s either shelved, or bought in very low numbers alongside a much larger foreign purchase of similar equipment.

GE’s F404-IN20 will be the Tejas’ initial powerplant, to be followed by the F414-GE-INS6, which beat the Eurojet EJ200 as the Tejas Mk.II’s planned engine.

Even so, DRDO continued to fund and back its long-delayed project. By January 2013, they had abandoned negotiations with France’s Snecma to create a Kaveri 2.0 version using key Snecma engine technologies, and resolved to try yet another global tender. A Kaveri without an afterburner would power a notional UCAV strike drone, and DRDO specified a pair of Kaveri engines for a proposed “Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft” project.

These pursuits would have kept the Kaveri development project consuming defense funds for another decade. In May 2014, however, Narendra Modi’s BJP Party scored a crushing landslide victory, and vowed to shake up the way government was run. DRDO felt the change, shifted their prioritization methods, and decided in November 2014 that the Kaveri program should be abandoned entirely.

\Additional Readings & Sources Background: LCA Tejas

• Indian Government – Tejas: India’s Light Combat Aircraft.

• India’s Aeronautical Development Establishment – Main site. Government agency developing the LCA family.

• DRDO – Light Combat Aircraft.

• Aerospace Web – Hindustan (HAL) Tejas / Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Light Multi-Role Fighter.

• Air Force World – LCA. Chinese site.

• GlobalSecurity.org – Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA).

• MILAVIA – ADA Tejas LCA (Light Combat Aircraft).

• Wikipedia – HAL Tejas. Detailed and well footnoted.

Background: Ancillary Technologies & Weapons

• General Electric – F404 engine family.

• IAI – EL/M-2032 – Multimode Airborne Fire Control Radar.

• ACIG Database – Kfir C.10. Includes a great deal of information concerning IAI Elta’s EL/M-2032 radar, and looks at the Derby missile.

• Tactical Missiles Corp. JSC – R-73E/R-73EL. AA-11 Archer short range air-to-air missile in the West.

• RAFAEL – DERBY Beyond Visual Range Air-to-Air Missile

• Tactical Missiles Corp. JSC – KAB-1500LG-Pr-E, KAB-1500LG-OD-E, KAB-1500LG-F-E. Laser guided bombs.

• Tactical Missiles Corp. JSC – Kh-59MK2 Air-Launched Missile. Short-range strike, similar to Raytheon’s AGM-65 Maverick.

• Tactical Missiles Corp. JSC – Kh-31A Medium Range Airborne Missile. AS-17 Krypton in the West, has several variants including the Kh-31P radar-killer.

• Tactical Missiles Corp. JSC – Kh-35E – Tactical Anti-Ship Missile. Sub-sonic, similar to Boeing’s Harpoon.

Background: Tejas Mk.II Technologies

• General Electric – F414 engine family. In Mk.II.

• Eurojet – EJ200. Lost Mk.II competition.

• India’s DRDO – Kaveri Engine. The state-owned R&D agency grudgingly abandoned their push to put this on the Tejas. For now.

• IAI – EL/M-2052 – Active Phased Array Airborne Fire Control Radar. Reportedly slated for Mk.II.

Official Reports

• India MoD (March 20/13) – Delay in Manufacturing of Tejas by DRDO.

• Air Commodore Muthanna (Oct 18/12) – Challenges In Design To Deployment: Critical Lessons From the D&D of LCA.

News & Views

• DID FOCUS – India’s MMRCA Fighter Competition. Covering the MRCA foreign competition, whose choices and success will affect the Tejas LCA project.

• DID – India’s DRDO Rethinking the Way it Does Business. Contains an extensive set of links to articles covering India’s defense sector and its organizational/ program issues. One of which is Tejas.

• Bharat Rakshak (Feb 11/13) – Interviews with LCA program test pilot Cmde Jaydeep Maolankar and N-LCA Deputy Project Director Cmdr Sukesh Nagaraj. Claimed. DID can’t confirm their authenticity, but we have no reason to disbelieve this account.

• AeroMag Asia – Jan-Feb 2013 issue [PDF] includes “LCA-Tejas: Sky is not the limit” | “TEJAS Programme is dashing towards the completion of IOC: Subramanyam” | “LCA-Navy can be a replacement for Sea Harrier: Balaji”.

• The Indian Express (Nov 15/06) – 23 yrs and first fighter aircraft hasn’t taken off. Says the LCA Tejas may face further delays, and the entire project could even be forced into a joint-venture in order to successfully deliver the aircraft.

• Vijay Times (May 1/06) – Glitches in LCA radar.

• The Sunday Express (April 8/06) – ‘Indigenous’ aircraft needs foreign lift, for its radar.

• Rediff (Feb 5/06) – Kaveri Engine – Reignited Hopes, Technological Edge?. Scroll to the right if necessary.

• Press Trust of India (Feb 2/06) – Light Combat Aircraft project to be completed in 2010. Scroll to the right if necessary.

• Frontier India (March 6/05) – Light Combat Aircraft – Tejas Testing. By Air Marshal Philip Rajkumar (Retd). Good description of the issues encountered trying to design and build the aircraft.

• Bharat Rakshak Monitor (March-April 2001) LCA Development and Costs. By Sunil Sainis and George Joseph. Contains the most detailed cost and industrial participation information we have found.

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