Defence`s Feeds

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

The European Defence Agency (EDA) currently has several job openings in the different directorates: Corporate Services Director (TA, AD14), Head of Unit Information Superiority (TA, AD12), Project Officer Components Technologies (TA, AD11), Programme Manager Satellite Communication & Project Officer Radio Spectrum (TA, AD11), Policy Officer Industry Relations and Support - SMEs (SNE), Project Officer Communication and Information Systems (SNE), IT Developer  (CA, FGIV). Candidates must apply via the EDA website.

The Agency is an “outward-facing” organisation, constantly interacting with its shareholders, the participating Member States, as well as with a wide range of stakeholders. It works in an integrated way, with multi-disciplinary teams representing all the Agency’s functional areas, to realise its objectives including its annual Work Programme and its rolling three-year Work Plan. Its business processes are flexible and oriented towards achieving results. Staff at all levels need to demonstrate the corresponding qualities of flexibility, innovation, and team-working; to work effectively with shareholders and stakeholder groups, formal and informal; and to operate without the need for detailed direction.

 

More information:

• Access the vacancy notices through our job portal

 

Presentation by Shingo Yamagami, Director General, Japan Institute of International Affairs
Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

Presentation by General Ramirez and General Pfrengle, Eurocorps
Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

Les 181 essais nucléaires menés en Polynésie française entre 1966-1996 ont eu un « impact environnemental » et « provoqué des conséquences sanitaires », a admis le président François Hollande, lors de son déplacement à Papeete, lundi 22 février. Cette reconnaissance était une revendication ancienne des associations de défense des victimes et des élus locaux. Le chef de l’Etat a annoncé une révision du traitement des demandes d’indemnisation des victimes des tests. La loi du 5 janvier 2010, dite loi Morin, du nom de l’ancien ministre de la défense, a apporté des « avancées », mais seule « une vingtaine » de dossiers − sur un millier − ont abouti, a-t-il justifié.
Les Polynésiens considèrent que les essais sont la cause de nombreux cancers dans l’archipel. François Hollande s’est engagé à ce que l’Etat accompagne le développement du service d’oncologie au centre hospitalier de Tahiti.

« Tourner la page »
La « dette nucléaire » ou « milliard Chirac » (en francs, soit l’équivalent de 150 millions d’euros aujourd’hui), une dotation annuelle qui visait à compenser la perte d’activité économique engendrée par la cessation des tests en 1996, « sera sanctuarisée ». « Son niveau sera dès 2017 rétabli à plus de 90 millions d’euros », a aussi promis M. Hollande, répondant, là encore, à une demande pressante des élus locaux.
« Les conséquences environnementales devront également être traitées » sur les atolls qui accueillaient les installations nucléaires, a-t-il poursuivi. L’Etat achèvera notamment « le démantèlement des [infrastructures] et la dépollution de l’atoll de Hao ». Ceux de Moruroa et Fangataufa feront l’objet d’une « vigilance méticuleuse ».
Plus généralement, le chef de l’Etat a reconnu « solennellement » la contribution de la Polynésie à la force de dissuasion nucléaire du pays.

Parmi les 181 essais qui ont donné lieu à une explosion, deux en 1968 ont eu pour but de tester des bombes soixante fois plus puissantes que celle larguée sur Hiroshima le 6 août 1945 : plus de 1 000 kilotonnes, contre environ 15 kilotonnes pour la bombe américaine « Little Boy ». Jusqu’en 1974, les essais étaient « aériens », autrement dit menés à l’air libre : ainsi, quarante et un ont été effectués soit d’une barge, soit d’un ballon, ou largués des avions. Passé 1975, ils n’ont plus été que « souterrains », d’un puit creusé dans l’atoll, ou directement sous le lagon. L’armée a reconnu qu’au moins un tir, celui du 17 juillet 1974, avait produit des retombées sur l’île de Tahiti. Mais il n’est pas impossible que les quarante précédents aient fait pareil, d’autant que ce tir en particulier n’était « que » de 20 kilotonnes (pour équivalent en kilotonnes de TNT). Pourtant, à ce jour, seules dix-neuf victimes ont été indemnisées par le ministère de la défense ou le Comité d’indemnisation des victimes des essais nucléaires (Civen) sur 1 024 dossiers déposés.
La loi Morin adoptée en 2010, qui encadre les indemnisations, était très attendue en Polynésie, mais n’a pas atteint ses objectifs : « La loi ne fonctionne pas », écrivaient les sénateurs dans un rapport en 2013. Les projections sur les indemnisations réalisées faisaient « état de dizaines de milliers de demandes », et « de 2 000 à 5 000 dossiers indemnisables », selon les sénateurs. Elles sont loin d’être atteintes.

Source

Tag: François Hollandenucléaire

Airbus A330 MRTT Aerial Refueling and Transport Aircraft

For several weeks, the Sudanese army led a deadly offensive to people in Darfur. And, until now, in general indifference. The Sudanese warplanes bombed continuously the mountainous plateau Jebbel Marra, causing many civilian casualties. The military strategy remain the same: once the bombs from the sky hit the villagers, the militias of the regime kill, rape, plunder and the survivors or neighboring villagers flee en masse. In a few days, according to the head of humanitarian affairs in Sudan Marta Ruedas, 34 000 people have been forcibly displaced. Several villages have been attacked, burned, destroyed.

The violence in Darfur erupted again in 2013, moving about a half million people, bombings and attacks continue without international echo. In February 2015, HRW alleged that 221 women and girls were raped by Sudanese forces during an organized attack in October 2014 against the city of Tabit, North Darfur. The activity of UNAMID staff on site (15 784 people in January 2015) is contested, the mission "spend more time to protect itself against attacks from pro-government militias, as acting with civilians. "

Nowadays the results of the EU support the AMIS mission, (one of the firts EU missions) are completly annulated. Read the CERPESC Analysis on Darfur in French (soon in English). This report has kept its relevance

See our book on the first EU missions in Africa here
Second, updated edition coming soon!

Tag: Darfur

With more than 11,000 aircraft currently stationed in Europe, the military are Europe’s biggest airline. Europe’s armed forces operate more than 150,000 flights per year. The Single European Sky initiative and its technological pillar, the Single European Sky Air Traffic Management Research (SESAR) programme, thus have considerable implications for the military. The European Defence Agency (EDA) will outline the military perspectives on SESAR at a seminar at the World ATM Congress in Madrid on 8 March.

EDA supports its Member States in the identification of the military operational and financial risks expected with the implementation of SESAR. The Agency facilitates also the coordination of military views by gathering input and requirements from Ministries of Defence.

At the World ATM Congress in Madrid, the European Defence Agency organises for the first time a seminar to outline military perspectives on SESAR. High-level speakers from the Agency, the Spanish Air Force, SESAR Joint Undertaking, SESAR Deployment Manager, EUROCONTROL and NATO will discuss challenges and opportunities stemming from SESAR for the armed forces. The seminar will take place on 8 March, 14:30 – 16:00, in the Delegate Theatre. To attend the seminar, you need to register for the World ATM Congress (free, see link below). More details on the agenda and speakers are available here.

In addition to the EDA led seminar, Agency staff will also provide contributions to the following seminars taking place during the World ATM Congress:

• The European ATM Standards Coordination Group (EASCG), Tuesday, 8 March, 10:30-13:30 
• SESAR JU seminar on the ATM Master Plan 2015, Wednesday, 9 March, 15:30-17:30
• SESAR JU seminar on “SESAR and the military”, Thursday, 10 March, 11:30-12:30

 

More information:

• EDA seminar at World ATM Congress - agenda
• SESAR and the military - project page
• SESAR JU at the World ATM Congress website and full agenda
• World ATM Congress

Want to keep up to date on the SSR field? Once a week, the CSG’s Security Sector Reform Resource Centre project posts pertinent news articles, reports, projects, and event updates on SSR over the past week. Click here to sign-up and have the SSR Weekly News Roundup delivered straight to your inbox every week!   SSR Resource Centre

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

The lower house of the Afghan parliament, the Wolesi Jirga, will end its winter recess and begin its next sitting on 6 March 2015. With elections delayed, the current group of MPs is likely to be in place for some time. This seemed like a good time, then, to review the lower house’s performance in 2015. AAN’s parliamentary reporter, Salima Ahmadi, reveals issues such as low attendance, a preoccupation with presidential decrees and only a nominal oversight of the executive. MPs’ most interesting work, she noted, usually occurred during the hour-long open discussions when constituents’ concerns were raised.

(This dispatch is AAN’s second look at parliament. The first, published on 4 February 2016, looked at how the upper and lower house are set up and function.)

What are MPs supposed to do?

The Afghan constitution (article 81) stipulates that the Wolesi Jirga, “as the highest legislative organ, shall manifest the will of its people as well as represent the entire nation.” Like parliaments throughout the world, it has three principle roles: law making, overseeing the government’s actions and activities, and representing the people. (1)

By way of example, the tenth sitting (from 6 September 2015 to 20 January 2016) provides a useful insight into the workings of the parliament. 51 sessions were held, including two interpellations (in Dari and Pashto, isteza), when a minister is summoned for questioning, after which MPs can dismiss him or her, in a vote of no confidence. There were also 15 questioning sessions (istejwab) when ministers and other senior officials, such as the directors of the National Directorate of Security (NDS) and the Central Bank, are summoned for questioning (but without the threat of a no-confidence vote) and three presentations of reports (istema), when ministers are asked to tell the house about their ministries’ activities. (2) The house also held 30 plenary sessions, which are the general sessions, which all MPs should attend where there is a set agenda followed by an hour-long open discussion. A closed session was also held in which the devaluation of the Afghani compared to the US dollar and other foreign currencies was discussed.

During this tenth sitting, MPs approved a total of 39 pieces of legislation, including ten laws, nine international agreements, six presidential legislative decrees, the annual national budget for the fiscal year 1395 (20 December 2015 to 20 December 2016) and amendments to the Internal Rules of Procedures of the Wolesi Jirga. (3) MPs also rejected six presidential decrees. Several were left pending when MPs went into their winter recess and are due to be considered in March, when the lower house reconvenes.

At first glance, it may look as if the parliament worked hard throughout 2015. Whether any of it amounted to much, though, is open to debate. There were serious flaws in the carrying out of MPs’ legislative and oversight roles. Moreover, one major underlying problem must be highlighted: the low attendance rate. For the most part, there was no quorum of MPs, which meant that issues could not be voted on and the work of the house frequently ground to a halt.

Where were the MPs?

There are currently 240 MPs. (4) The required minimum number of MPs for a quorum to vote on legislation is a simple majority, in other words 121. On most days, however, this reporter noted attendances as low as 68 and 76. In October 2015, for example, out of 14 sessions, a quorum was scraped together on only six occasions. The best attendance that month was 131. (5) In the last three months of 2015, the house was relatively full on only three occasions, with the best turnout 184. Generally, more MPs showed up for the ‘big occasions’, such as when a minister was summoned or the votes on candidate ministers (although far fewer turned up for the earlier sessions when MPs grilled the candidates), or when the budget was discussed. “The reason for MPs’ low attendance,” a member of the parliamentary affairs office, an employee of the parliament, told AAN, “is that most of the current MPs have businesses and therefore they attend to their own matters, rather than focusing on the national issues.”

This failure to reach a quorum sabotaged important work. Voting and discussions had to be postponed on issues such as the proposed amendments to the Rules of Procedures of the Wolesi Jirga (4 November 2015), the SAARC agreement for the prevention of natural disasters and the Convention of Islamic Organizations on Food Security (both on 18 November 2015), as well as on presidential decrees pertaining to nuclear energy and agricultural pesticides (11 January 2016). The persistent low attendance of MPs also slowed down the overall performance of the Wolesi Jirga, as MPs were unable to deliver what had been planned in the legislative calendar. On occasions when there was a quorum, there would often be rushed, mass voting. On 13 January 2016, for instance, the Wolesi Jirga discussed and voted on five pieces of legislation in less than two hours. (6) MPs have occasionally been known to work harder. They extended parliament’s eighth sitting (July 2014-January 2015) by a week (under government pressure), delaying the winter recess so that they could vote on candidates for the cabinet and on the budget. Likewise in January 2016, some MPs wanted to extend the tenth sitting saying they were needed to closely monitor the quadrilateral meetings trying to start a peace process. However, they were unable to collect enough signatures for this motion.

The same pattern of poor attendance was noted in the meetings of the dozen or so specialised commissions (such as for security, development, complaints and the budget) and joint commissions that review draft legislation before it goes to the house. According to the Free and Fair Election Forum of Afghanistan (FEFA), most of the commissions’ decisions were taken without the necessary quorum, sometimes with as few as two or three members. (7) However, for a commission decision to be valid, a majority of its members have to be present (article 28 of the Wolesi Jirga Rules of Procedure). The attendance rate of the administrative board of the Wolesi Jirga (MPs who are elected to organise the business of the house) was no better. On 28 January, for example, MP Abdul Rahim Ayubi was scheduled to reveal to the administrative board a list of MPs whom he claimed had received bribes. On the scheduled day, the administrative board members did not show up and no session was held (see the report here).

No serious measures have been taken against MPs who are constantly absent from the plenary and commissions sessions. Articles 111, 112 and 113 of the Rules of Procedures of the Wolesi Jirga prescribe a range of measures depending on the number of days (or months) of unexcused absence, from salary reduction, withholding salary to the suspension of privileges. (8) These rules have never been enforced. From the pattern of (non-)attendance, it would appear that many MPs show up to parliament only in order to collect their wages or to question ministers.

What did MPs actually achieve?

Representing their constituents

Starting with the function of the house where MPs seemed to perform best – representing their constituents’ views – it appeared that the one-hour open discussion in every plenary session is the most relevant forum for MPs to air and debate citizens’ current concerns. For example, during the tenth sitting (September 2015 to January 2016), MPs discussed the alarming security developments in various provinces, the targeted killings of journalists and analysts, the critical situation of the economy, the date for the upcoming parliamentary elections, the presence of Islamic State (Daesh) fighters in Zabul and Nangrahar provinces, human rights issues, the peace process, the security of roads and various important infrastructure works. Unlike the time allocated for issues on the agenda, MPs frequently use more than the designated one-hour slot for the open discussion. Often, so many MPs put their names on the Speaker’s list for the open discussion that their time has to be limited to three minutes in order to accommodate all those who want to raise an issue.

Such issues have a real impact on constituents’ lives and are discussed on a regular basis, but rarely find their way into the legislative agenda. When it comes to law-making, MPs are reactive. They also appear to be overwhelmed by having to review and vote on the plethora of presidential degrees issued from the Palace.

Law-making

Members of the Wolesi Jirga have the authority to propose legislation (a privilege they rarely exercise) and to consider and endorse or reject legislation from government ministries or in the form of presidential legislative decrees. It was the decrees that were most commonly discussed and voted on. According to the constitution, these need Wolesi Jirga endorsement to become law.

During the tenth sitting, for example, the lower house received approximately two dozen presidential decrees for consideration. It approved six, rejected six and the remaining ones were left pending for after the winter recess. (9) Those rejected included two decrees, in November 2015, relating to electoral reforms. According to article 109 of the constitution, the Wolesi Jirga should not be deliberating on issues related to elections in the last year of its term. The lower house is, however, already outside of its constitutionally mandated term, so there was already a prior constitutional violation.

Oversight role

The other core duty of the Wolesi Jirga is to oversee the executive branch of government. It has to give a vote of confidence to government nominees for cabinet ministers and several other senior offices of state, as well as approve the budget. It also has the power to summon ministers to present an account of what they have done (hearings or istema in Dari and Pashto), for questioning (istejwab) and, most seriously, interpellation (isteza) when MPs can dismiss ministers for poor performance. However, in 2015 there was little sign of MPs investigating candidate ministers’ backgrounds or ministers’ performances or, indeed, of calling the government to account much at all. Voting on serious matters often appeared to have taken place along party or ethnic lines. Not every MP is swayed by such factors, of course, but the actual matter at hand frequently appears to be less important than group solidarity – or not – with the minister concerned. There are also frequent accusations of money changing hands ahead of major votes, something that is difficult to prove, although AAN did uncover evidence of this in 2010.

Endorsing and rejecting candidates

In 2015, parliament questioned and then approved or rejected two groups of candidates for cabinet minister posts, in January (at the end of parliament’s eighth sitting) and then in April (during its ninth sitting). AAN’s reporting noted the candidates’ extremely weak presentations and, in turn, weak questioning by MPs, few of whom had actually turned up to the chamber. Among those rejected were some very feeble candidates. However, the overall pattern – the rejection of all the women, Hazaras and Uzbeks – gave the appearance of party, ethnic or tanzim politics at play. (In the vote on the second group of candidates, MPs accepted all of them.)

After the summer recess, the Wolesi Jirga approved six nominees, including one woman (Ghezal Hares), for the Independent Commission for Overseeing the Implementation of the Constitution, but rejected a nominee who would have become the first female member of Afghanistan’s Supreme Court, Anisa Rasuli. President Ghani was criticised by conservatives for putting forward a woman for this position:

Menstruating women were considered unclean in Islam and were not allowed to touch the Quran, Qazi Nazir Hanafi [an MP for Herat] said. As judges put their hands on the holy book every day, and it was unfeasible for a Supreme Court judge to take a week off every month, ran his logic, Rasuli’s appointment should be opposed.

(For additional media reporting on this matter, see here.)

Rasuli narrowly missed out on the vote (she received 88 of the 94 votes needed). Ghani then put forward a male judge, Abdul Hasib Ahadi, whose nomination was approved (see here).

Calling ministers to account

The Wolesi Jirga summoned two ministers for interpellation sessions: Interior Minister Nur ul-Haq Ulumi and Minister of Communications and Information Technology Abdul Razaq Wahidi. Ulumi was summoned on 2 November 2015 and ordered to answer questions on the deteriorating security in the country and, in particular, how Kunduz had come to fall to the Taleban at the end of September. MPs accused the leaders of the National Unity Government of being “incompetent” as they had failed to protect people’s lives or the national interest. Ulumi was asked to explain the reasons behind the fall of several districts to insurgents. He blamed “countries in our neighbourhood,” singling out Pakistan, saying they did not want a sovereign Afghanistan. He attributed the fall of Kunduz to the Taleban as “a failure of government leadership.” Ulumi further noted “the withdrawal of international troops and a poorly equipped air force as being factors in the country’s deteriorating security situation.”  He retained his position after MPs were apparently satisfied with his explanations and received 131 out of 151 votes.

Some ministers alleged that this support was not due to the fact that MPs had been convinced by his answers. MP Qais Hassan claimed, “A third hand is behind the 180 degrees change in lawmakers’ view,” adding, “Ulumi was not a good minister and did not properly manage his ministry.” In a Pajhwok article, MP Aziza Jales referred to “a door-to-door campaign in favour of the minister” and claimed that appointments based on “nepotism and misuse of tribal rivalries” had saved Ulumi from a vote of no confidence. “The same MPs who collected signatures to impeach the Interior Minister,” MP Rahman Rahmani from Balkh afterwards told AAN, “then became his defence lawyers during the interpellation session.”

On 4 January 2016 the Minister of Communications and Information Technology, Abdul Razaq Wahidi, was also summoned to give answers on alleged corruption charges and illegal appointments within the ministry, as well as a ten per cent tax collection on mobile phone credit. The presidential decree ushering in the ten per cent tax had been endorsed by the Council of Ministers while the Wolesi Jirga was in its summer recess. When they returned, MPs said it contravened article 79 of the constitution and, on 14 October 2015, voted it down. MP Ghulam Hussain Nasiri from Maidan Wardak said, “We must not discuss unlawful decrees.” “In the devastating economic situation of Afghanistan,” MP Ghulam Faruq Majruh from Herat told AAN, “imposing a ten per cent tax on telecom companies would be another burden on the nation.” There was no transparency in the tax collection process, he claimed, or where the money would be spent. Despite its rejection, telecom companies obeyed the decree and continued to enforce the ten per cent tax.

During his interpellation Wahidi rejected these allegations, calling them baseless. As for the tax, he said it “goes to the finance ministry budget and this ministry should be interrogated on how and where the budget is spent.” Wahidi added that in the first ten days of the decree being enforced, approximately 80 million Afghanis had been collected. Wahidi survived his vote of no confidence by a wide margin. (10)

On 13 January 2016, less than two weeks later, on their first day back in session and after the interpellation of Wahidi took place (see AAN analysis here), MPs inexplicably approved the tax in spite of their initial outcry. One MP, Shahidzada from Herat, said during the hour-long open discussion following the vote, that the sudden approval of the same decree (without any amendments) “shows the double standards of the Wolesi Jirga.”

While it may be that MPs were either satisfied with Ulumi and Wahidi’s explanations or had simply wanted to make their concerns known (and were never intent on sacking either minister), it should be noted that these same MPs, on 9 November 2013, endorsed the (now former) Minister of Refugees and Repatriation Affairs, Jamahir Anwari, who was publically accused of being involved in administrative corruption, fraud and land grabbing. Investigative reporting by the Independent Media Consortium on 28 September 2013 revealed detailed accusations that Anwari had UNHCR, the UN’s refugee agency, transfer tens of thousands of dollars into the personal accounts of family members and others (see reporting here, here in Dari and here). A month later, in October 2013, the Independent Joint Anti-Corruption and Evaluation Committee, a leading anti-corruption monitoring and evaluation body in Afghanistan, released its ‘vulnerability to corruption’ assessment on the process of land distribution for repatriations and displaced people led by the Ministry for Refugees (available here). The report detailed widespread administrative corruption, bribery, forgery, nepotism, embezzlement and poor customer service in the ministry. (11)

On 10 October 2013, 57 MPs requested that Anwari come forward to explain these allegations in an interpellation hearing. On 9 November 2013, the minister was subjected to a rigorous cross-examination (see here and here). He survived a vote of no confidence.

Approving the budget

As with the mobile phone tax vote in the autumn, MPs’ reluctance to endorse the budget dissipated eventually for no apparent reason. The Minister of Finance, Eklil Hakimi, had submitted the national annual budget on 25 November 2015 after it was approved by the Council of Ministers and discussed by the upper house, the Meshrano Jirga, which had made certain recommendations. The draft was then reviewed by the standing commissions and discussed in joint commission meetings, in accordance with the law. On 21 December 2015 (within the month allowed for by law, but already into the new fiscal year), the draft was presented to the lower house, which rejected it by a majority vote. The Wolesi Jirga members of the finance commission said both the budget and the proposed allocation of the budget for the provinces were unacceptable. MPs said the budget was “unbalanced” and accused the government of considering their own priorities and not the national interest (see here). The draft was sent back with comments and proposed amendments to the Ministry of Finance. The budget is one way MPs can put pressure on the government, which is has done in the past. In 2013 the Wolesi Jirga sent the 2014 budget back to the Ministry of Finance twice (see here and here).

With the Wolesi Jirga’s winter recess fast approaching, the government needed to react and press MPs to approve the budget. The initial draft budget had been 461.8 billion Afghanis (6.70 billion USD): 283.3 billion for ordinary expenditure and 178.5 billion for development (see here). During its second review of the budget, the Finance Ministry added just over 2.5 per cent to the budget (12 billion Afghanis – 17.4 million USD – of which 1.8 billion was allocated for ordinary expenditure and 10 billion for development). The head of the Wolesi Jirga Budget and Finance Commission, MP Ahmadyar Khan, who briefed MPs, claimed the new budget was more balanced because “18 different parts have been amended.” This time, MPs gave an overwhelming majority, with only six out of 146 members voting against the virtually unchanged budget.

MPs not going anywhere fast

In 2015, the Wolesi Jirga struggled to fulfil its constitutional function. Its current legality is also questionable, as it continues to sit beyond the constitutionally mandated end date of June 2015 (as analysed in the first part of this dispatch). The Independent Election Commission may have announced that parliamentary elections will take place on 15 October 2016, but that has not been generally endorsed. However, this batch of MPs will be with us for some – as yet unspecified – time to come. It is hard to see where an improvement on the 2015 performance could come from.

Edited by Lenny Linke

(1) In particular, the National Assembly holds the powers to: ratify, modify, or abrogate laws and/or legislative decrees; approve plans for economic, social, cultural, and technological development; approve the state budget, give or withhold permission for obtaining and granting loans; create and modify administrative units; ratify international treaties and agreements, or abrogate the membership of Afghanistan to them (see article 90, clause 1 of the Afghan Constitution). Based on the provisions of the Afghan Constitution, the Wolesi Jirga has some additional authorities compared to the upper house (Meshrano Jirga): deciding on the interpellation of each of the ministers; taking the final decision on the state’s development programs and state budget if there is a disagreement between the Wolesi Jirga and the Meshrano Jirga; approving the appointments according to the provisions of the constitution.

(2) Presentation of report (istema): listening to the report presented by the government to the plenary or commissions upon the request of the Wolesi Jirga;

Questioning session (istejwab): oral or written questions which are asked by the members of parliament in the commissions or in the plenary, which require responses from government officials during the session;

Interpellation sessions (isteza): the process of requiring a minister to provide an explanation for their actions in accordance with article 92 of the constitution, which can lead in the dismissal of a minister (see here).

(3) The 39 pieces of legislature approved during the tenth session included decrees related to electoral reform (two), the ten per cent tax on mobile users, agricultural pesticides, nuclear energy, procurement and transportation tolls, as well as decrees on amendments to the civil service law, the law on service management of electricity and amendments to the income tax law. See report “Wolesi Jirga performance in the tenth sitting” (6 September 2015 to 20 January 2016) by the Directorate of Legislative Affairs of Parliament, Kabul: 2016 (no web link).

(4) During the 2010 elections, 249 MPs were elected (according to the Afghan Constitution, there should not be more than 250 MPs in the Wolesi Jirga) for a period of four and a half years, or nine parliamentary sittings. This number of MPs has dwindled over the years to 240. In the last two sittings (January 2015 to January 2016), five MPs died (three in an explosion and one by natural causes). However, one of them, who died in a car accident, was replaced. Other MPs resigned from the Wolesi Jirga in order to take up positions in the government. Those MPs who died or resigned in the final year of the parliament, as per the rulebook, were not replaced.

Apart from the individuals officially recognised as no longer part of the Wolesi Jirga, there are also several MPs who are nominally still holding their mandates as MPs but who have refused to attend the Wolesi Jirga sessions due to their objection to the extension of the parliament’s terms beyond 22 June 2015. Despite their absence from the plenary sessions for the tenth sitting, they are still considered part of the Wolesi Jirga for the purpose of determining the quorum. During the last session of the tenth sitting, the Speaker of the House, Abdul Rauf Ibrahimi, singled out the following MPs, Ramadan Bashardost, Bakhtash Siawash and Farkhunda Zahra Naderi, as not having officially resigned from their positions. Therefore they need to be included in the number of active MPs. This means the total of 240 MPs in a plenary session can never been reached, hence the quorum technically should be adjusted to account for these ‘ghost’ MPs. However, given that parliament never comes near to being full, it is less significant than it might be.

(5) The Institute for Women, Peace and Security, a parliamentary oversight organisation, found that, on average, 57 per cent of parliamentarians were absent in the plenary sessions during the ninth sitting in 2015. In 2014, two out of three plenary sessions lacked a quorum (see Dari report here).

(6) When there is no quorum to vote on the draft laws then the scheduled draft laws and decrees are postponed until the next session. On some occasions there was mass voting. For example, on 13 January 2016, MPs voted and approved the following presidential decrees and laws in under two hours:

1. The law of regulating the telecommunications services charge

2. The legislative decree on agricultural pesticides

3. The legislative decree on nuclear energy

4. The toll taxes on gas and fuel law

5. Amendments regarding the procurement law

(7) “Wolesi Jirga Monitoring of Ninth Session of 16th Legislative Term: 16 Hut 1393 – 31 Saratan 1394,” Fair and Free Election Forum of Afghanistan (FEFA), Kabul: 2015 (see page 61).

(8) Rules of Procedures of the Wolesi Jirga

Rule 111

In case of a member’s absence in the plenary session or committee session, for each day of absence his or her monthly salary shall be deducted.

Rule 112

If a member cannot attend the sessions due to business related to his/her post [as MP] or because of lawful leave, his/her salary shall not be deducted.

This includes trips inside and outside the country relevant to the member’s job and the duties that are assigned to him/her at the time of conducting the sessions in the capital.

Rule 113

1. If a member is absent for one consecutive month, his/her main salary shall not be paid.

2. If a member is absent for two consecutive months, his case, based on the report of the administrative board, shall be investigated by the committee on rights, privileges and immunity of Jirga members. The committee shall put forward its opinion to the plenary session and in line with the article 108 of the constitution, the Jirga shall make the appropriate decision.

(9) Approved decrees:

1. 60th Presidential decree about telecommunication tax

2. 67th legislative decree about the ratification of law on service management of electricity

3. 82nd legislative decree about the ratification of some amendments in services of civil servants

4. 80th legislative decree about the rights of academic cadre for the institute of legislative affairs and academic research by imposing some amendments in this regard.

5. 71st presidential decree about agricultural pesticides

6. 69th presidential decree regarding nuclear energy

Rejected decrees:

1. 58th presidential decree about some amendments in the income tax

2. 75th presidential decree about the amendment regarding transportation tolls

3. 70th presidential decree about the addition of a second annex regarding a draft law on acting ministers or other officials.

4. 75th presidential decree regarding Structure, Authorities and Duties of Electoral bodies at the Independent Election Commission.

5. 74th presidential decree about the ratification of some amendments and the addition of some materials to the election law.

6. 70th presidential decree on the addition of a 2nd annex to the fifth article of the law on acting ministers

(10) Out of a total of 184 MPs present at Wahidi’s interpellation session, 104 MPs voted against his dismissal, 71 MPs voted in favour and nine votes were annulled (see here). Wahidi’s survival of the vote of no confidence was not without controversy, Kamal Nasir Osuli, an MP from Khost during the interpellation session for Abdul Razaq Wahidi, claimed that Wahidi had promised him 100,000 US dollars not to dismiss him. He also said that Wahidi had bribed another sixty MPs with 2,000 US dollars in order to also secure their support (see Dari report here).

(11) Earlier, UNHCR’s own evaluation of its Shelter Assistance Program conducted in the autumn of 2012, had also found the ministry to be an ‘unreliable partner’ due to corruption, inefficiency, mishandling of funds, lack of human resources, and an inability to demonstrate technical or thematic knowledge of the people under the ministry’s responsibility. In 2014, it was also revealed that a 2013 investigation by the United Nations Inspector General’s Office had found the ministry had misappropriated approximately 117,000 US dollars of UNHCR funds for staff bonuses, reimbursements to officials supported by forged documents and property rentals. Finally, the allegations were backed up by a report from the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) in August 2015.

Americas

• The USAF has earmarked $491 million over five years for the upgrade of B-52H radars. The modernization plan will replace the outdated Northrop Grumman AN/APQ-166 mechanically scanned array radar with further funds to be made available post-2021. The USAF strategy for the program has yet to be released, but it is likely that the plan will be to modify existing radar technologies and components to suit the B-52H, instead of developing something new, to increase reliability and durability of the radar.

• The US State Department has approved a $200 million Foreign Military Sale to Saudi Arabia. The sale will see the provision of support services by the United States Military Training Mission to Saudi Arabia (USMTM), which will be responsible for identifying, planning, and executing U.S. Security Cooperation training and advisory support for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Ministry of Defense. The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) did not elaborate on what exact training or services would be provided, although the deal would require the permanent or temporary assignment of as many as 202 case-funded US government or contractor personnel to Saudi Arabia.

Middle East North Africa

• An unknown Saudi Arabian order of 22 Hawk Advanced Jet trainers from BAE Systems has been revealed in the company’s 2015 report. This would double the amount to be procured by the kingdom’s air force, following the $3 billion deal for 22 of the same trainers in 2012. While little other information is given in the report, the deal does include associated ground equipment, and training aids for the Royal Saudi Air Force aimed at further enhancing their training capabilities. The news comes as BAE announced a sale increase of 7.6% for 2015, for a total of over $25.5 billion.

• A $3 billion Saudi Arabian aid package to allow the Lebanese Army to buy French weapons has been suspended. Saudi officials cited the lack of condemnation by Beirut over attacks on Saudi diplomatic missions in Iran for the cancelling the deal. The remainder of a further $1 billion package to help the Lebanese internal security service battle terrorism was also cancelled. The incident comes as one of a series highlighting the growing tensions between Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shi’a Iran, with Lebanese Hezbollah a key ally of Tehran. Equipment to be procured included combat and transport vehicles, attack helicopters, three small corvette warships, surveillance and communication equipment as well as the provision of training maintenance.

Europe

• A modernization of Poland’s Leopard 24A tanks will involve collaboration between Germany’s Rheinmetall Landsysteme GmbH and Poland’s state-run defense company Bumar-Labedy SA. The $144 million contract will see Rheinmetall build a prototype upgraded tank, dubbed the Leopard 2PL, and modernize a trial batch of about a dozen units. As with all ongoing Polish defense deals, the next phase will see work domesticated after a knowledge and technology transfer to Bumar-Labedy, who will take care of the modernization of the remaining tanks. At present, the Polish Army operates 128 Leopolds after a 2002 purchase from the German Bundeswehr.

• Deutz AG is to provide new engines for armored personnel carriers (APC) for the Ukranian Army. The German manufacturer signed a deal with Ukroboronprom, Ukraine’s leading defense group. The engines will replace the older Russian made ones found in the Armed Force’s BTR-4 vehicles as Kiev looks to cut procurement costs and bring equipment in line with NATO standards. The new procurement deal is believed to save Ukroboronprom $25 million, with savings to go toward developing and producing new weapons and equipment.

Asia Pacific

• Speculation surrounding Indonesia’s fighter modernization have been put to rest. Jakarta looks set to sign a contract for around a dozen Su-35s to replace its aging Northrop F-5 fighters, and supplement a fleet of 16 Sukhoi Su-27 and Su-30 fighters that form the backbone of its air force. Russian officials from the plane’s manufacturer United Aircraft Corporation refused to comment on the sale at last week’s Singapore Air Show, but it’s been reported that some of the components for the Su-35 could be made indigenously by Indonesian firms. Contracts for the deal could be ready and signed within a month’s time.

• Airbus has delivered the last of three C-295 aircraft ordered by the Philippines Air Force. Future sales to Manilla and other C-295 customers such as Vietnam and Indonesia could come in the future, alongside the smaller CN-235, for use in maritime patrol duties monitoring Chinese activity around disputed islands in the South China Sea. Sales of the C-295 have been growing steadily with operators found in most continents. The first sale of 2016 was recently announced by the company, with one C-295 to be delivered to the Mali Air Force in the second half of this year.

Today’s Video

• Actor Hugh Jackman flying a USAF F-16 at Naval Air Station Fort Worth Joint Reserve Base. Callsign Wolverine? :

Polish Leopard 2A4
(click to view full)

Germany is almost done selling off one of the world’s most impressive tank fleets, earning itself a solid market around the world in the process, and choking sales of competitive designs. In November 2013, Poland announced that it would buy a 2nd batch of Leopard 2 tanks from Germany, along with assorted other equipment. As usual, the package price was incredibly cheap: just EUR 180 million for 119 more tanks, plus range training fittings, machine guns, radios; and assorted armored tractors, cars, and trucks. Poland’s next question is what to do with the new gear…

Poland’s Leopard Cavalry Leopard 2A5
(click to view full)

Poland’s original set of 128 Leopard 2A4 tanks were bought and transferred in the mid-2000s. They need a full overhaul, and modernization would be an excellent idea. The new Leopards include another 14 2A4s, plus 105 of the more advanced Leopard 2A5s. This will form the high-end core of Poland’s armored brigades, with capabilities and survivability far ahead of its T-72 and PT-91 Twardy (locally designed upgrade beyond T-72M1) tanks.

The Polish Army needs commonality within its Leopard fleet at some point. Meanwhile, Polish industry is unhappy because the new acquisitions will replace the mothballed T-72 fleet with a German design, rather than having the MON fund a new Polish design by 2016. The logical solution is to involve Polish industry in a common upgrade effort that will begin by bringing the existing fleet to a more advanced Leopard 2PL standard, then follow by upgrading the newer Leopard 2A5s to create a common Polish standard.

Rumors have Poland looking for a final configuration that’s similar to Canada’s new Leopard 2A6Ms. That would reshape and strengthen the armor structure to 2A5 levels and beyond, upgrade the sights and communications, beef up the internal climate control to handle hot environments like Afghanistan, add extra mine blast protection underneath, and provide points to fit engineering utilities like dozer blades and mine clearance rollers.

A parallel track is working to make Poland self-sufficient in producing the 2 key ammunition types for its tank fleet: 120mm High Explosive shells for general use, and tungsten Armor Piercing Fin-stabilized Discarding Sabot shells for killing other tanks. Mesko S.A., which is being folded into Poland’s PGZ, has now received contracts for both types, and industrial investment is underway.

Contracts & Key Events Polish Leo-2A4s

February 22/16: A modernization of Poland’s Leopard 24A tanks will involve collaboration between Germany’s Rheinmetall Landsysteme GmbH and Poland’s state-run defense company Bumar-Labedy SA. The $144 million contract will see Rheinmetall build a prototype upgraded tank, dubbed the Leopard 2PL, and modernize a trial batch of about a dozen units. As with all ongoing Polish defense deals, the next phase will see work domesticated after a knowledge and technology transfer to Bumar-Labedy, who will take care of the modernization of the remaining tanks. At present, the Polish Army operates 128 Leopolds after a 2002 purchase from the German Bundeswehr.

October 6/15: Poland’s Armament Inspectorate has reportedly received three offers to upgrade the country’s Leopard 2A4 main battle tanks. Turkey’s Aselsan and Germany’s Rheinmetall and Krauss-Maffei Wegmann are the three bidders, with a selection slated for later this month. The country has bought two batches of Leopard 2A4s from Germany, with the Polish Army also operating around a hundred more modern 2A5 variants. In total 142 MBTs will be modernized, with a prototype scheduled for production next year. The new design will be known as the Leopard 2PL, with the winning bidder set to collaborate with the Polish Armaments Group to complete the modernization program.

Nov 13/14: Ammo. The Ministry of National Defence’s Armaments Inspectorate signs a PLN 240 million ($71 million) multi-year contract for tank shells with Mesko S.A. at Lucznik Arms Factory in Radom. This is the companion buy to the Sept 27/14 contract, designed to make Poland self-sufficient in tank-killing APFSDS-T 120mm shells as well as high-explosive ammunition. The new shells will supplement, and eventually replace, German DM33A2 tungsten armor-piercing fin-stabilized discarding sabot shells.

Supplying 13,000 APFSDS-T shells from 2015 – 2017 is only part of the bigger industrial picture. The consolidation of Mesko and other firms into PGZ (Polish Armaments Group/ Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa in Polish) is still on, and modernizing the Lucznik factory is part of that. Polish authorities will invest about PLN 45 million ($13 million) in new tooling and technology lines, as part of Poland’s efforts to ensure “independence for the Polish arms industry in this segment of military production.”

Poland is taking significant steps toward a defensive posture that is part of NATO, but senior officials doubt that NATO would actually help. As such, they’re trying to rely on that help as little as possible. They aren’t withdrawing from NATO by any means, and are pursuing closer cooperation and training with the German Army that could extend to joint commands – but they’re also quietly reviving the Home Army by recruiting at shooting clubs, etc. Sources: Dziennik Zbrojny, “Polish combat ammunition for Polish Leopard 2 tanks” | Aviation Week Ares, “Poland and Germany Deepen Army Cooperation” | The XX Committee, “Poland Prepares for Russian Invasion”.

120mm APFSDS-T ammo & Poland’s posture

Oct 20/14: 2A5s. Leopard 2A5 tanks continue to arrive from Germany (q.v. Nov 23/13) by rail, to join the 34th Armoured Cavalry Brigade. They’re received by German contractors, who work beside the Polish Army on inspection and maintenance to certify their condition.

Of course, an order like this requires more than just tanks. Technical support vehicles and trucks, specialized technical equipment, AGDUS laser shooting simulators etc. also need to arrive. But the process is underway. Sources: Defence24, “Poland Receives More Leopard 2A5 Tanks”.

Sept 27/14: Ammo. The Ministry of National Defence’s Armaments Inspectorate finalizes a PLN 114.4 million ($34.8 million) contract with Mesko S.A. for 14,000 120mm high-explosive tank shells, to be delivered as a multi-year deal over 2014-2017 (q.v. January 2013). Negotiations were sole-source in order to maintain the same set of ammunition for training and supply/ support chain purposes, and to maintain Poland’s industrial base in this area. In addition:

“The administrator indicates lack of possibility of introducing another set of ballistic data regarding the new round into the fire control system of the Leopard 2A4 tanks. The fire control system of the Polish Leopards 2A4 has an option of introducing only one more type of ammo, but this slot is reserved for the new 120×570 mm round with a sabot projectile.”

Poland currently uses German DM33 aluminum/tungsten sabot shells, but they don’t have the same effectiveness against explosive reactive armors as the most modern AFPSDS ammunition. Sources: Defence24, “Polish Army Acquires New Ammo for the Leopard Tanks”.

120mm HE ammo

Sept 2/14: 2PL etc. Poland is backing off of its planned Leopard 2PL upgrade, until the major industry consolidation takes place into PGZ (Polish Armaments Group/ Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa in Polish). This will allow the MON to allocate this work directly rather than relying on chosen team-ups (q.v. Dec 10/13), but it also takes away a lot of the competitive incentive. What it will not change, is the need to find a partner from Germany or Turkey with the requisite know-how. An opportunity for KMW, and for Poland’s GAIN SA? We’ll see.

The initial 2012 plan involved prototype rollout in 2014-2015, with full modernization of Poland’s original Leopard 2A4 fleet taking place from 2015-2018. Unfortunately, waiting for PGZ will destroy that timeline.

Poland will also need to address the issue of armored vehicles to accompany 34 Brigade’s Leopard 2A5 tanks. 10 Armoured Brigade currently uses M113 tracked APCs and derivative M577 command vehicles alongside its Leopard 2A4s, but Poland doesn’t have uncommitted surplus armored vehicles to stand up the 2nd Leopard tank brigade. There are rumors that Poland is negotiating a transfer of mothballed M113s and M577s from the USA in order to fill this gap. That will bring the issue of a 2nd modernization to the fore, of course, in order to ensure that the new armored vehicles can all work together. Sources: DziennikZbrojny.pl, “Przetarg na modernizacje Leopardow z problemami”.

Dec 10/13: 2PL upgrade. Poland’s MON receives 3 responses to their modernization RFP. The teams are:

• Wojskowe Zaklady Motoryzacyjne S.A., Wojskowymi Zakladami Lacznosci, and Rheinmetall Landsysteme GmbH
  
• Bumar-Labedy, OBRUM Gliwice, and PHO
  
• PCO SA and Turkey’s Aselsan Elektronik

Sources: DziennikZbrojny.pl, “Przetarg na modernizacje Leopardow z problemami”.

Nov 23/13: More Leopards. Poland orders their 2nd batch of Leopard 2 tanks from Germany, along with assorted other equipment: range training fittings, machine guns, radios; and assorted armored tractors, cars, and trucks.

As usual, the package price was incredibly cheap: just EUR 180 million for 119 more tanks (14 2A4s + 105 2A5s), plus all of the extras.

119 Leopard 2s: 14 L2A4, 105 L2A5

Oct 30/13: 2PL upgrade. Poland releases an RFP for modernization of its existing Leopard tank fleet to the 2PL standard. Upgrades will include modifications including armor improvements, a suspension upgrade, and modernized sighting and fire control. It’s issued per Decision No 118 of the Minister of National Defence, bypassing the Public Procurement Law in the interests of national security. This allows Poland to issue the RFP to domestic firms only, despite EU regulations. The deadline is Dec 10/13. Sources: Dziennik Zbrojny, “Przetarg na modernizacje Leopardow z problemami”.

January 2013: Ammo. A contract is signed with the Mesko Works to equip Poland’s Leopard tanks with 3,300 more 120mm high explosive shells: 1,500 in FY 2013, and 1,800 in FY 2014. The contract could grow to 14,000 shells, over a period lasting until 2017. Sources: Defence24, “14 thousand shells for Polish Leopards”.

Additional Readings

Readers with corrections, comments, or information to contribute are encouraged to contact DID’s Founding Editor, Joe Katzman. We understand the industry – you will only be publicly recognized if you tell us that it’s OK to do so.

DID would like to thank our friends at DziennikZbrojny.pl for their assistance with ongoing developments.

• The Armor Site – Kampfpanzer Leopard 2. The best public information anywhere, all variants.

• Army Technology – PT-91 Twardy Main Battle Tank, Poland.

• DID – Poland’s Balancing Act: A Briefing for the Defense Sector – Part 1. Guest article from Avascent Consulting explains the PGZ consolidation among other issues. Part 2 link at the end.

• DID (Sept 9/14) – Polish Defence Modernization: Between strategic intent and spending reality. Dominik Kimla looks at a different aspect: asks if the TMP’s full $44 billion in funding will really be there, and what that might mean.

• DID (Sept 4/14) – Queen of Battles: Poland’s New Artillery Programs (2014 snapshot). Includes new self-propelled howitzers for use with heavy armored formations.

News & Views

• The XX Committee (Oct 30/14) – Poland Prepares for Russian Invasion.

• Dziennik Zbrojny (Sept 4/14) – Przetarg na modernizacje Leopardow z problemami.

• German Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (Nov 22/13) – Deutschland und Polen unterzeichnen Vertrag zum Kauf von Leopard Kampfpanzern.

• Polish MON (Nov 22/13) – Kolejne Leopardy dla wojsk ladowych.

• Defence24 (Sept 22/13) – Polska kupuje Leopardy. Early report of the deal, numbers are very close but not exact. Also points out Polish industrial grumbles.

• Altair (Sept 6/12) – e-RAPORT MSPO 4/2012 – Ku spolonizowanemu Leopardowi 2PL. Germany’s KMW signed an agreement with Bumar Group re: modernization of Poland’s Leopard 2A4s.

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